Is a mexican drug cartel al-qaeda relationship possible to attack mexican or us interests

2

Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security

Is a Mexican Drug Cartel-Al-Qaeda

relationship possible to attack Mexican or US

interests?

Francisco Javier Franco Quintero Mármol

MA. Intelligence and International Security

2007-2008

Student number.0747426

DISSERTATION

3


4


Contents

INTRODUCTION

5

I. TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE & AL-QAEDA PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

8 II. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

20

III. AL-QAEDA

24

IV. MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS

41

CONCLUSIONS

55

BIBLIOGRAPHY

57

5


INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 2007 The Washington Times reported that, according to a Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) report, „[i]t is very likely that any future

September 11th type of terrorist event in the United States may be facilitated,

wittingly or unwittingly, by drug traffickers operating on both sides of the United

States-Mexico border‟.1 The article was supported by the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence report where it was stated that during the

last two years, Al-Qaeda had been aided by established Mexican drug cartels to

smuggle weapons of mass destruction and transport terrorist into the United

States (US) through sophisticated trafficking routes. The great concern for US

intelligence authorities, the article pointed out, is that terrorist cells have been

camouflaging their nationalities with Latin American nationalities to enter into the

US utilizing the illegal migration flow. The report concludes stating that the US

southern border is at terrorist risk, that it is vulnerable from the entry of terrorists,

weapons of mass destruction or portable conventional weapons into the United

States.

This warning is not new, after 9/11 certain US commentators have consistently

argued that the border is a serious security threat for the ease with which it can

be transgressed.2 However, even though no hard evidence has been presented

by the authorities, the US media has consistently voiced out alarm in this regard.

As a result of this concern and as an intelligence issue, the possibility of

terrorists, particularly Al-Qaeda, teaming with Mexican Drug Cartels (MDC) to

produce an attack in Mexico or in the US has motivated this dissertation.

1 „Terrorist teaming with drug cartels‟, The Washington Times, August 8, 2007

2 Leiken and Brooke (2007). In his article the authors stated that CNN is probably the most vocal of these; CNN collection

of „Broken Borders‟ reports can be accessed at www.nbpc.net/multimedia/borders/. According to them, The Washington Times is another: „„Insults from South of the Border,‟‟ The Washington Times, March 23, 2005; „„Terrorists Said to Seek Entry to U.S. via Mexico”, the Washington Times, April 7, 2003; „„Al Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs,‟‟ The Washington Times, September 28, 2004. They added that Fox News and NBC as well are repeatedly talking about the issue. Also, the authors include other reports as „„Bordering On Nukes? New Accounts from Al-Qaeda to Attack the U.S. with Weapons of Mass Destruction,‟‟ Time Magazine, November 22, 2004 by Adam Zogorin, and „„Search Underway for Six Who May Pose Terrorist Threat to Boston,‟‟ The Boston Globe, January 19, 2005 by Donovan Slack; along with the report presented by the UK paper The Telegraph: „„Arab terrorists „are getting into the US over Mexican border‟ ‟‟ on August 15, 2004.

http://www.nbpc.net/multimedia/borders/

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Historically the border has always been a motive of concerns for both countries.

After Mexico‟s independence in 1810, the Government was worried about the

continuous US illegal migration which had been placed in Texas, especially about

those bandits that running out of US territory found safe haven in Mexico.3 In

1846, without a casus-belli US soldiers crossed the border to initialize a war with

Mexico that after two years finished with Mexico‟s defeat and the loss of the

territories now known as Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and California.4 Later on

in the XX century, concerns in the frontier were focused in the increasing illegal

migration from Mexico to the US and the smuggling of drugs and goods: „[f]rom

Mexico came marijuana, heroin and, later, cocaine, whereas from the United

States came refrigerators, televisions, cars and weapons‟5.

It is a fact that the events of September 11, 2001 forced the re-examination of

Mexico-US border relations. In the post-9/11 calculus, terrorism raised new

national security concerns for both countries with the possibility of infiltration from

terrorists and weapons of mass destruction through the common frontier.

Therefore, Is a Mexican Drug Cartel-Al-Qaeda relationship possible to attack

Mexican or US interests? To answer this question the present dissertation will be

divided in four chapters. Chapter one has been divided into two sections: the first

one includes a review of terrorist attacks on Mexico and how this affected US‟

interests as well; in the second section the presence of Al-Qaeda in Latin

America will be analyzed. Chapter two deals with the importance of the analysis

of adversary intentions and capabilities to understand the level of the threat

posed. Chapter three analyzes Al-Qaeda‟s intentions and capabilities to attack

Mexico or the US and questions its intentions and capabilities to collaborate with

MDC. Chapter four discusses MDC‟ intentions and capabilities to attack Mexican

or US interests as well as its intentions and capabilities to collaborate with Al-

Qaeda. A conclusion arguing that in the short-term a collaboration between MDC

3 Vázquez and Meyer (2001).

4 Ibid

5 Pimentel (2000), p. 36

7


and Al-Qaeda to attack Mexican or US interests is not possible because

differences in both group‟s intentions will end the discussion, but warns that

intelligence communities in both countries must be alert for this possibility

because in the intelligence world adversary‟ intentions are changing all the time

and that which today seems irrational in the future might occur.

Finally, for the purposes of this dissertation, US and Mexican interests are not

defined by its strategic importance. Country‟s interests can be all those things

that formed modern national-states as its people, territory and government, even

though some interests are outside of traditional land boundaries, such as

embassies, citizens or even business enterprises. Mexico and especially the US

have worldwide interests. Thus, when this dissertation refers to either Mexican or

US interests it is talking about every single element that concerns Mexico or the

US.

8


I. TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE & AL-QAEDA PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

To start explaining terrorist activities in Mexico, it is useful to consider what Mark

Sedgwick stated: „the most important cause of global waves of terror is the

inspiring example for radicals everywhere of what are, or appear to be,

successful uses of terrorist strategies‟.6 In this observation, it is considered that

global influences had, and still continue to have, a big impact on terrorism

activities in the country, therefore three different waves of terrorism can be

historically distinguished in Mexico; the first one took place in the context of the

Cold War during the 70s and 80s, where leftist guerrilla groups carried out

several kidnappings and bombings on strategic targets; only during these

decades, the US and even other countries‟ interests were affected; the second

wave occurred during the 90s, where Narcoterrorist activities first appeared.

These actions were mostly inspired by the Colombian cartels of Cali and

Medellin; the third wave started after the 9/11 attacks, when apparently some

groups have been inspired by terrorist techniques of groups such as Al-Qaeda.

a) Terrorism activities in the 70s and 80s

In the context of the Cold War, several terrorist manifestations with a nationalist

and anti-American tinge appeared worldwide and Mexico was not the exception.

Terrorist activities on Mexico started in the 70s when two strongly politically

motivated organizations, the Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo

(People's Revolutionary Armed Forces) (FRAP) and La liga Comunista 23 de

Septiembre (The Twenty-third of September Communist League) carried out

6 Sedgwick (2007), p.97

9


kidnappings and terrorist attacks against strategic targets.7 As a result, this

period of time is considered the most intense as far as terrorist activities that

Mexico has ever dealt with.

FRAP‟s strategy consisted on kidnapping strategic targets in order to obtain

publicity and money. Those targets were either Mexican or US as happened with

the kidnapping of the US general consul, Terence G. Leonhardy, on May 4, 1973

in Guadalajara, Jalisco. The group demanded the release of thirty prisoners, a

publication of an antigovernment communiqué and the suspension of the search

for Leonhardy‟s kidnappers. The Mexican Government quickly agreed to the

demands and the diplomat was released on May 6.8 The next action was the

kidnapping of the former Governor of Jalisco, and the father-in-law of Mexican

President Luis Echeverria, José Guadalupe Zuno Hernandez, on August 28,

1974. The FRAP threatened to kill him unless the government paid a $1.6 million

ransom, released ten political prisoners and allowed them safe passage into

Cuba, and authorized a publication of a FRAP manifesto in leading newspapers.

The government refused to negotiate, and following a successfully operation the

police arrested the kidnappers and released Zuno.9

La Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre was more active in its actions and became

the first organization that utilized home-made bombs to affect US and Mexican

interests. The first attack occurred on July 17, 1972 when a panel truck

containing plastic cans filled with gasoline and attached to dynamite caps,

exploded in front of the US Consulate General in Monterrey, the capital of the

northern state of Nuevo Leon. The explosion destroyed the truck but caused no

damage to the Consulate and no injuries to any of its members.10 The second

7 In those decades the Government recognized 5 more guerrilla organizations: Armed Vanguard

of the Proletariat, Mexican People's Revolutionary Army, People's Armed Command, People's Liberation Army, United Popular Liberation Army of America; however these organizations had no criminal or terrorist activities. 8 Mickolus (1980), p.389

9 Ibid, p. 473

10 Ibid, p. 333

10


terrorist attack took place on September 16 1972, on Mexico's Independence

Day celebration, when twelve bombs exploded simultaneously in four cities

injuring one person and causing considerable property damage; seven of the

blasts damaged the offices of US owned businesses.11 The third attack occurred

on February 24, 1974, on another patriotic day in Mexico, when seven bombs

went off simultaneously during the night at the offices of US and other foreign

and national companies. In Guadalajara, for example, Pepsi-Cola and Union

Carbide plants were damaged, while Coca-Cola offices, a bakery, and federal

offices were targeted in the southern state of Oaxaca.12

However, US interests were not the only ones being attacked during the 70s or

80s by the Twenty-third of September Communist League. The organization

claimed credit for the kidnapping of the UK honorary consul, Anthony Duncan

Williams, in Guadalajara on October 10, 1973. Simultaneously, the organization

was also allegedly responsible of the homemade bombs that exploded one

month later causing considerable damage to the Bank of London branch in

Guadalajara.13 The following year, on December 5, this organization held

hostage two French diplomats at gunpoint in their embassy in Mexico City for five

hours.14 In addition on May 25, 1976, Nadine Chaval, the daughter of the Belgian

ambassador, was kidnapped after leaving her home in Mexico City when she

was going to the School, though the ambassador Andree Chaval, was the

intended victim, and after the ransom payment, she was released.15

Nonetheless, la Liga 23 de Septiembre, also affected Mexican interests as well.

