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Empowering Civil Society initiative by PRIA This version of the paper has been written under the three-year project Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution in Europe and India (http://www.projectcore.eu/), which concluded in December 2013, funded by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme.
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1
Implementation of governance initiatives in conflict settings in
India1
Sumona DasGupta, Rajesh Tandon, Amit Prakash2
Introduction:
Conflicts in India, as elsewhere in the world, are present in different regions and locales.
Some of these conflicts have been alive in some form or another since Indian
independence in 1947 and have manifested violence with varying intensities either
continuously or intermittently. Post colonial India’s democratic state has attempted to
deal with these conflicts in several ways, with different types of outcomes. In analyzing
the responses to conflicts the framework of governance has been applied with the
understanding that while any form of intervention can sometimes ameliorate, manage, or
resolve conflicts, it can also fuel them further or generate new ones. Sometimes the
processes occur simultaneously as every governance intervention unleashes a set of
intended and unintended consequences that impacts multiple actors at different levels.
The relationship between governance and conflict in the Indian context can be seen to
be two-way. An intervention can change the context and the dynamics of the conflict or
impact the drivers of the conflict. At the same time the changing trajectory of the conflict
can itself limit or alter the nature of intervention whether by government, the market or
other societal actors acting on their own or in some combination thereof.
India’s restive borderlands along the Northeast, the former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir bordering Pakistan, as well as the central Indian states of Jharkhand and Bihar
have all been sites of violent conflict at different times following independence in 1947.
The contexts are of course very different.
1 This version of the paper has been written under the three-year project Cultures of Governance and
Conflict Resolution in Europe and India (http://www.projectcore.eu/), which concluded in December 2013, funded by the European Union under the 7
th Framework Programme.
2 Sumona Dasgupta was the lead researcher on the project at Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), New
Delhi; Rajesh Tandon is President, PRIA, New Delhi; Amit Prakash is Professor at the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
2
The Northeast3 has been at the vortex of a cycle of violence characterized by
insurgencies with demands ranging from outright sovereignty to greater political
autonomy. Jammu and Kashmir has been the site of competing nationalisms overlaid by
clashing sub regional aspirations since 1947 with demands for the right of self
determination from the Kashmir valley taking the form of an armed insurgency from
1989. In both the ecologically fragile tribal dominated state of Jharkhand and social
cleavages ridden state of Bihar, resource politics linked closely with the rights of and
justice for the marginalized communities has engendered a conflict that is variously
termed as left wing extremism, Maoism or Naxalism.4
Despite these contextual differences and the fact that the drivers of the conflict are
different in each of these cases (and for each of the conflicts within the Northeast itself)
they are all located within the overall democratic institutional arrangements of the Indian
state. In governing these areas the Indian state implicitly or explicitly also ‘governs the
conflicts’ unleashing a set of intended and unintended consequences into the conflict
dynamics every time it makes an active intervention. These interventions range on the
spectrum from persuasive to coercive and include for instance special economic
packages, autonomy arrangements, as well as special legislations that place severe
restrictions on people’s democratic rights in order to facilitate counter insurgency
operations.
We begin this paper by clarifying how we use the term governance given the changing
discourses and explosion of literature on this subject and move on to exploring the
implementation of governing measures in addressing endemic militarized conflicts in
India. We identify and analyze four important thematic rubrics, around which, we submit,
3 The term Northeast is commonly used in India to designate the seven “sister” states of Assam,
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura – since 2003 Sikkim has also been included in the regional north eastern council. It is connected to the rest of India by a sliver of land called the chicken’s neck which is 33 kms wide on the eastern side and 21 kms wide on the western side- this constitutes only one per cent of the boundary – the remaining boundaries are international ones – with China, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. 4 In common Indian parlance the term Naxalism and Naxals are used to denote the Maoist
ideology and ideologues respectively. These are derived from a place called Naxalbari in West Bengal where the Maoist movement first took off in the 1960s. The Planning commission of India prefers to use the term left wing extremism to describe this movement that has swept through tribal dominated parts of central, east and even south India across a belt that is often described as the “red corridor.”
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governance and instruments of governmentality coalesce in these conflict spots -
namely, electoral democracy, security, ‘developmentalism’ and peace accords. We
discuss the governance measures in each of these thematic clusters in terms of their
viability, accountability, legitimacy and efficiency and in that context reflect on the nature
of sustainable peacebuilding in India.
Changing discourses on Governance and India’s Experiences
As Frederickson (2004: 6) indicates, the term governance has dozens of meanings and
is presently a power word, a dominant descriptor. Because it has a strong intuitive
appeal and is used to characterize both global and local arrangements, formal and
informal norms it is not always used with precision. Invariably when authors use the
word governance “ it may be unclear whether the reference is to organizational structure,
administrative processes, managerial judgment, systems of incentives and rules,
administrative philosophies, or a combination of these elements” (Lynn, Heinrich and Hill
2000: 1). While a discourse analysis of governance and its changing trajectory is outside
the purview of this paper what is relevant for us is to note those salient features of its
usage that would enable us to understand not just how structures and functions of
government operate in conflict areas but how governments actually “do their job” there.
We begin by noting with Bevir (2009: 3) that the language of governance has
increasingly become implicated in discussions of changes in the nature and role of the
state particularly after the public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s which resulted in
a greater shift towards markets, quasi markets and networks especially in the delivery of
public services. This led to a widespread belief that the state increasingly depends on
other organizations to deliver its policies and consequently forms of power and authority
can supplement state action or secure order even in the absence of state activity. In fact
some theories of governance suggest that the notion of a monolithic state in control of
itself and civil society has always been a myth (Ibid: 4). Articulating this even before the
reforms of the 1980s and indicating that the difference between private and public
organizations were increasingly going to become blurred Cleveland (1972: 13) had
predicted: “The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids
with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems—interlaced webs of tension
in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural. “Decision-
4
making” will become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral brokerage both
inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at
least announcing, the decision.”
In India writing in the post liberalization era, Tandon (2002) had defined governance as
“the joint responsibility of the state, market and citizens to mobilize public resources and
promote public decision-making towards the advancement of common public good.”
Clearly the nature of what constitutes public good will remain contested – some would
argue too contested to make this the centerpiece of a working definition - but what is
significant in this definition is the acknowledgement of the presence of multiple
stakeholders in determining what this might be. This implies as Debroy (2004) points out
that “governance is distinct from government, and is the process through which various
stakeholders articulate their interests, exercise their rights, and mediate their
differences.”
In practice therefore the “state always has to negotiate with others, policy always arises
from interactions within networks, the boundaries between the state and civil society are
always blurred, and transnational links and flows always disrupt national borders” (Bevir
2009: 30).Understood in this way, governance leads to what Prakash (2012) describes
as a pluralization of actors as well as levels of governance and makes the political
process within which social power is constituted central to any analysis of governance. It
also draws attention to the process in which actors and institutions both state and non-
state play a role in governance.
This pluralization and the tensions arising from this are evident not just in “mainstream”
India but also in conflict spots that are sometimes described, using Agamben’s words, as
India’s “areas of exception.” Governance from the top may appear to be stamped across
conflict spots if one surveys the plethora of government schemes, government jobs,
central legislations, special legislations and there is no doubt that the writ of the central
government is prominently etched through economic and security governance
mechanisms. However it exists side by side with what can be described broadly as
autonomy arrangements. Paradoxically these autonomy arrangements – notions of
federalism, devolution of power, minority protection, rights of indigenous people and
legal pluralism - were typically seen as exceptional measures bestowed by the central
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government to make democracy palatable in these “trouble” spots (Samaddar 2005).
Once brought into existence however they acquire a momentum and direction of their
own and are not always amenable to top down manipulation simply by dint of having
been mooted, legalized and validated by the government at the top.
As noted above, the market and the private sector have emerged as important players in
the process of governance since service delivery is no longer seen as the task of the
government alone. This is particularly significant in India’s conflict spots. Whether it is
Jharkhand or the Northeast or Jammu and Kashmir marketization has been seen as a
natural part of liberal governance and virtually as a panacea to violent conflict
particularly since the 1990s. As Samaddar (2012) points out this has been the
mechanism for establishing ‘social governance’ or ‘governance of peace’ with former
insurgents, resisters and opponents all acquiring a stake in the growth of capitalism. As
money became available, the trading class emerged, society became market oriented,
the salaried class increased, insurgency at least in its older incarnation crumbled. While
this may well have been the story of capitalism everywhere in the Northeast and other
conflict areas it has left a significant impact on old patterns of conflict and insurgencies.
