hidden community development among the urban poor informal settlers in metro manila by Toru nakanishi

Hidden Community Development among the Urban Poor: Informal Settlers in Metro Manila

Toru Nakanishi 1

Abstract

This article investigates how informal urban settlers autonomously and substantially organiseanddeveloptheirowncommunitiesinMetroManila.Suchacommunityisneitheronewhichhasbeenintroducedbyanoutsidethirdpartynoronewhichhasbeenorganisedbytheresidentstorealise concrete objectives. We can verify that a community of informal settlers emerges in theguiseof villageendogamynetworks,whichariseparadoxicallyfromchronicpovertyandareformedwithoutrecognition..Thedeepeningof thesenetworksprovidesfamilieswithincentivestoresidepermanentlyintheirlocalityandundertakecollectiveactiontoobtainpropertyrights.Suchnetworksspreadacrossmanysitesof povertyinMetroManilaatthesametime,andbuildopenstagesforenhancing and sharing local knowledge, which can be mobilised for development by the urbanpoor.

Introduction

Thepurposeof thispaperistoexaminethecapabilitiesof autonomoussocialorganisationscreatedbytheurbanpoor.Itisbasedonparticipantobservationsconducted in sections of Metro Manila in the Philippines for approximatelytwentyyears.Ourconcernhereisthemechanismof theformationanddeepeningof acommunitywhichispeculiartotheurbanpoorinMetroManila.

It is frequentlystated that rural socialorganisations inSoutheastAsiaareloosely structured and thus vulnerable. Such vulnerability increases in urbanlocalitieswhichhaveappearedaccidentallyandwhosecommunityorganisationsbegan later, because, unlike the situation in rural areas, it is difficult to assume the existence of common interests in urban localities. Contrary to thistraditionalunderstanding,weattempttoclarifythattheurbanpoorcanrealisepovertyalleviationandsocialstabilisationtosomeextentbymobilisingbuilt-incommunity-basedresources.Insuchacase,theemergenceof acommunityisnotaccidentalbecausetheautonomousdevelopmentof horizontalsocioeconomicrelationshipsparadoxicallyarisesfromchronicpoverty.Wewouldliketoclarifythepossibilitythatsuchacommunitymechanismisubiquitousamongtheurbanpoor.

The arguments presented here are as follows: After we review previousdiscussion on community among the urban poor in Section 1, the processof emergence of a community by the development of kinship-matrimonialnetworks in a locality is clarified in Section 2. These networks have contributed

3� - Toru Nakanishi

considerably to social development in the field of my research during the 1990s. Thus, inSection3,weclarify thepossibilityof aspilloverprocesswithinthenetworksdispersedacrossMetroManila,namely,theformationof kinshipbelts.Kinshipbeltscancreateakindof commonculturewhichiswidelysharedbythevastpopulationof thepooracrossMetroManila.Inotherwords,wehaveencounteredahiddenprocessforidentifyingtheurbanpoorinMetroManila.

1. Feasibility of a Community among the Urban Poor

1.1. Community-based Resources in Southeast Asia

Indeed, economics has played an important role in understandingcommunity by functional analysis,2 which stresses the relationship betweenprivate and social costs and benefits.3However, substantial characteristics of “acommunity”havetherebyvanished,aseloquentlydiscussedbyGeertz,Scottandother social anthropologists (Geertz1963;Scott1976).Scott suggests inhiscriticismof thehighmodernistapproachthatthefunctionalanalysisof acommunity indevelopment economics renders a community “legible” at theexpense of its abstraction and the dismissal of significant characteristics such as itsdiversity,whichisbasedonrichandcomplicatedlocalknowledge,thatismetis(Scott 1998). These characteristics are indispensable for the efficient functioning of acommunity(Scott1998).Developmenteconomicslackedconcernfortheassumptionsunderlyingacommunity,suchassocialrelationshipsasbasesof common interests for collective endeavours, a prerequisite for understandingtheessenceof acommunity.Therefore,webeginbyareconsiderationof somediscourses that are important for a substantialunderstandingof community-basedresourcesinSoutheastAsia.

Since the publication of Embree’s influential article (Embree 1953), communitiesinSoutheastAsiahavecometoberegardedaslooselystructuredcompared with those in East Asia. According to the traditions of socialanthropology,sinceruralsocietyinSoutheastAsiahasbeenbasedonthebilinealkindredsystem,tightlystructuredcommunitieshavenotbeenformed(Kroeber1919).

The notion of “chains of dyad relationships” offers another convincingviewpoint that can effectively explain these facts (Nakane1987). Societies inSoutheastAsia are not closed sets inwhich the “excludingprinciple” iswellbehaved.Sincedecision-makingfollowsbinomialrelations,theprivateinterestsof individuals prevail over the common interests of the social group. Theformationof closedsocialgroupsthatcaninternalisethecommoninterestsof localities in Southeast Asia is frequently considered to be difficult.

Informal Settlers in Metro Manila - 3�

1.2. “A Community” for the Urban Poor

Intheagrariansocietiesof Asia,peopleandlandhavebeenindivisiblyrelatedformanygenerations.Thevillagers,whohavetoconfronttheinclemencyof nature,arerequiredtobealwaysreadytocopewithnaturaldisastersthroughcollectiveactionunderacertainsetof rules.Here,wecanunderstandtheraison d’étreof alocalcommunitythathasalonghistoryandhasbeenestablishedinagrarianAsia.

Indeed, at first glance, there appears to be a shortage of community-based resourcesinurbanareasingeneral.Theaffectionof urbandwellersfortheirplacesof residenceisfarweakerthanthatof ruraldwellersbecausethehiredlaboursystem,bywhich theworkplace isgenerally locatedawayfromthe labourer’sresidence,isobservedtobemorecommoninurbanareas.Furthermore,unlikeinthecaseof agriculture,itisnotnecessaryforurbandwellerstorecognisethenecessityof collectiveactionforproductionriskcausedbychangesinweather.Manyurbanresidentsare immigrantswhobelongtovariousruralregions,ortheir descendants.Therefore, inter-personal relationships in anurban localitygrowthinandloosesincemanyresidentsliveinananonymousspaceandthisleadstohighpopulationmobility.Thisnecessarilyweakensresidents’affectionfortheirlocalityandtheirincentivetostaytheresincetheyexpectotherstoshifttootherlocalitieswithease.

