Challenging the Neopatrimonial State: Women’s Movements in

sub-Saharan Africa

School of Government Word Count: 13, 027

Laura Maclaren10373969

April 2016

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in International Relations at Plymouth University

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express deepest gratitude to my dissertation supervisor Dr. Rebecca Davies

for her full dedication, understanding and encouragement throughout my study and

research.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which women’s movements have

emerged as a key force in challenging the patriarchal developmental agenda within the

neopatrimonial structures of sub-Saharan Africa. The current state of affairs preserves

corrupt centralised governments, with the patriarchal elite often benefiting from the

neopatrimonial structures within the state. Furthermore, civil society movements that focus

on confronting this problematic activity, tend to remain marginalised. The 1980s and 1990s,

under the auspices of the Western liberal democratic agenda, provided an opportunity for

African women to express their autonomy. Working toward gender-inclusive politics,

economic independence and reducing gender-based violence were among many objectives

women’s movements intend to achieve. The state’s loss of authority, changing international

political arena and rejuvenation of civil society groups enabled African women to begin

establishing these intentions. On occasion, the neopatrimonial structures prove to be a

strong, undeterred influence on the region; as women’s organisations contend with co-

option, divided interests and the implications of operating outside of patronage circles.

Women’s groups have shown to be most successful in particular states that raise the profile

of women’s issues and maintains a strong orientation toward gender-inclusive policies.

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ACRONYMS

The following list describes the significance of various abbreviations used throughout the

dissertation. The page on which each is defined or first used is also given.

AEC African Economic Community AU African UnionAWD African Women’s DecadeCPI Corruption Perceptions IndexCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaDRC Democratic Republic of the CongoDWM 31st December Women’s Movement ECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEGDC ECOWAS Gender Development CentreFEMCOM Federation of National Associations of Women in BusinessFGM Female Genital Mutilation FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation FrontGBM Green Belt MovementHEs Household EnterprisesLMW League of Malawi WomenMDR Mouvement Democratique RepublicainMCP Malawi Congress PartyMYWO Mgendelea ya Wanawake OrganisationNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNWU Nigerian Women’s UnionOMM Organisation of Mozambican WomenPNDC Provisional National Defence CongressRECs Regional Economic CommunitiesRPF Rwandan Patriotic FrontUN United NationsUNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUS United StatesUWT Umoja wa Wanawake wa TanzaniaZCTU Zambian Congress of Trade Unions

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CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

ACRONYMS

CONTENT

1 INTRODUCTION: Motivation

1.1 Aims

1.2 Definitions

1.3 Literature review

1.4 Outline

2 BACKGROUNDS: Historical influences on African women and the movement

2.1 Pre-colonial to colonial

2.2 Post-colonial to neopatrimonialism

2.3 Conclusion

3 NEOPATRIMONIALISM: Women’s organisations within Africa’s hybrid-regime

3.1 Women’s wings: Co-option or creation and First Lady Politics

3.2 Divided interests: Toward rural class mobilisation

3.3 Operating outside of neopatrimonialism

3.4 Conclusion

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4 OPENING UP SPACE for African women’s movements

4.1 State’s loss of authority

4.2 Changing international political arena

4.3 Rejuvenated civil society

4.4 Conclusion

5 INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: New constraints, new possibilities

5.1 Raising gender-inclusive politics

5.2 Economic independence

5.3 Eradicating gender-based violence

5.4 Conclusion

CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Motivation

Women’s movements in sub-Saharan Africa have stimulated an unprecedented focus in the

last few decades. These dramatic developments preserve an importance that remains

unparalleled to any other. However, this rhetoric is best articulated by African revolutionary

and President Sankara, stating ‘the revolution and women’s liberation go together. We do

not talk of women’s emancipation as an act of charity or because of a surge of human

compassion. It is a basic necessity for the triumph of the revolution, women hold up the

other half of the sky’ (1983 cited in Sankara and Anderson, 2007: 66). Undoubtedly, this

area of focus remains an important one. Yet, women’s groups are increasingly becoming

entangled within neopatrimonial state structures that have often repressed, rather than

revered female mobilisation.

1.1 Aims

This dissertation approaches the relationship between neopatrimonialism and women’s

groups by revealing the dominance of patriarchal elites in their incessant exploitation of

patronage networks and control of the developmental agenda. Having said this, the papers

primary focus remains on the degree to which challenges made by the women’s movement,

have fractured the political order in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, leading onto the papers

research question: To what extent have women’s organisations established themselves as a

strong force in challenging the developmental status quo within the neopatrimonial

governance structures of sub-Saharan Africa?

The paper will argue: Women’s organisations in sub-Saharan Africa represent one

means of challenging the developmental status quo within the neopatrimonial state.

Alongside other civil society groups and external influences upon the region, women’s

groups have proven somewhat effective in challenging development orthodoxies. Yet,

problems arise when neopatrimonial politics positions itself as a strong, undeterred

influence in the region. The women’s movement has shown to be most successful in

particular states that raise the profile of women’s issues and maintains a strong orientation

toward gender-inclusive policies.

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Chapter One

1.2 Definitions

As a concept, neopatrimonialism is a ubiquitous phenomenon within the Africanist

scholarship. Coming in various forms and guises this state regime fundamentally relies on

informal and personalised patron-client systems, rejecting the formal freedoms legal-

rational states can gratify. Neopatrimonialism facilitates a ‘cyclical relationship … in which

resources are distributed through patronage networks to regenerate the political power’

(Beresford, 2014: 1). Such regimes tend to uphold the developmental status quo, with

corrupt, centralised governments benefitting the patriarchal elites and marginalising civil

society groups, remaining prominent characteristics. Women’s civil society groups, on the

other hand, are a definitional minefield. Coming in a multitude of sizes, influence and

agendas, they are often conflated with characteristics of feminism. In the context of this

paper, women’s movements, groups and associations are applied interchangeably with the

core understanding that they all contest political, social and other arrangements of

domination based on patriarchy and gender (Gouws, 2015). As the patriarch is akin to a

male figure, patriarchy is ‘a system of society or government in which men hold the power

and women are largely excluded from it’ (Walsh, Spangaro and Soldatic, 2015: 1).

Neopatrimonialism and patriarchy encompass two of the most frequented concepts within

the paper; other secondary concepts in subsequent chapters will be defined therein.

1.3 Literature review

The literature surrounding neopatrimonialism and patriarchy within sub-Saharan Africa is

plentiful, with the former becoming a staple underpinning amongst Africanist scholarships

after the 1980s. Encompassing political, economic and social structures, neopatrimonialism

has remained the rubric of state structures in many sub-Saharan African countries (Taylor,

2010: 3; Brown and Harman, 2013: 139; Omeje, 12: 2015). Thus, in order for Africanists to

understand the politics of the state on the continent, the concept of neopatrimonialism has

largely become the standard tool of analysis. Yet, some scholars offer insights into the

variation in governance quality and the state’s rejection of neopatrimonial political orders

(Alence, 2004: 167; Nyaluke, 2014: 150). Furthermore, some critics not only denounce

neopatrimonialism as an endemic character of African state structures, but also are

dissatisfied with the little focus on comparative monitoring of other states outside of the

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Chapter One

continent (Bach, 2011: 11). Through this assertion, others note the importance of indicating

neopatrimonialism as a ‘universal concept’ (Erdmann and Engel, 2007: 96) or ‘strongly

rooted’ (Beekers and Gool, 2012: 16) in political structures across the globe. Having said

this, admittedly the paper concentrates on sub-Saharan Africa, yet acknowledges that the

implications and variations of neopatrimonialism are multifarious and cannot be fully

examined in one piece of research. Concerning the discourses on patriarchy, it is seemingly

a less complex area of academic focus. Though there are differing interpretations of the

concept (Reeves and Baden, 2000: 28), patriarchy fundamentally remains as a system men

have ‘maintained’ (Carter, 2015: 41) through the relative positions of ‘power’ (Thornton,

2015: 5). This interaction exists within both the familial setting (Hendrix and Karant-Nunn,

2008: 72) and in public spaces (Woodward, 2015: 80). However, placing patriarchal

engagements within sub-Saharan Africa has exacerbated these arrangements, as African

women are overcome by the ‘patriarchal belt’ (Moghadam, 2007: 1; Littrell and Bertsch,

2013: 311) that often maintains the governing status quo. The existence of this belt

emphasises the disproportionate male governance of most sub-Saharan states, therefore

institutionalising women’s lack of access in participating in many facets of public life and

establishing themselves within the governance structures. In view of this, combining

neopatrimonialism with patriarchy has revealed a limited area of scholarship. Rather, a

focus has remained on either neopatrimonialism or patriarchy. When they are interlinked, it

is commonly a brief reference of women as victims of the patronage regime (Tiessen, 2008:

202; Waring, 2010: 12; Nyeck and Benjamin, 2015: 8) and not a direct challenge to it. Thus,

this habitual simplification of women and neopatrimonial regime leaves a lacuna in the

academic field. Subsequently, enabling this paper to outline the extent to which women’s

movements represent a force in challenging the neopatrimonial state.

