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flickr.com/Steve Rhodes Law and Economics of Aftermarkets Dr. Bruce Abramson, Esq.

Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

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Aftermarket businesses rest their success on top of someone else’s platform. Until fairly recently, most such businesses clustered in the customization or repair sectors, but software platforms and embedded chips have spread aftermarkets throughout the economy. Today, iPhone apps, Facebook games, universal remote controllers, replacement toner cartridges, and their like all define aftermarkets. From an economic perspective, aftermarket businesses are at the mercy of their platform providers. While some platform providers may prove sympathetic to the needs of their aftermarkets, others may be indifferent, or even antagonistic. What’s worse, platform providers may shift from one posture to another with little advanced notice. The laws governing relationships among platform providers, aftermarket players, and their shared customers are complex, drawing (at a bare minimum) from patent, copyright, antitrust, and contract law. This one-hour course will introduce participants to the basic concepts of aftermarkets, and survey both the state of the law and some open legal questions surrounding survival as an aftermarket player in the modern economy.

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Page 1: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/Steve Rhodes

Law and Economicsof Aftermarkets

Dr. Bruce Abramson, Esq.

Page 2: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Introduction:A Cautionary Tale

Page 3: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

developed a powerful platform

for social interaction.

flickr.com/Laughing Squid

Page 4: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Zynga developed popular social games running on the Facebook platform.

flickr.com/marcusnelson

Page 5: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Zynga now sells FB

credits and pays the

commission.

flickr.com/Will Norris

Page 6: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

POTENTIALLY

Page 7: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

You might be

It’s good to own a platform.

You might find comparable

opportunities.

Facebook

Page 8: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

You might be

A free ride doesn’t guarantee a free

lunch.

You might protect yourself

preemptively.

Zynga

Page 9: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

It could have

What if Zynga had been publicly

held?

Do analysts in the tech space

consider the possibility of hold

up?

worse

POTENTIALLY

been

Page 10: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Introduction:Can they do that?

Page 11: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Of coursethey can!

flickr.com/dalelane

They havemany tools:

Page 12: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/JulianBleecker

flickr.com/Horla Varian

flickr.com/NobMouse

Patents

Copyrights

Contracts

Page 13: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/myrrh.ahn

Of coursenot!

It violates:

Page 14: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/Jan Charles Linus Ekenstamflickr.com/steakpinball flickr.com/NobMouse

Contracts

Antitrust

Unfair Competition

Page 15: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Welcome to life in

(Or the aftermarketlife, for the dramatic)

the aftermarket!

flickr.com/sally_monster

Page 16: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/greebile

What are Aftermarkets?

Page 17: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Examples of AftermarketsClassic Contemporary Hybrid

flickr.com/scottfeldstein flickr.com/Rob Boudon flickr.com/Ev0luti0nary

Razor blades

Independent Jaguar MechanicsIndividual Coffee Servings

Xerox Machine Repair

iPhone App Developers

Facebook Game Developers

Replacement Toner Cartridge Manufacturer

Garage Door

Page 18: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/Norma Desmond

Key Issues:Strategic Considerations

Page 19: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Critical Strategic Question:

Do you want your relationship to be implicit or explicit?

And if the latter,when is the best time

to negotiate?

flickr.com/Eleaf

Page 20: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Key Issues:Legal Considerations

Page 21: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

The IP sideplatform owners

tends to favor

Page 22: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

The antitrust sideaftermarket player

tends to protect

Page 23: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Contracts and licensescan play critical roles in

implementing all such strategies -and in running afoul of their

limits.

Page 24: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/mattgrimm

Antitrust: CASE

Page 25: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/jcaputo4

The Takeaway:

As a strict matter of antitrust law,

standing in the way of vertical integration.

platform providers may impose somebut not all requirements that eliminateor reduce the scope of their competitors—including those “newly” competitive firms

Page 26: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/jackchengflickr.com/mag3737

AT vs. IP:KODAK and XEROX

Page 27: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

The Takeaway:

Leveraging your IP rights and/or

longstanding circuit split.

other assets to reduce competition inyour own single-provider aftermarket maybe acceptable. Or it may violate the antitrust laws. Or maybe we have a

Page 28: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/carywaynepeterson flickr.com/joe.ross

COPYRIGHT:CHAMBERLAIN AND MDY

Page 29: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

The Takeaway:

As a matter of copyright law, it is

and whether it extends to hardware devices

acceptable for at least some platformproviders to exclude aftermarket competition

using simple encryption algorithms.It is unclear how widespread this authority is

using embedded software.

flickr.com/jcaputo4

Page 30: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/TaranRampersad

flickr.com/Pewari

No Bots Allowedflickr.com/

balaam

No Pornography

Limitations on revenue Commissions

Contracts:Term of Use

Page 31: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

The Takeaway:

Contracts and licenses are mechanismsfor implementing business strategies.

They can cut many ways –and representing the best forum for

negotiating those strategies.

Page 32: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Strategy:Navigating Aftermarkets

Page 33: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/PatrickYHC

flickr.com/lessmore2 flickr.com/Eyebee

Anticipate!

Negotiate earlyvs. negotiate

late

Study markets &

statements

Look for cues Existing

competitors

SDKsDeveloper

Relationships

Page 34: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/The Rocketeerflickr.com/andercismo flickr.com/digitizedchaos

flickr.com/LuleRRE flickr.com/Eyebee

Trade Secrets

Protecting your own IP

Understanding contracts

& license

Give away razors& sell blades

Page 35: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

flickr.com/slayerphoto flickr.com/MyTudut

flickr.com/susanvg flickr.com/Scrunchieface

Strategic negotiations

Partnering

Preferred Relationships

Recognizing the asymmetry in the relationship.

Page 36: Law & Economics of Aftermarkets by Dr. Bruce Abramson

Thank Youfor Your Time.

[email protected]