Working paper 1 2013 police-military interaction

1 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operations

Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsWorking towards guidelines for action

when on operations.4 The research deliberately focuses only on the relationship between civilian police and military personnel, although mention is made of the specific role of military police. It does not deal with the role formed police units or constabulary-type forces might play or the role of private security companies; both of these subjects remain important areas for future research.5

In this document, therefore, the focus is on the interaction between the civilian police forces and the militaries of countries with Anglo–Peelian traditions of civilian policing, with a strong consent-based tradition and a tradition of professional volunteer military forces; examples are Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom.6 The document identifies the appropriate divisions of responsibility for the various forces, taking into account the hostility of the environment, in order to show areas where coordination, cooperation or collaboration might be beneficial and to point to ways in which such interaction might be profitably pursued.

> PaPer 01/2013

BK Greener and WJ Fish – Massey University, New Zealand

IntroductionPolicing is an increasingly important part of peace and stability missions.1 The word ‘policing’ suggests that it is civilian police who carry out the task, but recent practice has seen a marked rise in the use of more militarised formed police units, as well as indications that there is some acceptance of the use of military police or other military personnel in policing or policing-type tasks.

Although some new academic work has been done on the militarisation of law enforcement, broader theoretically informed research into what has been termed ‘third-generation civil–military affairs’ remains fledgling.2 In addition, there is a dearth of doctrine and guidelines relating to police–military interaction in the field. In 2009 the United Nations developed pre-deployment training guidelines that describe generic roles for police and military personnel in peace operations, but the guidelines are fairly general and more detailed documentation dealing with the relationship between the police and the military in operations does not appear to exist.3

The aim of this project was to help fill the gap between operationally specific reference documents and abstract academic arguments in order to provide some general guidelines for formulating how police and military personnel should interact and decide on the division of responsibilities


MethodologyThe project involved three main activities:

> more than 60 semi-informal interviews with serving and retired police and military personnel in Australia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste

> analysis of policy documents and academic commentary

> the bringing together of selected Australian Defence Force, Australian Federal Police, New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Police personnel for a day-long workshop in June 2011 to discuss various themes in greater detail so as to elucidate the main principles and develop recommendations for action.

The people with whom discussions were held came from a wide range of backgrounds; for example, those from the Defence Forces were from the Navy, the Air Force, the Army and the military police and were non-commissioned officers as well as high-ranking officers. The people chosen also represented a wide range of operational experience; for example, policing participants had been involved in police training and reform in Afghanistan, executive policing in Solomon Islands, election monitoring in Mozambique, post-tsunami victim identification in Indonesia, disaster response in New Zealand, and close protection in Timor-Leste. All were asked to describe their experience of working with the police or military in these contexts and were encouraged to speak about things that worked well and where tensions arose. The discussions were conducted in an open-ended manner, and points of commonality and divergence were noted.

The primary policy documents relating to activities in peace and stability operations—such as those obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the European Union, Australia and New Zealand—were collated in order to establish what guidelines for practice exist and what recommendations have previously been made. The amount of secondary source material on the subject of police and military roles and interaction in peace operations is growing and is to be found in academic journals such as Armed Forces and Society, International Peacekeeping and Policing and Society, as well as in reports from institutions such as the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the US Strategic Studies Institute, the Lowy Institute, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the US Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Civil–Military Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Finally, the project leaders, Dr Greener and Dr Fish, are indebted to those who participated in the discussions

and, in particular, those who attended and contributed to the June 2011 workshop—Senior Sergeant Peter Davis, Inspector Mal Schwartfeger, Major Tim Hind, Colonel Brian Cox, Wing Commander Wendy Horder, Major Josh Wineera, Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Combes, Dr Jim Rolfe and Dr Tony Murney. The workshop focused on roles, agents and situations and when and how various tasks should or can be performed by different agents. It is predominantly the work of this group, as well as the interviews and research, additional commentary from Lieutenant Ken Coombes and Superintendent Jason Byrnes, and much appreciated support from Inspector Roly Williams, Inspector Paul Sindlin and Lieutenant Colonel Vern Bennett that resulted in what follows and the recommendations made. Any mistakes are, however, the authors’ alone.

BackgroundDuring the Cold War policing efforts in peacekeeping operations typically concentrated on the support, monitoring, advising and training of local police forces. This range of roles reflected the peacekeeping norms of the day, norms that emphasised neutrality and consent-based operations. The post–Cold War era, however, has seen policing in peace operations become increasingly complex.

