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Dry Year Option for Water Solutions in Urban and Agricultural Settings
Luis RiberaNishita Sinha(Texas A&M University)
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Increasing UsagePollutionDeforestationFall in Groundwater levelClimate Change
Water Scarcity
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Requires more than traditional practices of water conservation
Cost-effective ways to reduce non-beneficial water consumption in irrigated agriculture without compromising economic returns
Lowering existing levels of consumptive water use, while at the same time increasing water’s productivity
A well-functioning water market can provide financial incentives for improving water’s productivity
Solutions
4Source: https://www.tceq.texas.gov/gis/metadata/edw_tsms_met.html
Edwards Aquifer
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Voluntary Irrigation Suspension Program Option
Participation open to irrigation water right holders including municipal and industrial
Water level below 635 feet in J-17 index well triggers the program
Goal- Enrollment of 40,000 ac-ft of waterTrigger Date- October 1stFlexibility- Farmers can walk out post
enrollment if water level increase
The VISPO
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Participants must suspend withdrawals in the following calendar year
Standby fee is paid to all participants irrespective of a suspension call
Implementation fee paid when program requires suspension of withdrawals
Initially pursue enrollment from counties with high impact factor- Atascosa, Bexar, Comal and Hays
Option Structure
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Two term contracts- 5yr and 10yrPayment Schedule
Contract Terms
5-year ProgramStandby fee $50/acre-foot, 1.5% increase per year
Implementation fee $150/acre-foot, 1.5% increase per year
10-year ProgramStandby fee $57.5/acre-foot for years 1-5 and step-
up to $70.20/acre-foot for years 6-10Implementation fee $172.5/acre-foot for years 1-5 and
step-up to $210.60/acre-foot for years 6-10
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Enrollment for the first program began in 2012Implementation once in 2015Fully enrolled program- some applications were
denied since enrollment was fullGuaranteed payment for farmers- stand-by
paymentFarmers cut back on vegetables. Cotton and
Sorghum worked well under dry-land cropping
Program Evaluation
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In 2015, Critical Period Management (CPM) reduction applied to permit holders
VISPO provides the financial incentive to cut further
Aided increase in spring flows and municipal water supply
Lower incidence on farmers of the reduced irrigation water supply
Program Evaluation
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VISPO is funded from aquifer management fees (AMFs) that are specified for the Habitat Conservation Plan- the municipal and industrial permit holders pay $44/acre foot of water as AMFs
Total cost of the program can be ascertained only after the expiry of contract terms due to myriad uncertainties
Edwards Aquifer Authority estimates cost of about USD 4 million for an average implementation rate of 33% over a period of 10 years under a fully enrolled program
Program Management
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Depends on Rio Grande for domestic and agricultural uses
Both agricultural and municipal water demand is expected to grow in the coming years
Oil and gas production has put significant pressure on water demand
Majority of municipal water demand is currently met by Rio Grande
Amistad-Falcon Reservoir system- the shared resource with Mexico
The Valley
To fix and delimit the rights is US and Mexico with respect to the water of:Colorado and Tijuana Rivers andRio Grande from Fort Quitman to the Gulf of
MexicoOne-third of the flow to Rio Grande from the Conchos,
San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo…this one-third shall not be less, as an average amount in cycles of five consecutive years, than 350,000 acre-feet
In case of “extraordinary drought” or serious accident to the hydraulic systems on Mexican tributaries…the treaty allows for the deficiencies to be repaid in the following five-year cycle
If reservoir levels exceed 85 percent full then deficit if forgiven and a new five-year cycle starts
Water Treaty of 1944
Water Treaty of 1944
Between 1953 and 1992 Mexico failed to deliver water to US only once
Since then, almost in every five-year cycle there has been a failure to deliver minimum water amount
Agricultural production in the LRGV depends heavily on irrigation water
Water Treaty of 1944
Value of Irrigation Water for LRGV
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Allocation from Amistad and Falcon reserves coordinated by Rio Grande water master
The DMI (Domestic, Municipal and Industrial) gets the priority followed by mining and irrigation
The DMI storage account is renewed at the beginning of each month
DMI and operational reserves are recharged before mining and irrigation water allocation
Rights Structure
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Surface water vs. Ground waterUrban has superior right to agricultureRisk and uncertainty exist with dependence on
MexicoThere are 27 ID’s and each operates
independentlyWater is stored in the reservoirs so takes a few
days to reach a farmer when calledAdministrative Differences- Role of ID’s and
water master!
Differences from Edwards Aquifer
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Municipal use is limited by municipal water rights- ag conservation may not help!
Sometimes, DMI usage exceeds their individual water right
IDs continue to “oversupply” DMI water to DMI users if they have availability
In absence of DMI water with the ID, cities can acquire water from a third party
These one time “contract water” deliveries are governed by the watermaster
Current Practice under Shortage
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Increase in water demand, climate change, uncertainty on deliveries from Mexico
Irrigation water used to charge the networks of canalThe reliability of municipal water availability may be
disrupted in cases of severe drought and absence of “push water”
Urban must also pay for water losses from seepage, evaporation and other operational losses
Municipalities may need to purchase water to provide for “push water”
Motivation for a DYOP
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Establishing a market where DMI can purchase push water from farmers
Similar to the VISPO, an option be given to farmers where they can slow down irrigation water usage to recharge the canals under water shortage
DMI water availability with the ID’s can be used as a trigger for withdrawal suspensions by farmers
When district has the required amount of water in the DMI account no suspensions will be required
Our Vision
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Like VISPO, payments will be made for both enrollment in the program and suspension when triggered
Volume of push water varies – canal status and length of the system are key determinants of push water requirement
Prices may be negotiated between the parties- cities/districts and farmers
Efficient pricing mechanism would imply paying the farmers the break-even price or the water use value
Payment Proposition
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The present value cost of the contract is the sum of payments to exercise the option and holding it discounted to the present time
We plan to develop a risk based simulation model to assess the probability of exercising the option under different scenarios
Simulation results will provide insight into the potential payments necessary to offset farmer and ID losses under different production and drought scenarios.
Value of the Option
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Cost of water procurement via a DYOP must be less than that of any other alternative
Can have shorter term unlike the Edwards Aquifer program- does not concern endangered species
A small-scale program involving a few districts that are more likely to benefit from DYOP may be put in place
A pilot program can help us understand large-scale challenges and feasibility issues
Other Elements
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Questions/Comments?
Value of Irrigation Water for LRGV
Value of Irrigation Water for LRGV