Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?

THINKING beyond the canopyTHINKING beyond the canopy

IUFRO

Session 101a Transitions to sustainable

forest management:Economic, social and

cultural parameters

10 October 2014

Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?

Verina Ingram

THINKING beyond the canopy

Prunus africanaPrunus africana• Afromontane, evergreen tree• Key species in Cameroon montane

forests • Fruit eaten and dispersed by >20

species, 50% endangered &/or endemic

• High degradation & deforestation rates in main harvest areas

• Local use and trade in timber and bark• Estimated 60,000 people dependent

on the international trade in 2007• Principal ingredient in prostatic

hyperplasia pharmaceuticals and health supplements

Introduction


Prunus africana

range and trade

= exporters & % world exports

1995-2013

= border trade

= traditional medicinal use & trade

= main importers & % world imports 1995-2013

= national management plan

Source: Cunningham 2008, Hall et al .2000, CITES WCMC Trade database 2014

22%

52%52%

50%

4%

8%

28%>1%

12%

1%

>1%

2%

1%

5%

1%0.1%

13%

2%

5%

>1%

Main harvest zoneszones


BackgroundInternational trade, apparent over-exploitation, respite & action

Photo: K Stewart

• Regulated since 1974 : arbitrary, poor enforcement and monitoring, counterproductive to sustainable trade.

• Cameroon worlds’ largest exporter origin of 51% of all exports since 1995, with increasing volumes harvested.

• Sources unknown. In 2007 wild P. africana un-quantified , inventories only in SW.

• This raised concerns about overexploitation of wild stocks, leading to :• IUCN Red List (Vulnerable) in 1998 – but “needs updating”• Trade restrictions (CITES Appendix II listed ) in 2005• ‘Special Forestry Product’ in Cameroon in 2006• EU suspension international trade from Cameroon November 2007• Cameroon self-imposed moratorium 2007-2010.

• Lobbies: African exporters, European importers, governments and conservation organisations. Conflicting conservation vs. livelihood and business interests

• Participatory developed national management plan in response to concerns by organisations in Cameroonian value chain

• Exports resumed 2010 with new statutory rules i.e. inventories and management plans. Inventories now near completion: approx. 60% wild in forest, 40% cultivated.

THINKING beyond the canopyValue Chain

Harvester WholesalerProcessor Exporter Retailer Consumer

Access to resources for production

Access to markets


Research questions

1. What arrangements are used to govern Prunus africana chains in Cameroon?

2. How do these governance arrangements impact the livelihoods of actors along the chain?

3. How do these governance arrangements impact chain and product sustainability?

Kongo CF,

Illegal harvesting, Kilum Community forest, December 2008


Meth

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see In

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4


Methodology: Assessing governance arrangementsIndicators Score

Strong 10

Clear8

Moderate5

Weak2

Non-existent0

Existence of an institution and rules/norms known and named

Well known by all actors; clearly stated

Stated by majority of actors

Named, some rules known

Not clear, few rules discernible Not stated or known

Boundaries of rights known by chain actors

Well known & stated by all actors Known by most Known to some Little known Not known

Monitoring and compliance with rules

Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None

Frequency of use of sanctions and enforcement

Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None

Use of conflict resolution mechanisms

Well used Occasional Infrequent Little used Not used

Use of individual & collective action to develop and modify rules

Well used Occasional Infrequent Little used Not used

Nesting horizontally (within particular scale) and vertically (value chain)

Well-nested, both horizontally &

vertically

Partiallyhorizontal & vertical

Some horizontal/and/or vertical

Lowhorizontal or vertical None

Level of accountability and dependence on actors

High level Moderate Low Minimal None

Moral grounding & (democratic) legitimacy of power High level Moderate Weak Very weak No

Location of decision making clear to actors

High level, clear to actors Known Uncertain Vague/unclear No

Longevity of institution Long lived Long to medium term Medium to short term Temporal None

Participation of actors Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None

Literature review of governance indicators (Graham, Amos, and Plumptre 2003; Hyden et al. 2008; Ibrahim Foundation 2013; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007; Ribot, Chhatreb, and Lankinad 2008; World Bank 2010) and institutional design principles (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Cox, Arnold, and

Tomás 2010; Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001) yielded eleven indicators.


Q1. Arrangements governing Prunus africana chains in Cameroon

“Super regulated” chain and products 2007 EU CITES trade suspension → crisis and review of arrangements

Statutory regulation •Grown in coverage •internationally influenced by ‘’involuntary’’ international standards•Enforcement arbitrary and ineffective , varies by region•Regulates wild harvest only

Voluntary, market based harvester collective action

•community-based companies and community forests •used, adapted, collaborated with, occasionally subjugated and often challenged traditional and regulatory authority•Alienated and disabled customary institutions as commodification increased. •community based action resulted in both forest management and unsustainable exploitation

Customary regulations •Differ by region, •preceded regulatory framework,•frequently overrun by projects and new forest management models- CFs•block and contradict statutory rights. •Focus on ownership and access to resource, in some areas on sustainable harvesting.

