US Navy in WW II session iii; Atl. Surface Ops, Pt. II

The U.S. Navy in World War IIsession iii-Atlantic Surface Operations, II

HMS Ark Royalhunting theBismarck

–Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ, 1418

“O quam cito transit gloria mundi.” (How quickly the glory of the world passes away)

–Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ, 1418

“O quam cito transit gloria mundi.” (How quickly the glory of the world passes away)

Versailles, Hall of Mirrors, 1685 France under Louis xiv, the apogee of absolutism

“[Sic] transit gloria mundi.” ([Thus] the glory of the world passes away)


Versailles, Hall of Mirrors, 1871 Prussia humiliates France on the battlefield and

proclaims the Second Reich here



“[Sic] transit gloria mundi.”

“[Sic] transit gloria mundi.”

“[sic] transit gloria mundi.”

“[sic] transit gloria mundi.”

Railway carriage, Forest of Compiègne,

June 22, 1940

In the very same railway carriage in which the 1918 Armistice was signed (removed from a museum building and placed on the precise spot where it was located in 1918), Hitler sat in the same chair in which Marshal Ferdinand Foch had sat when he faced the representatives of the defeated German Empire. After listening to the reading of the preamble, Hitler – in a calculated gesture of disdain to the French delegates – left the carriage, as Foch had done in 1918, leaving the negotiations to his Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) Chief, General Wilhelm Keitel.!

Wikipedia, “Second Armistice at Compiègne"

major topics in this session

I. The Fall of France

II. Operation Sealion

III. German surface raiders—Bismarckdämmerung

IV. St. Nazaire and Dieppe

V. German Reorganization and the End of the Surface Raiders

Text

I. the fall of France22.vi.40

“The disastrous Allied expedition into Norway brought about the fall of the British government. On May 10, the day that Hitler struck at the Low Countries, Neville Chamberlain yielded the office of Prime Minister to Winston Churchill, who set out to form a National Government with ministers representing all parties, in contrast to the Conservative Government of his predecessor. Under Churchill’s leadership the war was pursued with vigor and courage through the darkest hours, when Britain stood alone.” !

Sea Power, p. 503

The Right Man at the Right Time

Churchill at 10 Downing Street 20.v.40 (10 days after becoming PM)

The Right Man at the Right Time1874-born at Blenheim Palace to an aristocratic father (third son of the 7th duke of Marlborough) politician and an American mother, Jenny Jerome-noted beauty





in the deplorable custom of the time, both parents were too busy with their own affairs, political and amorous, to parent him




he was cared for by a nanny and shipped off to “public” (private) schools, lastly Harrow, 1888-93





1893-95— Royal Military College, Sandhurst, then Cuba to be “blooded” as an observer officer 4th Queen’s own Hussars

1896-India, Northwest Frontier Province (Afghanistan) chasing “bad guys” and playing polo

1898- with Kitchener to Omdurman, the last cavalry charge to work




1893-95— Royal Military College, Sandhurst, then Cuba to be “blooded” as an observer officer 4th Queen’s own Hussars

1896-India, Northwest Frontier Province (Afghanistan) chasing “bad guys” and playing polo

1898- with Kitchener to Omdurman, the last cavalry charge to work

1899-1900-Boer War journalist, POW, daring escape and politics

Winston “Rats,” then “Re-Rats”1900-based on his Boer War heroism, he wins the seat of Oldham in the “Khaki Election,” as a Conservative

1900


1904-he “rats” on the Conservatives (Tories) and sides with Liberals

1904



1908-his first Cabinet seat, President of the Board of Trade. He sides with the “radical” Lloyd-George and opposes naval spending

David Lloyd George as Chancellor of the

Exchequer-1908-1915

–Churchill in The World Crisis; 1911-1918, (1923)

“The Admiralty wanted six [Dreadnoughts]. We countered with four. We finally compromised with

eight.”




1910-a controversial Home Secretary, “the siege of Sidney Street,” the suffragettes





1911-made First Lord of the Admiralty. His attitude toward naval spending reverses and never wavers thereafter

1915-Gallipoli failure. He goes to the Western Front



















1916-returns to politics as Minister of Munitions

1919-War Secretary, pushes unsuccessfully for intervention in the Russian civil war

1920s-“re-rats” back to the Conservatives, an unsuccessful Chancellor of the Exchequer, fights the General Strike (1926)

“The Wilderness Years”-1931-1939

1929-The Conservative government was defeated in the general election. Churchill did not seek election to the Conservative Business Committee, the official leadership of the Conservative MPs

Over the next two years, Churchill became estranged from Conservative leadership over the issues of protective tariffs and Indian Home Rule, by his political views and by his friendships with press barons, financiers and people whose characters were seen as dubious

1931-Ramsay MacDonald formed the National Government, Churchill was not invited to join the Cabinet. He was at the low-point in his career, in a period known as "the wilderness years”

1932-he opposed those who advocated giving Germany the right to military parity with France, Churchill spoke often of the dangers of Germany's rearmament. He later, particularly in The Gathering Storm, portrayed himself as being for a time, a lone voice calling on Britain to strengthen itself to counter the belligerence of Germany

1934-Churchill's first major speech on defence stressed the need to rebuild the Royal Air Force and to create a Ministry of Defence

1938-Churchill was a fierce critic of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler[159] and in a speech to the House of Commons, he bluntly and prophetically stated, "You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will have war.” Writes, While England Slept. Wikipedia

The war energized Churchill, who was 65 years old when he became Prime Minister. An American journalist wrote in 1941: “… The last time I saw him, while the Battle of Britain was still raging, he looked twenty years younger than before the war began ... His uplifted spirit is transmitted to the people”. Churchill's speeches were a great inspiration to the embattled British. His first speech as prime minister was the famous "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat". One historian has called its effect on Parliament as "electrifying"; the House of Commons that had ignored him during the 1930s "was now listening, and cheering". Churchill followed that closely with two other equally famous ones, given just before the Battle of Britain. One included the words: ... we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender. The other: Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour'.

Wikipedia

“By again advancing through Belgium, as in World War I, the Germans simply passed around the left flank of the Maginot Line. Then, in a new modification of the Schlieffen Plan, the panzer divisions, followed up by motorized infantry, drove westward from Sedan to the English Channel, trapping the British Expeditionary Force in Belgium and Northern France.” !

Sea Power, p. 503

Goering Promises—Fails to Deliver

“Hitler, believing that the Luftwaffe would render escape impossible, ordered his panzer forces to stop short of Dunkirk

“partly in fear that his forces were over-extended and partly to give Air Marshall Goering’s planes the glory…

“Goering reckoned without three factors:

bombing of the troops was ineffective, the soft sand absorbing much of the force of the explosions

the RAF was fully committed to protecting the Dunkirk beach-head

the presence of evacuation ships and craft in such large numbers provided simply too many targets”

Ibid.

Channel, trapping the British Expeditionary Force in Belgium and Northern France. As early as May 20, the Admiralty, recognizing that a supreme effort was now needed to save the army, began to organize shipping for an evacuation from Dunkirk.…Private British boat owners spontaneously aided naval efforts, volunteering themselves and their craft for service. The Lords of the Admiralty accepted these gladly, but there was hard naval planning as well. They hoped to rescue about 45,000 men in two days…. “When the operation was completed, 338,226 men had been safely delivered to England by 861 vessels, with a total loss of 243 vessels sunk and many damaged. Less spectacularly, nearly half a million British and French soldiers and civilians, were lifted from other French ports during the last hours of France’s freedom.” !