1.4 Outline

A central claim in this book, as outlined in this chapter, is that women’s organisations

represent one significant force in challenging the developmental status quo within sub-

Saharan neopatrimonialism. Other determinants include other civil society movements, with

youth, labour and religious groups emerging alongside women to contest the state. The shift

in external influences has also had a profound impact on enabling Africa women to mobilise.

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Chapter One

Particularly, the changing international political arena and the state’s loss of authority

emerged as significant mechanisms for assisting women. However, neopatrimonialism has

persevered in many states south of the Sahara, as women’s organisations have often been

directly challenged by patriarchal patronage. The conjecture of all these progresses created

the right concerted effort for this paper to unfold. The next chapter (2) starts with a quasi-

chronological impression of the influences upon women in Africa. From pre-colonial, and

colonial to neopatrimonialism, this tripartite division of history will classify the transition

from female importance to the patriarchal underpinnings of 1980s neopatrimonialism.

Chapter 3 further recognises the relationship between women in sub-Saharan Africa and

neopatrimonial regimes by examining the direct linkages between women’s organisations

and patronage networks. It will focus on three problems: the co-option of women’s wings

and First Lady influence, divisions within the women’s movement, followed by the

implications with operating outside of the neopatrimonial networks. The paper then

explores how the 1980s and 1990s created important opportunities for women in pursuit of

challenging the neopatrimonial state. Thus, chapter 4 focuses on the state’s loss of

authority, changing international political arena and rejuvenated civil society in facilitating

the female insurgency within the sub-Saharan political order. Though neopatrimonial

structures may be in transition, women’s groups still contend with constraints. Chapter 5

examines the struggles women’s movements contend with into the twenty-first century.

Particular case studies are utilised to display these obstacles, whereby new possibilities for

further developments of the women’s movement are considered also. Finally, the

conclusion ties the threads of the dissertation together, discussing the revelations and

implications addressed along the way.

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CHAPTER TWO

Backgrounds: Historical influences on African women and the movement

First, it is necessary to underpin the contextual parameters of the paper. This chapter will

begin by classifying the pre-colonial importance of indigenous African women, noting their

control over their own lives and resources and their prominence in demanding respect.

Following this, the chapter identifies the colonial influences in provoking an intensification

of patriarchy, entrenching a gender imparity within the sub-Saharan state. The struggles for

independence did not end with decolonisation, as women were contending with post-

colonial conditions of patriarchy. Elaborating upon this, the 1980s political nature of sub-

Saharan Africa is to remain considered under the rubric of neopatrimonialism. This hybrid-

regime formulated a sui generis model of developmental orthodoxies that had profoundly

marginalised women.

2.1 Pre-colonial to colonial

Indigenous women remained a distinguished and dynamic authority within sub-Saharan

Africa. Working from the rural base, women had assumed an important role in agricultural

production with their labour contributions remaining indispensable to the community.

Nettleton supports this explanation, purporting that the pre-colonial structures outlined the

females ‘employment in tending the fields, caring for the elderly and, as importantly,

keeping cultural identity alive’ (2014: 343). Thus, the divisions of labour remained a

significantly equal union between men and women, as the status and role of African females

were not confined to simple domestic endeavours. Focusing on Namibia and the indigenous

Owambo, ‘in many communities women had access to property, the matrilineal system

tempered the control of men over women and especially of husbands over wives and

women played important roles as healers and ritual leaders’ (International Development

Law Organisation, 2013: 26). In turn, these communal responsibilities transitioned into the

political landscape, as administrative structures were often characterised by neutral

complementary governance between female and male elites. Sudarkasa goes beyond this

assumption, asserting that African women ‘were queen-mothers; queen-sisters; princesses,

chiefs and holders of other offices in towns and villages’ (1986: 91). Seemingly, a women’s

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Chapter Two

motherhood provided a framework for women to engage in traditional political activity, and

ushered in public notions of female independence and high place conspicuousness.

However, these matriarchal identities were more commonly recognised through

primogeniture legitimacy, whereby sons, brothers and husbands were the preferred

successors within the community. Committee agendas reflected this, as women’s issues had

been discussed in relation to the contributions they made within the family, rather than

public importance. Rather than revering the autonomous women that emerged to

command respect within political hierarchies, they were often rejected or essentially ‘jural

minors’ (Njoh, 2006: 88) under the fathers and husbands guardianship. Steegstra (2009)

supports this, referring to a female’s communal rule as ceremonial, existing only to

complement the male rulers or chiefs. As such, pre-colonial Africa did not exhibit perfect

gender parity, yet colonisation emerged as an era of institutional gender inequity.

The alienation of land affected all African citizens, but the far-reaching consequences

of colonisation had personally affected women. Within this, the colonial institutions that

had penetrated sub-Saharan Africa, as new relations forged with the African elites,

intensified patriarchy. Commenting on the relations, Akyeampong and Fofack note that

‘patriarchal alliances struck between various colonial administrators and African chiefs and

elders resulted in the systemisations and codification of patriarchy across African societies’

(2014: 44). This restricted women in terms of mobility, economic entitlements, political

positions and entrenched stereotypes relating to female status and roles. By forging these

links with colonial administrators, the African elites further eroded the position and

influence of women in society as they shifted toward gendered hierarchies and female

marginalisation. As Sharp asserts, ‘subaltern [women] must always be caught in translation,

never truly expressing herself, because the colonial power’s destruction of her culture

pushed [her] to the social margins’ (2009: 119). However, this status quo had been

challenged, as African women did not appreciate the new local and foreign arrangements of

patriarchal control. Within Zambia, women displayed their resilience through knowledge of

protest and rights. As Bosede purports, African women ‘used the court system to their

advantage, they learnt the value of protest and the need to frame arguments in certain

ways’ (2014: 10). This focus on resilience and knowledge highlights early examples of

women’s groups resisting the African state. Similarly, women had looked toward the

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Chapter Two

periphery in harnessing their empowerment and inciting change. Using Uganda as an

exemplar, Tripp (2004) suggests that female British administrators imported their notions of

women’s education onto the colonies. Further noting, that this provoked an avenue for

which the ‘colonial government was persuaded to support girls’ education’ (ibid. 124). This

was indispensable during Africa’s liberation struggles as women remained at the forefront,

demanding that their own governments honour the right to sovereignty and self-

determination. That being said, gender-blindness was inherent in post-colonial political

structures, as ‘even after the [colonisers] left, local chiefs remained powerful as they

became the main instrument for patronage politics’ (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015:

52).Henceforth, most sub-Saharan African states did not address the long-term impact of

the patriarchal patterns inherent within colonial institutions.

2.2 Post-colonial to neopatrimonialism

The nationalist impetus during the colonial era had further entrenched, rather than

dismantled, the patriarchal foundation that was inherent within the colonised state. The

colonial institutions had structured deep-seated and stereotypical demonstrations of a

woman’s status and role. Observing Lesotho women, Chingono (2012) found they endured a

triple jeopardy of exploitation, with the capitalist system, the state and traditional society

exerting control over their lives. Therefore, decolonisation from the Empire did not result in

a de-patriarchal state; rather the experiences of women had deteriorated as the impetus for

a movement was crippled. Furthermore, the changes within sub-Saharan Africa’s state

structures, further display the implications of post-independence patriarchy. In the 1960s

onward, most sub-Saharan states transitioned toward a more inclusive and democratic

society, as newly liberalised regimes sought electoral reform and multi-party politics.

Though the pre-democratic situations and structural and cultural contexts were enormously

varied (Anderson, 1999), the colonial experiences were common, with partitioned borders,

homogenous groups and alien institutions having influenced the origins of the regions

predominant political structure, neopatrimonialism.

This regime emerged within Africa in the 1980s and combined two forms of rule,

patrimonialism and rational-legal authority. The former conveys ‘personalised-rule as a kind

of authority structure that embodies some degree of domination and compliance’ (Woods,

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Chapter Two

2012: 350). Yet, this often relied on informal patriarchal foundations of the household,

whereby patrimonialism became a genetic extension of the governance structures within a

leader’s familial setting. The latter embodies the formal rule of law, committing to social

contracts between citizens and their governments as patterns of democratic elections and

formal legislation was promoted. Nevertheless, rather than conceding to this system, many

governments ‘were Africanised and penetrated by personalised patrimonial politics’

(Matter, 2010: 69). However, difficulties do arise in applying this system throughout the

entire region, insofar as, sub-Saharan Africa encompasses a rich mosaic of political

structures that are as diverse as the terrain the African people inhabit. This paper does not

seek to make sweeping overviews, but engaging with the sheer vastness of the African

state, generalisations are necessary.

