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A Strategy for Reliability Evaluation and
Fault Diagnosis of Autonomous Underwater
Gliding Robot based on its Fault Tree
Koorosh Aslansefat
Gholamreza Latif-Shabgahi and Mojtaba Kamarlouei
Email: [email protected]
Third International Conference on Robotics, Automation and Communication Engineering (ICRACE 2014)
Dubai, UAE, October 24, 2014
Topics
Autonomous Underwater Gliders (AUGs)
Fault Tolerance and its Necessity, Attributes and Solutions
Static Fault Tree, Assumption and Modelling
Faults in AUG’s Components
A Strategy to Construct AUG's Fault Tree
Reliability Evaluation of AUGs
Conclusion
2
Autonomous Underwater Gliders (AUGs) 3
An Autonomous Underwater Glider (AUG) is a special type of
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) that uses small changes
in its buoyancy in conjunction with wings to convert vertical
motion to horizontal, and thereby propel itself forward with very
low power consumption.
It can be use for long range survey (thousands of kilometers of range)
Extending ocean sampling missions from hours to weeks or months
Providing data on temporal and spatial scales
Much more costly to sample using traditional shipboard techniques
(typically cost $100,000)
The benefits of using AUGs
Fault Tolerance and Necessity
4
Applications
Safety Critical
Environment Critical
Budget Critical
Fault tolerance is the property that enables a system to
continue operating properly in the occurrence of the failure of
its components
Fault Tolerance and Attributes
Reliability
Availability
Safety
Performability and etc.
5
Generally, in fault tolerance such parameter need to measured:
Failure Rates
Repair Rates
MTTF, MTBF and etc.
Fault tolerant system evaluated by attributes such as:
Fault Tolerance and Modelling
6
Several methods have been developed for Reliability Evaluation
State Space Methods
(Semi) Markov Model
Petri-Nets
Combinatorial Methods
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)
Fault Tree
Numerical and Simulation-Based Methods
Monte Carlo
Static Fault Tree
A Fault Tree (FT) illustrates the ways
through which a system fails. It states
different ways in which combination of
faulty components (called the "Basic
Events") result in an undesired event in the
system (called the "Top Event"). In this
model, basic events are connected to each
other through logical gates forming upper-
level intermediate events
7
(a)(b)(c)
(d)(e)
Fault Tree Assumption
The occurrence of more than one fault at the same time is not
allowed and the common cause failures (CCFs) are ignored.
On-time repairing of vehicle's components is not allowed.
Dynamic characteristics such as functional dependency, components'
priority and the use of spares are not applied in the model.
The system components failure rate obeys exponential distribution
function
8
Fault Tree Solutions
9
1
AND
i
iQ Q
1
1 1OR i
i
Q Q
From probability theory, the output probability of AND & OR gates is
calculated as follows:
Faults in AUG’s Components
In this paper, 9 subsystems and their faults have been considered.
Power system
Leak detection system
Diving system
Environment detection
Collision avoidance
10
Computer system
Propulsion system
Communication system
Navigation system
Navigation System Faults
In AUGs, the GPS antenna is usually located on
one of the horizontal wings. Whenever the
vehicle comes to the surface, through its 90
degree rolling movement the antenna locates in
the highest place from water surface in order to
receive the data. In some other types of these
vehicles there is a flap behind the main rudder
where the antenna is located. If this system or
the rolling system confronts any problem,
vehicle's location recognition becomes hard and
the probability of vehicle’s loss is increased. It
is obvious that any malfunction in GPS and its
processor cause the vehicle to get lost.
11
A Strategy to Construct AUG's Fault Tree
The tree is constructed in five steps as follows:
1) Determine the level of faults occurrence (sensor, sub-subsystem, and subsystem).
2) Determine the contribution of each component faults in its upper level faults, and
then use appropriate gate (AND and OR gate) to construct subsystem or main
system’s fault tree.
3) Consider each subsystem fault tree as a module of main fault tree.
4) Find available probability of each component's failure.
5) Construct the main fault tree and evaluate system’s reliability
12
Example: FT construction of navigation subsystems
According to the first step, the level of navigation
subsystem's component is determined. In this
subsystem, four basic events exist each one of
which enables navigation subsystem and this is
the way to use OR gate
13
252222 25
25
22
1 1 1 1 ... 1 1 1 ... 1Nav i
tt
i
P P P P e e
Reliability Evaluation of AUGs
15
Reliability Evaluation of AUGs
16
Cut-Sequence in Fault Tree
17
CsIP(MCs)AUG Sub-Systems
4.452920.5637863Power Sys.
6.018510.7620066Leak Detection Sys.
6.957080.8808393Diving Sys.
6.805150.8616035Environment Detect Sys.
6.832430.8650568Obstacle Avoidance Sys.
6.956660.8807865Computer Sys.
7.616520.9643316Propulsion Sys.
7.213830.9133464Communication Sys.
4.913860.6221463Navigation Sys.
i
i
P MCsMCsI
P TOP
Conclusion
The literature suffer from AUGs fault tree construction and this paper
present a typical fault tree for AUGs
Reliability of two type autonomous underwater robot (AUVs and AUGs)
have been compared and shows the reliability of AUGs is more of than
AUVs
By means of cut-sequence analysis, failure bottleneck of AUGs such as …
and … have been shown.
18
Future Works
The presented fault tree can be developed to use for fault diagnosis of AUGs
This research can be extended for considering a dynamic behaviors of faults
such as priority and sequence dependency, spare, functional dependency and
repair.
The other dependability attributes such as availability and safety can be
evaluated.
It possible to use non-exponential failure distribution.
19
References
20
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Thanks