The situation is most unstable in slum areas where the urban poor areconcentratedanditisacceptedwithoutquestionordoubts.4So-called“informalsettlers”resideinawfullivingconditionssuchasrubbishdumpsordryriverbeds.Theyalsoconfrontvariousriskssuchasthedemolitionandevacuationof theirhousesorforcedrelocationtoresettlementareasbecausetheydonotpossesslandpropertyrights.Itisnatural,therefore,tosupposethattheseinformalsettlersaredependentonrelativesandacquaintancesoutsidethelocalitytoconfronttheconstantfearof forcedrelocation.Furthermore,theirstandardof livingisoftensoextraordinarilylowthatitdoesnotdeterioratenoticeablyevenafterasuddenterriblemisfortune. It appears that even if these settlers are forcibly evicted,itisnotimpossibleforthemtouncoveropportunitiestoupgrade,ratherthandegrade,theirstandardof livingortomovetootherlocalitiesinMetroManilaby harnessing their inter-personal networks even when forcibly relocated toresettlementareasoutsidethemetropolis,wheretheyearnalowerincomeduetothelackof jobopportunities.5Thepoorhavenoreasontocontinuetoremainthereunderinferiorlivingconditions,theunproductivelanddoesnotgenerateanyadditionalincomeandtheyarealwaysafraidof forcedrelocation.

Inthispaper,weaddresstheseissuesandillustratethattraditionaldiscussionof themcontainsomeerrors.Inotherwords,wewouldliketoclarifythat1)the

�0 - Toru Nakanishi

urbanpoorcanformanautonomouscommunityundercertainconditionsand2)kinship-matrimonynetworkswithin suchcommunitieshaveexpandedandspreadoutacrossMetroManila,connectingtheurbanpoor.

�. The Emergence of a Community among the Urban Poor

2.1. Roots of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Sitio Paz

Our field of concern is a squatter area – Sitio Paz – which I have been studying since1985(Nakanishi1990).Thislocality,theareaof whichisapproximately7,900 square metres, is situated in the fish pond belt along the Malabon River and the adjacent highway. The people surrounding this locality refer to it astambakan,whichmeans“dumpingarea” inTagalog,because the landthere isfilled with waste material that was discarded during the 1960s. Some of the current residents have been living in this locality since the early 1960s. It issaid that the first-comers were twenty households whose heads were born in IlocosandWesternVisayasregions.6Obviously,theywereawareof their lowstatusassquattersor informalsettlers; thefact that thepeople’sorganisation–theSitioPazTenants’Association–wascreatedasaplatformtodiscusslandandproperty rights indicates this awareness. Issues regardingproperty rightshave arisen due to a lack of consensus or sense of identity. In 1975, whenapproximately100houseswereforciblyrelocatedtentothirtymetrestowardstheeasttoeasetheconstructionof manpowerfacilities,itwasrumouredthatPasig City would sell this land to the then Malabon Municipality. When thisrumourbecamerealityattheendof the1970s,PasigCityofferedtosellthelandtotheresidentsonconditionthattheybuyitallatonce.TheSitioPazTenants’Association became defunct because a number of the residents insisted thattheycouldnotaffordtthis.

One of the reasons for the vulnerability of the locality is the historicalconfrontation between the township groups: Ilocanos and Visayans. The conflict was at its worst during the presidential election of 1985-1986. The collisionbetween the pro-Marcos Ilocos group and the pro-Aquino Western Visayasgroup sparked numerous incidents of violence. These divisions significantly influenced economic relations in the recycling industry of the locality. While many scavengershadsometypesof inter-linkeddealswiththeirbosses–junkshopowners–therootsof theserelationswerebasedonhometownconsiderations.The junkshopownersmonopolisedthe junkwhichtheirscavengerscollectedbygivinggrantsorlendingmoneyatlowinterestratesbasedonthecriterionof kababayan(town-mates).

WhileconfrontationscontinuedtoescalateinSitioPazuntilthemid-1980s,

Informal Settlers in Metro Manila - �1

thecompositionof thebirthplacesof thehouseholdheadsgraduallychangedduring this period. According to official migration data, inflows from Ilocos and Western Visayas decreased, while those from Bicol and Eastern Visayasincreasedrapidly(Nakanishi2002).Aftertheso-calledFebruaryRevolutionin1986, the residents of Sitio Paz benefited from political stabilisation and poverty alleviation to someextent (Figure1).Thisperiodcoincideswith changes inmigration inflows (Nakanishi 2002).

Figure 1 Head-Count Index* in Sitio Paz

*TheHeadCountIndexistheshareof thepopulationwhoseincomeisbelowthepovertyline.Source:Surveyconductedbytheauthor

Butwhyandhowdidpovertyalleviationoccur?Indeed, thescavengers,whoformthepooreststratuminthelocality,havebeenblessedwithgoodexternalconditions. Since the economic stability during the first half of the 1990s induced an increase in investment in the manufacturing and construction industries,it became easier for the scavengers to change their jobs (Nakanishi 1998).

Povertyline(The official poverty line = 1)

HeadCountIndex

�� - Toru Nakanishi

However, it is difficult to explain the voluntary reduction of the conflicts in the localitybyonlycitingtheimprovementintheresidents’livingstandards.Severeemotionally charged conflicts, instances of brutal violence or serious quarrels amongresidentshavenotbeenobservedevenduringthesevererecessionperiodsduring 1989-1991 and 1998-2000 although these were observed frequentlybefore1986.Itappearsthatweneedtoconsiderotherconditionsresponsibleforthesocialstabilisationof thelocality.Thesearetheconditionsthatcultivateasenseof belonging,inotherwords,acommunity.

2.2. The Conditions for the Emergence of a Community

Contrarytothetraditionalunderstanding,itappearsthattheincentivesfortheresidentstoleavethelocalitywereweak.Onehundredandsixtynine(84.1%)of 201familieswhoresidedinthelocalityin1985stillremainedtherein2004–andthese families included the descendants of the first generation.