A key function of neopatrimonialism is ‘that political office is

used for appropriating public wealth for private enrichment’ (Stewart et al, 2012: 49). The

regime relies on clientele networks that link patrons in cities with their rural clients through

the exchange of resources or political allegiance. However, the atrophy of rational-legal

institutions had meant women were contending with a state whereby ‘the rule of law is not

always guaranteed, and many public officials use their positions within the state to serve

their own, and not just the public interest’ (Thompson, 2010: 177). This was problematic for

women, as patriarchal leader’s accumulated power by ensuring governments were

centralised, with political nepotism and ethnic politics becoming the norm. Thus, rather than

establishing the state as key institutions to the national-building project, kin and ethnic ties

were favoured over solidarity and citizen parity. The unencumbered prominence of one-

party rule enabled patronage politics and grand corruption to encompass the

developmental characteristics of the sub-Saharan state. Some agendas had been prioritised

and others were secondary issues, highlighting the gender bias of post-colonial rule. Rai

goes beyond this assertion, positing that ‘both women and sub-altern men … were co-opted

into the elite nationalist programme despite the local struggles waged by them in their own

interests (2002: 12). Within this, women’s organisations were incapacitated, as often the

power of the patriarchal state was not dispersed, with local individuals of the core executive

actively seeking to monopolise political processes. Nevertheless, some notable post-

independence elites – Tovio, Kenyatta and Sankara – were openly committed to civil

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Chapter Two

movements and transforming women’s rights within societies. However, this leadership can

be denounced as a form of layered sophistry and a paralogism of African dictators that have

intentions to mask their own insatiable hunger and power (Mariam, 2010). Extensive

manipulation, bribery and harassment were commonplace within the 1980s political arena

as the privileged position of public officials were utilised for personal tenure.

2.3 Conclusion

By tracing the historic patterns in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter has showcased the

influences and the experiences of women within the pre-colonial, colonial eras and ending

with the neopatrimonial regime that had emerged within post-independence. The pre-

colonial importance of women was apparent from the rural base and within the traditional

political landscape, with Queenmothers demanding public notions of female independence.

Yet, colonisation depicted a fragile period for African women, as independence and rights

were replaced with restricted mobility and patriarchal authority permeating across sub-

Saharan Africa. In this respect, females were colonised by the Empire and subjected to male

domination, a double burden that had hindered the women’s movement. The nascent

possibilities of pre-colonial prominence and respect had shifted toward total male

dominance, as patriarchy became a central component of colonialism. Though the focus on

internal and external links with women groups revealed an indispensable demand for the

state to honour women’s rights and sovereignty, many post-colonial states continued the

colonial definitions of women. The neopatrimonial regime reinforced such stereotypes and

norms, as the developmental agendas and political fealties highlighted a gender bias that

had constrained the attempts for women’s organisations. Chapter three further recognises

this assertion by examining the direct relationship with women’s organisations and state-

linked patronage.

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CHAPTER THREE

Neopatrimonialism: Women’s organisations within Africa’s hybrid-regime

Establishing the contextual and conceptual parameters of neopatrimonialism in the last

chapters makes it possible to link this chapter with the paper’s argument. Initial steps in

answering the research question begins by recognising the direct relationship of women’s

groups and neopatrimonialism, with three problems examined therein. The first sought to

co-opt women’s wings into the single ruling party, and utilised the emergence of First Ladies

in creating and preserving state orthodoxies. The second focuses on divisions within the

women’s movement and highlights class as a predominant influence. Finally, the problems

associated with operating outside of the neopatrimonial political order are examined, as

women’s organisations have benefited from resources gained within the regime.

3.1 Women’s wings: Co-option or creation and First Lady Politics

Post-independence in the 1960s and 70s had led to the atrophy of rational-legal institutions,

with the vast majority of sub-Saharan African states undertaking a process of centralisation.

The government was ‘largely perceived as a structure of domination which is autonomous

from society’ (Niekerk, 2001: 47). These structures had also endeavoured to control other

forms of associational activity within the state; therein, the autonomous women’s

organisations were deemed as a potential threat to the political order. African patriarchs

strategically sought to involve women within patronage networks as a process of control

and to hinder possibilities of an influential opposition in challenging the developmental

status quo. Seemingly, this was implemented through the intentional co-option of women’s

groups into the single ruling party, as many emerged as women’s wings. This enabled the

African patriarch to prevent organisations from demanding an increased focus on women’s

issues and in doing so rejected the concerns that were not in the party’s interest. Medie

supports this notion by asserting, the ‘absorption of women’s movements by ruling parties

weakened these groups’ abilities to hold the state accountable as they began to function as

extensions of the governments’ (2013: 383). Though many women’s groups were ensnared

by the state during a regime, in some cases they were affiliated with the single ruling party

from the beginning of its tenure. The leaders of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), for

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Chapter Three

example, had co-opted the League of Malawi Women (LMW), a pre-independence

organisation that advocated increased female political participation. Yet, authoritarian

President Banda transformed the LMW movement into a minor grouping that was largely

contained by authoritative male figures and loyalists. Gilman supports this, and states that

the LMW ‘was appropriated by the Banda government into one of the most salient national

symbols and tool for repressions controlled by the government through the party’ (2009:

47). Thus, from the beginning of Banda’s tenure he had co-opted a previously independent

women’s group into a state accessory. Moreover, the gender discourse was shifted from

political empowerment of women, to utilising women as a symbol for personal control.

Having said this, criticism has arisen challenging the idea that repression was a generic

reflection of the state’s affiliation with female groups. In some women’s organisations

turned women’s wing, such as Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (UWT), the state directed

developmental agendas to female integration and political participation. Seemingly, this

combined ‘lobbying efforts of UWT, women politicians, gender equality advocacy NGOs

(Non-Governmental Organisations), and a certain degree of political will on the part of the

government’ (Yoon, 2008: 67). This provided a platform to mobilise women, whereby

linkages with the ruling party and African elites were revered, not rejected. As stated

before, these female groups were co-opted at the beginning of an incipient state leader. Yet

in other instances, women’s organisations are not co-opted by the ruling party, but are

created by them.

In Ghana, the 31st December Women’s Movement (DWM) was founded by the

Provisional National Defence Congress (PNDC) and served as the political backbone in its

campaign. Former First Lady Rawlings led the DWM during her husband’s regime. She

focused upon incorporating female political activities into the developmental consciousness

at local levels and beyond (Odame, 2010). However, Rawlings’ strong kinship linkages with

the PNDC meant she would often parallel and serve male dictatorships. The gendered

development initiatives that were proposed were commonly controlled and monopolised by

men, and maintaining this position was simple. Female elites were often bribed, as ruling

parties controlled women’s associations through patron-client activities. Rather than

challenging the patriarchal status quo within Ghanaian politics, Rawlings maintained strong

ties with the authoritarian state as the DWM arguably advanced the spread of the

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Chapter Three

patronage networks throughout Ghana. As patronage, ‘remains an enduring characteristic

of Ghanaian politics since independence’, (Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, 2007: 24),

Rawlings prioritised personal benefits over emphasising the need for substantive change of

the state’s parochial agenda’s. Though they are in a prime position to challenge the state,

given their direct access to governmental executives, First Ladies often accentuated their

position within the political core. Soothill agrees with this assertion, as their ‘relationship

with the governing party was prioritised over the advancement of gender equality’ (2010:

89). Thus, the women’s wings of governing political parties were intrinsically linked, with the

First Lady appropriating benefits for her allegiance to the single ruling party. Some scholars

have gone beyond this assertion and refer to this relationship as the ‘First Lady syndrome’

(Cheeseman, Anderson and Schiebler, 2013: 153). They had argued that these female elites

arose in regimes that have ‘been hostile towards independent women’s organisations and in

actuality are anti-feminist in their restoration of conservative gender politics’ ( ibid. 152). By

not challenging the gendered development orthodoxies, these First Ladies had overlooked

the inequalities between men and women within sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, they have

failed to ensure patronage as a positive force for all women, rather poor rural women were

often marginalised as this disconnect between high and low classes of African women

further threatened to impede the women’s movement.

3.2 Divided interests: Toward rural class mobilisation

Enticing organisational leaders with patronage had meant patriarchal elites were able to

focus the women on the benefits they could personally gain, rather than supporting them in

addressing the gendered issues within the development agenda. Within post-colonial

Mozambique, this patriarchal clientelism is apparent whereby elites maintained profound

positions through political power and networks, and demonstrated a high degree of internal

solidarity (Sumich, 2008). Seemingly, this elite cohesion espoused the interests of First

Ladies and other women akin to the patriarch, and overlooks the need to transform the

developmental metanarrative. However, Kang rejects this assumption, instead focusing on

class as a prominent issue in advancing the women’s movement within patriarchal

patronage. She posits that it was ‘class divisions, rather than elite pacts [that] affect the

representation of women’s interests’ (2014: 139). Further asserting that the ‘high levels of

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Chapter Three

inequality undermine cross-class solidarity within women’s movements ( ibid.). Supposedly,

the top-down focus of female organisational leaders, of which are controlled by male elites

and patronage politics, negates the rural women’s interest within the movement. The

Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM), working alongside the Mozambique

Liberation Front (FRELIMO), further enhances this argument. As Baden purports, OMM and

FRELIMO’s ‘top leadership remained male and policies were contradictory … there was also

resentment of the communal villages policy because of the practical difficulties they

created’ (1997: 62). Thus, the political clique of female clients and patriarchs had dissatisfied

the communal women. Without cohesion between the rural base and the political core of

women, problems arise in establishing independent women’s organisations to encourage

holistic agendas and promote equal rights, irrespective of class. The continued privileged

access to economic resources and political networks, constructs notions of a patrimonial

bourgeoisie whereby elite women appear disenfranchised from the wants and needs of

rural women. Whereas ‘women in middle-class households are leading advocates of efforts

to ensure access to marital assets for wives, widows and divorced women’ (Gordon, 1996:

