Upland forest restoration and livelihoods in Asia

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Upland forest restoration and livelihoods in AsiaLouis Putzel, APFNet Workshop on Degraded Forest Rehabilitation and Sustainable Forest ManagementKunming, 10 July 2014

Forest transition in Asia net increase in forest area in 4-5 countriesSource: FAO FRA 2010, authors analysis

Land Conversion in Swidden LandscapesVan Vliet, N., Mertz, O., Heinimann, A., Langanke, T., Pascual, U., Schmook, B., ... & Ziegler, A. D. (2012). Trends, drivers and impacts of changes in swidden cultivation in tropical forest-agriculture frontiers: a global assessment. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 418-429.

Drivers of decrease in swidden areaVan Vliet, N., Mertz, O., Heinimann, A., Langanke, T., Pascual, U., Schmook, B., ... & Ziegler, A. D. (2012). Trends, drivers and impacts of changes in swidden cultivation in tropical forest-agriculture frontiers: a global assessment. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 418-429.The Sloping Lands in Transition (SLANT) research projectCase studies in preparation in 7 countries (China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam)

Focus on effects of upland forest restoration on smallholder livelihoods, and eventually adaptive capacity and ecosystem service delivery Some comparative insightsBetween countries, role of government differs in promotion of tree planting on privately held/smallholder lands

Countries with more decentralized government systems (e.g. Philippines, Indonesia) countries featuring a high level of central planning (China, Vietnam)

In Philippines, government implements forestry programs mostly on government-owned land. Programs targeting smallholder-owned lands carried out by NGOs.

In Indonesia, the government promotes smallholder forestry through a credit system promoting tree planting for industrial supply.

In contrast, China and Vietnam have reforestation programs over large areas of land, mostly in smallholder managed landscapes.

These programs have been linked to forest tenure reforms, including, e.g.: allocation of former state lands to smallholders in Vietnam; collective forest land reform in China In China, major PES scheme; in Vietnam, loans and market opportunities

Different national approaches to smallholder forest restorationVulnerability of upland populationsIn all countries in Asia, upland populations tend to be vulnerable (with some exceptions)Often, ethnically distinct from national decision makersDistant from markets Marginal lands for productionEconomically disadvantagedExamples of National ProgramsExample #1: Chinas Conversion of Cropland to Forest Program (CCFP), also known as grain for green or Sloping Land Conversion ProgramExample #2: Indonesias Community Timber Plantation programme (HTR)Example #3: Vietnams 5M ha rehabilitation program (afforestation)

Photos: China Forest Economics and Development Research CenterExample #1: China(Slides prepared by Xie Chen, FEDRC)Started in 1999, fully rolled out by 2002 - Phase I: 1999-2007 - Phase II: 2008-2016

The Conversion of Cropland to Forest ProgramCCFP initial aims to reduce flooding & soil erosion, subsequentlly revised to emphasize economic development & poverty alleviation Payments to smallholders to convert sloping cropland to forests (>25 in Yangtze River & 15 elsewhere). - Grass: 2 yrs- Economic forest: 5 yrs- Protection forest: 8 yrs

Photos: China Forest Economics and Development Research Center

Photos: China Forest Economics and Development Research CenterCCFP policyOver 32 million rural households involved.

Up to 2013 more than US$42 billion invested.

27.55 million ha of land converted/afforested.

9.06 million ha of cropland enrolled.

15.80 million ha of barren/waste land enrolled.

2.68 million ha sealed off to allow natural regeneration (a.k.a. closed mountain afforestation)

Currently one of the most wide-spread programs in rural China.

Bennett MT, Xie C, Hogarth N, Peng D, and Putzel L. In revision. Household Delivery of Forest Ecosystem Services under Chinas Conversion of Cropland to Forest Program Do Local Institutions Matter? Submitted to Forests. CCFP policy regarding food securityInitially CCFP prohibited intercropping; later changed policy to allow itAllows economic tree plantation which provide fruits and other edible non-timber forest productsBasic cropland development and crop production has been part of the program task since 2008

IndicatorsCounty: socio-economic condition, CCFP investment, program implementation, forest resources and main outputs;Village: land use change, main price of A&F products, geo-features;Households: population & labor migration, land use, input and output of family productions, CCFP subsidy, households consumption

Direct impact of CCFP on Grain productionIncrease supply of fruits, edible non-timber forests via economic tree on CCFP land;Reduced cropland and reduced grain volume at household level.

