The Effective States and Inclusive DevelopmentResearch Centre (ESID)

The politics of improving educational outcomes: from quantity to quality?

A political settlements analysis of Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda

DSA Conference, Bath, 7-8 September 2015

ESIDwww.effective-states.org

Based at the Global Development Institute, University of Manchester

DFID-funded until end 2016

What kinds of politics can help to secure inclusive development and how can these be promoted? The role of state capacity and elite commitment What role do power relations and ideas play?

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PS Type Competitive clientelist Dominant party

Country/Domain

Bangladesh Ghana Bolivia Peru Zambia

Rwanda Uganda Cambodia

Accumulation

Growth GrowthNatural resources

Natural resources

Growth GrowthNatural resources

Growth

Redistribution

EducationHealth Social protection

EducationHealthSocial protection

EducationHealthSocial protection

EducationHealthSocial protection

EducationHealth

Recognit-ion

Gender GenderSpatial inq’ty

Gender GenderSpatial ineq’ty

Global PEAPublic Sectr Reform

PEAPublic Sectr Reform

Public Sectr Reform

PEAPublic Sectr Reform

The political economy of education Education: a social justice problem

Growing concerns over the quality of provision

More children in school than ever, but… ‘Schooling ain’t learning’ 50%+ of children complete primary schooling unable to

read even the simplest texts or perform simple arithmetic “…there is almost no information on the educational

attainment of any given cohort. Globally, how many 10 year olds can read fluently? No one knows” (Pritchett ‘13)

What shapes quality in education?• Reforms

– Investment of financial and human resources – Assessment systems; curriculum or methodology-based reforms– Accountability and incentive mechanisms – Poverty-focused and social protection measures – Early years education

What role does politics play? Politics matters, but we don’t know how (Kingdon et al ‘14) Ruling coalitions matter more than democracy (Kosack ‘12) Policy coalitions (Grindle ‘04)

• In-depth qualitative research; 5-country comparative case-study approach

Political settlement: ‘the balance of power between contending social groups on which any state is based’

From Khan (2010) HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: EXCLUDED ELITES

WEAK STRONG

VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: LOWER LEVEL FACTIONS

WEAK

STRONG

POTENTIALLY DEVELOPMENTAL DOMINANT COALITIONRWANDALonger-term horizons Implementation capabilities high

VULNERABLE AUTHORITARIAN COALITION

WEAK DOMINANT PARTYUGANDA, CAMBODIAImplementation capabilities weakened by multiple demands and ‘blockers’

COMPETITIVE CLIENTELISTBANGLADESH, GHANAShorter-term horizons: threat of powerful excluded elitesImplementation capabilities weakened

From political settlements to sector performance (Levy & Walton 2013)

Figure 2. The determinants of public organization performance

UNDERLYING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORGANIZATION

HOW PERFORMANCE IS MANAGED

PERFORMANCE

SECTOR-LEVEL INTEREST GROUPS, COALITIONS AND IDEAS SECTOR-LEVEL

Comparative findings• The political settlement matters

– Balance of power incentivises access over performance (inc. donors)– Links to problems of privatisation and problems of exit – Elite ideas of education as modernity/nation-building– Leads to a politicisation of educational policy and governance

• Does the type of political settlement matter? Competitive settings: greater ‘policy incoherence’ & rent-seeking Dominance: coherence; can limit scope for reform

• What works?• Central and decentralised mechanisms rarely well-aligned/balanced • Some positive examples of local ‘elite capture’ & political connectivity• Local coalitions: SMCs, Heads, political players: not PTAs/NGOs

Policy implications?

• Build stronger coalitions of support for improved performance at national and local levels

• From centralised to locally-driven solutions (Pritchett ‘13)• The centralised approaches that helped to improve access are

often inappropriate for improving performance• Move towards ‘thin’ forms of centralised accountability

(performance pressures) and ‘thick’ forms of localised accountability (politically salient stakeholders)

• Go with the local (rather than the national) grain?