THE 2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE

(THE GREAT EAST JAPAN

EARTHQUAKE).

MARGUERITE WALSH.

13TH DECEMBER 2013.

Introduction

On the 11th of March 2011 at 14.46 Japanese time, a catastrophic earthquake occurred

130kilometres off the eastern coast of Japan, at a depth of 22metres. This became known as

the Tohoku earthquake or The Great East Japan Earthquake due to the amount of damage it

caused. This earthquake can be described as a mega quake registering a magnitude of 9.0

on the Richter scale. 15,863 people died (The Japan Times, 2011) and it is set to be one of

the costliest disasters the world has ever experienced. This earthquake is the fifth strongest

earthquake in seismically recorded history i.e. since the start of the 20th century.

This was a triple disaster; the original earthquake created a tsunami which in turn damaged

the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Had these events occurred far from civilisation they

may have been less significant, however they occurred in Japan. Japan has a population of

~127million people (Statistics Japan, 2012) giving a population density of ~350 people per

km² (The World Bank, 2013). The 2011 Tohoku earthquake was therefore a “geohazard” as

it was an earth process that was very harmful to both humans and their property (Jarvis,D.,

2013).

Japan is not unused to experiencing geohazards as shown in the graph below; this is partially

due to its location along the Pacific Ring of Fire.

EM-DAT, 2013.

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Fig(1) shows the location of the Tohoku region within Japan (Japan Zone, 1999-2011).

The Tohoku region of Japan (in dark green) holds approximately one tenth of the Japanese

population (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013) and it was the area most heavily affected by

this earthquake.

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Cause

This earthquake was caused by active plate tectonics.

Fig(2) shows the plate tectonics around Japan. Japan lies along the Pacific Ring of Fire, an

area reputed for being highly tectonically active with lots of earthquakes and volcanoes

occurring there (GSJ, 2001-2013).

The Pacific Plate is being subducted beneath the Euroasian plate, at a rate of between 8

centimetres and 8.5 centimetres per year (DeMets,C., et al 2010). This creates a thrust fault

system (Davis,C., et al, 2012 and Sample,I., 2011).

(Tate,K., 2013).

Fig(3) shows the process of subduction of the Pacific Plate beneath the Eurasian Plate.

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Over time, stress and strain energy built up in the system. This energy had been

accumulating in the fault since the last megathrust event along this fault which occurred in

869AD.

Eventually the system became overloaded and the stress and strain had to be released, and

so it “ruptured the interplate boundary off-shore of east Japan, with fault displacements of

up to 40 m” (Ammonn,C.J., et al, 2011). Others (Maercklin,N., et al 2012) estimate the slip to

have been up to 50metres. The energy released by this rupture has been compared to a

“100-megatron explosion” (Lay,T., and Kanamori,H., 2011.) The released energy not only

ruptured the crust but also heated the surrounding rock, causing it to deform.

Often the shallow part of a thrust fault retains the energy better and allows it to build up

over time resulting in a unusually strong earthquake. The 2011 earthquake was particularly

destructive as it failed all over – both in the shallow “up-dip” and deeper “down-dip” parts

of the subducting plate (Lay,T., and Kanamori,H., 2011) releasing a huge amount of energy

in the form of the earthquake.

This plate boundary had caused hazards before but never to this scale. It consisted of three

main breaks which occurred within a couple minutes of each other. Each break moved at a

different speed but the third and last was the fastest at 2.5km/second. This was the main

rupture pushing southward (Koketsu,K., et al, 2011) and causing the most damage. Usually a

seismic rupture would occur singularly and then produce one earthquake. However on this

occasion three breaks occurred, one after the other resulting in a much longer and stronger

earthquake.

Each break released seismic body waves which moved through the crust. First the P-waves

moved out, these quickly reached Japan and set off the Early Warning System there. These

were followed by the slower but more destructive S-waves. The earthquake went on for 2.5

minutes which islonger than the average time for an earthquake <1minute (Lay,T., and

Kanamori,H., 2011.) 70 percent of the energy was released in the first minute of the quake

(Maercklin,N., et al 2012)

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These seismic waves shook Japan with a maximum frequency of 10Hz, peak ground

acceleration of 2.7g and peak ground velocities of 80centimetres per second (Lay,T., and

Kanamori,H., 2011.)

