Slide 1

Dear ladies and gentlemen.

I’d like to offer to your attention a briefing on “Verified cases of Russian

armaments and ammunition being transferred to the occupied territories of

Ukraine”

Slide 2

Despite the multiple appeals of both Ukraine and other countries, including

the UN Security Council, OSCE and other international organizations to stop illicit

transfer of the Russian armaments and military equipment to the Ukrainian

territory, Russia goes on with it, thus bluntly violating the international law.

The respective bodies of Ukraine regularly observe the cases of the large

amount of armaments and materiel, ammunition, POLs being transported from

Russia to the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions

through the uncontrolled part of the Ukrainian state border.

Since the start of 2016 we have detected modern Russian armaments’

presence near DONETSK, MAKIYIVKA, ILOVAYSK, TOREZ, ZAITSEVE,

LUHANSKE, NOVOSELIVKA, SHYROKYNE (DONETSK region) and

LUHANSK, POPASNA, KRASNYI LUTCH, ZOLOTE (LUHANSK region).

I would like to emphasize that this materiel in many cases is very

sophisticated systems, manufactured in Russia to be used for the air defence,

SIGINT, EW and communications. The use of such equipment requires the

operators to be specially trained in respective Russian educational military schools.

Now let’s look more closely into the cases of particular Russian armament

and materiel being identified in occupied areas of Donbas. I’d like to stress, that

I’m going to talk about the armaments and materiel which were produced in Russia

and are in service of its Armed forces or its allies and never been in the inventory

of the Ukrainian military.

Slide 3

First, a Russian T-72BM main battle tank of 1989 year model was

detected on March 26, 2016 during an exercise of the 100th Separate motorized

rifle brigade of the 1st AC, of the Russian occupation force in the TOREZ training

area, in Donetsk region. This type of the Russian main battle tank was seen earlier

in February 2016 during an exercise of the 4th

Separate tank battalion of the same

AC at the training area near the town of MOSPYNE, in Donetsk region.

This modification of T-72 main battle tank has never been and is not in the

inventory of Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Among the specific features of the T-72BM MBT, by which it can be

identified are, as follows:

1. “Luna” spotlight mounted to the right of the gun;

2. “Kontakt-5” turret-mounted dynamic protection system;

3. Body-mounted dynamic armour;

4. Specific shape of tracks.

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Slide 4

In April 2016 a Russian “Pantsir-S1” air defence system was detected in

the city of LUHANSK. This system was multiply seen in the occupied territories in

2014-2015. Such a system is usually used by Russian military command to cover

the Russian military convoys illegally entering Ukraine from Russia.

The “Pantsir-S1” guided missile/gun air defence system came into service

of the Russian Armed Forces in 2012. It is designed to cover troops and command

posts of the Russian Army or Air Defence battalions armed with S-300 or S-400

AD systems in the so-called short range Air Defence Zone.

The “Pantsir-S1” AD system is used exclusively by the Russian military. It

has been tested in combat conditions in Ukraine and Syria.

The identification features of the “Pantsir-S1” AD system are:

1. 12 pcs. ready to launch missile containers and 2 pcs. of 30-mm 2A38

twin-barrel automatic anti-aircraft guns;

2. Specific shape of the tracking radar;

3. Stern ladders;

4. Onboard technological equipment;

5. Four-axle chassis of Kamaz 6560 heavy utility truck.

This AD system is not in service of the Ukrainian military.

Slide 5 On April 8, 2016 a 9S482M7 Army Air Defence command post vehicle

was identified in the town of MAKIYIVKA (DONETSK region).

This command vehicle is designed to provide command and control for the

short and medium range Army Air Defence systems.

Such vehicles are not in service in the Armed forces of Ukraine.

The prototype of this command vehicle was demonstrated by Russia at

“MAKS-2007” aviation show in ZHUKOVSKYI (Moscow oblast of Russia) in

2007.

The identification features of 9S482M7 Army Air Defence command post

vehicle:

1. The bigger hull has a specific shape;

2. The turret is unarmed.

Slide 6

On May 10 and 12, 2016 a “Torn” SIGINT system was detected at the

combat position in the Northern part of YASYNUVATA. This brigade-level

SIGINT system is a standard equipment of the reconnaissance companies, which

are the part of either separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian

Armed forces.

Presumably, “Torn” SIGINT system is heavily used in Donbas occupied

areas to reconnoitre the distant positions of the Ukrainian forces.

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Slide 7

“Torn” SIGINT system is able to detect radio emitters at the range up to

70 km for HF band and up to 30 km for UHF band.

Moreover, it can intercept paging, cellular and trunking communications.

Number of simultaneously controlled users – up to 1024.