Projects•5 long term projects•Introduced CBOs and CFs, protected areas•Introduced harvesting rules, monitoring , controls

Corruption•Permitting process•Transport•Illegal harvesting•Access in CFs


Traditional & customary laws Statutory law

‘bricolage’

Regulatory authoritiesnational and provincial

ministries, local councils, implementing agencies

Traditional authoritiesChiefs, customary councils,

courts

Community forests

‘Project’ rules

NGOs & donors

Collective ‘Voluntary’ and ‘supplier’

rules

AFRIMED Prunus Platform

International organizations

Standards

inte

rnatio

nal

agreem

ents

Conventions

Stakeholders

Companies

Corruption

Private owners


• Harvesters & tree owners: silent chain “actors”, little voice & power in regulatory arrangements, act to create their own ‘’messy’’ arrangements

• Actors become bricoleurs – make best of arrangements they are in

• Creatively using and making new arrangements & remoulding existing ones to reduce vulnerabilities, cope with risks, take control, reduce hassle and make money.

Laurel & Hardy Silver screen stars c.1920-1940

Moses & PaPygeum hoe handle traders, c.1990-2009


Q2. How do these arrangements impact livelihoods?

• Trade suspension negative economic impact on harvester incomes

• Harvester incomes decreased with regulation and influence of projects

• Few exporters & importers profited for decades, two dominate

• Liberalisation increased prices and competition, decreased information.

• PAUs decrease competition, increased prices & scope for corruption

• Competitive PAUs form entry barrier for small operators and CBOs

• State officials and customary elites access revenues from corruption.

• Collective action aided CF & CBOs to increase revenue, secure rights

• Projects and CBOs explored possibilities for adding value

• Private owners no statutory provision to access markets or arrangements

50-59% market volume50 to 600%


Q3 How do these governance arrangements impact chain & product sustainability

Negative •Pre-2007 government ignored own rules, now introduced but methods questionable

•Statutory arrangements continue to be ineffective

•Regeneration tax barely invested in regeneration

•Projects promoting CFs & CBO facilitated ‘mining’

•Regulations, and project-based based upon a presumption of wild sourcing and threatened status, conventions created dominant, but mistaken perception

•Farmed trees unquantified, “invisible”, source undistinguished, inventories only now occurring.

•Community collective action, promoted by statutory and project-based arrangements, failed to control access or over-extraction

•Customary rules negated even by some traditional chiefs

•Corruption increased illegal harvesting

Positive•Research indicates techniques for sustainable harvest, •Projects stimulated collective and individual planting•Projects brought customary harvest rules into formal sphere•Trade suspension provided respite and led to quantification. •Concessions easier to control and monitor, increased rates sustainable harvesting when combined with project support.•Collaborations between research, development and conservation led to policies and institutions focus on product and livelihood sustainability.

Multiple, incongruent arrangements had mixed, but overall negative impacts


Conclusions

Overlapping and often incongruent governance arrangements •Conventions ripe for rationalisation, statutory needs tweaking, implementation and customary arrangements and projects to be incorporated

Impact of arrangements on livelihoods, mixed but generally negative •Access, employment and profitability decreased by increased regulations

•Importance of business, infrastructure & technical support

•Power critical in determining access to resource, markets and revenues

•Processing & storage offer local value adding

•Harvest techniques & domestication technologies potential to increase profits – but needs dissemination and enforcement

Impact of arrangements on the sustainability of Prunus africana also mixed but generally negative •Recognising tree and land tenure critical for sustainable exploitation

•Selective cultivation with appropriate market access key to sustainable supply and livelihoods

Recognize often clashing livelihood and sustainability impacts for different actors due to overlaps of traditional, regulatory, CBOs, projects with regulatory

arrangements


Role of researchTo address a range of issues simultaneously1

√ To link to development & government institutions for impact1

√ •Bearing in mind different/conflicts of interest

To inform policymakers & practionnners via evidence based science1

√•When evidence is incomplete? •When “they’’ don’t listen ?•Are scientists independent ?

To evaluate impacts of policy and governance actions

√•Who pays?•How to access data for all actors, particularly in competitive chains?

1 CGIAR Consortium Research Program 6 Forests, Trees and Agroforestry 2010

THINKING beyond the canopyTHINKING beyond the canopy

The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) is one of the 15 centres supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)

Thank you!

www.cifor.cgiar.org

[email protected]

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Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?