There is also a space that is occupied by elements outside of both government and
market. The top down government power is also challenged by what Partha Chatterjee
(2004) calls “politics of the governed” who form part of “political society.” They are
distinguished from civil society in Chatterjee’s formulation by the fact that they often act
outside the purview of the law. Such politics cannot be disciplined by governmentality
and in spite of the overwhelming nature of governmental power it can break free and
claim autonomy of its own. The actions of political society even when they are not strictly
speaking legal has to be accommodated because of a moral claim to justice for the
marginalized which no democratic government can ignore. Though Chatterjee was not
writing with specific reference to India’s conflict zones his argument has a special
resonance there because of forced migration due to conflict. It is in evidence for instance
in “camps” in and around Jammu where the conflict displaced population who have not
been provided government accommodation have built dwellings on empty lands. The
government does not have the moral right to evacuate them as they are in no position to
go back due to the sporadic violence in their villages yet by the tenets of law the
6
occupation of land is illegal. In such cases the government “governs” by “not governing”
– it simply looks the other way.
The space for organized civil movements may be restricted in the conflict spots due to
special legislations that can curb the fundamental rights guaranteed otherwise to Indian
citizens under Chapter 3 of the constitution but that has not always been able to stop
street protests, and dharnas. From the “naked protest” in Manipur in northeast India
where women disrobed outside the historic Kangla fort in July 2004 to protest against
the rape and killing of a woman, Manorama, allegedly by Assam Rifles personnel, to the
stone pelting youth in Kashmir valley in 2010 protesting against arbitrary killing and
detentions, to the silent protest of the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons
(APDP) in Srinagar’s Pratap Park every year, to the people’s agitation that forced the
Koel-Karo hydro Electric project to close in Jharkhand, a tableau of resistance has been
scripted in a variety of ways across these conflict sites in India. Some have been non
violent others have been marked by degrees of violence. The legal monopoly over
instruments of coercion in the hands of the state has not always been able to stop these
from playing themselves out.
India’s conflict spots have witnessed both centralizing and decentralizing forces of
governance, and multiple actors and processes have come into play. By the 1990s
several changes were already taking place in the larger Indian polity from which the
“areas of exception” could not be completely buffered. First India was beginning to
experiment with a new constitutional system of Panchayati Raj (1992) that created for
the first time in Indian history a constitutionally recognized institutional mechanism called
Gram Sabha (the village council). The downward accountability of democratically elected
representatives to the collectives of citizens was being asked for the first time. Second
several social movements and citizen protests had begun to question the “unilateral
decisions of the government at the district, state and national levels.” Civil society voices
had gained voice and visibility. The growth of the independent media, especially the TV
had enabled this dynamic. Third the popular participation of hitherto excluded
communities - tribals, scheduled castes and women - had become more assertive and
vocal. Supported by several long term efforts at conscientization and mobilization by
some political parties, trade unions and civil society groups, this rise in popular
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participation was an expression of the need to alter the state-society relations from its
historical traditions.
Recognizing the dual pull between centralizing and decentralizing forces and between
persuasive and coercive mechanics Samaddar (2012) has summarized the cardinal
principles of governing post colonial conflicts in India. First, sovereignty could never be
shared and the state had to be seen as strong by formulating police and administrative
measures though a balance had to be worked out between suppressive and civilian
measures. Second, till this balance was found conflicts would be allowed to linger and in
the meantime limited grant of autonomy was the best solution. Third, borrowing a page
out of the colonial book of statecraft, struggles of justice were to be treated as inter
group conflict for parity. The ultimate question was one of ratio- how much to govern the
conflict spots and how much “not to govern.”
Using Samaddar’s principles as a starting point, we submit that post independence India
has utilized four dominant strategies to respond to conflicts within its national boundaries
– the electoral democratic framework, governance through special security legislations
and counterinsurgency strategies, using development as a vehicle for peace and finally
dialogue and peace accords with different groups in the conflict spots.
First India adopted an electoral democracy framework of national and provincial political
authority that later moved to local levels through a constitutional amendments in the
1990s. Elections are assumed to mediate between conflicting interests and the politics of
negotiated settlements emerges in the electoral process. However for this approach of
governance to succeed the election process has to be fair and free and constitutional
mandate for each tier of governance has to be respected. Moreover if the legitimacy of
the election process itself is questioned at a substantive level, regardless of whether it is
procedurally fair and free, the population can face increased risk of violence. The threat
of violence can be from non state actors including militants who oppose the elections in
principle as well as from coercive instruments of the state which is bent on going through
with the process. Elections are therefore a double edged sword in areas of conflict –
they are an essential feature of representative democracy and the primary mechanism
for establishing systemic legitimacy but the same instrument can also produce conflict
and violence.
8
The second strategy is coercive and is undertaken to protect the “security” and “territorial
integrity” of India from those internal forces who seek to challenge its sovereignty. It
involves counterinsurgency operations by the Indian Army and other paramilitary forces
against militant groups and those who had adopted the path of armed movements
supported by “special laws.” This is a classic law and order approach and came with the
caveat that negotiations were possible only if armed resistance against the Indian state
was abandoned. This strategy has been adopted in all the conflict areas- in Jammu and
Kashmir, the Northeast and Jharkhand. Given the axiom that counterinsurgency is also
about winning the hearts and minds of the people the Indian army has also engaged
publicly with humanitarian and civic action work both in the northeast and in Jammu and
Kashmir to change the public perception among an alienated population that it is an
army of occupation.
The third governance strategy is peace through development where an attempt is made
to promote public infrastructure, services and jobs in the conflict spots so that former
(and new potential) militants have alternative avenues for gainful work. Special
economic packages and incentivizing the private sector in conflict areas has been the
path that has been followed to implement this strategy. Again this has had two sides-
while it has changed the conflict dynamics in some cases by making the market more
attractive for some conflict actors it has also created a political economy of violence
where new ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ acquire a vested interest in keeping the violent
conflict alive.
Finally the fourth governance strategy has involved a mix of negotiation, mediation and
dialogue that has sometimes culminated in the signing of official “peace accords.” In
many ways this can be seen as the other side of counterinsurgency operations designed
to “soften” up opponents before bringing them to the table for talks. While this has been
a strategy in all the conflict spots the northeast stands out as a veritable laboratory of
peace accords highlighting both the opportunities and challenges it presents. Again this
strategy has intended and unintended consequences that can both mitigate direct
violence on one hand and exacerbate new conflicts on the other as groups excluded
from the peace talks and the accords then enter the conflict arena more prominently.
9
Before we examine how these strategies of governance are implemented in the conflict
spots we briefly overview each of conflicts since their contextual differences will
determine the nature and process of implementation.
India’s Conflict Spots:
India’s Northeast is typically studied as a theater of insurgency and counterinsurgency
as it has been the site of the longest standing insurgency movement that has come out
of the Naga Hills from the time of Indian independence in 1947. Following the creation of
Nagaland in 1963, there has been considerable redrawing of internal boundaries and
creation of new states in this region between 1971 and 1987. The region is
characterized by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.5 British
colonial rulers may have annexed the region over almost a century but exercised control
over the hills primarily as a loosely administered “frontier” area. This historical legacy
spilled over into post-independence with the Nagas6 petitioning the British government
for independence in 1947 on the grounds that no Indian power had ever conquered
them. The British did not see this as feasible and the Indian leadership refused to
entertain this idea. Following this, a Naga insurgent movement commenced in 1952.
Another major rebellion - the Mizo rebellion took off in 1966. Multiple conflicts broke out
from the 1970s and today every one of the states except Sikkim is affected by some
form of insurgent violence. While several of the rebel groups including the United
Liberation Front Assam (ULFA), questioning Assam’s inclusion into the Indian Union and
the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur, questioning the merger
agreement that the king of Manipur signed with the government of India, have trained
their guns on the Indian state, it is also important to note that there are several
intergroup and intra group violent conflicts in the region as well, based on rival
“homeland” demands. These include for instance the Bodos and Non Bodos, the Karbi
5 About 30% of the population in this region belong to tribal communities mostly concentrated in
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. There are more than 160 scheduled tribes but a large non tribal population is concentrated in Assam, Manipur and Tripura as well. An estimated 220 languages are spoken in the region- the largest concentration of languages in the Indian subcontinent. 6 The Nagas are a group of heterogeneous tribes belonging to Mongoloid and Indo-Burman
stock- they claim common ancestry despite having different languages and social and cultural practices- they have a fiercely independent history with each village having existed as independent sovereign republic.
