YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 1

- Marianne Copier

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in

July 2016, NATO and the EU issued a

Joint Declaration which outlined areas

for strengthened cooperation in light of

common challenges to the East and

South, including countering hybrid

threats, enhancing resilience, defence

capacity building, cyber defence,

maritime security, and joint exercises.

This issue explores why it is so important

that NATO and the EU work together

and what their cooperation might look

like in 2017.

The first article takes a look at recent

developments, including the changing

U.S. Administration, that affect the

NATO-EU relationship. These pose

challenges, but they also bring a number

of distinct leadership opportunities for

the EU. The second article places the

threat of hybrid warfare, faced by both

NATO and the EU, in an historical

perspective.

NATO-EU Cooperation

Volume 7- Issue 01 January 2017

Contents:

NATO-EU Cooperation in 2017: Demonstrating Clarity of Purpose

Mr. Robert Baines analyses the current state of cooperation between NATO

and the EU and finds a lack of clarity in the role division between the two,

which needs to be addressed.

Stronger Together: Facing Threats from Outside and Within

Mr. Jordy Rutten looks at the role that reactionaries currently play in

internal politics in several NATO member states and places this phenomenon in

an historical perspective. Are hybrid warfare tactics now more successful than

ever?

Flags of NATO and the EU (Photo:NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 2

What Was NATO-EU Cooperation in 2016?

With 22 member countries in common, it is only

natural that NATO and the EU work ever closer on

security and defense. At the NATO summit in Warsaw

on July 8, 2016, a very workman-like joint declaration

was made by the President of the European Council,

the President of the European Commission and the

Secretary General of NATO. This declaration stressed

strengthened cooperation and identified seven common

challenges: hybrid threats, maritime security, cyber

defence, interoperability, defence capacity building,

joint exercises, and enhancing resilience.

These themes echoed much of the other discussions

surrounding the NATO Summit. Specific mention was

made of ‘unprecedented challenges’ and ‘most efficient

use of resources’, which seemed designed to address

concerns of inefficiency and duplication resulting from

greater NATO-EU cooperation.

The declaration identified that NATO and the EU

will ‘step up’ coordination on exercises and even more

importantly it stated an ‘urgent need’ to ‘broaden and

adapt our operational cooperation’. ‘Complementary’

was the term used to describe the relationship through

‘specific projects in a variety of areas’. This mention of

specific projects is the most fruitful part of the

declaration; it is in this area that real progress will have

to be shown in 2017.

Fast forward six months to December 6th, 2016,

and we find a more robust statement was made by the

EU High Representative Frederica Mogherini and

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the

NATO-EU Cooperation in 2017:

Demonstrating Clarity of Purpose

By Robert Baines o n February 16, 2017, European NATO

allies announced an agreement to invest

jointly in new kit and a command

headquarters in Europe. It was a quick response to

U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis’ demand for

more defence investment from member countries

when he visited NATO Headquarters on February 15.

This was a good move by the Europeans, and one

which will have to be followed up with more

investment and vision from the European Union for

the rest of 2017 and beyond.

Now, a little more than a month after President

Trump’s inauguration, it is obvious that NATO-EU

cooperation is going to need added clarity. In fact, it is

going to need clarity in two distinct areas: clarity will

be required on American intentions regarding NATO

operations and clarity will be required on the specifics

of NATO-EU cooperation. Only then can it be

implemented in such a way that it becomes truly

effective.

Considering that greater clarity from the American

administration has so far not been immediately

forthcoming on multiple issues, it is essential that

NATO-EU cooperation be articulated in a concrete

division of responsibilities. Extolling general concepts

such as resilience, cooperation and flexibility must be

eschewed in favour of agreements on specific priorities

and responsibilities of both the NATO and the EU

defence apparatus. While understanding that both

partners have different strengths and capabilities, the

identification of distinct leadership opportunities for

the EU must be a goal of this collaboration in 2017.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 3

implementation of the Joint Declaration. This statement

was given in a very different atmosphere—one of

uncertainty and tension in the face of President Trump’s

unpredictable views. It further specified the strides that

had been made and immediately stated what would have

been seen as self-evident before the uncertainty caused

by Mr. Trump’s ascendency: that ‘the security of

Europe and North America is interconnected’.