At the beginning of the 1990s UN civilian police monitored and verified the demobilisation of ex-combatants in Angola, while in Croatia they were expected to ensure that basic human rights in UN-protected areas were upheld and in Mozambique they oversaw the retraining of local police. From this their policing role broadened and deepened further. In El Salvador in 1992 the UN became involved in police reform efforts to an unprecedented degree, and during the Cambodia mission UN civilian police began to adopt executive policing roles (that is, having the ability to arrest and detain) as the mission evolved. By the turn of the century the situation in Kosovo and East Timor initially warranted full UN administration of those territories, meaning the full suite of policing roles was needed to help restore security, uphold law and order, and help provide justice for the local people.

The policing role in contemporary peace operations can involve both stability-related tasks and capacity-building tasks. In the case of the first category, police personnel deployed to peace missions can potentially take a more ‘active’ role in the earlier phases of an operation, when an executive policing mandate grants external police the power of arrest if there has been a breakdown of law and order. In the case of the second category, police can be used for


monitoring, training, mentoring and capacity building or in programs designed to ‘reform, rebuild and restructure’ existing police capabilities.

The ideal scenario of using police to perform these functions in peace and stability operations is, however, complicated by a number of factors. Important among these is the difficulty of deploying police abroad both in sufficient number and sufficiently quickly. The result is that there might well be situations, particularly during the early phases of a mission, in which police officers are simply unavailable to perform the necessary tasks. This leads to a so-called capability gap, and in the United States some commentators have described the use of military units for policing as ‘the least-worst option’ for filling the gap.7 Military personnel have thus been used in roles such as close protection, detention, traffic control, site investigation and—particularly controversially—the training and mentoring of civilian police, as in Iraq and Afghanistan; for example, the US 2nd Stryker cavalry unit has mentored the Afghan National Police in Kabul for years. Although latterly there has been an increase in the number of police deployed abroad, the problem of insufficient numbers at present means that military personnel might still be required to perform some police tasks.

There are a number of reasons for thinking that the potential blurring of police and military roles in such operations could be problematic. Upholding the distinction between the police and the military in democracies is considered vital to retaining civilian control over the use of force within state boundaries and in this way is a touchstone of liberal democratic politics.8 Separation and demilitarisation of police are recommended in order to keep military forces out of internal security and to ensure the successful functioning of democratic practices.9 Police are a vital part of a state’s capacity to provide for both security and justice, and in liberal democratic states they play a fundamental role in the protection of citizens’ rights. Police services and military forces in liberal democratic countries—particularly those with Anglo–Peelian traditions of policing—are therefore deliberately distinct entities, with a different ethos, training, skill set, outlook and attitude.10 The use of military personnel to perform policing functions in peace and stability operations is thus not ideal in terms of concerns about possible military involvement in internal security, distraction from core competencies, and a mismatch of ‘troops to tasking’—something both the police and the military appear to agree on. Nor is it ideal in that any regular use of the military to carry out frontline policing in post-conflict environments runs the risk of making the population feel as though they are under occupation.

In particular, the question of legitimacy is crucial when it comes to the likelihood of a local police force persisting in situ, since policing relies on legitimacy and consent in transforming power into authority.11 The question of legitimacy is therefore also central to the ability of interveners to leave peace operations. The chances for a lasting and sustainable peace are considerably diminished if this legitimacy is threatened by a confusion of military and policing roles and functions in a post-conflict society—on the part of the interveners and the host government, or both.12 In post-conflict situations it is also important that militaries are not tasked to help redress societal problems, whereas police can potentially do so. Militaries are designed to be instruments of the political executive; police are designed to be instruments of law and order. These fundamentally different starting points have flow-on effects for determining how such institutions might or might not be used in different situations. What is key here, then, is not just what the military can do in peace and stability operations: it is what they cannot be seen to be doing, or simply should not do, in such operations.

But even if the problem of the capability gap could be solved by increasing police numbers, a second important factor to consider is the hostility of the environments in which policing work might be required. It might simply be too risky for police to perform the necessary tasks. What is more, the fluid nature of the security environment for most peace and stability missions—which can switch from relatively safe to dangerous quite quickly—means that, even when police are available, they may very well still need the support of the military in order to safely perform the required tasks. This question of permissibility will greatly affect policy makers, planners and practitioners seeking to understand how best to create an ideal division of responsibility between the police and the military on operations.