10
and Dimasa in Assam, the Nagas and Kukis in the hills of Manipur, the Mizos and the
Brus/Reangs in Mizoram to mention a few. These have also sparked their own set of
conflicts and displacements. As Rajagopalan (2008: 79) observes “the multiple forms of
resistance in the exceptionally diverse ethnic landscape have produced politics and
struggles with multiple competing agendas.”
Like the Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir is also a border state with a restive population
in the valley of Kashmir many of whom remain deeply alienated from India and who
demand the right to self determination. The strategic heights of Kashmir and its location
as a gateway to Central and South Asia made it a strategic asset to both India and
Pakistan. Moreover two mutually exclusive ideologies – India’s secular and Pakistan’s
two nation one – made Jammu and Kashmir into an ideological battleground. Pakistan
felt that the Muslim majority state should rightfully fall under its jurisdiction according to
the logic of partition whereas for India the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was seen
as an acid test of its secularism. The outbreak of the armed insurgency in the Indian-
administered part of the Kashmir valley in 1989 shifted the terms of discourse from the
problem “of” Kashmir to the problem “in” Kashmir. It forced an acknowledgement of the
internal dimension of the problem in addition to the external Indo-Pak dimension (over
which four wars have been fought till date). Internally, the Indian administration felt
challenged by the widespread alienation among the population of Jammu and Kashmir.
This along with the internal-external nexus to the problem (emanating from Pakistan’s
overt and covert support for Kashmir’s armed insurgency) and the plurality of voices and
identities within Jammu and Kashmir has complicated the search for a solution that
would be perceived as just by all parties and stakeholders. Despite the fact that the
ferocity of the armed rebellion has died out the ebbs and flows of violence continue with
street protests, curfews and shootings continuing to be a part of everyday life particularly
in the valley.
The state of Jharkhand represents a different picture altogether but like the Northeast
and Kashmir has become yet another site of militarized conflict. Jharkhand was carved
out of Southern Bihar on November 15, 2000 essentially as a ‘tribal state.’ Rich in
mineral resources and with sound agricultural potential the major developmental debate
in Jharkhand at the time of its inception was anchored around whether it was the mining
potential or the agricultural potential that could be used as a natural launching pad to
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initiate a decade of development. The existence of a substantial tribal population in
Jharkhand who had not been part of the post independence mainstream development
story meant that the growth also had to be harnessed to meet the goals of poverty
alleviation and equity. Under these circumstances a violent Maoist/ Naxal movement in
India has swept through Jharkhand whose self definition is in terms of a pro poor
movement that aims at social justice for the marginalized. The Naxals run their own
parallel system of governance in areas controlled by them in Jharkhand including their
Jana Adalats (People’s courts) and People’s Police and exercise control over all matters
related to jal, joru and zameen (water, marriage and land). The military wing the
People’s Guerilla Army (PGA) conduct ‘operations’ against all perceived ‘class enemies’
including police, paramilitary forces and their informers. The state forces on the other
hand have carried out their operations in ways that have been severely criticized with
allegations of custodial deaths, false encounters and arrest of people under anti terrorist
laws.
The present contours of the State of Bihar emerged after the bifurcation of the older
State of Bihar into Bihar and Jharkhand in 2000. While complex contestation of
resources in this area no longer correlates to the tribal issues, other forms of conflict and
violence have not disappeared. While such contests in Jharkhand are primarily premised
on tribal issues, similar questions in the present-day Bihar take the form of caste-based
contestation. The two-decades of politics of recognition and representation under the
RJD-led government has altered the contours of such caste-conflict, which has since
acquired new forms. The commonality thus between Bihar and Jharkhand is a twin,
inextricably linked issues of recognition (tribe in Jharkhand while caste in Bihar) and
redistribution (in terms of ability to access, structure and control resources). Further, in
both States, these twin contests often acquire the form of politics of participation,
anchored on PRIs. This process becomes central in understanding the processes of
conflict and contestation in these two States – at once, generating avenues for
addressing some forms of conflict while exacerbating and generating other forms.
Given this backdrop we now turn to governance in the Northeast, Jharkhand and Bihar,
and Jammu and Kashmir drawing attention to how governance measures, initiatives and
schemes take on a life of their own in conflict zones altering the way we think about
electoral democracy, security, development and peace accords.
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Governing Conflicts through Electoral Democracy : Elections, representation and
Autonomous councils :
In this section we examine how conflicts are sought to be managed through electoral
democracy and its associated mechanisms and innovations including various autonomy
arrangements. It is important to note that even in the militarized pockets of conflict
within India – whether it is the north East, Bihar and Jharkhand or Jammu and Kashmir –
the formal procedural aspects of democracy officially operate. Unless the conflict area is
placed under President’s rule under article 356 of the Indian constitution which enables
the framework of the state apparatus to be temporarily suspended,7 the state legislature
continues to function, elections are held, new governments and representatives are put
in place following this. Currently in all the conflict areas, elected representatives come
from three categories as in other parts of the country namely those elected to the
central parliament (members of parliament or MPs), those elected to the state legislative
assemblies (Members of Legislative Assembly or MLAs) and finally elected
representatives to local urban and rural bodies. Many of the states under study have
their own regional parties that compete with the national parties for seats to the
legislative assembly and the central parliament.8
However elections to state legislative assembly in conflict areas, unlike their
counterparts in other states in India often come under the scanner, because they are
more likely to be susceptible to manipulation by the central regime in power. They have
in the past been used by the centre to retain control of state level politics or wrest control
using unfair means. Sometimes this has been done by openly rigging elections or by
7 Article 356 of the Indian constitution lays down that the President may assume to himself all or
any of the functions of the state in the event of the constitutional failure of the state machinery. In Jammu and Kashmir however President’s rule cannot be invoked directly and in the first instance and has to be preceded by a six month period of Governor’s rule as per the provisions of section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir constitution. The uses and abuses of article 356 is not confined to the states with active violent conflicts but this clause has been used in these areas- for instance Jharkhand has been placed under President’s rule three times, Jammu and Kashmir was under President’s rule from 1990-1996, in the north east article 356 has been used sometimes when movements turned violent – for instance in Assam in 1979 8 For instance Jharkhand has Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), All Jharkhand Students Union
(AJSU) and Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (JVM) and many more; Jammu and Kashmir have the people’s democratic party (PDP) and the National Conference
13
entering into pre poll or post alliances and deliberate power sharing arrangements to
avert an immediate crisis or by invoking article 356 to impose President’s rule.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the state of Jammu and Kashmir where rigging and
alliances have been used to leverage politics and ensure dependence on the central
government in New Delhi. In Jammu and Kashmir state level elections have been openly
rigged – something that reached in zenith in the elections of 1987 where the blatant
manipulation was arguably the final trigger for the eventual armed insurgency that broke
out in 1989. Though the state elections of 2002 and 2007 were deemed free and fair the
long history of manipulation of the elections as a governance control mechanism
remains a legacy that cannot be wiped out so quickly from public memory.
Apart from state level elections, a three tier system of rural local self governance called
Panchayati Raj Institutions (henceforth PRIs) was given a constitutional status through
the 73rd amendment Act of 1992 – it reached Jharkhand and Jammu and Kashmir in
2011 while variations of this had been operational in the Northeast from the 1950s.
While constituting these institutions of local self governance was primarily intended to
ensure decision making and participation in local development plans and issues these
have inevitably emerged as sites of contestations in about and around the larger conflict
in Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar and Jharkhand and in the Northeast.