The announcement named 42 Common proposals in

seven areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Ms. Mogherini stated that ‘we enter into the

implementation phase as of tomorrow’. This was a

reasonable update and a good message of immediate

action. In wake of this statement, German Foreign

Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, very generally

mentioned that, ‘with a changing security environment,

it’s a good thing for NATO and the European Union to

combine efforts’. True, but 2017 will have to be marked

by implementation and specifics. These words need to

be matched by actions that address the biggest challenges

NATO and the EU are both facing.

The announcement was a good foundation and

identifies shared priorities, but it does not give enough

specifics to satisfy the new administration of the United

States. At the same time, clarity is still required on Mr.

Trump’s positions regarding European defence. This

lack of certainty on the part of the American

administration means that clarity on the part of NATO-

EU cooperation becomes all the more important.

The Advent of Trump

In what may become the norm in 2017, President

Trump’s administration has already taken the European

defence community on an uncomfortable rollercoaster

ride. Mr. Trump’s comments on NATO and allied

defence spending on the campaign trail had already been

unsettling; after the election and in the first month of his

presidency, Trump’s mixed messages only added to the

confusion.

During the Senate confirmation hearing of Secretary

of Defence James Mattis, he called NATO ‘the most

successful military alliance in modern world history’.

Four days later, Mr. Trump called the Alliance

‘obsolete’. James Mattis – former NATO Supreme

Allied Commander Transformation – is evidently trying

to keep Trump in the NATO camp. It seems that

Secretary Mattis is the champion of NATO, and

President Trump the critic. This pattern has continued

with Mr. Trump being reticent on his own comments

regarding Europe, including a joint press conference

with UK Prime Minister Theresa May when she was

forced to repeat his words that he was ‘100 per cent

behind NATO’. Awkwardly, no direct confirmation

from the President followed.

Now, in mid-February, Secretary Mattis has visited

NATO HQ for a defence ministers meeting and

proclaimed that ‘the alliance remains a fundamental

bedrock for the United States and the trans-Atlantic

community, bonded as we are together’. At the same

time, he underlined that the United States expected

more defence spending from its allies.

The focus continually returns to Europe paying a fair

share of its own defence. If this is the prism through

which the Trump administration is looking, NATO-EU

partnership must have more to show for this

collaboration. 2017 must be a year not only for

cooperation but for dividing up responsibilities and

taking ownership of specific operations.

CLARITY - Who’s Doing What?

Since its inception, the EU defence apparatus has

been difficult to pin down. Organizational flow charts

that look like the nine rings of Dante’s inferno do not

bring clarity of purpose. The joint statements of July and

December of 2016 state many points of collaboration,

but there are no obvious priorities for each to take the

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 4

lead on. This is perhaps the most significant problem

of the entire endeavour and must be addressed in

2017. Specifically, the EU must take ownership of

some areas of its own.

Mr. Trump’s priority for NATO seems to be

fighting terrorism. Obviously, the EU should

collaborate on this;

showing that it can

reach beyond and

look after more

localized European

issues would be a

v a l u a b l e d e -

monstration of

responsibility.

There are two

specific areas where

there might be a

very useful role for

EU leadership in security coordination and

operational capacity. The first area for potential EU

leadership is in addressing the growing unrest in the

Balkans; the second is taking a more visible leadership

role in stopping the flow of illegal migrants across the

Mediterranean.

Getting the Balkans Right

The current situation in the Balkans is the perfect

chance to articulate a clear difference between the EU

and NATO defence priorities. There has been

growing concern in the past few months regarding

renewed tensions in the Balkans. Actions and rhetoric

exchanged between Kosovo and Serbia have escalated

slowly over the years and there have been many

indicators of brewing unrest and instability. Most

recently, a train covered in painted slogans stating

“Kosovo is Serbian” was stopped at the Serbian border

to Kosovo. This has created a very charged exchange,

including Serbian discussions of troop movements to

protect ethnic Serbians in northern Kosovo.

