Disaster in Japan11 March 2011

Disaster in Japan11 March 2011

David AlexanderGlobal Risk Forum Davos

14:46 Friday 11 March 2011Earthquake• epicentre: 130 km off coast• hypocentre: 24 km deep• magnitude: 9Tsunami• height: 11.87 - 29.6 m• magnitude: 3.6 to 4.9• 7 waves in 6 hours

• tsunami warning available in 3 minutes• arrival time was 9-26 minutes• 443 km2 inundated• only vertical evacuation was feasible• old and infirm people most at risk?• r/c buildings safe, other structures not

• 14,517 confirmed dead• 11,432 missing• 78 bodies recovered in first three days of April• possibly 1000 bodies in the 20km nuclear exclusion zone

In some instances, such as this case,there was no one to rescue.

54 of 174 cities in fourprefectures affected (1/3)

• 16,950 homes and buildings destroyed and 138,000 damaged in 7 prefectures• 170,500 people in 2,230 evacuation centres in 17 prefectures• 70,409 families living in centres• 4000 schools damaged and 554 used as evacuation centres

• 30,000 transitional houses to be supplied in two months:• construction has started on 4,216

• damage estimated at €216 billion ($309 billion) - more than twice the cost of 1995 Kobe earthquake (€92 bn)• insured property losses: 4.5-11.3%

Fukushima DaiichiReactors 1, 2 and 3:-• damage to the cores from cooling problems• buildings holed by gas explosion• containment damage possible• radioactive water detected in reactor, basement and groundwater• leaking crack in containment pit of reactor no. 2

Reactor 4:-• shut down prior to quake. • fires and explosion in spent fuel pond

Reactors 5 and 6:-• reactors shut down.• temperature of spent fuel pools was very high.

• safe limits exceeded 40 km away• radioactivity at plant 100,000 times usual level• radioactive iodine in the sea near the plant 4,385 times usual level

Fukushima Daiichi

• 70% of one reactor core severely damaged and 30% of another

• 20-km radius: 70,000 long-term evacuees• 20-30 km radius: 136,000 residents

The event:-• very intense, widespread destruction• permanent alteration of the coast• widespread post-earthquake fires• worst "Na-Tech" event for many years

The response:-• quick, well organised response to tsunami• rapid accommodation of survivors• fast repair of infrastructure• very complex logistical problems, especially regarding fuel, water supply and sewerage• generally high level of resilience.

The nuclear incident:-• poor public information management• evacuation policy inadequate?• long-term contamination?• lack of public trust in government.

Rising vulnerabilitywith increasingseriousness ofpotentialconsequences

Falling hazardwith diminishing

probability ofoccurrence

Severity

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Total annualpredicted costsand losses

Risk as productof hazard andvulnerability

What size of event should we plan for?

Total annualpredicted costsand losses

Severity

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FAT-TAILEDDISTRIBUTION

What size of event should we plan for?

What relationship of this event to:-• Kobe earthquake, 17-1-1995 ?• Kantō (Tokyo) earthquake, 1-9-1923 ?• future Tokyo earthquake scenario ?

Is this event a turning pointin world disaster risk reduction?

What price redundancy:what should we afford?

Likely to be one of the fastest recoveriesto a major seismic event in recent history,

but that may not be trueof the nuclear incident.

This was a true complex emergency:what does that mean for preparedness?

Will this event demonstrate the truevalue of resilience in saving a country

from economic and social ruin?

Will worse happen in Tokyo next time?

Will the lessons of the Japaneseearthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident

be taken to heart by decision makersin other countries?

Thank you for your attention.david.alexander@grforum.org