In Jammu and Kashmir there was a clear divergence in the attitude towards the local
government elections held amidst a huge turnout of over 75% in 2011. While the local
populace wanted to clearly distinguish their participation in these elections from being
conflated with their endorsement of the stand of the Indian government on the larger
Kashmir issue, key policy makers including the Foreign Minister of India did not hesitate
to appropriate the fact of the large turn out for local elections in 2011 to assert that this
was a “referendum against Pakistan and terrorism.”9 This added to the trust deficit and
gave an impetus to the United Jihad Council (UJC) to issue threats to the newly elected
representatives. The trust deficit between the government and the people was in any
case building up in the post local election phase with the state government being unable
to deliver on their promises of devolution of functions, functionaries and funds to the
9 Cited in Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, “ MHA weighing option of Providing Arms to Panches in J and K”
http://aafayyaz.blogspot.in/2012/11/mha-weighing-option-of-providingarms-to.html
14
newly elected representatives within what the latter deemed as a reasonable frame of
time. The initial euphoria over the local elections and the goodwill generated by notifying
and constituting the local bodies at the village level soon gave way to disillusionment
and anger among the people as the dialogue gap between local newly elected
representatives on one hand and the bureaucrats and the state officials, the MLAs, the
state government increased rapidly in the months following the elections.10 Since then
the discourse has veered towards the agenda behind the elections with hitherto quiet
militant groups publicly articulating that the elections were a diversionary tactic to draw
attention away from the larger conflict. At one level the institutional and functional
challenges of the panchayat system in Jammu and Kashmir may be seen as teething
problems which were no different from the ones faced by other states in India when they
had initially embarked on this path. But as DasGupta (2013) points out the fact that
Jammu and Kashmir has been the epicentre of a violent, militarized conflict carries with
it the legacy of broken trust and thwarted promises. And squandering opportunities in
such a scenario exacerbates old wounds.
In Jharkhand the site of left wing extremism/ Naxalism, PRIs may be relatively new but
the office bearers have asserted and realized their importance not just as key players in
planning and executing the development agenda but also in seeking a role beyond
development. As a tribal dominated state some areas are governed by Panchayat
(Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) of 1996 which among other provisions
makes it mandatory to seek the approval of the village council or Gram Sabha for use of
community resources – the Gram Sabha is also to be consulted before making
acquisition of land in the scheduled areas for development projects and before resettling
of rehabilitating persons affected by such projects in the scheduled areas.11 The
enabling provisions of PESA if implemented in letter and spirit is a potential instrument of
conflict prevention in an ecologically fragile state endowed with rich mineral resources
but ironically inhabited by some of the poorest and most marginalized sections of the
Indian population. Though cases where PESA provisions have been ignored, bypassed
10
This was the central finding of the PRIA team in the fieldwork conducted in Jammu and Kashmir in 2012. 11
Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act of 1996 provides that the legislature of a state cannot make laws in that part which are inconsistent with the customary laws. Social and religious practices and traditional management of community resources – it gives a special role to the gram Sabha- the village council- to preserve the cultural identity of the community, manage natural resources and be consulted on land acquisition. For the full text of this act see http://hppanchayat.nic.in/pdf%20files/Pesa.pdf
15
and sidelined abound, the central role given to Gram Sabha in this act implies that PRIs
have by and large emerged as the site of contestations for all political actors involved; a
space where MLAs, MPs, activists, the bureaucracy, police and the Naxals all jostle to
maintain their control over the Gram Sabha. Unlike Jammu and Kashmir where the idea
of the Gram Sabha has not been operationalized (despite its statutory provision in the
Jammu and Kashmir Panchayat Act of 1989) in Jharkhand this institution has emerged
as a viable instrument of control.
The centrality of the PRIs is evident from the fact that even the Naxal leadership with an
avowed goal of setting up a parallel administration is keen to partake of it by contesting
elections to PRIs, and through this channel, enhance their legitimacy vis-a-vis the
state.12 The PRIs have emerged as central actors of dispute management even when
there is no explicit legal provision for the same. The Naxals owing to their ability to
exercise violence often play a role in ensuring the outcome of local conflicts to suit their
ends. The reservation of seats at this level for marginalized sections especially women
has fuelled the view among male members that “deserving candidates’ have been
ignored by this policy.13 Despite this view the reservation of seats has led to the inclusion
of many hitherto marginalized sections into the PRIs which bodes well for increasing
popular participation and legitimacy. The fieldwork conducted in Jharkhand suggests
that women PRIs have been extremely effective but in non tribal areas women are
relegated to the background despite the fact that reservation of seats for women apply
both in tribal and non tribal dominated areas. 14
12
Interview conducted by JNU research team with PRI representative in Lohadaga district on 12 November 2011 and state official in Chatra district on 17 November 2011. 13
Interview in Hazaribag district on 3 November 2011 and 6 November 2011; in Lohardaga district on 12 November 2011 in Ranchi district on 12 November 2011 and Chatra district Jharkhand on 17 November 2011 all in Jharkhand conducted by the JNU team. 14
While females representative from lower caste in Chatra have used funds for tomato cultivation and poultry, tribal in Kisko have taken up sewing. However, respondents in Hazaribag and Gaya were mostly represented by their male relatives. The tribal women Mukhiya (village panchayat's head) in village in Ranchi went on to warn the men to mend their ways of domestic viloence or they feel the collective wrath of the women. Interview in Hazaribag district on 3 November 2011 and 6 November 2011; in Gaya district on 8 November 2011and 10 November 2011; in Lohardaga district on 12 November 2011; in Ranchi district on 12 November 2011 and 13 November 2011; and in Chatra district on 17 November 2011.
16
While in Jammu and Kashmir PRIs are yet to emerge as a potent force and in Jharkhand
they are asserting their rights and have understood the importance of controlling the
Gram Sabha, nowhere in India have institutions of local self governance been used
more creatively to manage conflicts as in Northeast India. These are not restricted to
PRI only. They include the sixth schedule councils, village self governance in the tribal
Northeast and tribe specific councils.
The sixth schedule adopted under article 244 of the Indian constitution was essentially a
conflict resolution mechanism that sought to address the political aspirations of the
Nagas which laid down the framework of autonomous decentralized government in
certain predominantly tribal areas of undivided Assam with legislative and executive
powers over subjects like water, soil, land, local customs, and culture (though this was
rejected by the Nagas as too little and not accepted by them). The original areas under
the sixth schedule included the present States of Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram,
North Cachar and Karbi Anglong (originally known as Mikir Hills) districts of Assam. In
these areas local governance was essentially entrusted to the largely elected
autonomous District Councils. In fact the sixth Schedule councils have been given more
powers than the local bodies that were constituted after the 73rd amendment act in India.
It may not have prevented turmoil and violence in these areas but has brought a degree
of equilibrium within tribal societies particularly by bringing dispute resolution including
matters around land boundaries under customary laws. It is important to ensure that
these are duly codified (Seventh Report Second Administrative Reforms Commission
2008: 156-157).
The experiment with autonomous councils in the Northeast has however not been an
unmixed blessing. While it may have been a conflict prevention mechanism at one level
at another level it also generated a new type of conflict. This emanates from the rising
disparity between the autonomous councils and the local bodies established as a result
of the 73rd amendment which are now being liberally funded by the State Finance
Commissions. This is particularly becoming important in Northeastern states like Assam
and Tripura where the two categories of local bodies co exist. Another layer of
discontent is added with comparisons being made between the “older” councils of
Assam vis a vis the preferential treatment being given to the “new” autonomous council
17
such as the Bodoland Territorial Council in the matter of procedures relating to funds
and budget allocations (Seventh Report of the Second ARC 2008: 159).
The current arrangement of local governance designed as a conflict prevention
mechanism has however muddied the waters with regard to mandates and jurisdictions
of different local bodies. In six tribe specific councils straddling twelve districts of Assam
the three tier Panchayati Raj institutions have been established along with
corresponding village councils. The jurisdiction of such Council is often spread over
geographically ‘non-contiguous’ areas. The seventh report of the second ARC (2008:
163) appreciated the fact that compelling socio-political and administrative reasons had
weighed with the State Government in establishing these bodies. Aspirations of tribes
not dominating a geographically discrete area could perhaps be met only through
imperfect solutions like these. The arrangement however, gives cause for concern as to
its long-term viability and apprehension that this conflict resolution measure could spawn
more conflicts. The report cautions that it should be kept in mind that in areas of mixed
ethnic composition, existence of bodies with overlapping jurisdiction could exacerbate
conflicts.