174), rural women may demand land accountability and gender equal participation as

crucial concerns for their livelihoods. Tripp advances this statement, arguing that female

elites were ‘often unqualified for their positions, patronising and out of touch with the

realities of their rural women constituents, the leaders frequently elicited apathy on the

part of women’ (2001: 41). That being said, as issues and interests of women’s groups are

abundant, it can be difficult in forming a cohesive movement. Channelling this, Howell and

Mulligan notes the difficulty ‘given the diversity and plurality of women’s organisations in

terms of ideology, values, influence, size and issues address … the utility of aggregated

notions of civil society becomes increasingly strained’ (2005: 249). Drawing attention to this,

serves to display the potential for rural spaces of female organisations. A

lower-class mobilisation of women, akin to an emerging revolutionary proletariat was

forming at the margins. The imposed patronage networks spearheaded by the patriarchal

leaders and supported by the female elites comprised of one ideology, one that

concentrated efforts on personal benefits and exploitation of their positions. Yet, an

ideological counteraction was developing, one that sought to shift state orthodoxies and

disrupt patriarchal patronage. Alexandridis supports this, purporting the ‘state apparatuses

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Chapter Three

that reproduce the ideologies of the dominant class are therefore responsible for the

exclusion and marginalisation of specific individuals that in their turn formulate resisting

ideologies in the margins’ (1986: 3). If ordinary women are able to hold the state

accountable, changes in political structures become apparent and an end to the culture of

female elite impunity and patriarchal patronage networks. Moreover, forming local level

women’s organisations can build heterogeneous links of womanhood, that work to cut

across social and class cleavages, with common goals and aspirations pertaining to gender

equality and improving women’s rights. Kenya’s Green Belt Movement (GBM), provides an

exemplar of this. Initially forming as a women’s environmental movement in 1977, the GBM

mobilised from the grassroots level to challenge the deleterious structures of a corrupt

authoritarian state under Moi. Undertaking reforms to further centralise powers of the

President, Moi exacerbated the negative practices predominant during Kenyatta’s reign. Yet,

the movement having extensive experience in advocacy, implemented community based

projects, conducted community awareness and supported participatory governance (GBM,

2016). This communal focus enabled efforts to broaden political agendas, and promote

discussions away from the negotiation tables and core elite. Likewise, remaining a fiercely

independent organisation, the GBM exposed the debilitating one-man rule and

governmental repressions within Kenya, with their autonomy lessening the possibilities of

state co-option and control. Having said this, elsewhere in Kenya, local women’s groups

were unwillingly ensnared by governance structures, as the ‘well known harambee self-help

movement in Kenya increasingly fell victim to various clientelistic manipulations’ (op cit. 42).

Additionally, the affairs of the Mgendelea ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO), the progress

of women, succumbed to the imposing nature of Kenyan politics. Wambuinjagi enhances

this notion, positing that ‘President Moi, at the height of power, ordered the affiliation …

[and] allowed the state to have control of the organisational agenda’ (2013: 131). While

establishing women’s groups outside of neopatrimonial politics seems difficult, once groups

were developed, rejecting patronage involvement was seemingly as problematic.

3.3 Operating outside of neopatrimonialism

Though the harambee movement and MYWO were subjected to deleterious neopatrimonial

activities, ‘Botswana’s leadership class was legitimate … they openly laid claim to traditional

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Chapter Three

authority, but they did so through the kgotla [meeting place for the tribe] and its mutual

obligations (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009: 147). The Kgotla has continued central

importance in providing a platform for individuals and fundamental in improving

governmental and community relations. Seemingly, these public assemblies promote

rational-legal political structures and reject the centralised and elitist notions of

neopatrimonial governance structures. However, core leadership of the Kgotla – the Bogosi

– defines the tribal chieftainship; this power is predominantly controlled by men who are

often reluctant in extending or sharing these positions and privileges with women. As

Moumakwa claims ‘the patriarchal structures seen in Bogosi normally determine gender

status on the basis of conceptions that do not afford all equal worth and respect’ (2010: 50).

Thus, operating outside of the patronage system is problematic for female groups,

especially as they instantly contend with issues relating to resources and influence. In many

sub-Saharan African states, the real power often lies within state-clientelistic systems. As

such, the neopatrimonial structures had failed to invest sufficiently in civil movements that

challenge and endeavour to function at a distance from the traditional political order. Van

de Walle supports this assertion, positing that ‘neopatrimonial systems tend to favour

consumption over investment, they produce unsustainable economic policies, and they

systematically underinvest in institutional capacity’ (2001: 16). Even in the states that are

endowed with resources, the authoritarian and patriarchal underpinnings have dominated

supply production and distribution, securing enclaves that provide little benefits to the

wider population. For women’s groups, this is problematic as enclave extraction is seemingly

averse to improving development outcomes with its gender imbalances having far-reaching

effects. In terms of influence, situations have arisen whereby women are campaigning for

political positions within a state that was characterised by extensive manipulation, bribery

and harassment of political oppositions. These women are often lacking ‘access to

important patronage networks and are thus disadvantaged in the political process’ (Kroeger,

2012: 13). Within this, personal rule was common with duties of the state carried out by the

leader’s relatives, friends and clients. This nepotism placed within corrupt governmental

structures, subsequently had meant rules of the game were repeatedly changed, removed

or ignored by the vehement patriarchal leader as they dominated and centralised political

power towards themselves. With this as a point of departure, women’s groups often

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Chapter Three

experienced an absence of resource support and influence when operating away from the

neopatrimonial regime. Thus, it is important to constitute the benefits women’s movements

have gained when they have worked within the patronage system. In its most benign

form, neopatrimonialism can extend the reach of state resources into the community.

Within the geopolitical and social peripheries of sub-Saharan Africa, rural women are

further from core activities and remain more excluded from participating in political

campaigns. Expressing ones opinions on candidates and advocating women’s issues remains

difficult and so clients must gain alternative favours from politicians. Koter posits, women

that loyally support a politician ‘can convert their social clout into material gains, by cashing

in on their involvement in the community’ (2013: 196). This patron-client system grants

females, specifically rural women, an increased access to resources, with their wealth ideally

permeating across the whole community. In some cases, resources may involve the building

of schools, new roads and health centres, with other developments taking place also.

Nonetheless, by operating women’s groups within neopatrimonial circles it is common for

men to manipulate political systems in support of the individuals they gained resources

from. This enables extensive control of the developmental agenda akin to the interests of

the powerful patriarchs. Nigeria showcases a strong example of this, as the Nigerian

Godfathers were at the ‘apex of a vast patronage network at federal, state and local level’

(Wyk, 2007:10). Often these Godfathers became regional warlords or incessant

governmental elites that exercised ardent political and financial control in the country. The

neopatrimonial clique’s of the Godfathers thwarted women groups accessing political

structures, and commonly remained low-key actors that were accountable to the male

politician. This assertion showcases that within Nigerian politics, only a small fraction of

females are participating as a result of the social huddles and challenges placed in their way

(Ipinyomi, 2014). This rampant corruption had hindered women in manoeuvring themselves

in positions of authority, as they became marginalised with neopatrimonial connections and

without.

3.4 Conclusion

Through the recognition of the post-colonial relationship between the women’s movement

and neopatrimonialism, this chapter has examined three implications that have revealed

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Chapter Three

why the movement deemed it necessary to challenge the patriarchal patronage networks.

Single ruling parties that had emerged from the 1960s onwards undertook a process of

centralisation, dominating associational activity. Therein, women’s organisations were

either co-opted into the ruling party from the beginning of a leader’s regime or created by

the party itself, as they became women’s wings. Often, kinship allegiance of the ruler

supported and led these women’s wings, as First Ladies emerged to exacerbate the spread

of patronage throughout sub-Saharan Africa. These female elites were supporting the

developmental status quo, with narrow agendas and interests remaining at the top and

were often incapable of implementing class cohesion. Thus, a disparity between low and

upper class women had developed, with rural female groups becoming dissatisfied with the

state and often mobilised against the ideologies of the patrimonial elite. Yet, operating

outside of neopatrimonialism was just as problematic for the women’s movement. Lacking

resources and influence, female groups had contended with powerful political candidates

and influential patriarchs with resources at their disposal. However, the 1980s and 1990s

democratic transition created important opportunities for women in pursuit of challenging

the neopatrimonial state. Chapter four will consider the state’s loss of authority, changing

global political arena and rejuvenated society as essential for African women to establish

these intentions.

17

CHAPTER FOUR

Opening-up space for African women’s movements

Over the course of the previous chapters, neopatrimonialism has showcased a strong and

undeterred political influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, as this chapter considers, the

1980s and 1990s democratic shift has created important opportunities for women in pursuit

of challenging the neopatrimonial state. Beginning with the internal contributions,

patronage politics were experiencing an identity crisis, with deteriorating legitimacy and

economic predicaments encouraging women’s groups to openly defy and disengage from

the failing government. Similarly, internal democratic transitions emerged as international

pressures of Western governance structures were being positioned, facilitating a feminine

insurgency within the political order. The post-independence era also experienced an

expansion of other civil society movements, with youth, labour and religious groups

emerging alongside women’s organisations in order to contribute to the democracy and

challenge the state.

