Emilene Sivagnanam

PUAF 6195 Final Paper

Submitted 04/28/2016

Revised 09/22/2016

1

How Land Laws Are Currently Affecting Food Security for Smallholder Farmers in

Cambodia, and with the onset of Climate Change, Will Land Laws Undermine their Food

Security by 2050?

Introduction

This three-part series discusses how Land Laws in Cambodia are affecting food security for

smallholder farmers, and how climate change will exacerbate the conditions by 2050. This third

essay focuses on:

1) The adverse effects of climate change on rice production, and thus food consumption;

2) The political economy of Cambodia that has resulted in increased food insecurity for

smallholder farmers;

3) Policy recommendations for achieving food security by 2050, despite the increasing

uncertainties caused by climate change; and

4) Monitoring and evaluation indicators to ensure good governance and food security.

History: Food Security and Land Laws in Cambodia

FOOD SECURITY

Rural Cambodians, and especially smallholders, are more at risk for food insecurity because they

face additional constraints in their efforts to produce edible food from crops (CARD 2008).

Refer to Paper 2 for Key Cambodia Facts, the Causal Factors that have Resulted in Food

Insecurity, and examples of constraints that make smallholders extremely vulnerable. Many

smallholders demand land as a source of livelihood, household reproduction, and identity (Beban

and Sovachana 2014), and current Land Law policies allow for land grabbing by agro-industrial

businesses from smallholder farmers, leaving smallholders landless and food insecure.

For the purpose of this paper, the Global Hunger Index (GHI),

will measure food security (IFPRI 2015). This indicator reflects

four dimensions: undernourishment, child wasting, child

stunting, and child mortality (IFPRI 2015). Although

Cambodia’s GHI has improved since 2005, it is still one of the

highest among its neighboring countries, and is considered a

‘serious’ level (IFPRI 2015). Furthermore, Beban and

Sovachana (2014) measured food insecurity as the number of

months per year participants lacked rice to eat, and found, on

average, both men and women lacked sufficient rice 3.25

months out of the year.

LAND LAWS Cambodia’s tragic history with the Khmer Rouge (KR) in 1975 resulted in the destruction of all

records of private property rights. The second paper in this series describes the current land

grabbing situation and the evolution of Land Laws.

In 2012, the Prime Minister signed a moratorium on Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) as an

attempt to resolve land disputes. However, the number of Social Land Concessions (SLCs)

Global Hunger Index for SE Asia

2015 2005

Lao PDR 28.5 36.9

Myanmar 23.5 37.4

Cambodia 22.6 29.8

Indonesia 22.1 26.5

Philippines 20.1 22.1

Vietnam 14.7 24.6

Thailand 11.9 13.6

Malaysia 10.3 14.6

Source: IFPRI, 2015

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PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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granted to government officials, military officers, and wealthy citizens have mysteriously

increased five-fold since then (Lipes 2014). In 2012 alone, the Royal Government of Cambodia

(RGC) granted 38 extra SLCs compared to 2011 (CCHR 2013). No complete list1 of reliable data

of ELCs or land deals exist, nor the bidding process, land investment, or decision-making criteria

because of the government’s lack of transparency (CCHR 2013). Many land disputes never make

it to the courts because smallholder farmers lack the knowledge or financial resources to further

their complaints (MoP 2007). Finally, the government can only intervene in land dispute cases

between individuals and companies, therefore protection of smallholder farmers is minimal and

ineffective (Lipes 2014).

Status of Land Grabbing: USAID reports that since the 1980s, the wealthy one percent of the

population has owned 20-30 percent of land (Calavan et al. 2004). Then in 2007, the Ministry of

Planning (MoP) suggested that the wealthier one fifth of Cambodians control up to 70% of

available land (MoP 2007). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

(MAFF), the government signed 114 contracts with agribusinesses in 1996-2012, totaling

1,215,867 hectares (MAFF 2013), which is 30.6%2 of the total arable land in Cambodia. Further,

in 2015, combined data from the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and MAFF indicated a total of

230 companies with grants for a total land area of 1,934,896 hectares (48.8% of arable land)

(Open Development 2015), even though the NGO, LICADHO, reports 2,157,744 hectares

(54.4% of arable land) of ELCs granted in August 2012. From 2012-2015 alone, the government

profited $80 million from previously leased ELCs (Open Development 2015). It seems that

reporting is somewhat convoluted, however the point remains that the government continues to

profit from ELCs despite the moratorium signed in 2012.

