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Chapter10 Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of science Master course student Tsubasa Iyama Major of Intelligent System

"What is this thing called science?"(Chapter10 and Chapter11)

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Page 1: "What is this thing called science?"(Chapter10 and Chapter11)

Chapter10Feyerabend’sanarchistictheoryofscienceMaster course student Tsubasa Iyama Major of Intelligent System

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Topic1.  The Story so far

2.  Feyerabend’s case against method

3.  Feyerabend’s advocacy of freedom

4.  CriBque of Feyerabend’s individual

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1.  The Story so far

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Problem

PosiBvism

FalsificaBonism

It is difficult to search the characterisaBon of science as disBnguishing it from other kinds of knowledge.

Science is special because it is derived from the facts.It is no clear account of how theories can be ‘derived’ from the facts could be found.

Science is what should be falsifiable.In any realisBc situaBon in science it is not possible to locate the cause of a faulty predicBon.

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KuhnandLakatos

Kuhn

Lakatos

Both Kuhn and Lakatos tried to solve the problem by focusing on the theoreBcal framework in which scienBsts work. But…

He stressed the extent to which workers in rival paradigms ‘live in different worlds’.

He ended up with a criterion for characterising science that was so lax that few intellectual pursuits could be ruled out.

Paul Feyerabend Described about ‘anarchisBc’ in this chapter

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2.  Feyerabend’s case against method

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AboutFeyerabend•  Austrian who was based in Berkeley, California

•  spent Bme interacBng with Popper and Lakatos in London

•  published a book in 1975 with the Btle “Against Method”.

Outline of an Anarchis2c Theory of Knowledge He challenged all of the aYempts to give an account of scienBfic method to capture its special status.

•  There is no such method. •  Science does not possess features that render it

necessary superior to other forms of knowledge. •  It is the principle ‘anything goes’.

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Feyerabend’smainlineofargument

The advances in physics and astronomy made by Galileo

He offered on the basis of philosophers own ground. It is aYempt to undermine characterisaBons of method and progress in science.

(Main Example)

If an account of method and progress in science cannot even make sense of Galileo’s innovaBons, then it is not much of an account of science.

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TheadvancesofsciencebyGalileoHe didn’t accept the facts considered to be borne out by the senses by his contemporaries.

Galileo’s opinion

1.  Reason conquers sense 2.  Replace the senses by ‘a superior and beYer

sense’, namely, the telescope !  His rejecBon of the claim that the earth is staBonary !  His rejecBon of the claim that the apparent sizes of

Venus and Mars do not change appreciably during the course of the year

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Rotationofearth:Observation

【ObservaBon】 Dropping the stone from the top of a tower, the stone will fall to just below the tower. Earth is

staBonaryIf earth moves…

Explain that “earth moves”.

Stone should fall to the locaBon shiced from beneath the tower.

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Rotationofearth:Assumption

frictionlessslopeθ

frictionlessslopeθ

ma = mg sinθ a = g sinθ

ma = - mg sinθ a = g sinθ

The speed of a ball will increase, because it is ‘falling’ towards the

centre of the earth.

The speed of a ball will decrease, because it is rising away from the

centre of the earth.

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Rotationofearth:Assumption

The speed will neither increase nor decrease since the ball will be neither

rising nor falling.frictionlessslope

The horizonal moBon of the ball persists and remains constant.

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Rotationofearth:Result

【Before falling】 Stone and tower has a horizontal movement at the same rate.

【Acer falling】 This stone will fall to just below the tower. This is the result that stone and the tower dropped while keeping the horizontal movement.

That’s why he could deny the argument that ‘The earth is staBonary’.

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VenusandMars:naked-eye|telescopeTheproblemisclearifweusethedataofthetelescope.But...

•  itcan’tcomparewiththeentityevenifthereisadefectofthetelescope,becausethesubjectisunknown.

•  Wecan’tusealuxurythatwereavailableintheobservationsontheground.

•  Wecan’tbesuretheobjectwiththenaked-eyetogotonearby.

Astronomical observaBon

It is impossible to show the validity of the telescope data in astronomical observaBon.

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VenusandMars:propagandaandtrickeryGalileoassertedthevalidityofthetelescopedatausingthepropagandaandtrickery

•  Heprevailsbecauseofhisstyleandhisclevertechniquesofpersuation.

•  HewritesinItalianratherthaninLatin.

•  Heappealstopeoplewhoareopposedtotheoldideasandthestandardsoflearningconnectedwiththem.

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CompatibilityofKuhnandLakatos

Lakatos

Kuhn

If Feyerabend’s construal of Galileo’s methodology is correct and typical of science, then posiBvist, inducBvist and falsificaBonist accounts have serious problem accommodaBoning it.

•  His methodology can be accommodated into Feyerabend’s .

•  They have in common in terms of ‘incommensurable’.

That methodology is so lax that it can accommodate almost anything.

