CC janneker thesis - 14 may 2012 final

DETERMINING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE

ROLE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

RESEARCH REPORT

Presented to the

Graduate School of Business Leadership

University of South Africa

In partial fulfilment of the

Requirements for the

MASTERS DEGREE IN BUSINESS ADMINSTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

By

CHANTAL CHARLENE JANNEKER

14 May 2012

DECLARATION OF CANDIDATE

I, Chantal Charlene Janneker being a registered student at UNISA and bearing the student

number 71649484, declare that this research report is my own work. All information

obtained directly or indirectly from other sources have been fully acknowledged and

referenced in the text.

14 May 2012

Signed: ____________________________ Date: _______________________

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge with much gratitude, the very thorough research conducted by

Jaré Struwig and Ben Roberts of the HSRC, both of who displayed great sensitivity and

clear and constructive thinking in their interaction with me regarding the questions asked

in the survey, the areas surveyed and the overall benchmarking of the results.

In particular, I would like to acknowledge and most sincerely thank my colleagues at

Necsa, so many of whom not only took interest in this project, but readily and willingly

provided me with constructive comment and voluntary assistance in generally editing this

document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... 10

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... 12

1. CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM .......................................... 32

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 32

1.2 The problem review ................................................................................... 35

1.3 The research objectives ............................................................................. 36

1.4 Methodology ............................................................................................... 38

1.5 The significance of the study ..................................................................... 39

1.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 40

2. CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM ANALYSIS .................................................................... 42

2.1 An overview of the global nuclear industry ............................................. 42

2.1.1 Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor (TMI-2) .......................................... 45

2.1.2 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Reactor-4 ..................................................... 45

2.1.3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) .................................... 46

2.2 Analysing the global nuclear challenges .................................................. 47

2.3 An overview of the South African nuclear industry ............................... 50

2.4 The South African nuclear challenges ..................................................... 53

2.5 The South African nuclear legislative and policy framework ............... 56

2.5.1 The White Paper on Energy Policy (1998) ............................................ 56

2.5.2 The Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999) ............................ 56

2.5.3 The National Nuclear Regulatory Act, 1999 (Act No. 47 of 1999) ....... 57

2.5.4 The Radioactive Waste Management Policy and Strategy (2005) ........ 57

2.5.5 The Nuclear Energy Policy (2008) ........................................................ 57

2.5.6 The National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act, 2008 (Act No. 53 of 2008) ................................................................................................... 57

2.5.7 The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2010), 2010-2030 (2011) ............... 58

2.5.8 The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP, 2010) ................................... 58

2.5.9 The Nuclear Energy Resource Development and Innovation Strategy (NERDIS) ............................................................................................... 58

2.6 The Nuclear Industry Players ................................................................... 59

2.6.1 The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) ...................... 59

2.6.2 The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) ................................................ 59

2.6.3 Eskom .................................................................................................... 60

2.6.4 The Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa (NIASA, 2012) ...... 60

2.6.5 The National Nuclear Energy Executive Co-ordination Committee (NNEECC, 2011) .................................................................................... 60

2.7 The business case for an integrated public awareness programme ...... 61

2.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 62

3. CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................. 63

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 63

3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s

knowledge of nuclear energy and technology .......................................... 63

3.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 63

3.2.2 The construction of the Koeberg NPP .................................................... 64

3.2.3 The selection of future nuclear sites ....................................................... 64

3.2.4 The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) ............................................ 64

3.2.5 Global events influencing public perception .......................................... 65

3.2.6 South African events influencing public perceptions ............................. 65

3.2.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 66

3.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2: To establish the South African public’s

support for different applications of nuclear technology ....................... 66

3.3.1 The nuclear debate in South Africa ........................................................ 66

3.3.2 The early history of strategic decision-making ....................................... 67

3.3.3 The later history of nuclear strategic decision-making ........................... 68

3.3.4 The era of commercial decision-making, transparency and open dialogue70

3.3.5 Challenges deterring public support for nuclear technology applications72

3.3.6 Solutions that may promote public support for nuclear technology applications ............................................................................................. 73

3.3.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 74


perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear energy and

technology ................................................................................................... 75

3.4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 75

3.4.2 Nuclear secured a position in South Africa’s energy mix ...................... 75

3.4.3 The nuclear debate concerning the benefits and concerns ...................... 76

3.4.4 Benefits and concerns of nuclear as perceived by proponent and opponent 77

3.4.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 79

3.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: To ascertain the South African public’s

perceptions of nuclear energy ................................................................... 80

3.5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 80

3.5.2 Nuclear likened to anti-abortion campaigns. .......................................... 81

3.5.2 The role of the media in forming public perceptions of nuclear ............. 81

3.5.3 Media sensationalism of the Fukushima accident .................................. 82

3.5.3 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 84

3.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: To clarify the South African public’s

perceptions of nuclear safety ..................................................................... 85

3.6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 85

3.6.2 Nuclear technology: A viable solution to the Kyoto commitments ........ 86

3.6.3 South Africa’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol ................................ 86

3.6.4 Events that influence public perceptions of nuclear safety ..................... 87

3.6.5 Psychological developments that influence public perceptions of nuclear safety ....................................................................................................... 87

3.6.6 Increased transparency in reporting nuclear safety incidents ................. 88

3.6.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 88

3.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To comprehend the South African

public’s views on nuclear energy in a global context .............................. 89

3.7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 89

3.7.2 Globally the NPT continues to be nuclear weapons deterrent ................ 89

3.7.3 NPT significantly boosts multilateralism ................................................ 89

3.7.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 90

3.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African

public trust for information on nuclear energy ...................................... 90

3.8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 90

3.8.2 South Africa’s legacy of social disparities still breeds distrust .............. 91

3.8.3 South Africa’s apartheid-era nuclear weapons history ........................... 91

3.8.4 Why public acceptance is synonymous with trust? ................................ 92

3.8.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 93

3.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 08: To evaluate the South African public’s

final assessment of nuclear energy and technology ................................ 93

3.9.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 93

3.9.2 In 1944 the South African nuclear programme was borne ..................... 94

3.9.3 In 1948 the South African Atomic Energy Board was established ........ 94

3.9.4 In 1970 the “Building 5000” complex was constructed ......................... 94

3.9.5 During the 1970s and 1980 South Africa resisted IAEA inspections ..... 95

3.9.6 In 1987 under severe pressure South Africa indicates it will sign the NPT95

3.9.7 In 1989 President F.W. de Klerk redefines South Africa’s nuclear aspirations ............................................................................................... 96

3.10 GANTT Chart Time-line ........................................................................... 96

3.11 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 96

4. CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ........................... 98

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 98

4.2 Research inception meeting ...................................................................... 98

4.3 Research design .......................................................................................... 99

4.3.1 Research philosophy: .............................................................................. 99

4.3.2 Research approach: ............................................................................... 100

4.3.3 Research strategy / methodology .......................................................... 101

4.3.4 Time horizons: (cross sectional) .......................................................... 102

4.3.5 Data collection methods: Reliability and validity ................................. 103

5. CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ...................................................... 113

5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 113

5.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s

knowledge of nuclear energy and technology ........................................ 114

5.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 114

5.2.2 Self rated knowledge in terms of determining the public’s knowledge of Nuclear Energy and Technology .......................................................... 114

5.2.3 Nuclear knowledge quiz for determining the public’s knowledge of Nuclear Energy and Technology ........................................................................ 117

5.2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 119


support for different applications of nuclear technology ..................... 120

5.3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 120

5.3.2 Support for different applications of Nuclear Technology ................... 121

5.3.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 125


perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear technology . 125

5.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 125

5.4.2 What survey respondents were asked in terms of perceived benefits and concerns of Nuclear Technology .......................................................... 125

5.4.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 130


perceptions of nuclear energy. ................................................................ 131

5.5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 131

5.5.2 General view of Nuclear Energy ........................................................... 131

5.5.3 Benefits and disadvantages of nuclear energy ...................................... 134

5.5.4 Future energy preferences ..................................................................... 138

5.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: To clarify the South African public’s

perceptions of nuclear safety ................................................................... 146

5.6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 146

5.6.2 Portrayal of nuclear risks in media and the public ................................ 147

5.6.3 Assessment of level of nuclear risk ...................................................... 151

5.6.4 Perceived likelihood of a nuclear accident ........................................... 156

5.6.5 Attitudes towards the storage of nuclear waste ..................................... 159

5.6.6 Evaluation of government’s and nuclear authority’s efforts in ensuring nuclear safety ........................................................................................ 161

5.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To understand the South African

public’s views on nuclear energy in a global context ............................ 164

5.7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 164

5.8. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African

public trust for information on nuclear ................................................. 167

5.8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 167

5.9. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 8: To evaluate the South African public’s

final assessment of nuclear energy and technology .............................. 173

5.9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 173

5.9.2 A composite profile of support and opposition to nuclear energy and technology ............................................................................................. 176

5.9.3 Multivariate Analysis (MVA) ............................................................... 178

5.9.4 Self-Reported Knowledge of Nuclear Technology and Energy Issues . 179

5.9.5 Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Energy .................................................. 181

5.9.6 Recent exposure to nuclear energy or technology advertising ............. 187

5.9.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 190

6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................... 191

6.1 Summary of findings ................................................................................ 191

6.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s

knowledge of nuclear energy and technology ........................................ 191


support for different applications of nuclear technology ..................... 192


perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear technology . 192

6.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: To ascertain the South African public’s

perceptions of nuclear energy ................................................................. 193


perceptions of nuclear safety ................................................................... 194

6.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To comprehend the South African

public’s views on nuclear energy in a global context ............................ 195

6.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African

public trust for information on nuclear ................................................. 196

6.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 8: To evaluate the South African public’s

final assessment of nuclear energy and technology .............................. 196

7. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 198

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: The nuclear bomb code name "Little Boy" dropped on Hiroshima (wikipedia, 2010). ................................................................................................................................... 42 Figure 2: Little Boy was a uranium gun-type nuclear fission weapon (perilousmemories, 2008). ................................................................................................................................... 43 Figure 3: The "Fat Man" bomb was dropped over Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945 by the B-29 "Bockscar" at an altitude of about 1,800 feet over the city (awesomestories, 2007) ............................................................................................................................................. 43 Figure 4: The "Fat Man" bomb had an explosive force (yield) of about 20,000 tons of TNT and was an implosion type, weapon using plutonium, which resulted in a supercritical condition and a nuclear explosion (blippitt, 2011) .............................................................. 44 Figure 5: The centre of gravity of civil nuclear power is shifting towards East. China has laid out plans to increase nuclear power capability 11 fold, up to 95,620 MWe (Insight, 2008). ................................................................................................................................... 48 Figure 6: The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant before the devastating natural disaster struck (dailymail, 2012). ........................................................................................ 49 Figure 7: The crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Okuma, northern Japan and nine days after the March disaster struck (dailymail, 2012). ........................................ 50 Figure 8: Location of Necsa at Pelindaba (maplandia, 2012) ............................................. 51 Figure 9: The Research Onion, (Saunders et al., 2000:84). ................................................. 99 Figure 10: Self reported knowledge and actual knowledge of nuclear scores by socio-demographic attributes ...................................................................................................... 119 Figure 11: South African attitude of the various applications of nuclear energy and technology) ........................................................................................................................ 121 Figure 12: Views on the different applications on nuclear technology by socio-demographic and other attributes ...................................................................................... 122 Figure 13: Concerns and Benefits of nuclear technology mentioned by socio-demographic attributes ............................................................................................................................ 129 Figure 14: Koeberg Nuclear Power Station ...................................................................... 131 Figure 15: General views of nuclear energy in South Africa and Britain mentioned by socio-demographic attribute (percentage) ......................................................................... 132 Figure 16: People that favour or disfavour nuclear energy (percent) ............................... 132 Figure 17: Responses in favour of nuclear energy by socio-demographic attributes (percent) ............................................................................................................................. 133 Figure 18: Disadvantages and benefits of nuclear energy by socio demographic and other characteristics .................................................................................................................... 137 Figure 19: South Africans least in favour of the building of new nuclear reactors ........... 139 Figure 20: Perceptions of the levels of energy by select socio-demographic characteristics ........................................................................................................................................... 144 Figure 21: Perceived nuclear incidents sometimes raise major concerns in the media and the public. In your opinion, compared to other safety risks, would you say that nuclear risks are? ............................................................................................................................ 147

Figure 22: Ratio of the share of citizens reporting exaggerated nuclear risk to the share perceiving underestimated risk in South Africa and Europe (ratio) .................................. 151 Figure 23: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family in South Africa and Europe .............................................................................................................. 152 Figure 24: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family, by levels of self-reported knowledge and support for nuclear technology and energy .......... 155 Figure 25: Belief in the possibility of a nuclear accident in South Africa ....................... 156 Figure 26: Vaalputs Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility ............................................... 159 Figure 27: Level of concern about the storage of nuclear waste from South African reactors ............................................................................................................................... 160 Figure 28: Level of concern about the storage of nuclear waste from South African reactors, by socio-demographic attributes ......................................................................... 161 Figure 29: Assessment of efforts by government and nuclear authority in ensuring nuclear safety in South Africa ........................................................................................................ 162 Figure 30: Distribution of views about nuclear weapons programmes (percent) .............. 166 Figure 31: People most likely to have seen or hear Necsa advertising in the various categories ........................................................................................................................... 168 Figure 32: Nuclear industry in SA should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear technology, by socio-demographic attributes. ................................................................... 171 Figure 33: Nuclear industry in SA should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear technology, by levels of self-reported knowledge and support for nuclear technology and energy ................................................................................................................................ 172 Figure 34: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy in South Africa and Europe ................................................................................................... 173 Figure 35: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy, by levels of self-reported knowledge and evaluation of nuclear energy. .......................... 175 Figure 36: Profiling supporters and opponents of nuclear energy and technology .......... 177 Figure 37: Attitudinal Categories by Demographic variables .......................................... 178

LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Current generation capacity, new electricity generation capacity and envisaged total by 2030 (DoE, 2011) ............................................................................................................................ 55 Table 2: Differences of Deductive and Inductive Research (Saunders, et al., 2004) ................... 101 Table 3: Number of Enumerator Areas selected by Province and Race ........................................ 104 Table 4: Sample (Unweighted and Weighted) ............................................................................... 111 Table 6: Knowledge about nuclear energy and nuclear technology (row percentage and mean score) ............................................................................................................................................. 116 Table 7: Nuclear Knowledge .......................................................................................................... 117 Table 8: Views on the use of nuclear technology in the various sectors ....................................... 121 Table 9: A profile of "Don't know" responses, by socio-‐demographic characteristics .................. 124 Table 10: Benefits of nuclear technology (Multiple response percentage) ................................... 126 Table 11: Benefits of nuclear technology by province (Multiple response percentage) ............... 127 Table 12: Concerns associated with nuclear technology (Multiple response percentage) ........... 128 Table 13: Portrayal of support for nuclear technology by self-‐reported knowledge and perceptions of risks and benefits (row percent) ................................................................................................ 134 Table 14: Benefits of nuclear energy as a source of electricity ...................................................... 135 Table 15: Disadvantages of nuclear as a source of electricity ....................................................... 136 Table 16: Agreement with future energy preference statements ................................................. 138 Table 17: Future energy preferences, by socio-‐demographic characteristics (percent that strongly agree or agree) ............................................................................................................................... 141 Table 18: Future energy preferences by self-‐reported knowledge, support for nuclear energy and perceptions of risk (percent) .......................................................................................................... 142 Table 19: Perceptions of the levels of nuclear energy by socio-‐demographic characteristics ...... 143 Table 20: Support for levels of nuclear as a source of energy by self-‐reported knowledge, support for nuclear energy and perceived risks .......................................................................................... 145 Table 21: Portrayal of risk in the media and public, by socio-‐demographic characteristics .......... 148 Table 22: Portrayal of risk in the media and public, by levels of self-‐reported knowledge and support for nuclear technology and energy .................................................................................. 149 Table 23: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family, by socio-‐demographic characteristics .......................................................................................................... 154 Table 24: Perceived risk of a nuclear accident occurring in South Africa, by socio-‐demographic characteristics ................................................................................................................................ 158 Table 25: The public's perception of nuclear safety ...................................................................... 163 Table 26: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? ...................................... 165 Table 27: Trust in sources of information ...................................................................................... 167 Table 28: Have you recently heard or seen any advertising from the SA Nuclear Energy Corporation Ltd? ............................................................................................................................ 169 Table 29: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy, by socio-‐demographic characteristics .......................................................................................................... 173 Table 30: Ordered logistical regression on self-‐reported nuclear knowledge ............................... 181 Table 31: Ordered logit regression models on overall perception of nuclear energy ................... 184 Table 32: Logistic regression models of 'do not know' responses to overall perception of nuclear energy question ............................................................................................................................. 186

Table 33: Logistic regression models of recent exposure to nuclear energy or technology advertising ..................................................................................................................................... 189

LIST OF PIE CHARTS Pie Chart 1: South African opinion on whether Nuclear Power Plants present a “risk”

Pie Chart 2: South African sentiments of nuclear energy

Pie Chart 3: The most trusted to provide accurate information on Nuclear Energy

Pie Chart 4: Six categories of South African opinion on Nuclear Issues

LIST OF APPENDICES

§ Appendix A: Module of Questions

§ Appendix B: Supplementary tables and figures

§ Appendix C: The example of an Enumerator Area map issued to assist the field

teams to navigate to the correct areas

§ Appendix D: Official letter describing the project and its duration to authorities

§ Appendix E: Kish Grid in the Questionnaire

§ Appendix F: Farmers Letter

§ Appendix G: Consent Forms

§ Appendix H: Letter of Introduction

§ Appendix I: Necsa Confidentiality Letter

§ Appendix J: 2011 Gantt Chart, Research Phase I

§ Appendix K: 2011/2012 Gantt Chart, Dissertation Phase II

ACRONYMS

AEB Atomic Energy Board

AEC Atomic Energy Corporation

AgriSA Agri South Africa

ANC African National Congress

ARMSCOR Armaments Corporation of South Africa

ARV Antiretroviral

CAN Canadian Nuclear Association

CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

CNA Canadian Nuclear Association

CO2 Carbon Dioxide

DEA Department of Environmental Affairs

DFA Department of Foreign Affairs

DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism

DME Department of Minerals and Energy

DST Department of Science and Technology

DoE Department of Energy

EA Enumerator Area

EC Eastern Cape

EIA Environmental Impact Assessments

EPR European Pressurized Reactor

EU European Union

FS Free State

GDP Growth Domestic Product

GHG Green House Gas (CO2, CH4, O3, N2O, etc)

GP Gauteng Province

GW Gigawatts

HSRC Human Sciences Research Council

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IDC Industrial Development Corporation

IPAP Industrial Policy Action Plan

IPCS International Programme on Chemical Safety IRP Integrated Resource Plan

JV Joint Venture

KZN KwaZulu-Natal

LP Limpopo

LSM Living Standard Measurement

MBq Megabecquerels

MP Mpumalanga

mSv Millisieverts

MVA Multivariate Analysis

NAC New Agenda Coalition

Necsa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation

NC Northern Cape

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NEP Nuclear Energy Policy

NERDIS Nuclear Energy Resource Development and Innovation Strategy

NETC Nuclear Energy Technical Committee

NIASA Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa

NNEECC National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee

NNR National Nuclear Regulator

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NPT Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

NUM National Union of Mineworkers

NVC Necsa Visitor Centre

NW North West

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OCGT Open Cycle Gas Turbine

CCGT Closed Cycle Gas Turbine

PAIA Public Access to Information Act

PBMR Pebble Bed Modular Reactor

PSU Primary Sampling Unit

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor

SASAS South African Social Attitudes Survey

SOE State Owned Enterprise

TWh Terawatt hours

UCOR Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB World Bank

WC Western Cape

WHO World Health Organisation

WNA World Nuclear Association

WWF World Wide Fund

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

USSR Former Soviet Union

GLOSSARY

Atom: An atom is a basic component of the chemical elements that form matter. It

consists of a nucleus composed of positively charged protons and neutral particles

(neutrons), orbited by negatively charged particles (electrons).

