1. The Russian Revolution1815-1924 Great October; April, 1917-January, 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009

2. Major Topics Introduction: The Hero in History The Sealed Train July Days Kornilov Great October Socialist Revolution Land! Peace! Bread! The Death of ConstitutionalismTuesday, October 20, 2009 3. Sidney Hook. The Hero in History. 1940 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 4. The Soviet Holy Trinity Tuesday, October 20, 2009 5. The Word Made Flesh Tuesday, October 20, 2009 6. Christ has died, Christ is risen Tuesday, October 20, 2009 7. Christ has died, Christ is risenLENIN- LIVED,LENIN- LIVES,LENIN-SHALL LIVE! Tuesday, October 20, 2009 8. Great Men versus Blind Forces Tuesday, October 20, 2009 9. Great Men versus Blind Forces April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009 10. Great Men versus Blind Forces April Theses July Days Tuesday, October 20, 2009 11. Great Men versus Blind Forces April Theses July DaysRed OctoberTuesday, October 20, 2009 12. Great Men versus Blind Forces April Theses July DaysRed OctoberBrest-LitovskTuesday, October 20, 2009 13. One need not believe that history is made by great men toappreciate the immense importance of Lenin for the RussianRevolution and the regime that emerged from it...the regime that heestablished in October 1917 institutionalized, as it were, hispersonality.Communist Russia, therefore, was throughout itsseventy-four years to an unusual extent the embodiment of the mindand psyche of one manPipes, p. 101 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 14. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 15. THE PARTYMIND,HONOR& CONSCIENCEOF OUREPOCHTuesday, October 20, 2009 16. The Sealed Train Tuesday, October 20, 2009 17. The locomotivewhich brought the The Sealed TrainBolshevik bacillus across Germany Tuesday, October 20, 2009 18. 1920 photo of Lenins Zurich tenementTuesday, October 20, 2009 19. 1920 photo of Lenins Zurich tenementTuesday, October 20, 2009 20. Lenin Hits BottomThe war years were for Lenin and Krupskaya a time ofsevere trials, a time of poverty and isolation from Russia.They lived in quarters that bordered on slums, took theirmeals in the company of prostitutes and criminals, andfound themselves abandoned by many past followers whohad come to regard Lenin as a dangerous fanatic. The onlyshaft of light for Lenin during this dark period was his loveaair with Inessa Armand, the daughter of two music hallartists and the wife of a wealthy Russian. She had metLenin in Paris in 1910 and soon became his mistress underthe tolerant eye of Krupskaya. Armand seems to have beenthe only human being with whom Lenin ever establishedtrue intimacy. Pipes, p. 112 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 21. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 22. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 23. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 24. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 25. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 26. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 27. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 28. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 29. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 30. For all his talk of civil war, Lenin had little faith in the imminence of revolution. Addressing a gathering of socialist youths in Zurich on January of 9/22 1917, he predicted that while Europe would not escape social upheaval, we old-timers perhaps shall not live [to see] the decisive battles of the looming revolution.Seven weeks later, tsarism collapsed.Pipes, p. 113 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 31. There is a tide... Tuesday, October 20, 2009 32. There is a tide... There is a tide in the affairs of men Which taken at the ood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries.Julius Csar. Act i. Sc. 3. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 33. The Parvus Puzzle born in the shtetl Berezino, raised in Odessa, began associating with The Bund 1886-age 19, ed the pogroms to Zurich 1891-PhD in philosophy, Marxist, emigrated to Germany, joined the SPD, befriended fellow emigreRosa Luxemburg 1900-meets Lenin in Munich, encourages the publication of Iskra 1904-predicts Russia would lose the war with Japan, German intelligence recruits him to work against Imperial Russia born Israel Lazarevich Gelfand( )1867-1924 1905-arrives in Skt-Peterburg with false papers, triesRevolutionary nom de guerre to engineer nancial collapse, exiled to SiberiaPARVUSTuesday, October 20, 2009 34. The Strategy of Permanent Revolution The nal act of the 1905 Revolution was played out in Moscow. OnDecember 6, the Moscow Soviet, dominated by the Bolsheviks, calledfor an armed uprising to overthrow the tsarist government, convene aConstituent Assembly, and proclaim a democratic republic. Thestrategy behind this action, which came to be known as one ofpermanent revolution, was formulated by Alexander Helphand .Parvus argued that socialists should not allow the rst stage of theRevolution to solidify bourgeois rule but proceed at once to thenext, socialist phase. Witte ruthlessly crushed the Moscow uprising.Pipes, pp. 43-44 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 35. Does Parvus nance Lenins return? 1906-all three Siberian prisoners, pictured here, escaped to the West; Parvus to Germany, Trotsky to NYC Parvus arranges to produce Maxim Gorkys play, The Lower Depths, with prots divided between Gorky & the RSDLP. He is accused of pocketing the proceeds during the Balkan wars he is an agent for Germany in Istanbul. He also Parvus (left) with fellow Siberian exiles,prots as an arms merchant for Krupp Lev Bronstein (Trotsky) & Lev Deich & Vickers Ltd (Leo Deutch) a Menshevik leader 1915-he convinces German intelligence to support the Russian emigresTuesday, October 20, 2009 36. The support that nearly all European socialist parties gave theirnational governments at the outbreak of war unquestionablybetrayed their solemn [pacist] pledges...provoked a crisis withinthe international socialist movement.[There was a] pro-war majority against a minority with strongRussian representation, which demanded an instant suspension ofhostilities. Lenin headed the extreme wing of that minority in thatinstead of calling for immediate peace, he insisted that thewar between nations be transformed into a war betweenclasses [even though civil war at home entailed militarydefeat by Germany]. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 37. Lenins anti-Russian propaganda, his open endorsement of Russias defeat, attracted the attention of the German government. One of its experts on Russian aairs was Alexander Helphand-Parvus.After the outbreak of the war, he argued that the interests of Russian revolutionaries and those of the German government coincided.In 1915 he contacted Lenin in Zurich, but at that point Lenin rejected his advances. [Lenin] agreed, however, in return for nancial help, to supply another German agent...with reports on internal conditions in Russia sent to him by his followers there. These activities, as well as his relations with the Austrian government, constituted high treason and Lenin maintained about them to the end of his life complete silence. They only came to light after German and Austrian archives were thrown open.Pipes, p.111 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 38. [In 1917, after the February Revolution] the principal proponent ofthe Lenin card was Parvus.With extraordinary foresight hepredicted that once Lenin returned home he would topple theProvisional Government, take charge, and conclude a separate peace.He understood Lenins lust for powerAt 3:20 p.m. on March 27/April 9, thirty-two Russian migrs left theZurich railway station for the German frontier. Among thepassengers were Lenin, Krupskaya, Grigorii Zinoviev with his wifeand child, and Inessa Armand.In Stockholm, Parvus awaited them. He asked to meet Lenin, butLenin refused, turning him over to Karl Radek it is virtuallycertain that the two worked out the terms of Germansupport for the Bolsheviks.Pipes, pp. 115-117Tuesday, October 20, 2009 39. Swiss Communist Fritz Platten, 1883-1942 after the collapse of the SecondInternational he joined the ZimmerwaldMovement and became a communist he was most famous for arranging thetrip in the sealed train from Zurich toStettin, thence by ferry to neutralStockholm 1919-Platten was active in thefoundation Third (Communist)International and spent time in theUSSR representing the Swiss CP Lenin and Platten in 1919 1938-arrested in the Stalinist purges,sent to a camp where he was shot in1942Tuesday, October 20, 2009 40. The Route of the Sealed Train Tuesday, October 20, 2009 41. The Route of the Sealed Train the trip in the sealed train from Zurich to Stettin, thence by ferry to neutral Stockholm Swedish communists then arranged the train trip north to the Swedish-Finland border through Russian Finland to the Finland Station in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009 42. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 43. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 44. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 45. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 46. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 47. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009 48. Lenin reads the April Theses 4 April 1917Tuesday, October 20, 2009 49. The April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009 50. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 51. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 52. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Asserts that Russia is "passing from the rst [bourgeois] stage of the revolution which, owing to the insucient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisieto its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; Tuesday, October 20, 2009 53. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Asserts that Russia is "passing from the rst [bourgeois] stage of the revolution which, owing to the insucient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisieto its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the inuence of the bourgeoisie and spread that inuence among the proletariat." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 54. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Asserts that Russia is "passing from the rst [bourgeois] stage of the revolution which, owing to the insucient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisieto its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the inuence of the bourgeoisie and spread that inuence among the proletariat." Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS, JBP] Tuesday, October 20, 2009 55. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Asserts that Russia is "passing from the rst [bourgeois] stage of the revolution which, owing to the insucient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisieto its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the inuence of the bourgeoisie and spread that inuence among the proletariat." Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS, JBP] Calls for "abolition of the police, the army, and the bureaucracy" and for "the salaries of all ocials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 56. The April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009 57. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," conscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 58. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," conscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 59. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," conscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 60. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," conscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social Democracy," whose ocial leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin rst developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he rst called the pro-war social-democrats "social chauvinists." Tuesday, October 20, 2009 61. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," conscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social Democracy," whose ocial leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin rst developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he rst called the pro-war social-democrats "social chauvinists." Calls for a new "revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and against the 'Center.'" This later became the Comintern (Third International) formed in 1919.Tuesday, October 20, 2009 62. April Riots Coalition Government Tuesday, October 20, 2009 63. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet Tuesday, October 20, 2009 64. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet wanted war till victory but without annexations and indemnities Tuesday, October 20, 2009 65. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet wanted war till victory but without annexations and indemnities Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople Tuesday, October 20, 2009 66. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet wanted war till victory but without annexations and indemnities Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior ocers which the Bolsheviks joined Tuesday, October 20, 2009 67. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet wanted war till victory but without annexations and indemnities Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior ocers which the Bolsheviks joined in this rst crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the Soviet to enter a coalition Tuesday, October 20, 2009 68. April Riots Coalition Government a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet wanted war till victory but without annexations and indemnities Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior ocers which the Bolsheviks joined in this rst crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the Soviet to enter a coalition Miliukov and Guchkov were out, six socialists from the Soviet accepted ministries, andKerensky [the only SR] became War Minister Tuesday, October 20, 2009 69. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 70. By entering the bourgeois government, the socialists automatically came to share the blame for everything that went wrong, for they were now part of the establishment. This allowed the Bolsheviks, who refused to join, to pose as...the tr ue custodians of the Revolution. And since under the hopelessly incompetent administration of liberal and socialist intellectuals events were bound to go from bad to worse, they positioned themselves as the only party able to save Russia.Pipes, p. 120Tuesday, October 20, 2009 71. Delegates to the First All-Russian Session of Workers and Soldiers Deputiesphotographed in the Tauride Palace, former home of the Duma, June, 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 72. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 73. Street demonstration in Petrograd, June, 1917The banner in the foreground reads: Down with the 10 capitalist ministers/All power to the Soviets of Workers,Soldiers and Peasants Deputies & to the Socialist Ministers/We demand that Nicholas II be transferred to Peter and Paul Fortress Tuesday, October 20, 2009 74. July Days Tuesday, October 20, 2009 75. July DaysPetrograd, July 4, 1917. Street demonstration on Nevsky Prospekt just after troops of theProvisional Government have opened re with machine guns.Tuesday, October 20, 2009 76. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals Tuesday, October 20, 2009 77. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government Tuesday, October 20, 2009 78. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 79. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and Tuesday, October 20, 2009 80. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so Tuesday, October 20, 2009 81. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so3. they thought in global terms and didnt much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 82. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so3. they thought in global terms and didnt much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution they could act with complete irresponsibility Tuesday, October 20, 2009 83. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so3. they thought in global terms and didnt much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution they could act with complete irresponsibility promise every group what it wanted Tuesday, October 20, 2009 84. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the sole alternative to the Provisional Government2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: they were really willing to use force, and they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so3. they thought in global terms and didnt much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution they could act with complete irresponsibility promise every group what it wanted encourage every destructive trend Tuesday, October 20, 2009 85. RED GUARD [of the] The banner reads:photo from 1917 factoryVulcan II. GR.Tuesday, October 20, 2009 86. Red Guard bodyguards for BolshevikNachalstvo (leadership) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 87. The Other Bolshevik ToolPravda (Truth) nanced by the German government Tuesday, October 20, 2009 88. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 89. The antiwar propaganda was carried out in muted tones, for the troops hated the Germans and Lenin was already under suspicion of being their a gent. Bolshevik newspapers distributed in vast quantities to the men in uniform carried a subtile message that was propagandistic rather than agitational in nature:* The soldiers were not to lay down their arms, but ponder who wanted war and to what end? (The answer: the bourgeoisie) This was a veiled appeal for civil war. The troops were exhorted under no circumstances to let themselves be used against the workers (by which was meant the Bolshevik Party).Pipes, pp. 120-21 ________________ *In the vocabulary of the Russian Revolutionaries, agitation meant an appeal to immediate action, whereas propaganda called for planting ideas in subjects minds which in due course would move them to act on their own Tuesday, October 20, 2009 90. Kerensky as Warlord an oensive was scheduled for mid-June Kerenskys personal contribution consisted in rousing the troops with patriotic speeches these had an enormous immediate eect which evaporated as soon as he left the generals regarded such rhetoric sceptically, dubbing the Minister Persuader in Chief the will to ght was no longer there Why should I die now when at home a new, freer life is only beginning?Saluting in the carriage as troops pass in reviewTuesday, October 20, 2009 91. Kerensky visiting troops at the front, 1917Tuesday, October 20, 2009 92. In Petrograd with his aides-de-campTuesday, October 20, 2009 93. In Petrograd with his aides-de-campTuesday, October 20, 2009 94. The Failed Kerensky Oensive Tuesday, October 20, 2009 95. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians Tuesday, October 20, 2009 96. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () Tuesday, October 20, 2009 97. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () Tuesday, October 20, 2009 98. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions Tuesday, October 20, 2009 99. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions the June oensive was the dying gasp of the Russian army Tuesday, October 20, 2009 100. The Failed Kerensky Oensive 16 June-the oensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions the June oensive was the dying gasp of the Russian army this military failure weakened the reputation of Kerensky and his governmentTuesday, October 20, 2009 101. The July Uprising Tuesday, October 20, 2009 102. The July Uprising 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministersresigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over anotherissue Tuesday, October 20, 2009 103. The July Uprising 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministersresigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over anotherissue neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctlyassessing that the correlation of forces didnt bode well Tuesday, October 20, 2009 104. The July Uprising 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministersresigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over anotherissue neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctlyassessing that the correlation of forces didnt bode well 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-oldsoldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to thefront, military demonstrations erupted Tuesday, October 20, 2009 105. The July Uprising 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministersresigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over anotherissue neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctlyassessing that the correlation of forces didnt bode well 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-oldsoldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to thefront, military demonstrations erupted 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marchedon both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latterassume all power Tuesday, October 20, 2009 106. The July Uprising 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministersresigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over anotherissue neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctlyassessing that the correlation of forces didnt bode well 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-oldsoldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to thefront, military demonstrations erupted 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marchedon both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latterassume all power 5 July--the turning point Kerensky releases forged (were they?)documents connecting the Bolsheviks to their German paymastersTuesday, October 20, 2009 107. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 108. Kronstadt Sailors SMERT BOORZHOOYAM(Death to the Bourgeoisie) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 109. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 110. Lenins Role? 4 July--originally out of Petrograd in Finland, Lenin returned hastily and addressed the demonstrators outside the Tauride Palace he counseled a peaceful demonstration but echoed their demand (originally his!) of All Power to the Soviets had he planned a coup as Lunacharsky later claimed? did he chicken out when he saw an unfavorable correlation of forces as Pipes claims (p. 127)? was he instrumental in persuading the Bolshevik Central Committee to take a leadership role in the uprising even though it was doomed to fail and the party would be hunted down and suppressed in the aftermath? (the ocial Soviet history and Sidney Hooks version) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 111. Wikis take No public record was ever made of the internal debates of the Bolshevik Party around the July Days. There were some within the Bolshevik Party who advocated an intensication of activity on July 4th. Most prominent among those were Nikolai Podvoisky and Vladimir Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik Military Organization, Volodarsky a member of the Petersburg Committee and Martin Latis of the Vyborg District Bolshevik Organization, who was highly critical of the Central Committee's decision to hold back the masses. Others in the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin were split on what to do. On July 5th at two or three o'clock in the morning, after the Provisional Government dispatched a number of loyal troops from the front to the streets of Petrograd and won the support of a number of previously neutral garrisons of troops, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to call off the street demonstrations.Tuesday, October 20, 2009 112. Bolsheviks on the run Lenin with a wig,as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 113. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control Lenin with a wig,as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 114. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks Lenin with a wig,as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 115. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command Lenin with a wig,as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 116. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be rmly in controlLenin with a wig, as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 117. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be rmly in control despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putschLenin with a wig, as a fugitive in FinlandTuesday, October 20, 2009 118. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be rmly in control despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putschLenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Lenin takes this time in hiding to nish his blueprint, State and RevolutionTuesday, October 20, 2009 119. Bolsheviks on the run with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be rmly in control despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putschLenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Lenin takes this time in hiding to nish his blueprint, State and RevolutionTuesday, October 20, 2009 120. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 121. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 the key concept is that the bourgeois state (Provisional Government) must be shattered, broken to pieces Tuesday, October 20, 2009 122. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 the key concept is that the bourgeois state (Provisional Government) must be shattered, broken to pieces quoting Marx--the state is the instrument of class oppression and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be broken up (zerbrechen) and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marxs stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 123. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 the key concept is that the bourgeois state (Provisional Government) must be shattered, broken to pieces quoting Marx--the state is the instrument of class oppression and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be broken up (zerbrechen) and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marxs stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) only thus can the state begin to wither away (stage 3) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 124. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 the key concept is that the bourgeois state (Provisional Government) must be shattered, broken to pieces quoting Marx--the state is the instrument of class oppression and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be broken up (zerbrechen) and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marxs stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) only thus can the state begin to wither away (stage 3) in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 dictatorship will employ managers and bookkeepers paid workmens wages Tuesday, October 20, 2009 125. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 the key concept is that the bourgeois state (Provisional Government) must be shattered, broken to pieces quoting Marx--the state is the instrument of class oppression and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be broken up (zerbrechen) and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marxs stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) only thus can the state begin to wither away (stage 3) in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 dictatorship will employ managers and bookkeepers paid workmens wages much of Lenins argument is to point out the errors of the Social- Democrats like Germanys Karl Kautsky and Russian SR, Viktor Chernov Tuesday, October 20, 2009 126. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Tuesday, October 20, 2009 127. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical giftsLev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 128. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical gifts operational direction of the coup isentrusted to the Bolshevik MilitaryOrganization headed by N.I. PodvoiskiiLev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 129. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical gifts operational direction of the coup isentrusted to the Bolshevik MilitaryOrganization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii Trotsky compliments Lenin. Betterread, a superior speaker, he can movecrowds; whereas Lenins charisma islimited to his followersLev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 130. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical gifts operational direction of the coup isentrusted to the Bolshevik MilitaryOrganization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii Trotsky compliments Lenin. Betterread, a superior speaker, he can movecrowds; whereas Lenins charisma islimited to his followers but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 131. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical gifts operational direction of the coup isentrusted to the Bolshevik MilitaryOrganization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii Trotsky compliments Lenin. Betterread, a superior speaker, he can movecrowds; whereas Lenins charisma islimited to his followers but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: he had joined the party late Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 132. With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forcespasses to his associates. (Pipes, p. 128) Trotsky is the most visible, owing tohis outstanding rhetorical gifts operational direction of the coup isentrusted to the Bolshevik MilitaryOrganization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii Trotsky compliments Lenin. Betterread, a superior speaker, he can movecrowds; whereas Lenins charisma islimited to his followers but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: he had joined the party late Lev Davidovich Bronstein, he is insuerably arrogant AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 133. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 134. The event that enabled the Bolsheviks to recover fromtheir July debacle was one of the more bizarre episodes ofthe Russian Revolution. Known to historians as theKornilov aair, it resulted from a struggle in Kerenskysmind between his sense that as head of state in a situationof near-anarchy and a looming German oensive heneeded the armys support, and his fear as a socialistintellectual that the army was likely to breed acounterrevolutionary Napoleon.* Pipes, p. 129___________________* In private conversations with the author, Kerensky conceded that his actions at the timehad been strongly inuenced by the experience of the French Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 135. Kornilov Tuesday, October 20, 2009 136. General Lavr Kornilov Kornilov in 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 137. German troops enter Riga, 3 September 1917Tuesday, October 20, 2009 138. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 139. [Kornilov] had made a rapid career in the army owing to personal courage and his ability to inspire troops. He knew little and cared less about politics; such opinions as he had on the subject were neither conservative nor monarchist but rather progressive. he was an ardent p a t r i o t . He a l w a y s d i s p l a y e d a t e n d e n c y t o insubordination.Pipes, p. 129 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 140. Lavr Georgeivich Kornilov, 1870-1918 born to a Siberian cossack military family graduate of the artillery school, distinguishedservice in the Russo- Japanese and First WorldWars 1917-commanded the only successful partof the Kerensky oensive, he was oeredcommand of all the Russian forces Kornilov accepted, but on certainconditions: removal of the most harmful provisions of Order No. 1 reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion or mutiny, at the front or at the rearTuesday, October 20, 2009 141. The Two Rivals Kornilov loves freedom...but Russia comes for him rst, and freedom second, while for Kerensky...freedom and revolution come rst, and Russia second--Boris Savinkov, Kerenskys deputy negotiations dragged on for two weeks before Kornilov receives agreement to his conditions. But Kerensky, hostage to the Soviet, never fullls the agreement 14 August--Kornilov speaks at the Moscow State Conference over Kerenskys objection. He is wildly cheered. Liberal and conservative politicians look to him as the countrys savior. ...after the Moscow conference it was clear to me that the next attempt at a blow would come from the right and not from the left.