This rupture caused the seafloor to rise by between 5 and 10 metres (Lay,T., and

Kanamori,H., 2011). This vertical displacement led to a tsunami of up to 20 metres in places

(Tate,K., 2013). The difference between the seafloor rise and the actual height of the

tsunami waves was due to friction between the movement of the water and the seafloor

contributing to the build of the wave. This is the same process as which makes natural,

normal waves at sea.

In comparison to other large earthquakes with >7.0 magnitude, the Tohoku earthquake

showed high stress and strain resulting in a big slip but over a relatively small area. This may

be due to barriers which prevent the stress and strain extending out to the surrounding

plate(s) (Simons,M., et al 2011). Possible barriers include subducted seamounts; extinct

volcanoes below the sea surface which are common along the Pacific Ring of Fire.

This earthquake was therefore a megathrust event in an area of subduction (Koketsu,K., et

al, 2011).

The tsunami was created by the Euroasian plate rupturing upwards causing displacement of

the surrounding water. The exact area of the tsunami origin was determined by measuring

the different arrival times of the tsunami at buoys and gauges throughout the Pacific Ocean

(Hayashi,Y., et al 2011). This estimated the tsunami source to be 500kilometres long and

200kilometres wide. This is a large expanse of water and hence is why the tsunami reached

all the land masses surrounding the Pacific Ocean, although to varying degrees of strength.

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(Hayashi,Y., et al 2011)

Figure(4) shows the origin of the tsunami with the epicentre of the earthquake nearly at its

centre. The close proximity of the Japanese coastline means it experienced the brunt of the

tsunami waves.

The large area of the tsunami origin may be due to the strength of the earthquake rupturing

up and down the fault line; this makes it hard to find the point of maximum uplift. The

tsunami source area also covers 6 previously known rupture sites, showing once again how

earthquakes and tsunamis in the area are all related and descended from one another.

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Effect

According to a report released by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency in 2011, the

earthquake and its related events led to the deaths of 15,863, while there were 4414 left

missing and 5901 injured. Over 90% of these victims drowned (The Japan Times, 2011)

indicating the tsunami did the greatest damage to both human life and infrastructure.

Despite Japan not being fully recovered, this is already shaping up to be the costliest

disaster since World War 2. Estimates for the damage vary between $190-295 billion

(Reuters, 2011) and $185-309 billion (Censky,A., 2011).

(Statistics Japan, 2013.)

Above is a table showing the damage done by the earthquake in the different

prefectures/regions of Japan.

Structural Damage.

Given the magnitude of the earthquake more damage to buildings and infrastructure would

have been expected. As it stands much of the building damage was done by the tsunami as

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opposed to the earthquake itself. This is due to the strict building codes that have been

updated and enforced over the years (Normile,D., and Kerr,R.A., 2011). New measures and

guidelines have already been put in place by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport

and Tourism to target the issue of buildings subsiding, especially for timber frame houses

(Tatsuo Narafu, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank,

2012). After the 1880 Yokohama Earthquake the Seismological Society of Japan was

established; “Since then, every big earthquake forced to make some development in

earthquake resistant technology and seismic codes”. Until 2011 the codes were mainly

concerned with the effects of an earthquake or war (after World War 2). However the 2011

event has now highlighted the need to consider damage brought about by tsunamis, and

plan for tsunami evacuation buildings (Ishiyama,Y., 2012). The 2011 earthquake was another

learning curve for those involved in planning and construction. Lessons learnt included “that

seismic-resistant building design prevent collapse of buildings and protects human lives, that

retrofitting vulnerable buildings is essential to reduce damage, that seismic isolation

functioned well, and that nonstructural building components can cause serious damage”

(Tatsuo Narafu, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank,

2012). Often budget is a limitation of implementing safety measures in buildings, as is

preservation orders on older, historical buildings.