Ibid.

“On June 11, in order to participate in the German victory, Italy declared war•.…Paris fell to the Germans on June 14, and the next day Premier Reynaud requested the British government to release France from her pledge not to make separate terms with Germany. The British agreed on the condition that the French fleet would not fall into the hands of the common enemy….France was divided into two zones: occupied France, the Atlantic front and all the northern part including Paris; and unoccupied France, with a government under Petain but dominated by the Nazi sympathizer Pierre Laval and his associates.• “Meanwhile Admiral Darlan, CinC of the French navy, who had pledged his word of honor that the French fleet would not fall intact into the hands of the Germans, sent all ships the following message in code:” !

op. cit, p. 504


op. cit, p. 504


op. cit, p. 504

“I refer to the clauses of the armistice now being telegraphed in plain language by other channels.I am taking advantage of the last coded messages I can send in order to make known my views on this matter. 1. The demobilized warships are to stay French, under the French flag, with reduced French crews, remaining in French metropolitan or colonial ports. 2. Secret preparations for auto-sabotage are to be made in order that an enemy or foreigner seizing a vessel by force shall not be able to make use of it. 3. Should the Armistice Commission…come to a decision different from that in paragraph one, warships are without further orders to be dispatched to the United States or, alternatively, scuttled, provided that no other action is possible to preserve them from the enemy. Under no circumstances are they to fall into enemy hands intact. 4. Ships that seek refuge abroad are not to be used against Germany or Italy without prior orders from the CinC. ” ! !

op. cit, p. 504

“The armistice terms as finally announced provided that French ships were to be assembled in ports to be specified…under German or Italian control. Germany solemnly declared it her intention not to make use of the French ships herself….On the other hand,…French Atlantic bases must be placed completely at the disposal of the Germans for U-boat operations.” !

op. cit, p. 504

“The resolution of the problem of the French fleet in the Mediterranean brought tragedy, as will be recounted in the next [session]. To immobilize the French battleship Richelieu• at Dakar, on the western bulge of Africa,• the British carrier Hermes• approached and sent in six torpedo-bombers which attacked the battleship•, doing enough damage to keep her off the seas for a year. Two French cruisers and a carrier in the West Indies were neutralized through the diplomatic efforts of President Roosevelt. Thus, while attaining only partial success, the British were able to attain their tenuous command of the sea, but at a cost of embittering their former allies. This unfortunate by-product of their operations was to exact a toll at the time of Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa in late 1942.” !

op. cit, p. 505


op. cit, p. 505


op. cit, p. 505

Text

II. Operation SealionExperimenting with landing craft; Pionierlandungsboot—summer, 1940

French cartoon, summer, 1940

“Jubilant over his swift conquest of France and confident that Britain would capitulate in a few weeks, Hitler at first paid scant attention to any idea of invading England. In this belief he was encouraged by…Goering. Admiral Raeder • however feared the situation was such that Hitler might suddenly order a cross-Channel attack. Raeder regarded Britain as the chief foe, but had little confidence in the success of an invasion since he knew that he had inadequate time and resources to stage it. [Still, he] went ahead with preliminary planning in order not to be caught off guard when it became obvious even to Hitler and Goering that Britain had no intention of surrendering. Raeder understood the difficulties far better than the army commanders who began to show an interest in invading England, for they had millions of victorious troops unhand and no place to go with them. They eyed the English Channel and though that crossing it would present no more problems than crossing a very wide river. Encouraged by the army, Hitler on July 16, 1940, issued a directive for the invasion of England, Operation SEA LION.” !

op. cit, p. 504

Hitler's directive set four conditions for the invasion to occur:!! •! The RAF was to be "beaten down in its morale and in fact, that it can no longer

display any appreciable aggressive force in opposition to the German crossing".!! •! The English Channel was to be swept of British mines at the crossing points, and

the Strait of Dover must be blocked at both ends by German mines.!! •! The coastal zone between occupied France and England must be dominated by

heavy artillery.!! •! The Royal Navy must be sufficiently engaged in the North Sea and the

Mediterranean so that it could not intervene in the crossing. British home squadrons must be damaged or destroyed by air and torpedo attacks.!

This ultimately placed responsibility for Sea Lion's success squarely on the shoulders of Raeder and Göring, neither of whom had the slightest enthusiasm for the venture and, in fact, did little to hide their opposition to it. Nor did Directive 16 provide for a combined operational headquarters under which all three service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) could work together under a single umbrella organization to plan, coordinate and execute such a complex undertaking (similar to the Allies' creation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) for the later Normandy landings).!!

Wikipedia

Unternehmen Seelöwe

“This directive, drawn up by the army, showed little grasp of the naval problems involved. It ordered that the landings be made on a broad front from Ramsgate to a point near the Isle of Wight, a front of approximately 200 miles, and that it be ready to jump off by August 13. • Patiently Raeder explained that landing on such a scale would require many harbors for preparation of the invasion fleet, that the French ones were too damaged for use, that the concentration of shipping…would infallibly reveal the plan to the British, and that in any event Germany did not have anything like the number of ships the operation would require. Raeder emphasized that the assault must be on a narrow front where there could be a reasonable hope of maintaining a supply line across the Channel. From his point of view the only possible landing sites lay between Dover and Beachy Head. On hearing this proposal, the Chief of the Army General Staff retorted, ‘I might just as well put the troops that have landed straight through a sausage machine.’ Raeder replied that he wanted to put the troops ashore and not at the bottom of the sea.” !

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Four years later the Allied D-Day landings showed just how much material had to be landed continuously to maintain an amphibious invasion. The problem for the Germans was worse, as the German Army was mostly horse-drawn.• One of its prime headaches would have been transporting thousands of horses across the Channel. British intelligence calculated that the first wave of 11 divisions (including the airborne divisions) would require a daily average of 3,300 tons of supplies. In fact in Russia in 1941, when engaged in heavy fighting, a single German infantry division required up to 1,100 tons of supplies a day, though a more usual figure would be 212-425 tons per day. British intelligence further calculated that Folkestone,• the largest harbor falling within the planned German landing zones, could handle 150 tons per day in the first week of the invasion (assuming all dockside equipment was successfully demolished and regular RAF bombing raids reduced capacity by 50%). Within seven days, maximum capacity was expected to rise to 600 tons per day, once German shore parties had made repairs to the quays and cleared the harbor of any blockships and other obstacles. This meant that, at best, the nine German infantry and two airborne divisions landed initially would receive less than 20% of the 3,300 tons of supplies they required each day through a port, and would have to rely heavily on whatever could be brought in directly over the beaches or air-dropped.!The capture of Dover and its harbour facilities was expected to add another 800 tons per day, raising to 40% the amount of supplies brought in through ports, but this rested on the assumption of little or no interference from the Royal Navy and RAF with the German supply convoys shuttling between the Continent and the invasion beaches!