By 1989, having acquired considerable experience in governing conflicts through
autonomous councils in the Northeast, the government of India yielded to the demands
of the Ladakhi Buddhist Association (LBA) in Jammu and Kashmir to set up an
autonomous Hill Council in 1989 following tripartite talks between New Delhi, Srinagar
and LBA leaders. The balance of power between the three geographical regions of the
state of Jammu and Kashmir- namely Kashmir valley which had been the epicenter of an
armed insurgency in the 1990s, Jammu and Ladakh had often led to Jammu and Ladakh
demanding better devolution of powers within the Jammu and Kashmir state and the
demand for union territory status by Ladakh was part of this process. As a result of the
1989 agreement the LBA agreed to give up its demand for union territory status.
The Act provided for an Autonomous Hill Council each for Leh and Kargil, and an inter-
district advisory council to advise them on matters of common interest. This Hill Council
was envisaged as a dynamic instrument for empowering the Ladakhi Buddhist
community especially for deciding their local development priorities (Behera 2000: 51-
52). Institutionalization of the Autonomous Hill Council has proved to be a successful
18
experiment to the extent that it has validated the principle of creating alternate and
intermediary layers of governance for meeting the political and developmental
aspirations of the people of a specific region through constitutional measures.
Establishing the Autonomous Hill Council have shown how transforming governance
mechanisms and processes can help ameliorate a conflict and bring about substantive
changes both in terms of redressing the alienation of particular communities and
changing the situation on ground as well. The Autonomous Hill Council has empowered
the local stakeholders—both Buddhist and Muslim communities—to decide their own
development priorities. It may be noted though that in the first decade of the AHC’s
working, the new governance mechanisms had failed to meet popular expectations both
because, from above, the state government was not quite willing to share powers with
the newly elected councilors of AHC and, from below, the district-level bureaucracy was
reluctant to accept the new framework of accountability that had posited the elected
councilors as their new political masters.
Side by side with the autonomous Hill Councils newly elected panchayats were
conbstituted through out the state including in Ladakh in 2011. Though it is still too early
to tell whether the kind of conflicts generated by overlapping jurisdictions in Northeast
India will be repeated in this part of Jammu and Kashmir it appears that overall, the
elected representatives both at the level of the AHC and the village councils (halqa
panchayats) in Ladakh are more focused on finding ways and means of putting Leh and
Kargil on the fast-track path of development. According to the field research conducted
by Delhi University in Leh, they appear to have realized that the real challenge lies in
ensuring that its dividends are equitably shared among all the communities at the
grassroots level.
Overall the picture that emerges is one where electoral democracy in spite of its stresses
and strains is in the process of carving out its niche at the local level in all the conflict
spots. The experiments in the northeast in particular with Hill councils and Tribal councils
have been exercises in innovation and creativity for managing conflicts – while it carries
the danger of exacerbating some forms of conflicts it has been successful in militating
and managing others. In Jammu and Kashmir while the institutions of local self
governance at the panchayats level are still embryonic and the cause of much angst at
what people perceive to be tardy delivery on tall promises, the Hill Council in Ladakh
19
appears to have found its unique position and has the potential to play a role in conflict
resolution. In Jharkhand the scramble to control the Gram Sabha or village council may
carry the germs of incipient conflict between stakeholders but is nonetheless a testimony
to the importance of this institution in making decisions around conflict issues. Conflicts
cannot be resolved for all times to come – as old ones mutate and change their forms
new animosities and faultlines appear. The institutionalization of local bodies carries the
potential of greater local ownership of the peacebuilding process in all these conflict
spots. And of course as we have seen autonomies may clash and contest – the
challenge of governance is therefore for autonomies to co-exist and for the central
government to treat them as the bedrock on which democracy is built rather than as
exceptional measures to keep unhappy and restive populations temporarily quiet.
Governing conflict through Special Security Measures:
In this section we examine how governance is implemented through special security
mechanisms in conflict spots. In the midst of high levels of militarization of state and
society the question of security becomes paramount. A plethora of governance
measures are anchored around protecting “national security” from internal security
threats in the conflict spots under scrutiny. However a key question that emerges from
the by now well known discourses and debates around national and human security
paradigms is: security for whom? What happens if the governance measures for
protecting the “territory of India” end up making the people living in those areas feeling
unsafe? What is the way out if macro security ends up creating a web of micro
insecurities (Banerjee and Samaddar 2010). A survey of the governance measures for
security in these conflict spots indicates that this security dilemma remains unresolved.
As Margaret Blanchard (1996) points out, perceived internal threats often create far
greater repressive reactions than when the nation is at war. In India the governance
innovation to deal with the internal security threats in the restive border areas in the
Northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir was to introduce a set of laws that cracked down
on political movement, enabled the Indian army to be brought in for counterinsurgency
operations and facilitated these operations by allowing the Armed Forces extraordinary
powers through special laws that overturn the law of evidence. The army has been used
20
for counterinsurgency in the Northeast from the 1950s and in Jammu and Kashmir in the
1990s. Calling in the army to conduct counterinsurgency operations is a task that is
qualitatively different from its traditional role of safeguarding the borders from external
aggression and one that brings in new equations between the people, the army and the
civilian elected representatives.
At the centre of the debate on special laws is the one around the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act (AFSPA) that was brought into the statute book by the Indian parliament in
1958 and provided omnibus protection to any soldier or officer who may have violated
the rights of a citizen by forceful entry into a house, damage to property, detention
without warrant or custodial deaths (Chasie and Hazarika 2009).
Less than two years later the AFSPA of 1958 was enacted embracing some of the
clauses of the earlier Assam Disturbed Areas Act of 1955. It empowered soldiers to
shoot to kill and then protected them against prosecution other than by the central
government. Far from it being a short term legislation as was the initial proclaimed intent,
its operation was enlarged in 1972 and it remains in operation till date. This
extraordinary law specifically enabled the military to play a role in counterinsurgency. As
Chasie and Hazarika (2009: 11) highlight: “This was a turning point in policy formulation
and field action for it represented the moment when civil power to deal with a political
challenge was transferred to the army and paramilitary forces. A military response to a
political problem became embedded in the system and in Delhi’s approach.”
As a prominent commentator on the northeast India Sajib Baruah (2007: 3) posits, the
AFSPA gives “authoritarian trappings” to India’s democratic institutions and this and
other laws have tried to provide a “permanent counter insurgency capacity” since
“insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have become a permanent part of life in the
Northeast India.” The legacy of the Indo China war of 1962 where China claimed territory
in the Northeast Frontier Province (now Arunachal Pradesh) and continuing fears of
renewed hostilities with China over this border implied that politics in Northeast India
would always be looked at through a national security lens. Governance measures in the
Northeast have never been able to lose sight of this ever since.
21
Banerjee and Dey (2012) have pointed out that AFSPA has militarized the entire region
particularly Nagaland and Mizoram. Drawing attention to its wide-ranging social impact
they point to the fact that “a result of this act is that it has caused an inflow of men
working within the security structures of the government. Hence in many parts of
Northeast India infrastructure work such as roadbuilding for safe movement of troops
necessitated the presence of skilled labour and technical hands and so it mostly
attracted men. Also the flow of security personnel in the region increased the share of
male migrants. Such a situation affected the sex ratio negatively. It coincided with the
growing violence against women in the region.”
In the 1990s the provisions of this extraordinary legislation reached another site of
insurgency – Jammu and Kashmir through the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir)
Special Powers Act that mirrored the provisions of the act in the Northeast. It too
empowered commissioned and non commissioned officers to arrest, seize without
warrant and shoot to kill under section 4 of the act. The other piece of special
legislation in Jammu and Kashmir is the Public Safety Act that provides for detention of a
maximum of two years without trial in case of persons acting in any manner prejudicial to
the security of the state. It also allows for preventive detention upto one year where any
person is acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Writing in the
context of Jammu and Kashmir Manecksha (2011) points to the difficulty of securing
justice in a context where special laws are used to supplant the ordinary criminal justice
system which has its own procedures and human rights safeguards. The lack of respect
shown by state authorities and security personnel can be gauged from the fact that court
directives are pointedly ignored or circumvented by them.
These “exceptional” laws in the Northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir operate side by
side with the other civil and criminal laws creating a complex legal mosaic where an
average citizen is not always sure which law will be invoked under what circumstances.