Climate Change Projections and Impacts

Climate change poses additional problems for the food security of smallholder farmers. Most

smallholder farmers rely on the monsoon season, May-October, to provide enough water to flood

seasonal lakes and streams in order to irrigate their crops. In 2004, 84.4% of harvested land used

traditional rain-fed farming practices of rice (Yu and Fan 2010). However, climate change

induced water scarcity caused by drought; extreme weather events, flooding, and land

degradation are affecting crop yields (MoE 2006) and the ability of smallholder farmers to have

any sort of income (CARD 2008).

PROJECTIONS

Temperature: Regional climate change projections over the Mekong River Basin suggest an

increasing trend in mean temperature for the period 1960-2099, and a rapid increase after 2030

(Thoeun 2015). In addition, Oxford University projects mean annual temperature increases by

0.7-2.7oC by the 2060s and 1.4-4.3oC by the 2090s (Thoeun 2015).

1 The 2012 ELC moratorium ended government records of land concession sales to companies. The records do not

account for the SLCs sold to wealthy Cambodians, and there are no government records of land disputes because the

elite technically, legally acquired the land. 2 Average arable land 1997-2013: 3,969,000 ha (FAOSTAT 2016)

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PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Precipitation: Regional models indicate an increasing trend in mean annual rainfall for the period

2010 to 2050, mostly occurring during the wet season, and slightly offset by a decrease in the dry

season rainfall, followed by a decreasing trend from 2070-2099 (Thoeun 2015).

Fig. 1: Projected temperature and precipitation variability 1960-2099.

Source: Thoeun, 2015

IMPACTS Increased temperatures cause abiotic stress and enhanced respiratory rates, which reduces

duration of growth and grain filling time of rice crops (Wassmann et al. 2009). This results in

lower yield and lower quality rice grain (Wassmann et al. 2009). Furthermore, floods have

accounted for 70% of rice production losses between 1998 and 2002, and the occurrence of

drought and floods are one of the main contributors to poverty in Cambodia (MoE 2006). For

example, the severe floods from 2000-2002 resulted in 438 casualties and damages amounting to

$205 million (MoE 2006). Lower yielding or flood-damaged crops have implications on the

available food to consume. In a regional climate change study on food consumption, using

Emilene Sivagnanam

PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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caloric intake as a measure for food availability, SE Asia is projected to have a 4.3% decline in

kcals per day in 2050 (Nelson et al. 2009).

There are still uncertainties in forecasting High Impact Weather (HIW) events, and accurate

forecasts are not yet available in Cambodia for government use (MoE 2006). Currently, villagers

downstream rely on word of mouth from upstream areas to ready themselves for floods. The

information that does exists about water levels leaves farmers unsure of how to interpret the

information and is typically found in public areas, thus inaccessible to smallholders (MoE 2006).

Political Economy of Cambodia

Although there are numerous areas of weakness in Cambodia’s governance system that affect

achieving food security for smallholder farmers, this paper will focus primarily on aid

dependence and corruption.

Between the periods of 1993-2003, two problems with foreign aid emerged. First, the scale of aid

was roughly $600 million each year, which wildly distorted the economy (Ear 2007). In an audit

of the 2003 budget, the government spent $761.1 million (Kimsong and Wasson 2005), mostly

sourced from donors’ aid. Organizations took over funding for education, health care, social

welfare, and rural development, meanwhile the government was financially in control of defense

and security (Ear 2007). Since donor agencies took over most of the government’s

responsibilities for basic services, this left the government with minimal responsibilities towards

its citizens (Ear 2007). Second, most Cambodian scholars began working for foreign

organizations, which weakened state capacity. These problems inhibit a lack of political

willpower and poor leadership from the government, and an urgent need to redistribute aid to

improve governance (Ear 2007).

Additionally, aid dependence in Cambodia worsens bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, and

increases corruption (Ear 2007). An estimated $120-500 million per year went towards corrupt

actions (Ear 2007). According to USAID/Cambodia’s assessment on corruption (2004),

numerous diversions of financial resources occur from small facilitation payments. To name a

few: to speed up illegal grants of logging concessions or secure service delivery; police and other

officials demanding small bribes, students paying unofficial daily fees to supplement teachers or

administrators’ salaries, and/or additional fees to access public health services (Calavan et al.