As a result of the growing tensions, Albania and

Croatia delivered a joint letter to the NATO Secretary

General on February 16 to complain about this situation

and request a revision of the current peace-keeping

mission in Kosovo.

The letter specifically

ment ioned tha t

NATO should ‘keep

a t t e n t i o n o n

maintain ing the

security of Kosovo

a n d c o n s i d e r

concrete steps to

s t r e n g t h e n t h e

alliance’s efforts in

b u i l d i n g l o c a l

i n s t i t u t i o n a l

capacity’. One of the suggestions in the letter was to

develop the current Kosovo security forces into a

legitimate army, which was also recently suggested by

Secretary Mattis to the US Senate’s Armed Service

Committee on January 12.

Clearly there are indications of conflict in the air. It is

important to consider the complexity of the Balkans.

After all, the First World War was started there through

a domino effect nobody could control. Referring to a

potential return to the hostilities of 1999, the head of an

NGO in northern Kosovo explained recently that ‘here

we can go back 18 years in just one day, one hour [...]

This train issue has shown everyone how quickly any

normalization of relations could be undone’.

With all this happening within Europe’s own

borders, NATO is a key stake-holder with a clear

mandate to involve itself in negotiations. However, this

would be a perfect case for the European Union defence

Donald Tusk, Jens Stoltenberg and Jean-Claude Juncker at the

NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 (Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 5

mechanism to take a strong lead on with NATO acting

in a supporting role. Considering some of the

statements he has made on wanting to keep the U.S.

out of third countries’ internal affairs, it is quite likely

that President Trump would be happy to not have to

interfere in internal conflicts in the Balkans.

Diplomatically, EU leadership might also be an asset

in this region. There is still resentment over NATO’s

bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although

they eventually did end the conflicts, these sorties

killed civilians and depleted vital infrastructure. NATO

could certainly take a lead in the current situation, but

it would still be complicated by the past. This applies

much less to the EU, which could place it in a better

position to lead stabilisation efforts. Increased EU

defence posture in the region, including organized

exercises, observation and perhaps a training operation,

would be a proactive step to take positive control of the

situation and calm tensions. The EU has been quite

active in the region in the past with their Operation

Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia and the EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia-

Herzegovina under the “Berlin Plus” agreement of 2002

where NATO assets were made available to the EU.

The current situation is ripe for leadership by the

EU. In fact the EU has already been active and hosted

talks on February 2nd between Serbia and Kosovo. Now

is the time to become active from a defence and

security standpoint and take the lead, with support

from NATO. Whether that might also include

something akin to a force following the Berlin Plus

agreement or the more remote possibility of

developing the basics of a long-awaited “EU army” is a

more complex question. The fundamental need,

however, of a leadership project for the European

Union is evident.

Migrant Crisis

A second front for EU leadership relates to the

migrant crisis and stemming the flow of migrants to

Europe from Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa.

As with the Balkan situation, the EU has already been

very active in this role with NATO through its border

agency Frontex.

The European Union defence leadership in this case

would not even require a significant change in

operations. The point is to be able to show the strength

of European leadership. European allies must be seen as

taking care of what could be seen as strictly European

issues from the American point of view. The European

security situation relating to the migrant crisis is remote

from America. Recognizing this could be a uniting force

for the EU defence apparatus.

How President Trump views the migrant crisis in

Europe remains unclear. Strong borders and even border

defences meet with his strong approval. But when it

comes to NATO helping to patrol the Mediterranean

Sea, he may question why America’s contributions to

NATO should be spent on this operation.