This figure demonstrates the fact that the residents were strongly committed toremaininginthelocalityevenassquatters;thatis,theemergenceof alocalcommunity. The Sitio Paz Tenants’ Association was composed mainly of residentswhowereborn in Ilocos andmembersof the reconciledSamahangLakas Bisig,manyof whomhailedfromtheWesternVisayas.Allthehouseholdssharedonecommoninterest–toobtainlandtitlesinthelocality–andthesetwo tenants’ associations were consolidated into the New Sitio Paz Tenants’Association in 1989. It is surprising that all the families agreed to purchasetheir housing lots from Malabon City although this issue is currently undertrial.Perhaps theysharedafeelingof belongingto thesamecommunityandrecognisedtheexistenceof theircommoninterest,whichistoobtainlandtitledeeds.Theassociationhasnominallyandactuallydevelopedasanautonomousorganisation that reduces conflicts among residents.

Atthispoint,wehave toaskhowacommunitycanemerge inasquatterarea. At first glance, the land title appears to be the most important common interestfortheresidents,asindicatedbythebirthof thetenants’associations.It provides a strong incentive to form a community. However, the fact thatresidents have no land titles does not necessarily promote or strengthen theformationof acommunitybyitself.

Onereasonisthat,asopposedtoruralareas,landhasnotbeenobservedtoexertabindingpoweroverresidentsinurbanareas.If thegovernmentorderstheforcibleevictionof residentsandtheirrelocationtoaremoteresettlementarea,thedesiretoobtainrightsof residencewillnotinducesolidarityamongtheresidentsbutwillserveasanincentivetosearchforalternativehousinglots.Itis not difficult for them, in their process of migration, to find a new residence throughtheassistanceof theiracquaintancesbecausealmostallof themhave


relativesortown-matesresidingneartheirlocalities,evenif theycomefromruralprovinces.Thissituationhindersacommunityfromemerginganddeveloping.7Issuesof rightsof residence, therefore,donotcreate theconditions for theemergenceof acommunityinasquattersetting.Astrongcommunityitself isanecessaryconditionforresidentstoremaininalocalityof theirownresolvewhenconfrontedwiththeproblemsof forcedrelocation.

2.3. Development of Matrimonial Networks: Emergence of a Community

Our hypothesis is that the conditions for the emergence of an autonomouscommunity organisation in a poor urban locality are the expansion anddeepeningof thekinship-matrimonialrelationshipstherein.Thesearedevicesthatclarifyandprovideamutualunderstandingof theexistenceof commoninterestsfortheresidents.Theforty-plusyearsof theSitioPazlocalityhavebuiltextensivechainsof matrimonialrelationshipsthroughrepeatedinter-marriages– or, specifically, village endogamy. Within two to three generations, the kinship-matrimonial networks that have spread out across the locality have helpedreducethepotenttensionsbetweenthegroupssegmentedbyhometownandtodevelopingsolidarityamongtheresidents.Thedeepeningof thenetworkshasprovidedhouseholdswith incentivestoresidepermanently inthe localityandhaspreparedthemforcollectiveactionstoobtainpropertyrights.Althoughmostof the residents regardonly thosewithdirectmatrimonialnetworks astheirrelatives,theycouldhaveunconsciouslymobilisedthesewide-butthin-networksthatarespreadoutacrossthelocality.Ourhypothesiscanberewrittentostate that thesekinship-matrimonialnetworkshavedevelopedcommunity-basedresources.

Wewouldlikeheretoexaminehowtoday’skinship-matrimonialrelationshipshaveformedbyemployingsocialnetworkanalysis.Asanoperationalconcept,we use “the basic family group” as the node or vertex in our analysis. It isdefined as a family group that comprises family members with the same family namein2003andhavingcommonrelatives.8Tosimplifyournetworkanalysis,if anewmaleentrantwho immigratesfromoutsideof the localitymarriesamemberof somebasicfamilyandstillhasnomatrimonialmembersorrelativesthereinuntil thepresent(2003),hewouldbeconsideredasamemberof thebasicfamilygrouptowhichhiswifebelongs.9

Indeed, it is difficult retrospectively to trace all of the basic family. However, we have checked the list of families every year between 1985 and 2003. Asmentionedabove,therearethirty-twofamilies(15.9%)wholeftSitioPazfrom1985to2005.Onlytwentyfamilieshavemovedawaywhileallthemembersof twelvefamiliesincludingsixsinglefamilieshavealreadydied.Accordingtoourinformants,thesemembershavenokinshipormatrimonialtieswiththebasic


familygroup.Furthermore,our listcoversat least thebasic familygroups in1970, according to themembersof allof thebasic familygroupswhohavestayedsince1970andbefore.Wecanapproximate,therefore,thedynamicsof the process of network formation by using the concept of the basic familygroup.Thesegroupshavereachedsaturationpointsincethelatterhalf of 1980s(Figure2).

Figure � Number of Basic Family Groups in Sitio Paz: 1��0-�003(Base Year: �003)

Source:Surveyconductedbytheauthor.

Informal Settlers in Metro Manila - ��

Figure 3 Formation of Kinship-Matrimonial Relationships: Sitio Paz, 1��0-�003

Figure3 shows the formationof thekinship-matrimonial networksof basicfamily groups since 1970. Although two and more independent kinship-matrimonialnetwork“components”existed in the locality fromthe1970s tothe late 1980s, more than a half of these groups (58.9%: 76 groups out of 129) merged and united into one vast network component by 1988. Here acomponent is a term in network analysis, which is formally defined as a maximal connectedsubgraph(Scott2000;deNooyetal.2005).Inordertounderstandthelevelof thecohesionof thekinship-matrimonialnetworksinthelocality,wecanchecktheaveragedegreeof thenetworks–howmanykinship/matrimonialrelationshipsinthelocalityhaseachbasicfamilygroupontheaverage?Figure4 shows that the average basic family group already had about 1.5 kinship-matrimonialties(onekinshipand0.5matrimonial)whenacommunityemergedonourhypothesisinthelocalityin1988.Thisindexrisesto2.5(onekinshipand


1.5matrimonial)in2003.Figure5showshowthekinship-matrimonialnetworkhasgrownbyexaminingtherelativescaleof thelargestcomponent,ortheshareof theverticeswhichbelongtothelargestcomponentinallthevertices.Thissharesuddenlyincreasedfrom30%toabout60%in1988becausethetwolargecomponentsmergedasdepictedinFigure3.Whilemorethan70percentof thebasicfamilygroups(74.6%:100groupsoutof 134)wereconnectedbythesenetworksuntil1992,approximately90percent(88.1%:118groupsoutof 134)belongedtoanetworkinAugust2003.