Figure 5 below shows some examples of damage done to buildings by the earthquake and

tsunami. In particular a problem of liquefaction and subsidence arose especially along

coastal areas where the land may have been reclaimed or lie below sea-level (Tatsuo

Narafu, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank, 2012).

New measures and guidelines to prevent or limit this have already been put in place by the

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

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Fig(5)

(Tatsuo Narafu, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank,

2012).

Tsunami.

While the Tohoku earthquake was clearly devastating, it pales in comparison to the

destruction caused by the tsunami afterward. Reports of the height it reached along the

eastern coast of Japan vary. The Sendai Plain was the place most hit by the tsunami as the

epicentre of the earthquake lay just to the east, here “the maximum inundation height was

19.5 m, and the tsunami bore propagated more than 5 km inland” (Mori,N., et al 2011).

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Fig(6)(Mori,N., et al 2011)

Figure 6; shows the 2000 kilometre stretch of Japan’s eastern coast that was hit by the

tsunami. The worst hit area was the Tohuku region directly west of the epicentre.

Inundation height along the coast was up to 20 metres in places while run-up height levels

vary due to differences in topography and land use (Mori,N., et al 2011). Bays and inlets

north along the coast funnelled the effects of the tsunami giving higher than expected

waves. Japanese Statistics say it reached a height of 8.5 metres in Miyako in the Iwate

Prefecture to the north of the epicentre (Statistics Japan, 2013). In this area tsunamis are

not unheard of and there are many measures in place to protect against them. However

these measures paled in comparison to the strength and height of this tsunami.

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Fires

A large number of houses were destroyed by fire. These fires were started either by the

shaking of the earthquake itself or by the tsunami afterward. Overall 286 fires arose in the

aftermath of the earthquake (Hokugo,A., 2013). These fires can be broken up into two

categories; those that occurred inland and those that occurred near the sea (Tanaka,T.,

2012)

Fig (7) shows the number and distribution of fires resulting from the Tohoku earthquake and

tsunami (Tanaka,T., 2012).

The inland fires consisted of forest fires, electrical fires in buildings and industrial areas, fires

from damaged cars and in particular fires from piles of rubble. These fires would be

standard of an earthquake. Fires nearer the sea were often caused by burning oil, from

either refineries or tankers. These were the work of the tsunami more than just the

earthquake (Tanaka,T., 2012).

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One major problem Japan faced after the tsunami was what to do with the resulting debris

and rubbish. Over 24million tons of this waste was created through the destruction of

houses, roads, cars, farms etc. This was a nuisance to the clean up and also a hazard within

itself becoming a source of disease and pests as well as fire ((Koseki,H., et al, 2012,

Murasawa,N., et al, 2013 and Tanaka,T., 2012). The summer after the 2011 earthquake

between 20 and 30 fires occurred due to the debris left behind by the disaster

(Murasawa,N., et al, 2013 and Koseki,H., et al, 2012). This rubble often contains flammable

material and also micro organisms which can create their own heat and hence fire. Often

moisture in the rubble contributed to the fire.

Fig (8) shows a large pile of rubble smouldering and smoking (Koseki,H., et al, 2012)

As the microorganisms contained in the rubble die, they also ferment which releases heat.

Under normal circumstance this heat would not be nearly enough to produce a fire;

however the composition of the rubble allowed it to pick up a spark easily. In these rubble

piles are large amounts of paper and wood, refuse and household waste, as well as Tatami.

Tatami is a Japanese flooring material composed of straw and rushes. Altogether these

materials make for a highly flammable pile. Moisture also contributes to the flammability of

the bundles by promoting the fermentation of the microorganisms which then created heat.

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Figure (9) shows some of the flammable material contained in the piles (Murasawa,N., et al,

2013).

Nearer the sea, fires were caused mainly by oil and gas tankers being broken up directly by

the waves or being hit off the surrounding shoreline, or each other, and then igniting

(Hokugo,A., 2013). Often the leaking oil or gas would spread carrying with it the flames as it

is highly burnable. Figure (10) shows broken oil tankers and fire coming from the leaking oil.