Showing Responsibility

In May of 2017, NATO will host a summit to address

the many changes in the international situation since

2016, including the change in the American

administration. It would be an opportune moment to

clarify the possible leadership roles of both NATO and

the EU to an American administration that sees their

support as a finite resource not to be squandered on

duplication. Fruitful discussions of cooperation,

resilience and interoperability do not go far enough. May

2017 would be an excellent moment for a clarifying

joint declaration outlining specific areas of lead

responsibility to demonstrate Europe’s dedication to its

own defence.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 6

Robert Baines is the incoming President of the

NATO Association of Canada and the Executive

Director of the Canada-Albania Business Council. He

holds a BA in Philosophy from the University of

Trinity College and an MA in History from York

University. Involved in the youth boards of several

Canadian arts institutions, he is also a Vice-President

of the St. George’s Society, Toronto’s oldest charity.

Mr. Baines is a member of the Canadian Armed

Forces and has received the Canadian Forces

Decoration.

Emmott, Robin, NATO European Allies to Jointly Buy Planes, Set Up New Elite HQ, 16.02.2017, Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-defence-idUKKBN15V1JZ NATO, Joint Declaration, 08.06.2016, Available at: h t t p : / / w w w . n a t o . i n t / c p s / e n / n a t o h q /official_texts_133163.htm European Union External Action, EU and NATO Start New Era of Cooperation, 06.12.2016, Available at: https://e e a s . e u r o p a . e u / h e a d q u a r t e r s / h e a d q u a r t e r s -homepage_en/16643/EU%20and%20NATO%20start%20new%20era%20of%20cooperation Emmott, Robin and Siebold, Sabine, EU, NATO Cement ‘Transatlantic Bond’ Before Trump Takes Office, 06.12.2016, vailable at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-foreign-idUSKBN13V2DN BC, Trump Defence Chief Mattis Hails NATO as ‘Bedrock’ of Co-operation, 15.02.2017, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38979190 Milekic, Sven, Croatia, Albania Complain of Serbia's Nationalism to NATO, 16.02.2017, Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-albania-complain-to-nato-for-serbia-s-nationalism-02-16-2017#sthash.P0YrEp14.dpuf Qirezi, Arben, Mattis Speech Reheats Debate Over Kosovo Army , 03.02.2017, Ava i lab le a t : ht tp://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/mattis-speech-reheats- d e b a t e - o v e r - k o s o v o - a r m y - 0 2 - 0 3 -2017#sthash.A0NPeMp1.dpuf

Salem, Harriet, Kosovo, Serb Dispute Threatens to Derail

Balkan Peace, 24.01.2017, Available at: http://

www.politico.eu/article/eu-kosovo-serbia-train-dispute-eu-

mogherini-vucic-thaci/

NATO, Relations with European Union, 27.01.2017,

Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

topics_49217.htm

Morina, Die and Zivanovic, Maja, Kosovo-Serbia Talks

Fail to Defuse Tensions, 02.02.2017, Available at: http://

www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dialogue-of-

normalizations-or-tensions-02-02-2017

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 7

By Jordy Rutten

I n the days before Christmas 2014, a column

appeared on the pages of one of Britain’s main

newspapers. Its title read ‘Forget ‘Evil’ Putin –

we are the bloodthirsty warmongers’. It echoed sentiments

of the Cold War, when large numbers of left-wing

Europeans would openly sympathize with Moscow and

relentlessly attack the US and its allies for its alleged

imperial aspirations and for deliberately increasing

tensions with the benign, peace-seeking USSR. This

column, however, wasn’t printed in the Socialist

Worker or any other left-wing newspaper. It was

printed in the staunchly conservative and right-wing

Mail on Sunday, and written by Peter Hitchens, a self-

described socially conservative Christian. In the year

the Kremlin annexed Crimea and started a bloody

conflict in the Donbass region, it became clear that a

new form of Putinism was on the rise. Pro-Kremlin

positions weren’t just confined to the fringes of the far

-left any more, but grew increasingly popular among

reactionaries and conservatives as well. This newfound

love for the Russian president is accompanied by a

very ingenious adaption of the pro-Kremlin rhetoric of

the Cold War and easily taps into one of the main

weak spots of Western public opinion: the love for self

-criticism. This is not just a political phenomenon, but

another step in the deliberate destabilizing of the

European public sphere by the Kremlin. Putin now has

his mouthpieces positioned on both far ends of the

European political spectrum.