Figure �:The Average Degree of Kinship-Matrimonial Relationships for Basic Family Groups: Sitio Paz, 1��0-�003



Figure �The Share of the Maximum Component in the Overall Kinship-Matrimonial Network for all Basic Family Groups: 1��0-�003

Source:Surveyconductedbytheauthor

These figures suggest that the rate of village endogamy is considerably higher inthislocality,wherealmost40percentof themarriagesof second-generationresidents (110 of 276, 39.9%) are classified as village endogamy. While the tendency towards village endogamy in the rural areas was often pointed outin the paddy fields (Takahashi 1972; Umehara 1992), it could also be observed among the urban poor. This fact indicates that the chains of matrimonialrelationshipsformedafterthesecondgenerationtowardstheendof the1980sledtoreductioninthetensionsbetweenthegroupssegmentedbyhometown(whichareoftenfoundinmultilinguisticcountrieslikethePhilippines)andtheemergenceof acommunity.

Suchclose-knitvillageendogamynetworkscanbeoftenobservedamongtheurbanpoorinMetroManila.AsidefromSmokeyMountain(wheretherateof village endogamy is .373) in the next section, we find extremely close kinship-matrimonial relationships in a locality like Sitio Lakbay, Navotas, where we


conductedasurveyinAugust2005.Thisvillageneartheseashorehasmorethanfortyyearsof history.While576families(72.2%)outof 798aredescendantsof the first generation, 292 couples (50.7% of descendants’ families, 36.6% of all families)wereformedthroughvillageendogamy.

2.4. Poverty Paradox: Principles of Formation of a Community

Why have repeated inter-marriages or village endogamy practices beenpredominantinthelocality?Isthisendogamyaparticularphenomenononlyinthelocalityorageneraloneamongthepoorinalllocalitiesof MetroManila?Thesearethequestionsthatwemustaddresshere.

Letusbeginouranalysisbyexaminingthefactthathomogamyisthoughttobepredominantamongtheurbanpoor.Themostimportantfactorexplainingthis homogamy appears to be the existence of social strata caused by socialexclusionfromtheareasurroundingthelocality.ItisnotsurprisingthateveryMetroManilaresidentknowswheresitesof povertyarelocated.Suchhabitatsegregationbysocialstrataisoftenobservedindevelopingcountries.Itindicatesthattheresidentsof MetroManilashareanunderstandingthatthePhilippinesisstillaclass-riddensociety.

As previously mentioned, the locality has historically been referred to astambakan, a disdainful and abhorrent term, by the residents in surroundingareas.Thisisoneof thereasonswhychildreninthelocalityhavebeenmockedintheelementaryschool,leadingtoahighdropoutrate.10Residentshavealsobeenfrequentlydiscriminatedagainst in their search for jobs.Thepoorhaveexperienced deprivation of their right to obtain education and employmentbecauseof socialexclusion:thishasaggravatedtheirchronicpoverty.Therefore,thepoorclearlyrecognisethatitisalmostimpossibletomarrythewealthyoreven thenon-poor.The richhavenegative incentives tomarry thepoorandalmostnoopportunityordesire tomeet them.This is a typeof invisibleorimplicitsocialexogamyandthereasonfortheexistenceof repetitivehomogamyandtheabsenceof marriagesbetweenindividualsof differentsocialclasses.11

Secondly,whydopoorresidentsoftenrefrainfrommarrying inthesameincomebracketoutsidethelocality?Onereasonseemstobetheirgeographicallynarrow sphere of activities. Although public traffic utilities for the lower income bracket have developed rapidly since the Second World War, the sphere of its activities is still limitedbecauseof high transport costs and the like.Thecommutingspheresof mostof theresidentsarewithinoneortwojeepneyortricyclerides.Theworkplacesof approximately90percent(232)of thetotalfamily heads who have jobs (258) are within a radius of five kilometers of the locality,whilethereareonlysixheadsof familieswithworkplacesfurtherthantenkilometersfromthelocality.Asseenbelow,mostof theresidents’relatives


inMetroManilaconcentrateinthenorthwestpovertyzones,especiallyplaceslikeMalabonCity.Furthermore,thelowuniversityattendanceratehaslimitedtheopportunitiesforencounterswithresidentsinotherremotelocalities.Sincethepoor in theurban areas live in an anonymous space, theyhavevery fewopportunities for contact with the unspecified larger population. Therefore, the sphereof marriagechoiceisextremelynarrow.

Imperfect information may be another reason for avoiding homogamyoutside the locality. When searching for a spouse, even if a resident obtainssufficient information about a candidate from outside the locality, it is difficult forhim/her togatherdetailson thecandidate’sbinominal relationshipswithhis/herrelativesorneighbourswithinashorttime.Incontrast,if thecandidateis local, it is very easy for the resident to obtain sufficient information on the candidate’s social relationships and take a more informed decision regardingmarriage.

Thus,wecanconcludethatthemainreasonforthepredominanceof repeatedinter-marriagesorvillageendogamypracticesthatsupporttheemergenceof acommunityarisesfromtheresidents’geographicalandsocialisolationbecauseof chronicpovertyandsocialexclusion.Indeed,thefactthatthepoorresidentsare squatters appears to have induced a vicious circle of poverty throughinter-generationaltransferasaresultof repeatedinter-marriagesbetweenthepoor,whopossessfewassets.Inthesquatterarea,villageendogamyresultingfrompovertyhas induceda typeof adverse incorporation,whichhascausedchronicpoverty(Hulme2003).However,poverty itself willeventually inducetheformationof kinship-matrimonialnetworks,andadverseincorporationcanparadoxicallyleadtosocialstabilisationwithinthelocalityandalleviatepovertythroughtheemergenceof acommunity,asdiscussedbelow.

2.5. Matrimonial Networks and Functions of a Community

It should be noted here that the kinship-matrimonial networks discussedabovedependonthechainsof dyadrelationshipswhicharethesourceof thevulnerabilityof acommunity.Canweconsidersuchnetworkstobeacommunity?Indeed,relationshipsthatareindirectlybasedonthedyadrelationshipswithinthesenetworks–suchastherelationshipbetweenMr.AandMr.CwhohavematrimonialrelationshipswithMr.BundertheconditionthatMr.AhasamutualdyadrelationshipwithMr.B–arenotnecessarilyfriendly(Nakane1987).Sincekinship-matrimonialnetworkswerenotformedinSitioPazuntilthelate1980s,the dyad networks were segmented and there were frequent prolonged conflicts amongtheresidents.Suchnetworksdonotappeartoguaranteetheemergenceof acommunity.

