04/10/23 1

the price and promise of

citizenship: felon disenfranchisement

and american democracy

christopher uggenuniversity of minnesota

04/10/23 2

an nsf/soros project with jeff manza

• Research and methods– Scope/impact– Origins– Meaning– Crime– Public opinion

• The policy choice– Toward a national standard?– Minnesota bill to restore vote to non-

incarcerated felons

I. rising numbers since the 1970s

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disenfranchisement in Minnesota

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diverse u.s. laws

• No restrictions (2): – Maine, Vermont

• Inmates only (14 + DC): – Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts*,

Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah

• Inmates, Parolees (4): – California, Colorado, Connecticut*, New York

• Inmates, Parolees, Probationers (17): – Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas*, Maryland*,

Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico*, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin

• Inmates, Parolees, Probationers, Some or all Ex-felons (13):– Alabama, Arizona*, Delaware*, Florida*, Iowa*, Kentucky,

Mississippi, Nebraska*, Nevada*, Tennessee*, Virginia, Washington*, Wyoming

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5.3 million people (2004 estimates)

about 1 in 4 disenfranchised Minnesotans are incarcerated (2007)

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II. US origins (American Journal of Sociology 2003, with Behrens and Manza)

• Old idea, but U.S. is Exceptional– Most restrictive felon voting laws – Greatest rate and number of citizens affected

• Why Race?– African American vote dilution – Civil War and Reconstruction timing– Legal evidence (Hunter v. Underwood 1985)– History of (non-felon) disenfranchisement

04/10/23 9

hazard plots for the passage of restrictive and liberal felon disenfranchisement laws, 1850-2002

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.061

85

0-5

9

18

60

-69

18

70

-79

18

80

-89

18

90

-99

19

00

-09

19

10

-19

19

20

-29

19

30

-39

19

40

-49

19

50

-59

19

60

-69

19

70

-79

19

80

-89

19

90

-99

20

00

Decade

Haz

ard

Rat

e

More Restrictive Law More Liberal Law

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overall vote dilution

8.3%

1.7%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

2004

Perc

ent o

f Voti

ng A

ge P

opul

ation

African American Non-African American

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as percentage of VAP

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as percentage of African American VAP

disenfranchisement rate as percentage of MN voting age population by race

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III. meaning - political life of felonschapter in Imprisoning America, with Manza 2004

• General survey: Youth Development Study • Those who experience criminal sanctions

– …have lower turnout, due mostly to differences in education

– …are less trusting of the government and express lower levels of political efficacy

– …may be political independents

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political trust and efficacy

Never Arrested

Never Arrested

Never Arrested

Never Arrested

Never Arrested

Arrested

Arrested

Arrested

Arrested

Arrested

Incarcerated

Incarcerated

Incarcerated

Incarcerated

Incarcerated

2 2.5 3 3.5

Government cannot be trusted*

People running government are

crooked*

No confidence in criminal justice

system*

People like me have no say*

Get nowhere talking to public

officials*

Incarcerated Arrested Never Arrested

04/10/23 16

Dylan - illogic

• What is the fear that someone who has committed a felony would actually have a voice?… we’re going to have some organized crime guy running for office, and we’re all going to get behind him?...They have the expectation that you’re going to reintegrate back into society, become a functioning, contributing member of society. But yet you’re not allowed to have a say-so… which again makes no sense. The whole principle of our legal system is you pay your debt. Debt’s done, you move on.

04/10/23 17

Paul – taxation & voice

• I have no right to vote on how my taxes is going to be spent or used, which I have to pay whether I’m a felon or not. …I’m not saying give back gun rights or anything like that … But giving back voting rights is another way to make a person feel part of that community… when they [say], ‘What are you going to give back to the community for this and for that?’ I’m like well, hey, community doesn’t want a damn thing to do with me.