In 2002, then British Labour MP George Galloway,

clarified his somewhat eccentric position on the Soviet

Union. He stated ‘yes, I did support the Soviet Union,

and I think the disappearance of the Soviet Union is the

biggest catastrophe of my life. If there was a Soviet

Union today, we would not be having this conversation

about plunging into a new war in the Middle East, and

the US would not be rampaging around the globe’.

Galloway calls himself a socialist, had close ties to the

government of Saddam Hussein, supports Hamas, and

mourned the demise of Fidel Castro. Throughout his

political career, Galloway has consistently admired

whichever clique was in power in Moscow. In 2005, he

got expelled from the Labour Party for actively

supporting the killing of British troops. It should

therefore come as no surprise that George Galloway

was one of the loudest supporters of the Russian

invasion of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. In justifying

Moscow’s actions, Galloway and his political allies used

a line of argument that was residual from the days of the

Cold War. The most fanatic of those who sympathized

with the communist regime in the Kremlin, never

missed an opportunity to legitimize its actions by

criticizing Western foreign policy. This line of

argument usually manifested itself in two different

ways. The first form revolved around the idea that

Moscow’s actions were completely predictable and

sensible responses to Western aggression. Following

this logic, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and

Czechoslovakia, in 1956 and 1968 respectively, were

entirely justified responses to the creation of NATO

and alleged activities by Western intelligence services.

The second form of justifying Moscow’s actions was

Stronger Together: Facing Threats From Outside and Within

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 8

even less refined, but much more popular. This

reasoning would basically come down to stating that “we

are no better”. How could Americans criticize political

oppression in the Soviet Union, when they faced

McCarthyism back home? If the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan was indefensible, then how about the

American invasion of Vietnam?

Masochism Trumps Ideology

Both lines of thought usually returned to the same

rhetorical point. The conclusion usually consisted of well

-formulated attacks on Western, and especially

American, foreign policy. This stance revealed the true

nature of the pro-Soviet movement in Europe. In the

eyes of many Kremlin-sympathisers, it was impossible

for liberal, free-market societies ever to be on the right

side of history. Any alternative was preferable. During

the Cold War, there were many on the left who

cherished some kind of sympathy for the Soviet Union

because they wanted to see a state-led economy succeed.

But many lost these warm feelings towards Moscow

when the Soviet Union collapsed and its remnants

became the youngest and most devout converts to

capitalism. However, hardliners like Galloway stayed on

board, because they continued to regard Russia as one of

the necessary counterweights to Western imperialism.

This approach fully explains his remarks about the

supposed tragedy of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The

socialist Galloway did not mourn the demise of a state-

led economy, but the disappearance of a challenger to

US hegemony.

With regard to these dynamics, the French

philosopher Pascal Bruckner has given a persuasive

explanation of their political, psychological and

philosophical foundations. In his work The Tyranny of

Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism he deconstructs the

phenomenon of Western self-hatred. Written in 2006,

this book is testimony to a time when Western

masochism was particularly prevalent among sections of

the European Left. Bruckner decried the French far left,

which ‘is still dreaming of the final revolution and

supports any dictatorship provided that it is anti-

capitalist and anti-American’. Similar remarks were

made by the left-leaning commentator Nick Cohen,

who criticized the Anglosphere’s liberal left for

cherishing a culture in which “global warming,

environmental catastrophes, the suffering of Africa, the

tyrannies of the Middle East, racism, starvation and

global inequalities are all, when you get down to it, the

fault of Westerners”. This Western masochism has for a

long time been confined to certain parts of the far-left.

Cohen, Bruckner and many others on both left and right

attacked this tendency to be overly critical of the West

and to serve as apologists for any anti-Western

oppressive and totalitarian movement or government.