However,ourhypothesisdoesnotcontradictthelogicof dyadrelationships.


Intheprocessof thespreadanddevelopmentof villageendogamy,thekinship-matrimonial networks have become close-knit and have paved the way fortheemergenceof acommunity.Theclose-knitnetworksbuiltbymatrimonialrelationshipswouldprovidethemost importantsocialsite inthelocality,andif thedensityof suchrelationshipsweretoincrease,thiswouldundermineanyincentive for the residents to leave the locality. Thus, this logic correspondstowhatLynchhas termed thenarrownetworksof an “ego-baseduniverse”(Lynch1973;Nakane1987).Inthiscontext,acommunitycanbeconsideredtobeaplacewhereego-basedrelationshipsinthenarrowlocalityhaveextendedand deepened with face-to-face relationships, verifing that kinship-matrimonial networkshaveperformedthefunctionsof acommunity.

Such networks have provided social safety nets to residents through thesharingof jobinformation.Indevelopingcountries,mostjobopportunitiesareclosedtothepoorbecauselabourmarketsaresegmentedratherthanintegrated.This situation is not necessarily disadvantageous for employers because itcanpreventor at leastweaken the collectivepowerof tradeunions, formedby permanent labourers, by employing casual labourers instead. Althoughemployersinturnencountertheproblemof obtainingcredibleinformationonthequalityof labour,theymaydiscoverthattheycandependonthepersonalconnectionsof “good”labourers,developedthroughtheirkinship-matrimonialrelationships. From the labourers’ viewpoint, this is why they should alwayscollectjobinformationthroughtheirkinship-matrimonialnetworks.12

Figure6showsthatresidentshaveobtainedjobinformationbyutilisingtheirkinship-matrimonialrelations(relativesinFigure6)orritualkindred(compadre)relationships during recessions and other weak networks during booms, asGranovetter (1982) suggests.13 In other words, kinship-matrimonial networkshave contributed to increasing income and alleviatingpovertybyplaying theimportantroleof alastresortsafetynet,especiallyduringrecessions.Wealsoobserved that thespreadand trickle-downof assistance fromNGOsaswellasthecommunicationandsharingof jobinformationhavebeenimplementedthroughthesenetworks.

Furthermore, they have been able to perform certain functions of anautonomous administration. The residents have arrived at a realisation thatdisputes, troubles or conflicts can be resolved and cases of violence in the locality can be reduced by means of these networks. If a conflict arose between AandB,whohavenodirectsocial relationshipswitheachother,and if oneof them or a third person C desired reconciliation, it would not be difficult to find an appropriate third party D within the chains of the dyad networks betweenAandBtoresolvetheissue.Hence,evenif theydonotgraspthefullsignificance of these networks, a number of residents might realise through their


experiencesthatthesehavecontributedtothestabilisationof thelocality.Thusthekinship-matrimonialnetworkscanimperceptiblyplaythebasicfunctionsof acommunity.

Figure �Sources of Information on Job Opportunities


3. Kinship Belts as Global Networks: Spreading of Matrimonial Networks

3.1. Formation of Kinship Belts: A Small World for the Urban Poor

As an extension of the above discussion, this section proposes and verifies the hypothesisthattheurbanpoorinMetroManila,despiteappearingsegmentedanddispersed,areconnectedbywideandthinnetworksandshareakindof commonculture.Everydaylifeintheurbanlocality,whichisbasedonvillageendogamy,isassumedtobeatypeof complicatedandunconsciouslocalsocialnetworking,assuggestedbyJacobsandScott(Jacobs1961;Scott1998).SuchlocalnetworkscanworkacrossMetroManilabymeansof thechainsof dyadrelationships in the kinship-matrimonial networks created by homogamy; inotherwords,theinter-marriagesamongthepoorareinducedbythelogicinthepovertyparadoxexplainedabove.Thenarrowsphereof marriagedeterminedbypovertyandsocialexclusionwill increasepropinquitalhomogamy,namely,inter-marriagesamongtheresidentsintheneighborhoodwhobelongtoalmostthe same income bracket and reside in different but nearby localities. Thisprocesswillpromotetheformationof weaksocialrelationships,andthuscreatesubconscious,unorganised,butvastsocialnetworksamongtheurbanpoor.Wetermthesenetworkskinship belts.

Eventhepoorcanobtainmoreinformationbyincreasingtheirchancesof contactwith thoseoutside the localitybyusing thepublic transport facilitiesfor thepoor.Furthermore, theystillhavevarious typesof networks, suchashometownorritualkindredrelationshipsaswellaskinship-matrimonialones,whichtheyutiliseincaseof immigrationtoMetroManila.Thesefactorshavedevelopedkinship-matrimonialnetworksthatextendovertheSitioPazlocalityaswellasadjoiningareas.Thegeographicalsphereof thesenetworkswaslimitedtoanareawithinacertainradiusof SitioPaz,whichwaseasilyaccessibletotheresidentswithoneortwo30-minutejeepneyrides.Therefore,wearriveatthehypothesis that all thepoor localities inMetroManila are connected toeachotherandformaglobalhomogeneoussocialgroup.

3.2. Kinship Belts in the Urban Poor: Sitio Paz and Smokey Mountain

The existence of kinship belts can be directly verified by some data. We would liketoshowthatmanyof therelativesof thehouseholdheadslivingoutsideSitioPazconcentrateinMalabon,especiallythebarangays(villages)nearthislocality.It is difficult to collect all information on the “relatives” of the residents by interviewsbecausethecriteriafor“relatives”variesfrompersontoperson,eventhoughmostFilipinos regard second-cousins as close relatives.Furthermore,


forourdiscussionhere“relatives”whohaveneverbeen seenareoutsideof ourconcern.Inourinterviews,therefore,weconsideredonlyrelativeswhosefullnamesandbarangay-level addresses at leastwereknown to the residentsinterviewed.