Wikipedia

Could Sea Lion Have Succeeded?— Logistics

Four years later the Allied D-Day landings showed just how much material had to be landed continuously to maintain an amphibious invasion. The problem for the Germans was worse, as the German Army was mostly horse-drawn.• One of its prime headaches would have been transporting thousands of horses across the Channel. British intelligence calculated that the first wave of 11 divisions (including the airborne divisions) would require a daily average of 3,300 tons of supplies. In fact in Russia in 1941, when engaged in heavy fighting, a single German infantry division required up to 1,100 tons of supplies a day, though a more usual figure would be 212-425 tons per day. British intelligence further calculated that Folkestone,• the largest harbor falling within the planned German landing zones, could handle 150 tons per day in the first week of the invasion (assuming all dockside equipment was successfully demolished and regular RAF bombing raids reduced capacity by 50%). Within seven days, maximum capacity was expected to rise to 600 tons per day, once German shore parties had made repairs to the quays and cleared the harbor of any blockships and other obstacles. This meant that, at best, the nine German infantry and two airborne divisions landed initially would receive less than 20% of the 3,300 tons of supplies they required each day through a port, and would have to rely heavily on whatever could be brought in directly over the beaches or air-dropped.!The capture of Dover and its harbour facilities was expected to add another 800 tons per day, raising to 40% the amount of supplies brought in through ports, but this rested on the assumption of little or no interference from the Royal Navy and RAF with the German supply convoys shuttling between the Continent and the invasion beaches!

Wikipedia

Could Sea Lion Have Succeeded?— Logistics

The Battle of Britain—13 August 1940 [Adlertag]-October 1940

“In the Meantime, everything depended on the Luftwaffe.

“All agreed that command of the air was an absolute prerequisite to an invasion attempt.

“…heavy attacks against air installations in the south of England…to gain superiority over the R.A.F.

“…also intended to force Britain to sue for peace.






“The hope…was vain.































14 September-the day of decision for Seelöwe

12 October-postponed indefinitely

Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt • also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff, to put pressure on the British Government to come to terms. He observed that Napoleon had failed to invade and the difficulties that confounded him did not appear to have been solved by the Sea Lion planners. In fact in November 1939 the German Naval staff produced a study on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it required two preconditions, air and naval superiority, neither of which Germany ever had. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz• believed air superiority was not enough and admitted, "We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it.”!

Wikipedia

Was It a Bluff?

Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt • also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff, to put pressure on the British Government to come to terms. He observed that Napoleon had failed to invade and the difficulties that confounded him did not appear to have been solved by the Sea Lion planners. In fact in November 1939 the German Naval staff produced a study on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it required two preconditions, air and naval superiority, neither of which Germany ever had. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz• believed air superiority was not enough and admitted, "We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it.”!

Wikipedia

Was It a Bluff?

Text

III. German surface raiders—Bismarckdämmerung

“In the spring of 1941, the Hipper, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau again made brief sweeps into the Atlantic, sinking more than 20,000 tons in two months of operation. The Hipper returned to Germany, but in late March the two battleships were at Brest, a strategically located port from which to launch further raiding operations. “Admiral Raeder had now conceived the most ambitious raider operation of the Atlantic war. In the Baltic lay the great battleship Bismarck, newly completed, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Raeder planned to send these vessels out into the Atlantic, where they would be joined by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The powerful squadron thus formed, supplemented with a stepped-up U-boat campaign, could be counted on to paralyze British shipping. In preparation for this operation, supply ships and tankers were dispatched ahead to prearranged rendezvous areas far from shipping lanes, and German merchantmen disguised as neutrals combed the convoy routes in search of information. “…Raeder ordered the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen to Bergen, Norway. Here they were to await thick weather and then break out into the North Atlantic, the long way round north of Iceland. The Scharnhorst was to join them as soon as her damages were repaired.” !

Sea Power, p. 508

The Bismarck Breaks Out

Bismarck, 1940

“In the spring of 1941, the Hipper, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau again made brief sweeps into the Atlantic, sinking more than 20,000 tons in two months of operation. The Hipper returned to Germany, but in late March the two battleships were at Brest, a strategically located port from which to launch further raiding operations. “Admiral Raeder had now conceived the most ambitious raider operation of the Atlantic war. In the Baltic lay the great battleship Bismarck, newly completed, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Raeder planned to send these vessels out into the Atlantic, where they would be joined by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The powerful squadron thus formed, supplemented with a stepped-up U-boat campaign, could be counted on to paralyze British shipping. In preparation for this operation, supply ships and tankers were dispatched ahead to prearranged rendezvous areas far from shipping lanes, and German merchantmen disguised as neutrals combed the convoy routes in search of information. “…Raeder ordered the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen to Bergen, Norway. Here they were to await thick weather and then break out into the North Atlantic, the long way round north of Iceland. The Scharnhorst was to join them as soon as her damages were repaired.” !

Sea Power, p. 508


Aerial reconnaissance photograph taken byFlying Officer Michael Suckling

on 21 May 1941 in Norway

Aerial reconnaissance photograph taken byFlying Officer Michael Suckling

on 22 May 1941Bismarck had put to sea

“The Admiralty was particularly concerned about the Bismarck. In the spring of 1941 she was the most powerful battleship in commission. Mounting eight 15-inch guns in her main battery, she had a secondary battery of twelve 5.9’s and an antiaircraft battery of sixteen 4.1’s. Her armor was the most advanced on any capital ship, amounting to 16,000 tons dead weight. She had skillfully designed compartmentation to prevent flooding. All the available resources of the Royal Navy were required to track her down and sink her. !

op. cit, p. 509


“The Admiralty was particularly concerned about the Bismarck. In the spring of 1941 she was the most powerful battleship in commission. Mounting eight 15-inch guns in her main battery, she had a secondary battery of twelve 5.9’s and an antiaircraft battery of sixteen 4.1’s. Her armor was the most advanced on any capital ship, amounting to 16,000 tons dead weight. She had skillfully designed compartmentation to prevent flooding. All the available resources of the Royal Navy were required to track her down and sink her. !

op. cit, p. 509


“Admiral Sir John Tovey, CinC of the Home Fleet, who was anxiously awaiting news of their movements, immediately took steps to intercept….[He] had with him at Scapa Flow the battleships King George V,• flagship, and Prince of Wales • and the battle cruiser Hood • in addition to cruisers and destroyers. In England were the carrier Victorious,• which had not yet had her working-up cruise, and the battle cruiser Repulse.• At Gibraltar…the battle cruiser Renown • and the carrier Ark Royal.• The battleships Rodney • and Ramillies • were on duty escorting convoys in the Atlantic, and the battleship Revenge • was at Halifax. All these ships played some part in tracking down and sinking the Bismarck. !

Ibid.


“Admiral Sir John Tovey, CinC of the Home Fleet, who was anxiously awaiting news of their movements, immediately took steps to intercept….[He] had with him at Scapa Flow the battleships King George V,• flagship, and Prince of Wales • and the battle cruiser Hood • in addition to cruisers and destroyers. In England were the carrier Victorious,• which had not yet had her working-up cruise, and the battle cruiser Repulse.• At Gibraltar…the battle cruiser Renown • and the carrier Ark Royal.• The battleships Rodney • and Ramillies • were on duty escorting convoys in the Atlantic, and the battleship Revenge • was at Halifax. All these ships played some part in tracking down and sinking the Bismarck. !