--Aleksandr Kerensky Tuesday, October 20, 2009 142. Kornilov at the Moscow Conference taking the crowds cheers as he tours in an open limosineTuesday, October 20, 2009 143. Misunderstanding or Kerensky Plot? 22-27 August--the events of the Kornilov aair are quite complex and involve third party players who to this day remain unknown suce it to say that Kerensky pretended to believe that Kornilov was demanding dictatorial powers to deal with a suspected Bolshevik coup he thereupon relieved him of command and ordered his arrest. He also armed the Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks to defend against a counterrevolutionary coup at this point Kornilov did rebel but only after having been wrongly charged with rebellion --Pipes, p. 134Tuesday, October 20, 2009 144. Was there a Kornilov plot? Almost certainly not. The available evidence indicates there was a Kerensky plot to discredit the commanding general as the ringleader of an imaginary but widely anticipated counterrevolution, the suppression of which would elevate the Prime Minister to a position of unrivaled popularity...Neither Kerensky nor the Bolsheviks have ever been able to identify a single person who would admit, or of whom it could be demonstrated, that he was in collusion with Kornilov: and a conspiracy of one is an obvious absurdity. Pipes, p. 135Tuesday, October 20, 2009 145. Outcomes of the Aair Tuesday, October 20, 2009 146. Outcomes of the Aair Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists Tuesday, October 20, 2009 147. Outcomes of the Aair Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards Tuesday, October 20, 2009 148. Outcomes of the Aair Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections Tuesday, October 20, 2009 149. Outcomes of the Aair Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections most sinister was the break between Kerensky and the military. The ocer corps despised this treatment of their popular commander and Kerenskys pandering to the left. When, in late October, he would appeal to the military to help save his government from the Bolsheviks, he would meet with no response.Tuesday, October 20, 2009 150. Great October Socialist Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 151. Great October Socialist Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 152. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009 153. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009 154. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009 155. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 156. Boris Kustodiev (1878-1927) The Bolshevik (1920) The Treytyakov Gallery Tuesday, October 20, 2009 157. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly Tuesday, October 20, 2009 158. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the rst session for 28 November/10 December Tuesday, October 20, 2009 159. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the rst session for 28 November/10 December Lenins sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body Tuesday, October 20, 2009 160. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the rst session for 28 November/10 December Lenins sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body after November he would be rebelling, not against a bourgeois government; but against the will of the people Tuesday, October 20, 2009 161. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the rst session for 28 November/10 December Lenins sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body after November he would be rebelling, not against a bourgeois government; but against the will of the people hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of the people Tuesday, October 20, 2009 162. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the rst session for 28 November/10 December Lenins sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body after November he would be rebelling, not against a bourgeois government; but against the will of the people hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of the people although Lenin wanted immediate action, he had to yield to the majority of his associates who preferred the coup be carried out in the name of the soviets Tuesday, October 20, 2009 163. Trotsky and the MilRevCom Tuesday, October 20, 2009 164. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 165. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the rst time Tuesday, October 20, 2009 166. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the rst time soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman Tuesday, October 20, 2009 167. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the rst time soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet Tuesday, October 20, 2009 168. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the rst time soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet city after city followed Tuesday, October 20, 2009 169. Trotsky and the MilRevCom 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the rst time soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet city after city followed 13 October-Petrograd established the Military Revolutionary Committee with Trotsky as its chairman Tuesday, October 20, 2009 170. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 171. The precipitating event was a German naval operation in the Gulf of Riga. When completed in early October with the occupation of three strategic islands, it created a direct threat to Petrograd. Fearing German capture, the Russian General Staff proposed to evacuate the government from Petrograd to Moscow. The Ispolkom condemned the plan...as motivated by...the desire of the Provisional Government to surrender the capital of the Revolution. ...the Bolsheviks moved and the Soviet Plenum approved--over Menshevik objections--a motion to form a Revolutionary Committee of Defense to assume charge of the citys security not only against the Germans but also againstdomestic counterrevolutionaries.Pipes, pp. 140-41 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 172. Ispolkom caves to a Bolshevik 2nd Congress Tuesday, October 20, 2009 173. Ispolkom caves to a Bolshevik 2nd Congress Trotsky, as chair of the Petrograd Soviet, stacks the voting for calling a second All-Russian Congress of Soviets for October/November the Ispolkom, dominated by Mensheviks and SRs, rst condemned this action in the strongest terms 26 Sept/9 Oct-they reversed themselves, agreeing to a Bolshevik-picked Congress to convene on 25 Oct/7 November it was an astonishing and, as it turned out, a fatal capitulation Although aware of what the Bolsheviks had in mind, the Ispolkom gave them what they wanted: a handpicked body, packed with their adherents and allies, to legitimize a coup detat Tuesday, October 20, 2009 174. The Politburo although the caption suggests that the graphic reects the eve of the October Revolution, the prominence of Stalin suggests a later date this organ is the inner circle of the party, within the Central Committee Lenin had to convince this group that his timing and strategy was correct he secretly returned to Petrograd from Finland early in October 10/23 October-Lenin convinced all but Kamenev and Zinoviev of the need to actTuesday, October 20, 2009 175. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 176. Mesmerized by Bolshevik audacity, the Mensheviks andS R s r e s i g n e d t h e m s e l v e s to a n o t h e r B o l s h e v i kadventure, but they were not overly concerned, certainthat it would fail like their July putsch. Trotsky, whoduring these critical days was everywhere at once, waged awar of nerves, one day admitting, the next denying, thatan insurrection was under way. He held audiencesspellbound with speeches that alternately promised andthreatened, extolled and ridiculed. Pipes, p.142Tuesday, October 20, 2009 177. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009 178. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009 179. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! Tuesday, October 20, 2009 180. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards Tuesday, October 20, 2009 181. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars Tuesday, October 20, 2009 182. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force Tuesday, October 20, 2009 183. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughoutPetrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or weredisarmedTuesday, October 20, 2009 184. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, nomore than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks but the government could count on even fewer! Most remainedneutral The result of the Kornilov aair! and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughoutPetrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or weredisarmed no resistance was encountered, no shots exchanged Tuesday, October 20, 2009 185. The Latvian Riemen Tuesday, October 20, 2009 186. The Latvian Riemen military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 187. The Latvian Riemen military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 188. The Latvian Riemen military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riemen Division. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 189. The Latvian Riemen military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riemen Division. 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009 190. The Latvian Riemen military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riemen Division. 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with the Bolsheviks these units became Lenins most reliable troops during the entire civil war (1918-1921)Tuesday, October 20, 2009 191. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 192. TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA! The Provisional Government has been deposed. Government authority has passed into the hands of an organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the Militar y Revolutionary Committee, which stands at the head of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. The task for which the people have been struggling--the immediate oer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlord property in land, worker control over production, the creation of a Soviet Government--this task is assured. Long Live the Revolution of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants!proclaimed by Lenin, 9 a.m., 25 October 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 193. Fact versus Myth the cabinet that Lenin had declared deposed sat in the Winter Palace awaiting help their protectors: two or three detachments of military cadets, the Womans Death Battalion of 140 volunteers, some cossacks, a bicycle unit, and 40 war invalids commanded by an ocer with articial legs at dawn a half-hearted attack went forward but retreated at the rst hostile re 6:30 p.m. an ultimatum to surrender was ignored 9:00 p.m. the cruiser Aurora, with no live ammunition, red a blank salvo 11:00 p.m. the guns of Petropavlovsk fortress opened re. Two of thirty-ve rounds red hit the targetTuesday, October 20, 2009 194. Iconic scenes from Eisensteins Oktyabr, 1928 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 195. Iconic scenes from Eisensteins Oktyabr, 1928 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 196. The Congress of Soviets rubber stampsthe coup 25 October-Lenin delayed the opening of the Congress until the fall of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the ministers only Kerensky escaped, disguised as a Serbian military ocer, with the U.S. Embassys aid Of the 650 delegates 338 were Bolshevik. They were supported by the Left SRs, another 98. This gave Lenin a two-thirds majority around 1 a.m. 26 October word arrived that the Winter palace was in Bolshevik hands thereafter followed the Decree on Peace and the Land Decrees along with creation of a new provisional government, the Council of Peoples Commissars (Sovnarkom) and a Central Executive Committee (C.E.C./ orTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets, both dominated by the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009 197. Creation of the One Party State in the weeks and months that followed Great October Lenin quietly discarded the pretense of a government coalition some of the Bolsheviks expected to share power with the other socialists and the left SRs this was never Lenins plan Sovnarkom was originally styled the Provisional Government before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly this led many to believe that nothing important had really changed with the coup after the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, the provisional was quietly dropped Tuesday, October 20, 2009 198. Land! Peace! Bread! Tuesday, October 20, 2009 199. FREEDOM Land! Peace! Bread!BONDSPoster from 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 200. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 201. One of the rst acts of the Bolshevik leaders was aimed atsatisfying the peasant demand for land. Taking a leaf from theagrarian program of the left SRs, Lenin had proposed on 8November [N.S.], and the Congress of Soviets had accepted, adecree on land. This decree, the most radical approach to theagrarian question ever undertaken in Russia, provided that allland owned by landlords, the crown, the churches andmonasteries, together with all livestock and implements onsuch land, be transferred without compensation to the formerowners into the temporary custody of peasant land committeesand peasant soviets until the meeting of the ConstituentAssembly. Title to the land was to be vested in the state, butthe use of it was to be given to the peasants in perpetuity. Harcave, pp. 495-96Tuesday, October 20, 2009 202. Bolshevik Goals after Great October Tuesday, October 20, 2009 203. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009 204. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally Tuesday, October 20, 2009 205. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential Tuesday, October 20, 2009 206. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a breathing spellduring which to: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 207. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a breathing spellduring which to: 1) consolidate their authority Tuesday, October 20, 2009 208. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a breathing spellduring which to: 1) consolidate their authority 2) organize an administration Tuesday, October 20, 2009 209. Bolshevik Goals after Great October 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a breathing spellduring which to: 1) consolidate their authority 2) organize an administration 3) build a new, revolutionary army Tuesday, October 20, 2009 210. Divisions within the Bolsheviks Lenin was prepared to make peace with the Central Powers on almost any terms as long as they left him in power this was by no means the prevalent view in Bolshevik ranks most believed instead of making peace with her, Russia should make every eort to provoke the Proletarian Revolution in Germany Trotsky and Bukharin led the opposition. they argued that peace would help the enemy more than it would help Russia let them invade. It would arouse the Russians to ght harder and stir the souls of theworking classes abroad Most of the time Lenin found himself in a minority, sometimes a minority of one Tuesday, October 20, 2009 211. Commander of the Disintegrating Army early Bolshevik, active in 1905 played chess with Lenin in Zurich ensign in the tsarist army, leader in theMilRevKom sent to the Stavka in Mogilev whenacting Commander-in-Chief Dukhoninrefused to begin peace negotiations withthe Germans 20 November--the soldiers lynchedDukhonin upon Krylenkos arrival Nikolai Krylenko (1885-1938) he then took over and ordered individualunits to negotiate cease-res with theiropposites Tuesday, October 20, 2009 212. German and Russian troops fraternizing, winter of 1917-1918Tuesday, October 20, 2009 213. MogilevBrest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009 214. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting220 milesMogilev BrestLitovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009 215. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting 220 miles Russian soldiers desertionsskyrocketed after the Bolshevik coupMogilevBrest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009 216. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting 220 miles Russian soldiers desertionsskyrocketed after the Bolshevik coupMogilev many of their ocers began to seekcenters of resistance to the newBrestregime, others capitulated to the LitovskReds Tuesday, October 20, 2009 217. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting 220 miles Russian soldiers desertionsskyrocketed after the Bolshevik coupMogilev many of their ocers began to seekcenters of resistance to the newBrestregime, others capitulated to the LitovskReds the Germans and Austrians promptlyaccepted the Russian oer ofarmistice talks Tuesday, October 20, 2009 218. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting 220 miles Russian soldiers desertionsskyrocketed after the Bolshevik coupMogilev many of their ocers began to seekcenters of resistance to the newBrestregime, others capitulated to the LitovskReds the Germans and Austrians promptlyaccepted the Russian oer ofarmistice talks Nov 18/Dec 3--Russian delegationdeparted for German headquarters inBrest LitovskTuesday, October 20, 2009 219. the German oensive showed nosign of relenting 220 miles Russian soldiers desertionsskyrocketed after the Bolshevik coupMogilev many of their ocers began to seekcenters of resistance to the newBrestregime, others capitulated to the LitovskReds the Germans and Austrians promptlyaccepted the Russian oer ofarmistice talks Nov 18/Dec 3--Russian delegationdeparted for German headquarters inBrest Litovsk Dec 15/28--armistice talks adjourned Tuesday, October 20, 2009 220. The signing of the armistice at Brest (November 23/December 6, 1917) Sitting on the right, Kamenev. On the German side, sitting forth from left, General HomannTuesday, October 20, 2009 221. German Goals at Brest Litovsk many politicians and intellectuals hoped to turn Russia into a surrogate Africa, a colonial dependency, supplying raw materials to this end they would break up the Russian Empire along ethnic lines Germanic Baltikum and the breadbasketUkraine would become German satellites what remained of Great Russia would be too weak to resist their demands for economicconcessions from this perspective nothing suited Germany better than the Bolshevik regime this alliance of the odd couple,--radical Russia and monarchist Germany-- failed to save the kaiser but it did save Lenin Tuesday, October 20, 2009 222. Peace Talks Resume December 27/January 9 Germany takes a tougher line; without Russian consent recognizes Ukrainian independence, prepares to sign a separate peace treaty Trotsky, shocked, protests in vain an even greater blow is the proposed border, stripping away Poland, Ukraine, and Baltikum Trotsky declares this unacceptable and departs for Petrograd February, 1918--Germany and Austria-Hungary sign a separate peace with the Ukraine and instal a puppet government that helps them collect foodstus for their desperately needy home fronts Tuesday, October 20, 2009 223. Bolsheviks in Disarray Tuesday, October 20, 2009 224. Bolsheviks in Disarray the majority: Bukharin-break o talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- neither war nor peace would spark the World Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 225. Bolsheviks in Disarray the majority: Bukharin-break o talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- neither war nor peace would spark the World Revolution the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival Tuesday, October 20, 2009 226. Bolsheviks in Disarray the majority: Bukharin-break o talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- neither war nor peace would spark the World Revolution the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration Tuesday, October 20, 2009 227. Bolsheviks in Disarray the majority: Bukharin-break o talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- neither war nor peace would spark the World Revolution the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration 18 February--Lenin loses, 7-6, till nally Trotsky switches sides. BUT the Germans keep advancing Tuesday, October 20, 2009 228. Bolsheviks in Disarray the majority: Bukharin-break o talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- neither war nor peace would spark the World Revolution the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration 18 February--Lenin loses, 7-6, till nally Trotsky switches sides. BUT the Germans keep advancing 21-22 February--panic-stricken Lenin issues The Socialist Fatherland in Danger Tuesday, October 20, 2009 229. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror Tuesday, October 20, 2009 230. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 231. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: formation of forced-labor battalions of all able-bodied members of the bourgeois classto dig trenches: resisters would be shot Tuesday, October 20, 2009 232. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: formation of forced-labor battalions of all able-bodied members of the bourgeois classto dig trenches: resisters would be shot Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators,German spies are to be executed on the spot. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 233. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: formation of forced-labor battalions of all able-bodied members of the bourgeois classto dig trenches: resisters would be shot Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators,German spies are to be executed on the spot. introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely dened Tuesday, October 20, 2009 234. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: formation of forced-labor battalions of all able-bodied members of the bourgeois classto dig trenches: resisters would be shot Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators,German spies are to be executed on the spot. introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely dened nothing said about trials or even hearings for the accused Tuesday, October 20, 2009 235. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror terms of the decree: formation of forced-labor battalions of all able-bodied members of the bourgeois classto dig trenches: resisters would be shot Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators,German spies are to be executed on the spot. introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely dened nothing said about trials or even hearings for the accused the decree gave the new security organ, the Cheka, the license to killTuesday, October 20, 2009 236. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 237. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 238. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police murders during the civil war are reckonedbetween the absurdly low ocial 12,733 toas high as 500,000 Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 239. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police murders during the civil war are reckonedbetween the absurdly low ocial 12,733 toas high as 500,000 the most horrible tortures are documented Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 240. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police murders during the civil war are reckonedbetween the absurdly low ocial 12,733 toas high as 500,000 the most horrible tortures are documented its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of thePolish Marxist party (SDKPiL),imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana,from the 1890s to February, 1917 Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 241. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police murders during the civil war are reckonedbetween the absurdly low ocial 12,733 toas high as 500,000 the most horrible tortures are documented its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of thePolish Marxist party (SDKPiL),imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana,from the 1890s to February, 1917 supported Lenin from the April theses on Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 242. (CHE KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Proteering, and Corruption) the rst of the Soviet secret police murders during the civil war are reckonedbetween the absurdly low ocial 12,733 toas high as 500,000 the most horrible tortures are documented its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of thePolish Marxist party (SDKPiL),imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana,from the 1890s to February, 1917 supported Lenin from the April theses on Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 20 December 1917-Sovnarkom createsCheka, chooses him to head itTuesday, October 20, 2009 243. The Move to Moscow Tuesday, October 20, 2009 244. The Move to Moscow Because he did not trust the Germans to stop their aggression evenafter their terms had been unconditionally accepted, Lenin thought itprudent to transfer the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. Therelocation of government personnel took place in the rst half ofMarch. Lenin himself sneaked out of Petrograd on the night of March10-11 in a train guarded by Latvians. The journey was organized indeepest secrecy and only his sister greeted him on arrival. Heestablished his residence and oce in the medieval Kremlin fortress;several of his commissars did likewise. Security arrangements of thecomplex were entrusted to the Latvians. It...reected the new leaders morbid fear for their personal security. Pipes, p.174 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 245. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 246. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia Tuesday, October 20, 2009 247. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits Tuesday, October 20, 2009 248. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits here grows 37% of the countrys grain Tuesday, October 20, 2009 249. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits here grows 37% of the countrys grain she agrees to demobilize her armed forces Tuesday, October 20, 2009 250. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits here grows 37% of the countrys grain she agrees to demobilize her armed forces the SRs withdraw their participation in protest Tuesday, October 20, 2009 251. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits here grows 37% of the countrys grain she agrees to demobilize her armed forces the SRs withdraw their participation in protest the Allies feel betrayed and now face the prospect of defeat, begin to consider intervention Tuesday, October 20, 2009 252. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 253. While [industrial] production and commerce agged, the peasantsadded to the general plight by continuing to refuse grain to the cities inexchange for paper money which would buy little at the prevailinginated prices. The grain shortage was the more accute because the lossof the rich Ukrainian granary had cut deeply into the potential supply ofthe country....In desperation the government the government adopted the policy ofwresting surplus grain from the kulaks [wealthier peasants] and pittingthe poor peasants and city workers against them. Harcave, p. 506 Tuesday, October 20, 2009 254. the famine of 1921-22 HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009 255. the famine of 1921-22 product of the cumulative eect of war, civil war, conscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009 256. the famine of 1921-22 product of the cumulative eect of war, civil war, conscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009 257. the famine of 1921-22 product of the cumulative eect of war, civil war, conscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages approximately 5 million died, most in the Volga-Ural region HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009 258. the famine of 1921-22 product of the cumulative eect of war, civil war, conscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages approximately 5 million died, most in the Volga-Ural region only food aid organized by Herbert Hoovers American Relief Organization prevented even worse consequences HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009 259. The Death of Constitutionalism Tuesday, October 20, 2009 260. CITIZENSCOMRADESThe Death of PREPARE Constitutionalism YOURSELVES FOR AMANIFESTATION ON OPENING DAY (of the) CONSTITUENTASSEMBLYTuesday, October 20, 2009 261. The All Russian Constituent Assembly ( , VserosSIISkoe UchreDItelnoeSoBRAnie) was a democratically elected constitutional bodyconvened in Russia after the October Revolution of 1917. It metfor 13 hours, from 4 PM to 5 AM 5 January6 January 1918(OS). It was elected by popular vote and dissolved by theBolshevik government. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 262. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 263. Tuesday, October 20, 2009 264. Lenin had maintained, even before the elections, that the SecondCongress of Soviets reected the real will of the people and thatthe duty of the Constituent Assembly would be to recognize theauthority of the Congress of Soviets and then quietly dissolve.The majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly,however, refused to hand over their mandate to the SovietGovernment as requested and, in so doing, doomed theAssembly. Early on the morning of January 19 [N.S.], the pro-Bolshevik guard entered the meeting hall and complaining thatthe guard is tired, instructed the delegates to close the meeting.They had no choice but to comply. Later that day the C.E.C. ofthe Congress of Soviets issued a decree ocially dissolving theConstituent Assembly.Harcave, pp. 494-95Tuesday, October 20, 2009 265. The Kronstadt Sailors Tuesday, October 20, 2009 266. The Kronstadt Sailors 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the Avantgarde of the Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009 267. The Kronstadt Sailors 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the Avantgarde of the Revolution they, along with the Latvian Ries, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly o Tuesday, October 20, 2009 268. The Kronstadt Sailors 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the Avantgarde of the Revolution they, along with the Latvian Ries, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly o delegates complained that some of the sailors worked the bolts of their ries and mockingly took aim at the politicians Tuesday, October 20, 2009 269. The Kronstadt Sailors 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the Avantgarde of the Revolution they, along with the Latvian Ries, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly o delegates complained that some of the sailors worked the bolts of their ries and mockingly took aim at the politicians 1921-the Kronstadt mutiny would be the last domestic armed resistance to Communism until 1991Tuesday, October 20, 2009 270. 1921 poster ridiculing the Constituent Assembly Tuesday, October 20, 2009 271. 1921 poster ridiculing the Constituent Assemblyt h e t a t te r e d s a i l i s l a b e l l e d Constituent Assembly.Standing - a French militar y advisor with a bag of gold. S e a te d - - a c a p i t a l i s t , W h i te general, and SR Viktor Chernov.Above--vultures circleWe will see in the next class how remnants of the assembly fought in the Civil War as the true government of Russia Tuesday, October 20, 2009 272. Tuesday, October 20, 2009