Becquerel (Bq): A Becquerel is a unit to measure nuclear activity (1 Bq = 1 atomic

nucleus disintegration per second). The Becquerel is a very small unit. Nuclear activity

was previously measured in curies (1 curie – 37 billion Bq)

Containment Area: During the construction of a facility designed to house radioactive

materials, a series of containment barriers is put up between the material inside and the

environment outside the facility during construction. This creates separate areas called

“containment areas”.

Contamination: Contamination is the presence of an undesirable level of radioactive

substances (dust or liquid) at the surface of or inside any medium. Contamination in

humans can be external (on the skin) or internal (via the respiratory or digestive tracts).

Criticality: Criticality is reached when a medium containing a fissile nuclear material

becomes critical when neutrons are produced (by fission of this material) at the same rate

as they disappear (through absorption and leakage to the outside).

Decommissioning: Decommissioning is a term covering all the steps following the

shutdown of a nuclear or mining facility at the end of its operating life, from closure to the

removal of radioactivity of the site and including physical dismantling and clean-up of all

non-reusable facilities and equipment.

Decontamination: Decontamination is a physical, chemical or mechanical operation

designed to eliminate or reduce the presence of radioactive or chemical materials deposited

on or in a facility, open space, equipment, or personnel.

Dose: Dose is a measurement characterizing the exposure of individuals subjected to

radiation. The term dose is often mistakenly used instead of dose equivalent.

• Absorbed dose: This is a quantity of energy absorbed by matter (living or inert)

exposed to radiation. It is expressed in grays (Gy).

• Dose equivalent: In living organisms, an absorbed dose has different effects

depending on the type of radiation (X-ray, alpha, beta and gamma). To take these

differences into account, a dose-multiplying factor is used (known as the “quality

factor”) to compute a “dose equivalent”.

• Effective dose: This is the sum of weighted dose equivalents deposited on the

various tissues and organs by internal and external irradiation. The unit of

measurement for effective dose is the sievert (Sv).

• Lethal dose: This is a fatal dose of nuclear or chemical origin.

• Maximum permissible dose: This is a dose that must not be exceeded for a given

period of time.

• Gray (Gy): This is a unit of measurement for the absorbed dose. The absorbed

dose was formerly measured in rads (1 gray = 100 rads).

• Sievert (Sv): This is a unit of measurement for the dose equivalent, i.e. the fraction

of energy contributed by ionizing radiation and received per kilogram of living

matter. On the basis of the measured energy dose received (measured in grays), the

dose equivalent is calculated by applying various factors according to the type of

radiation received and the organ concerned.

• Commonly used sub-multiples are:

o The millisieverts, or mSv, equal to 0.001 Sv (a thousandth of a Sv), o The microsievert, or µSv, equal to 0.000 001 Sv (a millionth of a Sv).

For example, the mean annual dose from exposure to natural background radiation (soil, cosmos, etc.) of the population in France is 2.4 mSv/person, with the same being applicable to South Africa.

Enriched uranium and depleted uranium: Before uranium is used to manufacture “fuel

elements”, natural uranium is enriched with 235U (the proportion of 235U is then 3% to 5%).

Uranium enriched in 235U is obtained from natural uranium using an isotope separation

process. The physical or chemical processes used to produce enriched uranium also

produce at the same time uranium that has a lower proportion of 235U than natural uranium:

this is known as depleted uranium.

Enrichment: This is a process used to increase the abundance of fissile isotopes in an

element. Naturally-occurring uranium is composed of 0.7% 235U (fissile) and 99.3% 238U

(non-fissile). To make it suitable for use in a pressurised water reactor, the proportion of 235U is increased to about 3% to 4%.

Enumerator Areas: The smallest geographical area that formed the blocks of the

geographical frame for South African 2001 Census

Exposure: Exposure of an organism to a source of radiation characterized by the dose

received.

• External exposure: This is exposure from a radiation source located outside the

organism.

• Internal exposure: This is exposure from a radiation source located inside the

organism.

Fission: Splitting of a heavy nucleus, generally upon impact with a neutron, into two

smaller nuclei (fission products), accompanied by the emission of neutrons and radiation,

and the release of a considerable amount of heat. The energy thus released as heat is the

underlying principle of nuclear energy.

Fuel Cycle: All the industrial operations undergone by nuclear fuel. These operations

include: extraction, processing uranium ore, conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel

manufacturing, reprocessing spent fuels and waste management. The fuel cycle is “closed”

if it includes the reprocessing of spent fuel and recycling of fissile materials resulting from

reprocessing. The term “once through” cycle means that the fuel is disposed of in a

permanent storage site after its use in the reactor.

Fuel Element: A fuel element or assembly of rods is joined together and filled with

uranium or MOX27 pellets. Depending on the type of nuclear plant, the reactor core

contains from 100 to 200 fuel assemblies.

Fuel Rod: Metal tube (about 4 m in length and 1 cm in diameter) filled with pellets (about

300) of nuclear fuel.

Generation IV: Code name of nuclear reactors to put in operation beyond 2030.

Irradiation: This is the exposure to radiation and, by extension, its effects.

Isotopes: Elements whose atoms have the same number of electrons and protons but a

different number of neutrons. For example: Uranium has three isotopes.

• 234U (92 protons, 92 electrons, 142 neutrons);



A given chemical element can therefore have several isotopes with a differing number of

neutrons. All the isotopes of a given element have the same chemical properties, but

different physical properties (mass in particular).

Living Standard Measurement (LSM): A wealth indicator using assets or basic services

to determine a living standard measurement is classified from LSM 1 to LSM 10.

Measurement of Size (MOS): The Measurement of Size used for sampling households in

this survey was a function of the number of households in the enumerator areas.

MOX: ‘Mixed Oxides” is a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides used to make

certain nuclear fuels.

Natural Uranium: This is a naturally occurring radioactive element in the form of a hard,

gray metal, found in several ores, pitchblende in particular. Natural uranium comes as a

mixture composed of 99.27% non-fissile 238U, 0.72% fissile 235U and 0.01% 234U.

Nuclear Fuel: This is a nuclide that releases energy when it is consumed by fission inside

a reactor. By extension, any product containing fissile materials that yield energy in a

reactor core by sustaining the chain reaction. A 1,300 MW PWR contains about 100 tons

of fuel, periodically renewed in sections.

Nuclear Safety: In the nuclear industry, nuclear safety covers all the measures taken at

every stage of the design, construction, operation and final shutdown of a facility to ensure

operational safety and the prevention of incidents to limit their impact.

Plutonium: This is a chemical element with the atomic number 94 and conventional

symbol Pu. Plutonium-239, a fissile isotope is produced in nuclear reactors from uranium-

238.

Primary Sampling Unit: In sample surveys, primary sampling unit (commonly

abbreviated as PSU) arises in samples in which population elements are grouped into

aggregates and the aggregates become units in sample selection. The aggregates are, due to

their intended usage, called "sampling units". Primary sampling unit refers to sampling

units that are selected in the first (primary) stage of a multi-stage sample ultimately aimed

at selecting individual elements.

Radioactive Half-Life: This refers to the time required for half the atoms contained in a

sample of radioactive substance to decay naturally. The radioactivity of the substance has

therefore been halved. The half-life varies with the characteristics of each radionuclide:

• 110 minutes for argon-41;

• 8 days for iodine-131;

• 4.5 billion years for uranium-238. No external physical action is capable of

modifying the half-life of a radionuclide.

Radioactive Waste: This refers to non-reusable by-products of the nuclear industry.

Divided into four categories according to the intensity of their radioactivity:

• Very low-level waste (VLLW);

• Low-level waste (LLW); such as gloves, overboots and production masks all

coming from industrial production and maintenance operations (90% of waste

stored in specialized centres);

• Intermediate-level waste (ILW), such as certain parts coming from dismantled

production equipment, measuring instruments, etc., (8%);

• High-level waste (HLW), mainly fission products separated during reprocessing /

recycling operations (2%).

Radioactivity: This refers an emission by a chemical element of electromagnetic waves

and/or particles caused by a change in its nucleus. Emission can be spontaneous (natural

radioactivity) and has several forms. (See Dose and Becquerel).

Nuclear Reactor: This is a device in which controlled nuclear reactions are carried out.

The heat released by these reactions is harnessed to form water vapour to operate a turbine

driving an electric generator. Models vary according to the type of fuel, the moderator

used to control the reaction and the coolant used to remove the heat to be recovered. The

model currently used by Eskom in South Africa is two Pressurised Water Reactors

(PWR’s). Therefore the Koeberg nuclear reactor is moderated and cooled by light water

maintained in a liquid state in the core through appropriate pressurization under normal

operating conditions.

Uranium: This is a chemical element with the atomic number 92 and conventional

symbol U, with three natural isotopes: 234U, 235U and 238U. 235U is the only naturally

occurring fissile nuclide, which is why it is used as a source of energy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The main objective of this research problem explores, “Determining public perceptions and

understanding of the role of nuclear technology in South Africa,” in the context of public

acceptance. Understanding public perception is an important element in gaining the

support of stakeholders (the international community, national political and governmental

policy-makers, private-sector investors, the media, local communities, media opinion and

trend setters and our future leaders in universities and educational institutions such as

schools). The results of this study are envisaged to demystify public understanding of as

well as enable research and development of nuclear energy and technology to support the

planned South African nuclear new build programme.

The findings of a representative sample survey of 3004 adults distributed across South

Africa reveal that few claim to be “very knowledgeable” (3%) or “somewhat

knowledgeable” (15%) about nuclear energy and nuclear technology issues; most are “not

very knowledgeable” (18%); or “not at all knowledgeable” (34%) or they “don’t know”

(30%).

Not surprisingly, the highest perceived levels of knowledge occur amongst people with a

tertiary education (39%); and amongst residents of the Western Cape (37%); where about

4% of South Africa’s electric energy is generated at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. Also,

there are generally higher than average levels of knowledge amongst Indian (33%) and

White South Africans (31%); people in the high living standard measurement (LSM)

category (29%); residents of urban formal areas (26%) and males (22%).

Differences between age groups are not statistically significant. The lowest perceived

levels of knowledge about nuclear energy and nuclear technology occur amongst people

without schooling (2%); the low LSM group (5%); residents of the Eastern Cape (5%); or

of rural formal areas (7%); females (15%) and Black South Africans (16%).

Responses to three factual questions (research Objective 1: Knowledge of Nuclear Energy

and Technology, Self-rated knowledge and the Knowledge quiz) about nuclear energy in

South Africa yielded the highest mean scores amongst people with tertiary education;

Indians and Whites; those living in formal urban environments and those in the high LSM

grouping. The two provinces with the highest mean scores were KwaZulu-Natal and the

Free State.

Half of the adult population “don’t know” of any benefits of nuclear technology on the

multiple-choice list presented to them. Otherwise, the benefit most frequently identified

was that nuclear technology provides power/electricity/energy (20%). Others said it

creates jobs, helps the economy (16%); contributes to medical diagnostics and research

(14%); contributes to energy production efficiency (14%); or is less harmful to the

environment than are other energy sources (12%).

Regarding the benefits of nuclear energy as a source of electricity, 50% “don’t know”;

23% said that ‘it ensures a reliable supply of electricity’; and 16% said that ‘it helps to

combat climate change’.

The most frequently mentioned concerns regarding nuclear energy most frequently were

the safety of nuclear power plants (21%); the disposal of nuclear waste (17%); the effects

of radiation exposure or of a nuclear accident on workers and the community (16%); a lack

of knowledge of the implications (15%); the cost of nuclear-generated electricity (13%);

terrorist access to nuclear weapons (11%) and the environmental effects of producing

nuclear electricity (11%).

The main specific disadvantages of nuclear energy as a source of electricity were perceived

to be the risk of accidents (34%); the long-term disposal of nuclear waste (20%); the risk of

radiation or contamination (19%) and the general impact on the environment (17%);

although 49% “don’t know” of any disadvantages.

Almost half (48%) of those surveyed, “don’t know” whether nuclear plants represent a

risk? This proportion is much higher than the mere 5% across Europe that “doesn’t know”.

One-eighth (12%) of South Africans see nuclear plants as “a significant risk”; 23% as

“some risk”; 12% as “not much of a risk” and 4% as “no risk at all”.

Pie Chart 1: South African opinion on whether Nuclear Power Plants present a “risk”

More than a quarter (27%) perceives that there is a possibility of a nuclear accident

happening in South Africa and almost a quarter (24%) is of the view that in comparison to

other safety risks, nuclear risks are exaggerated. Almost a fifth (19%), on the other hand,

think that these risks are underestimated; 6% think that nuclear risks are wrongly perceived

and 52% “don’t know”.

Only 14% of South Africans have recently seen or heard advertising from Necsa; this is

highest amongst people with tertiary education (28%); Indians (24%); Whites (20%); high

LSM people (21%); the people of the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (both 21%) and

the Western Cape (20%). Almost half (47%) say the nuclear industry in the country should

do more to promote the benefits of nuclear technology.

The overall sentiment of nuclear energy in South Africa emerges as 41% “don’t know”;

23% neutral; 23% in favour and 13% against. Those most in favour of nuclear energy are

people living in the Western Cape (41%); those with tertiary education (37%); Indians

(35%); Whites (34%) and people in the high LSM group (32%). One-fifth (20%) said that

they see nuclear energy and nuclear technology more as a benefit; 18% see it more as a

risk; 18% are indifferent and 43% “don’t know”.

49%

12%

23%

12%

4%

South African opinions on whether Nuclear Power Plants present a "risk"

"Do not know" "Significant risk" "Some risk" "Not much risk" "No risk at all"

Pie Chart 2: South African sentiments of nuclear energy

Two-fifths (40%) of South Africans “agree” or “strongly agree” that the nuclear reactors at

Koeberg should continue to operate, 44% “don’t know” and 38% think that new nuclear

reactors to generate more electricity should be built.

More than a third (36%) say that renewable energy sources such as solar or wind energy

can take the place of nuclear power and 27% is of the view that coal and gas are worse for

the environment than is nuclear power. Almost half (49%) “don’t know” whether the

current level of nuclear energy as a proportion of all energy sources should be reduced,

maintained the same or increased; 12% think it should be reduced; 25% that it should be

maintained at the same level and 15% that it should be increased.

One third (33%) are concerned about the storage of nuclear waste, the proportions being

significantly higher in the Western Cape (55%), Northern Cape (38%), both close to

Koeberg, where more are “very concerned” and KwaZulu-Natal (48%). More than half

(51%) of South Africans “don’t know” how much the government and the nuclear safety

authorities are doing to ensure the safety of South African nuclear reactors. Only 23%

think they are doing enough, while 26% are of the view that they are doing too little.

Almost half (47%) are against nuclear weapons programmes; 43% “don’t know” or were

neutral on the issue and 10% were in favour of such programmes.

41%

23%

23%

13%

South African sen0ments of nuclear energy "Do not know" "Neutral" "In favour" "Against"

The most trusted to provide accurate information regarding nuclear energy, is the South

African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) (18%); followed by the South African

government (14%); scientists (8%) and energy companies that operate nuclear power

plants (7%), unlike in Europe, where 46% would trust scientists the most and 30% would

trust the national nuclear safety authorities.

Asked about whether nuclear technology should be utilised for specific purposes, almost

half of those surveyed said that they “don’t” know. Conversely, 42% said that nuclear

technology “should be used” to generate electricity; 35% agreed that it “should be used in

hospitals and clinics”; 31% were “in favour” of it being used in the treatment of cancer;

26% agreed that it “should be used in industry and big business” and a surprising 21% that

it “should be used for military purposes.”

18%

14%

8%

7%

Who is most trusted to provide accurate information on Nuclear Energy?

Necsa SA Government Sciendsts NPP Operators

Pie Chart 3: Who is most trusted to provide accurate information on Nuclear Energy?