The identification features of “Torn” SIGINT system are:

1. A distinctive shape of the antenna;

2. A "КаmАZ-4310" chassis.

The system is not in the functionary of the Ukrainian military.

Slide 8

In early April, 2016 a RB-531B “Infauna” Electronic Warfare system

on a base of BTR-80 APC was detected in the town of MAKIYIVKA

(DONETSK region).

This system is designed to protect road vehicles and personnel from radio

fused explosive devices, and to jam the adversary communication system at the

battalion level.

The system is composed of: SIGINT and radio jamming system,

C3 equipment, optic-electronic reconnaissance means and aerosol-screen

equipment.

First “Infauna” type systems were put into service in EW units of

98th Airborne division (IVANOVO) and 7

th Mountain air assault division

(NOVOROSSIYSK) of Russian Airborne Forces. It is not in service of the Armed

forces of Ukraine.

Action range: for radio fuses jamming – up to 1 km, for radio

communication jamming – up to 20 km.

The identification features of the system are:

1. An antenna system cover;

2. A toolbox;

3. The bigger hull has a specific shape;

4. The turret is unarmed.

Slide 9

On April 7, 2016 an R-330Zh “Zhitel” EW system was observed at the

position ready for use near the town of MAKIIVKA (Donetsk region).

Slide 10

Later on April 12, 2016 the R-330ZH “Zhitel” EW system was observed

while on march in the town of MAKIIVKA.

The system is designed for jamming GSM base stations, satellite

communication terminals and GPS signals as well as for direction finding.

Jamming range – up to 30 km. Deployment time – 40 min.

The system came into service of Russian Armed Forces in 2008.

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This brigade-level system is a standard equipment of the EW companies,

which are the part of either separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian

Armed forces.

On May 9, 2016 another R-330ZH “Zhitel” EW system was also detected

near the city of LUHANSK. As the result of its use during the military parade of

the Victory Day all mobile operator signals in the area were jammed.

The identification features of the system are:

1. An automobile chassis of Russia-manufactured “Ural-43203” or

“КаmАZ-43114” military truck with trailer;

2. A distinctive shape of the GSM antenna system located on the trailer of

power generator;

3. A distinctive shape of the direction finder antenna.

Slide 11

On April, 19 an RB-341V “Leer-3” electronic warfare system was

detected in DONETSK, which is the organic jamming equipment of the EW

companies of the separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian Armed

forces.

It is designed to jam basic satellite communication stations, GPS devices,

“Inmarsat” and “Iridium” satellite communication terminals and also to imitate the

work of GSM base communication stations, conduct direction finding of GSM user

devices for the targeting of artillery. The system is equipped with “Orlan-10” UAV

with radio jamming equipment. It is able to block mobile user terminals in a radius

of 3,5-6 km. The combat range of UAV is 120 km.

The work of no less than 2 x RB-341V “Leer-3” EW system was

observed during 1st AC artillery attack on ATO Forces in AVDIYIVKA on May,

16.

The system was put into service in Russian Armed Forces in 2015.

The identification features of RB-341B “Leer-3” EW system are:

1. The distinctive wooden flooring over the roof that facilitates the antenna

system deployment;

2. UAV Remote Control module antenna mast in transport position is hung

at the top right of the shelter;

3. A hermetic shelter of “Leer-3” EW system;

4. A Kamaz-5350 three-axle vehicle chassis.

This system is purely Russian and not in the inventory of the Ukrainian

military.

Slide 12

On the 9 of March, 2016 a RB-636 “Svet-KU” electronic warfare system

was detected in DONETSK. It is designed for control of radio environment, radio

emission finding, detection and analysis, and also HF and UHF radio sources

position-finding. Action range up to 40 km. Deployment time – 10 min.

The system was put into service in Russian Armed Forces in 2012.

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The identification features of the system are:

1. A chassis of Russia-manufactured KamAZ-5320 two-axle vehicle;

2. A cover for special equipment and distinctive wooden flooring over the

roof that facilitates the antenna system deployment;

3. A distinctive transmitter module antenna mast mounted at the rear

board of the shelter;

4. A shape and technologic features of “Svet-KU” EW system shelter.

Slide 13

On March 9, 2016 an automated R-934 BMV jamming station was

observed in Artema str., the city of DONETSK.

It is designed to jam UHF aviation C3 lines, tactical aviation aiming

systems, land and mobile communication lines, cellular and trunking

communication systems. Action range on air targets – up to 400 km, action range

on land targets – up to 75 km.

The system came into service of the Russian military in 2014.

Distinctive features:

1. A three-axle chassis of Russia-manufactured KаmАZ-5350 truck;

2. A towed power unit;

3. A shape and technologic features of the automated R-934BMV

jamming station special universal hermetic shelter.