During these years the other end of the political

spectrum made a lot less noise. The fringes of the

European far-right, traditionally a bulwark of

isolationism and anti-Americanism, were largely

opposed to the military adventures of Tony Blair and

George W. Bush as well, but in a less vocal manner and

with another ideational foundation. They did not

organize any large-scale demonstrations against Western

foreign policy. Their main difference with the anti-

interventionist far-left at the time lay in the fact that the

far-right did not invoke anti-Western arguments in their

criticisms of Western foreign policy.

Whereas the far-left opposition to Western foreign

policy was primarily caused by an antipathy against the

West itself, far-right opposition to Western foreign

policy consisted of a combination of realpolitik with an

admiration for political strongmen. Pleading for less

American and EU interference with Austrian foreign

policy, the Freedom Party-leader Jörd Haider visited

Saddam Hussein right before the outbreak of the Iraq

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 9

War in 2003 and paid a visit to the Libyan dictator

Gaddafi at a time when his regime was an international

pariah. He received many millions from both dictators.

The founder and long-time leader of the French National

Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, prided himself on being a

personal friend of Saddam Hussein. In 2015, Filip

DeWinter, the leader of the far-right Flemish Interest

Party, visited the Syrian dictator Assad. He called Assad a

‘courageous and impressive man’ and vowed to increase

pressure on conservative and nationalist movements in

Europe to support this ‘ally against Islamic extremism’.

All their arguments combined the idolizing of

strongmen with a perverted sense of national interests,

but the masochism of the far-left was still a no-go. The far

-right was in a precarious position. Politicians like Haider

and Le Pen railed against Islamic minorities in Europe,

presented immigration as an existential threat to their

home countries and asserted the superiority of Western

civilization. But when in Baghdad, they would cosy up to

Saddam Hussein, a man who put the words “Allahu akbar”

on the Iraqi national flag. This was an extraordinarily

awkward position to have to justify to their own

electorates. Using the same masochist rhetoric as

Galloway and his ilk was simply not an option for the

European far-right.

The Ideal Strongman

All this changed in 2014, when a wave of nationalist

and Eurosceptic parties dared to go down the road of

Western masochism. This was the moment when Europe

saw itself confronted with a re-emerging aggression from

the east: the Russia of Vladimir Putin. In the years leading

up to 2014, multiple entities from the right had started to

regard Putin as a natural ally. Standing up for traditional

values, unapologetically pursuing his country’s interests,

persecuting the domestic LGBT-community and

oppressing political opposition, they saw him as the

perfect counterweight against a weak and decadent West.

In the eyes of the far-right, the European establishment

had a naïve faith in multiculturalism, shunned their native

military and religious institutions and disregarded national

sovereignty. The far-right in Europe never cozied up to

Moscow when it served as the embodiment of worldwide

communism, and far-right leaders were careful not to

boast too much about their ties to totalitarian regimes in

the Arab world. But whereas they had to be careful in

visiting Tripoli and Baghdad too often, they felt they could

defend the Christian-Orthodox traditionalist Putin as

much as they wanted.

Since at least 2009, the Kremlin has developed its ties

with right-wing parties in Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Putin’s influence over nationalist and Eurosceptic parties

in Western Europe started its gradual expansion more

recently. This influence manifested itself openly in 2014.

After Putin’s illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula

and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, many European

nationalist movements strongly condemned the European

Union and NATO for provoking what they saw as an

entirely reasonable Russian response. Their favourite

strongman was now in open conflict with their favourite

enemy: the European Union. At the same time, Moscow

could now use its loyal allies in the political arenas of

Europe to bring about a situation more favourable to

Russia. To those familiar with the doctrine of Valery

Gerasimov, an influential Kremlin-insider who developed

the idea of political warfare, it became clear what was

going on: the autocratic regime of Vladimir Putin was

using the plurality of European democracy to its own

advantage. Europe found itself at the receiving end of

some of the core elements of hybrid warfare: the Russian

infiltration of Europe’s political sphere, combined with an

intense wave of propaganda and misinformation.