On November 30, 1976, they were allegedly responsible for four bombs that

exploded in Mexico City on the eve of the inauguration of President-elect Jose

Lopez Portillo;16 and the bomb that exploded at a military checkpoint near the

11

Mickolus (1980), p. 345 12

Ibid, p. 439 13

Ibid, p. 419 14

Ibid, p. 493 15

Ibid. p. 610 16

Ibid, p. 662

11


meeting site for Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Panama's President

Torrijos on May 6, 1977.17

Another important factor that needs to be highlighted is that Mexico was utilized

during the 70s and 80s by international terrorist groups to achieve its specific

demands. These were the notorious cases of the attacks against the Cuban

regime by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The objectives of these groups was twofold;

first, to conduct attacks on Cuban interests anywhere and everywhere where

they could be perpetrated, and second, to generate terror within Mexico in order

to affect the closest relationship that the Mexican Government had with La

Havana during the Cold War.18

In this regard the Cuban embassy in Lima, Peru, was targeted twice by bomb

packages mailed from Mexico that killed two and damaged the building. These

events occurred on February 4, 1974; and the next day, the Movimiento Armado

Nacionalista Organizado (MANO), a Peruvian terrorist group, claimed the

attacks.19 In the same fashion, the Cuban embassy in Mexico City was hit twice

on December 3, 197320 and January 20, 1974.21 Both attacks were claimed by

the Cuban National Liberation Front. In addition, there was a failed attempt to

assassinate the Cuban ambassador Fernando Lopes Muino, on November 28,

1975.22 The next day a group of Anti-Castro Cuban exiles were believed to be

responsible for planting a bomb that caused property damage on the entrance of

the Soviet embassy in Mexico City.23

The last case with regard to international groups utilizing Mexican soil to achieve

their demands occurred on April 27, 1986, when the police found and deactivated

17

Mickolus (1980), p, 697 18

Vázquez and Meyer (2001). 19

Mickolus (1980), p. 435 20

Ibid, p. 420 21

Ibid, p. 430 22

Ibid, p. 565 23

Ibid

12


a 15-kilogram gelignite bomb in the trunk of a stolen car, parked within 50 meters

of the US embassy in Mexico City. The next day, the unknown Simon Bolivar

Anti-Imperialist Commando claimed responsibility for the attacks and sent a

statement to the newspapers stating that the bomb was meant as a protest for

the US raid on Libya.24

b) Narcoterrorism in the 90s

As a result of international law enforcement pressure against drug traffickers in

Colombia, which started on the 80s but was intensified in the 90s, the cartels of

Cali and Medellin followed two courses of action: one, they expanded even more

their networks in order to camouflage the illegal activities and continued with their

business. Secondly, they defended themselves by carrying out an uncontrolled

war against rival cartels and also against law enforcement officials who impeded

the trade. The Cartel of Medellin was the most dangerous in this regard; Pablo

Escobar for example began a terrorist campaign under the principle of Plata o

Plomo, (Silver or Lead): a choice between accepting a job on a criminal payroll or

accepting a bullet in the head.25

While the violence in Colombia was intensifying, links between drug cartels in

Mexico and Colombia were stretched.26 In this regard, MDC probably considered

that the terrorist techniques used by the Cartel of Medellin to intimidate and kill its

opponents, as using car bombs for example, had the potential to succeed upon

the Mexican national security scenario. As a consequence, with or without direct

Colombian training, these techniques were imitated by criminal organizations in

Mexico.

In concrete, only two cases of Narcoterrorist actions were registered during the

90s‟. Both attacks occurred in North and Central Mexico, in the states of Sinaloa

24

Mickolus (1980), p. 387 25

Ibid 26

Ibid

13


and Jalisco respectively, this attacks were carried out to eliminate law

enforcement officers or as a revenge among drug lords.

The first event took place in Sinaloa on the morning of May 29, 1992 when two

car-bombs were set off simultaneously. In the first explosion the target was

Gustavo Rico Urrea, a local drug lord.27 In the second explosion the target was

Armando Barraza, a former local law enforcement official in Culiacán the capital

of the state.28The second event occurred in Jalisco, on June 11, 1994 when a

car-bomb exploded outside the Camino Real hotel in Guadalajara; the target was

Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the leader of Sinaloa Drug Cartel, who survived the

attack.29

c) Terrorism activities in the XXI century

Terrorism activities started in early 2000 and intensified in the following years

after 9/11 attacks and in the aftermath. These attacks have been carried out by

drug cartels, but most intensely and more frequently by insurgent groups; both

have completely different targets since while drug cartels still focus on

sanctioning their opponents and law enforcement officers, insurgents groups

have affected political institutions and national and international economic

interests.

Terrorist activities in the XXI century carried out by Insurgent groups

Seven attacks were attributed to leftist guerrilla organizations since 2000, and

even there is no evidence of collaboration between Insurgent groups an Al-

Qaeda in those attacks, is a fact that these guerrilla organizations have a radical

ideology and apparently are imitating Bin Laden‟s terrorist techniques to achieve

their goals. 27

„Surgió en los 90 el terrorismo del narco‟, El Universal, February 20, 2008 28

Ibid. 29

Ibid.

14


The first terrorist attack occurred on March 15, 2000 when a military air force

base and a dam were hit in the Estado de Mexico, the closest state to Mexico

City. The alleged responsible group was the Ejército Popular Revolucionario

(EPR), People‟s Army Revolutionary.30 This organization, formed by ex guerrilla

fighters from the 70s and 80s, currently is the most active guerrilla group in the

country.

The second attack took place on August 8, 2001, when three home-made bombs

exploded simultaneously in three Banamex Bank branches in Mexico City. The

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP), People's Armed

Revolutionary Forces, a group that split up from EPR claimed responsibility for

the attack.31

Three years later, on May 23, 2004 the previously unknown rebel group

Comando Jaramillista Morelense 23 de Mayo was believed responsible for

setting off three bombs at Banamex, BBVA Bancomer and Santander Serfin

Bank branches in Cuernavaca, a city only 60 km from Mexico City.32 In both

attacks no injuries were reported.

In the coming years EPR‟ attacks increased in intensity and level of complexity

just as the attacks on November 6, 2006 when three explosives were set off

simultaneously in Mexico City. The first target was the Partido Revolucionario

Institucional (PRI) headquarters, the party that ruled Mexico for 71 years, and

currently the second most important political party in Mexico; the second target

was the Tribunal Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral Tribunal), the institution that

validated the controversial July 2006 presidential election; and the third target

was a Scotiabank branch.33 Those attacks took place four months after the

presidential elections against political, electoral and economic objectives and

30

„La PGR aun no aclara 11 ataques eperristas‟, El Universal, December 14, 2007 31

„Cronología de atentados en el DF‟, El Universal, February 16, 2008 32


Ibid.

15


though no casualties were reported and the government‟s capabilities remained

intact, the EPR sent a powerful message about their opposition to political and

economic norms of the Mexican system.

The following three EPR‟s attacks were directed against PEMEX facilities

(Mexican state oil company). The first one occurred on July 5, 2007 in PEMEX

facilities in Salamanca, Celaya y Valle de Santiago, all of them in the state of

Guanajuato; the second attack occurred five days later on July 10, in PEMEX

pipelines in the state of Queretaro. The last one occurred on September 10, 2007

when oil pipelines were hit in the states of Tlaxcala and Veracruz. These attacks

represented an economic loss of more than US$ 300 million.34

Even though, some commentators consider that those attacks carried out by the

EPR arose as a response to law enforcement pressure35 the evidence suggests

that the EPR has impact a terrorist strategy to achieve its goals and is imitating

terrorist techniques such as those of Al-Qaeda against oil facilities in Saudi

Arabia and Iraq. In this regard Mexican intelligence agencies must be alert on the

networks that these groups are building up.

Terrorism activities in the XXI century carried out by drug cartels

Since 2000 only one incident has been registered. This occurred on February

15, 2008, when a bomb went off outside the building of the Secretaría de

Seguridad Pública del Distrito Federal ( Mexico City‟s Public Security

Ministry).The attack only killed the bomb-carrier and left two injured; the

34


Some people consider that those attacks were in response of the „the dirty war‟ against leftist groups. In fact previously to the attacks on PEMEX facilities three EPR‟ members were disappeared in the state of Oaxaca and so far their whereabouts remain unknown. The EPR pointed out that the local government was the responsible for these disappearances.

16


attempted target was a top police official and the Cartel of Sinaloa was

responsible for the attack.36

MDC intentions will be discussed further below, but in short it is considered that

MDC are imitating terrorist techniques of groups such as Al-Qaeda or others to

intimidate its rivals, as occurred during the 90s with cartels in Colombia, rather

than adopting a radical ideology or a terrorist strategy.