04/10/23 18

Peter – a racial thing

• I think that they just want less blacks to vote, you know what I’m saying? ‘Cause 90% of people’s that’s in jail, they’s black anyway, or on probation or whatever…. Less black people to vote, you know? … When less of us vote, that’s more for the other races to vote… We the most people that’s overcrowding the jails so that’s why I think it’s a racial thing towards us… I mean, it’s a white world…

04/10/23 19

IV. might voting affect crime?

• Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack, 2005– “research shows that ex-offenders who

vote are less likely to re-offend.” • National Review’s Peter Kirsanow

– “the problem with Vilsack’s claim is that there is absolutely no research to support it. Not one longitudinal study exists showing the effects of the restoration of voting rights on crime rates or recidivism.”

04/10/23 20

evidence

• participation and stakeholding– Practicing citizenship might help

reinforce identity as a law-abiding citizen– Skepticism

• qualitative interviews, plus 3 correlational studies(a) Minnesota general population (b) Minnesota ex-felons(c) Oregon probation & parole

04/10/23 21

a. general population (YDS)(with Manza; Columbia Human Rights Law Review 2004b)

15.6%

12.4%

5.2% 4.7%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

Arrested 1997-2000 Incarcerated 1997-2000

Did Not Vote 1996 (n=250) Voted in 1996 (n=464)

04/10/23 22

b. minnesota ex-prisoners

• Match MN voting and crime records – What percentage voted? [minimum of

17-20%]– Recidivism: voters and non-voters [7%

difference]– Recidivism with time-varying voting

• Much lower recidivism for voters in the previous biennial election than for non-voters, net of age, marriage, race, gender, offense, sentence length, property ownership…

04/10/23 23

c. Oregon: voting probationers and parolees have significantly lower recidivism rates

04/10/23 24

V. does the public support felon voting bans?(Public Opinion Quarterly 2004, with Manza and Clem Brooks)

• Harris Poll – Monthly omnibus telephone survey, July

18-22, 2002– National sample of 1000 adults

• Survey experiments – Randomly split into fourths– Varied wording and offense– Tested for “non-attitudes”

04/10/23 25

The public supports voting for ex-felons, probationers, and parolees, but not

prisoners

04/10/23 26

framing effects

80%

63%66%

52%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Generic (N = 232) White-Collar (N = 239) Violent Crime (N = 247) Sex Crime (N = 234)

Category of Ex-Felons

04/10/23 27

provisional answers to 5 questions

I. Impact?• Yes, but only in very close elections in states with

very strict laws• Parties can ignore preferences of 5 million poor

II. Origins?• Ancient practice, tied to racial conflict in U.S.

III. Do felons care about voting?• Yes, and they believe restrictions are too broad

IV. Is voting linked to crime?• Yes, it is correlated; it may reinforce an identity

as a law abiding citizenV. Does the public support strict felon voting laws?

• No. Most only want inmates banned

04/10/23 28

voting and change

• Iowa – online/cutest ever

• Florida– expert testimony/manson

• Minnesota– legislative testimony/treason

• Washington– clever application/control

• Tennessee, Oregon– real experts/dialogue

extending the vote to non-incarcerated felons (Uggen & Inderbitzin 2009)

1. extend democracy2. reduce racial disparities in access to the

ballot box3. enhance public safety 4. respond to public sentiment 5. accord with international standards and

practices6. Serve reintegrative goals of community

corrections – through participating as stakeholders in their communities

04/10/23 29

04/10/23 30

citizens, felons, and social choices

supplemental materials

04/10/23 31

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Table 1a. Nations without a General Prisoner Disenfranchisement Provision (N=40). Albania Denmark Italy Netherlands Sao Tome Austria Finland J apan New Zealand Serbia Bangladesh Germany Laos Norway Slovenia Bosnia Greece Lesotho Pakistan South Africa Canada Iceland Lithuania Portugal Spain China Iran Luxembourg Poland Sweden Croatia Ireland Macedonia Puerto Rico Switzerland Czech Rep. Israel Montenegro Romania Turkey Table 1b. Nations with a General Prisoner Disenfranchisement Provision (N=65). Angola Bulgaria Guatemala Malta Sierra Leone Argentina Cameroon Haiti Micronesia Slovakia Armenia Cape Verde Honduras Moldova St. Lucia Australia Chile Hungary Mongolia St. Vincent Azerbaijan Comoros India Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago Bahamas Cyprus J amaica Nigeria Uganda Barbados Egypt Kazakhstan Panama Ukraine Belarus Equator Kenya Papua New Guinea United States Belgium Ecuador Kosovo Peru United Kingdom Belize Equatorial Guinea Kyrgyzstan Philippines Uruguay Benin Estonia Latvia Russia Venezuela Botswana France Madagascar Samoa Vietnam Brazil Georgia Malaysia Senegal Zimbabwe