2004). The public perceives corruption as the leading problem with governance (Ear 2007), and

rates it as the most severe cause of human insecurity (Beban and Sovachana 2014). Currently,

between 30 and 40% of the central government’s $4.3 billion budget (Meng 2015) depends on

donor aid (U.S. Dept. of State 2016).

Without the government’s financial or legal support, smallholder farmers must rely on

alternative measures to achieve food security. This entails a reliance on wage labor or migration

to urban areas for work (Beban and Sovachana 2014). The Cambodian Rural Urban Migration

Project (CRUMP) reported Phnom Penh’s population grew at an annual rate of 8% between 1998

and 2008, from 567,860 to 1,237,600 residents, and 87% of the surveyed sample indicated it was

for work-related reasons (MoP 2012).

Emilene Sivagnanam

PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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Source: MoP, 2012

My Position on Cambodia’s Situation

Cambodia missed the Asian Green Revolution (AGR) from 1965-1990 because of political

turmoil, but was able to increase paddy rice production through extensive farming since their

first rice exports in 1995 (IRRI 2015). Since 2011, Cambodia’s rice exports increased 215%,

which currently makes the country the world’s fastest growing rice exporter (Workman 2016).

22 22.7 23.6 22.5

15.7 16

33 32.125.3 24.5

29.926.3

32 32.4

38.4 39.5 40.944.8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Per

cen

t

Years

Primary Sources of Income in Cambodia (in %)

Agriculture Non Agriculture Wage and Salary

Cambodia Rice Exports and Consumption (thousand metric tons)

Trade Year 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014* 2014/2015 2015/2016*

Exports 900 1,075 1,000 1,150 900

Consumption &

Residual 3,400 3,550 3,650 3,600 3,600

*Decline in exports follow same trend as neighboring countries

Source: USDA, 2016

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PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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By the year 2018, the RGC wants to transform the country into a demand-driven export market

and reach the status of an upper middle-income country (RGC 2014). Refer to Paper 1 to read

about the government’s National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP), Triangle Strategy, and its

inclusive achievements. During the period 1994-2006, Cambodia achieved macroeconomic

stability and considerable economic progress, with an annual average economic growth rate of

8.4% (RGC 2014). However, the country’s long history of political instability, an unstable

economy, and lack of political willpower resulted in the current state of corruption, which

hinders the country’s full potential to grow.

An example of an economic consequence of Cambodia’s corruption is the 2014 withdrawal of

the European Union (EU) importing sugar from Cambodia because of accusations against the

Phnom Penh Sugar plantation, owned by Senator Ly Yong Phat and his wife, Kim Heang

(Zsombor 2014). The sugar plantation is encroaching on farms and community forests of over

1,500 families (Zsombor 2014). After an investigation in 2012, EU cut imports from $42 million

in 2013 to $2 million in 2014 (-94.8%) (Crothers 2016).

Finally, the government is simply not investing enough money or resources into agriculture or

smallholders. During the AGR, on average, most countries spent 15.4% of their total budget on

agriculture, which resulted in small farms being more efficient producers than expansive farms

(Hazell 2009). In 2013, the RGC spent less than 1.0% of its national budget on agriculture

(Beban and Sovachana 2014).

Policy Recommendations

USE THE PRO-POOR MODEL

The pro-poor model includes a rural-orientated development strategy that raises

productivity and income for smallholders (Timmer 2015). This includes a

technology package that is easily adoptable for farms of all sizes, modern input and

credit systems that are affordable to smallholder farmers, public extension systems

Paddy Rice Production in Cambodia, 1993-2014

Source: FAOSTAT, 2015

Emilene Sivagnanam

PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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that prioritize farmers; and product markets and price support policies that ensure

stable, profitable prices (Hazell 2009).

The pro-poor model requires a price-policy approach with high price incentives to create

rural purchasing power (Timmer 2015). If implemented in conjunction with long term

investments (see section below), the model will lead to economic growth (Timmer 2015).

For example, Indonesia used the pro-poor model to reduce poverty substantially (Tsakok

2011). Their GNP per capita was $50 in 1967 and rose to $1,420 in 2006 because of the

government’s investment in rural areas (Tsakok 2011). Currently, the only pro-poor

based intervention outlined in the NSDP is for health financing (RGC 2014).