Therefore, overall six categories of South Africans are identifiable in relation to nuclear

issues. More than half (52%) were “Uninformed with No Opinion” on the risk verses

benefit dichotomy. Ten percent were “Informed, with No opinion”. Eleven percent sees

nuclear energy and technology “more as a benefit”, although they lack knowledge

“Uninformed Supporters” and 9% have a similar view, but backed up with some

knowledge “Informed Supporters”. There are two other categories that see nuclear energy

and technology “more as a risk,” the “Uninformed Opponents” (13%) and the “Informed

Opponents” (5%).

38%

30%

17%

15%

Who is most trusted to provide accurate information on Nuclear Energy?

Necsa SA Government Sciendsts NPP Operators

Pie Chart 4: Six categories of South African opinion on Nuclear Issues

Conclusion

In terms of determining the public perceptions and understanding of nuclear technology in

South Africa, the most compelling finding is the 52% who rated themselves as

“Uninformed and with No Opinion” on the risk verse benefit dichotomy. While at a first

glance, this poses an initial negative sentiment, on reflection, it also presents a huge

challenge and opportunity for the nuclear industry to strive to gain the support of this

critical sector of the South African population.

52%

10%

11%

9%

13%

5%

Six categories of South African opinions on Nuclear Issues

Uninformed with "No Opinion" Informed with "No Opinion"

"Uninformed" Supporters" "Informed Supporters"

"Uninformed Opponents" "Informed Opponents"

SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC’S PERCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 32

1. CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

According to a Solidarity Institute Report by (Calldo, 2008), “Warnings of a dark

future were clear and accurate. A White Paper of 1998 (DME, 1998) said that the

country would run out of electricity by 2007. The report was signed by the then

Minister Penual Maduna. Despite this dire prediction, it was never acted upon.

Eskom’s requests for budget to build new power stations were also denied in 1998

when the government instructed Eskom to stop building new power stations due to its

attempted privatisation of Eskom in the late 1990s.”

Calldo reported that, “Even President Thabo Mbeki said, “When Eskom said to the

government, ‘we think we must invest more in terms of electricity generation,’ we

said not now, later we were wrong. Eskom was right. We were wrong.” Even in

2003, former Energy Minister Phumizile Nlambo-Ngcuka said there is no looming

power crisis. She said the then Eskom CEO, Thulani Gcabashe assured her South

Africa will never run out of power. This entire situation is very controversial given

the fact that Eskom warned the government in 1998 of a looming power crisis.

All South Africans share similar experiences of living in the dark and newspaper

headlines revealing doom and gloom of widespread rolling blackouts in the latter

months of 2007. This marked the onset of South Africa’s electricity supply demand

exceeding Eskom’s electricity capacity, where the reserve margin was eroded,

threatening to destabilise the national grid. During this crisis, demand side

management was introduced, which focussed on encouraging consumers to conserve

power during peak periods to reduce the incidence of load shedding.

Reports said government claimed that the shortage caught them by surprise since the

South African economy grew faster than expected. However, their target growth rate

of 6% per annum was not achieved from 1996 to 2004, with the average gross

domestic product (GDP) growth rate during this period being 3.1%.


The entire situation was shrouded by controversy. Decision-makers and leaders both

in Eskom and government claim the solution was the construction of additional power

stations. However, investigative television programme, Carte Blanche, (wikipedia,

2010) reported that part of the problem related to the supply of coal to coal-fired

power plants. Several others suggested causes such as skills shortages and the

increasing demand for electricity around the country.

In spite of every effort being made, a possible energy crisis still looms in 2012. South

Africa urgently needs a viable solution to meet the need for an increase in electricity

supply to meet the growing demand. Government adopted the White Paper on Energy

Policy (DME, 1998), which calls for the achievement of energy security through the

diversification of primary energy sources. Subsequently, the Integrated Resource

Plan for Electricity Generation (IRP2010) was also adopted on 16 March 2011. The

IRP2010 provides a blueprint for the electricity generation mix for the next 20 years,

and requires that 42% renewables, 23% nuclear, 15% gas, 15% coal and 6%

hydroelectric generation capacity is added to the grid.

According to Thomas, et al. (1980), in their research report titled, “A comparative

study of public beliefs about five energy systems,” public acceptance is becoming an

increasingly important constraint to be taken into account by those responsible for

technological policies. Acceptance by the public will depend on their relevant

attitudes towards a given technology, and these attitudes will be a function of beliefs

about the attributes and probable consequences of the technology in question.”

Thomas’s study explores belief systems with respect to five energy sources: nuclear,

coal, oil, hydro and solar.

Across the world, debate rages about the risks and the benefits of harnessing nuclear

power to meet the energy demands of the twenty-first century. A recent Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report, (Kovacs, 2010) reveals

that in countries that have nuclear power sources, the proportion of the population that

see the benefits thereof outweighing the risks are far higher than is the case in

countries that don’t have nuclear power.


Furthermore, the study indicates that about two-thirds of Europeans are of the view

that nuclear power contributes to making their countries less dependent on the

importation of energy and half agree that it ensures more stability in the price of

energy. Similarly, residents of countries with nuclear power are much more likely to

think that these can be operated safely and that the disposal of nuclear waste can be

done safely, than are people living in countries that do not have nuclear power.

Nevertheless, more than half of the Europeans surveyed think that the risks of nuclear

power outweigh the benefits, especially if their country does not have nuclear energy

and therefore their experience of nuclear energy is minimal.

In a review of several earlier attitudinal studies, Eiser et al. (1988a) opined that

although a sizeable proportion of the population studies were opposed in principle to

the use of nuclear power, either for military or civil purposes, both opposition and

support tends to be stronger in the case of potential local nuclear energy developments

Woo & Castore (1980); Hughey et al., (1985) and Eiser et al. (1988a) found males,

employed people and those in social classes I and II were more favourably disposed

towards the potential establishment of a nuclear power station near their villages in

the south-west of England. The study also found that residents felt far more positive

about a potential oil well development in the same area than about the prospect of a

nuclear power station.

Major nuclear incidents occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States on 28

March 1979; Chernobyl (now in Ukraine, then in the former Soviet Union) on 26

April 1986 and Fukushima, Japan on 11 March 2011. De Boer and Catsburg (1988)

reported on the dramatic increase in opposition to nuclear power plants that emerged

in surveys conducted after the explosion of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl.

After the Chernobyl incident, the proportion of people in the United Kingdom (UK)

who thought that nuclear power stations were not very safe increased from 25% in

January 1986 to 41% in May 1986. Similarly, in Greece in May 1981, 56% were of

the view that nuclear power plants are dangerous and should not be built; however,

this climbed dramatically to 73% in May 1986 after Chernobyl. Comparable margins

of growth in opposition were recorded in surveys in Canada and the United States

(US) before and after the Chernobyl accident.


By contrast, South Africa makes minimal use of nuclear power (4% of the country’s

electricity is nuclear-generated) and has been spared any exposure to nuclear fallout

as has occurred in the northern hemisphere.

This research study provides an analysis, “Public perceptions and understanding of

the role of nuclear technology in South Africa,” collected in a national survey during

2011. The significance of this research lies in the fact that a comprehensive gap of

knowledge is addressed, given that a national project of this extent has not been

attempted in South Africa before.

Notably, countries with large nuclear programmes, such as France and the US have

established national benchmarks through research studies undertaken over a number

of years. Therefore, to begin to address the South African publics’ perceptions and

understanding of the role nuclear technology, we first needed to acquire a benchmark

from which to work. This entailed demystifying the nuclear myths and elaborating on

the facts to address the publics’ concerns.

1.2 The problem review

The main research problem of this study explores, “Determining publics’ perceptions

and understanding of the role of nuclear technology in South Africa,” in the context of

public acceptance being an important element in gaining the various stakeholders

support to ensure the advancement of nuclear research and development. A number

of emerging themes are identified in the problem review that follows.

a. Internationally nuclear energy has been utilized as a dual use technology, which has a

legacy of destruction and devastation due to global events such as Three Mile Island

(28 March 1979), Chernobyl (26 April 1986) and Fukushima (11 March 2011). There

are however also hugely beneficial nuclear technology applications such as nuclear

power, nuclear medicine, nuclear industrial and commercial applications.

b. Closer to home, the South African nuclear industry has a history going back to the

mid 1940s. Despite this, the South African public is still largely unaware of the basic

myths and facts associated with nuclear energy.


c. As mentioned, public consultation and public perceptions of nuclear energy and

technology, in the context of public acceptance is important in gaining stakeholders

support to proceed with the South African nuclear new build.

d. Nuclear power generated at Koeberg in Cape Town, is a type of nuclear technology

involving the controlled use of nuclear fission to release energy for work including

heat propulsion and the generation of electricity. Nuclear energy is produced by a

controlled nuclear chain reaction which creates heat that is used to boil water and

produce steam to drive a steam turbine. The turbine is connected to a generator which

is then used to generate electricity.

e. In comparison to ‘renewable’ power sources, nuclear power plants have a small

footprint (m2/kW produced) and release very small quantities of greenhouse gases

making them environmentally acceptable.

f. As South Africa is on the brink of launching its largest long-term infrastructure

development plan, determining the level of public perceptions and understanding the

role of nuclear technology is critical. This is especially vital in light of 23% (added

nuclear) of the countries foreseeable electricity generation capacity being attributed to

nuclear power.

g. The proposed nuclear new build is aimed at ensuring a sustainable electricity sector

that meets the country’s projected growth in demand at a minimal cost and

environmental impact.

1.3 The research objectives

As established, the problem statement seeks to, “Determine the South African

publics’ perceptions and understanding of the role of nuclear technology,” to gain

support for research and development of nuclear technology essential to support and

advance the nuclear new build.


While this research project highlights past controversial decision-making issues of a

national magnitude, it remains relevant to the prosperity and quality of life of every

South African. Given this will be the largest long-term infrastructure development

plan ever undertaken in South Africa, it will have far-reaching political, economical,

social/cultural, technological, legal and environmental (PESTLE) consequences.

The public therefore has a vested interest in supporting a sustainable nuclear energy

solution which is efficient, economical and environmentally negligible in terms of

carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore, public acceptance of nuclear technology is a

serious challenge which requires a smart solution. In light of the research problem

and objectives this research study was designed to determine the following:

Main research objective:

The main objective of this research is to, “Determine the South African publics’

perceptions and understanding of the role of nuclear technology.”

Research sub-objectives

1. To determine the South African public’s knowledge of nuclear energy and

technology;

2. To establish the South African public’s support for different applications of

nuclear technology;

3. To establish the South African public’s perceived benefits and concerns associated

with nuclear technology;

4. To ascertain the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear energy;

5. To clarify the South African publics’ perceptions of nuclear safety;

6. To comprehend the South African public’s views on nuclear energy in a global

context;

7. To establish who the South African public trust for information on nuclear energy;

and

8. To evaluate the South African public’s final assessment of nuclear energy and

technology.


1.4 Methodology

Empiricism is a theory (wikipedia, 2010) of gaining knowledge by means of direct or

indirect observation or experience. It asserts that knowledge comes primarily from

tangible sensory experience in a world of people, objects and events which are

factually based. The descriptive approach of this study is aimed at gathering

knowledge and opinions about the desirability of the present state of nuclear

perceptions in South Africa.

One of the views of epistemology is the study of human knowledge, along with

rationalism, idealism and historicism. Epistemology (roebuckclasses, 2012) is a

branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge. Empiricism

however, emphasizes the role of experience and evidence of especially sensory

perception, in the formation of ideas, over the notion of innate ideas or traditions. It is

a fundamental part of the scientific method that all theories must be tested against

observations of the natural world, rather than resting solely on reasoning, intuition or

revelation.

This research used data generated in the 2011 Human Sciences Research Council

(HSRC) South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) for a tabulation entitled

“Public Perceptions of Nuclear Science in South Africa.” The questionnaire used in

the HSRC Household Survey which was drafted following thorough consultations

with Necsa and by drawing upon similar surveys conducted abroad and made

available by the World Nuclear Association (WNA). The HSRC is world renowned

for their scientific survey methodology, and have been able to apply a rigorous

standard of statistical validity through correct sample sizing and demographic

diversity to the current work.

The sampling frame was developed using 2011 census mid-year population estimates

and consists of 1000 census enumerating areas (EA’s). The EA’s chosen from the

census sample frame were stratified by the socio-demographic domains of province,

geographic sub-type and the four main population groups (Blacks, Coloureds, Indians

and Whites). The master sample was developed in order to allow the HSRC to

conduct longitudinal social surveys. More specifically, it was designed with the


sampling demands of large, periodically repeated social surveys in mind to provide

critical information for policy and decision-making purposes.

The scope of the study focused on a representative sample of the South African

population, which covers the countries nine provinces, urban, rural, informal

settlements, traditional geographical areas, formal urban, farmlands and socio-

economic population groups. These variables were used as explicit stratification

variables.

The prime target population consisted of individuals aged 16+ who reside in South

Africa. The target population consisted of those people living in household structures,

and hostels with the exclusion of those living in special institutions, hospitals and

prisons. These geo-demographic categories reflect the diversity of the South African

population based on their rural/urban, income, education, ethnicity and geographic

characteristics. Such stratification has also ensured that the metropolitan, semi-urban

and rural population of South Africa have been thoroughly covered in the sample.

Three re-visits to the selected household were allowed if a randomly selected

individual was not at home at the time of the first contact.

This quantitative research results draws conclusions through statistical inferences.

This data is generally accepted as strong and objective data because it tells you both,

what and how much, as compared to qualitative data which only identifies the what.

1.5 The significance of the study

The results of this research and the analysis of outcomes, will be extremely useful

both to government and to the nuclear industry, given that the infrastructure build

mandated by the IRP2010 is the largest and most expensive in South Africa’s history.

This programme can be slowed down and even derailed unless difficulties in the area

of public acceptance of nuclear energy are identified early and addressed. Research

on this project began in December 2010 with the implementation of the first

comprehensive public awareness advertising campaign on nuclear energy.


First and foremost, the intent of this research study is to assist Necsa to fulfil one of

its mandates outlined in the Nuclear Energy Policy, namely Principle 14, Section 7,

which recognises the “need to stimulate public awareness and to inform the public

about nuclear energy”. Too successfully deliver on this mandate entailed undertaking

this research study to analytically, “Determine the South African publics’ perceptions

and understanding of the role of nuclear technology.” This is the first comprehensive

national study of this nature, both in terms of scope and depth, ever undertaken on

public perceptions of nuclear energy in South Africa.

In addition to Necsa, this research study will also benefit key decision-makers such as

the National Nuclear Energy Executive Co-ordinating Council (NNEECC) as well as

the broader South African nuclear industry. The results of this research is intended to

guide the nuclear industry to develop targeted messaging to address the varying public

concerns and ultimately assist in the advancement of nuclear research and

development, along with the nuclear new build programme.

The formulation of this research commenced with various benchmarks and market

segmentation having been undertaken. For example, how do we differentiate our

approach to national environmental groups with links to foreign organizations as

compared with local residents associations? Comparisons were made with similar

surveys conducted in other countries, specifically France and the United States. The

purpose of these benchmarks being to search for common principles and also

differences that will enable South Africa to adopt successful strategies that are

relevant, and to avoid those ones that don’t apply in our country’s context.

1.8 Conclusion

In addition to South Africa’s uranium rich resources, it has exciting nuclear energy

ambitions which entail ensuring a sustainable, efficient security of electricity supply

for its ever growing population needs. Apart from this, nuclear technology dominates

another exciting global niche in South Africa, producing high quality specialised

radiation-based products and services, for life sciences, healthcare and industrial

markets. Through NTP Radioisotopes, a subsidiary of Necsa, South Africa exports

life-saving medical isotopes to nearly 60 countries on five continents.


NTP is a world leader in the production and supply of radio-chemicals, in particular

iridium -131 (131Ir) and molybdenum-99 (99Mo), the latter being the most important

radioisotope used in the practice of diagnostic nuclear medicine. This product is used

amongst others, for the treatment of more than ten million cancer patients globally,

and earns the country foreign income which equates to a turnover of approximately

R800 m/annum.


2. CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM ANALYSIS

2.1 An overview of the global nuclear industry

During the Second World War, on the morning of 6 August 1945, the United States

Army Air Force B-29 Bomber, Enola Gay, dropped a nuclear fission weapon, code

named “Little Boy”, (Figure 1) on the city of Hiroshima (Figure 2). Three days later a

B-29 Bomber, Bockscar, dropped a plutonium implosion-type nuclear weapon, code

named “Fat Man”, (Figure 3) on the city of Nagasaki, Japan (Figure 4). The

estimated combined death toll ranged from 100,000 to 220,000 with some estimates

considerably higher when delayed deaths from radiation exposure are included. Most

of the casualties were civilians.

Figure 1: The nuclear bomb code name "Little Boy" dropped on Hiroshima (wikipedia,

2010).


Figure 2: Little Boy was a uranium gun-type nuclear fission weapon (perilousmemories,

2008).

Figure 3: The "Fat Man" bomb was dropped over Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945 by

the B-29 "Bockscar" at an altitude of about 1,800 feet over the city (awesomestories, 2007)


Figure 4: The "Fat Man" bomb had an explosive force (yield) of about 20,000 tons of TNT

and was an implosion type, weapon using plutonium, which resulted in a supercritical

condition and a nuclear explosion (blippitt, 2011)

The consequences of these bombings were devastating, not only to those who were

directly affected by the weapons, but the image of ‘nuclear’ was forever scarred after

World War II (Wikipedia, 2010). However, nuclear energy is a dual purpose

technology and is also used for peaceful purposes, such as the provision of specialised

radiation-based products and services, for life sciences, nuclear medicine, industrial

markets and for the generation of electricity.

Even though the technology and reliability of modern nuclear power plants have

improved over the years, nuclear energy is still perceived as a threat by the public.