The geopolitical arm-wrestling between Russia and the

West unfolded just as the European Parliamentary

Elections of 2014 approached. Since the outbreak of the

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 10

Euro-crisis, anti-EU sentiment had grown massively

and Eurosceptic parties, especially those on the right,

were riding high in the polls. To many nationalists, the

Ukrainian conflict served as the perfect argument

against the European Union. They painted a picture of a

failing union, that had caused unemployment, austerity,

social tensions and now even an outright war on the

eastern edge of the continent. The EU was and remains

the common enemy of both the nationalist Euro-

sceptics and Vladimir Putin.

The open alliance between the Kremlin and

European nationalists has tapped into old reservoirs of

anti-Americanism and isolationism. Traditionally, the

European far-right is no less anti-American, pro-

totalitarian or isolationist than the far-left. Now

Vladimir Putin has given them the perfect motive to use

the instrument that old leftist Kremlin-sympathisers

had been using effectively for so long: Western

masochism. Marine le Pen, who took over from her

father Jean-Marie as leader of the Front National, said

in 2014: ‘the crisis in Ukraine is all the European

Union’s fault’. At the height of Europe’s refugee crisis

in 2015, Heinz-Christian Strache, Haider’s successor as

Freedom Party leader, wrote: ‘With their military

interventions, bombs and rockets, the USA and NATO

have destroyed Iraq and Libya (…) The USA has been

playing with fire in the Middle-East for decades and

then they have the chutzpah to suggest the

responsibility for the wave of refugees this has caused,

lies with Europe. This is the clearest case of

destabilising geopolitics! In the meantime they violently

keep on playing with fire against Russia in Ukraine.’ In

aligning themselves with Putin, many far-right

politicians in Europe have largely adopted his distaste

for the Transatlantic Alliance. The hostility towards

NATO on the far-right has never completely faded

away, but it has grown immensely over the past years.

The influence of communists and other far-left

activists in Western Europe during the Cold War was

significant enough to make centre-left governments

like those of Olof Palme in Sweden and Willy Brandt

in West-Germany steer in a more Soviet-friendly

course. If the polls are right, France might soon have a

political landscape dominated by Marine le Pen. The

same goes for the Dutch Freedom Party of Geert

Wilders, who has been topping national polls for an

extraordinary long time now. They are very likely to

put their countries on a more Putin-friendly course and

stoke up anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments. These

are no natural internal developments of the old

continent, but part of a refined Russian strategy of

political warfare. In the zero-sum-game worldview of

Vladimir Putin, a weak and divided Europe is a goal to

which his political friends on both left and right are the

means. Completely in line with the ideas of

Gerasimov, Moscow is blurring the lines between war

and peace and has started to disrupt Europe from the

inside. Putin has successfully turned one of Europe’s

main assets, its democratic traditions, into a weakness.

He has turned the political landscape of the continent

into a battlefield, of which he controls both the far-

right and the far-left flanks.

The Right Diagnosis

The 2014 column of Peter Hitchens in the Mail on

Sunday was the perfect example of the right-wing love

for Putin. He wrote: ‘The EU (and its military wing,

NATO) have in the same period gained control over

more than 120 million of those people, and almost

400,000 of those square miles. (…) The EU and

NATO politicians broke all the rules of diplomacy and

descended on Kiev to take sides with demonstrators

who demanded that Ukraine align itself with the EU.’

When the European far-right defends Putin or attacks

NATO, the EU is presented as the absolute evil. It is

Atlantic Voices, Volume 7, Issue 01 11

the EU that is the main enemy, but that does not

mean NATO is popular. Peter’s late brother and

political opposite, Christopher, once wrote of ‘a

certain kind of anti-American style – the kind that

expresses contempt for mongrelisation and

cosmopolitanism. This is quite commonly found on

the European right, which always regarded America

as a mobbish, vulgar and indiscriminate enterprise.

Putin’s infiltration poses challenges to NATO and

the EU. To come up with effective countermeasures,

both must recognize the problem openly. The

masochist rhetoric of the far-right is no ordinary

political discourse, but part of the Kremlin’s political

warfare. In order to formulate a coherent approach to

Putin’s challenge, both NATO and the EU have to

make the right diagnosis. If any coherent cooperation

between these two in countering the Kremlin is to

emerge, it can only do so based on the right analysis

of the problem. The entanglement of old far-right

resentments and Putin’s opportunism has to be seen

for what it is: a massive challenge to a democratic,

progressive and stabile Europe that should not be

underestimated. The institutional framework of the

old continent and its important alliance with the US

and Canada are threatened by the same phenomenon.