Findings and recommendationsPolice and military personnel engage in operations in response to government directives and, these days, are typically part of much broader peace- or state-building efforts. In such operations multiple sites of coordination, cooperation and even collaboration can be required at a number of levels. One such site concerns a combination of agencies of a contributing state, as reflected in the current mantra of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. Another might concern cooperation between government and national or international non-government agencies, as sometimes suggested by the expression ‘a comprehensive approach’. Yet another concerns the case of the need for


interstate cooperation in multinational operations, and another still between agencies of the contributing and host states.

The primary focus of this project is the first of these sites of interaction—cooperation and coordination of the police and the military of a contributing state that is deploying these personnel to help provide security in a peace or stability operation. We note a number of recommendations throughout this document to try to help consolidate best practice for police-military interaction. In doing so, we recognise that the Australasian entities examined in this study might already pursue some or potentially all of these practices or are working towards them. The findings of this study will help underline the importance of these practices in our neighbourhood, but we also consider these recommendations to be of broader relevance to other global, regional or national institutions.

Pre-deploymentProject participants’ descriptions of their experiences in the field revealed some general pre-deployment considerations that are required to set the scene for functional police–military interaction in the field. Solid preparatory work should be done before deployment to help facilitate better relations in operations. In particular, at the more ‘macro’ level of government, where institutional design and strategic frameworks are formulated, there needs to be an initiation of suitable policies and well-directed resourcing to support and encourage multi-agency liaison. This could range from broader memorandums of understanding between agencies to policies that allow for and support the creation of specific training schedules that outline the police and military roles and procedures in different projected situations.

recommendation It is recommended that governments direct agencies involved or likely to be involved in peace and stability operations to develop generic strategic frameworks and broad policies on inter-agency interaction, independently of any specific deployments.

Mission-specific policies should be implemented when a particular deployment is embarked upon. In particular, the operational pattern of interaction between commanding officers and political leaders for a particular mission should be set out clearly and agreed to by all concerned in advance—especially in relation to command and control

in different phases of the operation and in relation to the determination of risk. To this end, a regular schedule of meetings or a system of updating should be arranged early in the piece. Escalation procedures in particular should be developed and understood by commanding officers from both police and military units.

Military forces often have the resourcing and institutional arrangements to allow them to take the lead in outlining mission-specific policies. But this does not necessarily mean they should be the lead agencies in developing such policies. Military-heavy policies will of their nature be somewhat skewed by the institutional culture. It would therefore be preferable that knowledgeable or specialist personnel from a civilian agency—such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Zealand—who have sound knowledge of police and military capabilities act as the coordinating pivot between police and military advice on these matters. This is in large part to ensure that policies are made with an eye to the long-term requirements of peace and stability operations, rather than being captive to shorter term or partial needs, although the personnel working in this area must also understand the capabilities and limitations of both the police and the military.

recommendationIt is recommended that before a deployment knowledgeable or specialist staff based in a civilian agency, and advised by the military and police, be responsible for coordinating the development of mission-specific policies to enrich the broader policies that apply more generally.

Finally, all subject matter expert sources consistently recommended that there be a considerable degree of inter-agency interaction during pre-deployment training and preparation. Desk-based exercises working with all arms of government need to be established to ensure the smooth running of whole-of-government approaches before deployment. Knowledge of what different agencies can and cannot do in such operations is important so that players in the relevant sectors of government are able to respond well to questions or problems that arise.

recommendationIt is recommended that pre-deployment training and preparation be conducted with as much cross-over as is possible or desirable given the different operational needs of each agency.


Assessing risk and the roles that need to be played to provide security in operationsOne of the primary requirements at the initial planning stage of an operation is an assessment of risk for the contributing country. Workshop participants in particular were of the view that the use of agents less suited to particular roles potentially increases that risk. An understanding of the roles of the police and the military in the provision of security is therefore fundamentally important. In assessing the roles that need to be played in order to contribute to security in a peace or stability operation, most participants in the discussions also asserted that engagement with the local context is vitally important—particularly in undertaking an initial needs assessment. Workshop participants were especially concerned that before deployment contributing agencies should know what is broken, why, and what can be done in what time and with what resources. In the light of this concern and in order to try to establish what an ideal division of responsibility might be between such agencies on operations, the various roles that need to be played in providing security are outlined here and then who might play these roles is considered.