Kuhn avoided Feyerabend’s anarchisBc conclusions essenBally by appealing to social consensus.

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Conculusionoffailedattempts

•  AYempts to differenBate scienBfic knowledge and other forms failed.

•  The high status are not jusBfied in our society.

The high regard for science is a dangerous dogma.(according to Feyerabend)

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3.  Feyerabend’s advocacy of freedom

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HumanitarianAttitudeFeyerabend’stheoryofscienceisinvolvinganattitudethatFeyerbenddescribedasthe‘humanitarianattitude’.

•  Individualhumansshouldbefree•  Theattempttoincreaseliberty,toleadafullandrewardinglife

•  Thecultivationofindividualitywhichaloneproduces,orcanproduce,well-developedhumanbeings

Humanitarian agtude

•  ScienBst’s increase of liberty : Removing scienBsts from methodological constraints

•  People’s increase of liberty : Give individualsthe freedom to choose between science and other forms of knowledge

“On Liberty” published by John Stuart Mill(1975)

AnarchisBc account of science

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LibertysocietyAccordingtoFeyerabend,Theinstitutionalisationofscienceinourscietyisinconsistentwiththehumanitarianattitude.e.f.Inschool,scienceistaughtasamatterofcourse.

We should separate the science and the state.

•  Science will not be given preference over other forms of knowledge or over other tradiBons.

•  A mature ciBzen is ‘a person who has learned to make up his mind. •  Science will be studied as a historical phenomenon so that each

individual ‘has the informaBon needed for arriving at a free decision.

•  The state is ideologically neutral.

Feyerabend’s ideal free society

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4.  CriBque of Feyerabend’s individualism

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UnderstandingofhumanfreedomFeyerabend’s view of freedom : “freedom from constraints”

It ignores the posiBve aspects of the "free".The posiBve aspects = The extent to which individuals have access to the means to fulfill their wishes

e.f. ) Freedom of speech A teacher claims the fascism in university lecture. •  Deny of ‘freedom of speech’ by disturbance of student ⇔ negaBve

•  There is a means for the claims to teachers ⇔ posiBve

Since this freedom is not to the student, disturbance of a teacher is jusBfied.

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FreedomunconstrainedIndividual and Society Individuals are born into a society that pre-exists them. The society’s characterisBcs do not choose and connot be in a posiBon to choose.

also science ScienBst will be only free to be determined within the range of certain constraints ( theory, mathemaBcal techniques, instruments and experimental techniques).

It can be free to pursue the ”subjecBve wishes” among a restricted sense

Author says that Feyerabend’s fanciful speculaBons about a utopia in which all individuals are free to follow their inclinaBons in an unrestricted way appear children.

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Chapter11Methodicalchangeinmethod

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Topic1.  Against universal method

2.  Telescopic for naked-eye data : a change in standards

3.  Piecemeal change of theory method and standards

4.  A light-hearted interlude

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1.  Against universal method

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Feyerabend’sclaimFeyerabend’s criBcismHe claims that “there is a universal, ahistorical method of science that contains standards that all sciences should live up to if they are to be worthy of the Btle ‘science’”.

‘universal’ : Universal is used to indicate that the proposed method is to apply to all science or putaBve sciences (physics,psychology, creaBon science or whatever)

‘ahistorical’ : The term ahistorical signals the Bmeless character of the method.(It is to be used to appraise Aristotle’s physics as much as Einstein’s and Democritus’s atomism as much as modern atomic physics.)

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Author’scriticismAuthor’s posiBonAgree : There is no idea to universal and ahistorical. Disagree : Deny that ‘there is no universal method’.

Idea of middle wayThere are methods and standards in science, but it is intended to be different for each science ,and it can be varied among a science, so it is changed to a beYer way.

There is a middle way, according to which there are historically conBngent methods and standards implicit in successful sciences.

Opposite opinion : John Worrall(1988) BeYer according to what standards? It is necessary to some super-standards.

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2.  Telescopic for naked-eye data: a change in standards

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StandardsofscienceOne of Galileo’s Aristotelian opponentsHe claims that should be compaBble with the evidence of the senses when they are used with sufficient care under suitable condiBons.

Galileo's policy in this situaBon : propaganda and trickery

As evidence to show the validity of the telescope data, it pointed out the shortcomings of the naked eye data on the "blink of light”.

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About‘blinkoflight’

e.g.) Torch

When viewed at a distance at night, when it is bright compared with its surroundings, it appears larger than its true size.

A lighted torch can viewed from near or far and at day or night.

Blink is dependent on the size of the apparent observed light source

This aspect of Galileo’s hypothesis can be subject to a direct terrestrial test.

Galileo’shypothesisBlinkofthelightistheresultofabrightness,smallnessanddistanceofthesource.

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Blinkoflight:observation【Brightness】Observestarsthroughclouds,blackclothandcoloredglass→Planet:Blinkiscompletelyremoved.→Star:Blinkisnotcompletelyremoved.