What has emerged consequently is not a system of parallel laws but interlocking laws
that has created a web of physical and psychological insecurities in the minds of the
people. As Singh (2006, 120) argues through a “subtle process of symbiosis” laws
pertaining to the so called ordinary crimes and those dealing with extraordinary
situations intertwine in specific contexts to the point where the two no longer exist
independently.
22
The special laws also have to be seen in the backdrop of the huge government and
security apparatus that also exists. The overwhelming presence of bureaucratic and
security structures intrude into everyday life which intentionally or unintentionally
interface all governance arrangements.
Apart from the use of the army in counter insurgency operations in phases both in
Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir the state’s paramilitary forces also operate – for
instance the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Border
Security Force (BSF) are used in Jammu and Kashmir while in the Northeast
paramilitary forces include the Assam Rifles, CRPF, Indo Tibetian Border Police (ITBP),
Sarashtra Seema Bal (SSB), and BSF. Jharkhand which has not yet seen the
deployment of the Indian armed forces or the use of the Armed Forces special Powers
Act however uses special paramilitary forces such as Indian reserve battalions, Combat
Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) unit of CRPF. As Naxals targeted government
and private property, the security forces are increasingly deployed to protect these – the
protection of the poor and marginalized segments of the population is not only neglected
they are even seen as the source of the threat. In Jharkhand the perception from the
field has been the excessive use of the special paramilitary forces limits the scope for
the development of the local police forces which is deemed to be central for security
from the Naxal threat. 15
Mohammad Ayoob has argued that most security problems in the developing world arise
from the imperatives of the state building process (Ayoob 1995). Banerjee and
Samaddar refer to the security conundrum where the macro security architecture causes
molar forms of insecurity or micro insecurity and argue that security has to be
understood as a dyad in/insecurity where someone’s security is always another’s
insecurity. As they point out “…in ensuring comprehensive security or macro-security,
what emerges is a perennially insecure nation, a schizophrenic world made up of circles
of insecurity” (Banerjee and Samaddar 2010: xxvi). Any form of state formation or state
15
Interview with Deputy Commandant of CoBRA Battalion at Barhi, Hazaribag on 6 August 2012 by JNU team. In fact the fieldwork conducted by JNU indicated the complex relationship between the paramilitary and local police forces. One one hand the paramilitary forces depend on the police owing to the latter’s better contextual knowledge. Thus unless local police acquire competence paramilitary forces can have only a limited role. On the other hand if local police acquire the necessary professional competence, paramilitary forces may not be needed at all.
23
restructuring- such as the recasting the boundaries of states in the Northeast, granting
statehood to new units - reassures the security of one group but may enhance the
insecurity of others. The conundrum continues.
The overall picture that emerges is one where people’s security gets the short shrift in
the name of national security whether in the Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir or
Jharkhand. The armed deployments are used to protect territory and private or
government property while non-combatant civilians feel neither safe nor secure as they
are caught between the guns of security forces and armed militants. If “freedom from
fear” is one of the twin pillars of human security (the other being freedom from want)
clearly special legislations and deployment patterns of security forces do nothing to
serve that purpose and in fact generates a further circle of insecurity.
Governing conflicts through ‘Developmentalism’:
In this section we turn the lens on how the Indian government has sought to manage
violent conflicts through the ‘development mantra’ which has unleashed several
unintended consequences. There is of course no doubt that there are economic causes
that drive the conflict in Northeast India, Jammu and Kashmir as well as in Jharkhand
that need to be addressed through creative governance initiatives. Sidestepping the
question of peace for development or development for peace for the moment, we focus
on the question of what kind of development is aligned with peacebuilding. A
governance model that is growth rate obsessed and pays inadequate attention to issues
of social equity and justice can only drive the conflict, not transform it. Moreover as Das
(2012:2) indicates governance that creates dependency through doles in insurgency
affected states in the name of development is not just pointless but dangerous.
Partition left both the border region of the Northeast and the former princely state of
Jammu and Kashmir cut off from their traditional trade links. In Kashmir partition became
an impediment to renewing the traditional silk route that had connected Kashmir with
central Asia and Middle East. From 2008 onwards two transitory points on the border
with Pakistan were opened through which cross border barter trade on selected items
could take place on specified days and under heavy security though this did not of
24
course come close to renewing the traditional silk route.16 It was nonetheless an
important governance measure to build confidence between India and Pakistan the two
sovereign parties locked in a dispute over Kashmir. According to a study by Kira (2011)
trade in agricultural commodities increased significantly but not that of handicrafts which
is the backbone of the region’s economy. However as he points out (and which is also
borne out by the PRIA field trip to Uri) there are numerous impediments to trade such as
the barter system lack of communication, absence of banking, limit of tradable goods,
and structural difficulties in free movement.
The Northeast which had till the 19th century been placed along the Silk Road also
became land locked and though the impact of disrupted trade ties on the extent of
poverty in this part has not been estimated there is little doubt that the impact was highly
regressive (Verghese 2001). An attempt to link the economy of the Northeast with the
power economies of south east Asia through the look east policy (LEP) was seen as
another governance measure to offset the geographical disadvantage of being
landlocked. Despite the promise of this new policy the manner in which it has been
implemented by the mandarins in Delhi did not give much scope to the people of the
region to mould it in their favour because it emphasized a flow of goods rather than
geographical and cultural contiguities which would have benefitted the people of the
region (Das 2010:351). An editorial in the Economic and Political Weekly (2010: 8)
cautioning against defining national self interest in terms of special interests of business
groups and corporate points out, “India’s Look East policy does not lead to greater
people to people contacts but brings Indonesia’s Salem group to Nandigram, South
Korea’s Posco to Orissa and cheap imports of palm-oil to Kerala, while it strengthens
military rule over democratic forces in Burma.” In this process the Northeast simply
serves as a flyover rather than as a point of either economic or cultural engagement.
The current manner in which the LEP has taken off may in fact set off another round of
ethnic conflicts in the region, warns Das (2010).
The violence of the insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations in both these regions
resulted in destruction of vital infrastructure. As the armed conflict spread to the rural
16
A two member team from PRIA visited the trade transit point on the Indian side of the Line of Control at Uri and interviewed truck drivers, trade facilitation officer, customs personnel, and local traders to find out the opportunities and challenges of this confidence building measure.
25
spaces of the Kashmir valley in the 1990s for instance schools, roads and bridges were
wantonly destroyed. Though estimates are hard to come by, one estimate cites a loss of
private and public property worth Rs 20,000 million upto 1998 because of the violence
(cited in Mahendra Lama 2005). Public utility installations in the Northeast have also
been a major target of insurgent groups and the ULFA attack on the petrol storage depot
of the Indian Oil Corporations’ Digboi Refinery in East Assam in March 2003 itself led to
burning of five million liters of motor spirit estimated at Rs 200 million (Lama 2005).
One of the most important strategies of pacification in India’s conflict areas, particularly
in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir are the special economic packages and funds
that are bestowed by the centre from time to time. One of the problems of the ‘economic
grants as panacea’ formulation is that a key question remains unaddressed – namely the
ultimate destination of these funds. Evidently these special packages typically delivered
by bureaucrats and instruments of public administration do not reach the people for
whom it is meant (DasGupta 2012). A complete focus on economic issues to the
detriment of other issues also results in sidestepping matters related to dignity, rights
and justice (Ibid).
Pointing out that the huge grants and subsidies have not generated any substantial
growth in India’s Northeast, Bezbaruah (2009) uses the term “kleptocracy” or rule of
thieves to describe the various projects that exist on paper and benefits none except
those who manage to steal the government allocated funds to fill their pockets. He also
argues that siphoning of money has remained so easy year after year despite mandatory
audits because this is precisely what the providers of the funds want given that they too
seek to benefit from this corrupt order.
In Jammu and Kashmir the strategy of pumping in central funds and creating non-
productive jobs creating huge outflows on salaries and pensions (not to mention the
unaccounted for expenses to maintain security) on a revenue base that is already limited
because of the conflict dynamics. This creates a Catch-22 situation. In fact, the salary
and pension component of Jammu and Kashmir is greater than its total revenue
generation. Therefore, it is not surprising that while the ratio of central transfers to total
revenue at 78.6% may be twice that for all other states (except for the north-east where
it is 67.6%), as much as 50% of Jammu and Kashmir’s own revenue goes into debt
26
servicing and into reducing the overdraft of the government with the J&K Bank
(Navlakha 2009). Navlakha also argues that this is no unintended consequence but an
intended one. It suits the national elite in New Delhi to device pacification strategies of a
kind that keep the dependency syndrome alive because of the opportunities it affords to
control the lives of a disaffected and alienated population and keep the power balance
firmly in its favour (Ibid.).