Ibid.


In other words, the Royal Navy would overcome Bismarck’s overwhelming strength by

concentrating superior firepower.

The last photograph of the battlecruiser Hood, taken from the battleship Prince of Wales. moments before they engage

Bismarck

“First contact with the raiders was made in the early evening of May 23 in the Denmark Strait [by two cruisers who hid in the fog till the “big boys” could-jbp] bring them into action. “On board the battle cruiser Hood, Admiral Holland calculated his intercept course and prepared for action at any time after 0140 24 May. Contact was not made until 0535, whereupon Hood [in service 1920-1941-jbp] and the new battleship Prince of Wales [in service 19 Jan-10 Dec 1941 sunk by the Japanese-jbp] engaged ….Holland, maneuvering both ships together, ordered a head-on approach which denied him the use of their after guns. The Germans opened fire, concentrating on the Hood.• To confuse their aim !

op. cit, p. 509



op. cit, p. 509



op. cit, p. 509


Br. first sightBismarck

0535

Prince of Wales opens fire

0553range 15 miles

Hood blows up

0600range 8 miles

HMS Prince of Wales maneuvers to avoid the sinking Hood

the view of Hood’s death from Bismarck

While Hood's sinking killed 1,415 men, Ordinary Signalman Ted Briggs, Able Seaman Robert Tilburn, and Midshipman William John Dundas, survived [3 out of 1,418 men!-jbp ]; they were rescued about two hours after

the sinking by the destroyer Electra. Electra spotted substantial debris, but no bodies. Wikipedia

Admiralty cable= 1/10 th nautical

mile (4 cables =

approx. ½ land mi.)

head-on approach which denied him the use of their after guns. The Germans opened fire, concentrating on the Hood. To confuse their aim and to bring his after turrets to bear, Holland ordered a 20-degree turn to Port,• but scarcely had the ships begun to swing in response to the signal when Hood disintegrated, hit in the magazine by a shell from the Bismarck.• The Prince of Wales had to swing • hard a-starboard to avoid the floating wreckage of the Hood. The situation had dramatically reversed. Tactical superiority had passed to the Germans. To make matters worse, the Prince of Wales, too new to have the mechanical difficulties worked out of her [commissioned 5 months earlier- jbp], was only able to fire three guns a salvo [3 out of 10—six forward, 4 aft—14” guns!-shocking-jbp ]”. !

Ibid.



Ibid.

The Bismarck Breaks Outfrom course 300º

to course 280º


Ibid.


Bismarck’s main battery salvoes at Hood as seen from Prinz Eugen


Ibid.



Ibid.


“First contact with the raiders was made in the early evening of May 23 in the Denmark Strait [by two cruisers who hid in the fog till the “big boys” could-jbp] bring them into action. “On board the battle cruiser Hood, Admiral Holland calculated his intercept course and prepared for action at any time after 0140 24 May. Contact was not made until 0535, whereupon Hood [in service 1920-1941-jbp] and the new battleship Prince of Wales [in service 19 Jan-10 Dec 1941 sunk by the Japanese-jbp] ….Holland, maneuvering both ships together, ordered a head-on approach which denied him the use of their after guns. The Germans opened fire, concentrating on the Hood.• To confuse their aim !

op. cit, p. 509



0535


0553

Hood blows up

0600

“First contact with the raiders was made in the early evening of May 23 in the Denmark Strait [by two cruisers who hid in the fog till the “big boys” could-jbp] bring them into action. “On board the battle cruiser Hood, Admiral Holland calculated his intercept course and prepared for action at any time after 0140 24 May. Contact was not made until 0535, whereupon Hood [in service 1920-1941-jbp] and the new battleship Prince of Wales [in service 19 Jan-10 Dec 1941 sunk by the Japanese-jbp] ….Holland, maneuvering both ships together, ordered a head-on approach which denied him the use of their after guns. The Germans opened fire, concentrating on the Hood.• To confuse their aim !

op. cit, p. 509



0535


0553

Hood blows up

0600

Prince of Wales flees0627

[commissioned 5 months earlier- jbp], was only able to fire three guns a salvo. “Rear Admiral Wake-Walker [CinC of the two-cruiser group], who had been enjoying a ringside seat from the bridge of the Norfolk, now found himself senior officer present with the full responsibility for Bismarck on his shoulders. In view of the loss of the Hood, the inefficiency of and battle damage to the Prince of Wales, and the comparative weakness of his cruisers, he decided to resume shadowing tactics in hopes of enabling Tovey’s force to arrive on the scene. “The loss of the Hood can be blamed in large measure on the British lack of readiness to spend money on conversion of older ships [1920] during the lean years of peacetime budgets. She was known to be vulnerable to plunging fire, but during the pre-war years nothing had been done to strengthen her. When war came it was too late; as long as she could operate, she could not be spared. [“War is a ‘come-as-you-are’ party”-Gen’l. Alexander Haig, USA-jbp] !

op. cit, pp. 509-510


not be spared. [“War is a ‘come-as-you-are’ party”-Gen’l. Alexander Haig, USA-jbp] ! “‘Hood has blown up.’ “The signal stunned the Admiralty. Nearly every officer on duty in the War Room had served in the Hood and remembered her as the pride of the British fleet, the backbone of Britain’s sea defenses. Now she was gone. With saddened hearts but redoubled determination they plotted the Bismarck’s death…. “After being dogged all day by the Norfolk, Suffolk, and Prince of Wales, the Bismarck suddenly turned on the Suffolk, which opened range rapidly. The move was made to cover the departure of the Prinz Eugen, • which escaped to the south and entered Brest ten days later. Once again the game of shadowing went on. Since the ships were by this time entering known U-boat waters, all British vessels were zigzagging. On the outward leg of one of these zigzags, the Suffolk lost radar contact and failed to regain it. Once more the Bismarck was loose….•

op. cit, p. 510

The Bismarck Disappears


op. cit, p. 510



op. cit, p. 510



op. cit, p. 510



op. cit, p. 510


Suffolk lost radar contact and failed to regain it. Once more the Bismarck was loose…. !!!!!! “By the morning of May 26, the pursuers began to lose hope….Suddenly at 1030, a Catalina • flying patrol from the Coastal Air Command broadcast a sighting of a battleship…approximately 750 miles west of Brest steering course 150 at 20 knots. On all ships, plotting officers hurried with their work. It was no British battleship. The Bismarck was found.”

op. cit, p. 511

Bismarckdämmerung

In a course such as ours we must forego the series of “might-have-beens,” near sightings, ‘Murphy’s Law’ malfunctions, which tormented the British pursuers until the final engagement. Our Naval Academy text describes Admiral Tovey’s decision-making in detail


op. cit, p. 511

Bismarckdämmerung



op. cit, p. 511

Bismarckdämmerung


“British code-breakers were able to decrypt some of the German signals, including an order for Lütjens [Bismarck’s captain-jbp] to make for Brest. The French Resistance provided the British with confirmation, as Luftwaffe units were relocating to Brest to provide support. Tovey could now turn his forces toward France to converge in areas through which Bismarck would have to pass. A squadron of Coastal Command PBY Catalinas based in Northern Ireland joined the search, covering areas where Bismarck might be headed in her attempt to reach occupied France. At 10:30 on 26 May, a Catalina piloted by Ensign Leonard B. Smith of the US Navy located her, some 690 nmi (1,280 km; 790 mi) northwest of Brest.[e] • At her current speed, she would have been close enough to reach the protection of U-boats and the Luftwaffe in less than a day. There were no British forces close enough to stop her.”!