The following types of roles need to be played in order to provide security in peace and stability and other operations:

> strategic planning and decision making in relation to security priorities

> governance and the rule of law

> intelligence

> special operations

> targeting

> protection of civilians

> securing assets

> force protection

> maintenance of public order

> patrolling

> responding

> investigative capability

> education, PR and liaison

> training of local police

> training of local military

> mentoring of local police

> mentoring of local military.

A number of discussion participants stressed that many of these matters are broader than ‘ just’ police or ‘ just’ military. The centrality of good governance and the rule of law repeatedly came up in discussions and in the workshop. Many personnel had been disappointed by experiences that had seen successful investigations or raids undone by, among other things, the lack of a functioning justice and corrections system.

recommendationIt is recommended that in planning for the policing elements of peace and stability operations, in particular, civilian lead agencies give consideration to ensuring the functioning of the general justice sector of which that policing is a part.

Who plays the roles?As noted, there can be situations in which police are simply unable to play the roles asked of them because of either deployment difficulties or the relative impermissibility of the environment. This has the consequence that matching players to roles is not as simple as deciding which agency should ideally play each role. To try and respect this consideration, while providing a classification that is simple enough to be functional, we found it useful to break the tasks down into the following four categories, which emerged from discussions with personnel about how they perceived the desirability of specific roles being played by specific personnel:

Police only. These are tasks that it is appropriate only for police to perform. If police are unavailable or incapable of performing these tasks for any reason, it is better that the tasks go unperformed. This said, it is assumed that in the performance of police-only tasks the police might need to call on the support of the military. An example of this type of limited supporting role for the military would be use of military personnel as a general deterrent to resisting arrest in the case of high-risk arrests.

Police first. These are tasks that police should do, if this is appropriate, but that could be performed by other agencies under police guidance and supervision. Again, it is assumed that the police might need to call on the support of the military in the performance of these tasks.

Collaborative. These tasks could be performed by either the police or the military—or possibly even by both agencies together. The lead agency would need to be determined case by case.

Military only. These are tasks that are suitable only for military forces. Reciprocally, however, there could be


situations in which the military might call for support from the police in performing the tasks. An example of such limited support would be for police to be ready to take custody of those suspected of crimes after instances of military contact.

We found no requirement for a distinct ‘military-first’ category on the grounds that if the military is unable to perform a certain military task no alternative agency will be in a position to perform this task in the military’s stead. As noted, however, this is not to say that the military would not benefit from the support of other agencies in the performance of these tasks.

Police-only tasksA recurrent theme in both the discussions and the workshop concerned ways in which the police and the military differ. Such differences influence the ways they tackle the various tasks assigned to them. (See Appendix A for further information about the differences between the police and military roles.)

Although some discussion participants from the military asserted that they ‘could’ perform policing tasks if asked to do so, many other military and all police personnel we talked with felt that the various cultural, educational, material, legal, organisational and operational differences between the services meant that there were certain core policing tasks that simply should not be performed by military personnel. It was stressed numerous times that skill sets and mind-sets differ and that military personnel have the ‘wrong optics’ for carrying out a significant proportion of general police duties. One example was that military training freely encompasses the use of lethal force and the control of elements within a given mission space, whereas policing relies much more on consent and prevention and these are underpinned by a legitimacy held only by police.

For these reasons the power of arrest is most definitely considered a police officer’s domain only (although the power to detain was seen as a more common phenomenon). Criminal investigations were also thought to be best performed by civilian police. Nevertheless, some aspects of this function—such as site preservation for later specialist investigation or site investigation by military police during periods of conflict—were seen as tasks that could involve military input; these are explained in more detail shortly.

It was also evident that most discussion participants believed that only police should train the local police, since training is the initial point at which ethos and values as well as skills are transmitted. Use of the military to

train police has the potential to reinforce trends towards the militarisation of law enforcement and involvement of the military in civil affairs at precisely the point where this should be discouraged.13

recommendationIt is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy in criminal investigations and the training of local police come solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.

Police-first tasksAlthough members of the military often suggested they were capable of performing a number of policing tasks, our research made it clear that there was among military as well as police personnel a level of discomfort about this possibility. Military personnel were concerned that there is plenty to train for already and that policing was not and would not be a core task: personnel commented on the broader political and social ramifications of any involvement in such a task. Despite this unease, however, all military personnel said they were comfortable working with police and that the experience of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands), in particular, has led to increased willingness to work in support of police objectives.

