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Outline• Brexit context - EU and WTO are critical• Principles for new circumstances• Unilateral Preferences (GSP)• Reciprocal Preferences• Trade Facilitation• Services• Aid for Trade• Investment
Brexit: trade negotiations
• EU-27 – soft vs. hard• WTO – establishing UK’s new status
(schedules of concessions, agricultural commitments, TiSA)
• EU FTAs (implemented, completed, underway)• GSP (30 countries), GSP + (13 countries), EBA• Additional countries (Australia, New Zealand,
Russia, China, ASEAN members)
Principles• Developing countries are
heterogeneous – But one can’t have a different policy for
each one• The UK will no longer influence EU
policy– But can still lead globally
• The UK will lose direct influence with partners– Conditionality weak; discrimination
likely• Trade policy should be simple and
pragmatic
The Context for Developing Countries: (I) The EU
• Leave the CU– Own trade policy – Rules of Origin → border controls, admin
costs– Trans-shipment; value-chains;
• The Single Market–Neither the CU nor an FTA; but
regulatory union– Certification – costs, maybe bans –More likely: SM equivalence in some
sectors
The Context for Developing Countries:
(II) The WTO• Normal (‘Most Favoured Nation’)
tariffs– Adopt EU schedules - rectification– Complications of agriculture, RoOs
impair rights• Rules on preferential trade– GATT Article XXIV; GATS Article V– Influence what the UK can do with
developing countries
Generalised System of Preferences I
• Unilateral; EU scheme currently covers:– 30 countries under standard terms; – 13 countries under GSP+ terms; and – 49 LDC under the terms of EBA
• Reduced tariffs but not all zero• Competitiveness provisions 17.5%;
14.5% textiles
Generalised System of Preferences II
• Effects on exports not massive – RoOs are major problem – 9% in Latin America– Addictive; influence economic structure – Largely zero-sum game between dev co.s
• At donor discretion– But discrimination must be ‘justifiable’
• Offer same for 4 yrs– Early announcement, then renegotiate
Rules of Origin (RoOs)EU Imports from LDCs and Utilization Rates:
Non-Agricultural Products excluding Fuels
Reciprocal Preferences (EPAs)
• Huge effort, virtually no return; – Costly and slow to negotiate – regional blocs– Very little liberalisation, even in principle– Any further liberalisation for UK will be
discriminatory• Maybe grandfather existing market access
and then review– Consider reverting to unilateral or bilateral
• Viability of ACP grouping post-Brexit?
Trade Facilitation• In the UK• Costs of customs high, even if quite
quick• De minimis for customs duty (€150
is low)– But VAT threshold too - €22– Efficient level is €80
• Exempt LDC imports from VAT? – at least B2C
Services• Critical to productivity (dev co regimes)– But FTA achieve little; need unilateral reform– Governance and regulation key to success
• Services Waiver– Capacity constraints reduce value
• Mode 4 – or temporary migration regimes– But need to improve visa regulations to be useful.
• UK not the most liberal market in Europe• Need to join TiSA talks – not automatic
Services – EU restrictiveness
Austri
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Denmar
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Figure 2: World Bank STRI for EU member states
Overall Finance Telecoms Retail Transport Prof. services
Aid for Trade• Potential benefit – facilities,
regulations, policy• UK is small player here, but data are
unreliable• Developing Country government needs
to consult private sector• Strictly not affected by Brexit • Link with trade agreements?
Investment Treaties • Recently became EU competence,
but still largely national in fact; • UK BITs generally not very
development friendly– Chance to re-design – but takes time
• BITs: ambiguous boost to investment • ISDS – will need to decide policy