In addition, it is important to highlight two important facts with regard to Mexican

terrorist activities after 9/11. The first one, is that some international terrorist

organizations have increased their presence in the country as was revealed with

the discovery of FARC offices in Mexico City on April 200237 and the arrests on

July 18, 2003 of six Spaniards and three Mexicans, all of them members of the

Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA).38 Mexican officials said they were laundering

money for ETA and forging documents for its members

The other fact is that because of Mexico‟s proximity with US, after 9/11 the

country could be more frequently used as a platform to attack the US regardless

of whether the MDC or other local criminal organizations are involved. This

observation became a reality on December 2003 when terrorist alerts in the

country increased drastically as a result of US intelligence agencies warning that

Al-Qaeda plan to hijack a commercial airplane departing from Mexico City which

could be used for terrorist purposes. This warning resulted in the cancellation of

the 409 Aeromexico flight flying from Mexico City to Los Angeles for three

consecutive days December 31, 2003, January 1, 2004 and January 2, 2004.39

This intelligence information affected other countries as well; actually it was a one

week terrorist alert that had started on mid-December 2003 with the cancellation

36

„Cronología de atentados en el DF‟ El Universal, February 16, 2008 37

Mickolus and Simons (2006), p. 38 38

Ibid, p. 218 39

„Aeroméxico suspende dos vuelos a Los Angeles por exigencias de EU‟, La Jornada, January 2, 2004

17


of other seven flights coming from the UK and France. The first one was the 223

British Airways flight that was cancelled on January 2 and 3, 2004.40 The last

time that this Boeing 727 flew to Los Angeles was on the December 31, 2003 but

was escorted by two F-16 of the US air force. Once the airplane landed, the crew

and passengers were subject to a rigorous interrogatory.41 The six remaining

cancelled flights during those days belong to Air France and were supposed to

arrived from Paris to Los Angeles on the 2nd and 3rd of January, 2004.42

THE PRESENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN LATIN AMERICA

According to Rohan Gunaratna „[t]he arrest and interrogation of an Afghanistan-

trained member of the Islamic Group of Egypt in Uruguay on February 27, 1999

was the first suggestion of a possible Al Qaeda presence in the region‟.43 The

suggestion was based on the fact that the Egyptian group „has merged with Al

Qaeda at strategic, operational, and tactical levels and functions almost as one

organization‟.44 However, as Gunaratna recognized, even though some Al-

Qaeda allies have been identified in some Latin American countries, the truth is

that there is no consistent evidence of a permanent Al-Qaeda presence in the

region.

With regard to Al-Qaeda‟s allies, Paul Williams stated that Hezbollah was the first

Middle Eastern terrorist group that came to South America in 198345 and was

followed by Hamas from Palestine, and by Egypt‟s Al-Gama‟a al-Islamiyya

(Islamic Group) that came to the region in the mid-nineties46. All of them

established permanent base-camps in a South American jungle corner called the

40

„British Airways cancela uno de sus vuelos con destino a Washington por seguridad‟ El Mundo, January 3, 2004. 41

Ibid 42

„Pasajeros de una pesadilla de número 223‟, Pagina 12, January 3, 2004 43

Gunaratna (2002), p. 164 44

Ibid 45

Williams (2005), p.123 46

Gunaratna (2002), p.164

18


Tri-Border area, a place that covers the cities of Puerto Iguazu, in Argentina; Foz

do Iguazu in Brazil; and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. Recent reports from the

Tri-Border area also include the presence of Al-Jihad from Egypt and al-

Muqawamah, which is a pro-Iran wing of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah.47

The importance of Al-Qaeda‟s allies in the zone resides on the fact that those

groups have developed an important infrastructure that might be helpful for Bin

Laden‟s intentions. These groups collude with local criminal groups and their

reach extents far beyond the Tri-Border area. These links are becoming

increasingly relevant because Al-Qaeda could connect with other groups further

north of the continent, towards the US. In this regard Paul Williams explains that:

[u]pon their arrival in the New World, the Hezbollah officials wasted little time in

establishing business ties with the drug cartels from Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and

Ecuador, along with Latin American paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Peru‟s Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Star”). The dealers

and the revolutionaries needed guns that Hezbollah could provide though its connections

with the Chechen Mafia, and Hezbollah sought cocaine that it could sell throughout the

Middle East and Europe with the help of the Sicilian Mafia.48

Furthermore, Gunaratna concludes that „[t]he Islamist terrorist threat to Latin

America and beyond will depend to a large extent on post-9/11 Al Qaeda-

Hezbollah decision-making, two groups that hitherto have cooperated to advance

common aims and objectives‟.49 In this regard it is a fact that Islamic terrorism

might become a serious threat in Latin America in the coming years. Additionally,

either using the infrastructure developed by Hezbollah or using by their own

capabilities, Al-Qaeda could settle anywhere in Latin America without the

necessity of maintaining permanent base-camps; or attack any country without

the support of its Tri-Border‟s allies.

47

Hudson (2003), p. 1 48

Williams (2005), p.124 49

Gunaratna (2002), p.165

19


Nevertheless, even though the long history of Latin American terrorist events, it

must be acknowledge that there is no evidence registered as far as terrorists

attacks carried out, or supported by, Al-Qaeda in any Latin American country

before or after 9/11. Gunaratna confirm that a terrorist alarm sounded on April 6,

2001, when the US closed its diplomatic missions in Paraguay, Uruguay and

Ecuador following intelligence reports that Al-Qaeda‟s attacks were likely to

occur,50 but nothing happened. In addition, there is no solid Al-Qaeda connection

to Hezbollah‟s attacks in Argentina on March 17, 1992 and July 17, 1994.

Since the 70s onwards, it cannot be ignored that although terrorist activities in

Mexico included the increased presence of international terrorist groups in the

country, as well as the possibility of an Al-Qaeda presence in any Latin American

country, a group‟s intentions must be considered a key element to analyze even

above of those facts. The reason is that when an attack or collaboration with

another group are planned, the group‟s intentions indicate how far a group is

willing to go in implementing its terrorist activities. In this sense a further analysis

will question Al-Qaeda‟s and MDC‟ intentions to collaborate and/or attack

Mexican or US interests.

50

Gunaratna (2002) p.165

20


II. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

Every group or individual has specific characteristics that define them and allow

them to achieve their goals. In the world of intelligence an adversary‟s

characteristics —regardless of whether an adversary is a group or individual, or

state or non-state actor— are defined by his intentions and capabilities.

The adversary‟s capabilities are all those resources that he can use in order to

achieve his goals and these can be material or non-material: material capabilities

are commonly weapons or money, and non-material capabilities are „… the

quality of the organization, morale, and military doctrine‟.51 On the other hand,

the adversary‟s intentions are his plans and goals, and according to Michael

Handel, these can be political and/or military.52 As a result it is considered that a

better understanding of an adversary‟s capabilities, but specially his intentions,

might provide a close insight of his agenda and therefore be able to estimate the

level of threat posed by such adversary. In this regard, Handel pointed out that it

is equally important to address both intentions and capabilities however it is more

critical to emphasize the study of the adversary‟s intentions for two key reasons:

(A) An adversary can still decide to attack even though his capabilities are relatively weak (1) if he miscalculates the strength of the intended victim; (2) If he is more interested in applying political pressure or making political gains even at the cost of a military defeat; (3) if he gambles that his surprise attack will have a force multiplier effect sufficient to compensate for his inferior capabilities. (B) War and surprise attack are determined not by the existence of capabilities per se, but by the political intention to use them. The mere possession of superior, equal, or inferior strength is therefore less important. A corollary of this is that, while the adversary‟s intentions can be influenced at any point, it is impossible to have comparable impact on capabilities immediately before the outbreak of war.53

51

Handel (2003), p.12 52

Ibid, p. 14 53

Betts and Mahnken (2003), p. 14

21


Moreover, the study and analysis of an adversary‟s intentions and capabilities

might be helpful as well to understand why this group or individual will be

interested in cooperating with other groups.

It is truth that not every terrorist or criminal group needs to establish alliances

with others to be able to achieve its goals. However some —especially those

which have targets beyond their borders or local conflicts, that target the „far

enemy‟— apparently are looking to collaborate with groups that might have

similar intentions and/or complementary capabilities to its own in order to fulfil

their objectives.

Groups sharing similar intentions might establish a cooperative relationship to

increase either political/military goals or strengthen the image and perceptions

within their audiences. In the other hand, some groups are looking to collaborate

with other groups because they have complementary capabilities to their own, or

they want to acquire new capabilities that are useful for their purposes. Al-Qaeda

for example, forged a tactical relationship with Hezbollah in order to master the

art of bombing buildings.54 In return, Hezbollah gain access to weapons and

money that has become important for its cause.

Notwithstanding, any cooperative relationship is possible only when both parties

obtain something in return for their cooperation. The most common bonds

between criminal and terrorist groups are drugs for weapons; money for

protection; or money for weapons. According to each group‟s own intentions and

capabilities any combination may apply.

Al-Qaeda, for example, built-up networks across many countries in order to

expand its intentions and capabilities; the World Islamic Front for Jihad against

the Jews and Crusaders represents the best example. Described by Bari Atwan

as „an umbrella group for various jihadi organizations including Egyptian Islamic

54

Gunaratna (2002), p. 12.

22


Jihad, Egyptian Jama‟at Islamiyah and several others from Kashmir and

Pakistan‟55 , this group of organizations has established a cooperative

relationship sharing intentions and capabilities to benefit each other and be able

to target the US and its allies everywhere and anywhere.

On the other hand, some of the MDC have built-up networks with other criminal

groups, especially in South American countries such as Colombia, Bolivia and

Peru. These relationships seek to establish safer traffic-cocaine routes to the US

and obtain mutual benefits in return of their cooperation. Colombian cartels

control the cocaine production in the region, while MDC control the routes to the

US and within. Simultaneously, the Colombians absorb the risk of producing

cocaine while the Mexicans absorb the risk of its transportation. In this sense

both organizations share risks, but also huge profits.

Following Handel‟s argument about why the study of an adversary‟s intentions

must be emphasized above its capabilities, it can be said that collaboration

between two or more groups is mostly determined by each group‟s intentions as

well.

Furthermore, using Handel‟s argument we can suggest that even a group with

relative weak capabilities will reject to collaborate with a group that has

complementary capabilities to its own if: a) it is considered that both agendas,

plans and goals are completely different; b) the group does not gain anything in

return for their collaboration; and c) he chooses to absorb the cost of a defeat in

order to save long-term intentions and goals that otherwise might be

compromised with a relationship with certain groups or individuals.

The problem in the intelligence information gathering process is that adversary

intentions are simpler to conceal and usually change from time to time, as Handel

observed when he stated that „only a handful of leaders, and at times a single

55

Atwan (2006), p. 54.

