foreknowledge

Structured brainstorming

Collaborative intelligence analysis

Essential Resources for Intelligence Analystswww.foreknowledge.info

ISSN 2225-5613April 2012Issue Two

Crowdsourcing &Crowd forecasting

Intelligenceanalytics

Bitácora de análisiso memo analítico

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

ContentsEditor:

Dalene Duvenage

Publisher:4Knowledge Analysis Solutions

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Pretoria0044

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From the editor 3

Collaboration in intelligence analysis 4

Collaborative intelligence sourcing and collection 6

Collaborative intelligence analysis 8

Exploring collective intelligence and forecasting 12

Other collaborative analysis projects 13

Psychology of intelligence analysis 14

Analyst toolbox

Structured brainstorming 16

Intelligence analytics 18

Analysis blog or analytic memorandum 19

News about our profession 20

The effective analyst 21

Meet Charmian Taylor 22

Upcoming conferences 24

Call for papers 26

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Dalene Duvenage

Brett Peppler is AIPIOPresident, Vice Chair of theInternational Associationfor Intelligence Education(IAFIE), and a member of

the adjunct faculties of several univer-sities.

Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa

The reception of the 1st edition for Foreknowledge was phenomenal! The aim of this e-maga-zine and the website is to educate and inform intelligence analysts and their managers and sup-port personnel about developments in our growing discipline. In this edition we focus on the

emerging trend of collaborative intelligence analysis and how the Lone Ranger analyst can tap into theknowledge of other experts. Recent research has shown that the levels of teamwork have increased in morethan 95% of scientific subfields; most probably because the remaining problems are incredibly hard to solve.We experience that in intelligence analysis as well where specialists have to collaborate because many ofour answers lie beyond our own individual cognitive grasp.

The following few pages will provide you with a framework to understand collaborative intelligence analy-sis and a snapshot of what intelligence organisations are doing to “exploit the collective intelligence of themasses”. Remember to click on the links to access more information. Enjoy!

Our contributors:

Janet Evans is AssociateInvestigator, Centre ofExcellence in Policingand Security, Australia

Tony Nolan is a risk, in-telligence and analysis of-ficer in the Australiangovernment.

Richards Heuer is a veter-an intelligence scholar andanalyst. He has writtennumerous books and arti-cles and resides in

Monterey, California, USA. He gaveus permission to summarise his book,Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

Juan Pablo Somiedo isfrom Madrid, Spain wherehe is strategic  and com-petitive intelligence and a

specialist in  the field  ofepistemology  applied  to theanalysis of information

From the editorFrom the editor

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Collaboration inintelligence

analysisA new trend that will change the

dynamics of the intelligence industry?

In the Knowledge Age, traditional in-telligence organisations have been dis-

enfranchised from holding themonopoly over their core intelligencefunction: forewarning. In fact, the in-telligence “space” has expanded withstakeholders and role-players like

NGOs, transnational organisationsand companies, private knowledge bro-ker firms, as well as interest and pres-sure groups representing communities,concepts and ideologies… This “de-mocratisation” of intelligence will

have a profound impact on the way in-telligence is conducted.

Dalene Duvenage (2010)

need2share

When one looks at the landscapeof intelligence analysis the last

few years, it seems as though the loneanalyst in her cubicle is gradually re-placed by teams of analysts to provideeither operational or strategic analysissupport to intelligence functions. Thetrend is definitely more evident in theUS and Europe where intelligenceproblems have forced disparate agen-cies to collaborate, than here in Africawhere most organisations agencieshave not yet matured to that extent.

Team analysis is more the exceptionthan the rule and many agencies stillrely on the expert advice of the indi-vidual analyst. This is especially evi-dent in law enforcement intelligenceand in other national security agencieswith minimal analytical resources.

Since 2008, analysts in the US had theprivilege of collaborative opportunitiesand tools like A-space and Intellipedia.The rest of the world is sadly trailingfar behind.

We are all well aware of the cognitiveand bias challenges faced by these loneanalysts, in addition to the over-whelming deluge of information. Col-laborating with other analysts mightlighten some these burdens, but theteam effort can also fail if the associat-ed complex dynamics and inherent

challenges are not managed effective-ly. The main obstacle to collaborativeintelligence remains tight productionschedules and the prevailing secret or-ganisational culture.

The following few pages take a snap-shot of what intelligence organisationsare doing to exploit the collective “wis-

dom of the crowds”.1

First we glance over what these termsmight mean in an intelligence context,before we look at different examples ofthe two main components of collabora-tion in intelligence namely collabora-tive collection or sourcing andcollaborative analysis.

Collective intelligence has developedin a distinctive discipline with propo-nents and critics in the last few yearswith numerous applications in naturalsciences, psychology, economy, digitalmedia, software development etc. Ourfocus here will be a very shallow buthopefully engaging perspective on de-velopments and possible applicationsin the intelligence analysis realm.

The graphic on the next page depictsthe fluidity of collaboration modeswithin intelligence analysis. I haveused some creative license with Dave1 James Surowiecki (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds: Why theMany Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective WisdomShapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations.

Dalene Duvenage

Snowden’s Cynefin model and a pre-vious model of mine to create this con-tinuum. Of course, this framework isnot absolute and only attempts to pro-vide a provisional framework.

There is limited collaboration in theknowable domain. Those of you fa-miliar with the puzzle and mysteriesanalogy, would understand that inthis space, the analyst would seek formissing puzzle pieces to complete hisunderstanding of an intelligence prob-lem that many of us are familiar with:election results of a stabile countrywith few role players, an organisedcrime syndicate involved in humansmuggling, a patent analysis of a com-petitor or an analysis of a new weap-

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Collaboration inneed2share

Many intelligence organisations are accepting the fact that they might not know allthe answers. Expert opinions of external scholars, think tanks, consultants and thegeneral public are increasingly sought to assist in making sense of the threats and

opportunities of the new world. This collaboration will impact on the way intelligenceorganisations collect, analyse and communicate their insights to decision-makers.

Knowable domain

● Individual expert analystusing intuitive and otherbasic techniques

● Traditional intelligenceproblems with clearly dis-cernable cause and effectelements or with little roomfor alternatives

● Mainly operational andtactical analysis

Complex domain

● Teams of expert analysts ap-plying structured techniques

● Complicated strategic intelli-gence problems with noclear-cut cause and effectelements, and which morphcontinuously

● Analysts focus more on varia-bles that change intelligenceproblem’s essence anddynamics

● Emergent solutions

Unknown domain

● Crowd sourcing & network ofexternal experts to makesense of strategic mysteries

● Chaotic, unexpected prob-lems with unknown agentsand variables (“black swans”)

● Flows and patterns not dis-cernable, only in retrospect

● No stable solutions, outcomeis never predictable or ex-plainable

Continuum of analysis collaboration in intelligence organisations

Dalene Duvenage, 2012

Limited In-house teams Broad collaboration

ons system. He intuitively knowswhere to get the intel and what itmeans and might use some basic ana-lytical tools like social network analy-sis and, timeline analysis to build anarrative. He rarely collaborates withother analysts and his intelligenceproducts are usually of an operationalor tactical nature.