INCREASE GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY THROUGH INDEPENDENT

MONITORING MECHANISMS

The RGC needs to respond to independent assessments of corruption. The

government must monitor actions and commit to precise notification procedures,

have open discussions of food trade policies, and create knowledge platforms that

collect, analyze, and diffuse information across the value chain (World Bank 2012).

Allowing an independent governing body to assess and monitor the government will

increase transparency and reduce corruption (Hazell 2009). In 2004, USAID/Cambodia

realized that, “corruption has become a part of everyday life…it has reached ‘pandemic’

proportions,” (Calavan et al. 2004). The organization assessed the corruption and

provided recommendations, but the RGC did not respond.

The RGC can improve its governance by increasing accountability through supervision

and citizen participation (Soksreng 2007), as well as through predictability, by applying

rules and policies in a consistent format (Soksreng 2007). Many human rights NGOs are

writing open letters3 to international government officials to demand an end to human

rights violations related to land disputes. These letters put the government and their

corrupt actions in the international spotlight, and outreach uses public pressure to change

the government’s behavior. An example of a successful effort is the Clean Sugar

Campaign, which started in 2011. In 2012, after numerous letters to the EU, the European

Parliament passed an urgent resolution to investigate the human right abuses related to

ELCs, which then led to a reduction in sugar imports from Cambodia (Boycott Blood

Sugar, 2016).

GUARANTEE LAND TENURE SECURITY FOR SMALLHOLDERS

The government needs to re-define their Land Laws to provide rights to smallholder

farmers without ambiguous language that allows loopholes or exploitation of the

Laws. Completing a full cadastral and land measurement survey is necessary to

register the land for smallholder farmers and transfer land titles (Trzinski and

Upham 2014).

The RGC needs to address the broken land ownership system that favors the wealthy

minority in Cambodia (Tsakok 2011). In 2002, the World Bank invested $33.9 million to

map and register land in the Land Management and Administration Project (Trzinski and

Upham 2014). However, critics of the program argue there were no provisions for

3 Four NGOs, FIDH, ADHOC, LICADHO, LDH teamed together and wrote an open letter to French President

Hollande on 10/23/15, and a letter to US Senator Kerry on 1/26/2016

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PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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independent monitoring and a lack of transparency (Beban and Sovechana 2014); and

yet, a complete map still does not exist and there is a gap between measurement and

titling (Beban and Sovechana 2014). In addition, working groups need to detail target

groups who will benefit from land tenure, create a beneficiary selection process,

restitution, land acquisition mechanisms, and provide a plan to increase access to land for

smallholders and their land tenure security (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010). It is

important for the government to be extremely clear in their goals so questions do not

arise later (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010). Setting up technical working groups or

commissions to find facts, produce initial recommendations, and building consensus

throughout the country will achieve clear-cut goals and prevent conflict later

(Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010).

LONG TERM INVESTMENTS

Long-term investments in rural development through Village Development

Committees (VDCs) will educate farmers about new technologies, empower

smallholder farmers with roles and duties, and provide resources to improve

villages.

As smallholders settle into their new plots, long-term investments in education and

technology, such as irrigation and milling machinery, will allow farmers to increase

processing, storage, and trade (Hazell 2009). In addition, accessibility to lucrative

markets will need to be developed (Tsakok 2011). Furthermore, rural roads provide

farmers access to the markets, which increases a farmers’ cash income and ability to

purchase food (Christiaensen 2012). Finally, farmers need incentives to invest in their

land to use climate-resilient methods and sustainably, intensively farm. This will

eventually lead to the creation of new labor in non-agricultural sectors (Tsakok 2011).

Thus far, the VDCs have held 423 courses on development plans, restored canals,

donated livestock, and provided essential materials (RGC 2013), and the RGC plans to

increase training VDCs in order to: create village development plans, use scientific

knowledge appropriately, and adapt to climate change (RGC 2013). Money for these

trainings will come from public investments, such as ministries, institutions and agencies,

NGOs, development partners and more (RGC 2013).

INVEST IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PROJECTS

The country needs more community-based initiatives to adapt to climate

variability. Developments for sustainable community irrigation systems (MoE

2006), an early warning system for floods, integrated soil and water management

(World Development 2006), and weather indexed insurance (World Bank 2012)

can protect smallholders from climate change.

The government must make significant investments in these high priority areas to

reduce the impacts of climate change on smallholder farmers now and into 2050.

