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Transhumanists tend to have a commitment to materialism and naturalism but nonetheless pursue goals traditionally associated with religious ideologies, such as the quest for immortality. Often, they hope to achieve immortality through the application of a technology whereby the brain is scanned and the person "uploaded" to a computer. This process is typically described as "transferring" one's mind to a computer. I argue that, while the technology may be feasible, uploading will not succeed because it in fact does not "transfer" a mind at all and will not preserve personal identity. Transhumanist hopes for such transfer ironically rely on treating the mind dualistically-and inconsistently with materialism-as the functional equivalent of a soul, as is evidenced by a carefully examination of the language used to describe and defend uploading. In this sense, transhumanist thought unwittingly contains remnants of dualistic and religious categories. Patrick D. Hopkins is a philosopher and ethicist who specializes in ethical theory and in applied ethical issues in science, medicine, and technology. He has a B.A. from the University of Mississippi in Experimental Psychology, worked in neuroscience research for several years at a major medical school and a primate research center, received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Washington University in St. Louis, and is currently Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Millsaps College in Jackson, MS. He has published numerous articles on biomedical ethics, science and technology studies, gender studies, and religious studies and has edited a book on the relationship between gender and technology.
Citation preview
Why Uploading Will Not Work
How Ghosts Haunt Transhumanism
Patrick D. Hopkins
H+ 2010
Transhumanist Tendencies
Naturalism
• Materialism
• Empiricism
Religious Analogs
• Transcendence
• Enlightenment
• TransubstanGaGon
• Singularity
• Universal consciousness
• Immortality
Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– Uploading is the transfer of the brain’s mindpa6ern onto a different substrate (such as an advanced computer) which be6er facilitates said en=ty’s ends. Uploading is a central concept in our vision of technological ascension…. (Kadmon, 2003)
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind either into a computer or other non-‐human receptacle, or from one human body to another. (Knowledgerush, 2009)
– Mind uploading is a radical form of human enhancement, whereby the human mind is transferred from the vulnerable organic medium of the brain to a computer system of some kind. (Human Enhancement and Biopoli=cs, 2009)
Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind, body and environment to an ar=ficial substrate. (Fact-‐Archive.com, 2005)
– Mind uploading, some=mes called whole brain emula=on, refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind to a substrate different from a biological brain, such as a detailed computer simula=on of an individual human brain. (Sen=ent Developments, 2009)
– Involving the transference of a mind from biological brain to computer hardware—or, for that ma6er, any other substrate…mind uploading is a tenet of transhumanist hopes and science fic=on. (Keim, 2009)
– The last stage, mind uploading, leads as logically on from brain emula=on as brain emula=on does from neuroprosthe=cs. Once it is possible to emulate a brain, it should be possible to transfer the mind within that brain from one set of hardware to another. (Virtual Worldlets Network, 2006)
Metaphor and Language
• SomeGmes obvious
• SomeGmes subtle
• SomeGme hidden literaliGes
Metaphor and Language
Argument and War
• Win an argument
• Weak points in the posiGon
• CriGcisms on target
ConversaGon and Conduit
• Got the idea across
• Put ideas into words
• Full of meaning
Language of Uploading
The Language
• “Transfer the mind from the brain to a computer”
The Metaphors
• Loca=on– The mind is “in” or “within” a
brain and can be put “into” a computer
• Mo=on– The mind can be “moved” or
“transferred” or “put” into a computer
• Substance– The mind is a thing that can be
moved from one “receptacle” to another
Problems
• Is the mind an an object that is housed “inside” a brain and through technology can be “moved” from one “receptacle” to another?
• Not according to most materialist, naturalist, versions of mind that inform transhumanism
Problems
• If we look for posi=ons that have held the view that minds or consciousnesses are actually substan=al objects that have loca=on and can be moved from one body to the next, we do not have far to look—only so far as popular religion.
• Souls, spirits, ghosts
• Uploading advocates have fallen prey to using the language of dualism, with its transmigratory souls and displaceable ghosts
Making Too Much of the Language?