4.1 State’s loss of authority

The notion of the state’s loss of authority emerged amidst an identity crisis for sub-Saharan

African politics, as many governments experienced a crisis of accumulation, with diminishing

resources access for patriarchal elites. Though, the region has a wealth of sizeable reserves,

with Ghana alone estimated to possess oil reserves of more than 800 million barrels (Crown

Agents, 2016), many states were struggling with accumulation difficulties. Rather than

investing capital into the economy to create more profits, which in turn were reinvested,

political leaders underinvested and economic development strategies grew erroneous.

Patronage practices were arguably the driving force here, as the state became the core

conduit of wealth and power in sub-Saharan Africa, often overlooking and obstructing

economic and social imperatives. Yet, the increasing accumulation crisis had meant

resources were scarce, limiting the influence leaders upheld among their bureaucratic

officials. Thus, the ‘hand-out mentalities’ (Boege, Brown and Clements. 2009: 18) were in

decline as the ancient regime of governmental coercion and personal politics were no longer

effective. Seemingly, the prospect for entire state collapse was a realistic possibility, as is the

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Chapter Four

case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia. Bøås and Utas (2014) had

revealed that Liberian civil unrest and crisis of governance meant the logic of official office

was secondary to alternative roles. Yet, some political elites were not just overlooking this

descent in political order; rather they were actively withdrawing the state and further

abandoning public obligations. The gulf between the failing state and women’s groups had

begun to grow as patriarchal elites relied on their own counsel and expertise to consolidate

the development agenda. These predatory states attempted to capture the state’s

institutions for the purpose of self-enrichment (Calland, 2016). Yet, this is not to say the

women’s movements passively permitted these actions from the state, nor does it mean the

decline of the state results in the collapse of civil society. Instead, by losing touch with the

African people in the mid-1980s and underproviding basic services, civil society began to

openly rebel against these structures, with women’s groups extricating and becoming

independent from the increasingly introverted and failing state. To this end, women’s

groups began strengthening relationships with non-state actors, with the evolving crisis of

stateness precipitating this arrangement. Somalia is a case in point, with the civil war

culminating in state collapse in 1991, and though opposing militia’s committed widespread

atrocities against women, the civil war constituted a blessing in disguise for Somali women.

Seemingly, female groups seized the opportunity to denounce state actions and collectively

hold demonstrations for peace through chanting and reciting poetry. This assertion is

supported by Ingiriis and Hoehne as they state ‘after such recitations warring militiamen felt

not only humbled, but also were compelled to accept the message carried by female poetry

– that is, to end war and hostility’ (2013: 321).

Thus, associational activity began a process of detachment from the governmental

structures that had previously constrained them. Women groups were outwardly drawing

on their oppression to create a new public image in challenging the authoritative order.

Whereas, ‘the neopatrimonial leader often cultivated a paternal image’ (Olayode, 2005: 31),

women demonstrated a challenging and authoritative presence. To this end, the crisis of

accumulation and deteriorating governance provided women’s groups with a platform for

mobilisation, as these unintended consequences enabled women’s organisations to

challenge state clientelism. Tripp (2013) notes the importance of resources having shifted

toward civil society organisations and away from state corruption, as women’s groups

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Chapter Four

overtly sought to improve their withstanding by defying the political status quo. Yet, other

scholars have observed that African women did not just challenge the state, rather they had

openly rejected it. As Geisler posits, corrupt political regimes ‘had led many African women

to opt out or disengage from the state, seeking to pursue their specific agendas in whatever

autonomous spaces are available’ (2004: 143). By disengaging from state structures and the

crisis of accumulation and governance, women chose to use their existing women’s groups

to focus on the social and economic concerns that had so far been overlooked by the

patron. Seemingly, this strengthened the relationship between women’s groups and other

non-state actors, with sub-national governance structures constituting avenues for women

to participate in influencing the development agendas at the community level. Within

Uganda, ‘a range of new parliamentary and local government seats were created for

women-only competition, thus separating women’s groups political engagement from the

mainstream of political competition’ (Goetz and Hassim, 2003: 13). Focusing on the positive

aspects of governmental deterioration is encouraged by Boege et al, as they state it is

‘important to stress the positive potential rather than the negative features of so-called

fragile states – de-emphasising weakness … and focusing on hybridity, generative processes,

innovative adaption and ingenuity’ (2008: 16). Insofar as, through the crisis of legitimacy

and resources, political space was created as women began to directly challenge the elite

and his political fealty. Women were openly oppositionist, displaying slogans of protest and

brandishing their political disdain. Zairian protestors demonstrated this as they ardently

vociferated Mobutu voleur (Mobutu thief) as a backlash for the Presidents opulent lifestyle

(Walton and Seddon, 1994). By contesting the parochial interests and corrupt politicians of

the debilitated state, women were able to ensure key issues of gender remained at the fore.

At the same time, other scholars are ambivalent of the state’s loss of authority. Where

women’s organisations have usually risen to foster social cooperation and improve female

rights, without formal state structures civil society might serve as a deleterious tool within

the country. Posner supports this argument and posits that groups could emerge that ‘sow

distrust and ferment violence [like] warlord gangs [and] mafia organisations’ (2004: 237).

Thus, disengagement from state structures is only relatively positive and women’s

movements must ensure they relinquish the benefits from the potentially new political

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Chapter Four

orders. Nonetheless, state collapse was becoming a reality, with deteriorating legitimacy

and economic descent necessitating a shift from neopatrimonial governing tactics.

4.2 Changing international political arena

The vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa had undergone a democratic insurgency in the

1990s. Botswana, for example, experienced a reinvention of ‘stable, competitive multiparty

politics based on a republican parliamentary model of governance’ (Brown and Kaiser, 2007:

1133). The dissolution of patriarchal hegemony and transition to a liberalised state enabled

women to contest for office. At the state level, the increase of a female political presence

demonstrated a transformative agenda as women’s issues, such as education, health care

and social welfare emerged, testing the patriarchal confinements of traditional

development itineraries. Arguably, by addressing and promoting political reform, women at

the executive level had incentivised engagements among the masses; sending an implicit

message that governmental structures are to be ventured by females and not just male-

controlled entities. Barnes and Burchard (2012) further this notion and suggest women act

as political symbols, providing a gender-specific campaign that mobilises support. The

governments that considered the warnings of state failure endeavoured to steer their

authoritarian system toward stability. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa’s domestic political affairs

were in transition, and consequently the nation-state was becoming positioned within

global governance. The changing international political arena enabled multi-level

capabilities for the women’s movements, as embattled elites were not just undergoing

domestic pressures for political restructure. Subsequently, the global governmental

situation experienced a shift toward political pluralism, as democracy and liberal freedoms

were revered. International bodies, such as the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) focused democratic governance in sub-Saharan Africa and advocated for women’s

empowerment and increasing women’s participation in politics. According to the UNDP,

they seek ‘to eliminate gender biases in national and international development’ (2016).

Thus, the 1990s was a centrifugal period, creating modern rational-legal institutions that

were eradicating patronage networks. Concepts of good governance emerged, epitomising

‘predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking … and a strong civil society participating in

public affairs’ (World Bank, 1994: vii). Additionally, fair elections had ruptured authoritarian

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Chapter Four

state formations, insofar as, the creation of ‘bureaucracy, impartial legal systems, rule of

law, depersonalisation of state revenues and resources’ were permeating across much of

sub-Saharan Africa (Fosu, 2013: 195). Yet, this internal development was externally

propositioned with the United States (US) spearheading the transitions during the Cold War,

as democratic ideals were strategically managed within the sub-Saharan African region.

Though female groups were benefitting from increased political presences at the national

level, African women did not always benefit.

Masculine notions of nuclear warfare and proxy wars were still commanding the

international spotlights; underscoring a palpable fear of the future. These hegemonic

masculinities were mirrored in the remaining neopatrimonial regimes, as power struggles

and rivalries between political ethnic factions were evident. Remarking on militias, Raleigh

notes that organised armed violence were utilised as ‘political elites co-opt militias to

achieve their goals’ (2015: 289) and are formed ‘to deal with local security concerns for

small ethnoregional groups’ (ibid. 290). To this end, the benefits of militia violence remain

with men, as weak patron accountability facilitates human rights abuses carrying out

widespread destruction of villages and sexual violence, among opposing political and ethnic

appellations. However, these conflicts unearthed stronger political autonomy for females as

women’s movements actively campaigned for their integration within mainstream political

activity. Achieving this was seemingly through an understanding of the Western third wave

of feminism, whose prominent issues focused on furthering the scope along ethnic and

social lines. Citing an example, Cheeseman, Anderson and Schiebler state the Nigerian

Women’s Union (NWU) ‘came together across regional and ethnic colonial divisions … and

to lobby for the extension of suffrage to all Nigerian women instead of excluding’ (2013:

150). This marks a significant advance from colonial rule as new levels of democratisation

expanded the opportunities for women and the movement. By abandoning their

authoritarian structures and the dissolution of their monopoly on political processes had

meant many African governments were able to re-legitimise along rational legal terms. Yet,

sceptics have questioned whether the democratic amendment had altered the

neopatrimonial presence. As the constitutional shift was externally imposed upon sub-

Saharan political orders and the weak historical roots of African democracy, had meant

some states were rejecting the Western multi-party ideals. Certain leaders whom had

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Chapter Four

rejected this political shift justified their refusal for the transition. La Palombara and Weiner

(2015) support this argument, noting that Ghanaian President Nkrumah habitually attacked

federalism in the Congo, deeming this form of democracy as socially divisive. In other cases,

neopatrimonialism was not directly eradicated by democracy; rather the Western liberal

rhetoric was often disconnected from real situations. Seemingly, the corruption malady was

so ingrained within the public psyche to the extent that delegation and decentralisation of

political power to civil society and public bodies was not adequate. As Joseph contends,

‘domestic and external actors can still effect democratic transitions, but leaders who come

to power via reasonably fair elections can resume monopolistic practices’ (2014: 65). In such

corrupt societies, civil society movements are frequently weak or underdeveloped.