【Distance】Observethetorchesinthedistanceatnight→Itappearslargerthanobservedinthedaytime

【Size】Themoonandthesundoesn’tblink,soitdoesn’tchangethesizeofthem.

Galileowasabletoshowthatthenaked-eyeyieldsinconsistentinformationwhensmalllightsourcescomparedwiththeirsurroundingsareviewed.

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Thecompatibilityofotheruniversetheory

Factors that increase the veracity of the telescope data Data of the telescope was also complies with the opponents of Copernican theory.

The size of Venus and Mars changes to clarify.

Copernican theory Ptolemy theory Tycho Brahe theory

conflictEarth moves

Earth is staBonary.

This claim had been common in both. → Data of the telescope was also complies with the opponents.

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3.  Piecemeal change of theory, method and standards

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Successof“changeofstandards”Common aim : Give a descripBon of the astronomical

observaBon backed by empirical evidence

Galileo presented a observaBon that opponents can not help but to accept.

e.g. )Light source in the night appears larger than it actually

Opponents should be willing to abandon the ‘criterion of science itself’ and accept some telescopic data rather than their naked-eye counterpart.

Share of observaBon

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Thecomponentsofthescienceanditschange

The components of the science•  Aims to arrive at knowledge of some specified kind •  Methods for arriving at those aims •  Standards for judging •  Facts and theories that represent the current state of play

as far as the realisaBon of the aim is concerned

We have already discussed ways in which theories and facts are fallible, and we illustrated in the previous secBon a change in methods and standards.

The detailed form that the aim of a science takes can change too.

e.g.) The experimental work of Robert Boyle

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TheexperimentalworkofRobertBoyle

"  Robert Boyle He is major contribuBon to the scienBfic revoluBon of the seventeenth century.

•  Two somewhat conflicBng aspects of Boyle’s work

" The old way (mechanical philosophy)

" The new way(pneumaBcs experiment)

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Oldway:mechanicalphilosophy

The aim of science is ulAmate explanaAon

Mechanical philosophy The material world is seen as consisBng of pieces of maYer.

An explanaBon of some physical process will be based on the shape of the material parBcles, moBons, collision and rearrangements associated with the process

Adequate explanaBons were ulBmate explanaBons.

They appealed to the shapes, sizes, moBons and collisions of corpuscles, and these noBons were themselves not considered to be in need of explanaBon.

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Newway:pneumaticsexperimentBoyle’s experiments on the physics of air led him to explain a range of phenomena in terms of the weight and elasBcity of air.

But his explanaBons were not scienBfic explanaBons from the point of view of the mechanical philosophy. ( not ulBmate) Appealing to the nature of the air was not acceptable unBl those properBes themselves had been explained in terms of corpuscular mechanisms.

Later, the aim of ulBmately described in physics has been recognized as something unaYainable.

Change of the Aims

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SummaryofchangesThe “aims”, “methods”, ”standards” and “theory and facts" to consBtute science gradually change.

However…If it were typical of science that rival scienBsts see everything differently from the point of view of their respecBve paradigms, it would indeed be impossible to capture an objecBve sense.→But there are no situaBons in science or its history.

We don’t need a universal, ahistorical account of scienBfic method to give an objecBve account of progress in science.

The objecBve explanaBon that how a method changes is possible.

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4.  A light-hearted interlude

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Reactionofdefendersofuniversalmethod

It can be interpreted as a general assumpAons that consAtute universal method

Imagined reacAonIt does illustrate a change in standards, an appeal to some higher, more general standards is involved.e.g.) Galileo and his rivals of common maYers They demanded that their account of planetary orbits should be borne out by appropriate evidence.

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Author’sopinionSuppose we do try to formulate some general principles that any proponent might be expected to adhere to.

“Common-sense scienAfic method” ‘ take argument and the available evidence seriously and do not aim for a kind of knowledge or a level of confirmaBon that is beyond the reach of available methods’

There is universal method in the commonsense.

However...

Such a universal method is unsuitable for finely describing the change of the science because of too vague.

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Statusofsciencesociologists of science and postmodernists (call them ‘the levellers’ for short)

establishment of the reliability of the science

the interest of scienBsts and groups of scienBsts (such as social status)

the same way as any other social task does. →deny the special status about science

AuthorThere is a commonsense disBncBon. e.g.) ・The aim to improve knowledge of how chemicals combine ・The aim to improve the social standing of professional chemists.

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FinallyPhilosophers of science have presumed that ‘a disBncBon between science and other kind of knowledge’ can only be achieved with universal method. → Failure

1.  An account of universal method by adapBng a version of probability theory (Chapter 12)

2.  Counter what it sees as the excesses of the theory-dominated accounts of science by taking a close look at experiment and what it involves (Chapter 13)

The pursuit of universal method in the philosophy of science is conBnuing. Two important movement as follows :