Despite the historical legacy, nuclear power generation has proved to be an essential

and environmentally friendly part of the global sustainable energy supply. As with

any industry incident, bad publicity from nuclear incidents has resulted in an inherent

fear of the technology. Apart from the bombings, the only three major nuclear


incidents that have occurred since World War II has left an even deeper scar, fear and

doubt about the safety of nuclear energy. These incidents are:

2.1.1 Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor (TMI-2)

Cause: On 28 March 1979, near Harrisburg in the United States of America

(USA), failure involving the water pumps in the TMI-2 reactor allowed

pressure to build up in the reactor causing a partial core melt-down. A relief

valve automatically opened in response but failed to close again, allowing

cooling water to escape from the reactor. Operators at the plant didn’t get the

signal that the valve was still open and radiation was released.

Effect: The nuclear fuel rods inside the reactor experienced a partial

meltdown, i.e. some fuel rods overheated and melted. Fortunately, the

radioactive material at no stage escaped from the containment vessel.

Exposure to radiation and radioactive matter: Experts say the resulting

radiation exposure was never enough to cause a detectable health effect in the

general population.

2.1.2 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Reactor-4

Cause: On 26 April 1986, about 80 miles north of Kiev, Ukraine the Reactor

Operators were performing a test to see how the reactor would respond in the

event of an electrical failure, essentially thereby bypassing, ignoring and

overriding built in safety controls and inadvertently causing a dramatic power

surge and total core melt-down.

Effect: The core had not been shut down prior to the test and the power surge

triggered a series of events that sent the nuclear reaction out of control,

causing two explosions. The reactor was not surrounded by a containment

structure, so the explosions and the subsequent fire sent a giant plume of

radioactive material into the atmosphere which was dispersed by the winds.

Exposure to radiation and radioactive matter: At least 5% of the

radioactive reactor core was released mostly westward towards Poland and


other neighbouring countries in the atmosphere. Two Chernobyl plant

workers died on the night of the accident and 28 more people died within a

few weeks from radiation poisoning. In the long-term, several thousand more

people were at risk of developing cancer.

2.1.3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)

The 11 March 2012 marks the devastating natural disaster which severely

impacted the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (Figure. 5) in Japan. This event had the

potential to result in the worst nuclear disaster in history after a number of

reactors were damaged by a magnitude nine earthquake, followed by a

tsunami (Figure. 6).

Cause: The Emergency Cooling Systems at the plant started to fail after

being flooded by the tsunami that followed the massive earthquake which also

knocked out the conventional electricity supply to the facility. Workers at the

Fukushima Daiichi NPP experienced numerous problems in maintaining water

levels in the three reactors that were in operation when the earthquake struck.

These were boiling water type reactors where water is essential to keep the

nuclear fuel rods inside the core from overheating. Officials suspected that the

fuel rods had melted in the reactors due to the cooling systems having failed

and the fuel rods not being submerged in water as normally required.

Effect: After the tsunami four of the six nuclear reactors in the Fukushima

Daiichi NPP were in trouble. Explosions occurred in Unit 1 and 3 from a

build-up of hydrogen gas and were thus not attributable to any nuclear

reaction. Experts suspected that the nuclear rods inside these two reactors had

started to melt but had not breached the containment vessel, which was

designed to keep radioactive material from escaping. At the time, Unit 2

posed a bigger threat with the explosion possibly having caused a breach in

the containment vessel, which could have allowed radioactive steam or water

to escape.


Exposure to radiation and radioactive matter: It should be noted that the

earthquake and tsunami killed tens of thousands, whereas the release of

radioactive material has to the date of this report killed nobody.

2.1.4 Conclusion

The major contributing factors in all three major nuclear incidents experienced

globally since World War II were mainly due to human factors, such as poor

management, poor design of the facilities, poor training of Nuclear Reactor

Operators, poor operating instructions and most importantly, the lack of a

nuclear safety culture. All three incidents could easily have been avoided had

the prescribed safety design and management measures been adhered to (pub-

iaea, 2011).

2.2 Analysing the global nuclear challenges

Despite the military applications and nuclear accidents, developing countries have an

insatiable appetite for electricity and are proceeding with the construction of new

nuclear power reactors barely a year after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster disrupted

the growth of nuclear power around the world.

According to the U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, headlined: Nuclear Pushes

on despite Fukushima, “Sixty nuclear reactors are currently (2012) under construction

globally, with 163 more on order or planned, according to the WNA. Little has

changed from the results posted by the trade group who conducted a February 2011

survey, a month before Fukushima, 62 reactors were under construction and 156 on

order or planned.”

The Wall Street Journal reported that these numbers contradict the perception that the

nuclear power industry was stopped in its tracks after the meltdown at the Fukushima

NPP following the earthquake and tsunami. This incident has been rated by some as

the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl in 1986. While Japan and some European

nations prepare to shut down or mothball their nuclear plants, the march to build

reactors in developing countries continues.


“We didn’t lose a single order after the Japanese Fukushima incident,” said Sergei

Novikov, a spokesman for Rosatom, a state owned company created to promote

Russian nuclear exports (The Wall Street Journal, 2012). The company said its

backlog of international orders rose to 21 plants at the end of 2011, up from 11 a year

earlier. The orders for new reactors are largely based on crash industrialization

programs in such emerging markets as China and Vietnam, built around electricity

intensive industries like aluminium and glass. Such new capacity also is raising

living standards in more advanced, but still accelerating economies, like South Korea,

where electricity increasingly powers everything from automated bathroom faucets to

tablet computers (WSJ, 2012).

The centre of gravity for electricity consumption is clearly shifting eastward. The

IAEA forecasts global electricity demand to grow by 2.4% a year over the next two

decades, rising by more than 80% by 2035. Power demand during that period is

forecast to grow at an annual rate of 5.4% in China, compared with just 0.9% in the

European Union (EU) and 1% in the USA (Insight, 2008).

Figure 5: The centre of gravity of civil nuclear power is shifting towards East. China has

laid out plans to increase nuclear power capability 11 fold, up to 95,620 MWe (Insight, 2008).


Some 53% of power plants of all types, not just nuclear, to be built through 2020 are

in the Asian-Pacific region, according to IHS Cera, (HIS, 2012) an energy consulting

firm. China alone accounts for 38% of that total. “Each year, China adds new

capacity equivalent to the total generation in the U.K.”, said Ivan Lee, an Asia energy

research analyst for Nomura Securities (WSJ, 2012).

Many governments have concluded that nuclear energy must remain part of their

overall energy mix. Nuclear energy is less subject to the price spikes of fossil fuels

and the weather issues that can complicate alternative energy production like wind

power. It has allowed Beijing to grow its overall power generating capacity, while

cutting reliance on fossil fuels that have polluted its air and waterways and have

increasingly become a point of social tension for local governments. “People are

doing the calculations and realizing that you cannot reduce the impact on the

environment without nuclear,” said Li Ning, an expert on China’s nuclear industry at

Xiamen University (WSJ, 2012).

Figure 6: The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant before the devastating natural

disaster struck (dailymail, 2012).


Figure 7: The crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Okuma, northern Japan

and nine days after the March disaster struck (dailymail, 2012).

2.3 An overview of the South African nuclear industry

The South African nuclear industry has its origins in the mid-1940s, with the

establishment of the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) in 1948 through an Act of

Parliament. The AEB was tasked foremost with regulating the uranium industry in

the country, with a supporting role in research on radioactivity that was being

conducted by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) at the time.

The research included monitoring of radioactivity and radon gas in gold mines, the

importation of radioisotopes and the application of radioisotopes in research and

medical practice (Necsa Annual Report, 2010/11).

During the 1950s, the potential for the peaceful application of nuclear energy was

becoming apparent and in 1959, the state authorised the development of a domestic

nuclear research and development programme, which would be undertaken by the

AEB and planning began on the building of a research rector. The Pelindaba site,

which is located 30km to the west of Pretoria near Hartbeespoort Dam (Figure 8), was

established in 1961 and continues to be the base for South Africa’s nuclear research

and development programmes.


Figure 8: Location of Necsa at Pelindaba (maplandia, 2012)

The South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI-1) reactor

went into operation in 1965, while in 1970 the Uranium Enrichment Corporation

(UCOR) was established to develop an enrichment programme. By the late 1970s,

the country ranked among the few nations possessing the capacity to enrich uranium

and plans were finalised for the construction of the first nuclear power plant.

Construction of a nuclear energy power station commenced at Koeberg, 30 km north

of Cape Town near Melkbosstrand in 1976, after a contract with Framatome

(currently Areva) of France was signed. The plant was constructed to be the sole

provider of power in the Western Cape since fossil fuelled power stations were

deemed too small and too expensive to be viable. Coal would have been too

expensive to transport by rail from the then Transvaal province (some 1500+

kilometres).

Koeberg has two uranium fuelled PWR’s, with Unit 1 being synchronised to the grid

in April 1984. Unit 2 followed in July 1985. Operated by South Africa’s only

national electricity supplier, Eskom, the Koeberg nuclear power station continues to

be the only nuclear power station in the country and the entire African continent.


In 1986, the AEB and UCOR were merged to form the Atomic Energy Corporation

(AEC), while during the same year the Vaalputs Waste Disposal Site for low and

intermediate-level waste, situated in Namaqualand in the Northern Cape, became

operational. Following the transition to democracy in South Africa in 1994, the AEC

became the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) in 1999 following the

passing of the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 46 of 1999.

In terms of waste management requirements, low and intermediate-level nuclear

waste is stored at Vaalputs. With respect to the disposal of high-level waste,

Koeberg’s high level waste, which is largely in the form of spent reactor fuel, is

currently in storage ponds on location. High level waste from SAFARI-1 is placed in

dry storage within the Pelindaba facility.

Owing to perceived and real threats to the apartheid government, a clandestine

programme to manufacture nuclear weapons was implemented during the 1970s. Six

and a half nuclear weapons were built with the intention that they serve as a deterrent.

However, in response to dramatic changes in the international geopolitical landscape

and the resultant CODESA negotiations to replace the vestiges of the apartheid

system with a fully representative government, the government at that time decided to

end the production of nuclear weapons and to dismantle the nuclear weapons

programme.

South Africa was the first country to voluntarily accede to the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear Weapons in 1991, which seeks to prevent the spread

of Nuclear Weapons to other than the five Nuclear Weapon States that existed at that

time (USA, UK, France, China, and Russia) and to facilitate peaceful nuclear co-

operation between Treaty members and provide a foundation for universal nuclear

disarmament (NPT, 1991).

South Africa also entered into a safeguards agreement, including the Additional

Protocol with the IAEA in 2002 (IAEA, 2002). In 1993, then President F W de Klerk

publicly revealed the previous existence of the programme, its dismantlement and the

country’s accession to the NPT. Since 1998, South Africa has actively participated in


NPT meetings, and advocated nuclear disarmament, as a member of the New Agenda

Coalition (NAC) (Nuclearfiles, 2000).

2.4 The South African nuclear challenges

Despite its historical legacy, nuclear power is experiencing a renaissance the world

over. Drivers of this nuclear renaissance include an increasing energy demand,

concerns over security of supply, concerns over climate change, economics, insurance

against future price volatility and the dependence on high emission fossil fuels, all of

which are combining to make the case for the increased use of nuclear power (IPCS,

2010).

“South Africa promotes the right of all states to develop nuclear technology for

peaceful purposes. It promotes nuclear energy as part of combating GHG emissions

and to ensure security of energy supply. The pursuance of energy security is not only

a right of all states but also a global responsibility. The energy crisis facing

developing countries is likely to worsen as states reach capacity constraints in the

power sector, so it is crucial to South Africa’s interests to expand its nuclear-power

capacity. Through the IRP, the government has given its support and commitment to

nuclear as a viable option for low-carbon base-load electricity generation,” Dipuo

Peters, Minister of Energy (Mail & Guardian, 2011).

Much like many countries throughout the world, South Africa is presently grappling

with the twin policy challenges of addressing climate change and ensuring that the

future energy needs of the country are adequately met. It is increasingly apparent that

the mounting concern with respect to climate change and energy security has

influenced the direction and nature of energy policy in South Africa in recent years,

with nuclear power also being reclassified as a low-carbon technology. From an

international perspective, South Africa has unacceptably high levels of GHG

emissions, a situation that is informed by the country’s energy-intensive economy,

which is overwhelmingly dependent on the country’s extensive low quality coal

reserves (Winkler & Marquand, 2009).


Fossil fuels therefore dominate the energy sector, with coal providing 75% of the

fossil fuel demand and accounting for more than 90% of SA’s electricity generation

capacity (DEAT, 2009: 3). In response, the government has committed to reducing its

GHG emissions by 34% by 2020 and 43% by 2025, a decision that has significant

implications for the energy sector.

The IAEA has defined energy security as ‘the uninterrupted physical availability of

energy at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns’

(IAEA, 2001). Bearing this in mind, the over-reliance on low quality coal, coupled

with environmental considerations and a need for a developmental approach in

securing the energy requirements for all South Africans, has resulted in a strong

energy policy emphasis on diversifying the country’s primary energy sources in

coming decades.

In response, the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (DME, 1998) listed the securing

of energy supply through diversity as one of five core policy objectives. A decade

later, this priority is again reflected in the 2008 National Energy Act, which also aims,

inter alia, to ‘ensure uninterrupted supply of energy’ and ‘promote diversity of supply

of energy and its sources’ (DoE, 2008). This approach is echoed in the Department of

Energy’s Integrated Electricity Resource Plan (IRP) for 2010-2030 (DoE, 2011),

which was promulgated by Cabinet in March 2011 and which outlines a preferred

scenario in relation to medium to long-term options for increasing the electricity

supply and managing demand over a 20-year period between 2010 and 2030.

Premised on estimates, it is expected that electricity consumption over this period will

increase by three-quarters from 260 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2010 to 454 TWh by

2030. Similarly, peak electricity demand is predicted to increase from 39 gigawatts

(GW) to 68GW over the two decades. The Policy-Adjusted IRP 2010 scenario

proposes a reduction in the overall share of coal in the country’s electricity generation

and a corresponding increase in the overall share represented by low-carbon

technologies.

At present, nuclear energy accounts for an estimated 3% of primary energy sources in

general and 4% of sources used for electricity generation. Through the IRP, the


government makes a strong commitment to the future of nuclear energy alongside

various forms of renewable energy. The envisaged energy generation mix by 2030 is

expected to consist of 46% coal, 13% nuclear, 5% hydro (9% if pumped storage is

added), 11% gas-fired power, 10% wind, and 11% solar (9% PV power and 1% CSP)

(Table 1). More specifically, the IRP scenario indicates that an additional 9600MW

of new capacity will be installed from nuclear energy by 2030, which represents 23%

of all new capacity that is to be produced.

Table 1: Current generation capacity, new electricity generation capacity and envisaged total

by 2030 (DoE, 2011)

Total generating capacity in 2010

New (uncommitted) capacity options

from 2010-30

Total generating capacity in 2030

MW % MW % MW %

Coal 34 821 74 6 250 15 41 071 46 Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) 3 420 7 3 910 9 7 330 8 Closed Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 0 0 2 370 6 2 370 3 Pumped storage hydroelectricity 2 912 6 0 0 2 912 3 Nuclear 1 800 4 9 600 23 11 400 13 Hydro 2 150 5 2 609 6 4 759 5 Wind 800 2 8 400 20 9 200 10 Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) 200 0 1 000 2 1 200 1 Photo-voltaic (PV) 0 0 8 400 20 8 400 9 Other 890 2 0 0 890 1 Total 46 993 100 42 539 100 89 532 100

This study is of particular importance to ensure popular support for the planned

additional 23% for nuclear. The first part of this new nuclear capacity will be added

to the electricity grid from about 2023, with the remainder operational by 2030.

Depending on the nuclear reactor design chosen, between six and nine nuclear units

are expected to be constructed, located at several sites in South Africa (Peters, 2011).

A single site or power station usually accommodates more than one reactor. The

three sites that Eskom have earmarked for power stations are the Koeberg site at

Dynefontein, 30km north of Cape Town, Bantamsklip on the southern Cape coast

near Pearly Beach, and Thyspunt near Oyster Bay in the Eastern Cape. The 2012/13

Budget Review provides an indicative cost of R300-billion for the new nuclear build

over the next 17 years (National Treasury, 2012:105).


2.5 The South African nuclear legislative and policy framework

Post-apartheid nuclear energy legislation and policy has been characterised by a

strong commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, also in accordance

with the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, coupled with a mounting government emphasis on

the expansion of nuclear power as part of a more diversified energy mix (IRP, 2010).

The following legislation and policy documents, while not exhaustive, provide the

essence of the nature and trajectory of the South African government’s position on

nuclear energy:

2.5.1 The White Paper on Energy Policy (1998)

This policy document expressly calls for the attainment of energy security in

the country through a diversification of primary energy sources in coming

decades in the context of climate change mitigation efforts. In terms of the

future role of nuclear energy, the White Paper indicates that the “Government

will ensure that decisions to construct new nuclear power stations are taken

within the context of an integrated energy policy planning process, with due

consideration given to all relevant legislation, and the process subject to

structured participation and consultation with all stakeholders.” The document

further stresses that options around new nuclear capacity from the late 2000s

onwards will ultimately “depend largely on the environmental and economic

merits of other energy sources relative to nuclear and its political and public

acceptability, construction lead-times and load characteristics.”

2.5.2 The Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999)

The NEA delegates responsibility for nuclear power generation, management

of radioactive wastes and the country's international commitments under the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Minister of Minerals and Energy.

Necsa is also formally established from the AEC under this Act, and is

assigned responsibility for most nuclear energy matters including wastes and

safeguards.


2.5.3 The National Nuclear Regulatory Act, 1999 (Act No. 47 of 1999)

This Act established the NNR, which was formerly the Council for Nuclear

Safety, to govern and ensure the safety of the public and environment covering

the full fuel cycle from mining to waste disposal.

2.5.4 The Radioactive Waste Management Policy and Strategy (2005)

This strategy document articulates a national radioactive waste policy

framework that identifies principles to govern nuclear waste management. It

further provides for the necessary management structures for radioactive waste

management.