However, the post-independence experienced an expansion of other civil society

movements, with youth, labour and religious groups emerging to contribute to democracy.

4.3 Rejuvenated civil society

Democratic reform experienced particularly significant pressures from the civil society

associations within sub-Saharan Africa. Depicting democracy as a master frame for

gendered initiatives, Viterna and Fallon reason that ‘women’s movements will achieve more

feminist gains in states where these master frames are both broadly accepted by the public’

(2008: 671). This new political landscape for women’s groups sets the scene for other civil

society associations to critically debate the issues surrounding government policies.

Accordingly, Howell and Mulligan state that ‘women’s organisations serve as a useful

barometer for assessing the development of civil society in a context of state dominance

and rapid socio-economic change’ (2005: 247). To this end, numerous civil society

associations were challenging the corrupt and narrow development agendas, which

featured heavily within the majority of neopatrimonial states. Youth, born in the 1980s and

later, constitute a group that came of age during political democratic restructure and the

reinvigoration of women’s movements in sub-Saharan Africa. However, young citizens

within the region had still contended with a multitude of contradictions and ambivalences

pertaining to their independence and movements within society. Young women especially

experience restrictions as they were often tied to marriage, child-care and household

responsibilities and frequenting places outside of the home was uncommon. Observing the

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Chapter Four

Ghanaian youth of Madina, Langevang and Gough posit that their narratives were ‘infused

with imageries entailing hierarchical distinctions between the rural and the urban, low-

income and high-income residential areas’ (2009: 753). Seemingly, this political order was

embedded in the youth’s consciousness and opportunities to break free from these

confinements were impotent. That being said, the women’s organisations that detached

from neopatrimonialism and advocated democratic transitions had ignited a similar

response from the youth. Groups of young African women had emerged and decried

corruption, echoing decades of popular condemnation, with movements of young African’s

passionately striving for participation in democratic political processes and an eagerness to

lead their nation’s development agendas. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and

AIDs (UNAIDS) notes the importance of inspiring these youth as ‘sourcing the power and

potential of the region’s young people will provide enormous opportunity for growth’ (2015:

15). However, this is not purely a political endeavour as progressions have been made to

ensure young women can gain labour opportunities and earn an income independent from

the familial patriarch. In terms of agriculture, ‘women comprise 43 percent of the

agricultural labour force’ (Filmer and Fox, 2014: 115) but are often left unpaid with the

male-member progressing from non-farm activities first. Seemingly, this prompted changes

as democratic society’s encouraged new labour opportunities for women in sub-Saharan

Africa.

The emergence of Household Enterprises (HEs) has showcased informal non-farm

enterprises. HEs are a form of self-employment together with casual workers or family

members to assist the production of a service. Such examples may be hairdressing or

dressmaking; producing low-cost items that are traded at local markets and within village

shops. Though HEs foster progression from agricultural and household duties for women

and enables economic independence away from the patriarch, focusing on these forms of

employment is problematic. Fox supports this notion, arguing that the ownership of

informal enterprises are ‘seasonal ventures … [and] females are disadvantaged with respect

to earnings’ (2012: 29). To this end, though men are more likely to engage in urban

employment opportunities, the informal male-owned enterprises that do exist have

contended with fewer constraints regarding other responsibilities at the household level.

Consequently, productivity is often comparatively higher than if the enterprise was female-

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Chapter Four

owned. Yet, with the consolidation of democratic regimes, women were able to establish

themselves in labour movements. One aspect of democracy is the extent to which differing

interest groups are represented within the developmental agenda and decision-making

process, with trade unions emerging to facilitate such endeavours. In the 1990s, the

Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) ‘called for the restoration of multi-party

democracy and took the initiative to campaign for its restorations’ (Maree, 2012: 13). By

maintaining a democratic space the ZCTU could oversee the peaceful and legitimate power

transfer from one party to another, ensuring each interest group is represented and

participating within the new regime. However, remarking on gender, Kester rejects this

assumption and states that ‘trade unions have seldom provided adequate representation of

women at decision-making levels and as such tended to be poor at representing women and

their interests within democratic structures’ (2016: 226). To this end, trade unions were

important in consolidating democracy, yet their focus remained on male-dominated activity

with no gendered initiatives emerging within the labour movement. Seemingly, this

showcases that governmental structures still restricted aspects of associational activity, as

development agendas were controlled by the patriarchal elite and the leaders of civil society

groups were subordinate to the state’s interests. This was also the case in religious groups

as ‘the state’s overreach to control the leadership of even ordinary civil society institutions

ranging from labour unions to religious institutions makes people completely vulnerable’

(Schneider and Nega, 2013: 238).

Within religion, men have often justified their oppression of women

with holy literatures, depicting God as a father ruling the world through a network of men.

Some verses within the Bible, for example, limit the advancement of women in sub-Saharan

Africa and renders male dominance as an auspicious outcome. This has remained an

extensive obstacle toward gender equality within the region as the parochial

understandings of religious texts have denounced the social, political and economic

ramifications women oppose. Furthermore, within Islamic sects, structures tend to be less

democratic, often religious extremism is advocated, and one-party states are favoured. This

often reproduces oppressive patriarchal structures that control most aspects of a women’s

life, including appearance, education and finance. Rwafa furthers this argument and states

within Islamic extremism ‘girls are not allowed to go to school, and that western-educated

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Chapter Four

girls can actually be punished by death’ (2016: 45). Thus, religion has long been established

as a social cleavage dividing political factions between, and within, societies. This is notably

demonstrated in Nigeria’s Boko Haram, with the religious Jihad motivating the destruction

of democratic ideologies, with girls and women caught in between the political hostilities.

To this end, religious groups have a rare luxury other interest movements do not have, as

notions of Christianity and Islamism supersede the state’s interests. That being said, some

churches and mosques benevolently emerged as a significant force within the anti-

authoritarian regime. Inciting change, ‘church and mosque pulpits were used to hold

governments to account … and provided leadership for a rejuvenated society … [and]

through this leadership, mass discontent was channelled into a call for multi-party

democracy’ (Thompson, 2010: 251).. This may explain why women in sub-Saharan still

maintain a staunch practice of religion. In fact, studies suggest that there are only minor

gender differences in both Christian and Islamic religions, as a high degree of religious

commitment is prevalent among both genders (Pew Research Center, 2016).Therefore, the

male accoutrements within religion has not lessened a women’s loyalty to her faith.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has displayed how post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa had reached something of a

watershed in the 1980s and 1990s. The internal domestic politics within the region

demonstrated that the state was experiencing an identity crisis because of the prevailing

legitimacy and resource crises. Within this, some patriarchal states further withdrew from

their public responsibilities and abandoned gender-inclusive developmental agendas.

Subsequently, women’s groups began a process of disengagement from neopatrimonial

political structures as illustrated within Zaire. External transitions were also apparent, as the

1990s, democratic insurgency was emerging under the auspices of the Western liberal

agenda. Stable multi-party politics based on rational-legal structures facilitated

opportunities for women to express their autonomy and demand an increased political

presence. Thus, the developmental agenda began developing from personal politics for

male elites and toward gender-inclusive policies. Yet on the one hand, masculine notions

were underpinning the majority of mainstream political activity at the global and national

levels, with political and ethnic divisions interrupting female advances within governing

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Chapter Four

orders. On the other, women’s associations were one component in a wider trend of civil

society movements emerging in sub-Saharan Africa. Youth movements emerged to contest

political corruption and groups of young women mobilised to ensure economic gains

independent from patriarchal control. These economic endeavours a positioned within a

wider labour movement as the ZCTU highlighted in their support for democratic transitions

in sub-Saharan Africa. Though religious sects often reflected patriarchal structures within

the development agenda, faith groups had emerged to incite change toward a democratic

order. Overall, the 1980s and 1990s state’s loss of authority, changing international political

arena and rejuvenated society opened up space for women’s associations to challenge the

neopatrimonial state and support democratic transitions. Furthermore, the twenty-first

century further reveals new possibilities for women to advance their political importance in

the region. Chapter five considers these opportunities, with constraints considered also, as

the neopatrimonial regime still exists in states with women’s groups aiming to establish

themselves political, economically and in securing a safe future.