Investment structure of CCFP II of monitoring counties in 2012

36.14%6.56%19982011Change of poverty rate of monitoring households

ResultsFarmers volunteering for CCFP

Source: He J., 2014. Governing forest restoration: Local case studies of sloping land conversion program in Southwest China. Forest Policy and Economics, dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2014.05.004

Results: Socioeconomic assessment of sampled households after CCFP Source: He J., 2014. Governing forest restoration: Local case studies of sloping land conversion program in Southwest China. Forest Policy and Economics, dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2014.05.004ConclusionsInsufficient power was transferred to village level, even though the state's CCFP policy aims to promote local participation and autonomy. This is a lesson for other developing countries in which implemention of forest restoration tends to be more top down (He 2014).Nonetheless, the overall results of monitoring indicate that rural welfare is generally not negatively affected by the CCFP, and rural household participants are probably benefiting. Further research is needed on the effects of urban migration and off-farm labor to distiguish between the direct effects of CCFP subsidies (including funds to promote migration) and other factors.

Example #2: Indonesia(adapted from Nugroho et al. 2013)The Community Timber Plantation ProgramUpland sloping land area is 76,3 million ha or about 41% of Indonesia terrainIn Java island, smallholders forest and agroforest in sloping lands, in upper watersheds are about 1.7 million ha or about 46.4% of total smallholders forest in Java In 2007, Government of Indonesia established Community Timber Plantation program (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat, or HTR)Programme targeted 5.4 million ha of forests for allocation to smallholders for timber plantations by 2010, all of which are supposed to be be fully planted by 2016HTR GoalsUsing state production forests to provide additional supplies of plantation timber to forest industries.Improving the livelihoods of people living in and around degraded production forest areasIncrease forest coverProgram designTo stimulate adoption, the government provides flexible credit to HTR holders.The government has allocated ca. US$ 4.5 billion from its Reforestation Fund to support this programme.By January 2010, USD 210 million had been made available formicro-credit financing

Accessing HTR CreditTo obtain HTR Loan, the households form farmer groups of at least five members, with each member possessing an area of 8 to 15 ha.The entire process of application for and receipt of an HTR loan involves 20 steps involving 9 different organizations.

Assessing outcomes of HTR credit schemeHousehold interviews in 2 regions to understand borrower characteristicsIn South Kalimantan, 179 respondents randomly selected (112 respondents who had experience in borrowing and 67 respondents without) In Riau, 101 respondents randomly selected, (48 respondents with borrowing experience and 53 without)

Interviews with authorities to understand loan scheme design and implementationGap analysis to assess matching of borrower characteristics with loan parametersResultsThe HTR credit scheme does not match borrower characteristics well, which explains low adoption by smallholders (0103 85 197 40 100 222 195 23 224 19 47 197 206 244 202 231 117 195 215 12 229 23 112 137 251 228 99 154 113 158 102 28 10 3 138 122 125 1 163 77 221 172 219 162 22 197 217 162 62 56 226 48 241 108 154 91 174 252 23 221 4 213 176 154 31 207 104 159 65 96 212 197 175 202 63 248 141 170 146 68 21 159 253 42 21 51 65 125 3 27 143 104 186 109 114 114 101 225 2 42 32 97 113 186 195 112 172 216 52 190 196 196 12 58 201 35 171 50 13 18 180 228 204 128 2 200 66 177 6 200 4 95 67 195 70 139 155 213 160 17 56 230 175 76 108 47 76 44 63 228 136 244 13 239 34 226 184 25 31 171 213 19 56 90 26 197 228 24 143 61 27 120 67 143 237 156 119 164 63 228 27 116 93 52 161 168 88 45 179 201 112 171 12 184 84 139 146 26 242 171 212 160 235 50 10 107 135 145 200 116 31 229 166 141 252 202 193 49 249 137 76 43 8 227 116 168 92 13 5 140 98 255 230 121 3 57 17 246 129 98 118 110 49 155 121 243 12 10 115 200 251 234 252 4 124 143 184 6 25 97 197 162 69 28 104 73 123 141 80 7 151 133 143 90 216 123 249 168 149 205 226 163 185 108 10 31 117 112 175 11 220 176 146 57 232 26 198 113 163 73 233 48 17 36 141 66 245 240 47 169 41 136 14 77 81 243 142 191 69 78 243 209 167 150 128 48 254 14 251 109 96 148 231 116 94 71 213 22 187 28 66 35 10 192 141 32 244 12 186 162 164 157 101 16 65 109 176 178 80 224 162 202 2 0 1 145 156 157 5 33 8 203 108 178 253 56 59 245 210 10 13 30 101 117 196 49 170 105 66 77 111 226 83 73 247 32 155 46 166 61 15 99 26 253 96 94 121 6 204 27 217 140 7 29 108 74 39 62 114 194 124 140