Wikipedia

“British code-breakers were able to decrypt some of the German signals, including an order for Lütjens [Bismarck’s captain-jbp] to make for Brest. The French Resistance provided the British with confirmation, as Luftwaffe units were relocating to Brest to provide support. Tovey could now turn his forces toward France to converge in areas through which Bismarck would have to pass. A squadron of Coastal Command PBY Catalinas based in Northern Ireland joined the search, covering areas where Bismarck might be headed in her attempt to reach occupied France. At 10:30 on 26 May, a Catalina piloted by Ensign Leonard B. Smith of the US Navy located her, some 690 nmi (1,280 km; 790 mi) northwest of Brest.[e] • At her current speed, she would have been close enough to reach the protection of U-boats and the Luftwaffe in less than a day. There were no British forces close enough to stop her.”!

Wikipedia

e Smith was one of nine American officers assigned to the RAF as special observers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Air_Force

Bismarckdämmerung

Bismarckdämmerungthe only possibility for the Royal Navy was the Ark Royal with Force H, brought up from Gibraltar by Admiral Somerville


the carrier’s Swordfish would have to slow Bismarck until the “heavies” could catch up to her



2047 26 May-the attack began. The second torpedo damaged the port rudder, jamming it at 12º to port




one of Bismarck’s attackers returnsto Ark Royal




2115-all repair efforts failing, Capt Lütjens reported his ship as unmaneuverable:“We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer!”






daybreak, 27 May-Rodney and George V begin the artillery duel








Rodney fires on Bismarck















“The Bismarck, although badly crippled, still had magnificent endurance and splendid fire control. Her third salvo straddled the Rodney, but soon the weight of British firepower began to tell, hitting the Bismarck’s main battery director early in the action so that the accuracy of her fire diminished appreciably. Soon the Bismarck was a helpless wreck, rolling sluggishly in the trough of the sea. But she refused to sink. At length Admiral Tovey, with barely enough fuel to get home, had to break off. Cruiser Dorsetshire requested permission to expend her last three torpedoes on the Bismarck before leaving, and as her third torpedo hit, the Bismarck slowly rolled over and disappeared beneath the waves. The Hood had been avenged.• “The loss of the Bismarck put an end to German use of major combat ships for attack on transoceanic commerce. Raeder’s standing with Hitler took a decided drop. German commerce warfare on the high seas thereafter was left to Dönitz’ U-boats and a few disguised merchant raiders.” !

op. cit, p. 512

Bismarckdämmerung


op. cit, p. 512

Bismarckdämmerung

Bismarckdämmerung

HMS Dorsetshire picks up Bismarck

survivors. Out of a crew of 2,200 only 114

survived


op. cit, p. 512

Bismarckdämmerung

“Britain’s pride in the Royal Navy’s achievement in hunting down and destroying the mighty Bismarck was somewhat quenched the following year when the Germans brought home the last of their big surface raiders. After the Bismarck episode, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen had remained at Brest.” !

op. cit, pp. 512-513

Epilogue- “The Channel Dash”

“Britain’s pride in the Royal Navy’s achievement in hunting down and destroying the mighty Bismarck was somewhat quenched the following year when the Germans brought home the last of their big surface raiders. After the Bismarck episode, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen had remained at Brest.” !

op. cit, pp. 512-513


“Hitler, convinced that the Allies were about to attack Norway, desired to concentrate all his naval strength there. Hence he ordered the three ships at Brest to make a break for home.”

Aerial reconnaissancephotograph, probably takenby the British Royal AirForce circa February-June1942. The arrow in thelower center • marks theposition of the battleshipScharnhorst, which wasthen under repair at the Kielnavy yard for damagereceived during theFebruary 1942 "ChannelDash".

Aerial reconnaissancephotograph, probably takenby the British Royal AirForce circa February-June1942. The arrow in thelower center • marks theposition of the battleshipScharnhorst, which wasthen under repair at the Kielnavy yard for damagereceived during theFebruary 1942 "ChannelDash".

“The failure to stop the Germans aroused great indignation in Britain….Nevertheless there were compensating advantages. The threat to Atlantic convoys from Brest had been eliminated. More important, the ineffectiveness of the Royal Navy’s air striking power had been so clearly revealed that the Navy at long last began to receive its share of up-to-date aircraft, formerly exclusively the prerogative of the R.A.F.” !

op. cit, pp. 513-514



op. cit, pp. 513-514


Normandy

Brittany“The month following…theRoyal Navy recovered muchof its lost prestige by a raid

on St. Nazaire.”


op. cit, pp. 513-514


Normandy

Brittany“The month following…theRoyal Navy recovered muchof its lost prestige by a raid

on St. Nazaire.”

Text

IV. St. Nazaire and DieppeA Dingo scout car has been abandoned at Dieppe, 19. viii.1942

The Birth of British Combined Operations

Admiral of the Fleet Roger John Brownlow Keyes,! 1st Baron Keyes, Bt GCB KCVO CMG DSO!

1872 – 1945!First Director Combined Operations-July, 1940-October, 1941

The Birth of British Combined OperationsApril 1918-capping a distinguished naval career, he planned a daring combined operations raid on the German U-boat pens







1931-retiring from the service, he won the seat for the naval town, Portsmouth, which he kept until 1943 when he entered the Lords





the ‘30s-he joined his old comrade Churchill and the others pressing for preparedness, denouncing Munich, and demanding an aggressive prosecution of the war





the ‘30s-he joined his old comrade Churchill and the others pressing for preparedness, denouncing Munich, and demanding an aggressive prosecution of the war

April-May, 1940-with Churchill, demanding the Trondheim raid, offered to lead it! (age 68)



“The combination of Roger Keyes as naval commander and Adrian Carton De Wiart, V.C. as military commander at Trondheim might have dramatically changed the course of the Norwegian campaign. Though both men were relatively old for active service, they were both aggressive. Whatever happened, there would have been no half measures.!!When both columns were evacuated in early May 1940, Keyes was apoplectic. There was shock in Britain. Parliament gathered to debate matters on 7 and 8 May 1940. The first Backbencher to speak was Keyes.!!Making a dramatic entrance in the full uniform of an Admiral of the Fleet…• Keyes gained the full attention and respect of the House of Commons. He could speak on this topic with greater authority than anyone else in the country. He said that he dressed in uniform because he wanted to speak for his friends among the fighting seagoing navy, who were very unhappy. It was not the fault of the Navy. Leadership of the war effort was the problem. It is commonly felt that the intervention of Keyes was the beginning of the end for the Government of Neville Chamberlain [emphasis added- jbp]. Other speakers followed his attack, notably Leo Amery and David Lloyd George. The government fell two days later on 10 May 1940, and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister.”!

Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Stennett_Amery

“The combination of Roger Keyes as naval commander and Adrian Carton De Wiart, V.C. as military commander at Trondheim might have dramatically changed the course of the Norwegian campaign. Though both men were relatively old for active service, they were both aggressive. Whatever happened, there would have been no half measures.!!When both columns were evacuated in early May 1940, Keyes was apoplectic. There was shock in Britain. Parliament gathered to debate matters on 7 and 8 May 1940. The first Backbencher to speak was Keyes.!!Making a dramatic entrance in the full uniform of an Admiral of the Fleet…• Keyes gained the full attention and respect of the House of Commons. He could speak on this topic with greater authority than anyone else in the country. He said that he dressed in uniform because he wanted to speak for his friends among the fighting seagoing navy, who were very unhappy. It was not the fault of the Navy. Leadership of the war effort was the problem. It is commonly felt that the intervention of Keyes was the beginning of the end for the Government of Neville Chamberlain [emphasis added- jbp]. Other speakers followed his attack, notably Leo Amery and David Lloyd George. The government fell two days later on 10 May 1940, and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister.”!

Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Stennett_Amery



he joined his old comrade Churchill and the others pressing for preparedness, denouncing Munich, and demanding an aggressive prosecution of the war


July, 1940-the new PM asked Keyes to oversee the new force which he named Commandos after the Boer raiding parties of the Second Boer War (1899-1902)

October, 1941-Keyes resigned the post, frustrated by the bureaucratic turf wars and foot-dragging. The next month his first-born son was killed in the raid on Rommel’s headquarters



























Luftwaffe light antiaircraft gun at St. Nazaire

former American destroyers [2 Sept 40-destroyers for bases agreement], HMS Campbeltown, as an explosive blockship • to ram and destroy the lock gates. To support the operation and to destroy harbor facilities, a group of motor launches carried a raiding force of Commandos. Entering the Loire late at night on March 27, 1942, the group…made recognition signals [to fool the German sentries-jbp] thereby gaining four valuable minutes during the final approach. When the Campbeltown had only 1,000 yards to go, all German batteries opened fire. Her captain increased to full speed and rammed the lock squarely, bringing her time-set explosive charge into perfect position. The crew was taken off in motor launches. Meanwhile the Commandos had fought their way ashore with great difficulty and set about blowing up port and lock machinery. With the main objective achieved…the survivors made good their escape with the loss of three motor launches on the way home. The next morning, while a group of senior German naval officers were inspecting the Campbeltown to plan her removal, the demolition charges blew up, wrecking the lock gate and wiping out the inspection party.” !

op. cit, p. 514

St. Nazaire

captured Commandos

captured Commandos

The Lucky Ones

The Not-so-Lucky Ones

The Not-so-Lucky Ones

“A raid on Dieppe conducted on August 19, 1942 was intended not only to inflict damage but also to test amphibious techniques. Some 5,000 Canadian [1,000 British and 50 U.S. Rangers-Wiki] troops participated. Counting heavily on surprise, the army refused naval gunfire support; hence only eight destroyers with 4-inch guns accompanied the troops. Through a chance encounter with a small German coastal convoy, the raiders on one flank lost surprise and were repulsed with heavy losses •, the few men who got ashore being quickly killed or captured. The other flank met with success, but the main assault on Dieppe itself also failed. The presence of a battleship would, in the opinion of the Naval Force Commander, have ‘probably turned the tide in our favour.’ The Canadians lost some 3,350 men, or 67% of the troops involved. The raid, while discouraging to ideas of cross-Channel operations in 1942 and 1943, did reveal many weaknesses in amphibious planning which had to be rectified before the forthcoming major landings in Africa and Europe.” !

op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe

German Defenses


op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe


op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe


op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe


op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe

The Lucky Ones?


op. cit, p. 514

Dieppe

The Lucky Ones?

No. 3 Commando after the raid

Lessons Learned from Dieppe Dieppe was a pathetic failure. Sixty years later, it seems obvious that Jubilee was a bizarre operation with no chance of success whatsoever and likely to result in a huge number of casualties. In August 1942, British and Allied officers did not have yet the knowledge and combat experience to make a proper assessment of the risks of such an operation. This catastrophe was useful precisely in providing that knowledge which was later to make victory possible.

The Dieppe fiasco demonstrated that it was imperative to improve communications at all levels: on the battlefield, between the HQs of each unit, between air, naval and ground forces. The idea of capturing a well-defended seaport to use as a bridgehead was dropped after August 19th, 1942. In addition, the raid on Dieppe showed how important it was to use prior air bombings to destroy enemy defences as much as possible, to support assault troops with artillery fire from ships and landing crafts, to improve techniques and equipment to remove obstacles to men and tanks.

The true meaning of the sacrifices made at Dieppe was made obvious two years after this ill-fated date, when on D-Day the Allies gained a foothold in Europe to free the continent from Nazi aggression.

!http://www.junobeach.org/e/2/can-eve-mob-die-e.htm#null

http://www.junobeach.org/e/2/can-eve-mob-die-e.htm#null

Text

V. German Reorganization and the End of the Surface Raiders

Tirpitz capsized, 12. xi.1944

Merchant ships of Arctic convoy JW53, escorted by a destroyer, brave pack ice and German blockades to

supply Britain’s ally, the Soviet Union, in 1943

Merchant ships of Arctic convoy JW53, escorted by a destroyer, brave pack ice and German blockades to

supply Britain’s ally, the Soviet Union, in 1943

BBC, History Magazine, 12, 2013, pp.50-51.

op. cit, p.52.

“During the 12 months from March 1942 to March 1943 the Arctic convoys became a byword for the horrors of the war at sea. Ten convoys (265 merchant ships) were sent to the Soviet Union….Sixty of the merchant vessels would not reach their destination and a further 22 were lost on the return leg…through enemy action, mines and harsh seas.” !

op. cit, p.53.

“The German surface ships were gradually transferred to Norway, where they could repel the invasion Hitler feared and where they would be in a position to strike at Arctic convoys to North Russia. In the early morning hours of December 31, 1942, a German raiding force composed of pocket battleship Lützow, heavy cruiser Hipper, and six destroyers made contact with a convoy [JW 51 B] meagerly protected by five destroyers, • two corvettes, • and one trawler. The Germans split up, the Hipper with two destroyers attacking the escort, the Lützow and four destroyers making for the helpless convoy. Then ensued one of the most amazing actions of the war [the Battle of the Barents Sea]. Captain R.S.V. Sherbrooke • managed his tiny escort force so brilliantly and so aggressively that the entire German force had to turn to deal with him. For more than an hour he held the attention of the Germans, losing only one destroyer, while the convoy escaped into the fog. On the arrival of the British cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, the Germans obeyed their standing orders to avoid engaging major forces and retired. The convoy reached Russia without the loss of a ship. The Germans lost a destroyer and sustained heavy damage to the Hipper. The most important damage however was not to the ships but to the German navy, for this action caused a major reorganization in the German naval high command.” !

Sea Power, p. 515

Reorganization of the German Navy


Sea Power, p. 515



Sea Power, p. 515



Sea Power, p. 515



Sea Power, p. 515



Sea Power, p. 515



Sea Power, p. 515


Painting depicting the sinking of German destroyer Friedrich Eckoldt by HMS Sheffield at the Battle of Barents Sea.!!