2.5.5 The Nuclear Energy Policy (2008)

The NEP is a significant document as it represents the first occasion in which

a South African government has formulated and comprehensively detailed its

position on nuclear energy. As the ministerial foreword notes, the document

“clarifies the main objectives and lays down the principles that will guide

Government’s vision for an extended nuclear energy programme.” The

document provides a vision that embraces investment in additional nuclear

reactors to meet the country’s rising electricity demand. The policy also

outlines an intention to acquire other steps in the nuclear fuel chain, including

the reintroduction of an enrichment capability, the acquisition of reprocessing

technology and plans to beneficiate uranium into nuclear fuel.

2.5.6 The National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act, 2008 (Act No. 53

of 2008)

Building on recommended governance structures in the 2005 Radioactive

Waste Management Policy and Strategy and 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy, this

Act provides for the establishment of a National Radioactive Waste Disposal

Institute. The function of the institute would be to manage radioactive waste

disposal on a national basis. The responsibility for Vaalputs will eventually be

placed with such an Institute.


2.5.7 The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2010), 2010-2030 (2011)

Drawing on the 1998 Energy Policy and 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy in

particular the plan outlines the preferred scenario for diversify the energy mix

between 2010 and 2030 to ensure a greater reliance on renewable and nuclear

energy and a reduced dependence on fossil fuels. Considerations relating to

energy security and climate change feature prominently in deciding on the

choices associated with the IRP Policy Adjusted scenario.

2.5.8 The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP, 2010)

In January 2007 Cabinet adopted the National Industrial Policy Framework

(NIPF) which sets out Government’s broad approach to industrialisation with

the following core objectives:

a. To facilitate diversification beyond our current reliance on traditional

commodities and non-tradable services;

b. The long-term intensification of South Africa’s industrialisation process

and movement towards a knowledge economy;

c. The promotion of a more labour-absorbing industrialisation path with a

particular emphasis on tradable labour-absorbing goods and services and

economic linkages that catalyse employment creation;

d. The promotion of a broader-based industrialisation path characterised by

the increased participation of historically disadvantaged people and

marginalised regions in the mainstream of the industrial economy; and

e. Contributing to industrial development on the African continent, with a

strong emphasis on building its productive capacity.

2.5.9 The Nuclear Energy Resource Development and Innovation Strategy

(NERDIS)

Necsa developed the South African NERDIS, (Necsa, 2011) together with the

Department of Science and Technology (DST). The strategy includes an

extensive analysis of the entire national nuclear programme and identifies

matters to be addressed during the expansion of the nuclear fleet. The

NERDIS is expected to make a significant contribution to the roll-out of a

viable expanded South African nuclear programme.


2.6 The Nuclear Industry Players

The Department of Energy (DoE), through the Minister of Energy, assumes

overarching responsibility for the governance of the nuclear industry in the country.

The Department administers the Nuclear Energy Act, the National Nuclear

Regulatory Act and the National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act.

2.6.1 The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa)

Necsa is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) based at Pelindaba. It’s core mandate

is to undertake and promote nuclear research and development. Necsa

operates the SAFARI-1 research reactor, and is also involved in commercial

nuclear applications, such as the commercial production and international

sales of nuclear medical isotopes. Necsa’s subsidiary, Pelchem, announced in

2012 that it would be involved in manufacturing ingredients for anti-retroviral

(ARV) medicine as part of a joint venture (JV) with an international

pharmaceutical company. Necsa has also been responsible for managing

Vaalputs in the Northern Cape, the designated storage facility for low and

intermediate level nuclear waste. The 2008 National Radioactive Waste

Disposal Institute Act provides for the establishment of a National Radioactive

Waste Disposal Institute that will manage radioactive waste disposal in South

Africa. Once established and fully operational, the responsibility for Vaalputs

will be transferred to this dedicated nuclear waste management agency.

2.6.2 The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR)

The NNR was established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulatory Act,

1999 (Act No. 47 of 1999) and is responsible for exercising regulatory control

over the safety of nuclear installations, certain types of radioactive waste,

irradiated nuclear fuel and the mining and processing of radioactive material.

More specifically, the NNR is mandated to undertake the following activities:

a. Provide safety standards and regulatory practices for protection of persons,

property and the environment from nuclear damage;

b. Exercise regulatory control related to safety over the siting, design,

construction, operation, manufacture of component parts, decontamination,

decommissioning and closure of nuclear installations;


c. Exercise regulatory control over vessels propelled by nuclear power or

having radioactive material on board which is capable of causing nuclear

damage;

d. Provide assurance of compliance and to ensure that provisions for nuclear

emergency planning are in place, and

e. Serve as the national competent authority in connection with the IAEA’s

Regulations for the Safe transport of Radioactive Material.

2.6.3 Eskom

This state-owned enterprise (Eskom, 2012) is the national electricity utility

that generates approximately 95% of the electricity used in South Africa and

approximately 45% of the electricity used in Africa. Eskom is the owner and

operator of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant.

2.6.4 The Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa (NIASA, 2012)

NIASA is a body composed of organisations, groups, and individuals drawn

from organisations concerned with nuclear power generation and with other

industrial and non-industrial applications of nuclear technology in South

Africa. The aim of the Association is to represent the Nuclear Industry in

South Africa and to support, promote and champion the collective interests of

its members.

2.6.5 The National Nuclear Energy Executive Co-ordination Committee

(NNEECC, 2011)

The NNEECC is an executive level (Cabinet) government structure that was

proposed in the 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy and that was established in

November 2011. It is tasked with coordinating and implementing a phased

decision making approach to the nuclear programme. Cabinet further

approved the establishment of the Nuclear Energy Technical Committee

(NETC) to support the NNEECC.


2.7 The business case for an integrated public awareness programme

Although significant public consultation has already taken place as part of the

IRP2010 development process, the critical period for public engagement still lies

ahead, when the EIA’s are carried out, and when the new NNEECC, chaired by the

Deputy President, consults with social partners in the labour and business sectors.

While it might appear that the issue of public perceptions is a soft issue that may be

perceived by some as not being on the same level as engineering design or financial

modelling, this is not the case in reality. Recent events have clearly demonstrated that

small vociferous sectors of the public have the power to delay nuclear construction

programmes, e.g. through clever use of statutory mechanisms such as EIAs, thereby

adding significantly to the overall cost. In some countries, nuclear programmes have

even been aborted owing to anti-nuclear public pressure groups.

The South African Government’s vision for nuclear energy is guided by the principles

of Cabinet’s Nuclear Energy Policy, 2008. Principle 14, Section 7 of the Policy states

that “Government shall create programmes to stimulate public awareness and

information about nuclear energy” (NEP, 2008).

As the only SOE, mandated to execute nuclear research and development and also in

terms of other nuclear related initiatives both nationally and internationally, the Necsa

launched a state-of-the-art Visitor Centre (NVC) on 03 February 2011. This facility

was officially opened by the Minister of Energy, Ms Dipuo Peters, to fulfil

government’s directive to demystify nuclear myths, contextualise South Africa’s

nuclear heritage, inform the public about nuclear science and technology and inspire

learners to pursue careers in nuclear technology. The launch of this facility was

accompanied by a 12-month focussed public awareness programme that was driven

by an internationally renowned global advertising company and utilised a variety of

media to demystify nuclear energy and promote the NVC amongst a broad target

group that specifically included disadvantaged communities.


2.8 Conclusion The history and political sensitivity of nuclear energy is sufficiently contentious that

negative opinion is easily generated and maintained amongst the general population,

both nationally and internationally. This chapter seeks to provide the historical and

political background to substantiate the view that addressing public perceptions

adequately is a critical element of the successful implementation of the nuclear

component of South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2010). The major

contributing factors to the three nuclear incidents experienced globally were mainly

due to human error, as is the case with most unfortunate incidents.

An embedded safety culture is essential in the nuclear industry, just as compliance

with the prescribed safety culture is in the aviation, mining and other industries. Just

as the escalating road death fatalities are avoidable, especially over the holiday

season, so to were all the nuclear incidents, had the prescribed safety design and

management measures been adhered to. The South African Government, through the

DoE, Minister of Energy, assumes over-arching responsibility for the governance of

the nuclear industry in the country and is guided by the principles of a range of robust

internationally benchmarked legislative frames which include:

The White Paper on Energy Policy (1998);

The Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999);

The National Nuclear Regulatory Act, 1999 (Act No. 47 of 1999);

The Radioactive Waste Management Policy and Strategy (2005);

The Nuclear Energy Policy (2008);

The National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act, 2008 (Act No. 53 of 2008);

The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2010), 2010-2030 (2011);

The Industrial Policy Action Plan IPAP) and;

The Nuclear Energy Resource Development and Innovation Strategy (NERDIS)

This legislative framework together with the nuclear industry professional

associations and SOE’s act as implementing agents in realising South Africa’s nuclear

ambitions of energy security through the diversification of primary energy sources.


3. CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

The following literature review will address highlights and defining moments in the

nuclear history that have impacted on South African public perceptions and their

understanding of the role of nuclear energy. This includes past nuclear incidents,

(Stumpf, W. op.cit) nuclear history in South Africa, (Albright, D. “South Africa and

the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 4, July/August

1994,) the role of the Media, the role of Environmental Activists and the role of the

South African Government.

3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s knowledge of nuclear energy and technology

3.2.1 Introduction

The apartheid-era South African nuclear weapons programme, which built and then

dismantled six and a half Hiroshima type bombs, is unique in international history.

However, more than two decades after the programme’s exposure, the historical

record of this case remains remarkably thin. Batteries of secrecy laws were utilized

during the programme’s lifetime to conceal the existence of South Africa’s nuclear

arsenal.

According to Harris et al., (2004), although the need for concealment has evaporated

with De Klerk’s decision to dismantle the programme, secrecy laws obstructing the

fuller public disclosure have seemingly persisted into the democratic era. While there

has been no formal, high-level articulation of official nuclear secrecy policy or

justification, officials of two successive African National Congress (ANC) led

governments have apparently expressed strong objection to further disclosures beyond

those made in 1993 – 1994.

The then South African government decided to incorporate nuclear power into the

energy mix early in 1970. The Koeberg NPP, consisting of two operating 960 MWe

PWR’s, is owned by Eskom, the national electricity utility. The decision to utilise

nuclear power was justified on economic grounds, since uranium is an abundant


mineral in South Africa, as well as the problematic geographic spread of coal, cooling

water and load centres.

Traditionally, gold mining has been a major sector in the South African economy that

produces uranium as a by-product. At the time, the 1972 oil crisis was still fresh in

everyone’s mind and the spectre of diminishing fossil reserves was frequently raised.

Spreading the base of fuels used to generate electricity was seen as a sensible strategy

for utilities. Whilst Eskom’s decision to construct a Nuclear Power Station was never

secret, it was not applied with high public participation. The same practice was

followed as with fossil stations at the time.

3.2.2 The construction of the Koeberg NPP

During the construction of Koeberg NPP, South Africa was increasingly subjected to

political and economic pressure as well as isolation, owing to apartheid. Prior to fuel

loading the plant was sabotaged, resulting in a year’s delay. Current thinking is that

at the time this was sooner an action against the policy of apartheid than against

nuclear power.

3.2.3 The selection of future nuclear sites

The entire South African coastline has been assessed and certain sites have been

identified as being suitable for possible future nuclear power stations. The process

used included full public participation and was in accordance with good EIA

practices. The aim was to integrate these sites into a long-term national planning

strategy, even though no firm plans existed to build a given technology on any of the

sites.

3.2.4 The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

On 18 July 2010, Business Times headlined that “Government pulls plug on PBMR”.

“The government has pulled the plug on its ambitious nuclear energy programme after

investing more than R9 billion into it over about 11 years. The PBMR, which was

established in 1999 to build small nuclear power reactors, faces imminent closure.”


In a letter dated 5 July 2010, (Times Live, 2010) the then Public Enterprises Minister

Barbara Hogan informed the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) of the

following. "The Minister of Finance has clearly stated that there will be no further

funding for the company, and I would like to reiterate that this position has not

changed. It is clear that the remainder of the cash on hand is to be utilized solely for

the winding down of the company as well as the preservation of the intellectual

property."

The objective was to design, license and build a prototype nuclear reactor plant,

which, if successful, would have paved the way for building small power plants to

help meet SA's needs. The company operated as an independent entity, governed by

an agreement between founding investors Eskom, the Industrial Development

Corporation (IDC) and USA nuclear conglomerate, Westinghouse.

3.2.5 Global events influencing public perception

As explored earlier, the bombs dropped at Nagasaki and Hiroshima greatly influenced

public acceptance of nuclear power. Opponents of nuclear energy use shocking

graphic visuals from these unfortunate incidents to instil horror and fear in the public.

Despite ongoing industry public awareness education, the public globally find it

difficult to separate the horror images from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The

accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are well known to the general public

and most opponents of nuclear power will cite these examples together with,

Fukushima when arguing against nuclear power

3.2.6 South African events influencing public perceptions

The existence of South Africa’s former nuclear weapons programme was made public

on 24 March 1993, by the former State President, Mr F W de Klerk. He informed the

South African Parliament that the country had embarked on the development of a

limited nuclear deterrent during the period covering the 1970s and 1980s.

He confirmed that the nuclear weapons had been fully dismantled before South

Africa's accession to the NPT on 10 July 1991 and signature of a Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a mere 7 weeks later, on 16 September 1991.


He also granted permission for full access by the IAEA to facilities and records of

facilities, which in the past had been used for the secret development of the nuclear

deterrent capability.

With this admission, South Africa has put to rest speculation over many years of the

true status of its’ suspected nuclear deterrent programme. The public invitation to the

IAEA for full access to details of the past programme and the facilities that had

already been converted to non-nuclear commercial activities before accession to the

NPT was also given in accordance with South Africa's stated policy of full

transparency after accession (Stump, W. 1999).

3.2.7 Conclusion

South Africa occupies a unique position relative to the NPT in that it is the only

country to have had voluntarily decommissioned a nuclear weapons capability and

acceded to the Treaty. A balance sheet of the history of South Africa’s nuclear

programme outline above, should give some insight into the political forces that might

drive countries into acquiring a nuclear deterrent capability and also those forces that

may reverse that decision.

3.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2: To establish the South African public’s support for different applications of nuclear technology

3.3.1 The nuclear debate in South Africa The history of the nuclear debate in South Africa can be divided into two distinct

contexts. The first context is that of "strategic" decision-making about nuclear issues

as it has been defined by the Nationalist Government in the era from the early 1950s

to the early 1990s, and the second context is that of "commercial" decision-making

since the 1990s (Venter and Fouché 1994: 79; Williams1994: 73).

Taking a closer look at the context of strategic decision-making, a further division can

be made between an earlier phase spanning the 1950s and early 1960s, and a later

phase spanning the 1970s and 1980s that was characterized by a siege economy


following the international boycott of minerals and embargoes on technology transfers

to South Africa.

Similarly, the context of commercial decision-making of the 1990s is embedded

within a wider context of political transformation within which the emphasis shifted

to that of reconstruction and development with a view to satisfy the basic needs of the

majority of South Africa's citizens. As it will be shown in the analysis below, the

nuclear debate in the 1990s highlighted many of the tensions between commercial

decision-making about nuclear technology and development oriented decision-

making.

3.3.2 The early history of strategic decision-making The early history of strategic decision-making about nuclear technology in South

Africa begins with the formation of the Atomic Energy Board in 1948. It was set-up

under the leadership of Prime Minister Smuts to exercise control over and trade in

uranium in South Africa, following interest that was expressed by the USA and

Britain to procure uranium for their nuclear weapons programmes. Uranium mining

in South Africa commenced in 1952 when a uranium production plant was opened at

West Rand Consolidated Mine to supply uranium to the Combined Development

Agencies, the official procurement organizations of the British and United States

governments. By 1959 twenty six mines in South Africa were feeding material to 17

production plants which supplied almost 6 000 mt of uranium per annum for delivery

to the Combined Development Agencies. However, from 1960, the demand for

material for military purposes declined, and with it so too did the production of

uranium in South Africa (Williams, 1994 & Eberhard, 1994).

During this time, uranium production in South Africa was considered to be a strategic,

military associated business (Williams, 1973), and accordingly it was operated under

a blanket of official secrecy. The freedom to publish and discuss information about

the production and sales of uranium simply does exist, so an uninformed public was

created that could not engage in a meaningful public debate about nuclear issues by

raising concerns, objections and opposition to it, or holding government officials and

politicians accountable for their policies.


3.3.3 The later history of nuclear strategic decision-making The later history of strategic decision-making about nuclear fuel and/or energy in

South Africa coincided with the 1970s and 1980s, although earlier indications of the

trends of this era can be traced to the early 1960s. The oil crisis in the early 1970s

brought about a swing in favour of nuclear power in industrialized countries, and this

in turn led to a dramatic surge in the demand for uranium in the industrialized

countries of the world. South Africa's uranium production was at about 1 865 million

tons (mt) in the mid 1960s. Production soared to a record level of 6 156 mt of

uranium in 1980. At this stage, South African uranium accounted for 14% of

production in the western world (Williams, 1994: 73).

Along with the oil crisis, international pressures against the apartheid regime in South

Africa from the early 1970s started to create a siege economy. This led to a number

of strategic choices that for the first time resulted in heated public debates in South

Africa about the military and civilian use of nuclear power. In 1976, construction

started on South Africa's first civilian NPP at the Koeberg site. Following the same

pattern of secrecy about nuclear technology that was established in the earlier phases

of the installation of nuclear power plants in the rest of the world, the consultative

process with the people of Cape Town on the building of Koeberg, and with the

people of Namaqualand on the siting of Vaalputs, was done in what many described

as a high-handed and derisory manner.

During the phases of its construction and in the first years of its operation, public

resistance mounted against Koeberg from a widely based alliance known as Koeberg

Alert, but this made little impact on the decision to go ahead with the power station.

Eventually, public debate subsided, although none of the issues driving it (for instance

safety, radiation risks, disaster management, and waste storage) were really resolved.