23


leader (e.g., Hitler, Stalin, Sadat) will shape the strategy of a state‟ Therefore,

since there are elements unknown for analysts, a possible collaboration between

Al-Qaeda and MDC might occur, but hopefully present analyses that will question

both groups‟ intentions to collaborate with each other might be helpful to shed

light on this issue.

24


III. Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda emerged as the worldwide most wanted terrorist organization after the

9/11 attacks, and has been described as „the first multinational terrorist group of

the twenty-first century‟ 56 with intentions and capabilities to attack the US and its

allies anywhere and everywhere.

Al-Qaeda, an organization led by Osama bin Laden, is formed by formal and

informal networks „that mobilize people to resort to terrorism‟,57 or as others

prefer to describe it, „a global umbrella for groups and individuals who share their

agenda‟.58 This decentralized organization composition gives Al-Qaeda two

special characteristics: one, the possibility to maintain worldwide presence and

support through radical Muslims living in the five continents; and two, that Al-

Qaeda‟s cells can work almost independently of the core organization, making it

irrelevant whether the main leaders are alive or not.

Moreover, the reasons for Al-Qaeda‟s global intentions are founded in Bin

Laden‟s „Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the land of the

Two Holy Places‟, a fatwa or religious opinion that according to Sageman was

the result of four events that radicalized and motivated the group to carry out a

global war against the US and its allies.

[The first event was] [t]he Gulf War in 1991 [that] established the continued presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia [the place were la Mecca ---the holiest place in Islam--- is and Bin Laden‟s home country]. [The second event was] [t]he Somali humanitarian crisis in 1993 [that] dispatch US troops to Somalia to aver widespread starvation among the population, Those with a more paranoid conspiratorial view of history saw in this twin presence the beginning of a full-scale US invasion of the Middle East through a pincer movement from the north in Saudi Arabia and from the south in Somalia. [The third event occurred when] the Algerian government cancelled the second round of elections in January 1992 [and] when it became clear that the FIS [The Islamic Salvation Front], was going to wing by landslide. The hand of the French government, another far enemy, was assumed to be behind this move. [The

56

Gunaratna (2002), p. 1 57

Sageman (2008), p. 31 58

Atwan (2006), p. 219

25


four event took place when] [i]n the former Yugoslavia, Serb military forces were carrying out ethnic cleansing against an unarmed Muslim Bosnian population. To prevent the situation from escalating, Western powers established an arms embargo on the region. Muslims decried the embargo, saying it favoured the Serb forces who had access to their own weapons from the remnants of the former Yugoslav army. In 1994, the conflict between Muslim forces in Chechnya and predominantly Christian Russian forces escalated into a full-blown civil war. 59

According to Sageman, Al-Qaeda‟s terrorist activities started in 1995, when they

began to plot against far enemy targets.60 Its activities became more intense as a

result of subsequent events explained in the 1998‟ fatwa. The fact is that the

possibility of an Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or the US in collaboration with MDC

might occur because it falls within Bin Laden‟s global strategy. However, to

confirm this statement both groups‟ intentions and capabilities must be

questioned and analyzed beforehand.

AL-QAEDA’S INTENTIONS.

According to Bari Atwan, Al-Qaeda‟s intentions are based on a long-term strategy

that has four aspects: (1) military, (2) ideological/political within the Islamic world,

(3) ideological/political within the populations of the US and its allies, and (4)

economic.61

(1) Military strategy

Following the argument of Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, Al-Qaeda‟s main

military strategist, Atwan argues that the organization has started a long-term

strategy that has five distinct stages.

59

Sageman (2008), p.42 60

Ibid, p. 58 61

Atwan (2006), p. 221

26


The first and second stage are closely related; first of all Al-Qaeda aims to

provoke „“the ponderous American elephant” into invading Muslim lands‟62 by

conducting continuous attacks on US interests. This has the objective to bring US

soldiers into Muslim soil and consequently, this leads into the second stage of the

plane, which generates the widespread hatred of America by exploiting the

religious aspect that reminds themes of the crusades that „reawaken another

“giant elephant” – the umma itself‟.63 This reaction brings potentially all Muslims

into a war against the US. The third stage consists of „expand[ing] the conflict

through the region and engage the US in a long war of attrition‟ thereby creating

a „jihad Triangle of Horror‟64 running from Afghanistan through Iran and Southern

Iraq, into Turkey, south Lebanon and Syria. The fourth stage is to „become a

global network‟65 by affiliating Muslims all over the world and giving the

organization flexibility in order to make extremely difficult to detect next terrorist

attacks. The fifth stage consists of opening war-fronts in as many places as

possible, regardless of whether these arise within the Arab world. The main

objective here is to increase US casualties, and most importantly to provoke the

bankruptcy of the American military budget.66

(2) Ideological and Political strategy within the Islamic world 67

The strategy within the Islamic world consists of demonstrating that the US and

its allies are carrying out an unending war that far from seeking an end to terrorist

groups, are seeking an attempt to kill Muslims and obtain control of oil resources

in the region. This has the aim of reinforcing Al-Qaeda‟s military strategy as well

as the reception of more support from Muslims around the world.

(3) Ideological and Political strategy with US populations and its allies

62

Atwan (2006) p 221 63

Ibid 64

Ibid, p 222 65

Ibid 66

Ibid 67

Ibid, p 223

27


The ideological and political strategy within US population and its allies,

according to Atwan, is trying to „foment a „clash of civilizations‟ with Christian

fundamentalism opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, resulting in an eventual all-

out war between the „believers‟ and the kafir‟.68

(4) Economic strategy69

Finally, Al-Qaeda‟s Economic Strategy and the so-called „terror premium‟,

consists of conducting regular attacks on oil pipelines and installations to make

an impact on oil prices and destabilize the US economy.

For the purposes of this dissertation three statements might be inferred following

Atwan‟s arguments: a) Al-Qaeda will continue with its attacks on US interests; b)

they will carry out an attack on Mexico with or without collaboration of MDC; and

c) Al-Qaeda will continue with its alleged intentions to collaborate with MDC for

its next attacks in the US. Although Atwan‟s insights with regard to Al-Qaeda‟s

intentions must be considered extremely relevant and important to be analyzed

by intelligence agencies, whether or not Al-Qaeda‟s intentions are analyzed

separately on a case by case basis, we will probably find that not all these

arguments are as evident as some consider.

Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to attack US‟ interests.

Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to continue attacking US interests are clear enough to be

explained; these targets might be either on US soil or overseas. Osama Bin

Laden has stated several times that the US would never enjoy security till „infidel

armies‟ leave the Gulf and as far as US foreign policy remains the same in the

region, Al-Qaeda‟s intentions against the US will likely probably remain exactly

the same.

68

Atwan (2006), p 225 69

Ibid, p. 227

28


Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to attack Mexican interests

The Mexican case presents a different analysis than the US case when

considering Al-Qaeda‟s intentions. When the 9/11 attacks occurred, including

those that took place in US-friendly countries, it was considered that Mexico was

far from Al-Qaeda‟s eye. This statement was based on three views: A) that the

Mexican Government had no strategic (political and economic) interests neither

in Central Asia nor in the Middle East; B) that from a Military point of view,

Mexico has never participated in any conflict where Muslims had been involved,

and sometimes had been opposing US foreign military policy; C) From a Social

perspective, even when Mexico has some small Muslim communities, around

6000 thousand members,70 these ones have never been politically involved or

have carried out suspicious activities; furthermore Mexico does not maintain

close links with communities that have been related with some Al-Qaeda‟s

attacks as Pakistanis, Lebanese, Saudis, Emiratis, Egyptians, or Maghrebis.

Nevertheless, because Al-Qaeda has grown as a terrorist organization with

global intentions challenging the US and its allies everywhere, more countries are

now threatened. As Atwan pointed out, Al-Qaeda „is capable of constantly

transforming and adapting to changes in circumstances, history and strategy‟;71

and for it, differences between countries are apparently factors that do not

safeguard potential victims from other possible attacks. In this regard the

closeness of the Mexican economy with the US economy was the key factor

considered by Al-Qaeda to threaten Mexico as well.

The Al-Qaeda threat to Mexico was de facto presented on February 8, 2007 in

Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) issue #30, an on-line Magazine; the article‟s title

was Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon and the author, Adeeb al Bassam, stated the

following:

70

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía www.inegi.gob.mx 71

Atwan (2006), p. 219.

http://www.inegi.gob.mx/

29


The American culture‟s addiction to oil will continue for at least several more decades. Therefore the United States will remain dependent on the Middle East in the near future, its oil will continue to be an easy target for all the enemies of the United States, and it will remain a weak spot for many decades to come. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the U.S. has spent a great deal on alternative energy technology, and will spend even more in and in earnest. This indicates that America might become independent of the Middle East, or at least lessen its reliance on the region in the long term, while sufficing oil from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and several new collaborators, as well as domestic energy sources. That is why it is imperative that we strike petroleum interests in all regions that the United States benefits from, and not only in the Middle East. The goal is to cut off its imports or reduce them by all means

The targeting of oil interests includes oil production wells, export pipelines, loading platforms, tankers---and anything else that will deprive the United States of oil, force it to make decisions that it has avoided having to make for a long time, disrupt and stifle its economy, and threaten its economic and political future.

Shaykh Usama‟s [Bin Laden‟s] instructions are crystal clear with respect to the targeting of oil interests. In implementing these instructions, the mujahideen must gather information [and] select worthy targets. 72

Certainly, Mexico is the third main oil exporting country to the US, and has been

since the 80s, with 1.1 million barrels per day (mbpd), only below Canada and

Saudi Arabia with 1.8 mbpd and 1.5 mbpd respectively.73 According to the

Energy Information Administration, the top-five oil exporting countries accounted

for the US‟ 66 percent of all the crude it needs.74

Consequently, and considering Al-Qaeda‟s global strategy, Al-Qaeda could hit

any Mexican oil-installation in addition to any of the 364 oil fields, 199 offshore

platforms, 6 refineries or even any of the fifty-four thousand kilometres of onshore

pipelines or any of the two-thousand kilometres of offshore pipelines.75

Additionally, because these installations are complex and are distributed through

the whole country, Al-Qaeda‟s threat is a latent reality. The fact that the Mexican

72

The complete article can be accessed at www.globalterroralert.com 73

Energy Information Administration www.eia.doe.gov. Statistics from May 2008 74

The other two countries are Venezuela (1.030 mbpd), and Nigeria (0.851) mbpd 75

Petróleos Mexicanos www.pemex.com.mx

http://www.globalterroralert.com/

http://www.eia.doe.gov/

http://www.pemex.com.mx/

30


intelligence community is focused in the „war on drugs‟ makes Mexico an even

more vulnerable target for Bin Laden even when counting on US support in

helping Mexico secure its border.

