Experimental Science and Observational Science      This is another useful distinction, overlapping with and similar to "operation science and historical science" in some ways, but not others.      In all historical sciences, scientists observe systems they cannot control, since they can only observe what happened the way it already happened.  But in astronomy and geology, for example, they can decide "how far back in the past" to observe, by looking further out in space or deeper down in the geological column.      In non-historical sciences, scientists can do either experimental science or observational science by observing systems that are controlled or uncontrolled, respectively.  In fact, in many field studies (in ecology, oceanography, anthropology,...) the goal is to observe a system "as it is naturally" with no interference due to actions by the scientists.  The degree of control over a system can range from no control through partial control to total control, but for any system the result (what happens in the system) depends on nature.  And when observing a set of uncontrolled systems, scientists can achieve some benefits of controlled experiments by using multi-variable statistical analysis of the systems-and-observations.      When scientists decide how they will make observations, when they decide what to observe and how, their goal can be to fill gaps in current knowledge or confirm previous observations, to resolve anomaly, distinguish between competitive theories, provide support for an argument, or impress a funding agency.      To be more efficient (so they'll use less of their valuable time and resources) or for systems that cannot be physically observed, scientists can run thought experiments by asking "if we do this, what might happen and what would we learn?"      An important practical aspect of science is experimental design, which is introduced as

 Shorter versions ofmost pages beloware in an FAQ   for Creation,   Evolution, &   Intelligent   Design

Two   Kinds   of Naturalism

MethodologicalNaturalism:   A Brief   Overview

Is   methodological naturalism   wise?

Four   Types   of Intelligent   Design

Historical Science:Can it be scientific?

Can   design   theory be   truly   scientific?

an application?The   Origin   of   Life

Intelligent   Design in   Science   Journals

Design   in   Science?

Origins-Homepage

FAQ for Origins

Education   (home)

a foundation for the simplicity of science and is analyzed in my overview of scientific methodand detailed examination.

       Prediction & Retroduction, Mechanism & Agency      Prediction and Retroduction:  Because theory-based inferences are usually called predictions, the non-scientific meaning of "prediction" (focusing on the "pre") can lead to the mistaken impression that in science a logical inference must be made before an event occurs.  But in historical science the timing of prediction is not a cause for concern, because ascientific prediction (which is a logical if-then inference where one if-condition is to assume the theory is true: if this theory and if this system, then we will observe __) can be logically valid when it's made after an event has occurred.  In fact, a theory-based inference can be logically valid even after observations are known, in a logical process of retroduction where the goal is to find a theory whose logical if-then predictions will match the known observations.  In historical science, the main goal is to describe (and maybe explain) what did happen, not to predict what will happen.  But some predictions are possible in some historical situations, when these predictions are allowed by the types and amounts of contingency operating, and our knowledge about the contingencies.      Mechanism and Agency:  In some historical situations, only undirected natural process is involved, so a mechanistic explanatory theory can provide an adequate description and explanation.  In other situations, "what happens" depends on the decisions and actions of an agent.  This introduces an element of unpredictability, but a historical detective using scientific reasoning (in forensics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, archaeology, geology, astronomy, or history) only has to

determine what did occur, not predict what will occur, in a descriptive theory.  And in an agency explanatory theory, proposing that "agent action was involved" is the scientific conclusion of a historical detective.

      Unobservable Causes of Observable Effects      Can scientists logically infer the existence of things they cannot observe?  Yes, if an unobservable cause produces observable effects.  This cause-and-effect principle is used in operation science.  For example, even though electrons and ideas cannot be observed, modern theories propose electrons (in chemistry) and ideas (in psychology).  Why?  Because our observations are explained in the most satisfactory way — using "if... then..." hypothetico-deductive logic asking "if this theory is true, then what should we expect to see?" — by theories proposing the existence of unobservable causes (electrons and ideas) that produce the effects we observe.      Similarly, in historical science we can logically infer the existence of causes we did not observe, if these unobserved causes produced effects we can observe.  Therefore, when skeptics ask "Were you there? Did you see it?", they are ignoring the principle that scientific logic depends mainly on observable effects, not observable causes.  Because of this principle, even if an event or process was not directly observed, a plausible scientific theory can propose that the event or process did occur.