Figure (10) (Koseki,H., et al, 2012)

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Once one of these fires begins it is difficult to get under control. They can occur anywhere

that rubble and rubbish builds up and will spread quickly. Often bands of fires joined

together to cover a much larger expanse. While 28,000 fire fighters (Hayashi,T., 2012) were

brought together to help in the devastation this was still not enough to keep these fires

under control.

Figure (10) (Hokugo,A., 2013) shows the different ways a fire may arise after an

earthquake/tsunami event. By studying these different scenarios it may be possible to

mitigate against such events repeating in the future.

Transport

The destruction of transport infrastructure is not only damaging within itself but also

hinders the evacuation and rescue of people during the disaster, and the cleanup and

reconstruction afterward. The main airport in Tohoku is the Sendai airport. Approximately

one hour after the earthquake shook this airport was washed over by the tsunami

destroying its terminal and airport building (Minato,N., and Morimoto,R., 2012).

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(The Telegraph, 2011.)

(ABC News, 2012.)

Figure 11(a) and (b) show the damage done to the Sendai airport by the tsunami. The top

picture shows the airport building surrounded by water, while the bottom image shows the

wreckage afterward with cars and airplanes both mixed in with other debris.

The loss of this airport was a huge blow to the rescue and cleanup afterward, as was the

damage done to the railway service. Stopping rail transport to and from Tokyo led to “near

travel paralysis within the capital” (Minato,N., and Morimoto,R., 2012 and Impact

Forecasting, 2011). Many roads from national to regional were also washed away by the

gigantic waves. In addition to this there were many fuel shortages as refineries and tanks

had been destroyed or burnt by the tsunami (Minato,N., and Morimoto,R., 2012 and

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Tanaka,T., 2012). Additional supplies were difficult to import as Japans ports were severely

damaged (Impact Forecasting, 2011).

To combat these disruptions many regional airports, that were usually only used a few times

a day for flights within Japan, were opened for 24 hours to evacuate people to cities around

the country and bring in relief and rescue workers. Airports in Fukushima, Yamagata and

Hanamaki all lengthened their hours to deal with the heavy flow of traffic (Minato,N., and

Morimoto,R., 2012). Another way the Japanese government might have maintained the

transport system was to have stores of oil further inland and upland where the tsunami

could not reach. Although oil refineries are usually located near the sea for distribution and

processing an emergency supply should be kept elsewhere.

Japan is a highly industrialised country which consumes a lot of energy. It also trades crude

and refined oil, gas and coal. The storing of oil would have helped immediately after the

disaster. However in the longer term this disruption to the energy industry had negative

impacts of the Japanese economy. Oil companies such as Cosmo Oil Company and JX Nippon

Oil & Energy Corporation all experienced fires and damage as a result of the tsunami

(Impact Forecasting, 2011) and are only starting to recover fully now.

Fukushima

The disaster at Fukushima has become the second worst nuclear disaster in the world after

Chernobyl in 1986 (Imtihania,N., and Marikoa,Y., 2013).

It’s unknown exactly how much damage was done to the Fukushima power plant by the

earthquake as the radioactive explosion afterward destroyed all the evidence. However the

earthquake shaking rose 20% above the level tolerable by the plant so it mostly likely

caused some damage (Lay,T., and Kanamori,H., 2011.)

While Fukushima survived the earthquake relatively intact it was the tsunami which caused

the greatest damage. Giant waves inundated over the sea walls flooding the nuclear plant.

This cut off the power supply needed to cool the nuclear reactors. The nuclear reactors then

overheated causing three to go into meltdown and release radiation (Lay,T., and

Kanamori,H., 2011 and Dudden,A., 2012). It is interesting that this radiation accident

occurred not because of damage to the reactors themselves but due to the nuclear plant

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not being able to cool the reactor when the power went out not being able to vent the

dangerous gases that were building up within the system (Bunn,M., and Heinonen,O., 2011).