Of thetotalrelativesof thehouseholdheadsinSitioPazwholiveoutsidethe locality (588), 259 (44.0%) live in Malabon City. Furthermore, Figure 7indicatesthatthenearerthebarangay istothelocality,thelargerthenumberof the relativeswho tend to reside there:Concepcion (59) (where the locality issituated),Catmon(24),Muzon(21),Langos(20),andBayan-bayanan(20).Thesedata show an uneven distribution of the residents’ relatives in neighbouringbarangays.Otherrelatives’addressesarealsoconcentratedinneighbouringcitiesandmunicipalities (Figure8).The totalnumberof relatives living in the topsix cities andmunicipalities, includingMalabonCity, is521 (88.6%).Further,302relatives(51.4%)areconcentratedinanareawithinthreekilometersof thelocality, while 405 relatives (68.9%) live within five kilometres.

Thesamephenomenon isobservedamong the residentsof theso-called“ex-SmokeyMountain”.SmokeyMountain(SM)wasthelargestdumpingareainMetroManila.Itwasopenedinthe1950’s,butitceasedtobeusedin1994.Allthesquattersresidinginthisarea(approximately4,000households)wereforcedtorelocatebytheendof 1997.InAugust2004,abouttwo-thirds(approximately2,800households)stillresidedinthetemporaryhousinglotsbuiltbytheNationalHousingAuthorityin1996,whiletheremainderhadbeencompelledtorelocatetotheotherlow-incomeareainMetroManila,theresettlementareas,ortheirhomeprovinces.


Figure � Geographical Distribution of Relatives in Malabon City for Sitio Paz Residents



Figure �Geographical Distribution of Relatives in Metro Manila for Sitio Paz Residents


InresearchconductedduringAugust2003,theresidentsof 1000householdswere interviewed. These residents were selected by random sampling fromamongthelistof householdsresidinginthetemporaryhousinglots.Accordingto this questionnaire research, 1,464 (41.2%) of the total relatives in MetroManilawereconcentratedinTondodistrict inCityof Manila,whereSmokeyMountainandthetemporaryhousinglotsarelocated.Theconcentrationrateintheneighbouringsixcitiesandmunicipalitieswasabove80percent.While1,840of the residents’ relatives (51.9%)were concentrated in an areawithinthree kilometers of the locality, 2,251 relatives (63.5%) resided within five kilometers.Here,weobserveclosekinshipnetworksanda tendency towardsvillage endogamy in the temporaryhousing lots.Within799households, theinstancesof marriagesbetweenresidentswhowereborninSMare81(10.1%)andcasesof marriagesinwhichatleastonepartnermigratedintoSMwherehe/shemettheotherpartnerare217(27.2%).Thus,therateof villageendogamyis.373(298cases).


Thus,inbothSitioPazandSmokeyMountain,therelativesof theresidentswholiveinMetroManilabutcomefromoutsidethelocalityareconcentratedinsitesof povertynearthelocality.14ThissuggeststhattheurbanpooralloverMetro Manila are mutually connected by the kinship-matrimonial networksthroughpropinquitalhomogamy.

3.3. Shared Culture of the Poor

Here, we examine the role that kinship belts play in the lives of the urbanpoor.First,theurbanpoorcancomplementthefunctionsof acommunitybyemployingkinshipbeltnetworks.Casuallabourerscanobtainalternativesourcesof information regarding jobopportunitiesorvendorscanextend theirownmarketsthroughthesenetworks.Underconditionsof marketsegmentationora high level of uncertainty, they can benefit from sharing diverse information even beyond the local networks, as discussed in the last section. As alreadyargued, residents encounter constraints on access to information due to therestrictedgeographical sphereof their social behaviours. In such a situation,kinshipbelts thatenablethecirculationof informationtoother localitiesareextraordinarilyusefultotheurbanpoor,asareritualkinship(compadre)networks,which may sometimes surpass social stratification in importance (Hart 1977; Nakanishi1999).

Of greater significance is the creation and communication of the common culturepeculiartotheurbanpoor.Therearecountlessandvariedtypesof localknowledge(ormetis),whichcouldbeusefulinimprovingtheirlives.SquatterareasinMetroManilalookverysimilar,althougheachalsoappearstobeindependent,segmented and/or dispersed. These areas employ the same techniques tomanagetheillegalsupplysystem(kabit)of publicwaterorelectricity.Theyalsoemploythesamemethodof constructinghousesfromscrapsof buildingwaste.Thesehousesand the techniqueof constructing themhave longbeencalledbarong-barong.Eventhegames,songsordancesof childrenhavespiltover tokinshipbelts.SomepopularsongsbyfamouscomposersinrecentyearswerearrangedbasedonsongsanddancesthatwerecomposedinsquatterareasandwerealreadypopularamongtheurbanpoorchildrenacrossMetroManila.AlltheinformantsIinterviewedinSitioPazandSmokeyMountainbelievedthistobethereasonfortheinstantpopularityof thesesongsamongthepooracrossMetro Manila. Although it is difficult to verify the truth of this story, the fact that my interviewees in Sitio Paz and Smokey Mountain believed this to betrueisimportant.Thisstoryaboutpopularsongsisalreadyakindof commonknowledgebaseduponthekinshipbelts.

Furthermore,kinshipbeltsshapepoliticalviews.Weobservethatkinshipbeltsplayedanimportantroleinthepoliticalbehaviourof theurbanpoorduringthe


FebruaryRevolutionin1986andintheforcedresignationof PresidentEstradain 1999. Networks with neighbouring localities have provided an alternativesourceof informationthatdiffersfromthemassmedia.Thejeepneyortricycledrivers voluntarily provide services for relativesor acquaintancesbeyond thelocality.Itmaybemucheasiertoverifytheidentityof economicrelationssuchaslabourcontracts.Duringthe1980s,thesystemsof thejunkshop-scavengerrelationships inbothSitioPaz andSmokeyMountainwere extremely similar(Nakanishi1990;Brillantes1991).Theywere typesof inter-linkagebasedonhometownrelationships.15

Whilethekinshipbeltsamongtheurbanpoorwereformed,developedandstrengthened,localknowledgewasestablishedonthebasisof commoncustomsand has spread across Metro Manila. Thus, we can arrive at the hypothesisthat localknowledgespillsover toall theurbanpoorbykinship-matrimonialrelationship belts through propinquital homogamy. Knowledge gained in alocality was refined or improved by encounters with similar cultures, was rendered suitable to the specific locality by repeated trials and errors, became the refined metis,embodyingrichaccumulatedexperiences,andspreadacrossMetroManila,eventhoughparticipantsdonotrecognisethefullstructureof thesenetworks.Therefore,itcanbesaidthatthechainsof thewidebutweaknetworkshaveproducedasenseof identity,whichhaspromotedthecommunicationof thecultureof theurbanpoor.