27

CHAPTER FIVE

Into the twenty-first century: New constraints, new possibilities

As chapter, four elucidated, necessary political shifts provided opportunities for African

women’s movements to challenge the neopatrimonial state and restructure it toward a

democratic order. Yet, at the turn of the twenty-first century, women’s movements were

still contending with corrupt patriarchal elites, with gendered-inclusivity not guaranteed.

Herewith, chapter five assesses the current constraints and possibilities for women’s groups

in challenging the developmental agenda. The chapter identifies that democratic transitions

have not permeated the whole region, as some state’s still possess authoritarian rule with

neopatrimonialism remaining a governmental underpinning. Yet, seemingly, states that

have transitioned to democracy means opportunities are emerging for a benign

developmental agenda toward raising gender-based issues. Two case studies are compared

and contrasted to support this assertion, with Nigeria and Rwanda analysed regarding their

political, economic and security policies towards the women’s movements.

5.1 Raising gender-inclusive politics

Since the early 1990s, the mobilisation of women in sub-Saharan Africa was a

transformation concurrent with the democratic dynamic of the state. The regions political

landscape had undergone reforms, with the decline of one-party regimes and corrupt

political elites coinciding with an evolving civil society; giving the impression that

neopatrimonial development orthodoxies were deteriorating. Nigeria was such an example,

setting a precedent for rational-legal institutions and eluding the colonial constitutional

imprint; thus culminating a shift in their governmental modus operandi. As stated in the

Financial Times, ‘last year’s acceptance of electoral defeat by Goodluck Jonathan, then

Nigeria’s president, was seized upon by optimists as a sign that leaders were putting the

institutional process above their personal egos and fortunes (2016). Although democratic

stability was not achieved until 1999, the role and status of Nigerian women has continued

to evolve within the political arena. Seemingly, the state’s education system has remained a

key component in affording women opportunities to rise in the male-dominated societies

and demand equality in participating within the government. Falola (2013) supports this

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assertion, purporting that intelligent, educated and confident Nigerian women were

emerging in leading occupations to challenge many aspects of patriarchy and are gradually

organising to ensure the political sphere expands adequately to accommodate them.

Though within the pre-colonial period Nigerian women held larger positions in politics as

Queenmothers were central to negotiations and gaining the respect of her community,

currently women still contend with restrictions regarding their political participation.

Arguably, the factors responsible for this are the regressive discriminatory customs and

laws. Agbalajobi furthers this notion and states that ‘the overall impact of gender bias,

cultural norms and practices entrenched a feeling of inferiority in women and place them at

a disadvantage vis-à-vis their male counterpart in the socio-political scene’ (2010: 79).

Subsequently, it seems the Nigerian state should continue their democratic trajectory but

ensure that gender-inclusive politics remain at the forefront of the nation’s developmental

vision. However, some states within sub-Saharan Africa have not embarked on a

constitutional amendment nor are experiencing a shift from a dictatorship in the near

future. Focusing on Rwanda, the NGO Freedom House asserts that it ‘has become

one of the most repressive countries in Africa, continuing its anti-democratic trajectory as

the government works to close civic space in the run-up to the contentious 2017 elections’

(2015). Arguably, unlike Jonathan’s support for democracy in Nigeria, Rwandan President

Kagame’s regime ardently suppresses opposition candidates and restricts demonstrations

against his political vision. Although, democratic arrangements have been introduced in the

state with the Arusha Peace Accords outlining a transition plan, the hostilities and fervent

violence of the 1994 genocide had immediately halted processes. Moreover, the draft

constitution released in 2003 provided bicameral parliaments and multi-party politics. Yet,

Kagame had banned the main opposition party Mouvement Democratique Republicain

(MDR) in the same year (IRIN, 2003), with his ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

controlling the governmental structures. Such parochial self-aggrandisement on the part of

Kagame has impaired women’s associations desperate to elude these neopatrimonial

endeavours of the patriarchal elite. By undermining democratic amendments in Rwanda,

the political elite have arguably put power before country, with a complex arrangement that

safeguards the political interests of the RPF and its advocates. Seemingly, certain aspects of

Kagame’s tenure have returned to former neopatrimonial regimes, bribing key officials for

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political support that remain ‘harboured today in parts of the politico-military establishment

in Kigali’ (Booth and Mubeti, 2011: 6). For Rwandan women aiming to manoeuvre

themselves into political structures, patriarchal patrimonialism has hindered their

opportunities. Adams supports this assertion, stating that ‘women rulers in patriarchal

patrimonialism were anomalies, and as such likely to be coded as polluting or actively

threatening, as sources of unwelcome ambiguity and instabilities in the categories of rule’

(2003: 9). With that being said, women have made vast strides towards equality since the

1994 genocide, as they encompass a new generation of independent, ambitious and self-

reliant African women; emulating the rise of educated Nigerian women mentioned earlier.

To this end, democratic shifts are not always necessary in ensuring a staunch political

orientation toward gender-inclusive politics. Rather, Kagame’s approach to gender rights

has deviated from the sub-Saharan developmental norms, as reconstruction of state

governance is distinctly promoting new vital roles for women in politics. Topping (2014)

furthers this notion and posits that 64% of parliamentarians are women, the highest

proportion of any parliament in the world. Gendered initiatives are enshrined in their

constitution, as the state continues to support the rise of Rwandan women in rebuilding the

nation. Therefore, Kagame’s RPF were boosting women’s representation in political

processes. These conscientious decisions to focus on gender equality have advanced women

from victims in the genocide to powerful decision-makers, as developmental agendas

remain prominently toward a female-inclusive governmental vision.

5.2 Economic independence

The antithetical bases between democracy and neopatrimonialism seem obvious, yet the

structures that secure men’s power in the state, the economic and private revelations were

not always dismantled by the transition to pluralism and government accountability. Even

well-established democracies such as Nigeria have shown informal barriers like the cultural

and social understandings that women must play a subordinate role in the economy and

should remain within the private domain. Within this, ‘these kind of ideologies about

women have tended to marginalise … [and] belittle … women’s contributions to the

economic wellbeing of the home and society’ (Okoyeuzu, Obiamaka and Onqumere,

2012:18). Additionally, employment instability and gendered wage gaps have continued to

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constrain a women’s access to a sufficient income. Where women should be provided with

maximum opportunities in order to participate fully in their role in the economic growth of

Nigeria, unpaid female work and restrictions on financial education showcases the Nigerian

state has remained negligible on the part of gender equality. Though the Nigerian state is

central in implementing and amending the constitution, there are regional bodies that may

prove more beneficial to the women’s movements in redressing the gendered economic

imbalance. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have emerged under the auspices of the

African Union (AU). Accordingly, under the 1991 Abuja Treaty ‘the purpose of RECs is to

facilitate regional economic integration between members of the individual regions and

through the wider African Economic Community (AEC)’ (AU, 2016). Nigeria, a member of the

Western REC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) facilitates

economic regional cooperation; expanding its utility to that of regional security, a court of

justice, administrative duties, alongside its other provincial functions. Additionally, the

ECOWAS chairpersons’’ accession to power is achieved through free, fair and transparent

elections. For women within the ECOWAS borders, the benefits have been substantial with

the ECOWAS dedicating an institution to focus solely on gender polices. The ECOWAS

Gender Development Centre (EGDC) (2016) promotes networking and coordination,

capacity building through training and awareness raising, development programmes,

research and advocacy. Seemingly, basing the system on the recognition of the state as a

primary actor in gender-inclusive policies is incautious, as regional bodies have somewhat

successfully ensured a strict adherence to democratic principles and economic

independence for women. Thus, neopatrimonialism in Nigeria and the decentralisation of

power at all levels of governing structures should be deteriorating. Yet, according to Brown

and Kaiser even in “successive military and democratically elected governments in Nigeria

have squandered billions of dollars through mismanagement and corruption” (2007: 1134).

This is in contrast to Rwanda’s staunch anti-corruption commitments. Agreeing with

this assertion is Transparency International (2016) as their 2015 Corruption Perceptions

Index (CPI) declared Rwanda as the 3rd least corrupt nation in sub-Saharan Africa and the

least corrupt among the East African community. Though Rwanda is showing a decline in

democratic principles, its anti-corruption measures have formed the basis of ongoing

gendered advocacy campaigns that addresses women in cities, rural areas and institutions

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throughout the country. However, as with Nigeria, the Rwandan state cannot adequately

initiate a continued commitment to women in their struggle to improve their social and

political stature within the nation. That being said, unlike ECOWAS with gendered economic

provisions remaining a pillar to the regional body, the Central REC, the Economic

Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has yet to formulate substantial dialogues or

policies for a regional gender strategy. This is problematic as ‘particularly during the long

civil wars and crises in Central African countries … girls and women were abused’ (African

Development Bank, 2011: 8). Without gender-inclusive economic measures entrenched

within the ECCAS principles and vision, women are still omitted from participating within key

processes to ensure their representation within the nation-building project. Furthermore,

regional actors could prove valuable in inciting a shift toward regional women’s movements.

