DAY 9 – WHO VOTES?

July 10, 2013

Fundraising

“I’d rather wrestle a gorilla than ask anybody for fifty cents.” Senator John Glenn (D - Ohio)

Sources of Congressional candidate funds: 1) Individual contributors

$2,400 per candidate $45,600 per election

2) PACS 3) Party Committees 4) Personal Funds

Incumbents always do better. Why? House incumbents outspent challengers six times over in

2010. Senate incumbents outspent 11 times over in 2010.

2012 Spending in PA Races http://www.opensecrets.org/states/cands.php?state=PA&cycle

=2012

Can you buy votes?

Not exactly. Challengers

Spending is positively correlated with electoral success.

Incumbents Spending negatively correlated with electoral

success. Why? Spending matters less later in campaign races. http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/09

/how-much-does-a-house-seat-cost/

Campaign Techniques

Air Wars Positive vs. Negative ads – what are the tradeoffs?

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 Requires candidates personally appear with their advertisements.

Evolving mass media “Word of mouth on steroids.”

The Ground War “Pressing the flesh.” Get out the vote (GOTV) drives

Parallel Campaigns Outside players – Freedom Watch – “Dina Titus must be from TaxUs”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5O7rwAj6G4 Citizens United v. FEC - Corporate spending

http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205 Super PACs

Sources of Donations in 2012 Presidential Election

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/non-party-spending-house-and-senate

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/non-party-spending-house-and-senate

Data Mining

Using voter information from the internet to more efficiently target voters.

The Obama Campaign’s use of data to target voters “Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers

Who Helped Obama Win” http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secr

et-world-of-quants-and-data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/print/

Translating Obama’s success on a smaller level. “Honey I Shrunk the Obama Data Machine”

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/obama-database-smaller-campaigns-93860_Page3.html

DOL (pp.87-100)

Who Votes?

Reasons for Not Voting

Demographic reasons Legal barriers

National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter law)

Electoral arrangements Absentee ballots, several elections, etc.

Biased or careless election administration “Congestion at the Polls: A Study of Florida Precincts in

the 2012 General Election” Michael C. Herron and Daniel A. Smith http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/f5d1203189ce2aabfc_14m6

vzttt.pdf?__hstc=223762052.9503e16f848624f372ca14cf597a8ea4.1372858875812.1372858875812.1372858875812.1&__hssc=223762052.1.1372858875813

Voter ID Requirements Citizen Disaffection Ineligible Voters

Biases of Voting

The 1% of the 1% http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06

/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/

Source: http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/26/1pct_of_the_1pct_polarization/

Source: http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/26/1pct_of_the_1pct_polarization/

How Voters Decide

Low-information rationality Party loyalties

Explains 90% of vote choice among registered Democrats and Republicans

Independents True independents versus closet partisans

Partisan resurgence Examples of strong versus weak party ties

Split-ticket voting Driven largely by partisan shifts in the South (p.91)

Changing Voter Distributions by Election

Figure 4-2 in DOL

Why do less people vote in midterms?

Does the electorate look different? Affluent More

Educated

Changing Makeup of Voters

Source: McDonald (2010) “Voter Turnout in the 2010 Midterm Election”, The Forum 8(4)

Source: Hannah (2013) “Ballot Initiatives and Electoral Timing” Unpublished.

How might an older group of voters during Midterms affect election results?

Surge and Decline Theory

From Bafumi, Erikson, Wlezien (2010) “Balancing, Generic Polls, and Midterm Congressional Elections” Journal of Politics 72(3)

Ballot Initiatives and Electoral Timing

“Tell your friends: We lost because of timing, not lack of public support.” 

Scott Morgan – CA Proposition 19 Advocate (Legalization of Marijuana)

Conventional wisdom states that more conservative voters participate in midterm elections.

