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Presented as part of the IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar Series, hosted by the IFPRI Gender Task Force. Presented by: Jessica Hoel.
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Measuring Gender with GamesIFPRI Gender Methods Seminar
October 25, 2013By Jessica Hoel, PHND Postdoctoral Fellow
How I came to study gender with games
Why games are good
Answer very specific questions
Controlled environment
Abstract away from many things going on in the background
Put specific numbers on abstract concepts
What games miss
Answer only the specific question you asked
Context
Subtlety
Contingency
Heterogeneity
Goals for this presentation
Framework for thinking about gender differences in outcomes
Helped me to get to more specific questions
Examples of laboratory games used to measure different factors
Not comprehensive
Inspiration for future work
Tips for new lab experimentalists
An Economist thinks about Gender
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Agency
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Constraints
Agency
An Economist thinks about Gender
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Constraints
Preferences
Agency
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Constraints
PreferencesBeliefs
Agency
Reasons for Gender Differences in Outcomes
Agency
Constraints
Preferences
Beliefs
Beliefs
Exploring gendered behavior in the field with experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a Nairobi slum by Fiona Grieg and Iris Bohnet JEBO 2009
Research Topic: Why are informal savings groups most often composed of only women?
Research Question: Do people contribute differently to public goods in mixed gender v. same gender groups?
Voluntary Contribution Game
Voluntary Contribution Game
Voluntary Contribution Game
First Stage
Everyone gets same endowment; can contribute to Common Pot or keep for self
Voluntary Contribution Game
Second Stage
Multiply Common Pot by 20 KSH, then distribute evenly
Tokens kept for self are worth 10 KSH
Beliefs
270 slum dwellers outside Nairobi
Men and women give equally in same gender groups
Men give the same in mixed and same gender groups
But women give less in mixed gender groups.
Women in mixed gender groups say they expect other participants to contribute less
Women have different beliefs about how much men will contribute.
Preferences
Gender differences in risk attitudes: Field experiments on the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi by Binglin Gong and Chun-Lei Yang JEBO 2012.
Research Question: do men and women have different preferences for risk?
If so, are gender differences consistent across matrilineal and patrilineal societies?
Investment Game
100% chance tokens will payout 10 RMB
50% chance tokens will payout 30 RMB
50% chance tokens will payout 0 RMB
Categorizing Games
Note that Investment Game is a twist on the Voluntary Contribution Game
VCG Outcome determined by other players
Distribution of outcomes is wide
Investment Game Outcome determined by chance
Only two possible outcomes
Preferences
132 men and women from two villages, one matrilineal and one patrilineal.
Men invest more in risky asset than women in both groups, but difference between them is smaller in matrilineal society.
Suggests men and women have different risk preferences, and that the difference is partially influenced by culture.
Constraints
Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies by Pamela Jakiela and Owen Ozier (November 2012)
Research Question: Do men and women feel different social pressure to share income with relatives and neighbors?
Twist on Investment Game
50% of people get BIG endowment: 18 tokens
50% of people get SMALL endowment: 8 tokens
Twist on Investment Game
PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE
50% of people get Private Treatment
50% of people get Public Treatment
Constraints
If social pressure doesn’t matter, people who get big endowment should invest the same amount in the risky cup regardless of public v. private treatment.
But if social pressure matters, and respondent gets the big endowment in the public treatment, should invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup.
2145 subjects from rural villages in Kenya.
Constraints
Men invest the same amount in the risky cup in the Private and Public treatments.
Women are substantially more likely to invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup when their decision is public and they receive the large endowment.
Suggests that women face different pressures to share with their friends and relatives than do men.
This reflects different constraints on choices.
Agency
What Causes Inefficiency between Spouses? A Within-Subject Structural Test of the Relative Importance of Asymmetric Information and Limited Contracting with Experimental Evidence from Kenya by Jessica Hoel (September 2013)
One Research Topic: do spouses act as if they have equal control over household resources?
One Research Question: are spouses willing to sacrifice household income to maintain some personal control?
Dictator Game
Tokens pay 30 KSH
Tokens pay 20 KSH
PUBLIC DECISION
Agency
If husbands and wives share resources, respondents should put all tokens in the Spouse cup. Maximizes total winnings for the household.
Can go home and reallocate later.
But if a respondent doesn’t believe that settling up will happen, may keep some tokens for Self.
Play Public Spouse dictator games with 370 couples in Kenya
What this looks like
Agency
Not very many people play efficiently.
Lots of people split the money exactly evenly.
Agency
Efficient
Women more likely than men to split money exactly evenly.
Even distribution of money.
Agency
Suggests that men have more control over household resources than women do.
Women sacrifice more household resources to maintain personal control over some.
Women choose even allocation more often, perhaps because they don’t believe reallocation will happen later.
Women have different agency than men do.
Structural Behavioral Model
Model that parameterizes motives to give money in dictator game
Play 5 types of dictator game with spouses and strangers
Structurally estimate parameters of model for each individual
Measure 5 motives to share money
Efficiency between spouses
Limited Contracting between spouses
Asymmetric Information between spouses
Altruism to strangers
Fairness with strangers
Tips for new lab experimentalists
Be creative
But “read” the literature (i.e. ask someone who knows the literature)
Be specific
Keep your design and script as simple as possible
Questions and Discussion