After the accident at first a “mandatory exclusion zone” of 20kilometre was applied. This

was then extended to 30kilometres. A survivor of a nuclear incident is called a “hibaku”, the

word was created after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1945. Many people ~10%

of those evacuated died in evacuation centres due to poor conditions there. It is hoped that

the remaining survivors will be compensated, although by whom (either the government or

TEPCO) is still unclear (Dudden,A., 2012). Others, such as the United Stated Government,

believe there should be an 80 kilometre exclusion zone. Pregnant women and children were

most in danger. Until the 25th of May, over two months after the tsunami the Tokyo Electric

Power Company was still keeping people in the dark as to just how bad the situation was

(Dudden,A., 2012).

Estimates of how much nuclear waste is still being emitted are varied but average at

300tonnes a day (Oskin, B., 2013)

Japan today.

While Japan initially swung into action to rebuild itself the effects of such a large disaster do

not just disappear overnight, or even two years later. Housing continues to be a problem,

either because the funding isn’t there or because previous sites for homes and communities

are being reconsidered after the devastation. There are “still roughly 290,000 people from

Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures living in evacuation shelters, temporary housing,

or other sorts of refuge” (Phro,P., 2013) of these ~52,000 remain emigrant due to the

danger of the Fukushima nuclear reactor.

Another heartbreaking effect of the earthquake and tsunami are not just those who died,

but also the 1,000s of people who remain missing years later “On Sept 11, a 1,000-person-

strong team searched the coastlines of the three prefectures for the 2,654 people still

missing” (Phro,P., 2013).

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Surrounding tectonics.

The 2011 earthquake may also have had implications on the surrounding plates and

tectonics. It is impossible that such an earthquake registering 9.0 on the Richter scale could

not affect the surrounding geology. In this case “the redistributed stress activated distant,

long-quiescent faults, the first time that has been recorded” (Kerr,R.A., 2011). This is

especially worrying given the close proximity of Tokyo. Tokyo is the capital of Japan and has

a population of 13.16 million people (2010 figure) (Statistics Japan, 2013). When the 2011

earthquake hit it measured only 5.0 magnitude in Tokyo (Statistics Japan, 2013). Many are

fearful that the next earthquake to hit Tokyo will not be as gentle. As it stands small

earthquakes and tremors are now 3 times more common than they were before the 2011

disaster (Toda,S., and Stein,R.S., 2013). Many studies since the Tohoku earthquake have

resulted in a bleak prediction for the future, one estimates “a 17% probability of a M≥7.0

shock over the 5-year prospective period 11 March 2013 to 10 March 2018, two-and-a-half

times the probability had the Tohoku earthquake not struck” (Toda,S., and Stein,R.S., 2013).

While another states the odds of another earthquake of similar magnitude in the next 50

years has gone from 35% to 50% (Kerr,R.A., 2011).

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Figure (12) above (Toda,S., and Stein,R.S., 2013) shows how seismicity around Tokyo has

changed between pre and post the Tohoku earthquake. The increase after the 2011

earthquake is believed to be leading up to another devastating megathrust earthquake.

It is clear that the earthquake and tsunami had devastating consequences on Japan and it

will take generations for them to recover fully. It is necessary to learn from these effects to

plan and mitigate similar situations in the future.

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Mitigation

Learning from past earthquakes is the best way of predicting and planning for future ones.

Many believed that the maximum magnitude of an earthquake in or around the Tohoku

region (offshore of Miyagi) would have a magnitude between 7 and 8 (Simons,M., et al

2011). Below is a close –up of the seismic hazards map produced by the Earthquake

Research Committee in 2005. It shows the maximum magnitude possible at each fault and

the probability of an earthquake this size occurring. None of the predicted magnitudes

exceed 8.

Figure (13) (Earthquake Research Committee, 2005.)

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While the Japanese government, geologists and other scientists had predicted an

earthquake event they had not predicted one of such huge magnitude (Oskin, B., 2013).

It is often the case that the magnitude of a historical event is often an underestimation and

therefore affects the prediction of future events.