Concluding Remarks

This paper investigates the process whereby community and kinship beltsare formedanddeepenedby strengtheningkinship-matrimonial relationshipsamongtheurbanpoor,whicharisefromthefactthattheresidentshavebeencompelledtoconfrontchronicpoverty.InthePhilippineshousingpolicyfortheurbanpoor,especially inMetroManila,has lackedconsistencyanddeepenedurbanpovertysincetheSecondWorldWar.Repeatedneglectoverthelongrunhasbeencompoundedbylargescaledemolitionandrelocation(Laquian1969;Berner 1997). Several policy implications, which were obtained through ouranalysis,canbeoutlinedasfollows.

The first pertains to the slum/squatter policy in Metro Manila. The reason for the ineffectiveness of the unified slum clearance policies has been thegovernment’sneglectof theaforementioned localnetworks.Thecostof clearingslumsthathavealonghistory,havebeeninhabitedbymorethantwogenerationsandarealreadyestablishedinanareawillbeextraordinarily largeascomparedwiththatof clearinganewslumarea.Theclearancemayoftendeprivethepoorof theirindispensablenetworksandmayhaveseverenegativeeffectsonthem.Inthiscase,itwillbemuchmoreeffectivetoutilisethekinship-


matrimonialnetworksforpovertyalleviation.Mobilisation of the networks of “core” families to alleviate poverty is

the secondpolicy implication. Indeed, since community in thePhilippines isextremelydependentonthedyadrelationshipsof individualmembers,itdoesnot possess an efficient vertical system for the circulation of information observedamongEastAsians,whoemploy“exclusionprinciples”.IntheManilalocality, however, it is easy to detect the core family that was established first and thuspossesses richnetworks at various levels.Thegovernment canmobilisesuch resources of core families to build a more efficient aid delivery system. Thenetworksthatutilisecommunity-basedresourcesamongthepoorshouldbestudiedanddevelopedfurther.

Finally,weshouldreconsider the issueof establishingacommonidentityfortheurbanpoor.If theexistenceof kinshipbeltsisrecognised,itsuggeststhe existence of common local knowledge (or metis), common customs andcommonculturepeculiartotheurbanpoor.Thisimpliesthatwecanlearnmanymorelessons,evenfromsmallpilotprojectsthattargetonlyasmallsegmentof the urban poor. While fixed-point observations in specific urban poor districts areoftencriticisedasstudiesof specialcases,itisrevealedthatsuchstudiesmayholdrichinformationanddeepinsightsforunderstandingvariousproblemsof urbanpoverty.

Notes

1. This study isapartof a researchproject fundedbyMonbushoGrant inResearch,entitled“SocialChangesunderEconomicDevelopment”(2002-2005).IowemanyvaluablecommentsandinsightstoCristinaA.Pangilinan(HelpFoundation),FerdinandMaquito(Universityof Asiaandthe Pacific), Hiroyoshi Kano (University of Tokyo), Makoto Maruyama (University of Tokyo), Kaku Sechiyama(Universityof Tokyo),andNorikoHataya(SophiaUniversity).2. A community is generally defined as a social group that has some sense of belonging, possesses itsownenforceablerulesandcustomsforthepursuitof members’commoninterestsandcomprisesfamilieswhoresidepermanentlyinagivenlocality.3. AccordingtoastudyinJapan(Ishikawa1990),thefunctionsof acommunityareasfollows:redistribution of income, mutual reciprocity in case of emergency and achievement of scaleeconomiesandcollectiveactionagainstmonopoly.Thecommoncharacteristicisthatacommunitycan solve problems that arise from the immaturities of markets and governments. This impliesthat a community is not necessarily regarded as an altruistic utopia under an immature marketsystem(Hayami2000).Evenindevelopingcountries,traditionalcustomssuchaslabourexchangesor various reciprocities can be explained as a form of social security for risk diversification, long-run insuranceandsoon(Barrett2005).4. Lobo(1981)isoneof thefewstudiesthatindicatedthetendencyof squatterstopermanentlyresideinalocalityandsuggestedtheimportanceof dynamicinter-generationalanalysisof asquatterarea. Lobo’s field, however, is Lima, Peru. 5. SeeLaquian(1968)andBerner(1997).6. Thepre-1985history explainedhere relieson interviews (August2004)with residentswhohavestayedinthelocalitysince1968.