An obvious potential target could be Cantarell, the largest oil field in Mexico and

the second largest oil field in the world. Cantarell is protected by the Mexican

Army but still presents vulnerabilities because of its magnitude and also

considering the capability and complexity of Al-Qaeda‟s attacks which enable it to

hit hard targets.

Furthermore, regardless of the level of threat and the possible targets that could

be hit, do we consider this Al-Qaeda threat as a real one even though it has not

been articulated clearly by any radical fatwa or even by Bin Laden itself?

Sageman argued, that after 2004 instructions and communications to Al-Qaeda‟s

followers appear to have started to run through the internet and on-line portals or

magazines.

The Madrid bombers were inspired by a document posted on the Global Islamic Media Front website in December 2003. The Hofstad Group in the Netherlands interacted through dedicated forums and chat rooms and inspired other young Muslims to join them physically after making contact with them on the forums. The April 2005 Cairo Khan al-Khalili bombing was added by the Internet, with the perpetrators downloading bomb-making instructions from jihadi websites. One of the largest international terrorists cases of its kind---the arrest of the Toronto group in Operation Osage in June 2006---had its roots in the group‟s linkage through an online forum to a group in Copenhagen that sent some of its members to Bosnia to bomb the U.S. embassy there, to a group in London that acted as general coordinators, and to two people in the state of Georgia in the United Sates. The people who tried to plant bombs on trains in Germany in the summer of 2006 met in an Internet forum. This clearly shows the change from offline to online interaction in the evolution of the threat.76

76

Sageman (2008), p. 110

31


In this sense it is clear that the threat is completely real and now Mexico is on Al-

Qaeda‟s line of fire. So should we ignore those facts previously described when

Mexico was considered far from an Al-Qaeda attack? Or should we believe in this

Al-Qaeda‟s intention of bringing different countries into conflict regardless of

whether these have been opposed to US foreign military policy in the Middle

East? Should we then consider Al-Qaeda as an organization that randomly

chooses its targets?

Many questions emerge since Al-Qaeda threatened Mexico, and there are no

simple explanations or answers on this regard. The fact is that Mexico is a close

US business partner and this factor is considered the motive behind a potential

Al-Qaeda attack. Consequently, Mexican intelligence agencies must be prepared

for an attack because in the final analysis, Al-Qaeda is an unpredictable

organization with followers capable of conducting terrorist activities anywhere

where the US might be affected.

Al-Qaeda‟s intentions when teaming with Mexican Drug Cartels

As was observed in the introduction, some US reports pointed out to an imminent

relationship between Al-Qaeda and MDC. The reason is that MDC have

operational and logistic capabilities that could be useful for Al-Qaeda‟s purposes,

such as the sophisticated trafficking routes that MDC controls and its criminal

networks within US territory. However, even though this relationship sounds

theoretically attractive and possible, in practice it is more complicated as it first

appears and as some people consider.

According to Hutchinson and O‟Malley, where cooperation between terrorist

groups and criminal organizations may exist, three types of relationships must be

expected: Temporary, Parasitic and Symbiotic.

32


a) „“Temporary” is perhaps the most likely relationship and can be seen via one-

time contracts for quick profit, or sporadic and episodic cooperation over time‟.77

From this statement if follows that temporary relationships could also be either

strategic or tactical.

Temporary Strategic relationships occur when both groups cooperate because

both share intentions or have a mutual interest in carrying out together some

activities during a specific period of time. Temporary Tactical relationships arise

when, regardless of their intentions and common objectives, each group

collaborates in the sharing of capabilities or in order to acquire new ones.

A Temporary Strategic relationship will be, however, more difficult to establish

between both groups because they have completely different aims, goals and

intentions. An analysis of drug cartels‟ intentions will be further discussed to

clarify this point.

On the other hand, a Temporary Tactical relationship neither can be established

because a key element of this relationship is that both organizations obtain

something in return for their collaboration. And apparently, even Al-Qaeda has

the intention of teaming with MDC, there is nothing that Bin Laden could offer in

return to MDC for their cooperation. This point will be further discussed when

both organizations‟ capabilities are discussed.

b) The second cooperation described is the „“Parasitic” cooperation [that]

involves more enduring relationships between terrorist and criminal groups,

although it is one where terrorists are feeding off organized crime profits and

activities‟.78

Whether Al-Qaeda has the intention to take advantage of MDC capabilities by

gaining their loyalty or by coercing MDC members, it will be an error of strategic

77

Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1104 78

Hutchinson and O'malley (2007), p. 1104

33


calculus resulting in a probable disaster rather than constitute a strategic benefit

for Al-Qaeda‟s purposes. Gaining MDC loyalty is considered less probable

because although both groups do not share any similar intentions, MDC are

profit-oriented organizations where everything that negatively and unnecessarily

affects the business is rejected. Gaining MDC loyalty by coercion will be a

mistake for Al-Qaeda because as it will be demonstrated, MDC have more than

enough capabilities to face Al-Qaeda in Mexico. It does not, as a result, make

sense to believe that Al-Qaeda has the intention to carry out a war against MDC.

c) The third type of relationship is the „“Symbiotic” relationship‟,79 but according to

the authors „there is no available evidence of symbiotic partnerships between

terrorist groups and organized crime groups‟ making it the least probable

relationship to occur. The reason resides in each group‟s nature and intentions.

„Criminal groups do not desire media, public, and government attention, whereas

the opposite is true of most terrorist groups‟80 ; besides where one is politically

motivated, the other is profit-oriented that seek optimal business conditions.

„These and other ideological and organizational differences preclude symbiotic

cooperation between the two groups‟81 , conclude the authors.

Furthermore, regardless of the argument presented by these types of

relationships a key question remains; does Al-Qaeda really aim at collaborating

with any of the MDC?

It is obvious that Al-Qaeda is interested in MDC‟ operational capabilities but

Hutchinson and O‟Malley argue in this regard that „the degree of a terrorist

group‟s organization and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will

engage in.‟82 Following this argument Al-Qaeda was described as „a global

79

Ibid. 80

Ibid. 81

Ibid. 82

Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1096

34


umbrella for groups and individuals who share their agenda‟83 and composed by

extremely secret and mostly autonomous cells and structures. Organizations like

Al-Qaeda, Hutchinson and O‟Malley argue, have low-profile members with few

specialized skills capable of carrying out attacks mostly with quite low financial or

material assets. Further Hutchinson and O‟Malley stated that

[f]or such groups, engagement with crime may have three key determinants:84

1. The nature of the event or the attack planned; 2. The activities, training, and material they require; and, 3. The availability of self funding, traditional types of financing, and resources on hand.

Under this argument it can be stated that Al-Qaeda desires a working

relationship. However, the problem is that MDC may compromise any secret

operation because they are constantly being infiltrated by US and Mexican

security authorities. Additionally, drug traffickers are difficult to trust because they

are profit oriented, making hard to maintain minimal levels of loyalty. Finally, most

Al-Qaeda recruits are home-grown people85 in order to blind international law

enforcement attention, and even despite the fact that many drug traffickers have

US passports most of them have traceable criminal records, a characteristic that

Al-Qaeda continuously tries to avoid.

Even with the support that MDC‟ capabilities provide, collaboration with them

implies inherent risks that may compromise any possible Al-Qaeda operation, a

risk that terrorists groups, especially, avoid being exposed to.

83

Atwan (2006), p. 219 84

Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1099 85

Ibid, p 1100

35


AL-QAEDA’S CAPABILITIES

Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities

Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities reside in three pillars: its supporters, its weapons

and training, and its financial wealth.

Members.

It is difficult to estimate the number of members that a secret organization such

as Al-Qaeda could have, however some argue that they „can draw on the support

of some 6-7 million radical Muslims worldwide, of which 120,000 are willing to

take up arms‟.86 Beyond this, it is true that „the war on terror‟ carried out by the

US and its allies, along with Al-Qaeda‟s strategy of presenting it as a war against

Muslims and to have control of the oil sources in the region has apparently aided

Al-Qaeda‟s recruitment strategy. As Atwan noted „American foreign policy is the

best recruitment officer al-Qa‟ida has ever had.‟87

Weapons and Training.

Moreover, regardless of the conventional weapons that this organization could

possess, Al-Qaeda has appropriated and mastered the tactical use of „suicide

missions‟, which have become its most effective and cheaper weapon.

Atwan stated that suicide missions are extremely difficult to detect without

previous intelligence information and are relatively easy to carry out.

In terms of logistics the suicide bomber typically pilots a vehicle with explosives into the target or detonates bombs carried on his own body, sometime in a bag o rucksack (as in the London bombings) or, more commonly, in a suicide belt or

86

Gunaratna (2002), p. 95 87

Atwan (2006), p.10

36


vest. A suicide belt is easily manufactured, and several websites give step-by-step instructions in how to customize a strip of strong fabric with pockets to hold the explosives and detonators. Worn underneath the bomber‟s normal clothing, it is very difficult to detect.88

Another key element of Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities are its training camps,

because here is where the indoctrination and training of its followers take place.