In fact, these issues have remained latent, hidden just below the surface of public

debate, and have surfaced again, the moment new proposals about nuclear power

generation were formulated.


Where the commissioning and installation of Koeberg (construction was completed in

March1984) led to a public debate of some sort about the safety and other substantive

issues related to such an installation, another strategic choice was made by the

apartheid government in 1971 (Albright 1994: 153), namely to secretly develop a

nuclear weapons capability by making use of sufficiently enriched uranium.

It is still unclear exactly how this weapons capability was developed and funded

(Christie, 1994), but it clearly coincided with the decision of the Atomic Energy

Board of South Africa in the late 1970s to become self sufficient as far as nuclear fuel

supplies were concerned. Since sanctions prevented South Africa from buying

enriched uranium on the world market, it led to the erection of a number of small

plants, including the Z-plant at Pelindaba, in which uranium could be taken through

all of the stages of conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication (Venter and Fouché

1994: 79, 83, 84).

Of these latter developments, the public initially knew very little, but slowly it was

eventually realized locally as well as internationally, that South Africa had indeed

developed nuclear weapons, so that issues regarding nuclear proliferation also entered

the public debate. The Kalahari Incident in 1977 was detected by USSA and USA

surveillance satellites when the construction of deep shafts for underground nuclear

weapons testing were discovered; arising from an unaccounted for nuclear explosion

in the Southern Ocean, off-shore of the Prince Edward Islands, in South African

possession. Speculations that international pressure was placed on South Africa to

dismantle its nuclear weapons before the political transition of April 1994, all

contributed to the image of a very close association between civilian use of nuclear

energy and nuclear weapons.

A further characteristic of the development of strategic nuclear capabilities during this

time was that the state guaranteed loans through which South Africa's nuclear

facilities were financed. It was clear from the outset that uranium conversion and

enrichment facilities would never recover the capital costs by sales revenue. In fact,

until the early 1990s the full responsibility for servicing loans was carried by the

South African government. During 1994, the servicing costs of these loans (interest


plus capital) were estimated at between R150 million and R200 million annually

(Venter and Fouché 1994: 83).

Others indicate that the nuclear sector received generous state subsidies from the

Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs' budget that peaked at R705 million (or

92% of the Department's budget) in 1987/88 (Auf der Heyde, 1994: 97). During

1994, it was estimated that South Africa's nuclear fuel production capability was

subsidized by the state at almost R300 million per year, with income generated from it

only amounting to R10 million from export contracts and about R80 million from

contracts with Eskom at prices much higher than spot prices in the international

nuclear fuel market (Auf der Heyde, 1994:98).

While these figures only become known during the 1990s, the general ethical concern

raised about such subsidies in the face of commercial losses was that it constituted a

substantive drain on the country's resources (Auf der Heyde, 1994: 98). From an

ethical point of view, this was public money that was utilized to serve the agenda of

the then regime. While this regime justified this expenditure on the basis of strategic

reasons, this justification clearly fell away in an era of a democratically elected

government, accountable to the whole of the population.

3.3.4 The era of commercial decision-making, transparency and open dialogue Although indicators to this effect were present at earlier stages, for example in the

founding of Nufcor by a consortium of mines in 1967 to produce uranium, it was

during the early 1990s, that it explicitly shifted from strategic to commercial decision-

making in the nuclear energy field in South Africa. During this time it was realized

that South Africa could not afford to continue its decision-making on nuclear issues

on an ideological basis; and that the basis for decision-making should shift to "rational

analysis derived through integrated energy planning within a policy framework which

seeks to advance social equity, economic competitiveness and environmental

sustainability" (Eberhard 1994: 48). This entailed a major paradigm shift in which an

optimal energy balance was sought to meet social needs (The Nuclear Debate 1994:

199; DME 1998: 6).


The Management of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), which replaced the

earlier Atomic Energy Board), for instance, determined that its uranium enrichment

capability was not commercially viable, due to the small size of the enrichment plants,

but also because of the depressed and oversupplied nuclear fuel market. The AEC

Management subsequently made the decision to close some of its enrichment plants,

or to convert to a wide spectrum of other market-driven production capabilities with

civilian applications (as opposed to technology driven products with military

applications) (Venter and Fouché 1994:79, 84, 85, 87-88; Albright 1994: 152; cf. also

Stumpf 1994).

In addition, it should be noted that this shift took place within a political context

within which the emphasis strongly moved to that of ensuring social equity,

environmental sustainability (Eberhard 1994: 40), and greater openness, transparency

and flexibility indecision-making. Within such a context it became evident that the

nuclear industry would only survive if it could clearly demonstrate that it was

economically competitive and not an unnecessary drain on the country’s financial

resources when there was pressing social priorities. It also had to demonstrate that it

contributed to the economic development of the country, or at least was not

incompatible with the national policy goal of environmental sustainability (cf.

Eberhard 1994:40).

Evidence of this shift towards social goals, openness and dialogue were evident in the

early 1990s, when South Africa become a signatory to the Nuclear NPT (on July 8,

1991) and subsequently opened its uranium enrichment facilities for inspection by the

IAEA. During this time, South Africa also became a significant supporter of the

OAU's declaration of Africa as a nuclear weapons-free zone. This ideal was

formalized as the Treaty of Pelindaba was signed in Cairo in April 1996. South

Africa played a brokering role in the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT in

New York in April-May 1995, and slowly started to resume its activities in the IAEA.

Further impetus to this trend of openness and dialogue was given on March 24, 1993

when president F.W. de Klerk confirmed in a speech in Parliament the world's

suspicion (cf. Moore1987) that South Africa had engaged in a nuclear weapons

programme. The full extent of his announcement was that in 1990 South Africa gave


final effect to decisions made in1989 after the fall of the Berlin wall, that all nuclear

devices had been dismantled and destroyed. At that stage, South Africa had six

nuclear explosive devices, and was working on a seventh when the decision was made

to stop the programme (Barrie 1994: 164-165; Amuah 1994: 177).

First, the R210 million pilot enrichment plant, otherwise known as the Y-Plant was

closed in February 1990, followed by a systematic dismantling of the nuclear

weapons themselves at Armscor’s Advena warehouse. The process included

decontamination of the buildings, safe storage of the remaining of highly enriched

uranium at Pelindaba and a number of inspections by the IAEA to verify the process

of dismantling was complete. The documentation relating to the process of weapon-

making was also destroyed. According to Barrie (1994: 171), this dismantling

demonstrated South Africa's willingness to co-operate with international bodies on the

matter of nuclear weapons proliferation, and "speaks volumes for this country's good

faith".

3.3.5 Challenges deterring public support for nuclear technology applications The disclosure by F.W. de Klerk underlines the very close link that existed until very

recently within South Africa between commercial and military applications of nuclear

technology. It underlines the fact that if the political will to pursue such technologies

exists, that overt commercial applications of nuclear technology can very well be used

very effectively as a smokescreen to conceal such military applications.

As pointed out by Barrie (1994: 171), any commercial nuclear capacity will have to

live permanently under the cloud of latent nuclear weapons proliferation. Given

South African’s history in this regard, as well as the secrecy within which it was

shrouded, the fear of proliferation is deeply ingrained in the political consciousness of

many South Africans. As such, this fear constitutes a major political reality that will

have to be taken seriously in any decision, or attempted decision, to proceed with and

new developments in nuclear technology within the commercial sector.

During an unprecedented conference on the nuclear debate in South Africa that was

held in Cape Town from 11-13 February 1994, it was mentioned that one possible


response to this fear of proliferation would be to renounce civilian nuclear technology

altogether, but it was pointed out that this would be a very difficult decision to justify,

since there are many other applications of nuclear technology besides that of

electricity generation (for example that of radioisotopes used in research, industry and

the medical fraternity to treatment cancer). It was also argued that South Africa

would be losing highly skilled personnel and substantive technological capacity if the

indigenous nuclear industry were unravelled (Eberhard 1994: 50; cf.). Another

response was to only approve of nuclear technology that was diversion proof, and to

put in place an elaborate machinery of surveillance and verification (Barrie 1994:171;

Albright 1994: 143).

3.3.6 Solutions that may promote public support for nuclear technology applications Given the emerging picture, it seems that public trust and support for civilian

applications of nuclear technology will require a level of transparency to enable a

process of surveillance and verification. However, this may prove very difficult,

given the fact that surveillance and verification imply levels of access to and openness

about nuclear technology that may be in conflict with current standards and practices

regarding the safety of that technology. Barrie (1994: 171) makes a very important

point when he draws attention to the link between commercial and military nuclear

power: "The link is such a close one and an inconvenient reality for those who would

deny it."

Furthermore it is important to note within this era of commercial decision-making and

open dialogue about nuclear technology that market forces alone may prove not to be

adequate to address all of the issues that may emerge. The nature of the nuclear fuel

cycle presupposes, due to its organizational and technological complexity, a degree of

centralized co-ordination that only the state is able to offer (Barrie 1994: 174). The

possible motives for a state to become involved with nuclear technology could be:

a) Either for its perceived contribution to external security (through nuclear

weapons); or

b) For the contribution it can make to economic growth that relies on scientific and

technological innovation, and a centralized energy system (Barrie 1994: 174).


Expansion will depend on factors such as economic growth, public attitudes and

approaches by decision-makers in assessing the macro-economic, health and

environmental aspects of the different options available for electricity generation

(DME 1998: 60).

3.3.6 Conclusion In conclusion, it can be said that a whole new set of challenges emerged during the

1990s in the South African nuclear debate. Besides the central issues characteristic of

all debates about nuclear technology (safety and health issues, radiation risks, disaster

management, proliferation, nuclear waste storage and cost efficiency) a number of

serious framework issues emerged during the 1990s that have to do either with

a) The mechanisms of policy and decision-making on nuclear issues, or

b) With public trust in the structures and institutions responsible to control the

nuclear industry.

In these two areas, a number of unresolved issues still exist which can be captured in

the following questions, starting with issues of mechanisms and procedures:

a) What exactly should the role of public participation be in the process of

developing nuclear policy, albeit that decision-making on nuclear issues entail

technical detail that is inaccessible to the lay public (Amuah 1994)?

b) How should the tension between demands for open dialogue and transparency

about nuclear issues for the sake of public control (on the one hand) and the

demand for secrecy about nuclear issues for security reasons (on the other hand)

be addressed?

c) What should the appropriate mix of energy options for South Africa be in terms of

an integrated energy plan, and what should the place in this mix be, if any, for

nuclear power generation? What exactly do we mean when we say that we should

choose "the best option in terms of suitability and the lowest price for our

immediate and future needs" (Stott 1994: 53)?

d) Can the nuclear industry make a positive contribution to the processes of

economic, social and political reconstruction and development in South Africa?


3.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 3: To establish the South African public’s perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear energy and technology

3.4.1 Introduction

A positive public perception towards nuclear energy is critical to the South African

economy. It is only through public acceptance that Government can advance their

plans for the much need South African nuclear new build. Another important value

proposition that has emerged in the era of commercial decision-making and open

dialogue about nuclear power is the fact that taxpayers’ money will need to be used to

develop a nuclear capability in South Africa.

Apart from financing challenges, there are serious value propositions for localisation,

skills development, economic growth and development, innovation and

industrialisation, the efficient utilization of our rich uranium resources, job creation,

social empowerment, as well as an environmentally sustainable, security of supply to

meet the growth needs of South Africa.

There is also a view that argues that South Africa should not waste the millions

invested in the apartheid-era nuclear programme which provided “exciting

development opportunities” that resulted in an “immense technological achievements”

(Barrie 1994: 172), while others characterized it as "a costly mistake" and "excessive

investment in a highly protective industry" (Stumpf 1994: 27).

3.4.2 Nuclear secured a position in South Africa’s energy mix

Creamer Media Reporter, Jean McKenzie published a lead article entitled, “Nuclear

could ease energy shortage, creates jobs – Adam.” (01 June 2011). “NIASA

President, Dr Rob Adam said, “Investment in nuclear power would not only ease

South Africa’s energy shortage, but would also allow for significant job creation.

Adam, who was the then Necsa CEO, delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Energy

Minister, Dipuo Peters at the Nuclear Industry Localization Conference (NILC) in

Cape Town at the International Convention Centre (ICC) from 1 to 3 June 2011. He

said that nuclear would remain a large part of the IRP, which sets out South Africa’s

energy mix over 20 years.”


“The country’s intention to invest in nuclear power is extremely positive for the nuclear

industry,” according to WNA, Director of Trade and Transport Serge Gorlin,

(McKenzie, 2011). He also highlighted the current state of nuclear programmes and

nuclear new build plants around the world, following the crisis at the earthquake and

tsunami that hit the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan.

3.4.3 The nuclear debate concerning the benefits and concerns

In 1953, the British Government approved the construction of the world’s first

commercial nuclear power station, Magnox, at Calder Hall, which had a capacity of

120 MW. In 1956, the Queen Elizabeth reactor was put on stream and operated

safely, reliably and successful for 47 years, until it was decommissioned in 2003.

Today we have much more advanced nuclear expertise, a much better understanding

of nuclear reactor physics, better materials, longer experience, a longer computer

design and a exceptional safety record (better than most other industries). According

to (Kenny, A., s.a.), While we are far more capable, in almost every way in building

nuclear power stations, it now takes eight years or more to build a nuclear power

station today. The reasons for the lengthy construction period include:

a. The very onerous, expensive and time consuming regulation that is generally

imposed on such construction, greatly increasing capital costs;

b. Political obstruction and delays in granting required permissions;

c. Long delays in granting licenses, with often crippling financing interest rates

during the construction phase when no income is being generated;

d. Protracted Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s) and the dual regulatory

regimes of the NNR and Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA); and

e. Protests and demonstrations interfering with, or delaying, decisions to build, or

grant approval to transport nuclear fuel/waste, etc.

Most, if not all, negative scenarios and agenda’s can be directly attributed to current

public perceptions. In addition, public fear of nuclear power is relentlessly stoked by

well-funded international activist groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth,

World Wide Fund (WWF) and politicians who seldom have any scientific or


engineering qualifications, yet demand more and more regulation of nuclear power and

cause more and more delays and refusals. These are the views and of Andrew Kenny,

acclaimed South African climate expert, in a presentation on nuclear perceptions.

3.4.4 Benefits and concerns of nuclear as perceived by proponent and opponent

The issue of nuclear power is not a clear cut. Nuclear proponents promote it as

the solution for the world's current energy problems. However, opponents claim

that, not only nuclear power is not a solution, but it may turn out to be the source

of new problems. The debate on the benefits and concerns by nuclear

proponents say:

a) Nuclear is a much cleaner alternative than oil, natural gas or coal, emitting much

less carbon dioxide (CO2) than the latter options;

b) Nuclear power is the best means to acquire independence from oil and gas

producing nations that now command world energy supply. It uses a uranium

type fuel that is relatively abundant and cheap compared to oil or gas;

c) Nuclear reactor efficiency is high, having increased from the past 70% to the

current 80% grade;

d) As the so-called "carbon tax" (calculated on the basis of equivalent CO2

emissions) will become common practice, nuclear kWh, currently significantly

more expensive to produce than coal, oil or gas-powered electricity, will regain

competitiveness;

e) New technologies of nuclear fuel reprocessing may significantly reduce the

amount of nuclear waste produced by the prevailing technologies. Nuclear fuel

reprocessing, also known as uranium enrichment, consists of extracting plutonium

from spent fuel and turns it into fuel for use in another plant; and

f) New approaches of nuclear waste management, namely the geological repository,

of which the first project should become operational in Finland by 2020, will

solve the problem of disposal without short and long term hazards to public health

and safety.

These arguments posed by supporters of nuclear are rather unconvincing to non-

believing opponents who say:


a) Nuclear power may not be the answer to a carbon-free environment. In order to

make a dent in the projected GHG emissions by 2050, the world would require 1

TW (terawatt) of nuclear power by that date (MIT study, 2003). This means

tripling global nuclear power production. Taking into account the current 372,000

MW capacity, the 40-50 year life cycle of the reactors, and the resulting need to

replace the operating units now with a median age of 24 years, a simple

calculation shows that the world should add roughly 2,000 MW capabilities each

month in the course of the forthcoming 42 years, starting today. As a yardstick,

the modern European pressurized reactor, a generation III+ reactor (EPR) under

construction in Finland, has a 1,600 MW capability, is budgeted at 3 billion euro,

and should take 57 months to build from pouring the first concrete to plant

commissioning. The technical, financial and managerial burdens may prove an

insurmountable obstacle in the way of the terawatt objective.

b) The cost of nuclear power is currently 15% to 60% higher over life time than

conventional coal or gas power (MIT study, 2003). Speculation about the possible

impact of a "carbon tax" to bring the cost of nuclear power to par with alternative

sources should be tempered by other developments. For instance, new

technologies may revamp coal powered plants, and the burying of CO2 (being

tested in Germany) may defuse the threat of the carbon tax. On the other hand,

there are no reliable estimates as yet of the real cost of disposing of spent fuel and

other nuclear waste, for which there is actually no solution currently. Facts say

that nuclear power may be cheaper to run due to inexpensive fuels, but very

expensive to build, requiring heavy capital investments, huge front-end pre-

construction and on-site engineering costs, and very long waiting periods until the

plant can bill the first kWh. This is why the World Bank (WB) has a long-

standing policy not to lend money to nuclear projects (WB 1991).

c) Nuclear power technologies are promising, but remain to be proven.

Reprocessing spent fuel has been adopted by France. However, not only it entails

sizable risks from complex and dangerous reprocessing, but it is also very costly.