      Miracles in Operation Science and Historical Science      In operation science, we have no reason to suspect that God is miraculously changing the results of everyday experiments.  But even if there were occasional miracles, the scientific practice of demanding reproducible results (and being able to test the reproducibility by

repeating the same experiment) would negate the effects of occasional miracles, so the ultimate conclusions of operation science would not be affected.      In historical science, an occasional miracle could have significant consequences in history.  These consequences could be important when we're trying to develop an accurate historical science that finds the truth of what actually happened in history.  For example, IF life would not emerge from nonlife by natural chemical evolution but God wanted life so He miraculously created it and then let it evolve by neo-Darwinian mechanisms, a science that ignores this possibility (because it is restricted by methodological naturalism) would not be able to find the truth.

       An Invitation to Examine the Evidence      Earlier in the page, I say: "Sometimes the limitations of historical data provide a reason for caution about conclusions."  But we usually have reasons to be confident about the conclusions of historical science.  Therefore, "we should carefully examine the evidence-and-logic for a particular situation, and try to determine the scientifically justifiable level of confidence in the reliability of a particular claim about that situation."  When doing this we should also consider "the big picture" and the logical principle of multiple independent confirmations when the evidence-and-logic in a wide variety of situations leads to the same conclusion, and this occurs when we examine the abundant evidence for an old earth and old universe.      Postmodern radical relativists — ranging from young-earth creationists who are selective postmodern skeptics (they challenge the credibility of historical science but not operation science) to comprehensive postmodern skeptics (who

challenge the credibility of all science and most other scholarship) — claim that in historical science the evidence is almost always inadequate, so the conclusions of scientists must be determined by their nonscientific beliefs.  Most scholars, including myself and other members of ASA, think these relativists are exaggerating the logical difficulties, making mountains out of molehills, and historical sciences have a solid foundation — the logical evaluation of empirical evidence — that provides a reliable way to learn about the history of nature and the fascinating world created by God.  We encourage you to explore ORIGINS EVIDENCE where you can carefully examine a wide range of historical situations and scientific claims, so you can determine the levels of confidence that you think each claim deserves when it is evaluated based on the evidence-and-logic of science.

Terminology — Operation Science and Operations ScienceThe first recent major use of this concept by a scholar, in Mystery of Life's Origin (1984) by Charles Thaxton, compared operations science (plural) with origins science, which is one type of historical science, or perhaps is a narrow way to view historical science.  Logically, we could call it either operations science (because different areas of science study the many different operations of

nature) or operation science (if we view the many operations as being combined into a unified overall operation of nature).  A prominent young-earth organization, Answers in Genesis, calls it operation science.  But in his recent book Signature in the Cell (2009), Stephen Meyer follows Thaxton in calling it operations science.  Originally I also used Thaxton's term and called it operations science, but I recently changed it to operation science, partly because in a recent Google-search in 2010, I found 300 entries for one search ["operation science" "historical science"] but only 80 when using the analogous search ["operations science" "historical science"], although this balance may shift due to the prominence of Meyer's book.  Also, I like the sound of "operation science" better, because it flows more easily by avoiding the s-and-s in the middle of operations science, which requires careful-and-slow enunciation yet still sounds awkward.

Evolution as "Both Theory and Fact"? A Philosopher Blows Away the Often-Heard Darwinian ClaimCasey Luskin August 5, 2011 12:30 PM | Permalink

We often hear Darwin lobbyists claim that evolution (meaning neo-Darwinian evolution) is "both theory and fact." For example, Wikipedia (which is never shy about advocating specific points of view) has a page titled "Evolution as theory and fact" that cites various authorities on this, including Larry Moran's Evolution is a Fact and a Theory, Stephen Jay Gould's article "Evolution as Fact and Theory," Richard Lenski's article "Evolution: Fact and Theory," and Theodosius Dobzhansky's infamous paper Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution. 

Now, Northern Arizona University philosopher Peter Kosso has blown the cover on the claim that evolution is "both theory and fact." He does so in a short piece published by Springer Briefs in Philosophy, "A Summary of the Scientific Method" (Springer, 2011). In the paper, he challenges the typical definition of "theory" used by the Darwin lobby.When attacking opponents, Darwin lobbyists typically define "theory" as "a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that can incorporate facts, laws, and tested hypotheses" (National Academy of Sciences, 1999) or "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence" (National Academy of Sciences, 2008). Using such definitions, saying the "theory of evolution" now necessarily implies an idea that is "well-substantiated" and "supported by a vast body of evidence." Darwin lobbyists thenscold those who say that "evolution is just a theory" as misunderstanding the definition of the term "theory" and also mock them for unwittingly implying that evolution is well-supported. But is that what "theory" really means?Kosso observes that in practice, the term "theory" says little about the degree of certainty that characterizes an idea. As he notes "neither 'theoretical' nor 'law' is about being true or false, or about being well-tested or speculative."How does Kosso define theory? He writes that "all theories describe objects or events that are not directly observable. This is the core concept of theory. A theory describes aspects of nature that are beyond (or beneath) what we can observe, aspects that can be used to explain what we observe." He continues:

Germs, atoms, caloric, curved spacetime, and elemental strings are all, to one degree or another, unobservable. That's what makes them theoretical. But that doesn't make them unreal.

Kosso goes on to explain that saying something is a "theory" doesn't necessarily imply it is a "fact," or even that it is well-supported by the evidence:A theory is true if it describes unobservable things that really exist and describes them accurately. Otherwise it is false. This shows the mistake in contrasting "theory" and "fact." A fact is an actual state of affairs in nature, and a theory, or any statement for that matter, is true if it matches fact. Some theories are true (atomic theory), some are false (caloric theory), and the scientific method is what directs us in deciding which are which.Thus, Kosso has blown the cover on the Darwin lobby's attempt to redefine theory to necessarily imply a concept which has strong evidential backing and is "well-tested" or "supported by a vast body of evidence."

Kosso continues, stating: "To say of some idea, That's a theory not a fact, is a confusion of categories, a comparison of apples and oranges." While I agree with Kosso on this, it would stand to reason that it is also a confusion of categories to say "That's a theory and a fact." Thus, Kosso's argument also could cut against Darwin proponents who say "Evolution is both theory and fact." 

Amending My Recommendations For Expressing Skepticism of Neo-Darwinian EvolutionA few years ago, I wrote a series where I explained why using the line that "evolution is a theory, but not a fact" is an ineffective way of expressing skepticism of neo-Darwinism. As I wrote:

I've long opposed using such a rhetorical line of "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" to oppose evolution because it gets you caught up in a semantic debate over the proper definition of fact and theory, and communicates very little about the most important component of this debate -- the scientific evidence. ... What follows is a slightly longer description of what one might say to communicate doubts about neo-Darwinism while avoiding semantic mistakes and communicating more than mere soundbyte arguments:When evolution is defined as mere change over time within species, no one disputes that such evolution is a fact. But neo-Darwinian evolution -- the great claim

that unguided natural selection acting upon random mutations is the driving force that produced the complexity of life -- has many scientific problems because such random and unguided processes do not build new complex biological features. According to the technical definitions of "theory," "fact," and "hypothesis," such neo-Darwinian evolution is neither theory nor fact. It's just a hypothesis."

(Is "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact" or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics?)

Today, I continue to very much stand by the position that the "evolution is a theory, not a fact" or "evolution is just a theory" lines are poor and ineffective means of expressing skepticism of neo-Darwinism. However, in light of Kosso's definitions of "theory," driven by no discernible agenda, I would like to amend myself.What follows is an amended description of what one might say to communicate doubts about neo-Darwinism while avoiding semantic mistakes and communicating more than mere sound-byte arguments:

When evolution is defined as mere change over time within species, no one disputes that such evolution is a fact. But neo-Darwinian evolution -- the great claim that unguided natural selection acting upon random mutations is the driving force that produced the complexity of life -- has many scientific problems because such random and unguided processes do not build new complex biological features. Neo-Darwinian evolution is a theory that has been falsified by the evidence.

And that's a fact.