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The Political Settlement & Basic Education Quality
in BangladeshNaomi Hossain, IDS Sussex
Mirza Hassan, BRAC UniversityKhondoker Shakhawat Hossain
Md. Sajidul IslamMd. Ashiqur Rahman, BRAC University
Intro and Overview
• The puzzle: access without learning• Approach– tracing reform agenda from elite politics to frontline
• Elitist competitive clientelism supports– weak consensus on the need for quality– frontline discretion (weakly programmatic at point of
delivery)– protection of teachers from accountability pressures
The political settlement in Bangladesh
• Mainly competitive clientelistic since 1991
• Elite consensus on basic ed– Priming population for development – Space for NGOs & aid
• Vehicle for nationalism– Highly competitive – with
expansionary effects
Ed quality & the political settlement
• Political goals met by low quality mass schooling– No industrial elite pressure for higher average skills
• Quality is no priority: weak winners/strong losers– Donors have owned quality agenda– policymaking is weakly centralized, civil society not v influential– teacher associations enjoy ‘invisible power’ over quality agenda
• Learning outcomes & time-on-task low– Secondary schooling to get to primary level– Pupils get 20-50% of international average hours learning
Promoting higher quality learning
• Reform programmes nominally about quality (currently PEDP3 2011-15)– In practice quality = size, resourcing, access– Teacher performance measures all carrot, no stick– Some accountability reforms been shelved– But measures of student learning may make a
difference (not at school level)
Lessons from the frontline
• Rural & urban GPSs in Narayanganj • Determinants of teacher effectiveness – Professional rewards– Financial incentives & time pressures– Accountability pressures
Reflections on PSA and education provision
• PSA helps to explain access without learning– Pol settlement supports wider not better basic ed– Teacher immune from accountability
• Informal accountability can be strong (hypotheses needed)
• Class & gender biases hardwired into failing reforms