With this in mind, a number of areas were identified as tasks where the military could support police or, if it was unsafe for police to perform those tasks, perform them in their stead. The maintenance of public order is already well established as a police-first task, yet most military personnel we spoke with had taken part in exercises or operations where the need to ramp up or ramp down responses had been central, and since 1999 military training in maintaining public order has also become more commonplace, particularly for South Pacific deployments. Other tasks that were deemed to be ideally performed by police yet potentially performable by the military were community liaison and the mentoring of local police forces. In relation to the first of these, discussions highlighted how the community engagement work done by military personnel returning to Timor-Leste in 2006 helped set the scene for civilian police to follow up with closer liaison efforts. In the latter case—mentoring—although it was deemed essential that the police do the initial training of police personnel, discussion participants generally suggested that if the police were unable to mentor local police forces for some reason the military could potentially perform this task under police guidance. In Afghanistan, for example, police have typically not been allowed out from ‘behind the wire’ to mentor their Afghan National Police colleagues in the field. In such instances military personnel have provided that support.


There are problems with using such a model for mentoring, however, because of the possibility of sending the ‘wrong message’ to host states.

We would therefore stress that, for the present, using the military for police mentoring is to be a last resort and, if such mentoring must occur, it is a task for military police. An alternative solution might, however, be to identify police with military reservist or strong tactical experience to be classified in such a way as to allow them into the field. Current operational decision-making procedures do not expressly allow for direct police input into the choice of military personnel for such tasks. We would suggest, however, that it is worth military commanders seeking such input, both to maximise resources and to minimise risk.

recommendationIt is recommended that the maintenance of public order and community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks. Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forces should be designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring being carried out by military police if civilian police indicate they are unable to perform this role. It is further recommended that alternative options for facilitating police mentoring of local police in non-permissive environments be investigated by police agencies.

In this regard we note that military police appear to have increasingly oriented themselves towards the potential for policing in less permissive environments. Consider, for example, the Australian First Military Police Battalion’s assertion:

The foundations of 1 MP Bn proficiency are the technical aspects of policing, and the combat survivability required to execute policing tasks where the operational uncertainty precludes or restricts operations by civilian police.14 [emphasis added]

In considering the ramifications of this, discussion participants acknowledged that military police have fairly competent levels of police training and that they might have specialist capabilities—for example, in functioning in a non-permissive environment, close protection and dog handling—that civilian police lack, which could make them potential agents in the performance of police tasks. It was also noted, however, that military police are not sworn officers of the law, owe allegiance to the political executive rather than the law, are bound by hierarchy more than civilian police, work within a military law framework, have different methods for interrogating suspects, and have less

experience in dealing with general public matters day to day. Despite this, most participants considered that, although not ideal, they would prefer to have (Australian and New Zealand) military police rather than infantry or other military personnel performing policing-type tasks were this the choice presented to them, although they were still cautious about treating military police as if they were civilian police.

recommendationIt is recommended that, when civilian police indicate that they are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks, mission planners consider the use of military police in the first instance and ensure that provision is made for civilian police guidance and supervision of those tasks.

For this to work successfully, however, who is ‘supporting’, who is ‘supported’ and in what phases of an operation need to be clearly outlined and understood, as do the political and operational consequences of those decisions.

recommendationIt is recommended that, once a non–civilian police agency is deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laid out by the lead agency and clearly relayed to military and police leaders. Command and decision-making structures should, as much as is feasible, be known by all involved in the mission—civilian, police and military.

Significantly, too, although civilian police were of the strong view that policing skills and know-how accrue over time—and most agreed that these are things that need to be exercised regularly so as to be reinforced—there were situations where they thought some skills might usefully be transferred to military personnel. In particular, site preservation and basic investigative skills required for evidence collection were seen to be relatively straightforward, fairly fundamental skills that military personnel could train for. These were thought to be of particular use in cases where it was likely that war crimes or other major criminal activity had occurred and demanded a response but civilian police were not yet in situ to carry this out. In fact, the military already has some useful capabilities in this area. Military police, force protection and explosive ordnance device personnel have particularly relevant skill sets. For example, force protection could provide security through cordons, access control and checkpoints; military police have some forensic capability; and explosive ordnance device personnel can provide explosives analysis.