In the complex domain the intelli-gence problems gets a bit more diffi-cult to understand as there are usuallya myriad of role players, interests andfactors impacting across functionaldesks and intelligence priorities withstrategic implications for various gov-ernment departments. Again, takingthe puzzle analogy, analysts receivepuzzle pieces that just won’t fit anyfamiliar pattern, most of the time notwo pieces will even be from the samepuzzle. With careful consideration,you start picking up semblances of a

pattern, but there is just never enoughtime or pieces to confirm whether youhypothesis is correct or not, so youhave to reach out and share puzzlepieces and collaborate to get a grasp ofwhat is happening. Intelligence issueslike the ongoing unrest in Syria, thegrowing threat of instability on theborder between the US and Mexico oran upcoming tightly contested elec-tion in a neighbouring country re-quires multi-faceted analysis. A teamof analysts then collaboratively try tomake sense of the essence and dynam-ics of the intelligence problem. Theyapply various structured analyticaltools to make sure they have ad-dressed and argued as many as possi-ble assumptions, hypotheses,scenarios and possible decision impli-cations. Minority viewpoints are alsotaken into account as the team realisethey might still not have the full pic-ture.

In the unknown domain, intelligenceproblems are chaotic and unexpectedwhile the intelligence community ac-knowledges that it does not have suf-ficient analytical capacity to deal withit. These problems, like the possibleeconomic implosion of China, are realmysteries and in-house analyst teams’expertise and are not sufficient tomake sense of the myriad interrelatedvariables. External experts, sometimeseven the general public are ap-proached to assist in either thesourcing/collection of relevant infor-mation and/or the analysis and inter-pretation of disparate flows ofinformation. Usually, collaborativesoftware is used to gather the viewsfrom across a country or even interna-tionally, which is then either moderat-ed by in-house experts or selfregulated like a wiki. The next pagesgive you a glimpse of collaboration inintelligence organisations .

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

need2share

collaborativeintelligence sourcing& collection

Crowd sourcing: the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas,or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of peo-ple and especially from the online community rather than from

traditional employees or suppliers(Merriam Webster)

Mark Blair, CEO of DefenseAnalyst’s Generic Intelli-

gence Requirements Company(DAGIR Co.) shares his viewpointson collaborative intelligence sourc-ing and collection, or crowd sourc-ing:

“The crowd represents giant, oftenuntapped, populations of passiveand active collectors. This is, ofcourse, a known quantity… fromTip Lines to Milk Cartons to ‘How’smy driving?’ bumper stickers, com-panies and agencies have harnessedthe collection prowess of the crowdfor decades. The crowd is a power-ful collection of independent, au-

Social Forum which, as an advi-sory body, will bring togetherrepresentatives of the PublicAdministrations, field experts,academics, researchers, univer-sities, specialized institutions,business firms and social organ-isations to carry out joint analy-ses on security matters.

Spain’s security strategy - everyone’s responsibility

tonomous operators that, onceactivated, produce extremely pow-erful bodies of information in anextremely short time frame.

For example, in early 2009 the StPaul police released a database ofchurch burglaries and asked thepublic for help. We built a crowd-sourcing web page with a geospa-tial analysis system and an array ofanalytic tools. Although the effortwas terminated for reasons thatwere never made public, contribu-tors from 11 different countries lenttheir labor and expertise to solvethe problem and produced findingsthat provided valuable insight.”

Today there are unprecedentedtechnologies and tools that pushcrowd collection far beyond its sim-ple beginnings that incorporatesdynamic GIS maps, databases, cellphone geo-tagged image capturingand feature recognition.

Crowd sourcing is about themany contributing a little, not afew contributing a lot. It is lowcost, rather speedy, and has awide breadth of opinions, exper-tise, and dissent (which is good).A properly managed crowd is aformidable analytic machine thatasks for little and gives great divi-dends”

Integrated External ResponseUnit (URIE) for the deploymentof Spanish civilian experts innational and multinational mis-sions abroad, conflict preven-tion, peacekeeping, emergenciesor humanitarian aid. It will in-crease Spanish civilian capabili-ties and a civilian-militaryapproach, making Spain a moreeffective and committed inter-national actor.

Economic Intelligence System(SIE), in collaboration with theprivate sector, for collecting andanalysing economic, financialand business information rele-vant to security, detecting andpreventing acts against our in-terests, and supporting the ac-tion of the State and betterdecision-making in this area.

In its new security strategy released in June 2011, the Spanish government envisagesthree fora that will incorporate external input to its national security strategy:

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Ushahidi which means "testimony" in Swahili,was a website that was initially developed to

map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-elec-tion fallout at the beginning of 2008 for Kenyans toreport and map incidents of violence that they saw viaSMS, email or the web. It has grown to a system thatfacilitates early warning systems and helps in datavisualization for response and recovery.

The Ushahidi platform has been used to monitor elec-tions in India, Mexico, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Ithas been deployed in the DR Congo to track unrest,Zambia to monitor medicine stockouts and the Philip-pines to track the mobile phone companies. It has alsobeen crucial in rescue operations in Haiti.

A key component of Ushahidi is the ability to use mo-bile phones as a primary means of both sending crisisincidents and receiving updates. The Internet can bedifficult to access or completely unavailable in someparts of the world, so the platform was created withthe mobile phone as a foundational element.

Crowdmap is the fastest, simplest installation of theUshahidi platform. Within minutes you'll be upand running with your own installation, mappingreports events and visualizing information.

Read more about Ushahidi here and here. Listen toa podcast on Ushahidi crowdsourcing here.. Readabout crowdsourcing here and here.

The crowdmapping story

Screen shot of the Syrian Spring Crowd map

Six years after its creation, theUS Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) undertook thefirst Quadrennial HomelandSecurity Review (QHSR), whichwill inform the design and im-plementation of actions to en-sure the safety of the UnitedStates and its citizens. The QH-SR includes recommendationsaddressing the long-term strate-gy and priorities of the nationfor homeland security andguidance on the programs, as-sets, capabilities, budget, poli-cies, and authorities of thedepartment.Rather than set policy internallyand implement it in a top-downfashion, DHS undertook the

QHSR in a new and innovativeway by engaging tens of thou-sands of stakeholders and solic-iting their ideas and commentsat the outset of the process.Through a series of three week-long, web-based discussions,stakeholders reviewed materialsdeveloped by DHS study groups,submitted and discussed theirown ideas and priorities, and rat-ed or “tagged” others’ feedbackto surface the most relevant ideasand important themes deservingfurther consideration.This National Dialogue on theQHSR had important benefits. Byengaging stakeholders at all lev-els, DHS was able to incorporateground-level expertise and spe-

cialized knowledge into the re-view. It also provided theopportunity to strengthen trustand create buy-in for later policyimplementation.Many forms of media were usedto reach potential participants.These included e-mails to thou-sands of professionals, invita-tions delivered at conferences ormeetings, links and buttonsplaced on web pages of DHSand component sites, referencesin articles and homeland securi-ty journals, and “Dear Col-league” letters passed amongcongressional offices as well asTwitter, Facebook, GovLoop,and Ning.See reports here and here.