Sea Power, p. 515


Painting depicting the sinking of German destroyer Friedrich Eckoldt by HMS Sheffield at the Battle of Barents Sea.!!


Sea Power, p. 515


Painting depicting the sinking of German destroyer Friedrich Eckoldt by HMS Sheffield at the Battle of Barents Sea.!! Narvik

Altenfiord

op. cit, p.55.

A seaman pictured aboard an ice-encased HMS Belfast. “If you didn’t shift the ice, the

ship could capsize, it was in danger of overturning,” said a convoy veteran of one of the hazards of operating in the intense

cold of the Arctic

Altenfiord base for the

German raiders


German raiders

Finnmark County

the northernmost part of Norway


German raiders

Finnmark County


Alta Municipality

around the Altenfiord

(now Altafjord)

Finnmark County


Alta Municipality

around the Altenfiord

(now Altafjord)

Kåfjorden where the

raiders tried to hide

the Hipper. The most important damage however was not to the ships but to the German navy, for this action caused a major reorganization in the German naval high command. “When word of the action reached Hitler, he stormed and raged. !!

op. cit, p. 515


the Hipper. The most important damage however was not to the ships but to the German navy, for this action caused a major reorganization in the German naval high command. “When word of the action reached Hitler, he stormed and raged. !!

op. cit, p. 515


the Hipper. The most important damage however was not to the ships but to the German navy, for this action caused a major reorganization in the German naval high command. “When word of the action reached Hitler, he stormed and raged. He would have all the heavy ships scrapped, he declared, so that their steel could be used by the army and the Luftwaffe and their personnel could be sent to man the submarines, which were the only naval forces carrying on a useful fight. He ordered Admiral Raeder to report to him to receive the scrapping order in person, but Raeder managed to get the meeting postponed until January 6. As he waited for Hitler to cool off, he prepared for him a kind of child’s guide to sea power, pointing out the importance of the German heavy ships in tying down the British navy. But in the meantime, Goering had got Hitler’s ear. Goering had always been intensely jealous of Raeder and sought any method of encompassing his ruin. A braggart, a schemer, and an unscrupulous liar, Göring proposed to win the war with his Luftwaffe alone. !!

op. cit, p. 515


“He had promised to reduce Britain by air attack,


and he had failed.


and he had failed.

“He had promised to reduce Russia by air attack,


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.

“He had promised to keep German forces in Russia supplied,


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.

“He had promised to keep German forces in North Africa supplied,


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.

“He had promised to destroy Allied shipping to Britain,


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.


and he had failed.

“He had promised to himself that he would scuttle Raeder, and he succeeded.”

Ibid.

“He had promised to himself that he would scuttle Raeder, and he succeeded. “Goering promised that his Luftwaffe could do, and do better, all that the surface ships could do, and Raeder was out. He resigned on January 30, 1943 and was succeeded by Dönitz. The contrast between the two men was great. !!

Ibid.


contrast between the two men was great.


contrast between the two men was great.


op. cit, p. 515

“Dönitz was an ardent Nazi “Raeder a professional naval officer, generally aloof from politics

“Dönitz was a man of action “Raeder, something of a naval philosopher and historian.”

“Raeder, something of a naval philosopher and historian.” “When Dönitz took command of the German navy, he was convinced that Hitler’s position was sound. This conviction lasted only a few months. When he began to see the war as a whole in contrast to the limited view he had had as U-boat admiral, he realized that Raeder was right; there was more to sea power than submarines. He succeeded in persuading Hitler to reverse the order, so that no ships were scrapped. The rescued ships however were not immediately used significantly. Nearly a year passed before the next major use of a surface ship occurred, once more against the North Russian convoys. Meanwhile the British in September 1943 had immobilized the Tirpitz by a midget submarine attack.” !!

Ibid.


“Raeder, something of a naval philosopher and historian.” “When Dönitz took command of the German navy, he was convinced that Hitler’s position was sound. This conviction lasted only a few months. When he began to see the war as a whole in contrast to the limited view he had had as U-boat admiral, he realized that Raeder was right; there was more to sea power than submarines. He succeeded in persuading Hitler to reverse the order, so that no ships were scrapped. The rescued ships however were not immediately used significantly. Nearly a year passed before the next major use of a surface ship occurred, once more against the North Russian convoys. Meanwhile the British in September 1943 had immobilized the Tirpitz by a midget submarine attack.” !!

Ibid.


The Scharnhorst’s Last Cruise

“On Christmas Eve of 1943, the Scharnhorst set out from Norway to intercept a convoy bound for North Russia. But the convoy had been diverted northward, and the battleship met instead a cruiser scouting force of the British Home Fleet. In the morning of December 26, H.M.S. Belfast made radar contact with the German and opened fire, joined by the Sheffield and the Norfolk, but foul weather so reduced the speed of the British cruisers that they soon lost contact. .” !!

op. cit, pp. 515-516


First RADAR Contact

0920

First RADAR Contact

0920

Firing 0925-0940

Scharnhorst encountered Burnett's Force 1 shortly after 09:00. At a distance of nearly 13,000 yd (12,000 m), the British cruisers opened fire and Scharnhorst responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on the cruisers, the German battlecruiser was struck twice, with one shell destroying the radar controls and leaving Scharnhorst virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the battlecruiser were forced to aim at the enemy's muzzle flashes. This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant, leaving Norfolk the relatively easier target. Bey [Scharnhorst’s skipper-jbp], believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy.!!

Wikipedia


Scharnhorst turns south

again seeking to return to Altenfiord

the cruisers fire on

Scharnhorst convoy

1221

Bey [Scharnhorst’s skipper-jbp], believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy.!Once he had shaken off his pursuers, Bey turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them. Burnett, instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers' speed to 24 kn (28 mph; 44 km/h), positioned Force 1 so as to protect the convoy. It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about and which was criticized in some quarters but supported by Fraser, but to Burnett's relief, shortly after noon Scharnhorst approached the cruisers once more. As fire was again exchanged, Scharnhorst scored hits on Norfolk, disabling a turret and her radar. Following this exchange, Bey decided to return to port, while he ordered the destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by a U-Boat. The reported position was out of date and the destroyers missed the convoy.!!

Wikipedia


Scharnhorst fights against

increasing odds at 1610

the British make contact and at 1650 the battle begins

“…the German line of retirement provided a perfect intercept course for the battleship Duke of York and the cruiser Jamaica, under the command of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who had relieved Sir John Tovey as CinC of the British Home Fleet. The Belfast, Sheffield, and Norfolk made no further attempt to engage, contenting themselves with shadowing the German. By late afternoon the two British forces were in the area of expected contact.• Because in those latitudes it was already pitch dark, Burnett illuminated with starshell, whereupon the Duke of York and the Jamaica sighted the Scharnhorst and immediately engaged at 12,000 yards. A high-speed eastward chase developed until the 14-inch shells of the British battleship began to take effect, and the Scharnhorst lost speed. British destroyers then further slowed her with torpedo attacks. Ordered to sink her with torpedoes, the Belfast and the Jamaica attacked in concert with destroyers and sent the Scharnhorst down off North Cape a little before 2000.” !!

op. cit, pp. 516-517



op. cit, pp. 516-517



op. cit, pp. 516-517



op. cit, pp. 516-517


Blindfolded Scharnhorst survivors come ashore at Scapa Flow on 2 January 1944. Of her crew of 1,968 only 36 men were pulled from the frigid waters

Later in the evening of 26 December, Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on board Duke of York: "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will c o m m a n d y o u r s h i p a s gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today" !!