Slide 14

A Russian ZALA 421-08M tactical UAV was downed near the village of

NOVOSELIVKA (DONETSK region) on April 12, 2016. It is in the inventory

of the Russian military since 2008.

Slide 15

Earlier on March 28, 2016 another Russian "Granat-1" tactical UAV was

downed near the village of LUHANSKE (DONETSK region). It is in the inventory

of the Russian military since 2014.

External features, markings on parts and microchips indicate their

manufacture by the Russian defence industry enterprises (except for separate

elements made in China).

Both ZALA 421-08M and Granat-1 tactical UAVs are the aerial

components of “Grusha” and “Navodchik” Unmanned Aerial Systems, designed

for ISR, artillery spotting and real time intelligence transfer to command posts.

Their operation range is 10 km.

Slide 16

Since late 2014 up to date Ukrainian soldiers have regularly identified and

captured in the conflict area a large amount of the Russian small arms and

ammunition which have never been in production in Ukraine or in use by our

power structures.

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Slide 17

In particular: in January 2016, after the clash with the “DNR” militants

who infiltrated deep into the territory of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian

military, the troopers of Ukrainian Armed forces picked up couple of used tubes of

MPO-A "Borodach" man-portable thermobaric rocket launcher.

The distinctive markings on the tubes (year of manufacture and rocket

launcher indexes) revealed the Russian identity of that weaponry. It is in service of

the Russian Armed forces only and was put into service in Russian Armed Forces

in 2004. This particular piece was produced in 2008.

Slide 18

One used tube of another type of the Russian man-portable

thermobaric rocket launchers, which is RPO-A Shmel, was picked-up in late

February, 2016 by the Ukrainian troopers during the patrolling mission near

SHYROKYNE (DONETSK regions). According to the markings it was produced

in 2011.

Slide 19-20

Another used tube of the same RPO-A “Shmel” man-portable

thermobaric rocket launcher was picked up in February 2016 by the Ukrainian

Armed Forces troops after the exchange of fire with the militants near ZAITSEVE

(DONETSK region).

This weapon was put into service in 1988. It is exclusively used by the

nuclear bacterial chemical (NBC) units of the Russian Army.

Slide 21

On March 25th

, 2016 an improvised explosive device reworked out of

Russian RPO-A “Shmel” thermobaric rocket launcher was found near

ZOLOTE (Luhansk region). The rocket launcher was manufactured in Russia,

which is confirmed by the distinctive markings.

Slide 22

On March 29, 2016 an OG-7V fragmentation shell for RPG-7V antitank

rocket launcher was found between ZAITSEVO and MYKYTIVKA (Donetsk

region). According to the markings it was manufactured in 2007 at the factory

No. 56, “Planta” federal state unitary enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil, Russia).

Slide 23

Another projectile - a TBG-7V thermobaric rocket for RPG-7V rocket

launcher was found at the same day at the same position.

Slide 24 According to the markings it was manufactured in 2008 by the at the factory

No. 56, “Planta” federal state unitary enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil, Russia.

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Slides 25

At the following slides you can see additional samples of the Russian munition,

captured by the Ukrainian troops in the occupied territories of Donbas. The

examination of the markings reveals that they were manufactured in Russia.

For instance, an outdated Russian RPG-26 anti tank rocket.

Slide 26-27

In particular the RShG-2 assault grenade and PG-7VR projectile were

produced at the Russian “Planta” Federal State Unitary Enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil

city.

Slide 28

On March 21, 2016 near the 177,2 elevation which is 7 km to the S-E from

Popasna, Luhansk region, Ukrainian Armed forces servicemen bumped the МОN-

50 directional anti-personnel mine with MD-5M detonator manufactured in 2003

in Russia. Although it is widely used all over the world, the markings on it make it

unique. According to the markings it was manufactured in 2003 at the factory

No. 15, which is the “Promsintez” Joint Stock Company, Chapayevsk city, Samara

region of Russia).

At present the mine is neither in the inventory of the Armed Forces of

Ukraine, nor manufactured in Ukraine.

Slide 29

In conclusion I would like to emphasize, that being a party to the negotiation

process and a warrantor of the Minsk agreements abidance, Russia at the same time

does not stop the illegal transferring of the armament and materiel to support the

illegal armed formations, bluntly violating the international law.

Despite the multiple requests, Russia has not provided any reasonable

explanation on how the sophisticated Russia-manufactured armament and materiel

appear in the conflict area. Such equipment neither has ever been in service of the

Ukrainian Armed forces nor has the Ukrainian government ever provided any

permission for its entry.

Thank you for your attention.