Broader dissemination of a more general awareness of such matters would, however, be helpful for operational effectiveness and improved police–military relations.


recommendationIt is recommended that military personnel receive basic training in site preservation and evidence collection, especially when deploying on missions that are likely to require such skills.

Collaborative tasksDiscussion participants noted that some activities, such as patrolling, were regularly engaged in by both police and military—although often motivated by different factors. For example, both organisations use patrolling to gather intelligence but do so for different reasons: the police might seek to interpret the criminal environment and to allocate resources to resolving problems; the military might seek to gather intelligence in order to accomplish the mission at hand. Establishing the utility and desirability of various patrolling options (for example, joint patrols or police patrols supported by the military) is an important task given the impact of such decisions on local perceptions and options for action. It is also important to note that there are different types of patrolling. For example, military personnel can be deployed on security, clearance, listening, fighting, community engagement, presence, reconnaissance, convoy escort, and many other types of patrol. Many of these are solely military in function or purpose and would not be suitable for police involvement. Similarly, traffic control through road blocks and cordons and border control activities are tasks that can at times be performed by either the police or the military, but it should be noted that the use of different agents might signal a difference of approach or attitude towards the purpose of such activities

Other operational activities that have been explicitly joint in nature are the repatriation of internally displaced people and preparation for elections, where military personnel were responsible for securing the perimeter and police were responsible for searching and maintaining order within the perimeter.

Most discussion participants agreed that these efforts generally worked well as long as a fairly clear division of responsibility had been decided on beforehand. They were concerned that there must be a clear policy- and decision-making lead in the mission and that, before being assigned a particular role on operations, representatives of agencies should be at the table in the early phases of a mission to ensure clarity about available capacity and the requirements of their respective institutions. This recommendation has already been noted.

Military-only tasksThe remaining tasks—such as force protection, the securing of assets, and the training and mentoring of local military forces—were seen as appropriate and desirable for the military to perform. In the case of training and mentoring, the reasoning is not so much to do with operational capacity but more about a general principle that like should train like—military to train military and police to train police.

Other matters

Cultural differencesAs noted, there are major differences between the culture of the police and that of the military. Misunderstandings based on these differences emerged time after time in discussions. For example, members of the police forces often expressed frustration at the highly systematic planning of the military, while military members were taken aback by the tendency of police personnel to ‘plan’ on the way to an incident, making decisions quickly and with a high degree of individual responsibility and discretion. This difference in planning, at the strategic level and particularly the operational level, causes friction, especially if the rationale for such a planning style is not known. As with many of the other concerns raised, familiarity tended to be seen as the best solution to working through problems connected with differing planning methods or priorities. It is important for police to understand, for example, that the detailed planning required in a military context is not just a result of the risks involved: it is also a result of the sheer logistics of dealing with such an organisation. Organisational inertia is inherent in agencies dealing with large numbers of people, equipment and machines and is something police might not be familiar with. The embedding of Australian Federal Police personnel as liaison officers in AusAID and the Australian Defence Force appears to have been highly successful in terms of ‘firefighting’ before problems begin and is something other agencies should consider.

recommendationIt is recommended that more permanent interaction between the police and the military be facilitated by secondments or exchanges of personnel, as well as shared training, education, liaison and exercises to increase interoperability and mutual understanding.


RankingAnother problem that has arisen at times is caused by the fact that police ranks are not easily translated into military ranks. Police personnel on early deployments to RAMSI commented on the difficulty of conveying their seniority to military personnel because of the relative ‘flatness’ of police ranking structures. Pleas were made for a constable with 12 years’ experience to be seen as equivalent in ‘worth’ to a platoon, rather than being seen as an individual private. This problem of ranking recognition and equivalence has been mitigated to some extent by experiments with brevet ranking (moving inspectors up to superintendent, for example, for the duration of an overseas operation) or by the actual removal of ranking altogether in some cases (with AFP officers at times simply having ‘agent’ status). Such mechanisms have allowed for flexibility, but each has attendant problems. Brevet ranking causes difficulties when ‘real’ rankings become known, while the lack of ranking can add to confusion about who is in charge during a crisis. Most discussion participants seemed to suggest, however, that such problems were fairly minor in that leadership and respect provide for seniority.

recommendationIt is recommended that consideration be given to the question of ranking on a case-by-case basis.