In training camps, jihadi fighters obtain military training in the use of explosives,

heavy weapons and in guerrilla and assassination techniques. In addition, they

gain specialised training courses in surveillance and counter-surveillance

operations; learn how to forge and adapt identity documents, and most

importantly, assimilate elemental techniques to carry out suicide attacks in land

or sea.89

Even though some Al-Qaeda training camps were closed in Afghanistan as a

consequence of the US invasion, there are rumours that some camps are still

distributed and working worldwide. Al-Qaeda‟s training camps have been recently

founded in England, in the Lake District and in the southern counties of

Berkshire, Kent and East Sussex.90

Money

Al-Qaeda‟s financial wealth is another material capability that needs to be

considered. In this regard Gunaratna described that Bin Laden‟s business and

worldwide investments, along with state sponsors as Sudan, Afghanistan and

Iran or Islamist groups‟ contributions and clandestine money collection in some

mosques, generates significant funds for the organization. He concludes by

stating that

[v]ery few groups have acquired financial assets and independent resources to the extent that Al Qaeda has. Despite a US-led worldwide effort to close down its

88

Atwan (2006), p.100 89

Gunaratna (2002), p. 72. 90

„Top extremist recruiter is jailed‟ BBC news, February, 26, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7190323.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7190323.stm

37


financial networks, Al Qaeda continues to operate through the hawala, or unregulated, banking system, based on the use of promissory notes for the exchange of cash and gold. Al Qaeda also benefited from copying many of the financial models and networks devised by the disgraced Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which collapsed in 1991. It was used extensively by terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism and by various security and intelligence organisations. 91

The Internet

Moreover, alongside Al-Qaeda‟s capabilities with regard to fighters, weapons and

money described above, it is considered that Bin Laden‟s organization is using

another „weapon‟ that has been extremely helpful to recruit, organize,

communicate and train jihadi fighters: the internet.92

It is not clear whether the Internet can be described as a material capability

though it is a fact that Al-Qaeda is using the system for its own purposes. As was

described further above, some terrorist attacks were planned and organized in

on-line chat forums, and the instructions to build home-made bombs can be

found in some jihadi web-pages. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in Spain were

inspired by a web magazine and Mexico was threatened as well on-line.

In this regard, Bari Atwan adds that

The internet is a multipurpose tool and weapon. It can be used to communicate one-to-one or to millions; it can be used to convey hidden information, instructions or plans; and since computers control the majority of the developed world‟s infrastructure, it is a chink in the West‟s amour, easily penetrated by dedicated hackers. Cyber-attacks can create enormous damage at very little cost to the jiihadis, a principle they value and which we have already seen applied with devastating results in al-Qa‟ida‟s preference for suicide missions over armed combat.93

91

Gunaratna (2002), p. 70 92

Sageman (2008), p.114 93

Atwan (2006), p. 125

38


Overall, despite of whether a material capability exist or not, the Internet must be

considered as a weapon that Al-Qaeda is using in order to fulfil its goals. As

Atwan declared, Al-Qaeda is „the the first Web-directed guerrilla network‟.94

Al-Qaeda non-material capabilities

As was described beforehand by Handel, non-material capabilities are the quality

of the organization, morale, and military doctrine, and in this regard Al-Qaeda‟s

strength equals that of its material capabilities.

Quality of the organization.

In terms of the quality of the organisation Al-Qaeda is extremely efficient because

it has been able to expand the organization horizontally avoiding rigid and

hierarchical forms;95 it „is structured in such a way that it can operate without a

centralised command. As a result, al-Qaeda regional bureaux functioned as the

nodal point of its oriental network outside Afghanistan and liaise with other

associate groups and Al Qaeda cells.‟ 96

As it expands horizontally, the internet becomes the most important tool within

these small and independent groups, because it provides ease of

communication, recruitment and a portal for receiving elemental instructions to

conduct attacks.97

Despite the US invasion in Afghanistan that made Al-Qaeda lose its main

organizational base, the truth is that the „war on terror‟ has not been able to

94

Ibid, p.122 95

Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman (2008). 96

Gunaratna (2002), p. 10 97

Atwan (2006).

39


eradicate the organization since it has survived as by not remaining static and

consequently increasing its versatility.98

Morale

The heart of Al-Qaeda‟s high morale resides on the fact that the organization

rather than being destroyed, is still fully functioning and capable of hitting the US

and its allies.99 This fact has been exploited by Bin Laden and his associates to

increase the confidence of Al-Qaeda‟s militants and has enabled it to maintain

their loyalty and keep radicals highly active and motivated. 100

Military Doctrine

According to Rohan Gunaratna

[m]ost Al Qaeda attacks involve three distinct phases. First, intelligence teams mount surveillance, be it on a static or a moving target. Based on the target intelligence obtained, the attach team rehearses its operation in an Al Qaeda camp, often on a scale model of the building or vessel in question. Next and Al Qaeda support team arrives in the target area and organises safe houses and vehicles, bringing with it the necessary weapons and explosives. Lastly, Al Qaeda‟s strike team arrives and withdraws after completing the mission, unless it is a suicide attack. As the exfiltration of attack teams in a hostile environment is very difficult, suicide is likely to remain Al Qaeda‟s preferred tactic for the foreseeable future.101

In this sense Al-Qaeda has become a modern terrorist organization that

maintains highly standards on its operations. Firstly it is „a secret, almost virtual

organization, one that denies its own existence in order to remain in the

shadows‟102, which has allowed them to succeed in most of its attacks. Secondly,

new Al-Qaeda recruitments are not coming only from Pakistan or Afghanistan or

any other related country, these are home-grown individuals, sometimes without

98

Ibid. 99

Gunaratna (2002). 100

Ibid. 101

Ibid, p. 78 102

Ibid, p. 3

40


any previous links with radical Islam.103 Thirdly, Al-Qaeda is determined to

function at a global level, as Gunaratna described: „[i]nstead of resisting

globalisation, its forces are being harnessed by contemporary Islamist groups,

constantly looking for new bases and new targets worldwide‟.104 Fourthly, it is

constantly transforming and adapting its resources available because „its

networks are intertwined in the socio-economic, political, and religious fabric of

Muslims living in at least eighty countries‟105

Al-Qaeda‟s capabilities to attack Mexican or US interests.

It is clear enough that Al-Qaeda has capabilities to hit interests in both countries.

Even though the „war on terror‟ has limited its resources available, its capabilities

have not been much eroded or eliminated, and the organization is still fully

functioning. It cannot be ignored that Al-Qaeda is the first terrorist group that was

capable to hit the US „on land (US embassies in east Africa, 1998), sea (USS

Cole, Yemen, 2000) and in the air (September 11, 2001)‟106. This reflects the

power of Al-Qaeda and it seems that there will be no changes with regard to Al-

Qaeda‟s capabilities in the coming future.

As was observed previously, Al-Qaeda has interesting capabilities that have

transformed into the most dangerous terrorist organization. Notwithstanding, the

key element still remains whether Al-Qaeda can offer MDC something in return

for their collaboration as a conduit to fulfil their objectives and strike at US

interests primarily, but also at Mexican targets. In this regard, a further analysis

about MDC‟ intentions and capabilities will answer this question.

103

Atwan (2006). 104

Gunaratna (2002), p. 11 105

Gunaratna (2002), p. 10 106

Ibid p. 7

41


IV. MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS.

The origins of drug trafficking in Mexico started with poppy cultivation in the north

of the country, in the mountains of the state of Sinaloa from where the heroin was

sent to the US during the 40s in the context of World War II. In the 50s the crisis

in the mine industry in the northern states of Chihuahua and Sonora compelled

some workers to cultivate marijuana and poppy, an activity considered legal at

that moment. As legal restrictions in the US appeared, along with an increase in

the demand of drugs during the 60s, the prices of marijuana and heroin rose and

the profits were quickly duplicated pushing illegal activity to Sinaloa‟s

neighbouring states. In the 70s the activity was concentrated in the so called

„golden quadrangle‟ a region in the mountains that acquired perfect conditions for

illegal activity: remoteness of law enforcement officials and closeness to the US

border. This zone comprehended the limits of the states of Durango, Sonora,

Chihuahua and Sinaloa. Until the end of the 70s illegal activities were controlled

by several families which became powerless in 1982 when Miguel Felix Gallardo

created the so called Cartel of Guadalajara, an organization inspired in the

Medellin Drug Cartel, which associated some of these families in order to control

the production and distribution of heroin and marijuana within the US.107 In this

fashion, and most importantly, it become a powerful organization that could face

Mexican and US authorities.

Gallardo‟s main associates Rafel Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca took care

of the drug business after he was captured in 1989, though internal leadership

problems provoked the separation of both drug lords.108 Since then, several

different drug cartels with complex organization structures were created.

Currently drug trafficking is controlled by seven cartels based in Mexico: the

Tijuana Cartel, run by Arellano Felix brothers that controls almost 3000 km in the

western part of the Mexico-US border; the Juárez Cartel, run by Amado Carrillo 107

Ibid. 108

Ibid.

42


Fuentes that controls the center of the Mexico-US border corridor; the Golfo

Cartel, run by Osiel Cárdenas that controls the eastern side of the border in the

state of Tamaulipas and all drug access via the Gulf of Mexico; the Sinaloa

Cartel, run by Joaquín Guzmán that competes in drug production and distribution

with the first three in the whole Mexico-US border; the Colima Cartel, run by the

Amescua Contreras brothers, that controls drug production and distribution in

several states in the central Mexico; the Pedro Díaz Parada Cartel, that controls

drug production and distribution in some states in the south of the country

including in Oaxaca and Chiapas; the Milenio Cartel, run by Valencia brothers

which while being the smallest of the MDC, controls drug distribution in four

states.

The main differences between MDC are their geographical location and their

profits, making margins. The Tijuana, Juarez, Golfo and Sinaloa Cartels are the

most important and violent ones since they control the most important trafficking

routes and distribution markets within the US.

MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS CAPABILITIES

MDC Material Capabilities

Money & Corruption

MDC‟ main capabilities are their financial wealth. According with John Walters,

US Director of National Control Drug Policy, MDC obtain US$13 800 million

annually for their sales on US soil109 where around 85% of the profits is

distributed between the main four while 15% goes for the other three of the big

seven. In this regard, an estimation calculates the Carillo‟s family fortune on more

than US$ 25 thousand million. Consequently these huge sums of money have

109

„Ganancias por 13,800 mdd deja venta de drogas a EU: John Walters‟. La Cronica de hoy, 21 de Febrero de 2008

43


provided MDC with means to continue defying both Mexico and the US either by

killing law enforcement officials or by corrupting them. Only the Golfo Cartel pays

out around US$ 2 million per week in corruption on both sides of the border.

Weaponry

The most common weapons used by MDC are machine guns that can penetrate

armour cars, grenade launchers, and assault rifles as AR-15 and AK-47.

According to the Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora, in the last five

years the most dangerous weapons confiscated by the authorities were Barrett

rifles caliber 50 millimeters (mm); M72 rocket launchers caliber 66 mm; grenade

launchers 40 mm; Sub-machine guns FN Herstal Model PS90 caliber 5.7x28

mm; pistols FN Herstal Model Five Seven caliber 5.7x28 mm, as well as

fragmentation grenades caliber 40 and 37 mm.110 It is considered that these

weapons are extremely effective to succeed in a war against the Mexican military

and law-enforcement officials as well against rival drug cartels.

Additionally some statistics revealed that about 2000 illegal weapons coming

from the US cross daily.111 These weapons are easily obtained in more than

seventeen thousand sell-points on the US frontier cities and smuggled into

Mexico by air, sea or land.112 The US government has done little in helping

Mexican authorities stop this problem, which allows MDC to continue acquiring

the ultimate weaponry available to maintain illegal activities.

Members

MDC are formed by paid-members that work within the organization or externally

—especially in law-enforcement agencies— and meet different roles in the

organization. These members vary in their background from those who

distributed drug in the streets through experienced lawyers and economists, to

the called „gatilleros‟ (trigger-pullers), groups who protect the organization and

carry out the assassinations; these groups are considered extremely important

110

„Se arman los narcos por descuido del Gobierno‟, El Universal, 27 de Abril de 2008 111

Ibid 112

Ibid.

44


within the organization because they carry the weapons. The gatilleros are

mainly conformed by ex- police officers and/or ex-militaries, including many

police and militaries working for drug cartels within law enforcement agencies.

These groups of trigger-pullers are divided in cells formed by around 10 to 50

members that work accordingly with specific instructions of their leaders and drug

lords. It is estimated that the four biggest cartels have around 1500 „gatilleros‟

each, in addition to the many police and militaries working for them within law-

enforcement agencies.

„Los Zetas‟ are one of the most famous and dangerous „gatilleros‟ formed by

around 100 militaries that were hired by the Golfo Cartel in 2002. They deserted,

from a rouge elite Mexican military unit that was trained in the US to combat drug

cartels, to join the lines of the cartel. They are experts in explosives,

communications, intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence operations, and

advanced technology weaponry manage.

Non Material Capabilities

„The Know How‟

Regardless of MDC‟ material capabilities, it is considered that they possess

something which could be attractive for groups such as Al-Qaeda. This is „the

know how‟ of the operation in the Mexico-US border. Because of thier illegal

activities they know how corruption works in both the US and Mexico. They

control sophisticated trafficking routes by air, land and sea; and they control the

human-smuggling and the weapons trafficking business. This non-material

capability increases the adversary‟s resources available in facilitating an attack

on the US or Mexico.

The importance of the Mexico-US border resides in two facts: 1) it is a door to the

US, and 2) it is the most dynamic border in the world where all along its 3200 km,

45


most of them vast an remote territory, daily legal crossings stand close to 12 000

commercial trucks and 660 000 people113 either for business, holidays or for job,

and illegally cross tons of drugs, thousands of weapons, hundreds of cars and

between 650 to 1200 undocumented people. Most of these illegal and legal

activities are controlled by MDC.

The „know how‟ is also important within the US territory. According to the

DEA114, Mexican cartels control the transportation and wholesale drug

distribution in every region of the US except the Northeast that are controlled by

Asian Cartels (primarily Vietnamese) based in Canada. This allows them to move

drugs, arms and persons through the US, which would be really appealing for Al-

Qaeda‟s intentions, with relative ease.

Organization

MDC are complex in their organization with highly defined command-and-control

structures. They are hierarchical by nature, but since most of their leaders are in

prison, they are now organized in a more decentralize form where the „gatilleros‟

have a leading role but always following direct orders of the drug lords despite of

these are in prison.

In this regard, and according with some experts, currently MDC‟ organization

opens a door for the possible collaboration of terrorist groups and criminal

groups. Chris Dishman stated that international law enforcement pressure is

forcing the breakdown of hierarchical structures in illicit organizations and

creating new opportunities for criminals and terrorist to collaborate. 115 This

argument is based on the fact that „beheading‟ MDC by imprisoning drug lords or

extraditing them to the US is weakening MDC. As a result, lower to mid-level

113

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, www.inegi.gob.mx 114

„Drug Traficking Organizations‟, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/18862/dtos.htm, June 16 , 2008 115

Dishman (2005).

http://www.inegi.gob.mx/

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/18862/dtos.htm

46


criminals are taking advantage of their independence to form networks because

they need to find funding sources to continue with their illegal activity.

Nevertheless Mexican drug cartels are not decentralized at all even though its

main leaders are in prison. It is true that Mexican law enforcement efforts are

cornering some MDC causing many of their cells to have to work independently

or to collaborate with other groups to survive. These networks are mainly related

to drug production and distribution. However, the organization does not split up,

because after drug lords are dead or in prison the „gatilleros‟ or the family of the

drug lord takes control of the organization since they possess both the „know-

how‟ as well as the weapons. The four most important cartels continue being

managed by the same families, and have been doing so for the last two decades.

Dishman argues that „like modern terrorists, law enforcement crackdowns on

transnational criminal organizations have forced criminals to expand their use of

networks.‟116 Following this argument some reports indicate that MDC have

starting to collaborate with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(FARC).117 However these relationships are more related with comparative

advantages in cocaine production in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia rather than

Mexican efforts to eradicate drug production. Additionally MDC also collaborate

with Colombian cartels since the mid-nineties.

MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS INTENTIONS.

Mexican Drug cartels are not political motivated, quite the opposite, their

members are profit-oriented and in order to increase the income the organization

is managed with benefit versus cost operations. Even drug activity is not based

on political, social or religious ideology is constituted by three fundamental

intentions: a) it must benefit its own community (at local level and not even

116

Dishman (2005), p. 240 117

Rodriguez and Arroyo (2008).

47


necessary pro-Mexico); b) it must maintain a relative status-quo environment

because it is more convenient for business activities; c) it is pro-US, or at least is

neutral, because it is their biggest and more important client.

Nevertheless many commentators argue that MDC‟ intentions have been

changing in recent years since levels of violence and constant threats to Mexican

institutions have increased. With regard to these new intentions, it is commented

that even drug cartels that are not fully politically oriented are seeking to

challenge and influence the Mexican state in order to intimidate government

efforts. This might be true, however a further analysis will suggest that the

reason of this changes on their strategy, rather than being related to new MDC‟

intentions, is a consequence of different events that have been happening in

Mexico in recent years.

In this regard, as an effect of the democratic process in Mexico —that started in

the 90s, running through its peak point in 2000 but which continues to this date—

this has resulted in the decentralization of responsibilities within the law-

enforcement agencies where some of the old agreements between authorities

and MDC ended. In this context MDC discovered that without protection of the

authorities, only the strongest would survive. Consequently each cartel started to

hire small armies to defend their territories against rival cartels and authorities.

They also continued buying local authorities‟ protection but now under the Pablo

Escobar‟s „silver or lead‟ principle.

Consequently, an open war between MDC and law-enforcements officials started

immediately. The disputed northern territories were transformed in battlefields

and the levels of violence increased in strategic places in Mexico, US, and even

South and Central America where selective assassinations became common

occurrences. In 2006 around 5000 deaths related with these disputes were

48


registered. In 2007 more than 2500 deaths occurred and in 2008 from January to

June 1500 deaths have been registered so far. 118

Certainly, as conflict intensified the methods used by MDC have been changing;

today it is not enough to kill an enemy in order to create and provoke terror and

uncertainty to ones enemies. Applying kidnappings, tortures, mutilation and

decapitation as methods is essential for survival.

These instances represent a clear and dangerous challenge to Mexican

authorities in their „war on drugs‟. However, far from reflecting a mutation in MDC‟

intentions, because there is no evidence of this, the purpose of this violent war is

to inflict fear to rival cartels and inhibit Mexican state efforts to combat MDC

trafficking to the US. It is evident that MDC are changing their intimidation

techniques for more dangerous ones, but they are not seeking to destroy

Mexican state institutions or generate chaos within the territory because,

assuming a rational behaviour, they realize that those conditions could cause

their own demise. As was observed by Mark Sedgwick

[a] radical ideology is indisputably an essential ingredient in producing terrorism. To state the obvious, a terrorist without ideological (or religious, or religio-ideological) motivation would, by most definitions, be either an ordinary criminal or mentally ill. And an ideology that was not radical could hardly justify terrorism.119

In this observation no religious or political motivations exist that fall under MDC

intentions.

MDC‟ intentions in teaming with Al-Qaeda

Criminal and terrorist organizations are looking to establish relations according to

their own intentions and according with the aims and goals they have. In this

118

„Ordenan a PGR dar cifra de victimas del narco desde 1970‟ El Universal July 16, 2008 119

Sedgwick (2007), p. 99

49


sense there is enough evidence about collaborations between terrorist and

criminal groups. Some insurgent groups, such as, Shining Path, in Peru and the

FARC, have relations with local drug cartels.120 The process is simple to

understand; drug-traffickers benefit from terrorists‟ military skills, weapons

supply, and access to secret organizations and terrorist get a source of income

and expertise other activities such as money laundering. Normally, terrorist

groups provide either protection or access to modern weapons, and drug cartels

share the profits.