04/10/23 33

poll wording

• There has been some discussion recently about the right to vote in this country. Some feel that people convicted of a crime who are in prison should have the right to vote. What about you? Do you think people in prison should have the right to vote?– … who have been released from prison on parole

and are living in the community…– who are sentenced to probation (but not prison) and

are living in the community …(Or haven’t you thought much about this?)

• Now how about people convicted of a crime who have served their entire sentence, and are now living in the community. Do you think they should have the right to vote?– “ … convicted of the illegal trading of stocks … ”– “ … convicted of a violent crime … ”– “ … convicted of a sex offense … ”

04/10/23 34

0.6

0.65

0.7

0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Perc

ent S

urvi

ving

with

out N

ew A

dmiss

ion

Survival until New DOC Admission by [Fixed] Voting Status (MN DOC)

non-voters voters

04/10/23 35

Table 2.Cox Estimates of Recidivism with Time-Varying Voting (N=1,307)

1 2 3 risk ratio (model 3) Civic Participation Time-Varying Voting -2.193***

(.357) -2.083*** (.357)

-1.468*** (.360)

.230 -77.0%

Demographic Characteristics African American (v. white) .618***

(.100) .433***

(.103) 1.542 54.2%

American Indian (v. white) .257 (.183)

-.049 (.184)

.952 -4.8%

“Hispanic” (v. white) -.280 (.359)

.083 (.360)

1.087 8.7%

Female (v. male) -.297# (.166)

.203 (.169)

1.226 22.6%

Offense Characteristics Property Offense (v. violent) .727***

(.108) .143

(.115) 1.154 15.4%

Drug Offense (v. violent) .396* (.161)

.374* (.167)

1.453 45.3%

Other Offense (v. violent) .300 (.282)

-.001 (.284)

.999 -.01%

Time Served (years) .104*** (.021)

1.109 10.9%

Post-release Characteristics Time-Varying Age -.181***

(.008) .834 -16.6%

Time-Varying Marriage -.251# (.153)

.778 -22.2%

Property Ownership .272 (.212)

1.312 31.2%

-2LL 6458.8 6374.6 5632.5 Chi-Square (df) 55.1***(1) 144.2****(8) 681.7***(12) # p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Standard errors are in parentheses

04/10/23 36

Discrete-Time Logistic Regression Estimates of Recidivism With Time-Varying Voting (person-years)

Parole (n=63,844)

Probation (n=167,975)

B (S.E.) Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) Civic Participation

Time-Varying Voting -.258* (.116)

.773 -.327*** (.101)

.721

Demographic Characteristics

African American (v. white) -.096# (.054)

.908 -.321*** (.090)

.725

American Indian (v. white) -.188 (.131)

.828 .324*

(.133) 1.383

“Hispanic” (v. white) -.720*** (.088)

.487 -.041 (.084)

.960

Male (v. female) .186***

(.056) 1.205

.119* (.053)

1.127

Time-Varying Age -.079*** (.005)

.924 -.052*** (.005)

.949

Offense Characteristics

Personal Offense (v. property) -.111* (.047)

.895 -.117* (.060)

.889

Other Offense (v. property) -.090* (.044)

.914 .070

(.052) 1.072

Offense Missing (v. property) .601**

(.223) 1.824

.442 (.304)

1.555

Number of admissions .238***

(.006) 1.269

.407*** (.009)

1.502

Age of admission .053***

(.006) 1.054

.033*** (.006)

1.034

-2LL 25102.9 24020.5 Chi-Square (df) 3399.24*** (17) 2781.03*** (17)

# p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Standard errors are in parentheses