Mission complementarityAdditional difficulties have arisen in relation to incommensurability of levels of pay, benefits such as accommodation arrangements, rotation length, working hours when in the field and, in particular, leave when on an international deployment. Military personnel often commented that police seemed to have a much better ‘package deal’—although they also recognised that they had signed up for international deployments under known conditions while police might not have come into the job with such a task in mind. Some particular concerns, such as the military being ‘dry’ when police could drink alcohol, were significant despite their specificity and were handled with variable levels of success. Many of these matters have been dealt with more directly in recent years or a greater understanding has developed, helping to alleviate some of the tensions that can arise, as they did after RAMSI in 2003. One important factor that seems to help shape how such differences are ridden out in the field is the personalities of the commanding officers and how well they can work together to establish a strong working relationship between the police and the military.

recommendationIt is recommended that authorities reconsider the complementarity of operational matters relating to leave, pay and other aspects of deployment where possible. It will be necessary for differences to remain between police and military personnel in some areas, but in other areas greater complementarity will help to ease tensions and improve operational effectiveness. Where differences do need to remain, personnel should be told why.

We also note that this awareness goes hand in hand with a deeper understanding between personnel of all agencies that remuneration and conditions will vary not just between agencies within a country, but also between personnel from other countries.15

Deployment length and handoversDeployment length was a consistent concern among police personnel: deployments of six months were seen as far too short to gain any ground in an operation; nine months was generally viewed as the minimum time frame needed. Most police called for 12-month deployments—or two years for specialist roles. Handover periods were also identified as crucial to mission success. Staggering the rolling of major appointments for both police and military personnel allows for additional continuity in the provision of security, as does the allocation of time for senior personnel to provide advice to incoming officers.

recommendationIt is recommended that authorities reconsider the length of deployments, the pattern of handovers, and the effects of high tempo and rotation on overall mission goals in both the police and the military sectors.

ConclusionFinally, it is important to note that police–military interaction in places such as Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan has been very much dependent on personalities—that is, the willingness and ability of key personnel to engage productively with one another. Although it might be difficult to do much about the compatibility of senior personnel in a mission, increased organisational awareness of the complementarity of roles available, as well as of the differing priorities that will apply to the police and the military in the field, is vital for helping to pin down general operating principles. The best policy and guidelines can describe options, but mutually beneficial and symbiotic functioning can occur only if the people concerned respond willingly to directives designed to improve cooperation. This


in turn requires that all agencies understand the value an effective combination of police and military personnel can bring to peace operations.

Summary of recommendationsThe recommendations noted in this document are general guidelines intended to help consolidate best practice. We note that a number of institutions—including those Australasian entities examined in this study—might already pursue some or potentially all of these practices or are working towards them. We would also suggest, however, that these recommendations are of broader relevance to institutions outside the trans-Tasman context.

1. It is recommended that governments direct agencies involved or likely to be involved in peace and stability operations to develop generic strategic frameworks and broad policies on inter-agency interaction, independently of any specific deployments.

2. It is recommended that before a deployment knowledgeable or specialist staff based in a civilian agency, and advised by the military and police, be responsible for coordinating the development of mission-specific policies to enrich the broader policies that apply more generally.

3. It is recommended that pre-deployment training and preparation be conducted with as much cross-over as is possible or desirable given the different operational needs of each agency.

4. It is recommended that in planning for the policing elements of peace and stability operations, in particular, civilian lead agencies give consideration to ensuring the functioning of the general justice sector of which that policing is a part.

5. It is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy in criminal investigations and the training of local police come solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.

6. It is recommended that the maintenance of public order and community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks. Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forces should be designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring being carried out by military police if civilian police indicate they are unable to undertake that role. It is further recommended that alternative options for facilitating police mentoring of local police in non-permissive environments be investigated by police agencies.

7. It is recommended that, when civilian police indicate that they are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks,

mission planners consider the use of military police in the first instance and ensure that provision is made for civilian police guidance and supervision of those tasks.

8. It is recommended that, once a non–civilian police agency is deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laid out by the lead agency and clearly relayed to military and police leaders. Command and decision-making structures should, as much as is feasible, be known by all involved in the mission—civilian, police and military.

9. It is recommended that military personnel receive basic training in site preservation and evidence collection, especially when deploying on missions that are likely to require such skills.

10. It is recommended that more permanent interaction between the police and the military be facilitated by secondments or exchanges of personnel, as well as shared training, education, liaison and exercises to increase interoperability and mutual understanding.

