Multiple Actors, Conflicting Roles and Perverse Incentives: The Case of Poor Operation and Maintenance of Coastal Polders in Bangladesh

Photo: David Brazie

r/IW

MI

Photo :Tom

van Caken

berghe

/IWMI

Photo: Tom

van Caken

berghe

/IWMI

www.iwmi.org Water for a food-secure world

Farhat Naz, PhD (ICRAF-‐HaNoi) Marie-‐Charlo9e Buisson, PhD (IWMI-‐Delhi)

Mul?ple Actors, Conflic?ng Roles and Perverse Incen?ves: The Case of Poor Opera?on and

Maintenance of Coastal Polders in Bangladesh

Interna'onal Conference on Revitalising the Ganges Coastal Zone Dhaka, Bangladesh

22-‐10-‐2014


STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION Ø Background of the Study: A Global Literature Review

Ø Objectives of the Study: Operation has short term effects and involves daily acts in our study context; Maintenance is less immediate and induced effects will only be seen in the medium or long term

Ø Methodology

Ø Multiple Actor Framework: Water Management of Bangladesh

Ø  Actors in Operations: Decentralization and Informal management

Ø  Actors Involvement in Maintenance of Polders

Ø Policy Recommendations

Ø Conclusion


BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY Ø  In Bangladesh coastal areas, inundation, salinity intrusion

and severe flooding are frequent occurrences.

Ø  To overcome this, Bangladesh government has invested progressively in coastal zone management through construction and rehabilitation of polders.

Ø  The former government of East Pakistan invested in large scale coastal embankment projects in the 1960s and 1970s through WAPDA (Water and Power Development Board), which is now BWDB (Bangladesh Water Development Board).

Ø Similarly in late 1990s and early 2000s, LGED (Local Government Engineering Department) of Bangladesh also got involved in water management through sub-projects.


Background of the study contd.

Ø Benefit of polders were short lived: The physical structures delinked the wetlands from the rivers, caused drainage problems and water logging.

Ø Deterioration of the polders, required continuous round of rehabilitation.

Ø  Large-scale public irrigation systems are often characterized by chronic underinvestment in maintenance, rapid deterioration, unreliable and inequitable water service and reduction in service area (Araral, 2005).

Ø Globally large irrigation bureaucracies tend to be biased towards construction, dependent upon foreign loans, and advocate the farmer participation with patronage (Vermillion, 2002).


Background of the study contd.

Ø  In the 1980s, the global policy emphasis in irrigation development shifted from a focus on infrastructure construction towards Operation and Maintenance (O&M).

Ø  This shift concurred with a decline in the international prices of major irrigated crops and an increase in construction costs (Turral, 1995).

Ø  International donors consider deferred maintenance as the core problem in government managed irrigation systems worldwide (Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012).

Ø Public projects are conceived as rational, well-structured and politically neutral, but this is far from reality (Mehta et al, 2001).


OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

Ø  To understand what determines poor state of affairs of the polders.

Ø  To study the various strategies adopted by the different actors towards the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of the polders.


Ø Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted: § Qualitative data collection: 92 Key Informant

Interviews (KIIs), 57 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

§ 9 study sites in the coastal zone of Bangladesh

§ 5 Large polders built by BWDB (Polder 31, 3, 43/2F, 30, 24-G)

§ 4 Sub-projects (less than 1000 hectares) (Latabunia, Jainkathi, Bagachra-Badurgacha, Jabusa)

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH


AREA OF STUDY


MULTIPLE ACTORS FRAMEWORK: WATER MANAGEMENT OF BANGLADESH

Ø Decentralization and Formalization of Water Management: §  Started in 1999 with the Bangladesh National Water

Policy (NWP), and operationalized in 2001 with the Guidelines for Participatory Water Management (GPWM).

§  Despite NWP’s focus on citizen power, the steps outlined in GPWM focussed more on consultation over project design without a clear mechanism to ensure that the stakeholders held any decision-making power.

§  The guidelines opened participation to a large range of actors but also created confusion on the respective roles of each these actors.


Multiple Actors Framework: Water Management of Bangladesh Contd.

Ø Defining the Actors--Top-Down Scale: Formalization and Power §  BWDB is the oldest and most key formal actor in water management.

It is predominately an engineering, construction-oriented agency.

§  BWDB has responsibility of executing flood control, drainage and irrigation projects, through major investments in the water sector supported by the Ministry of Water Resources and by international donors.

§  As per the NWP, BWDB is responsible for water management in polders larger than 1000 hectares. It has implemented the Integrated Planning for Sustainable Water Management.

§  LGED entered into the water management arena in the 1980s.

§  LGED formalized its role in the water sector through the Small-Scale Water Resources Development Sector Project.



§  LGED lies heavily on local stakeholders’ initiative and on communities to identify interventions and ratify engineering design.