ObjecGon
• Just a metaphor, uploading proponents are not taking this literally
Response
• Something very important depends on metaphors of loca=on and mo=on
• Specific minds are “transferred”• Preserva=on of iden=ty treated as
unproblema=c because of moving a singular object
• The mind “in” the computer is the same mind as the one “in” in the brain
• Not the same type, not a copy, but the same one
Problem of IdenGty
• If minds are not literally movable substances, the preservaGon of idenGty is sGll a problem, even though the language hides it
• The word “transfer” includes preservaGon of idenGty
• When an object is simply moved from one locaGon to another, preservaGon of idenGty is easy
• But if the mind is not literally “moved” or “transferred”, then how is idenGty preserved?
Transferring & Copying
• proponents of uploading do not believe that a mind is literally being carried from one place to another
• “transference” is supposed to be accomplished by emula8on, simula8on, or replica8on—all terms that boil down to the concept of copying
Copying = Transferring?
Method
• Example: Moravec’s “Transmigra=on”
• robot brain surgeon microscopically scans the layers of your brain, constructs a 3-‐D chemical map, writes a program modeling the neural =ssue’s behavior, and then installs and ac=vates the
Consequences
• Though you have not lost consciousness, or even your train of thought, your mind has been removed from the brain and transferred to a machine (110).
• Ul8mately your brain would die and your mind would find itself en8rely in the computer (112).
• You may choose to move your mind from one computer to another that is more technically advanced…(112).
• The program can also be copied to a future equivalent of magne8c tape. Then, if the machine you inhabit is fatally clobbered, the tape can be read into a blank computer…(112).
• As a computer program, your mind can travel
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying “move” something?
• For example, copying a page from a book (even if you slowly destroy the original page) does not “move” the page
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does the copying of personal idenGty work by different rules?
• Moravec says yes, because “pa^ern-‐idenGty” not “body-‐idenGty” is key to the mind
Metaphysics of Copying
• Moravec: “PaMern-‐iden8ty, conversely, defines the essence of a person, say myself, as the paMern and the process going on in my head and body, not the machinery suppor8ng that process. If the process is preserved, I am preserved. The rest is mere jelly (116-‐117). “
• Lets grant it is correct to say that the process (of cogniGon) is what defines an individual
• The problem is in thinking that copying the process “preserves” the process
Metaphysics of Copying
• We must be aware of the very strong sense of the terms needed for this topic
• Moravec says that copying preserves iden8ty because the copy is indis8nguishable and because copying simply transfers a paMern
• “Iden8ty”– Not simply exactly similar, but the very same thing; A is iden=cal to B only if A and B are the very same one thing
• “Preserve”– To maintain iden=ty over a process; e.g.,
• “Indis8nguishable”– There are no proper=es A has that B has
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying preserve idenGty?
• No
• It makes a new thing that is exactly structurally and behaviorally similar, but that’s not good enough
Why?
• DisGnguishability
• Pa^ern IdenGty
• Understanding Thought Experiments
Why?
DisGnguishability
• The copied mind is a process produced by different ma^er in a different place with a different history
• The relaGonship between the original and the copy is not nearly as strong as the “relaGonship” between the original and itself
Why?
Pa^ern IdenGty
• PaMern “iden8ty” in the strong sense is not preserved either
• PaMerns are not abstracted things (that are then treated as concrete things)
• There is no “paMern” above and beyond the actual maMer. Take away the maMer and you have no paMern leT.
• PaMerns are not real. “They” are just nouns that we use to talk about the fact that material systems are organized in par8cular ways.
• Exactly similar organiza8ons of maMer produce exactly similar processes, but there is no “paMern” that is “moved” any more than there is a mind that is “moved”
• Thinking of paMerns as movable things is trea8ng them like souls
Why?
Thought Experiments
• Photocopying example
– Material ink organized in exactly similar ways
• Moravec’s destrucGve uploading
• But imagine this.
• Gun to your head example
• Just Kidding variaGon
• You are in exactly the same relaGonship to the copy as you would have been had you been killed.
Conclusion
• Uploading sounds at first like a wondrous marvel of technology that promises immortality, but on closer inspec8on it depends on vague, inaccurate, and faulty assump8ons that are holdovers from supernaturalism and dualism.
• Trea8ng minds and paMerns as objec8ve moveable substances or proper8es is just as mysterious as beliefs about ghosts and souls and vital spirits.
• The discourse on uploading has inherited a language that tricks us into thinking minds work much the same way as souls.