The US’ Homeland Security National Dialogue Project

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Mark Blair, CEO of Defense Ana-lyst’s Generic Intelligence Re-quirements Company (DAGIRCo.) shares his view on collabora-tive intelligence analysis:“The key to organizing and syn-thesizing collaborative analyticefforts is to provide a simple andintuitive interface allowing indi-viduals to make small contribu-tions with little effort. We don’tadvise trying to re-invent thewheel here.For instance, the Delphi Method iswell suited for many analytictasks and we often incorporatesuch methods in our systems.Some analytic endeavors requiremore complex, specialized appa-ratuses or low-cost solutions. It isimportant to remember that col-laborative analysis is about thecrowd, not the analysis.The crowd will take care of theanalysis, if you give them theright tools and dynamic naviga-tion to peruse the contributions ofothers. A new contributor mustquickly and easily find his/herplace in the larger effort. At thehigh-level, facilitators/solicitorsneed an easy way solicit the righthelp to meet their needs. Crowd-Sourcing systems must address allof these issues.Crowds have other benefits aswell. Crowds can fight cognitive

biases, plan accordingly. For in-stance, the ability for contributorsto remain anonymous can combatGroup Think (Mind Guarding,Bandwagon Effect, etc.), and theoveremphasis of the opinions of“experts” or individuals in an au-thoritative position (Halo Effect).Other dangers such as Confirma-tion Bias, Availability Heuristic,and Anchoring Effect are dilutedas they are less likely to express auniform influence over a largergroup (crowd) of contributors.When organizing a collaborativeeffort it is important to give thecrowd an array of tools. If yougive them only a hammer “everyproblem is a nail.”Providing evidence-driven or da-ta-driven tools can ensure that thecrowd develops an empiricalfoundation for analytic conclu-sions. A program (ACH2.0) basedon Richard Heuer’s Analysis ofCompeting Hypotheses producedby the Palo Alto Research Centercan be downloaded for free here.Tools such as this and even simpledatabases encourage the develop-ment empirical foundations (e.g.statistical models, regression anal-ysis, etc.) and bolster confidence.From our experience, another sur-prising quality of the crowd, isthat if you give them tools, theywill use them. “

In December 2010, the UK

Ministry of Defence’s Centre for

Defence Enterprise (CDE) launched

a Collaborative Multi-Source

Intelligence competition for

proposals that show novel

approaches to collaborative fusion

and analysis using multiple and

different sources of intelligence.

One of the specific challenges is

Collaborative analysis models,

tools and services. The aim is to

develop the understanding of team

sense-making concepts and

processes, together with

applications and services which

offer support to those processes.

More information on the

competition here.

Current status of the project is

unknown.

need2share

collaborativeintelligenceanalysis

Collaborativeintelligence analysis

competition in UK

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

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Collaborativesensemaking ininternal teams

Collaboration is fundamentally about be-haviors and interactions among individu-als working toward a common objectiveenabled by IT tools and appropriate or-

ganizational policies and underlying cul-tural norms. The correct nexus for

collaboration is the human interfacewith other minds, not the human inter-face with IT. Robust social networksserve as an essential underpinning of

collaboration and ensure that communi-ties can come together to put more eyes

on the target, promote analytic excel-lence, and facilitate informed decision-

making. Achieving a robust collaborativeenvironment requires sustained leader-ship commitment on the part of seniorleaders in every intelligence community

and military organization.

Randoph Pherson and Joan McIntyre2009

Randy Pherson proposes that analytical unitsshould have Transformation Cells which will drivethe establishing of a collaborative culture and mech-anisms that are most appropriate to their work envi-ronment and in interpreting the rules of the road.Such help must have a human face to be effective.The success or failure of efforts to promote culturalchange usually depends on how effectively thetransforming vision is articulated to lower levelmanagers and the workforce at large.

This is best accomplished by forming a small groupof interpreters and facilitators who can function as a“help desk” for managers and officers by providingtailored guidance on how to implement collabora-tive practices within their work environment in themost effective and efficient manner possible. SuchTransformation Cells can provide the human infra-structure needed to interpret the leader’s vision (hisor her Command Intent) and help officers apply iteffectively in their workspace.

Travels with ShilohImagine an intelligence shop where the analysts areafforded some control over their time like Googletime. It could be something pretty modest, like 10%or 20% of their total work time. Analysts can then‘pitch’ projects to their peers and ask for their assist-ance in order to benefit from their expertise (‘Canyou take four hours to do a statistical analysis of IEDdetonations from 2007-2009?’) or can ask for time(‘I’d like to ask for 20 hours to complete project X.’)In the latter case, analysts would donate the time tosomeone whose project they endorsed and agree to‘cover’ for them (with consideration for officeneeds).

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

collaborativeintelligenceanalysis

need2shareCollaborative

sensemaking byexternal expert teams

The world’s first civil society intelligenceagency

Open Briefing is the world’s firstcivil society intelligence agency; anaccessible platform for insight andanalysis on key defence, securityand foreign policy issues. Theyprovide open source intelligenceassessments and independentsecurity briefings, so that a betterinformed civil society can properlyengage with peace and securitydebates and influence positivepolicy developments in theseareas. Open Briefing incorporatessocial media into everything itdoes. They use newcommunication technologies tocomplement traditionaldissemination strategies and allowusers to access content how theywant, when they want.They rely on the good will and hardwork of a small group of associateanalysts to support the differentintelligence desks. This is avoluntary, remote work role, whichcan be easily fitted around yourother

commitments. It is only open tothose with excellent research andanalytical skills and demonstrableknowledge and considerableexperience in one or more of ourissue or regional desk areas.Associate analysts have aninformal relationship with OpenBriefing, in that they are affiliated tobut independent of theorganisation. They assessintelligence items, complete sourcereliability assessments and filematerial and analysis on theorganisation’s website. They alsoprovide commentary on items filedon the website and create andpublish dossiers.They help develop social networksby commenting on Open Briefing’sFacebook page, suggestingsources to add to the desk Twitterlists, suggesting videos to add tothe desk YouTube playlists,commenting on LinkedIn and otherprofessional networks using your

Open Briefing affiliation,and suggesting items toadd to the digital library.They also conduct peerreview and help improveOpen Briefing’spublications. Theanalysts are at this stagenot paid but areincluded in OpenBriefing’s “list ofexperts” for mediaenquiries.See their website here

Waiting to speak

Domination

Fear of speaking

Misunderstanding

Inattention

Lack of focus

Inadequate criteria

Premature decision

Missing information

Distractions

Digressions

Missing stakeholders

Groupthink

Poor grasp of problem,

Ignored alternatives

Lack of consensus

Poor planning

Hidden agenda

Conflict

Inadequate resources

Poorly defined goals

Robert O Briggs 2009

Collaborationchallenges

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Wikistrat is the world’s first Massively Multiplayer Online Consultancy (MMOC). It leverages a global networkof subject-matter experts via a patent pending crowd-sourcing methodology to provide insights unavailableanywhere else. This online network offers a uniquely powerful and unprecedented strategic consulting service:the internet’s only central intelligence exchange for strategic analysis and forecasting, delivered, for the firsttime, on a real-time, interactive platform. Their network of hundreds of experts follow our scenario-drivencrowd-sourced policy planning methodology to generate unique intelligence products.See their website here

Singapore’s Risk Assessment andHorizon Scanning Programme

Singapore’s Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) is locatedwithin the National Security Coordination Secretariat un-der the Prime Minister’s Office. HSC serves as the opera-tional nerve centre of the Risk Assessment and HorizonScanning (RAHS) programme. HSC investigates and rec-ommends, through horizon scanning, case studies or otherinitiatives, key emerging issues as well as risks or uncer-tainties across various domains that would have a signifi-cant impact on Singapore.The RAHS system provides end-to-end capabilities to col-lect and classify data, analyse and understand relation-ships, and anticipate as well as discover emerging issuesthat could have a strategic impact on Singapore. It com-bines tools, methods and networks for effective scanningand analysis.RAHS has provided an opportunity to adopt a whole-of-government approach to strategic anticipation. It hinges ona collaborative approach linking ministries and agenciesacross government. It has the potential to connect silos andchallenge mindsets, develop an instinct to share, and en-courage a collective analysis of possible futures.The RAHS programme was also designed with strategicnetworking in mind. To this end, the RAHS programmehas been utilized by and contained the contributions of an-alysts from the academia and beyond Singapore. The keyobjective of such an integrative approach is to bring part-ner agencies together to work collaboratively on issues ofinterest and towards a unique solution to the problems athand.However, collaboration with the private sector has provento be a big challenge and HSC is still trying to find theright collaboration model.

Establishing trusting working relationships

Define rules of engagement, data ownership andattribution

Ensure mutual benefit

Obtain management support

Align reward structures with collaboration goals

Develop comprehensive training programs

3

4

5

6

7

8

Define collaboration goals and schedule & get buy-in

Define collaboration processes and workflow

Checklist for successful collaboration

(Tamra Hall & Kerry Buckley, Mitre Corporation)

1

2

Ensure critical mass usage9

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

The MIT Center for Collective Intel-ligence is exploring a very interest-

ing research question; "How can peopleand computers be connected so that –collectively - they act more intelligentlythan any individuals, groups, or com-puters have ever done before?" The re-search is based on the phenomenonobserved in natural and human systemswhere a group tends to make better de-cisions than its individual members.

Elsewhere researchers already have op-erationalised the phenomenon of collec-tive intelligence by developingprediction markets in which participantsbuy and sell predictions about uncer-tain future events and are paid only iftheir predictions are correct. Predictionmarkets have been found to be surpris-ingly accurate in a wide range of situa-tions (including forecasting productsales and US Presidential elections).

Collective forecasting methods such asprediction markets are used for deci-sion support by a range of leading or-ganisations. Decision support is aprocess of assessing a range of likelyfutures, and selecting the action leadingto the best expected outcome. Forecast-ing, especially the quality of forecasts iscritical for decision support. Collectiveforecasting methods utilize all availabledata, insight and human intuition bycollecting clear, probabilistic forecastsof well defined events, pooling the col-lective forecasts of analysis in a struc-tured, disciplined manner.

Leveraging collective intelligence andforecasting offers tangible benefits forintelligence practice especially whenapplied to the challenge of predictiveintelligence. All good intelligenceshould be forward-looking because thefuture is where the consumer’s next de-cisions will be made. More broadly,collective forecasting offers an organis-ing principle for intelligence practice,which may help to break down barriersto collaboration across enterpriseboundaries.

During 2012, the Australian Institute ofProfessional Intelligence Officers(AIPIO) is partnering with Presciient tooffer a Collective Forecasting Competi-tion to expose intelligence practitionersand other interested observers to theseemerging forecasting methods. TheCompetition also allows AIPIO to makea substantive contribution to the intelli-gence body of knowledge. The Compe-tition was launched in Canberra,Australia on the 16 February 2012, andthe Competition website is now live athttp://aipio.system-ii.com.

The purpose of the Competition is tointroduce participants to a number ofsimple, powerful collective forecastingmethods, including probabilistic fore-casting, forecast accuracy measurement,pooled (collective) forecasting and con-ditional forecasts. These are cuttingedge methods being used by a range oforganisations and agencies around theworld. The Competition gives partici-pants an opportunity to be exposed to,and trained in these powerful modernmethods.

The Competition allows participants topredict the outcomes of a range ofevents of interest to intelligence profes-sionals across all domains of intelli-gence practice. The selected eventsinclude regional and global events relat-ing to weapons proliferation, conflict,the movement of people and goods, and

statistics such as arrest numbers, boatarrivals and numbers of casualties.Events will include both unconditional(simple predictions) and conditional(dependent on policy/action) events.Participants are able to submitsuggested events to add to the mix, byemail to AIPIOcfc@presciient.com, orcreate your own events by using the“new” button on the interface.

The Competition works on three eventexpiries; in April, July and October 2012allowing participants to focuspredictions on event outcomes at one,three and six months from the Compe-tition’s launch date. Predicted eventoutcomes will be assessed against actu-al outcomes, with competition partici-pants ranked by a range of accuracymeasures, and compared with pooledforecasts. Presiciient is making availa-ble its online collective forecasting plat-form – System II – for AIPIO to run theforecasting competition. The System IIplatform also provides a systematicmeasure of prediction accuracy: of thepool of predictors, and of any individu-al predictors within the Competition.

All interested folk may participate, soplease register to create a Competitionaccount to make predictions. A “HowTo” manual may be found at the top ofthe main page of the Competition web-site, and additional supporting docu-ments explaining collective forecastingand the competition ‘rules’ will shortlybe available on the AIPIO website(www.aipio.asn.au).

In related activity, AIPIO will be run-ning a master class on Collective Fore-casting with System II during theannual AIPIO conference – Intelligence2012 – to be held at the Swissotel Syd-ney during 24-26 July 2012. A reviewof the Collective Forecasting Competi-tion will be presented at the annual Fo-rum, which will be held in Perth on 30November 2012.

Exploring CollectiveIntelligence and Forecasting

need2share

collaborativeintelligenceanalysis

Brett Peppler, FAIPIO

President,

Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers

Australian Institutefor Professional

IntelligenceOfficers

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The U.S. Government, specifi-cally the Intelligence AdvancedResearch Projects Activity (IAR-PA), is funding the work of sev-eral projects that explore newmethods to combine predictionsfrom a wide range of volunteercontributors to provide moreaccurate forecasts of globalevent with the expectation thatit will improve the accuracy ofintelligence analysis.

Informed investigates various aspects of individual andgroup predictions to gain fresh insights into the factors thatinfluence people’s predictions about key world events andtrends. In addition, it looks at ways to leverage and inte-grate this information to develop more accurate overallpredictions.

Daggre by George Mason University aims to learn moreabout the cognitive and social dynamics involved in accu-rate intelligence forecasting. If you agree to participate, youwill be asked to browse and modify forecasts of local andworld events through a password-protected website

SPADE by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, with Mas-sachusetts Institute of Technology and University of IllinoisUrbana-Champaign aims to enhance the accuracy, preci-sion, and timeliness of forecasts for a broad range of events.The predictions you provide will be combined and weight-ed with thousands of others in a unique way that outper-forms simple aggregation techniques.

Forecasting ACE is a joint venture by private researchcompany and seven different universities. The universitiesare: The University of Maryland, The University of Michi-gan, Ohio State University, Fordham University, WakeForest University, Wichita State University and the Univer-sity of California-Irvine. The company is Applied ResearchAssociates.

Other collaborative analysis projects

Collaboration White paper: Collaborationin the National Security Arena: Mythsand Reality - What Science and Experi-ence Can Contribute to its Success here

Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teamsto Solve Hard Problems Lessons from andfor Intelligence Professionals J. RichardHackman, 2010 here

A Wiki Is Like A Room…And Other Les-sons Learned From 15 Wiki-based, OpenSource, Intelligence Analysis Projects,Kristan Wheaton here

Groupthink: The brainstorming myth byJonah Lehrer here

A Tradecraft Primer: Structured AnalyticTechniques for Improving IntelligenceAnalysis here

Resources

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

thinking

Richards Heuer

There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of IntelligenceAnalysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of

chapter 2 on Perception. You can also download the entire book here.

Analysts have a set of as-sumptions and expectations

about the motivations of peopleand the processes of governmentin foreign countries. Events con-sistent with these expectationsare perceived and processed easi-ly, while events that contradictprevailing expectations tend to beignored or distorted in perception.Of course, this distortion is a sub-conscious or pre-conscious proc-ess. This tendency of people toperceive what they expect to per-ceive is more important than anytendency to perceive what theywant to perceive.Expectations have many diversesources, including past experi-ence, professional training, andcultural and organizationalnorms. All these influences pre-dispose analysts to pay particularattention to certain kinds of infor-mation and to organize and inter-

pret this information in certainways. Perception is also influ-enced by the context in which itoccurs. Patterns of expectationstell analysts, subconsciously,what to look for, what is impor-tant, and how to interpret what isseen.These patterns form a mind-setthat predisposes analysts tothink in certain ways. A mind-setis akin to a screen or lens throughwhich one perceives the world.There is a tendency to think of amind-set as something bad, to beavoided. Actually, mind-sets areneither good nor bad; they areunavoidable.People have no conceivable wayof coping with the volume ofstimuli that impinge upon theirsenses, or with the volume andcomplexity of the data they haveto analyze, without some kind ofsimplifying preconceptions about

what to expect, what is impor-tant, and what is related to what.Analysts do not achieve objectiveanalysis by avoiding preconcep-tions; that would be ignorance orself-delusion. Objectivity isachieved by making basic as-sumptions and reasoning as ex-plicit as possible so that they canbe challenged by others and ana-lysts can, themselves, examinetheir validity.Comprehending the nature ofperception has significant impli-cations for understanding the na-ture and limitations ofintelligence analysis.The circumstances under whichaccurate perception is most diffi-cult are exactly the circumstancesunder which intelligence analysisis generally conducted--dealingwith highly ambiguous situationson the basis of information that isprocessed incrementally under

Psychologyof

intelligenceanalysis

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

thinkingpressure for early judgment. Thisis a recipe for inaccurate percep-tion.Intelligence seeks to illuminatethe unknown. Almost by defini-tion, intelligence analysis dealswith highly ambiguous situations.As previously noted, the greaterthe ambiguity of the stimuli, thegreater the impact of expectationsand pre-existing images on theperception of that stimuli. Thus,despite maximum striving for ob-jectivity, the intelligence analyst'sown preconceptions are likely toexert a greater impact on the ana-lytical product than in other fieldswhere an analyst is working withless ambiguous and less discord-ant information.Moreover, the intelligence analystis among the first to look at newproblems at an early stage whenthe evidence is very fuzzy indeed.The analyst then follows a prob-lem as additional increments ofevidence are received and the pic-ture gradually clarifies. An ana-lyst who starts observing apotential problem situation at anearly and unclear stage is at a dis-advantage as compared with oth-ers, such as policymakers, whosefirst exposure may come at a laterstage when more and better infor-mation is available.The receipt of information insmall increments over time alsofacilitates assimilation of this in-formation into the analyst's exist-ing views. No one item ofinformation may be sufficient toprompt the analyst to change aprevious view. The cumulativemessage inherent in many piecesof information may be significantbut is attenuated when this infor-mation is not examined as awhole.The intelligence analyst operatesin an environment that exertsstrong pressures for what psy-

chologists call premature closure.Customer demand for interpretiveanalysis is greatest within two orthree days after an event occurs.The system requires the intelli-gence analyst to come up with analmost instant diagnosis beforesufficient hard information, andthe broader background informa-tion that may be needed to gainperspective, become available tomake possible a well-groundedjudgment. This diagnosis can onlybe based upon the analyst's pre-conceptions concerning how andwhy events normally transpire ina given society.

As time passes and more informa-tion is received, a fresh look at allthe evidence might suggest a dif-ferent explanation. Yet, the per-ception experiments indicate thatan early judgment adversely af-fects the formation of future per-ceptions.Once an observer thinks he or sheknows what is happening, thisperception tends to resist change.New data received incrementallycan be fit easily into an analyst'sprevious image. This perceptual

Comprehending the natureof perception has significant

implications forunderstanding the nature

and limitations ofintelligence analysis

bias is reinforced by organization-al pressures favoring consistentinterpretation; once the analyst iscommitted in writing, both theanalyst and the organization havea vested interest in maintainingthe original assessment.That intelligence analysts performas well as they do is testimony totheir generally sound judgment,training, and dedication in per-forming a dauntingly difficulttask.The problems outlined here haveimplications for the managementas well as the conduct of analysis.A prudent management systemshould:● Encourage products that clear-

ly delineate their assumptionsand chains of inference andthat specify the degree andsource of uncertainty involvedin the conclusions.

● Support analyses that periodi-cally re-examine key problemsfrom the ground up in order toavoid the pitfalls of the incre-mental approach.

● Emphasize procedures that ex-pose and elaborate alternativepoints of view.

● Educate consumers about thelimitations as well as the capa-bilities of intelligence analysis;define a set of realistic expecta-tions as a standard againstwhich to judge analytical per-formance. #

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Analyst toolboxtoolbox

When to Use ItBrainstorming in some form isone of the most widely used ana-lytic techniques. It is often used atthe beginning of a project to iden-tify a list of relevant variables,driving forces, a full range of hy-potheses, key players or stake-holders, available evidence orsources of information, potentialsolutions to a problem, potentialoutcomes or scenarios, or, for lawenforcement, potential suspects oravenues of investigation.Value AddedThe stimulus for creativity comesfrom multiple analysts bouncingideas off each other. A brain-storming session usually exposesan analyst to a greater range ofideas and perspectives than theanalyst could generate on his orher own, and this typically resultsin a better analytic product.

Structured Brainstorming

The underlying assumption ofbrainstorming is that if peopleare scared of saying the wrongthing, they’ll end up saying noth-ing at all. … there is a problemwith brainstorming. It doesn’t

work…Decades of research haveconsistently shown that brain-storming groups think of farfewer ideas than the same

number of people who work aloneand later pool their ideas…

While the instruction ‘Do notcriticize’ is often cited as theimportant instruction in brain-storming, this appears to be a

counterproductive strategy. Ourfindings show that debate and

criticism do not inhibit ideas but,rather, stimulate them relative to

every other condition.Osborn thought that imaginationis inhibited by the merest hint ofcriticism, but Nemeth’s work anda number of other studies havedemonstrated that it can thriveon conflict…Dissent stimulates

new ideas because it encouragesus to engage more fully with thework of others and to reassess

our viewpoints

Jonah Lehrer (2012)

From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysisby Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. 2010.

Rules● Be specific about the purpose

and the topic of the brain-storming session.

● New ideas are always encour-aged, so never criticize anidea during the divergent(creative) phase of the processno matter how weird or un-conventional or improbable itmight sound. Instead, try tofigure out how the idea mightbe applied to the task at hand.

● Allocate enough time to dothe brainstorming correctly.

● To avoid groupthink andstimulate divergent thinking,include one or more “outsid-ers” in the group – that is, as-tute thinkers who do notshare the same body ofknowledge or perspective asthe other group members butdo have some familiarity withthe topic.

● Write it down! Track the dis-cussion on a whiteboard, ea-sel, or with sticky notes.

● Summarize and distribute thekey findings at the end of thesession. A wiki let the discus-sion evolve further.

● Participants should be en-couraged to express everyidea that pops into theirheads. Even ideas that areoutside the realm of the possi-ble may stimulate other ideasthat are more feasible.

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

Analyst toolboxExploiting divergent viewpoints toenhance collaboration

1. Pass out “Post-It” or “sticky” notes andmarker pens to all participants.

2. Pose the problem or topic in terms of a “focalquestion.” Display this question in one sen-tence for all to see on a large easel or white-board.

3. Ask the group to write down responses to thequestion with a few key words that will fit ona Post-It. When a response is written down,the participant is asked to read it out loud orto give it to the facilitator who will read it outloud. Marker pens are used so that peoplecan easily see what is written on the Post-Itnotes later in the exercise.

4. Stick all the Post-Its on a wall in random or-der as they are called out. Treat all ideas thesame. Encourage participants to build oneach others’ ideas.

5. Usually there is an initial spurt of ideas fol-lowed by some pauses as participants con-template the question. After five or tenminutes there is often a long pause of aminute or so. This suggests that the grouphas “emptied the barrel of the obvious” andis now on the verge of coming up with somefresh insights and ideas. Do not talk duringthis pause even if the silence is uncomforta-ble.

6. After two or three of these pauses, concludethis divergent thinking phase of the brain-storming session.

Structured brainstorming stepsThere are no hard and fast rules on exactly how Structured Brainstorming should be done. The following12-step process was developed for the CIA’s Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis and has workedwell for a number of years. The process is divided into two phases, a divergent thinking (creative) phasewhen ideas are presented, and a convergent thinking phase when these ideas are evaluated.

1. Ask all participants as a group to go up to thewall and rearrange the Post-Its into affinitygroups (groups that have some commoncharacteristic). Participants are not allowed totalk during this process. Some Post-Its maybe moved several times, but they will gradu-ally cluster into logical groupings. Post-Itsmay be copied in order for one idea to be fitinto more than one group.

2. When all Post-Its have been arranged, ask thegroup to select a word or phrase that best de-scribes each grouping.

3. Look for Post-Its that do not fit neatly intoany of the groups. Consider whether such anoutlier is (1) useless noise, or (2) the germ ofan idea that deserves further attention.

4. Assess what the group has accomplished.Have new ideas or concepts been identified,have key issues emerged, or are there areasthat need more work or further brainstorm-ing?

5. To identify the best ideas, the facilitator orgroup leader should establish up to five crite-ria for judging the value or importance of theideas.

6. Set the analytic priorities accordingly, anddecide on a work plan for the next steps inthe analysis.

Divergent or creative phase Convergent or evaluative phase

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Hello and welcome to mycolumn about Intelli-gence Analytics. Its focus

is the cross over between Intelli-gence Analysis and MathematicalAnalytics, which I call IntelligenceAnalytics. We have all seen in fic-tional storylines and TV shows,where the use of data solvescrimes, brings down the bad per-son and saves the day. Of coursethere is much exaggeration, oversimplification, and of course thereis always perfect data, and lots ofdata available.Now, when we deal with the realworld, things are never that fast oreasy. However, mathematics, datamining and modelling has con-tributed to solve crimes, reducerisks, and preventing criminalevents.When we get down to it, we alluse maths every day in our lives,but we don't always think aboutwhere we can use maths in ourintelligence careers. This is be-cause of a number of reasons:● we don't think we are maths

people,● maths can't possibly measure

what we need,● there is not enough data,● maths is something other

people do,● I don't have the skills I need,

etc.

I'm sure we can think up lotsmore. But on the other side of thecoin:● maths can help us tell a story,● maths can help us join pieces

together,● mathematical modelling can

uncover patterns,● maths can help solve a case,

and● maths has helped to save

many lives all around theworld.

Before I continue, I want to getone thing straight. Maths can notdo it all, it is not meant to replaceyou, it is not meant to take awayany part of your job. Indeed with-out the Intelligence Analysts per-spective, data mining, analytics,and computer modelling is use-less, because it has no contextwithout the Analyst to interpretand incorporate the results intothe problem / case at hand.What I intend to do in this col-umn, is point you to resources,share open source tools, and tellyou about various methods usedin the intelligence process. I hopeyou will find these columns help-ful and informative, making yourjob easier and helping you to getbetter results.So you know a little about me, Iam an Intelligence Officer who us-es mathematical analysts and pat-

tern recognition to profile peopleand environments, as well as un-cover factors in events.I failed mathematics at school,and was never good at maths inuniversity. Now, I develop newtechniques, help mentor differentpeople, and advise all levels ofAustralian Government, as wellas to the corporate sector. I am asupporter of Analyst First, amovement which puts people be-fore software.However, I could not really end,with out a few suggestions. Didyou know that there is softwarefreely available, that will textmine a document, or website, andproduce lists of words, draws re-lational maps of the most usedterms, and that is just the begin-ning.There are tools of analysis whichuse what is called Random For-rest, to make 500 decision trees,and then tell you just how wellthe model will predict a futureevent. There are free online tuto-rials on how to use maths to im-prove the intelligence product.Maths and Analytics give the in-telligence analyst a scientific plat-form to support their logic anddeductions, combining togetherto make quality reports. Untilnext time!

Intelligence analytics:intelligence analysis + mathematical analytics

Tony Nolan Risk, Intelligence and Analytics Officer, Australian Government

toolbox

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

toolboxBitácora de análisis o memo analítico

El memo analítico es un instrumentode apoyo al análisis muy importante.Goza de mala fama entre los analis-tas, porque además de suponer untrabajo extra (con el consiguientetiempo invertido), puede hacer lasveces de pequeño "chivato" de si tra-bajamos duro o nos dedicamos aotras cosas.Los memos analíticos se elaboran confines de triangulación entre analistaso investigadores, para que otras per-sonas puedan ver lo que hicimos ycómo lo hicimos. El analista refleja eneste documento los pasos que ha seg-uido para realizar sus análisis así  co-mo el por qué ha escogidodeterminadas técnicas en lugar deotras. La bitácora analítica refleja loque “transpiramos” al analizar la in-

formación y nos apoya al establecerla credibilidad del método de análi-sis. Además facilita el hecho de quesi, por cualquier motivo, abandona-mos ese análisis, otro analista puedacontinuar donde nosotros lo deja-mos. Para la elaboración del memoanalítico se sugiere seguir las sigu-ientes indicaciones:● Registrar la fecha de anotación● Incluir cualquier referencia o

fuente importante. Por ejemplo,si consultamos a un colega, ano-tar quién es él, su puesto y sucomentario. Señalar material deapoyo localizado (fotografías,videos, etc).

● Marcar los memos con encabeza-dos que sinteticen la idea, cate-goría o concepto analizado.

● No restringir el contenido de losmemos o anotaciones, permitir-nos el libre flujo de ideas. Porejemplo, incluir anotaciones ocomentarios sobre los problemasdurante el proceso.

● Usar diagramas y esquemaspara explicar ideas, hipótesis yconceptos

● Cuando uno piense que una cat-egoría o concepto haya sido losuficientemente definido, crearun memo adicional y etiquetarlocon la palabra “saturación”.

● Registrar las reflexiones que ay-uden a pasar de un nivel de-scriptivo a otro interpretativo.

● Guardar una copia de todos losmemos.

Juan Pablo Somiedo Madrid, Spain http://elbuhoanaltico.blogspot.com/

The analytic memorandum is a veryimportant aid instrument in analysis.However, it is not popular amongstanalysts because, in addition to signi-fy additional work (with the conse-quent time spend), it may sometimesserve as an “indicator” that we areworking hard or that we are workingon something else.The analytic memorandum is draftedwith the aim of triangulation betweenanalysts or investigators so that otherpeople can see what we do and howthis was done. In this document theanalyst reflects on the steps he hastaken to do his analysis, as well as onthe reasons why he has selected cer-tain techniques as opposed to others.The analysis blog therefore reflectsthat which we “perspire” while ana-lyzing information and assists us to

establish the credibility of the analy-sis method used. It furthermore facili-tates the possibility that, should weabandon the analysis for whateverreason, another analyst could contin-ue with the process where we left. Indrafting an analytic memorandum, itis suggested that the following proc-ess be followed:● Register the date of drafting.● Include all references or impor-

tant sources. For example, if acolleague was consulted, note hisname, position and his comment.Indicate available support mate-rial (photographs, videos, etc).

● Mark the memorandum withsubtitles which summarizes theidea, category or analyzed con-cept.

● Do not limit the content of thememorandum or notes in orderto allow for a free flowing of ide-as. For example, include notesand comments on different prob-lems during the process.

● Use diagrams and sketches toexplain ideas, hypotheses andconcepts.

● When you think a category orconcept has been sufficiently de-fined, create an additional mem-orandum and label it with theword “saturated”.

● Register the thought processeswhich assisted you to move froma descriptive to an interpretativelevel.

● Keep a copy of all the memoran-dums.

Analysis Blog or Analytic MemorandumTranslated by Anina Bester, Pretoria, South Africa

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

in the news

GCHQ (ed: excerpted)

The GCHQ Student SponsorshipScheme (SSS) has been shortlistedfor an award by the NationalCouncil for Work Experience(NCWE). The GCHQ SSS scheme(formerly called the SponsoredUndergraduate TechnologistScheme) was established in 2005.The aim is to attract and retaintechnologists to GCHQ with a realtechnical interest and focus. Theyare recruited onto the schemefrom University for one or twosummer placements or an indus-trial year placement.During their time in GCHQ theyare given the opportunity to workin technical areas across the de-partment and do project workthat benefits both the organisationand the student’s personal andacademic development. TheGCHQ SSS scheme has seen over200 students pass through, a sub-stantial number of which are nowworking as permanent employeesin the Department.

GCHQ shortlisted inNational Council forWork Experience

Awards 2012

ACH softwareused by French

biotechnologystudents

CIA to softwarevendors: A revolution

is comingReuters 21 Feb 2012 (ed: excerpted)

The U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency told software vendors onTuesday that it plans to revolu-tionize the way it does businesswith them as part of a race tokeep up with the blazing pace oftechnology advances.Rather than stick with traditionalall-you-can-eat deals known as"enterprise licensing agreements,"the CIA wants to buy softwareservices on a "metered," pay-as-you-go basis, Ira "Gus" Hunt, theagency's top technology officer,told an industry conference.Reginald Brothers, deputy assist-ant secretary of defense for re-search, told the conference thatexisting software tools for dataanalysis, management and inter-action lagged the vast amounts ofinformation that drones and otherhigh-tech U.S. military sensorswere vacuuming up. "The big da-ta problem is the analysis of it," hesaid. Existing tools "do not aidusers ... in the mission timelines."

News about our profession

Business Intelligencecompulsory subject

for all Frenchstudents in 2013

Sudyrama 9 Jan 2012

From 2013 the French Govern-ment announced that business in-telligence will become acompulsory subject in the educa-tional curriculum of all Frenchstudents.Olivier Buquen, the French gov-ernment representative in chargeof Business/economic Intelligencestated that this project is designedto train future employees andbusiness leaders by raising aware-ness on the concept of intelli-gence.

During the 24-hour of bachelorlevel courses and the 16-hour ofgraduate level courses, the stu-dent will be trained to protectsensitive data and companyknow-how to gain and maintaincompetitive advantages.From the year 2012, 20 Frenchuniversities including Paris-Dau-phine and the University JeanMonnet in Saint-Etienne, will pio-neer these CI courses it should bespread in all the French educa-tional programs in 2013."

Jan 2012: Twenty-six students inthe Advanced Master in Biotech-nology Management (link) at Gre-noble Ecole de Management(GEM) are becoming beta-testersof an intelligence analysis soft-ware developed by CIA veterans –

a first in Europe. Arsia Amir-Aslani, Professor and Director ofthe Advanced Master in Biotech-nology Management at GEM,said: “We are training studentswho already have a strong scien-tific background, bringing themstrategic management, technologyand innovation skills. It is essen-tial for us to expose our studentsto the most advanced analyticaltechniques and more particularlycutting-edge software for them toimmediately add value to theircompanies, upon graduation.”News release by University

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

The effective analystJanet Evans

Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia

In the last issue Idescribed how

three themesemerged in theprocess of under-standing what con-stitutes an effective

analyst. In this issue I am going toexplore in some detail the firsttheme as an indicator of an effectiveanalyst, the Analytical product.I find it difficult to reflect on the ef-fectiveness an analyst withoutwanting to ask what they produce. Iam not alone because of the thirtysubject matter experts who contrib-uted to the study all wanted toknow about products. Responseswere categorised into product de-velopment and the skills requiredto disseminate the product. Herethe focus is developing the analyti-cal product.Four main arguments emerge whenassessing analysts’ effectiveness inrelation to developing products.The first is the analyst as a compe-tent thinker. It creates a picture ofan effective analyst as a person whois capable of lateral thinking, crea-tive thought and “thinking outsidethe box”.The second conceptualises the ana-lyst as a problem-solver who pro-vides inferences andrecommendations for action mov-

ing the role from that of technicianto decision makers associate, as de-scribed in the first article of this se-ries. In summary the decisionmaking aspect of the role includesmental processes resulting in thenomination of several justified alter-natives for action and Mark Lo-wenthal (2009) describes intelligenceas existing solely to support policymakers and that the analyst contri-bution should be to support deci-sion makers.The third is that life experiencecounts for a lot in assessing analyst’seffectiveness. This study clearlyidentified the analyst needing a di-verse range of experiences that theycan draw on for their analysis.These experiences included butwere not limited to being well trav-elled, extensive work experienceand being exposed to many situa-tions or experience within policing,being trusted and respected bypeers and superiors or experience inthe criminal investigations depart-ment. Everyone in the study de-scribe a need to have something todraw on to be effective.The last is the need for training,mentioned by some but not empha-sised.What this tells me is when I amlooking to recruit an analyst I needto make sure they can think well,

“thinking outside the box” andthey use their life experience to in-form their thinking.When I reflect on the recruitmentprocesses I have used I am not surea one hour written test adequatelycaptures how well someone thinksparticularly if I am trying to cap-ture outside the box thinking.Equally knowing someone has col-lected many life experiences maynot translate into something mean-ingful in a single interview. Thequestion I leave you with is: doyour current recruitment practicesreally test what you think, and re-search suggests will make an effec-tive analyst? I am not sure minehave!What is also apparent is how im-portant thinking was rated in com-parison to training. Training wasmentioned but thinking was em-phasised. This poses some what ofa dilemma because changing some-one’s ability to think laterally orcreatively is a much bigger chal-lenge for organisations than train-ing an analyst in a technique orsoftware but if thinking is an un-derlying element of effectivenesswe need to recruit it or develop it.Again I pose a question. How dowe measure thinking skills andhow do we develop them? •

In this 2nd article in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her andMark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.

career

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

peopleMeet Charmian Taylor

Corrections intelligence analystDepartment of Corrections, Wellington, New Zealand

Not many countries have in-telligence analysts in their

corrections department. What isthe role and function of intelli-gence analysts in the NZ Correc-tions department and what valuedo you bring to the organisation?Operational Intelligence, the De-partment’s intelligence function,assists in protecting the public byidentifying possible criminal ac-tivity by prisoners and workingwith prison management to pre-vent or address it. This in turn re-duces the number of victims ofcrime, holds prisoners to accountand ensures sentence compliance.Protecting the public is the NZCorrections Department’s key pri-ority.

Charmian Taylorwas awarded the

2011 Prime Minis-ter’s Prize in Stra-tegic Studies from

Victoria Universityfor achieving excel-lent all-round aca-demic performance

advance knowledge of their activ-ities and provide recommenda-tions for action.Our activities also contribute toreducing crime in the community.The team liaises closely with otherGovernment agencies, such as theNZ Police, and provides themwith information and evidence touse in their investigations or bringcharges against those involved incriminal offending. There aremany examples where the moni-toring of prisoners’ telephoneconversations has led to arrests inthe community for family vio-lence, drug offending and fraud,etc.

Who are your clients andwhat types of intelligence

products do you provide tothem?We follow the National Intelli-gence Model, whereby we workclosely with decision makers, toboth provide intelligence prod-ucts and advice, as well as receivedirection as to intelligence priori-ties. This involves the integrationof tasking and coordination proc-esses within operational decisionmaking. Intelligence productsprovided to decision makerswithin Corrections range fromsimple intelligence reports whichdetail a crime or disorder problemand suggested responses, to tele-phone monitoring disclosures,prisoner profiles, and tactical as-sessments at both a prison andnational level.

Operational Intelligence plays animportant role in ensuring thesafety of staff and prisoners andthe good order of the prison envi-ronment by detecting criminal ac-tivity. Information gathered byanalysts working in the Opera-tional Intelligence Unit includessuch things as who prisoners areassociating with, criminal activityattempts, any tensions betweenprisoners or groups of prisoners(including gang tensions) and oth-er information likely to shape orinfluence criminal activities.Intelligence gathered is used totrack emerging trends and‘hotspots’ of criminal behaviour,and advise prison management,so that strategies can be put inplace. We believe one of the mosteffective ways to tackle criminalsand organised crime is to have

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

Tell us about your studiesand the award you received

from the Prime Minister?During my studies in the Masterof Strategic Studies course of-fered by Victoria University Icompleted papers covering topicssuch as Strategic Analysis, Ter-rorism and Counter-Terrorism,Intelligence Analysis and Inter-pretation, Transnational Crimeand Intelligence-Led Enforce-ment.To complete the research compo-nent of the MSS, my dissertationexamined how terrorist, extrem-ist and organised crime groupsare utilising the internet andweb-based technology, and iden-tified points of convergencewhere intelligence operations canbest utilise resources in order toachieve the most effective results.Graduating in December 2010with a MSS, I received the PrimeMinister’s Prize in Strategic Stud-ies in September 2011. The annu-al prize is one of three Prizes inpublic policy, public manage-ment and strategic studies, whichare awarded to the students whohave the best overall perform-ance in the Master of Public Poli-cy, Master of Public Managementand Master of Strategic Studies.

What are your greatest chal-lenges you face as an in-

telligence analyst and how doyou overcome them?As an analyst, I face a number ofdifferent challenges each day, in-cluding information collection,competing priorities and timeavailable to undertake analysis. Iwouldn’t say these are challengesare unique to just me though, butmost intelligence analysts world-wide. One of the greatest chal-lenges I face would probably beworking towards embedding

strategic intelligence as part of theday-to-day culture of Corrections.As Intelligence is still a relativelynew function, this may take sometime. It’s not impossible though,and I believe there’ll be a shift to-wards safety and security withinprisons becoming intelligence led,much like how NZ Police andCustoms operate now.

What can intelligence ana-lysts do to promote our

profession?

One of the most important waysto promote intelligence is for ana-lysts to always work with hones-ty, integrity and passion. Bybuilding trust with informationsources, as well as your decisionmakers, and writing productsthat you believe in and are will-ing to stand up to when scruti-nised, you can help others tounderstand and believe in thevalue intelligence can provide.

Read more about intelligence analysis in the corrections domain:

● Example of a Criminal Tradecraft report here

● Investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues(strategic report) here

● Intelligence: the key to gang suppression, Brain Parry here

● Using prison gang intelligence from the Inside-out, Melissa Johnsonpages 4-8 here

● State of New Jersey Investigation: Gangland behind bars here (seeappendix for typical use of analysis tools)

● The correction connection: intelligence gathering approaches inprisons, Jess Maghan here

● Corrections Intelligence chapter written by Melissa Johnson inCriminal Intelligence for the 21st Century: a guide for IntelligenceProfessionals available from LEIU and IALEIA here

people

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

1 - 4 April 2012 : Hilton San Diego Bayfront, USThe Intelligence Studies Section's contribution to theannual ISA conference is 18 intelligence studiesoriented panels, and a number of single papers onother panels that are intelligence (national securityand defense) related including:▪ Intelligence, IT, and the Global Information Age▪ Beyond the intelligence cycle▪ Intelligence transformation in new democracies▪ Who's Watching? Intelligence and surveillance in

the Information Age▪ Explaining and evaluating Intelligence Analysis▪ Intelligence cooperation and communication▪ Intelligence and the private sector▪ Improving intelligence analysis methodologies

For conference information click here

For programme information, click here

International StudiesAssociation

Annual ConventionSan Diego

collaborateshare

discuss

April 2012

April 30 – May 4, 2012Loews Coronado Bay, San Diego, US

A wide range of topics and training sessions on lawenforcement intelligence related topics

For more information: Click here

LEIU & IALEIA AnnualConference

May 2012International Association for IntelligenceEducation (IAFIE) 8th Annual Conference

21- 24 May 2012 : Washington DC, USIntelligence Education:  Theory and Practice

Call for papers on the following topics:▪ Research initiatives▪ History of intelligence analysis▪ Future trends in the field of intelligence analysis▪ Nexus between intelligence education and intelligence training▪ Successes and lessons learned in intelligence education▪ International perspectives in developing the profession

Contact Bascom D. Talley, Events Committee Chair, at dittalley@jhu.edu no later than close of business on February29, 2012. More info on CFP here, more info on conference here

events

April 2012 • Foreknowledge2

events

24th - 26th July 2012: Sydney, Australia

Intelligence 2012 explores the challenges arising from the growingpartnership between intelligence practitioners and their customers.Customer expectations of intelligence officers are growing asintelligence-led approaches are becoming more widely employedin government and the private sector.

Two key challenges to be explored at Intelligence 2012 concern:

▪ anticipating risks in the operating environment; and

▪ influencing action by decision-makers.

Intelligence 2012 will include case-based perspectives frompractitioners, managers and customers, offering practical advice toaddress these topical professional challenges. You can also attendtwo master classes in critical thinking and collective intelligence.For more information: Click here

Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk & Influencing Action

June 2012

International BISA-ISAconference

20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, ScotlandBritish International Studies Association and the

International Studies Association Joint

International Conference has the following intelli-gence related themes:

▪ Risks and Challenges: Information, Intelligenceand Procurement in the Military

▪ International Perspectives on the Teaching ofIntelligence

▪ Intelligence, Misconduct and Torture▪ Understanding Intelligence: From National Sys-

tems to AbstractFor conference information click here

ISPM conference

Strategic foresight, strategic agility and futureorientation special interest group

17-20 June 2012 : Barcelona, SpainNot an intelligence conference, but topics has

relevance to intelligence business andmethodologies

▪ Strategic agility▪ Environmental scanning and peripheral vision▪ Strategic foresight▪ Future orientation

For conference information click here

For special interest group information, click here

July 2012The Australian Institute of ProfessionalIntelligence Officers (AIPIO) Annual

conference

collaborate

3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

Contribute to the growing body ofknowledge in the intelligence

discipline by writing for journalsand presenting at the following

conferences. Send notices of CFP’sto editor@foreknowledge.info Call for Papers

Due in April 2012

Workshop on Innovation in BorderControl 2012, August 21-22, 2012,

Odense, Denmark. Proposals: 30 April2012. Information here

International Symposium on OpenSource Intelligence & Web mining2012, August 21-22, 2012, Odense,Denmark. Proposals: 30 April 2012.

Information here

International Symposium on Founda-tions of Open Source Intelligence andSecurity Informatics: August 27 & 28,2012, Istanbul, Turkey. Proposals: 15

April 2012. Information here

Due in May 2012Need to Know II: Lessons learned:

October 16-17 21-22, 2012, Odense,Denmark. Proposals: May 20, 2012.

Information here

IALEIA Journal Summer 2012:Manuscripts: May 15, 2012.

Information here

In the next Foreknowledge:● Feedback on the ISA conference

● Should we kill the intelligence cycle?● Learning from other disciplines

● We talk to various thought leaders● A wiki for the Foreknowledge resources list?

● And many more!