§  UP (Union Parishad) is the elected grassroots local government institution; and it stands at an intermediate level between the government and the communities.

§  Their main involvement in water management is through the social safety nets which provide funds and labour to undertake infrastructure rehabilitation (roads, embankments and canals).

§  WMOs (Water Management Organizations) provide the institutional framework to local stakeholders for formally participating in water management.

§  At the community level, WMOs should ideally comprise of Water Management Groups (WMGs) in areas of more than 1000 hectares and those managed by the BWDB; and Water Management Cooperative Associations (WMCAs) for areas with less than 1000 hectares under LGED management.



Ø Informal Actors: §  Individuals or groups are also involved in water

management in Bangladesh.

§  The gate committees.

§  Gher committees or beel committees.

§  Typically it is common to find these informal individuals/ groups, associated with a formal roles.


ACTORS IN OPERATION: DECENTRALIZATION AND INFORMAL MANAGEMENT

Ø  Centralized and Formal Operations-The Former Khalashi System: §  BWDB employed government-funded gatemen called khalashis to operate gates but this systems has been abolished now.

Ø  Formal Water Management Groups-The principal actor in operation: WMOs are responsible for the operation of the gates, eg. Polder 43-2F.

§  In sub-projects, WMCA has been opening and closing the gates, eg. Polder Bagachra-Badurghacha.


Actors in Operation: Decentralization and Informal Management Contd.

Ø Responsibility of Operations Delegated to Gate Committees: §  WMOs have to supervise water management for several

villages, hence delegate their roles to gate committees, eg. Polder 43-2F.

§  WMCA also delegate their responsibility to gate committees, eg. Jabusha sub-project.

Ø  Informal Operations and Elite Capture:

§  Informal operations take place and elite capture is prevalent in most of the polders, eg. Polder 30, 3.


Actors in Operation: Decentralization and Informal Management Contd.

Ø  From Collective to Private Operations: §  Private gates are neither operated by the gate committees nor by the

WMGs, they are operated privately by individual gher owners, eg. Latabunia and Polder 31.

Ø  Union Parishad in Operation: §  In the absence of any formal and functional WMOs, the UP become

an important substitute in operating the gates, not as an organization but through their chairman or members, eg Polder 30.

Ø  Gaps and overlaps in operation: §  Institutional arrangements of water management varies across and

within polders about who opens the gates and makes decisions.

§  In all locations, (BWDB or LGED sub-projects) the informal actors (e.g. elites) tend to dominate the operation of the sluice gates.


ACTORS INVOLVEMENT IN MAINTENANCE OF POLDERS Ø Breach at the Central Level: Deferred Major Maintenance

§  BWDB owns the infrastructure, but due to funding constraints they are not very effective in providing maintenance.

§  WMCA takes responsibility of minor and emergency repair, while major responsibility lies with the LGED.

Ø Water Management Groups: Deferred Minor Maintenance §  WMGs do not have the capacity to address significant damage, but

still finance some minor repairs.

Ø  Informal and Local Level Involvement-Safety Net for Essential Maintenance: §  Gher owners and local communities are also involved in the repair

of gates and minor maintenance done by beel committee, eg. Bagachra-Badurgacha sub-project.


Actors Involvement in Maintenance of Polders Contd.

Ø Union Parishad: The Constrained and Substitute Actor §  Gradually responsibility has shifted to the UP for minor

repair and on emergency basis.

§  UP executes repair work and re-excavation through mobilising people and through targeting social safety nets towards water infrastructure, for eg. Polder 43/2F, Polder 30.

§  Due to financial and institutional constraints, the role of UP in water infrastructure maintenance remains limited.


POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS •  Policy in terms of water management has to be revised and

clarified.

•  Rethinking the water management policy may go through redefining the stakeholders.

•  Role of each actor should be clearly defined in terms of operation and maintenance (O&M).

•  All actors involved in O&M should have access to an arena for discussing and coordinating actions.

•  UP closet to rural people, can offer realistic possibilities to play a vital role.


CONCLUSION Ø Water management in the coastal zone of Bangladesh is

much more tricky than the procedures and roles defined by the policy.

Ø Multiplicity of actors on the scene of operations produces overlaps and conflicts, which benefit private interest.

Ø Gaps and deferred maintenance arise from the multiplicity of actors, which leads to disrepair and degradation of infrastructure, weakening sustainability of the coastal zone livelihoods.

Ø Policy has created confusion on the respective role of each actor and has not taken into account the social, institutional and power structure of Bangladesh.


THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

This analysis is based on data collected for the project “G3: Water Governance and Community Based Management in Coastal Areas of Bangladesh” led and funded by Challenge Program on Water and Food (CPWF)-CGIAR.

Government & Nonprofit

Multiple Actors, Conflicting Roles and Perverse Incentives: The Case of Poor Operation and Maintenance of Coastal Polders in Bangladesh