A lot of similarities can be drawn between the 869AD Jogan earthquake and the 2011

earthquake. It was a large earthquake, of minimum magnitude 8.3 which occurred to the

east of Japan, in the Pacific Ocean. This in turn caused a tsunami which inundated the

Tohoku coastline particularly at Sendai where sand sediments have been found which

indicate the distance inland reached by the waves to have been ~4kilometres (Minoura,K.,

et al 2001). A study by Minoura,K., et al, 2001, drew attention to the Jogan earthquake and

tried to use it to predict and model for any future earthquakes. They reported that the

likelihood of a large tsunami hitting the area again was “high” and that if one did occur it

would flood 2.5 to 3 kilometres inland (Minoura,K., et al 2001). Another study since the

2011 earthquake by, KaganY.Y., and Jackson,D.D., 2013, has used data from this earthquake

in combination with historical data in an attempt to estimate the likelihood of another mega

earthquake (>9M) occurring. They suggested that around the world at different subduction

zones, an average of five mega quakes occurs every century, and five did actually happen in

Chile, Russia, the USA, Indonesia and then Japan. The next hundred years will be interesting

to see if this prediction stands again as this is possibly more hindsight than fact. KaganY.Y.,

and Jackson,D.D., even believe that magnitude 10 earthquakes should not be ruled out in

the future.

A study by Maercklin,N., et al in 2012 suggests the possibility of two seismic cycles in the

area. The first cycle, where stress and strain builds up in the deeper part of the subducting

slab, causes a large earthquake (Magnitude less that 8) every 10years. Meanwhile there is

second cycle creating stress and strain nearer the surface in the shallow part of the surface.

When this is released it results in a megathrust earthquake with a magnitude greater than 9,

this occurs approximately every 1000years. It is thought the 2011 earthquake occurred

when the two coincided.

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Approximately one minute before the earthquake struck warning was sent out by Japan's

earthquake early warning system. This information came via texts to people’s phones and

broadcasts on TV, radio and the internet (Oskin, B., 2013). These warnings came from the

Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA).

Around the world nearly 1300 seismometers were able to pick up on the waves radiating

from the earthquake through the crust, oceans and atmosphere. These seismometers were

able to send back near real-time data which helped the Japan Meteorological Agency and

NOAA understand what was happening and how it might cause a tsunami (Lay,T., and

Kanamori,H., 2011.) Within minutes initial tsunami warnings were released by the NOAA

Tsunami Warning Centre and over the next few hours details of estimated arrival times and

heights were added (NOAA/US Dept of Commerce /NWS, 2011).

Japan is a region which is prepared for earthquakes and tsunamis have experienced quite a

number of both. This preparation can be a curse however when people become complacent

about their safety. It is believed that after the earthquake and warnings only ~58% of the

population evacuated to higher ground before the tsunami struck. Included in this

percentage are those that did evacuate, but not to high enough ground as it was thought

unnecessary. The original warning issued by the JMA estimated wave heights of 3 to

6metres and many thought the seawalls would be enough to protect them. Should the

magnitude of the earthquake have been better estimated it would have resulted in more

accurate prediction of the tsunami height. More people would have then evacuated instead

of putting their faith in the sea walls.

In the wake of the earthquake a new agency has been set up – G-EVER, in an attempt “to

establish an effective international framework where we collaborate and develop a system

to gather information on disaster mitigation in Asia-Pacific Region, including Japan”

(Tsukuda,E., 2013). G-EVER hold meetings and conferences to bring together information

about disasters in and around the Pacific, in attempt to predict and plan for the future.

People attending these meetings come from different Universities and Geological Surveys

around the world (Tsukuda,E., 2013).

In Fukushima a more transparent communication policy between TEPCO and the people in

the surrounding areas could have resulted in much more people being evacuated and

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avoiding coming in contact with the radiation. Better safety measures could also have been

applied. Some were as simple as building up the sea wall higher as geologists had pointed

out that previous earthquakes could have caused a tsunami higher than the 10metres of the

wall (Dudden,A., 2012).