In Jharkhand one of the reasons for the slow development of the state is the reported
nexus between the politicians, bureaucracy and the Naxal organizations. The evidence
from the field across five districts shows that many development projects that were
approved were either not constructed or not in a functioning mode due to two reasons.
The funds for the project are either reportedly siphoned off by officials at the district and
block level or by members of the panchayats or the constructions are obstructed or
stopped mid way by the contractors because they have failed to pay the share of the
bribe to the variant organizations of Naxals. The Naxals ask levy only from those
projects which have big enough means from whom a share can be more than 2-3 lakhs.
Levy is not asked from projects of schools or health centres. 17
Clearly therefore the central government policy of ‘transfer of money’ to the disaffected
states has done little to address the conflict. Parachuting a series of special economic
packages that do not take into account the specific needs of the land and the people, far
from addressing the problem ends up breeding a political economy of violence where a
new class of ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ emerge with a vested interest in keeping a violent
conflict alive (DasGupta 2012).The so called special package funds find their way into
the hands of timber mafias and land mafias and do little to ameliorate the lot of the
people living in the region. This has been true of both the Northeast and Jammu and
Kashmir. In Jharkhand increased funds have actually allowed the extremists to sustain
themselves through a “levy economy” while in the Northeast the ULFA routinely imposed
“taxes” during the Assam agitation in the 1980s.
Increasingly however, and especially since the 1990s, there has been a change of
governance strategy. While special packages in conflict spots continue to be announced
from time to time and governance policy is still driven by the expectation that
17
Fieldwork carried out by JNU in Jharkhand
27
marketization of resources will make the conflict economies competitive and free
markets are the locomotive of economic development (Sachdev 2005: 191), much of
the central funds for development are now being channeled through the PRIs. The
predominant role of the PRIs in specific choice and implementation of a wide range of
governance initiatives – such as MGNREGA , IAY18 - is now increasingly becoming a
norm in all states including the Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir and Jharkhand. In fact in
Jammu and Kashmir one of the reasons why panchayats (village councils) were finally
constituted and notified in 2011 was because of the implicit threat that the government of
India would not channel funds unless this was through the institutions of local self
governance.
The resultant governmentality of participation if implemented in letter and spirit certainly
has the potential to reshape the development discourse. However charges of corruption
the rise of “shadow contractors,” proxy voting at the Gram Sabhas, using women’s
reservation to perpetuate rather than fight patriarchy continue to beset the
implementation process.
The general picture that surfaces across the conflict sites is that the active interventions
made by the central government in the name of development particularly through grants
and doles has fuelled rather than mitigated the conflicts – in all cases the ultimate
destination of the funds remain shrouded in mystery – but clearly they have not
generated productive employment opportunities for the marginalized and vulnerable
sections. In all cases the expectation that free markets will provide a magical antidote to
the conflict has resulted in the unbridled growth of the corporate sector acting in close
cooperation with the government. While this may have led to the flow of easy money for
some and the conflict may have changed and mutated because of this the root economic
causes of the conflict remain unaddressed through these governance interventions.
18
MGNREG stands for Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee id the largest welfare programme run by the government of India. Enacted as a law in August 2005 it provides 100 days of paid employment to adult members of a household willing to do unskilled manual labour related to public works at the statutory minimum wage. IAY stands for Indira Awaas Yojana, which aims at helping rural people living below the poverty line in construction of dwelling units and upgradation of existing unserviceable houses by providing assistance in the form of a full grant.
Th
28
Peace Accords: Negotiations and Dialogue around conflicts:
In this section we draw attention to the manner in which conflicts are attempted to be
governed or managed through negotiation and bargaining tangibly manifested by the
way specific peace accords are hammered out. Northeast has in fact become the
veritable laboratory for such accords in India. While it involves processes of negotiation,
mediation and power its dialogic content often appears to be compromised in the interest
of quick solutions.
As Samaddar (2004) points out the language of international politics has failed to discern
modes of power and the political technology of rule in post colonial regions like South
Asia where “plural dialogues carry seeds of power and resistance and contested
conversation and may lead to accommodation, reconciliation and peace.” Yet the studies
of post colonial regimes have not taken dialogue seriously because they saw themselves
as embodying the highest will of the citizens. Following decolonization, the political class
became a reserved club and having entered into what it saw as a transactional
relationship in the interest of governance it replaced a genuine process of dialogue with
command, silence and juridical language. The state discourse of constitution,
parliament, election, party, law and above all national security replaced the earlier
associational oriented conversation in politics.
Even as the spirit of genuine dialogue was seriously compromised in the post
independence period, the more limited processes of negotiation and bargaining
continued to be a part of the strategy of governance in the ‘trouble spots.’ For instance in
Jammu and Kashmir power sharing electoral agreements between the state parties and
the national parties have been used for political trade offs from time to time. Sheikh
Abdullah and Indira Gandhi’s accord of 1975 in Jammu and Kashmir paved the way for
the National Conference, led by the former, to return to power after it dropped its
demand for plebiscite. Again following President’s rule in 1986 an accord was signed by
National Conference’s Farooq Abdullah and the then PM Rajiv Gandhi of the Congress
(1) which was defended on the grounds that it would ensure greater flow of central funds
into the state indicating that central aid was conditional and a political tool.
29
However it is in Northeast India that a wide ranging system of negotiation and bargaining
has ensued and has typically manifested itself in a series of peace accords that have
been much wider in scope than the ones in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact among all the
conflict spots in India the Northeast represents the most wide ranging attempts at
“managing” conflicts through a plethora of governing measures incorporated in a series
of accords.
Rajagopalan (2008) in her study on peace accords in the Northeast has mapped no less
than 13 prominent ones between insurgent groups, state governments and government
of India in the period 1949-2005. The limited interaction between Northeast India and the
rest of the country to which it is joined by a 37 km sliver of land has translated into an
emphasis on peace accords as a means to stem violence, resolve conflicts and
restructure social relations. These have included redistribution of authority by creating
territorial or non territorial means of representation and self governance, which we have
already discussed at length. While this is a time tested conflict resolution mechanism
the devolution of power remains a real problem in the region and creating new
administrative or territorial units is not a guarantor of viability, resource independence or
autonomy. In fact as we have seen overlapping and intersecting powers and functions
have been serious administrative limitations.
Consequently the key question is: as a governance strategy what has been the efficacy
of such accords in bringing an end to violent conflict? To answer this we need to
understand what a peace accord is and what it represents. As Rajagopalan (2008: ix-xi)
points out “peace accords are usually regarded as formal agreements between conflict
parties, and can take many forms: from the minimal form of a ceasefire agreement to the
scope of a mini constitution.” Whatever be their scope – and the range is considerable -
if the expectation is that they are endpoints that would bring a permanent end to the
conflict then disappointment is likely to follow. On the other hand if they are regarded as
frameworks for further negotiations, as “bookmarks in the peace process” that work
towards the creation of an inclusive platform for dialogue then they acquire a different
kind of value. Unfortunately different stakeholders have different expectations from the
same accords and this does not always lead to sustainable peace.
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We need not look beyond the three accords signed with the Naga rebel groups in 1949,
1960 and 1975 to illustrate some of these points. The 1949 accord promised Nagas a
measure of autonomy; the 1960 accord paved the way to statehood; in 1975 undefined
“underground groups” who were waging an insurgency surrendered. Yet the conflict
continued. One of the reasons was that each of the negotiations engaged a subset of
those who were fighting (Rajagopalan 2008: 2). On the other hand the Mizo accord of
1986 is considered much more successful – uniquely so in fact – because the ethnically
inclusive mobilization of the Mizo National Front centred around a regional rather than a
ethnic identity. However even this accord did address a single group’s concern over
others and cracks in this unified front resulted in further accord making with the Bru and
Hmar ethnic groups. Accords signed in Tripura appear to have made no difference to the
escalating violence because militant groups there have morphed into transborder
criminal organizations (Rajagopalan 2008). In the case of the Assam accord there was
an attempt to genuinely address the root causes of conflict - illegal immigration, nativism,
citizenship but the provision of the accord has been very difficult to implement. The
challenge as Rajagopalan (2008: xii) points out is “to facilitate the incorporation of the
peace process into the practice of everyday politics and over time the impulse to
articulate interests through violence and simulate peacebuilding through accord signing
are both rendered redundant.”