This is beneficial as regional bodies solely dedicated to challenging state orthodoxies could

assume a more influential role in encouraging gender-inclusive agendas as the

developmental norm across sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, collective groupings of

women have been established within some sub-regional groups. This is demonstrated by

the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with the Federation of

National Associations of Women in Business (FEMCOM) established to promote the

interests of women entrepreneurs. With an institution based in Rwanda, FEMCOM can

function ‘as a forum for exchanging ideas and experience among women entrepreneurs of

the subregion, as well as an instrument for encouraging and facilitating the setting up or

expansion of enterprises’ (Ruppel, 2009: 287). While this forms as a firm foundation in

working towards the empowerment of African women in remaining a challenge to the

deleterious political order, without democracy in Rwanda this is somewhat squandered.

Where democracy can entail an all-inclusive system, it is contemptuous that women are

often systematically excluded from participating within the economic processes of Rwanda.

5.3 Eradicating gender-based violence

Within the democratic structures of Nigeria’s political order, female politicians have

experienced heightened levels of physical violence and psychological threats regarding their

candidacy. To this end, patriarchal elites continue to strategically reinforce the entrenched

developmental norms of male-domination and undermine the participation and integration

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of women’s perspectives within governmental processes. The lead up to the 2015 Nigerian

elections had demonstrated high levels of intimidation and gender-based violence.

According to Safir and Alam, ‘these harms hamper women’s ability to exercise political voice

through voting, activism, public dialogue, campaigning and running for or holding office’

within Nigeria (2015: 3). Thus, despite the democratic achievements and progress made in

Nigeria, women still contend with major challenges and obstacles. These continued high

rates of violence against women within governance structures have culminated a response

from women’s groups in protesting together around rights-based issues. Though the

twenty-first century has not progressed women’s groups into continent-wide movements,

there are signs of pan-African women’s associations beginning to emerge. Seemingly, these

are coalescent around certain issues, with rape and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)

constituting a continued focus for women’s movements in Nigeria. As Okeke, Anyaehie and

Ezenyeaku posit, ‘FGM is widely recognised as a violation of human rights, which is deeply

rooted in cultural beliefs and perceptions over decades and generations with no easy task to

change’ (2012: 70). This abuse of a women’s autonomy regarding health, security and

physical integrity led many female associations to directly challenge the state in efforts to

eliminate FGM in Nigeria. Though rural cohorts of women joined the crusade to reject FGM,

it is at the international level that has created frameworks for gendered initiatives at the

national level, with security remaining a prominent issue. The AU having launched an

African Women’s Decade 2010-2020 (AWD), aimed to guide the participation of African

Women ‘within local and international consultations on women’s rights and gender

equality’ (CARRMA: 2016). Distinct objectives of the AWD remain, as focus follows areas of

women’s empowerment, economic development and health with many other core aims

promoted and worked toward. This is a useful platform for women in sub-Saharan Africa as

women’s political, economic, social and cultural progress is integrated into a single agenda.

Moreover, ensuring African governments remain committed to gender issues and parity is

fundamental. Each year entails a new theme, with 2016 focusing on peace and security and

violence against Women. Such external pressures had seemingly urged former President

Jonathan to ban the FGM practice in 2015 and to develop national plans in line with

objectives of the AWD.

Thus, ‘at the international level, women’s peace and security concerns

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are now an accepted part of the normative peacebuilding effort of institutions like the UN

Peacebuilding Commission’ (Tripp, 2015: 42). That being said, global initiatives are often

implemented at a slow rate with conventional strategies re-forming within national political

structures. The UN, in establishing goals for female participation, is problematic, as the

percentage of elected positions within the international organisation remains proportionally

lower for women with males retaining high levels of permanent representation. With this,

local governance structures have consolidated to empower women and their communities

in stopping gender-based violence and demanding accountability (Kimani, 2012). It is usually

particular localities that render women more vulnerable to gender-based violence, with

burglary, theft and rape exacerbated within low-income rural areas. Indeed, within urban

settlements, violence occurs with little recourse for protection, but women are usually left

most insecure when settled within the state margins. To this end, grassroots level policy

approaches command compliance from national level structures and raise awareness of the

perverse developmental agendas. Yet, some scholars reject this assumption and instead

assert that local activist organisations are most effective with national and international

support. Weldon and Hutun posit that bottom-up women’s groups ‘bring home the value of

international regional treaties … international norms and autonomous feminist mobilisation

magnified the effect of one another’ (2013: 245). Within Rwanda, local organisations

campaigning for an end to violence against women have utilised assistance through training

and other capacity building initiatives from the UN and national organisations. As financial

resources are often scarce for local women’s movements, this is beneficial where ‘funds are

released from the government and the international donor community … dedicated to

combating violence against women’ (UN Rwanda, 2008: 26). An overt promotion of local

women by the Rwandan elites and gender-sensitive leadership, particularly by Kagame, has

enabled ‘the grassroots mobilisation of women in Rwanda to culminate in formal political

representation’ (Berry, 2015: 150). This in turn, empowers women to drawn on their

gender-specific knowledge and experiences to bring political, economic and social issues to

the fore. Therefore, micro, meso and macro organisation levels constitute a powerful force

in ensuring peace and security for women in Rwanda and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa,

provided they all cooperate through similar development agendas and safeguard women’s

interests at the community level and beyond.

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5.4 Conclusion

Understanding the contemporary challenges and opportunities for women’s movements in

the twenty-first century has highlighted that a restructure toward democratic constitutions

enabled women to contest the patriarchal state and its monopoly of developmental

interests. Within Nigeria, free and fair elections along with an increasingly educated class of

women has further pressurised the government to maintain an orientation toward gender-

inclusive politics. Though Rwanda still has neopatrimonial tendencies, with ardent one-party

systems and parochial development agendas, women parliamentarians are continuously

increasing as Kagame’s gendered initiatives and anti-corruption measures remain at the

forefront of its constitution. Thus, women’s groups have shown to be most successful in

particular states that raise the profile of women’s issues and maintains a strong orientation

toward gender-inclusive policies. Moreover, in both Nigeria and Rwanda, the state is key in

formulating policy and institutional changes, that is, to tackle the fundamental causes of

monetary gender inequities and remove the obstacles that hinder women’s involvements in

economic and wider development strategies. However, the quest for peace and security for

women cannot primarily remain a state obligation. AU organs and RECs cooperating with

sub-Saharan states and their civil society actors constitute necessary arrangements to

ensure safety and the integration for women and their challenge of the developmental

agenda. With this, regional efforts have extended the frontiers of outreach in sub-Saharan

Africa and working alongside civil society and international actors enables women’s groups

to ensure a benign development agenda toward raising gender-based issues.

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CONCLUSIONS

Using a gendered-lens to view civil society has enabled this study to determine the extent to

which women’s movements have emerged as a key force in challenging neopatrimonialism

and state patriarchy. The historical parameters undertaken in the paper had highlighted the

deleterious encounters women had contended with regarding their restricted mobility and

access to political sovereignty. Though pre-colonial women demanded public notions of

independence and rights, it was the patriarchal notions of authority within the colonial

period that had manifested within post-independence neopatrimonial structures. Having

said this, given the vastness of the region, problems arose when applying neopatrimonial

state structures to every sub-Saharan state. Hence, the generalisations exercised

throughout the paper will necessitate further study within the Africanist scholarship. By

further exploring the direct relationship between women’s movements and neopatrimonial

governance structures had revealed why women in sub-Saharan deemed it necessary to

challenge the patriarchal patronage networks. From the 1960s onwards, women’s

organisations became co-opted within or created by the one-party state with First Ladies

emerging to maintain the narrow interests of the patriarchal elite. This further

problematised the mobilisations of women in challenging the neopatrimonial state, as

divided interests between the females at the elite and rural levels had meant implementing

class and development cohesion remained difficult. Yet, the 1980s onwards had proved to

be a turning point for women’s movements in challenging the neopatrimonial state

orthodoxies. Internal governance structures were undergoing an identity crisis, with

external democratic pressures facilitating a developmental shift from personal patriarchal

politics to gender-inclusive policies. By displacing the personal interests of the individual and

disbanding the political fealty of the neopatrimonial state, women could progress in

establishing themselves as equal and not subordinate to men. This may remain an ambitious

agenda, but by increasing the dialogue of female-based issues at national and global levels,

women’s and other social movements can strengthen their effectiveness in opening up

space for democratic transitions. Rational-legal institutions and rule of law bureaucracy

assisted in accumulating opportunities for women to express their autonomy and demand

an increased political presence. Furthermore, this can prevent neopatrimonialism from

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remaining a defining characteristic of sub-Saharan African politics by relegating it to a lesser

entity within governance structures. Demonstrated in Nigeria and Rwanda, their somewhat

unwavered dedication toward gendered obligations highlighted the importance of states in

their role in gender-based issues. Though women’s organisations are representing a means

of challenging the developmental status quo within the neopatrimonial state, sub-Saharan

governments should maintain a staunch vision toward raising the profile of women’s rights

at the community, national and global levels. Yet, implications have occurred when

neopatrimonial politics positioned itself as a strong, undeterred influence in the region. This

had necessitated the state to extend its developmental direction toward regional and

international bodies to garner support for political, economic and peace and security

policies within the state. Seemingly, this has provided a direction for areas of future

research whereby the ability for women’s groups in challenging the neopatrimonial state

structures is further investigated, along with the role of regional and external bodies in their

pursuit of gender-inclusivity within the sub-Saharan political order.

37