The government failed to implement the national SPEEDI (System for Prediction of

Environment Emergency Dose Information). This would have supplied better information on

the path the radiation might follow, which could have been used to prepare better

evacuation plans. The SPEEDI data was eventually supplied to the US government who

produced radiation maps. Had these maps been made available sooner evacuation

boundaries and routes would have been better planned for (Dudden,A., 2012). The

Japanese government also raised the threshold limit of radiation, to avoid spreading panic

while broadcasting overly optimistic information and educational guides that said

everything was going to be alright (Greenpeace., 2011-2013).

Around the world the Fukushima incident has scared many governments into reconsidering

their nuclear energy policies. Some such as China are continuing on with their plans for a

huge nuclear power system, while others like Germany and Switzerland intend to phase out

all their nuclear power (Bunn,M., and Heinonen,O., 2011; Visschers,V.H.M., and Wallquist,L.,

2013.)

An alternative to turning our backs on nuclear energy entirely would be to design and build

new nuclear reactors to be more self contained and less dependent on outside sources of

energy etc. Strengthening the safety and security of existing nuclear power plants is a more-

short term and inexpensive solution. These improvements fall into 6 different areas;

1. higher safety standards (better regulation and better design)

2. higher security standards (against terrorism and other threats)

3. stronger emergency response (specialised people who can respond quickly)

4. strengthened and expanded peer reviews (better knowledge and understanding

supplied by experts)

5. legally binding requirements (including more transparency and better

communication when a problem arises)

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6. expanded international cooperation (learning from each other and helping one

another in times of crisis) (Bunn,M., and Heinonen,O., 2011).

In the case of fires there are a number of ways to mitigate against them. Putting piping

through the piles of rubble will create ventilation. This will allow the decomposing

microorganisms to release their heat energy into the atmosphere rather than into the

surrounding rubble (Koseki,H., et al, 2012). Similarly if the rubble piles could be stored in a

dry, sheltered area or if they were covered in a tarpaulin it would keep them dry, slowing

down the process of fermentation in the microorganisms (Koseki,H., et al, 2012). Ideally the

disposal or the rubble would be the best solution, though this is not always feasible at the

early stages when the main concern is saving human lives. Instead careful monitoring of

areas of rubble and their temperature changes may be enough to prevent a fire (Koseki,H.,

et al, 2012). Remote sensing can be used to do this over large areas. A plan for a secondary

evacuation after the earthquake/tsunami should also be considered in case the fires get out

of control (Hokugo,A., 2013).

The Tohoku region was an area used to and well prepared for tsunamis. They experience

tsunamis roughly every 10-50 years (Mori,N., et al 2011). One area – Sanriku has been

undergoing a cycle of a tsunami at least every 40years for the last 115 years, they were also

hit by the 2011 tsunami. This tsunami led to the loss of 44/52 households in the area as well

as the death of 4 people. Its population are well aware of the danger and yet choose to live

and return to the area after each event (Ueda,K., and Torigoe,H., 2012). A number of

measures have been put in place along the Japanese coast in an attempt to cope with such

disasters. These measures include education, evacuation drills, tsunami barriers, building

regulations and the building of evacuation centres (Cyranoski,D., 2011 and Mori,N., et al

2011) However it was still the tsunami that did the most damage and created the worst loss

of life.

For the future more planning and “worst case scenario” situations are needed. Much faith is

being put into simulations, but there are many factors to be considered in these projections

including “high-resolution bathymetric and topographic data, wave breaking, diffraction,

and the other hydrodynamic effects, but also relate to the locations of buildings, streets, and

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other elements of urban infrastructure”, (Mori,N., et al 2011), and so can have variable

results.

Conclusions

The Tohoku earthquake had many ramifications and devastating effects. While it could not

have been prevented, it could have been predicted and planned for better. It is important to

remember that extreme events can happen and not to think of them as flukes or once-offs

but instead something that requires more planning to prevent loss of life and economic

damage. This earthquake must now be taken as a lesson, one which we can learn a great

deal from for the future.

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References.

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