Wikipedia


Admiral of the Fleet Bruce Austin Fraser,! 1st Baron Fraser of North Cape GCB, KBE

1888 – 1981

“That the Scharnhorst was mishandled is evident. She was superior to the three British cruisers which first engaged her and stood a good chance of fighting it out with them to a successful conclusion. If she had done so and then continued toward the convoy, interception by the Duke of York would have been impossible, at least until after the Scharnhorst had wreaked havoc among the freighters. Her running to the south to regain the Norwegian ports meant that she was running toward the most likely route for the approach of British reinforcements. In running for safety, the Scharnhorst adopted the course that offered the least probability of inflicting damage on the British and offered the greatest risk to herself. She had been sent out with a specific task, that of inflicting the maximum damage to the convoy. Her abandonment of her task meant that she was expended uselessly, with no gain to compensate for her loss.” !!

op. cit, p. 517


“That the Scharnhorst was mishandled is evident. She was superior to the three British cruisers which first engaged her and stood a good chance of fighting it out with them to a successful conclusion. If she had done so and then continued toward the convoy, interception by the Duke of York would have been impossible, at least until after the Scharnhorst had wreaked havoc among the freighters. Her running to the south to regain the Norwegian ports meant that she was running toward the most likely route for the approach of British reinforcements. In running for safety, the Scharnhorst adopted the course that offered the least probability of inflicting damage on the British and offered the greatest risk to herself. She had been sent out with a specific task, that of inflicting the maximum damage to the convoy. Her abandonment of her task meant that she was expended uselessly, with no gain to compensate for her loss.” !!

op. cit, p. 517


“The chief remaining German surface ship was the huge battleship Tirpitz at anchor in …Altenfiord far in the north of Norway. [As mentioned earlier, she had been immobilized by a British midget submarine attack-jbp]• …the explosion, which unseated her main engines and did heavy damage to her rudders and steering engine. “Following the sinking of the Scharnhorst, and when Allied intelligence reports revealed that the Germans had nearly completed repairs to the Tirpitz, the British determined to hit her again lest she attack North Russian convoys or make a break for the open Atlantic as the Bismarck had done.• This time the Admiralty decided to employ carriers….flyers from H.M. carriers Victorious, Furious,• Pursuer, Searcher, and Emperor prepared to launch their attack….in the early morning of April 3, 1944. The Victorious and the Furious carried bombers, while the other three carriers provided the fighter escort. Attacking in two waves, the planes scored 15 hits, doing extensive damage without however impairing the ability of the Tirpitz to steam, for the bombs could not penetrate the eight inches of steel that formed her armor deck. “After the worst of the damage had been repaired, the ship was still not completely seaworthy, and as the dockyards in Germany were too battered to repair her, the Germans decided to move her to Tromsö, north of Narvik, where she might be employed as a floating battery. Tromsö was within range of the R.A.F. long-range bombers. On November 12, 1944, Lancasters capsized her by direct hits with six-ton bombs. This time there was no question of repair. The Tirpitz was gone.” !

Ibid.

The End of the Tirpitz

Tirpitz camouflaged in the Fættenfjord!


Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.


A British aerial reconnaissance photograph of Tirpitz moored at Kaafjord! The artificial smoke generators on the shores of the fjord have not yet !obscured her.!


Ibid.



Ibid.


A Fleet Air Arm crewman chalks a message! on the 1,600-pound bomb carried!

by a Fairey Barracuda of HMS Furious!


Ibid.



Ibid.


“The use of surface forces by the British and Germans during World War II shows a major strategic difference between a nation that must use the seas at all times and one that may use the seas at times of its own choosing. When the German heavy ships went to sea, they could briefly achieve local equality or even superiority, since the British naval forces had to be spread thin to have strength available in any area where the Germans might attack. Given time, as with the end of the hunt for the Bismarck, the British could assemble sufficient force to deal with any German threat on the high seas. The prime requirement of the Germans was not to allow this time, while doing maximum damage to the convoys which supplied the necessities of Britain’s very existence. “The campaign in Norway proved to the British that the Royal Navy with its shortage of aircraft carriers could not operate successfully in areas dominated by land-based aircraft. The unscrupulous German assault on Denmark and Norway showed how an inferior navy with a limited objective, a limited time in the operating area, and a secure supply line could place a force on a strategic flank and maintain it in the face of British sea power. However important Norway was to the strategic and political aims of the Western Allies, Britain was helpless to oust the Germans when the British themselves could not develop a secure line of supply and could not significantly interfere with that of the Germans.” !

op. cit., pp. 517-518.

Summary

significantly interfere with that of the Germans.” “The navy of the Third Reich played no important part in the operations against the Low Countries and France which were overcome by the army and the Luftwaffe. Yet once again, as was traditional in British military operations [cf. Moore’s fighting retreat to Corunna in 1809-jbp], a defeated British army fought its way to the sea, and once again the Royal Navy successfully evacuated it to form a core of trained men for future operations. With the fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war, Britain’s sea superiority was so threatened that she was forced to act drastically, albeit reluctantly, against the French fleet to ensure that she would not have to face two hostile navies in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. “When Hitler reached the Channel, he found the British still defying him, still prepared to fight to the end—without allies if necessary. The worst the Luftwaffe could do merely hardened their will to resist. Unable to bring the stubborn British to terms, Hitler, like Napoleon, turned his back on the Channel and struck eastward, at Egypt and Russia. But unlike Napoleon, he undertook both campaigns simultaneously. Just as his armies were bogging down in both areas, American forces entered the war against him in decisive strength.” !

op. cit., p. 518.

Summary

American forces entered the war against him in decisive strength.” “The German surface fleet proved as ineffective as the army and the Luftwaffe in forcing Britain to capitulate. After the loss of the Bismarck, the Germans made offensive use of their warships only for attacks on the convoys to North Russia. Little was accomplished, and the Scharnhorst was lost at sea, while the Tirpitz died ignominiously as she lay at anchor. Only one arm of the Wehrmacht proved really effective against Britain. That was Dönitz’ U-boats, which in the Battle of the Atlantic brought the British to the verge of defeat.” !!

Ibid.

Summary

American forces entered the war against him in decisive strength.” “The German surface fleet proved as ineffective as the army and the Luftwaffe in forcing Britain to capitulate. After the loss of the Bismarck, the Germans made offensive use of their warships only for attacks on the convoys to North Russia. Little was accomplished, and the Scharnhorst was lost at sea, while the Tirpitz died ignominiously as she lay at anchor. Only one arm of the Wehrmacht proved really effective against Britain. That was Dönitz’ U-boats, which in the Battle of the Atlantic brought the British to the verge of defeat.” !!

Ibid.

Summary

But that’s another story, which we will consider after the struggle for the Mediterranean…- jbp

Education

US Navy in WW II session iii; Atl. Surface Ops, Pt. II