This should have an even greater effect on direct initiatives – where voters decide on policy. What policies might be particularly affected by

this?Following slides are from Hannah, Lee. 2013 “Ballot Initiatives and Electoral Timing”, Unpublished. Parts of paper presented at 2011 and 2012 State Politics and Policy Conference.

Morality Policy and Direct Democracy

Abor-tion

10%

Civil

Rights 4%

Crime Policy 8%

Drugs 6%

English Language 4%

Gaming 34% Guns 2% Gay Rights 10% Assisted

Suicide; 2%

Other 21%

Morality Policy by Category (N=254)

Research Question

Does the timing of an election systematically affect the results of ballot initiative campaigns? Do the demographic differences in the electorate

between midterm and presidential elections affect results? Why yes? Why no?

Do certain candidates provide favorable conditions, or surges, for initiative campaigns? Do popular liberal candidates affect the chances of a

liberal outcome on an initiative? Do popular conservative candidates affect the chances

of a conservative outcome on an initiative. In short, do popular presidential candidates provide a

coat-tail for the initiative campaign?

Defining Surge Elections

Type of Election Election Year

Margin of Victory Notes

Republican Surge Election

1980 9.7 – Reagan (50.7); Carter (41.0)

1984 18.2 – Reagan (58.8); Mondale (40.6)

1988 8.5 – Bush (53.4); Dukakis (45.6)

Democratic Surge Election

1996 8.5 – Clinton (49.2); Dole (40.7)

2008 7.2 – Obama (52.9); McCain (45.7)

Non-Surge Election

1968-1976 --- *Candidates do not take unique stances on morality policy.

1992 5.6 – Clinton (43.0); Bush (37.4)

*Candidacy of Ross Perot complicates Democratic surge arguments.

2000 -.6 – Bush (47.9-); Gore (48.5) *This margin is too close to be considered a surge election.

2004 2.4 – Bush (50.7); Kerry (48.3) *This margin is too close to be considered a surge election.

Model & Analysis

Dependent Variable - % Conservative Vote on an Initiatives

Example:Initiative Category Conservati

ve?% Yes

D.V.: Conservative Vote

MI – Proposal 08-02 (2008) – Removes some restrictions from embryonic stem cell research

Morality No (0) 52.6 100-52.6 = 47.4

AZ – Prop 202 (1998) – Allow federal office candidates to declare position on abolition of income tax and IRS, and have that appear on ballot.

Tax Yes (1) 45 45

Model – Logistic Regression

CovariateExpected Direction

Education -

Fundamentalist +

Catholic +

Black +/-

Hispanic +/-

Ideology -

Midterm Election +

Special Election +

Gubernatorial Election -

Democratic Surge Election -

Republican Surge Election +

Sta

te D

em

og

rap

hic

Facto

rsEle

cto

ral

Con

text

Facto

rs

Dependent Variable: Conservative Outcome (1)

Three Models:

1- Full Model (254)

2- Model Excluding Gaming (169)

3 - Model only Gaming (85)

Liberal Effects Conservative Effects

-1.05

-1.47

-2.22

1.57

-0.59

Results

State-level demographics have little effect on the odds of a conservative outcome

Timing matters (Model 2): Odds of a conservative outcome is 1 to 4 in Democratic surge

elections. Nearly 5 to 1 in Republican surge elections. Interestingly, odds of a conservative outcome in gaming policy

decreases to nearly 1 to 10 in Republican surge elections. Results are robust for:

Region Political culture (Elazar 1972). Fixed-effects model controlling for states. OLS Models. Close Elections.

Discussion

It is unlikely that the initiative process could be manipulated in regards to timing.

Conservative outcomes are no more likely in midterm elections and might even be less likely.

Model 1 may reflect a Republican backlash in midterms.

Results possibly due to increased initiative awareness in midterms (Smith 2001), the ability of morality policy initiatives to increase turnout and interest (Nicholson 2003), or the increased mobilization potential of initiative campaigns during midterms (Donovan et al. 2009).

Results suggest that initiative campaigns benefit from the coattails of popular presidential candidates.