11. It is recommended that consideration be given to the question of ranking on a case-by-case basis.

12. It is recommended that authorities reconsider the complementarity of operational matters relating to leave, pay and other aspects of deployment where possible. It will be necessary for differences to remain between police and military personnel in some areas, but in other areas greater complementarity will help to ease tensions and improve operational effectiveness. Where differences do need to remain, personnel should be told why.

13. It is recommended that authorities reconsider the length of deployments, the pattern of handovers, and the effects of high tempo and rotation on overall mission goals in both the police and the military sectors.

Notes1. See Pfaff (2007) and Sedra (2006).

2. Rosen (2009) claims that we are in a third generation of civil–military relations: the first was a domestic debate about the military and the soldier’s role in relation to the state; the second was the literature on the military contribution to humanitarian interventions or complex humanitarian emergencies; and the third is a deeper look at the multi-agency roles played in international operations. One of the few considerations of this is provided by Rasmussen (1999), who considered the response to the Los Angeles riots as well as British involvement in Ulster in suggesting some more general


guidelines for the possible use of armed forces in internal security roles. The main recommendations dealt with the following: planning for public order emergencies in advance; police to train to deal with public order in a way that does not exacerbate the situation; police to always be accountable; police to develop procedures and techniques that make them legitimate; and if use of reinforcement (including military) is needed there must be ‘well established procedures and societally approved criteria’.

3. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2009a, 2009b, 2008).

4. We owe the use of the term ‘division of responsibility’ to Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Australian Defence Force, who suggested it in the stead of ‘division of labour’ to highlight the significance of work done in planning and preparation, not just in operational ‘boots on the ground’.

5. For more on the role of formed police units as part of the spectrum dealing with capability gaps in particular,

see Dziedzic (2003); De Weger (2009); Wiatrowski, Pino & Pritchard (2008); and Zimmerman (2005).

6. The focus here is on policing models used in Great Britain rather than Northern Ireland.

7. Keller (2011).

8. Dunlap Jr (1991) and Gray (2008).

9. Watts (2001).

10. For an overview of literature debating the contemporary relationship between police and military, see Weiss (2011).

11. Turk (1982, p. 115).

12. As noted by Last, coercive capacity in particular ‘raises questions about consent, legitimacy and the public interest in international missions’ (2010, p. 34).

13. Friesendorf & Penska (2008).

14. 1st Military Police Tactical Policing Conops Brief 2010, Powerpoint for ADF.

15. Thanks to Superintendent Jason Byrnes for this point.

Appendix A Police and military roles

Police principles—1829 Soldiers’ rules—1947, 19931. Prevent crime rather than repressing it. 1. Fight only enemy combatants.2. Depend on public approval. 2. Harm none who surrender.3. Secure willing observance of laws. 3. Do not torture or kill POWs.4. Cooperation reduces the need for physical force. 4. Collect and care for all wounded—friend or enemy.5. Offer impartial service to law, rather than pandering to public

opinion, friendly good humour and courtesy.5. Do not attack medical personnel, facilities or equipment.

6. Use force only as a last resort, and use only the minimum amount of force necessary.

6. Destroy no more than the mission requires.

7. All citizens have police responsibilities. 7. Treat all civilians humanely.8. Do not judge guilt or innocence. 8. Respect private property and possessions.9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder. 9. Prevent and report violations of the law of war.

Source: Reith (1956), Friedland (1996), as cited in Last (2010).

Military component Traditional peacekeeping operations.

Multi-dimensional operations

Monitor or supervise military arrangements that parties to a conflict have agreed on.

Create a secure and stable environment for other elements of the peace process to be implemented.

Police component Can be deployed either as individual UNPOL or as formed police units to either traditional or multi-dimensional peace operations.

Play a role in establishing public safety and preventing crime as well as facilitating rule of law.

Collaborate closely with civilian components such as human rights, judicial and civil affairs and corrections.

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2009a).


Friesendorf (2012) characterises the differences between military and police tasks thus:

> material characteristics—equipment and technology used

> educational characteristics—a focus on combat and concept of ‘friend and foe’ versus persuasion of citizens and criminals

> cultural characteristics—language, appearance, place of living, beliefs

> legal characteristics—military laws and statutes and international humanitarian law versus civil, criminal and police law

> organisational characteristics—emphasis on hierarchy and secrecy in large units versus discretion and smaller units

> operational characteristics—combat versus prevention and investigation of crime and reply to service requests.

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Education

Working paper 1 2013 police-military interaction