That’s why the joint declaration of December 2016

on EU-NATO cooperation is an important step

towards the development of a resilient response to the

political warfare that Europe now faces. The Euro-

Atlantic Alliance has taken its time to finally wake up

to Moscow’s malevolence. Putin has a head start. The

West can only catch up by showing determination,

self-confidence and decisiveness.

Putin has deliberately lifted the lid of an old

reservoir of far-right hatred for the New World and

its involvement in European affairs. This unholy

alliance has to be confronted head-on. The possible

unravelling of the Euro-Atlantic bond could very well

start on the European mainland. What Moscow

couldn’t achieve through its leftist proxies during the

Cold War, it could very well bring about through the

skewed use of rightist forces nowadays. The political

leanings of the fifth column may have been altered, but

not their aims or rhetoric. Far from it.

Jordy Rutten studied Public Administration theory

and International Relations. He is currently a board

member of YATA Netherlands. His main field of

academic interest is in the role of defence industrial

capabilities in grand strategies.

Peter Hitchens, Forget ‘evil’ Putin – we are the bloodthirsty warmongers, Mail on Sunday, 21 December 2014

Simon Hattenstone, Saddam and me, The Guardian, 16 September 2002,

Andy McSmith, George Galloway: the political rebel with a cause, The Independent,

Pascal Bruckner, The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism. p. 182

Al Jazeera, Austria investigates Haider links, 3 August 2 0 1 0 , h t t p : / / w w w . a l j a z e e r a . c o m / n e w s /europe/2010/08/201083144015177966.html

Barry James and International Herald Tribune, A consistent opponent of immigration: Le Pen based appeals on fears about crime, in The New York Times, 23 April 2002, Alex van der Hulst, Filip Dewinter bezoekt Assad: ‘moedig en indrukwekkend man’, 25 maart 2015, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/03/25/filip-dewinter-bezoekt-assad-in-syrie-moedig-en-indrukwekkend-man-a1417595 Dr. Andrew Foxall. Putin’s Useful Idiots: Britain’s Left, Right and Russia. Russia Studies Centre. Policy Paper No. 10 (2016) Boris Reitschuster. Putins Verdeckter Krieg: Wie Moskau den Westen Destabilisiert. p. 9 https://www.rt.com/news/185616-eu-pen-crisis-ukraine/

Christopher Hitchens. A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq. p. 28

About the author

Bibliography

This publication is co-sponsored by the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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Editor: Marianne Copier

YATA/ATA Programs DAYS-Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar

On 9-12 March it is time for the annual DAYS, organized by YATA Denmark

in cooperation with the Royal Danish Defense College. This year it will take place

in Copenhagen for the first time. The focus will be on hybrid and social media

warfare, and on autonomous weapons systems.

NATO-EU Roundtable, Estonia

On March 30-April 1, you can find us at the NATO-EU Roundtable,

organized for the fifth year in a row by the Estonian Atlantic Treaty

Association. This event brings together around 60 international students

and young professionals from diverse backgrounds.

GLOBSEC Young Leaders’ Forum

In May, Bratislava is again the place to be when the 10th annual GLOBSEC

Securrity Forum takes place there.. If you’re a young professional (25-35 years

old), you can apply for the GLOBSEC Young Leaders’ Forum. The deadline for

application is March 26th, midnight CET. Head to www.globsec.org

YATA at the Munich Security Conference

YATA’s Executive Vice-President

Ulrik Trolle Smed (Denmark)

participated in the high-level Munich

Security Conference 2017 as one of

only three Junior Ambassadors, a

privilege he secured by writing a

winning essay titled “Bringing the

private sector on board”.

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Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

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countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

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include the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

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The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

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