7. Here,sincetheconditionof disposal(thattheentiresitebepurchasedatonce)isnotacommonissuefortheresidents,theriskof opportunisticbehaviourbysomeresidentscannotbeexcluded.8. InthePhilippines,achildreceivesthelastnameof thefather,whilethatof themotherisusedas themiddlename. Ingeneral,however,uponmarriage thedaughterchangeshermiddlenametothelastnameof herfather,becauseherlastnameissubstitutedbyherhusband’slastname.Adaughter’smiddlenamebeforemarriage,which is the lastnameof hermother, thusdisappearswhenshemarries.9. Whensuchafamilyformsnewmatrimonialrelationshipswithotherresidents, itbecomesanew basic family. The purpose of these procedures is to reduce the insignificant vertices for the socialnetworkanalysis.Thelargerthenumberof vertices,themoremeaninglesslycomplicatedthenetworkgraphbecomes.10. Some residents who obtained university scholarships opened private classes to teachsupplementarylessonstochildreninthelocalchapel.Theydidthisinordertoreducethedropoutrateof childrenaftertheyattendelementaryschool.Onesuchuniversityex-studentwhojoinedthisprojectrecalledthatoneof thereasonsforthehighdropoutrateinthelocalitywasdiscriminatoryutterancesagainstthechildren.Itwasremarkedthattheperformanceof thechildreninthetambakanwasaspoorastheirclothes.Thiswassaidnotonlytheirfriendsbutalsotheirteachers.11. Infact,itcanbeobservedthatthereisconsiderablesimilaritybetweenthejobsof thehouseholdheadsinthelocalityandthoseof theirspouses’brothersandsisterswhocomefromoutsidethelocality. This suggests that even marriages of the residents to outsiders should be classified as homogamy.12. Ontheissuesinpoliticaleconomyinthelabourmarketindevelopingcountries,seeWilliamson(1988).13. “Compadre system” is defined as the ritual kinship relations between different families following Roman Catholic practices such as baptism, confirmation and marriage. Since there is no rule of godparents,agodchildcanhaveanynumberof godparents.Thecircleof ritualkindredisextendeduptotherelationsbetweenmembersof theritualfamilies,orevenbetweenthegodparents’families.Compadre relationships can infinitely extend beyond the localities. The godparents are formally requiredonly togivea religiousadvice to theirgodchild,butsomesocialnormsoblige themtooffersomekindof socialsecuritytotheirgodchildorhisfamilyaswell.Thegodparentscanalsofind benefits in compadre,suchassocialprestige,stabilisationof othersocio-economicrelationshipsbetweenritualfamiliesandsocialcapitalintheformof socialrelationshipsbetweenthegodparents.Thus,inthePhilippinesetting,thecompadrehasbeenmaintainedforalongtime.SeeHart(1971).14. Alltheirrelatives,exceptforeignerssuchasJapaneseorAmericans,areconsideredtobelongtothelowincomebracketinthePhilippines,asdeducedfromtheemploymentdataof therelatives.However,moreaccurateanddetaileddatamayberequiredinthisregard.15. It is reasonable for landlords in rural areas to have contracts with labourers or tenants topayhighwages(orrequirelowtenancyrates)whilecharginghighinterestratesforcreditontheunderstandingthatthelabourersortenantswillnotbankruptorcheatthem(Basu1997).Ontheother hand, in urban areas, since scavengers can easily go bankrupt and flee and their turnover rate ishigh, junkshopownerswillofferacombinationof lowwagesand low interest rates.The lowinterestrateitself maybeastrategytosecurethesupplyof labourinanonymoussocialconditions.SeeNakanishi(2002).

References

Basu,Kausik.1997.Analytical Development Economics.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Barrett,ChristopherB.,ed.2005.The Social Economics of Poverty.NewYork,NY:Routledge.Berner,Erhard.1997.Defending a Place in the City.QuezonCity:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress.Brillantes,A.1991.‘NationalPoliticsViewedfromSmokeyMountain’.InFrom Marcos to Aquino, ed.,


J.Benedict,etal.QuezonCity:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress.Davis,Mike.2006.Planet of Slums.NewYork,NY:Verso.Embree,JohnF.1950.‘Thailand:ALooselyStructuredSocialSystem’.American Anthropologist52:

181-193.Geertz,Clifford.1963.Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia.Berkeley,

CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’. American Journal of Sociology 78: 1360-

1380.______. 1982. ‘The Strength of Weak Ties? A Network Theory Revisited’. In Social Structure

and Network Analysis, eds., P.V. Marsden and Nan Lin. Thousand Oaks, CA: SagePublications.

Hart,DonnV.1977.Compadrinazgo: Ritual Kinship in the Philippines.DeKalb, IL:NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress.

Hayami,Yujiro.2000.Development Economics.London:OxfordUniversityPress.Hulme,David,andAndrewShepherd.2003.‘ConceptualizingChronicPoverty’.World Development

31(3):403-423.Ishikawa,Shigeru.1990. Fundamental Issues in Development Economics(inJapanese:Kaihatsu Keizai-gaku

no Kihon Mondai).Tokyo:Iwanami-Shoten.Jacobs,Jane.1961. The Death and Life of the Great American Cities.NewYork,NY:VintageBooks.Kroeber,AlfredL.1919.‘KinshipinthePhilippines’.Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of

Natural History19:69-84.Laquian, Aprodicio A. 1968. Slums are for People. Quezon City: UP College of Public

Administration.Lobo,Ssuzan.1981.A House of My Own: Social Organization in the Squatter Settlements of Lima, Peru.

Tucson,AZ:Universityof ArizonaPress.Lynch,Frank.1973. ‘PerspectiveonFilipinoClannishness’.Philippine Sociological Review21(1):73-

79.Medina,BelenT.G.2001.The Filipino Family.2ndedition.QuezonCity:Universityof thePhilippine

Press.Nakane,Chie.1987.Social Anthropology(inJapanese:Shakai-Jinruigaku).Tokyo:Universityof Tokyo

Press.Nakanishi,Toru.1990.‘TheMarketintheUrbanInformalSector’.Developing Economies28(4):271-

301______. 1991. The Economics of Slums (in Japanese: Suramu no Keizai-gaku). Tokyo: University of

TokyoPress.______.1996. ‘ComparativeStudyof InformalLaborMarketsintheUrbanizationProcess:The

PhilippinesandThailand’.Developing Economies34(4):470-496.______.1998.‘CustomsandPoverty’(inJapanese‘KanshutoHinkon’)InDevelopment and Poverty

(in Japanese: Kaishatsu to Hinkon), eds., K. Yamazaki. Tokyo: Institute of DevelopingEconomies.

______.1999.Poverty,CustomaryEconomyandMigrationinMetroManila.DiscussionPapers.CIRJE-F-44.Tokyo:Facultyof Economics.Universityof Tokyo.

______.2002. ‘BuildingBridges:Poverty,CustomsandEnvironmentalPolitics’.InMetro Manila: In Search of a Sustainable Future,eds.,TatsuoOhmachi,etal.QuezonCity:Universityof thePhilippinesPress.

Neuwirth, Robert. 2005. Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World. New York, NY:Routledge.

Nooy,de,Wouter,A.Mrvar, andV.Batagelj. 2005.Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Scott,JamesC.1985.Weapons of the Weak.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.


______.1998.Seeing Like a State.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.Scott,John.2000. Social Network Analysis.2ndedition.ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublication.Takahashi, Akira. 1969. Land and Peasants in Central Luzon. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center

Press.Umehara,Hiromitsu.1992.Rural Villages in the Philippines(inJapanese:Firipin no Nou-Son).Tokyo:

Kokin-Shoin.Watts,DuncanJ.2003.Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age.NewYork,NY: W.W.Norton.Williamson, Jeffrey,G.1988. ‘MigrationandUrbanization’. InHandbook of Development Economics,

Volume1.,eds.,H.Chenery,et.al. Amsterdam:North-Holland.

Government & Nonprofit

hidden community development among the urban poor informal settlers in metro manila by Toru nakanishi