Experiences from India’s conflict spots particularly from Northeast therefore clearly
indicate that while peace accords can help bring down direct violence they are not
inherently transformative in nature. They emphasize processes of bargaining,
negotiation and mediation by the more powerful stakeholders. Unless they are preceded
and followed by a more dialogic process, the achievement of social peace will continue
to remain a challenge. On the other hand if the reduction in direct violence following a
peace accord is used as an opportunity for addressing issues of justice and rights for all
a transformative opportunity may well open up.
Assessing Governance in conflict areas: An Overview
In this paper we have drawn from experiences across three conflict sites in India to
engage with the question of the implementation of governance measures in these areas.
Clearly any discussion of these measures in terms of legitimacy, accountability,
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transparency and efficiency will have to take into account the conflict contexts. As
bunkers, roadblocks, armed forces and paramilitary occupy the landscape along with
electors, bureaucrats, local politicians and the new elite an unusual scenario is created
which make it more challenging to assess the actual impact of governance initiatives on
all segments of society.
Elections, its associated institutions including the legislature, the Election Commission
and electoral politics are closely tied with the institutional and procedural democracy –
elected representatives provide the system with legitimacy. As our analysis has
indicated in all the conflict spots under study (barring the periods they were under
President’s rule) elections and the electoral processes are technically in place through
allegations of rigging and elections at gun point persist in some cases. Despite the cloak
of legitimacy the electoral process provides, the actual question of accountability of
these elected representatives to the people who have elected them remain questionable.
Allegations of corrupt politicians in league with timber and land mafia and with the
bureaucrats abound in Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir and in Jharkhand as we have
seen and despite elections the political class is regarded as part of the problem rather
than the solution.
At the grassroots level, PRIs are the primary bodies entrusted with the functions of
fostering participation in, and transparency and accountability of developmental policies
and their implementation. One of the ways in which accountability can be encouraged is
by making the Gram Sabha an enabling institution. Though it is not an elected body it
comes close to simulating an institution of direct democracy. Given the community ties
within the village it can be an effective forum for ensuring accountability of elected
representatives at least at the panchayat level though the problem of unscrupulous
elected representatives at higher levels remains out of its ambit. As we have seen Gram
Sabhas have been given a special status in areas where the tribal population is
dominant through an enabling legislation (PESA) but the evidence base that it is being
implemented in letter and spirit remains weak. Yardsticks of efficiency and viability have
to be balanced against the importance of ensuring legitimacy and accountability and
even if the process of decision making slows down creating participatory institutions at
the grassroots level is paramount for any conflict transformation.
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The experiment with autonomous councils has been an innovative tool of governance –
in so far as it tries to provide representation to different groups and communities in
society. However in terms of overlapping mandates and jurisdictions with the regular
PRIs it does not necessarily result in efficient decision making. As experiments with this
governance innovation in the Northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir show it opens up
the space for competitive demands and the claims. In the Northeast particularly rival
tribal and kinship groups make it difficult to settle competitive claims. The answer is to
find ways of increasing their viability and efficiency and recognizing their role in conflict
resolution.
The principle of participation is particularly important in conflict spots where violence
typically results in further marginalization of grassroots voices. However there are a
number of challenges and trade offs here. Since participation has become the buzzword
it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. Instances of ‘coerced
participation’ specially of women and tribals have been known to happen only to satisfy
the participation criteria on paper. Also the limited autonomy of the PRIs is a serious
challenge to its legitimacy – often there is a huge gap between the promise and the
practice when it comes to the actual devolution of functions, funds and functionaries.
Due to the legacy of violence in these areas and the destruction of infrastructure such as
roads, bridges, schools the pressure to rebuild quickly and efficiently is ever present and
participatory development while promoting parity is necessarily time consuming and in
that sense not always considered efficient.
Governing conflict through special security legislations as we have seen is highly
controversial and has resulted in many abuses. It has bred a culture of impunity and
excesses and allegations that these special laws are “lawless laws” that actually violate
the right to life guaranteed in article 21 of the Indian constitution. By overturning the law
of evidence and allowing the right to imprison and shoot on suspicion it makes the
armed forces unaccountable for their actions – in the eyes of the people their actions are
seen as illegitimate. In terms of viability and efficiency there are question marks because
there is no evidence base to indicate that armed manifest violence has come down as a
result of the special laws.
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Pumping in development funds as a mechanism for conflict governance is neither
efficient or viable and as we have seen create a culture that erases even the trappings of
accountability. Added to this are the huge accounted for security expenditures whose
ultimate destination remains unknown.
Finally peace accords as a mechanism for governing conflicts can be viable and efficient
especially to end direct violence but cannot be a substitute for keeping the language of
dialogue alive thereafter. Accords duly signed have the seal of legitimacy and if carefully
worded and negotiated can ensure accountability. However it is easy to fall into the trap
of looking at peace accords as ends in themselves rather than as benchmarks of a much
longer transformative process.
In Conclusion:
The narratives from India’s conflict zones indicate two things. First we see that
governance particularly in conflict areas is always in a state of flux as new rules of
engagement emerge through the various combinations of private and public authority,
the emergence of markets sometimes in collusion with the Indian state as a major player
in these conflicts, the shifting interests of powerful non state actors in the central, state,
regional and local levels and the creative responses of social actors on the ground who
can also find ways to recombine and reprocess institutional resources in response to
new challenges. It follows therefore that governance in conflict areas is always a political
task not a technical one and it generates a continuous political expansion that happens
at every level and every stage.
During the past decade the meaning of governance has been considerably altered in the
imagination of ordinary citizens. Popular participation in decision making about issues
that affect the lives of the people has become a constant demand. Therefore the
discourse in India as well as its practice has begun to influence the state to reform itself.
The Right to information Act is one example of ensuring transparency in the way the
government functions. The modern information technology is being used to share more
information about the norms, criteria and process of decision making that governments
at all tiers adopt. Likewise the accountability of government officials for non performance
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of their duties is being fixed in several legislative provisions like NREGA, service
charters etc.
In some fundamental ways therefore the business of governance of society is no longer
exclusively in the hands of national governments alone. The provincial governments,
PRIs and municipalities are all mandated to govern the affairs of India today. In this
process of transition effective division of labour across different jurisdictions is yet to
stabilize. Contestations about devolution of authority and resources are continuing.
Therefore what India’s discourse on governance suggests particularly in conflict spots
are two contending sometimes colliding forces at work. Despite the top down
governance measures that are put in place and the visible hand of the central
government much more participatory processes and forms are also simultaneously
being invented through actual practices on the ground. As citizens become more
assertive and vocal as civil society becomes more involved and as media, despite
allegations that it acts irresponsibly and is guided more by the market than by journalistic
ethics, continues its overall watchdog role, the meaning of governance in India is
gradually becoming more inclusive bottom up and with this also more contested.
Notwithstanding the central government’s attempt to keep the conflicts “under control” it
is no longer a simple public administration approach or the colonial law and order
machinery that will be equated with emerging meanings of participatory and democratic
governance in India today. Viewed in this sense governance in India is about state-
society relations. Participatory governance conceptions include the administrative and
public management instruments and institutions but are not limited to them.
Understanding governance in conflict spots in India today entails understanding how
bottom up processes of popular participation interact with the formal institutions of
governance in Indian democracy. This interaction brings into the discourse what
Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011) have described as a state-nation framework. The
Westphalian nation-state frame makes the state the centre around which different
communities, sub cultures and ethnic nationalities define themselves. In the state-nation
frame that state has to accommodate multiple nationalities communities and subcultures
as well as their diverse aspirations. This perspective reinforces the principle of
subsidiarity in governance arrangements and requires much more authentic and
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sensitive devolution to sub regional and regional institutions of governance, not as a
pacification strategy, but to create a peace based on what Das (2012) has called “the
traiadic principles of rights, justice and democracy.” A quiescent state-managed
suspension of violence based on pacification cannot be the basis of sustainable social
peace.
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