France only reprocesses 28% of yearly spent fuel. Lots of R&D, funding and time

are still needed to master the process technically and economically. The so-called


generation IV reactors presenting advanced features are decades away from

commercial deployment.

d) Nuclear power technologies, particularly the more advanced ones based on fuel

reprocessing, fly in the face of political leaders concerned with nuclear

proliferation in military weaponry. It is difficult to reconcile militancy for the

spread of new and advanced nuclear plants, with the effective prevention of the

use of enriched uranium for bellicose purposes.

e) Safety and health of present and future generations should command the greatest

caution. Nuclear power is inherently hazardous. Needless to mention grave

incidents like Three Mile Island (1979) or Chernobyl (1986). Maybe more

worrisome are the hundreds of "smaller" incidents, leakages, releases of waste,

short-circuits, small fires, earthquake damage, overheating, human errors, and

misplaced fuel, inventory that supposedly plague the installed park of nuclear

plants worldwide. Such hazards are a good reminder of the inability of all

involved, maintenance technicians, security officials, process managers, plant

engineers, etc. to maintain installations under tight and safe control.

According to Insight, (2008) the facts are as follows:

a) A large plant produces 25 to 30 tons of spent fuel per year, not to mention

other forms of waste, such a contaminated items, materials and equipment.;

b) Nuclear waste is highly radioactive, presenting both short-term radioactivity

(fission products) and long-term radioactivity (mostly plutonium and

curium). Radioactive decay is very slow; and

c) The process of nuclear waste disposal is vulnerable to accidents or malicious

tampering. The only guarantee is that future generations will inherit a hidden

wealth of dangerous radioactive materials;

3.4.4 Conclusion

A major policy milestone was achieved on 16 March 2011, just days after the

Japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster struck. South Africa’s Cabinet approved

the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2010) which will form the basis of planning to


meet our countries electricity power generation needs until 2030. The plan envisages

that nuclear will contribute an additional 9,600 MW of the total generation mix by

2030. However, while South Africa stood firm to its commitment to nuclear after

Fukushima, Germany announced drastic steps to completely close its nuclear

programme, with the decommissioning of all its NPP’s complete by 2022.

Switzerland will not close its nuclear energy programme, but has been cautious and

announced that it will not be replacing three units that have come to the end of their

life cycle, said Serge Gorlin (McKenzie, 2011).

Gorlin added that other countries with established nuclear programmes, such as the

UK and the USA, were reviewing their existing nuclear plans, but have not

fundamentally altered their stance towards nuclear energy generation. Developing

countries, such as India and South Korea, were still pursuing growing nuclear energy

programmes. Reports by Creamer Media (2011) during the question and answer

session after Gorlin’s presentation, concern was expressed by participants at the NILC

conference in Cape Town, over the public perception of nuclear power, which

threatened to undermine nuclear growth. Gorlin admitted that at any time “the threat

that hangs over nuclear is that governments will change colour and decide not to

pursue a nuclear programme.”

3.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: To ascertain the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear energy

3.5.1 Introduction Health & Sitkin (2001) believe that a change in behaviour can more easily be

expected when there is both a positive personal attitude and a positive personal

environment. The extent to which behaviour can be changed by interventions in the

personal domain, such as education or information, depends on the strength of the

contextual environment (Stern, 1999). Issues in the contextual environment include

public policy and economic variables. Crises have been shown to be an effective

driver of change. The Cape Town electricity crisis is not unique and other countries

have dealt with the consequences of their electricity crises by changing the behaviour


of consumers to manage electricity demand (Journal of Energy in Southern Africa,

February 2008)

3.5.2 Nuclear likened to anti-abortion campaigns. Despite all the negative publicity, the South African government indicated its support

for nuclear power, only days after Fukushima in March 2011. The DoE indicated that

nuclear power generation would play a significant role in the country’s future energy

mix. The DoE Director-General, Ms Nelisiswe Magubane said, “The inclusion of

nuclear power would assist South Africa in its efforts to reduce GHG emissions.”

Magubane noted that it would be challenging to rebuild an industry that has been

dormant for almost 30 years. She said the biggest concerns around nuclear power

were the lack of information and communication to the general public. “Nuclear has

always been linked with big price tags and environmental and historical disasters. In

fact, it is right up there with anti-abortion campaigns,” said Magubane. She urged the

industry to increase its communication efforts and to assist government in forming a

greater understanding of nuclear power generation to the general public (Prinsloo,

2010).

3.5.2 The role of the media in forming public perceptions of nuclear Several recent media articles have highlighted the importance of including nuclear

power in the energy mix in South Africa. However, the main hindrance to the

acceptance and growth of nuclear energy is believed to be public perception, which

has largely been negatively influenced by the media.

The story, “What’s really wrong with Harties?” featured in the 07 May 2010 issue of

Farmer’s Weekly (farmersweekly, 2010). This publication reported that one of the

residents at the Hartbeespoort Dam claimed that Necsa was polluting the Crocodile

River, which had resulted in the death of fish in the river and in some people

contracting cancer from eating fish with high radioactivity levels. Despite Necsa’s

response that this report had no scientific or factual basis, the publication continued to

highlight similar stories.


On 09 March 2011, the world watched as a tragic natural disaster unfolded in Japan.

An earthquake and then a tsunami wreaked havoc along a huge stretch of the north

east coast, as it swept far inland devastating a number of towns and villages. Yet the

images published and aired globally were primarily of headlines that “A powerful

explosion has hit a nuclear power station in north eastern Japan, which was badly

damaged in Friday’s devastating earthquake and tsunami.”

Damian Grammaticas reported on the destruction wrought by the tsunami in Sendai

(BBC News, 2011) with the headline “Japan Earthquake: Explosion at Fukushima

nuclear plant.” The fact of the matter is that at the time of writing this report, twenty

seven thousand had people died as a result of the earthquake and tsunami, yet no one

died as a result of the impact of these disasters on the Fukushima NPP.

3.5.3 Media sensationalism of the Fukushima accident

“I’m ashamed for my profession. The media’s reporting of the nuclear accident at

Fukushima goes well beyond mere sensationalism. It sacrifices the calm assessment

of fact and reason to populist hysteria and a radical green agenda,” said Journalist, Ivo

Vegter (dailymaverick, 2012). “Radiation and you,” runs the headline. “The

radiation levels at Fukushima are now equivalent to having 4 000 chest X-rays in an

hour. This crisis has prompted the questions: is nuclear energy really worth it, and on

a more personal note, what exactly do I need to know about radiation?”

Health24, a division of Naspers’ Media24, is probably not to blame for this

misleading introduction to what might have been a useful guide to radiation levels,

mirroring this post and graphics by Randall Munroe of XKCD fame (Birgit

Ottermann, Health24, 2011). The story’s author admits to not being a nuclear expert,

although even a non-expert might be expected to tell the difference between waste

water contained inside the reactor and radiation exposure to the wider population. In

essence, however, this story just repeats the nuclear hyperboles that even the most

reputable of news organizations dish up daily (Health24, 2011)


“Alarm over plutonium,” reads the headline over a Reuters story carried by

TimesLIVE (Reuters, 2011). In the article you read about “low-risk levels”. Despite

scary descriptions of plutonium as “highly carcinogenic and one of the most

dangerous substances on the planet,” there’s not a hint that the soil in question was

about 50 times less radioactive than, say, a typical human body, nor that they may

well have stumbled upon harmless residues from Pacific weapons tests staged decades

ago.

“Japan Nuke Plant Water ‘Leaking into Sea,” screams Sky News (Sky News, 2011). It

quotes a “Sky News correspondent” as saying “radiation in the sea near the plant was

currently more than 4,000 times the legal limit”. This might alarm readers, especially

because it quotes such a reputable source, but there is no mention in the story that the

normal limit is extraordinarily low, that the Pacific Ocean is extraordinarily big, and

that the radioactive substance in question (iodine-131) decays extraordinarily rapidly.

A few weeks from now, all that will be left behind is some of the burny stuff your

mother used to put on scrapes, albeit in concentrations so low that only a committed

homeopath would benefit from bathing in Japanese coastal waters.

The Guardian warned, “Japan fears food contamination as battle to cool nuclear plant

continues: Abnormal radiation levels reported in tap water, vegetables and milk with

concerns that fish may also be affected” (Guardian, 2011). Most of the contamination

involves the aforementioned iodine-131, which was the main culprit for elevated

thyroid cancer risk after Chernobyl. Its half-life is eight days. At the time of writing,

a fortnight after the article, the IAEA reported (IAEA, 2011) that that most drinking

water restrictions have been lifted.

“Dangerous Levels of Radioactive Isotope Found 25 Miles from Nuclear Plant,” yells

the New York Times headline (New York Times, 2011). Sure, it’s higher than

normal, but it would have to remain that way for a few decades, while you lived there,

before there’d be a small chance that you would notice.


“Japan may have lost race to save nuclear reactor,” trumpets a Guardian headline,

evoking fears of a meltdown and containment breach, before promptly contradicting

itself: “no danger of Chernobyl-style catastrophe” (Guardian, 2011).

But who to believe, when Agency France-Presse, as reported by News24 “Fukushima

much bigger than Chernobyl – expert”? The “expert” in question, Natalia Mironova,

is an anti-nuclear campaigner, speculating about an entirely fictional worst-case

scenario in Fukushima. As the story unfolds you learn that the UN has long

dismissed claims that tens or even hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of

Chernobyl, and even the reliable alarmists at Greenpeace limit themselves to a

number of 60,000. However, Mironova said, “Chernobyl would likely impact the

health of 600 million people around the world over the long-term, or nearly nine times

more than were killed in World Wars I and II.”

Needless to say, many of these stories follow a typical pattern. First, scream

something scary about the radiation risk. Exploit the fact that “normal” or “legal”

limits are extremely low. For example, the legal radiation exposure limit for US

nuclear workers is eight times lower than the level known to cause a detectable

statistical cancer risk. However, it is 50 times higher than the limit for ordinary

members of the public. Given such remarkably low limits, it is easy to create

headlines that involve scary numbers. When the norm is virtually zero, it’s pretty

easy to get to a thousand times worse.

3.5.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, one can safely assume that most of the various media readership is not

well versed in nuclear physics. Therefore throw in some stuff naming scary-sounding

radioactive isotopes and add a few ominous measurements in millisieverts (mSv) and

megabecquerels (MBq), and you’ve scared the vast majority senseless. Of course,

then they bury a few caveats down the middle somewhere to protect their backsides if

anyone accuses them of lying. Those paragraphs might hint that despite the

unimaginable terror, “experts” say it’s not likely to be very serious and official

measures are mostly precautionary in nature.


As if the sensationalist tabloid media isn’t enough of a blot on the noble profession of

journalism, the respected mainstream has gone well beyond mere sensationalism in its

reporting on Fukushima. If ordinary environmental reporting, which goes under

banner headlines such as “Addicted to Oil”, “Frankenfoods” and “World in Peril!”,

isn’t enough, surely the demonstrably hysterical headlines about Fukushima are

convincing evidence of a radical green bias in the mainstream news media?

This bias is an abdication of responsibility. Worse, it is dangerous. Besides the

immediate financial harm that results from such irresponsible, untruthful reporting, it

gives anti-progressive environmentalists slogans for protests in the streets and is

likely to prompt a nuclear ice age at government policy level. “One ought to be proud

to be a journalist, but the coverage of Fukushima is a disgrace to the profession,” said

Ivo Vegter (dailymaverick, 2012). Sadly, this is how public perceptions of nuclear

energy are largely formed the world over.

3.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: To clarify the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear safety

3.6.1 Introduction The “Survey of Different Approaches utilised to Aid Public Acceptance of Nuclear

Energy” produced in April 1999 by the Unipede: Nuclear Task force set out to

contribute to the improvement of public acceptance of nuclear energy by analysing

public perceptions of nuclear in different participating countries. The objective of the

survey was to identify rational and non-rational root causes for the main fears of the

public as well as identifying a number of guidelines that when used, may efficiently

achieve an improvement of public acceptance. The members of UNIPEDE’s Task

force for Nuclear Affairs were drawn from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,

Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and

the United Kingdom, Wald, F. &Peresso, E.M. 1999.


3.6.2 Nuclear technology: A viable solution to the Kyoto commitments According to Wald, F. & Peresso, E.M. 1999, Participating governments at the Kyoto

Summit in December 1997 agreed to CO2 and other GHG reduction targets. Many

different methods may be used to reach these targets, such as energy savings,

optimised use of energy, renewable energy, clean fossil fuel technologies and of

course, nuclear power. Each has its peculiar advantages and disadvantages.

A major advantage of nuclear power is that it allows for the long-term and consistent

generation of large amounts of cost-effective base load electricity with very low

releases of CO2 gas and a very low overall carbon footprint. Nuclear energy can be

part of the solution to lowering the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Without

nuclear energy, it would not be possible for a significant number of countries to meet

both their targets for energy demand and their Kyoto commitments.

3.6.3 South Africa’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol Global climate change is possibly the greatest environmental challenge facing the

world in this century, (unfccc.int, 2012). South Africa ratified the Kyoto Protocol on

July 31, 2002, with the Protocol entering into force just over two and half years later,

on February 16, 2005. As of this date, South Africa needed to reduce its GHG

emissions through actively reducing the use of fossil fuels, or by utilizing more

renewable resources.

Although South Africa is the African continent's greatest air polluter, with its

emissions per capita considerably higher than many of the other developing countries,

it is not classified as an Annex 1 party. Annex 1 Parties refers to developed countries

and other parties included in Annex 1 to the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) that committed themselves to limiting

anthropogenic emissions and enhancing their GHG sinks and reservoirs.

The Kyoto Protocol set binding targets for Annex 1 Parties to limit or reduce their

GHG emissions. It has established innovative mechanisms to assist these Parties in

meeting their emissions commitments. Non-Annex 1 countries are not subjected to

caps on emissions. Emission quotas (known as “assigned amounts”) were agreed by

each participating Annex 1 country, with the intention of reducing the overall


emissions by 5.2% from their 1990 levels by the end of 2012. South Africa falls into

the "Non-Annex 1" Parties’ category, where mostly developing nations that do not

have any legal bindings to the Protocol are categorized. However, Non-Annex 1

countries such as South Africa, have agreed in principle to reduce their GHG

emissions

Non-Annex 1 parties agreed to achieve emission reduction targets by the

Commitment Period (2008 – 2012). Upon ratifying the Protocol, these agreements

would then become legally binding and the participating nations would be responsible

for their actions in terms of global warming. In order to achieve this, nations ratifying

the protocol will have to adhere to several regulations, of which some would include:

a. Climate change prevention policies have to be implemented;

b. Energy efficiency must be improved upon;

c. The waste and transport sectors need to reduce emissions in their sectors; and

d. Instruments that work against the Kyoto Protocol must be phased out.

3.6.4 Events that influence public perceptions of nuclear safety In identifying developments and events that have influenced public acceptance of

nuclear power, it is believed that all direct and contributory causes should be

considered. While developments and events in this document are discussed in light of

the South African public context, a number of these events are of international

relevance, since nuclear cannot be confined to particular countries. As is often said, a

nuclear incident in one country is a nuclear incident in every country, since the

consequences are global.

3.6.5 Psychological developments that influence public perceptions of nuclear safety Awareness of atmospheric pollution, health and environmental effects has increased

in both professional bodies and in the public arena. This together with governmental

commitments to reduce pollution and production of GHG will influence the power

industry. Nuclear power is a better option in this regard, than for instance coal-fired

power stations. However, the issue of emissions of radioactive material and nuclear

waste remains contentious.


3.6.6 Increased transparency in reporting nuclear safety incidents As indicated by the UNIPEDE Task Force survey, the increased transparency in

reporting of nuclear incidents and investigations has had a negative influence on

public acceptance in South Africa, owing to a lack of understanding when interpreting

these reports. The public tends to assume that any event at a nuclear power station is

cause for great alarm. The safe economic operation of many nuclear plants does

however build trusting perceptions with the public.

3.6.7 Conclusion South African legislation mandates that public participation and consultation are an

integral step in the construction of any nuclear facility. This consultation begins at

the onset with an EIA which according to the study influences the acceptance for

nuclear power.

An open and transparent approach to public consultation and reporting, together with

information and education of nuclear issues has proven successful in influencing

public perceptions toward the support of nuclear safety. This was evident during the

12-month focussed public awareness programme driven by an internationally

renowned global advertising company (Saatchi and Saatchi, SA). A variety of media

tools were applied to targeted different audiences with different messages.

This entailed taking a phased messaging approach with measurement criteria through

a newspaper print campaign, a regionalised radio campaign, activations otherwise

known as industrial theatre, secondary school debates, community debate and digital

media to mention but a few. For example, prior to one of the debates 65.25% of the

church members were against nuclear energy, with only 34,75% in support of nuclear.

However after the debate, that percentage dropped by 30% with 60.84% in support of

nuclear and only 39.16% against. A sum total of 19 295 church member were

reached during this campaign, with similar results evident in the other campaigns.


3.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To comprehend the South African public’s views

on nuclear energy in a global context

3.7.1 Introduction

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been at the heart of the global

nuclear debates, as reported on April 30, 2012 by Alistair Burt of Business Day. This

included recent international talks about Iran’s nuclear programme and concern that it

is developing a nuclear weapon. We have also seen the DPRK rocket launch

ostensibly, a failed satellite launch, but widely suspected to be part of a nuclear

weapons programme. Yet at the same time we’ve seen unprecedented agreement by

world leaders at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, 2012 to work together to

tackle the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Given the expectation that world-wide energy demand is set to double by 2050 and

the stark reality that we must reduce global GHG emissions if we are to avoid

catastrophic climate change, then it is clear that the debate about the peaceful uses of

nuclear power and the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons is set to continue. The

NPT is at the heart of the approach to this debate.

3.7.2 Globally the NPT continues to be nuclear weapons deterrent

The NPT was borne out of fear that the Cold War era would lead to a nuclear arms

race. In many ways it has surpassed expectations in terms of longevity, participation

and meeting its counter-proliferation objectives. Today, with 189 states parties to the

Treaty, it has more signatories than any other treaty of its kind. The three non-

signatories; India, Israel, and Pakistan are the only additional states believed to have

gained possession of nuclear weapons since the Treaty’s inception in 1968. While we

have left the Cold War era long behind us, the Treaty continues to be a considerable

deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapons.

