What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior?

Motivation Argument Conclusions References

Mixed Randomized-Repeated Designsor

What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior?An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics

by Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez, and László Sándor

Journal of Economic Perspectives, v.28, n.3, 2014, p.169-188

Matheus Albergaria de MagalhãesAntonio Sergio da Silva

Técnicas de Levantamento e Análise de Dados

Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

June 19th, 2015

Matheus Albergaria de Magalhães & Antonio Sergio da Silva

What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? (Chetty, Saez & Sándor, 2014)


SECTIONS

Motivation

Argument

Conclusions

References




MOTIVATION

Figure 1Submissions Per Year - Top Journals in Economics

Source: Card & Dellavigna (2013).Matheus Albergaria de Magalhães & Antonio Sergio da Silva



MOTIVATION

Figure 2Publications Per Year - Top Journals in Economics




MOTIVATION

Figure 3Publications Divided by Submissons in Previous 2 Years




MOTIVATION

Figure 4Papers’ Lenght and Number of Authors - Top Journals in Economics




MOTIVATION

Figure 5Survival Function - Papers Refereed

Source: Hamermesh (1994).Matheus Albergaria de Magalhães & Antonio Sergio da Silva



MOTIVATION

What do we know?

Facts:

1. Submissions per year increased (Card & Dellavigna, 2013).

2. Papers’ lenght increased (Card & Dellavigna, 2013).

3. More authors per paper (Hamermesh, 2013).

4. Dramatic slowdown of the publication process (Ellison, 2002).




MOTIVATION

Why should we care about referee reports?

A few opinions:

"Refereeing is a ... formal service to the research of others. As you becomeknown, you will receive an increasing stream of requests to referee. ... Atmost schools this sort of service is expected, desired and even rewarded”(Hamermesh, 1992, p.177).

"You are performing a valuable service to the profession. It is worth doingwell. It also is good for your spirit when you have done somethingworthwhile for society” (Choi, 2002).




MOTIVATION

The Reviewer’s Dilemma

I Individual costs from submitting a high-quality refereereport quickly..

I ..but aggregate gains to the authors of the paper and tosociety from the knowledge produced.

I Question 1: why should anyone bother to write a refereereport?

I Question 2: is there any way to make the process moreefficient (and fast)?




ARGUMENTExperimental Design:

I Period: 02/05/2010 to 10/26/2011 (20 months).

I All referees for the Journal of Public Economics wererandomly assigned to one of four groups ("Control", "Social", "4Week" and "Cash").

I Each observation corresponds to a single referee invitation(referees invited multiple times contribute with multipleobservations).

I Reminder emails one week prior to each group’s deadlines.

I Cash incentives were withdrawn six months before the endof the experiment.




ARGUMENT

Table 1Treatment Groups - Journal of Public Economics

Source: Chetty et al. (2014).




ARGUMENT

Figure 6Timeline of Interventions and Outcomes





ARGUMENT

Table 2Fraction of Referees Who Accept Review Invitation by Treatment Group





ARGUMENT

Figure 7Pre-Experiment Review Times by Treatment Group

Source: Chetty et al. (2014).Matheus Albergaria de Magalhães & Antonio Sergio da Silva



ARGUMENT

Figure 8Post-Experiment Review Times by Treatment Group

Source: Chetty et al. (2014).Matheus Albergaria de Magalhães & Antonio Sergio da Silva



ARGUMENT

Four Sets of Outcomes:

1. Shortening the deadline from six to four weeks reducedmedian review times from 48 days to 36 days.

2. Providing a cash incentive for reports sent within fourweeks reduced median review times by an additional 8 days.

3. The "Social"treatment reduced median review times by 2.5days.

4. Social incentives had much larger effects for tenuredprofessors.




ARGUMENT

Lessons for the Peer Review Process:

1. Shorter deadlines are extremely effective in improving thespeed of the review process.

2. Cash incentives can generate significant improvements inreview times and also increase willingness to submitreviews.

3. Social incentives can also improve referee performance.




ARGUMENT

Lessons for Prosocial Behavior:

1. Attention matters: reminders and deadlines havesignificant impacts on behavior.

2. Monetary incentives can be effective in increasing someforms of prosocial behavior (contrarily to other evidence, such asGneezy & Rutschini, 2000; Squazzoni, Bravo, & Tákacs, 2013).

3. Social incentives can be effective even when other policyinstruments are ineffective.




CONCLUSIONS

My Impressions:

I Very innovative attempt to address a relevant questionthrough the use of a mixed ramdomized-repeated design.

I Clear-cut implications, both for academics and policy-makers.

I Main flaw: authors did not explore other potencial uses ofthis design (e.g., interactions and interaction contrasts)(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, chap.7).




REFERENCES

Card, D., DellaVigna, S. (2013). Nine facts about top journals in economics.Journal of Economic Literature, 51(1), 144–161.http://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.1.144.

Chetty, R., Saez, E., Sándor, L. (2014). What policies increase prosocialbehavior? An experiment with referees at the Journal of Public Economics.Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), 169–188.http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.3.169.

Ellison, G. (2002). The slowdown of the economics publishing process.Journal of Political Economy, 110(5), 947–993. Retrieved fromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/341868.




REFERENCES

Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A. (2000). A fine is a price. The Journal of Legal Studies,29(1), 1–17. http://doi.org/10.1086/468061.

Hamermesh, D. S. (1992). The young economist’s guide to professionaletiquette. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(1), 169–179.http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.1.169.

Hamermesh, D. S. (1994). Facts and myths about refereeing. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, 8(1), 153–163. Retrieved fromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2138156.




REFERENCES

Hamermesh, D. S. (2013). Six decades of top economics publishing: who andhow? Journal of Economic Literature, 51(1), 162–172.http://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.1.162.

Squazzoni, F., Bravo, G., Takács, K. (2013). Does incentive provision increasethe quality of peer review? An experimental study. Research Policy, 42(1),287–294. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.014.

Tabachnick, B. G., Fidell, L. S. (2007). Experimental designs using ANOVA.New York: Thompson Brooks/Cole.




Thank YouMatheus Albergaria de Magalhães

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http://www.sites.google.com/site/malbergariademagalhaes



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http://www.sites.google.com/site/malbergariademagalhaes

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What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior?