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GNSS Jamming Detection, Localization and Mitigation Dr. ing. Marco Lisi European Space Agency 12/03/2015 1 M. Lisi - Navigation, Surveillance and Signal Intelligence Conference - Warsaw

GNSS Jamming Detection, Localization and Mitigation

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Page 1: GNSS Jamming Detection, Localization and Mitigation

GNSS Jamming Detection, Localization and Mitigation

Dr. ing. Marco Lisi European Space Agency

12/03/2015 1 M. Lisi - Navigation, Surveillance and Signal Intelligence Conference - Warsaw

Page 2: GNSS Jamming Detection, Localization and Mitigation

Summary • All critical infrastructures of our society are tightly linked to

GNSS s (mainly GPS). Any major disruption of GNSS services can throw them off and cause outages with potentially disastrous effects;

• GNSSs, such as GPS and Galileo, besides suffering from intrinsic limitations (e.g. too weak radio signals, not allowing for indoor, underground and underwater applications), are vulnerable and exposed to many threats, such as cyber-attacks, jamming and spoofing;

• To guarantee a reliable, continuous and resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) service a full, seamless integration of GNSS and of non-GNSS infrastructures and platforms is needed;

• Moreover, advanced anti-jamming receivers, based on digital beam-forming and software-defined radio technologies, have to be developed.

12/03/2015 2 M. Lisi - Navigation, Surveillance and Signal Intelligence Conference - Warsaw

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Critical Infrastructure GPS Dependencies

12/03/2015 3 M. Lisi - Navigation, Surveillance and Signal Intelligence Conference - Warsaw

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Commercial GNSS (GPS) Jammers

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Susceptibility to Interference/Jamming

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Military Vehicle-Mounted GPS Jammers

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GNSS Threats: Spoofing • Spoofing is the possibility to generate, through relatively inexpensive and

technologically simple equipment, fake replicas of GNSS signals. In this way, it is possible to provide to the attacked user or infrastructure inaccurate information about both location and time;

• The reality of this type of threat was glamorously proven in 2013 by a team of researchers from the University of Texas. They boarded a 65-meter, $80 million luxury yacht named “White Rose of the Drachs”, sailing from Monaco to the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.

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Is GNSS a Time Bomb?

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IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE!

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North Korea’s e-Loran System

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Multi-Sensor, Data Fusion Platforms

DARPA's “timing & inertial measurement unit” (TIMU)

MICRO-TECHNOLOGY FOR POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING

(MICRO-PNT)

Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks (CSAC)

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Future PNT System of Systems Infrastructure

Non-GNSS PNT Systems

Autonomous PNT Platforms

GNSSs

eLoran Wi-Fi

GSM SOPs

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GNSS Receivers Anti-Jamming Techniques

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• Analogue Filtering (e.g. SAW) at RF and Digital Signal Processing at baseband (pre-correlation) to reduce out-of-band interferences and suppress interfering signals before de-spreading. Increased resolution of Analogue-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) for higher dynamic range;

• Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) with Analogue Beam-Forming (pre-correlation);

• Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) with Digital Beam-Forming (pre-correlation);

• Antenna/Receiver in Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology with adaptive digital beam-forming and digital signal processing (post correlation, i.e. to maximize the overall C/(J+N).

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GPS Anti-Jamming Receiver (U-blox)

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Spatial Nulling and Beamforming (1/2)

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Spatial Nulling and Beamforming (2/2)

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Principle of Adaptive Array Antenna

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GPS Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) with Anti-Jamming Capabilities

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Software Defined Radio (SDR) with Adaptive Beam Steering for Anti-Jam Applications

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Conclusions • Whether we like it or not, our society has become essentially

dependent on the world Positioning, Navigation and Timing infrastructure, today mainly based on GNSSs;

• Many critical infrastructures of our society would literally collapse in case of a total, worldwide GNSS failure;

• The world urgently needs an even stronger, more resilient and more versatile PNT system of systems;

• In parallel, advanced antenna/receiver architectures, based on adaptive beam-forming and software-defined radio technologies, are also needed, in order to counteract intentional and unintentional jamming.

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OOPS! I have not finished yet…

Let us not forget about the role of Education

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GNSS Education in the Secondary School: Istituto Tecnico Superiore Statale (ITSS)

“Majorana-Giorgi” - Genova

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SPACE CHALLENGES (http://www.spaceedu.net/

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Korean

Thank You English

Russian

Danke German

Grazie Italian

Gracias Spanish

Obrigado Brazilian

Portuguese Arabic

Simplified Chinese

Traditional Chinese

Thai

Merci French

Japanese

תודהJewish

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Dziękuję Polish