These projects will cost roughly $65.5 million over the course of three years (MoE

2006), but the results will have considerable impacts on adapting to climate

variability. The RGC claims people are the focus of 2016, listing priority sectors as

the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport; The Ministry of Labor and Vocational

Training; and the Ministry of Health (Meng 2015). However, efforts to improve

livelihoods will not be valid if a climate change induced HIW events kill hundreds of

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PUAF 6195 Final Paper

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Revised 09/22/2016

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people and destroys crops. The government needs to increase their budget4 for the

MoE, or NGOs need to personally fund and work with the Ministry to maximize

results, scale up projects, and reduce repetition of pilot projects. Moreover,

community-based, integrated soil and water management practices can double

productivity compared to rain-fed practices (World Development 2006) and empower

individuals. Finally, weather-indexed insurance can be useful for farmers if

precipitation falls below or above a set threshold that would lead to low yields (World

Bank 2012). This would provide a safety net for farmers that had a smaller yield.

Monitoring and Evaluation Cambodia’s institutional environment needs to transform in order to reduce corrupt land

grabbing, increase land tenure, and improve food security for smallholders. In addition,

adaptation to climate change is necessary in order to sustain food security of farmers into the

year 2050. These changes will require a monitoring and evaluation procedure to ensure timely

policy responses to developments in order to inform policymakers of the most effective

measures.

Currently, the major actors involved in M&E are the office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of

Planning, Ministry of Economy and Finance, and other supporting actors (RGC 2013). This is an

issue in itself; the government needs to increase independent accountability institutions to

increase transparency (Soksreng 2007). Once civil society, the private sector, and the

marginalized are involved, the following indicators listed in the table below will evaluate my

policy recommendations.

4 In 2016, these ministries will receive roughly 5.2 percent of GDP (Meng 2015). 5 These numbers are my own rough estimation from scaling up small projects unless referenced otherwise 6 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2016 7 Less CSOs result in less excessive funding and repetitious projects, this gives organizations more advantage

against the government. 8 CCHR, 2013 9 CCHR, 2013 10 Touch and Neef, 2015

Indicators for Monitoring My Policy Recommendations

Recommendation

Category

Indicator 2013 2050 Goal5

Independent

Monitoring

Number of civil society

organizations that have leverage in

government decisions

1,3506 5007

Number of policies/procedures with

consistent application of rules

N/A (total possible)

Land Tenure Number of land titles 380,0008 700,000

Resolved land disputes cases 40 (2011)9 29310 (total possible as of

Emilene Sivagnanam

PUAF 6195 Final Paper

Submitted 04/28/2016

Revised 09/22/2016

10

Conclusion

Most smallholder farmers do not own land titles, and current Land Laws allow interested

investors the legal right to evict farmers from their homes. When smallholders are displaced

from their homes, their livelihoods are affected, and thus, their food insecurity. However, even

with guaranteed tenure, the onset of climate change will affect rice productivity, now, and into

the future. Although the RGC has accomplished many development achievements in the past 25

years, land insecurity sprouts a new era of conflict for Cambodians and the Royal Government.

The RGC needs to use the pro-poor model, invest in long-term rural developments and

adaptation projects, and revise the Land Laws to guarantee tenure. Bottom line, the government

must increase transparency and reduce corruption.

The next topical areas to assess are:

What organizations, institutions, or political powers have enough influence to demand

transparency from the RGC?

What strategy will effectively stop corruption in Cambodia?

How can climate change adaptation become a priority to the RGC?

How will the suggested improvements directly/indirectly benefit smallholder

farmers?

11 All values in this section are from RGC, 2013 12 IWMI and CGIAR, 2013 13 GEF, 2012 14 IFPRI, 2015 15 IFPRI, 2009 (2000 and 2050 value)

2014)

Long Term (next 35

years) Investments11

Rehabilitation of rural roads (km) 26,900 40,000 (total possible)

New roads (km) 125 15,000

Literacy rate (age 15-24) 91.5 100

Number of villages given training

for Village Development Plan

1,610 15,000

Number of household consumers

with electricity

1,125,679 8,000,000

Climate Change Number of hectares (ha) with access

to community irrigation systems

(wet + dry season)

1.12 million12 2 million

Number of trained employees who

can install, maintain, and operate

EWS

513 26

Food Security Global Hunger Index 22.6 (2015)14 5.0

Daily calorie per capita consumption

(kcal)15

2,696 (2000) 3,277

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Revised 09/22/2016

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