However according to MDC‟ intentions and capabilities it seems that they are not

looking for modern weaponry, military skills or new drug markets. Possibly,

protection provided by Al-Qaeda might be considered as an intention in teaming

up with them, but it cannot be ignored that MDC are continuously being joined by

ex-militaries that are well-trained and possess knowledge of the Mexican

territory. How effective will be a jihadi fighter in Mexico when compared to a

Mexican soldier trained specifically for this „war on drugs‟?

So what can Al-Qaeda offer to MDC in return for their cooperation? Is there

something useful Al-Qaeda can offer that can benefit MDC in their war?

Apparently no, and in any event this collaboration might be prejudicial for drug

cartels intentions; so why they would like to collaborate with Bin Laden?

It is important to consider that MDC networks are based on their intentions and

are guided by specific needs such as „risk reduction (joining with locals to exploit

local conditions or access corrupt officials), market extension (new products or

outlets), or product exchange (such as guns for drugs).121 In this regard, Al-

Qaeda cannot offer anything to MDC. Firstly, MDC have the best comparative

advantages for drug production within the Mexican territory including in some

South American countries because of their proximity to the US. Secondly,

120

Williams (2005), p,124 121

Sullivan and Bunker (2002), p. 41

50


besides Europe, why would any MDC want to extend its market if the US is the

most important one? And thirdly, why would any MDC purchase any weaponry in

elsewhere considering the US is the biggest weapon manufacturer in the world?

With regard to the collaboration between criminal organizations and terrorists,

Hutchinson and O‟malley pointed out that:

the potential for convergence of two existing groups would seem to depend on the possibility that they would both gain from combined operations, yet at the same time be able to maintain their own operational security—and this seems unlikely over the long term. Organized criminal groups, for example, do not desire media, public, and government attention, where the opposite is true of most terrorist groups. Where terrorists seek political inclusion and legitimation (as in the case of some revolutionary movements) and/or political dominance (as in the case of most religious terrorist organizations), organized crime groups seek optimal “business environments.” Such distinctions curtail any cooperation between these groups at the sporadic level: the risks to security far outweigh the benefits of cooperation.122

In this observation it is accepted that lacking a mutually beneficial relationship will

lead MDC to reject cooperation with Al-Qaeda, and so far there is nothing that

Bin Laden can offer MDC to gain their loyalty.

MDC‟ intentions to attack Mexican or US interests

Regardless of whether collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda materializes,

another question is whether MDC hold the intent to attack Mexican or US

interests.

According to MDCs‟ intentions, no obvious reasons exist to attack US interests

since MDC are not interested in changing the balance of power within the US.

Most importantly the US is MDC best client, so any attack will be considered

prejudicial for their ends. Moreover, only one assassination case pends against

MDC in the US; that of a US law-enforcement official. This was the famous case

122

Hutchinson and O'malley (2007), p.1100

51


of Enrique Camarena an undercover agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA) that was tortured and killed in 1985 by the extinct Cartel of Guadalajara.

The immediate consequences of this assassination were the capture of three

drug lords that were extradited to the US; more DEA agents in Mexico and more

US support to the Mexican government to carry out this „war on drugs‟.123 After

this incident, no DEA agent has been killed.

MDC‟ intentions in attacking Mexican interest are different. Traditionally MDC‟

war is against rival cartels and law enforcement officers who impede their trade.

In this regard several police officers have been killed since the origins of drug

trafficking problems. Historically drug lords had been cautious and have avoided

attacking top-officials, politicians, civil society and any other target that might

cause media attention or a large scale retaliation by Mexican authorities.

However, as a consequence of historical events described above, along with law

enforcement pressure over MDC, the level of violence has escalated significantly.

This leads us to consider the possibility of MDC being interested in attacking

critical Mexican interests in response of this pressure. The failed terrorist attack

of February 2008 in Mexico City against a top law-enforcement official is a first

warning and demonstrates how far MDC are willing to go to maintain their

independence.

This attack may be more related to the imitation of a terrorist technique rather

than as a means of demonstrating changes in MDC intentions. In this regard,

Mark Sedgwick argues that terrorism may be „contagious‟ because in the context

of global waves of terrorism, some groups, regardless of whether they have

previous terrorist activities, are influenced „by recent actual or apparent success

of a terrorist or similar violent strategy anywhere in the world‟124 . He additionally

comment that

123

Ibid 124

Sedgwick (2007), p. 101

52


“[c]ontagion” is possible at two levels, and can happen in two ways. On one level, a group might copy a particular terrorist technique, and on another level a group might copy a general terrorist strategy. Either of these might happen directly or indirectly. Direct contagion might occur when a member of one established terrorist group personally assists in training members of another group in a particular technique, or personally assists in establishing a distinct, new terrorist group. Alternatively, there might be no direct contact; contagion might be indirect, when a group observes the apparent success elsewhere of either a technique or a general strategy.125

In this analysis, the possibility of collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda is

unlikely to occur at this moment. Consequently the best explanation found for the

February attack was that MDC are copying terrorist techniques. This is extremely

worrying for Mexican intelligence agencies because it reinforce suspicions that

suggest MDC are changing their intimidation techniques. Nonetheless, we must

consider what Sedgwick concludes that „[a] particular terrorist technique in only of

interest to a group that has already made the decision to adopt a terrorist

strategy; [but] a technique cannot on its own cause a resort to terrorism‟126

Finally, even though the so called „Colombianization of “Mexico”‟ is far from

coming to pass, there are several security warnings Mexican intelligence

agencies must guard against because otherwise the country could plunge into an

unprecedented escalation of violence.

MDC‟ intentions to facilitate an Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or US

Even though it is considered that MDC intentions in attacking US interests are

improbable, it could be feasible for them to facilitate, wittingly or unwittingly, an

Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or US.

As was observed throughout this study, any collaboration with Al-Qaeda would

be prejudicial for MDC‟ own ends with immediate consequences. Unwittingly,

125

Ibid, p. 102 126

Sedgwick (2007).

53


collaboration might be possible, though we cannot ignore that within MDC‟s

organization almost everything is controlled for their leaders.

Nevertheless this statement relates more with concerns about undocumented

migration to the US, where US intelligence authorities are worried about the

possibility of terrorist cells using migration routes to enter into the US.

Despite US media alarms and disinformation, undocumented migration coming

from Mexico is not related to terrorist activity so far. There is no single hard

evidence that confirms the opposite. Furthermore, some experts have argued

that the real US open corridor is Canada through where many of the 9/11

attackers entered the US. 127

In this regard, using a data base created from the biographical data of 373

terrorist, Leiken and Brooke found out that

[i]n light of the public attention to the specter of illegal terrorist entry through the U.S. southern border, we conducted an extensive search but found not a single entrant from Mexico. In contrast, we found 26 subjects with Canada as a host country, three of whom, including the Millennium Bomber Ahmed Ressam, entered or attempted to enter the U.S.

Forty-six percent of those in Canada became naturalized Canadian citizens. Sixty two percent of the Canadian-hosted sample came originally from North Africa: 10 Algerians, three Moroccans, and three Tunisians. This high correlation between the Maghreb and Canada again echoes immigration channels. Many Maghrebis possess at least a working knowledge of French, and immigration networks bridge France and the Maghreb, as we have shown above. At least seven of the Canadian-hosted individuals in our chart, such as Ressam and other members of the „„Fateh Kamel network,‟‟ spent time in France before arriving in Canada, where they settled in and around French-speaking Montreal.

Forty-two percent of the subjects hosted in Canada entered via asylum claims. Fifty-four percent of those claiming asylum saw their claim denied yet remained in the country. Canada‟s asylum system provides claimants with „„generous welfare and social assistance programs,‟‟ into which Ressam and his cohorts dipped while they plotted their attack. These conditions have attracted notice in jihadi circles. A senior FBI official says that Canada is the most worrisome

127

Leiken and Brooke (2006), p. 511

54


terrorist point of entry, and Al Qaeda training manuals advise agents to enter the U.S. through Canada rather than through France.128

Thus, though the Mexico-US border might still pose a terrorist threat to the US, it

seems there is currently no direct relationship between migration and terrorism.

Additionally any potential collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda analyzed

throughout this study leads us to conclude that for the moment such collaboration

is unlikely to occur.

128

Ibid, p.513

55


CONCLUSIONS

Mexico and the US have a difficult history regarding of their common frontier. In

the XXI century new problems have complicated even more the relationship

between both countries when terrorist issues and adversaries with intentions and

capabilities to hit interests in both sides of the border need to be faced.

In this regard, it cannot be ignored some facts: a) Mexico has terrorist activities

where leftist guerrilla groups and Drug Cartels organizations, that currently have

the monopoly of the violence, are imitating terrorist techniques to defy the state;

b) Mexico has previous experiences where the country was utilized by

international terrorist groups to achieve objectives of its agenda against foreign

countries; c) MDC and Al-Qaeda have complementary capabilities that makes

attractive any collaboration between both organizations; d) Al-Qaeda has a global

strategy to hit US interests anywhere and everywhere, in this observe the

possibility of an Al-Qaeda attack specifically in Mexico is likely to occur.

Nevertheless, those are not enough factors to consider a collaboration between

both groups to attack both Mexican or US interests, because when an attack or

collaboration with another group are planned, the group‟s intentions indicate how

far a group is willing to go in implementing its terrorist activities. Is in this regard

that the adversary‟ intentions required to be deeply studied and analyzed to

provide a close insight of his agenda and therefore be able to estimate the level

of threat posed by such adversary.

Consequently at this moment it seems that some are exaggerating the link

between Mexican drug cartels and Al-Qaeda. Both have different aims, goals and

its networks are originated by different motives. Nonetheless, even in the short-

term this collaboration seems improbable, intelligence agencies must be

prepared to monitor closely both groups‟ intentions because these may change

56


from time to time, and those things that today are considered unreasonable by

intelligence analysts, could probably become the opposite in the near future.

57


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