3.7.3 NPT significantly boosts multilateralism

The UK Foreign Office Minister, William Hague said, “We took a big step towards

achieving this in 2010. As my first overseas duty as a UK Foreign Office Minister, I

attended the NPT Review Conference at the UN in New York. The outcome was a

significant boost to multilateralism. All states parties agreed to support the Treaty to


meet new and existing threats. A five-year action plan was agreed by consensus,

spanning the three so-called “pillars” of the NPT progress toward disarmament by

existing nuclear weapon states, measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons to others and, a crucial part of the bargain struck in 1968, supporting the

peaceful use of nuclear energy for those that want it. Agreement to the action plan

represented the start of a process. The real test will be through delivery of the action

plan to meet our commitments by the next Review Conference in 2015.

3.7.4 Conclusion

“Since 2010 the UK has set out our plans for the reduction of our nuclear warheads,

missiles and overall nuclear weapons stockpile. Amongst the nuclear weapons states

(China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), all members of the NPT, stockpiles

already stand at their lowest since the Cold War and we meet regularly to discuss how

we will work together to make further progress towards our long-term goal of a world

without nuclear weapons,” said Hague.

South Africa shares the international community’s concern regarding the spread of

nuclear weapons and strongly advocates the concept of a nuclear weapon-free world

and became a State Party to the NPT in July 1991 (dfa, 2004). It still occupies a

unique position in that it is the only country to have voluntarily decommissioned a

nuclear weapons capability and acceded to the NPT (StumpF, W., 1994)

3.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African public trust for information on nuclear energy

3.8.1 Introduction When the public assess risks, they seldom have sufficient statistical evidence at hand.

Instead they rely on inferences and intuition based upon their own limited past

experience and confidence. Therefore the fear and distrust which shrouds the nuclear

industry globally, is a perceived and subjective risk (Slovic et al., 1980) and

(Holgrave and Webber, 1993).


3.8.2 South Africa’s legacy of social disparities still breeds distrust South Africa has a vivid nuclear legacy synonymous with sentiments of apartheid,

secrecy and covert nuclear weapons operations. Despite the demise of apartheid in

South Africa, came an increased awareness and visibility of the social disparities

between the different race groups, and a strong emphasis in policy initiatives on

levelling the playing field, as well as bringing previously marginalised individuals,

particularly Black South Africans and women, into the economic mainstream.

Yet, despite some progress towards racial reconciliation, large socio-economic

inequalities between race groups remain, and race continues to be a pervasive theme

in everyday life. The relics of the past are so embedded, that the expectations and

social meaning created by apartheid persist, with the racial identity of South Africans

still affecting trust relationships, particularly those involving Black South Africans,

who were most severely marginalised by apartheid institutions.

In one of the first studies of its kind in South Africa, Ashraf et al., (2003) found that

Black people make significantly lower offers in a trust game, supporting previous

work which suggests people of previously disadvantaged groups in society may be

less trusting (Alesina et al., 2000).

The work reported here comes from trust games run with high schools students in

which photographs of participants were used to transmit information about the race of

individuals in the games and extends this earlier work by examining the impact of the

racial identity of both advantaged and disadvantaged individual behaviour in this

strategic setting. This work closely resembles that of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001,

2002), Glaeser et al., (2000), and Eckel and Wilson (2003) as described in

http://wwwcssr.uctza/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/pubs/wp78/pdf.

3.8.3 South Africa’s apartheid-era nuclear weapons history Research into South African apartheid-era nuclear weapons history has been severely

hampered by longstanding secrecy laws, not to mention the destruction of most policy

records. The recent declassification and release of a 1975 Defence Force

memorandum recommending the acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, indicates

that important documents have survived. This document sheds light on military


attitudes about nuclear acquisition, and about the extent of the South African Israeli

alliance. It confirms that Israel had offered South Africa missiles, and may have

offered nuclear warheads as well.

While the release of the 1975 document is promising, the Promotion of Access to

Information Act, (PAIA) 2000 and the convening of an interdepartmental

Classification and Declassification Review Committee in 2002 do not thus far

represent a decisive shift towards greater openness on apartheid-era history. The

state’s incentives for disclosure, controlled to avoid nuclear technology leakage,

(Harris et al., 2004) include the benefits of the lessons of the past to the global non-

proliferation regime, contributing to South Africa’s prestige and foreign policy

agenda, and enhancing the country’s democratic transparency.

3.8.4 Why public acceptance is synonymous with trust? In recent years, public acceptance has often been considered as the single most

important issue that has to be resolved in most nuclear related decision-making

processes. Many nuclear decisions based upon robust technology and economic

incentives alone, have failed to be implemented. The limitations common to most

decision-making processes is that of public opinions having been ignored or only

partly considered. For example, decisions are normally made by a group of selected

experts using cost benefit analysis, in which all the values aggregated are in terms of

cost versus benefit. However, cost-benefit analysis is not designed for multi-

stakeholder decisions. In particular, public participation is treated separately from the

primary decision-making process. The position is taken that the public have to be

persuaded or convinced after the decision has been made by the decision-makers.

Therefore, efforts are usually directed towards advertisements and education as a

means of attempting to change public attitudes and beliefs. Generally, this process

creates a situation of confrontation between the public and the decision-makers that

there is danger of each side insisting on its own adversarial stance resulting in public

distrust of the decision-maker.


3.8.5 Conclusion Judging from the research at hand thus far, it seems the public perceptions of trust are

more easily influence by media propaganda, as a result of the very covert nuclear

legacy and trend of perceived secrecy both the past and present South African

governments have been accused of. On the one hand, this is understandable given the

sensitivity of the information should it land in the wrong hands. However, the South

African public have right to know how public money was used and to what end.

While the South African nuclear programme was largely kept secret, there were

innovative technological development and globally comparable capabilities that

resulted from this programme, which all South African can be proud of.

These are just some of the questions related to public trust in the structures and

institutions responsible for controlling the nuclear technology:

a) How can we ensure public scrutiny of the powers that allocate resources for

research and development of science and technology in South Africa?

b) How can we ensure that “South Africa never again allows its resources, scientists

and engineers to produce weapons of mass destruction" (Nelson Mandela, quoted

in the Washington Times, 4 Dec. 1993)?

c) Was everything revealed about the South African nuclear weapons programme?

(Albright 1994: 142).

d) Why was South Africa's nuclear weapons programme not subjected to a TRC

hearing?

e) Did South Africa contribute to the development of Israel and China's nuclear

capacity and if so, to what extent (Albright 1994: 142, 147-148)?

f) As the industry had concealed and denied so much in the past, could people

believe them now (The Nuclear Debate 1994: 140)?

3.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 08: To evaluate the South African public’s final assessment of nuclear energy and technology

3.9.1 Introduction The recent history of South Africa’s nuclear programme presents an import and

unprecedented case of a state that developed and then voluntarily relinquished its

nuclear weapons. In a final assessment of nuclear energy in technology in South

Africa, we look at the chronology of events, based on a survey of from the Emerging


Nuclear Suppliers Project (ENSP) database. This does not purport to be the final

word on the South African nuclear programme. It does however, provide an over-

arching view of the driving forces behind the “attainment and renunciation” of nuclear

energy and technology in South Africa, which is a direct reflection of the publics’

perceptions today.

3.9.2 In 1944 the South African nuclear programme was borne Interestingly, the South African nuclear programme began in 1944 when the British

Government, through Winston Churchill asked the then-Prime Minister Jan C. smuts

to survey South Africa’s uranium deposits. The study revealed the existence of large

deposits of low-grade ore.

3.9.3 In 1948 the South African Atomic Energy Board was established In the 1950s, South Africa sent its scientists to study nuclear physics in the US under

the aegis of the “Atoms for Peace” program. Then in 1952 the first South African

uranium plant was opened at West Rand Consolidated Mine, near Johannesburg.

Under the aegis of the “Atoms for Peace” programme, South Africa and the US

signed a bilateral 50 year agreement for nuclear collaboration. Under this agreement

in 1957, South Africa acquired the 20 MW Safari-1 reactor and highly enriched fuel.

Soon after in 1959, the research and development programme for processing natural

uranium was launched.

3.9.4 In 1970 the “Building 5000” complex was constructed This facility was equipped with high explosives, criticality and the nuclear weapons

manufacturing capability. In the same year, the enrichment project was made public

and the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (AEC) was also established. When South

Africa’s program began in earnest in the early 1970s, the scientists sent to the US in

the 1950s were instrumental in its development. Nuclear weapons research was

carried out by the South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) under the guise

of developing peaceful nuclear explosives for the mining industry. The sense of

urgency was sharpened by the southward march of the African liberation movement,

which the South African government viewed as inspired by the Soviet Union. South


Africa conducted its nuclear program in absolute secrecy, with very few government

officials and even top Cabinet members knowing of its existence.

3.9.5 During the 1970s and 1980 South Africa resisted IAEA inspections Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Group of 77 pressured the IAEA to carry out

inspections on South Africa’s nuclear facilities, such as the pilot uranium enrichment

plant. In an uncorroborated report, James Adams claims that South Africa and Israel

had signed a technical cooperation agreement during the visit of South African Prime

Minister John Vorster to Israel. On October 15, 1976, the South African Government

and France formalize the Koeberg negotiations by signing a bilateral agreement.

Allegations that South Africa had made preparations to conduct a nuclear test in the

Kalahari in 1977 increased concern about the country’s intentions. But South Africa

continued to resist IAEA efforts to conduct an inspection.

Also in 1977, South barters 50 metric tons of yellowcake for 30 grams of Israeli

tritium. The material is code named “Teeblare (Afrikaans for tea leaves) and is

shipped secretly to South Africa in small “capsules each containing 2.5 grams.” The

shipment timing suggested the “Teeblare” were meant for the weapons programme,

but South African Arms Corporation (Armscor) decided not to use them in the

manufacture of nuclear devices. In 1979, South Africa and Israel reportedly conduct

a joint nuclear test in the South Atlantic. This secret operation was exposed by the

US Vela reconnaissance satellite, which detected a “double flash” of light in the South

Atlantic. The bomb was reported to be 2 – 3 kilotons (kt).

3.9.6 In 1987 under severe pressure South Africa indicates it will sign the NPT As a result, the Group of 77 removed South Africa from the African seat at the IAEA

in 1979. Further resistance led to a move in 1987 to expel South Africa from the

IAEA. At this point South Africa responded to western pressure by indicating that it

would sign the NPT. The decision to expel it from the IAEA was then deferred. In

1982 South Africa passed the Nuclear energy Act which made it illegal to divulge

information concerning uranium reserves, as well as actual or potential output without

government permission. Also in 1982, the ANC bombs the Koeberg-1 reactor in

retaliation for the South African defence force raid on Maseru, Lesotho, in which 42


ANC members and Lesotho citizens were killed. Although no exact figure was given,

the damage caused by a series of four explosions to the R1.8 billion complex was

reported to be extensive. Despite sanctions imposed by France against South Africa

in 1986, Framatome still supplied Koeberg with nuclear fuel. In 1986 the US

Congress also passed the “Anti-Apartheid Act” barring uranium imports from South

Africa.

3.9.7 In 1989 President F.W. de Klerk redefines South Africa’s nuclear aspirations After President F.W. de Klerk’s election in September 1989, AEC officials were

informed of his intentions to discontinue the nuclear weapons program. This was a

calculated move to thwart attempts by the Group 77 to deprive South Africa of its

rights and privileges as a member of the IAEA. In July 1991, South Africa finally

acceded to the NPT and subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

on September 16, 1991. An AEC official later stated that the possibility of a black

majority rule contributed to the decision. Less than two years after these acts of

sincerity, the international community were shocked by a starling government

revelation. In 1990 the ban on the ANC is lifted and Nelson Mandela is released from

prison. On March 24, 1993, President de Klerk disclosed publicly that South Africa

had built and, destroyed six nuclear bombs and still maintains a stockpile of highly

enriched uranium.

3.10 GANTT Chart Time-line Refer to Appendix J: 2011/2012 Gantt Chart, Research Phase I

Refer to Appendix K: 2011/2012 Gantt Chart, Dissertation Phase II

3.11 Conclusion In conclusion, it is clear from a brief overview of the chronological account of South

African nuclear programme at its inception in 1944 and it s renunciation in 1993, that

it was marred in controversy. From the alienation of the majority of its people

through a system of apartheid, to the threat of hostile attacks from both international

in internal sources, to international sanctions, a comprehensive covertly strategized

nuclear weapons capability to nuclear weapons testing.


De Klerk’s action improved South Africa’s reputation among African states and

paved the way for participation in the creation of an African Nuclear Weapon-Free

Zone. Doubts however remain, about whether or not de Klerk disclosed the full

extent of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. Apparently, valuable

information pertaining to the program has been destroyed by the then government,

except for the material accounting and material transfer records. IAEA authorities,

however, seem satisfied with official statements.

On reflection of the facts, there is certainly no doubt why the South African public’s

final assessment of nuclear energy and technology is one of fear, doubt, distrust and

racial division. The delays experienced in the pending nuclear new build are much

clearer, given the many secret and antagonistic relations that inform the public’s

perceptions of nuclear today.


4. CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction The research philosophy depends on the way you think about the development of

knowledge (Saunders et al., 2000:84). The aim of this study is to determine public

perceptions and understanding of the role of nuclear technology in South Africa.

From the literature review it has been deducted that the perception of nuclear energy

in South Africa has been severely damaged by the impact of devastating nuclear

bombings and accident abroad, clandestine weapons operations locally from 1994 to

1993 which also happened to coincide with a political struggle and transition period,

According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), “The right choice of approach helps you to

make a more informed decision about the research design; to think about which

strategies will work for your research topic and to adapt your design to cater for any

constraints.” The HSRC has been conducting the South African Social Attitudes

Survey (SASAS) on an annual basis since 2003, with the ninth survey completed late

in 2011. SASAS is a nationally representative sample survey of approximately 3,500

adults aged 16+ that investigated public’s attitudes, beliefs, behaviours patterns and

values in the country.

Due to various requests from government departments and other organisations, the

HSRC has decided to make a similar capacity available to external organisations in

the form of a client survey. The client survey runs parallel with the HSRC’s SASAS

survey and follows the same methodological principles. A module on ‘nuclear

energy’ was included for the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) in

the 2011 SASAS round. After the project was awarded, the contract between the

HSRC and Necsa was signed and marked the official start of the project.

4.2 Research inception meeting An inception meeting was held between Ms Chantal Janneker (Necsa) and Ms Jare

Struwig (HSRC) to discuss the project. The main aim of the meetings was to clarify

the issues relating to the terms of reference including sampling, project definition,

questionnaire content and design, deliverables, communication channels, progress

reports and other logistical issues.


4.3 Research design The research process used to define the research strategy of this study is detailed in

(Figure 9). It describes the generic process “research onion” that supports the

researcher to ‘depict the issues underlying the choice of data collection methods’

(Saunders et al., 2000:84). The layers of the “research onion” represent the following

aspects:

Figure 9: The Research Onion, (Saunders et al., 2000:84).

4.3.1 Research philosophy: This research study has a positivistic philosophy as it aims to collects facts and causes

of behaviour which make generalizations similar to those in the physical and natural

sciences (Remenya et al., 2000: p 32). This quantitative research study allows the

researcher to become familiar with the problems of “determining public perceptions

and understanding the role of nuclear technology in South Africa”. The emphasis is

on facts and causes of behaviour (Bogdan and Biklen, 1988), with the information in

the form of numbers that can be quantified and summarised using a mathematical

process for analysing the numeric data and expressing the final results in statistical

terms (Charles, 1995).


4.3.2 Research approach: As mentioned earlier, this research study has made use of deductive reasoning where

one started thinking about generalizations (Saunders et al., 2003: 86-87), mostly

applicable in disciplines where agreed facts and established theories are available

(Remenya et al., 2000: p.75).

Research sample design

The long-term aim of this survey programme is to construct an empirical evidence

base that enables one to track and explain the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns

of the country’s diverse population. Empirical research is a way of gaining

knowledge by means of direct and indirect observation or experience.

Different types of frameworks exist for designing research methodologies through

quantitative, qualitative and mixed method approaches. Empirical evidence can be

analysed quantitatively and has been chosen for the purpose of this study. Through

quantifying the evidence or making sense of it in a qualitative form, the researcher

can answer empirical questions with the evidence (data) collected. Different

approaches can be taken such as deductive or inductive. Deductive research starts

with existing theories and concepts and formulates hypotheses that are subsequently

tested; its vantage point is received theory (Gummesson, 2000). The researcher

begins with an abstract, logical relationship among concepts and then move toward

concrete empirical evidence (Neuman, 2003).

An inductive research starts with real-world data, and categories, concepts, patterns,

models, and eventually, theories emerge from this input (Gummesson, 2000). The

researcher begins with detailed observations of a subject and moves toward more

abstract generalizations and identifies preliminary relationships (Neuman, 2003).

After the initial stages, all types of research become iteration between the deductive

and the inductive. This is sometimes referred to as adductive research (Gummesson,

2000). This research is deductive. From (Table 2), outlining the main differences

between deductive and inductive research approaches, the deductive research

approach is most appropriate for a positivistic research philosophy.


Table 2: Differences of Deductive and Inductive Research (Saunders, et al., 2004)

Deduction Induction

Scientific principles Gaining an understanding of the meanings

humans attached to events

Moving from theory to data Close understanding of the research context

Need to explain causal relationships

between variables

Collection of qualitative data

Collection of quantitative data More flexible structure to permit changes

of research emphasis as the research

progresses

Application of controls to ensure validity of

data

Realization that the researcher is part of the

research process

Operationalization of concepts to ensure

clarity of definition

Less concern with the need to generalize

Highly structured approach

Researcher independence of what is being

researched

Necessity to select samples of sufficient

size in order to generalize the conclusions

4.3.3 Research strategy / methodology An important step in the research design is the choice of research strategy for

collecting data. A preliminary literature review was done to identify specific

questions for study, to create a better understanding of the nature and complexity of

the decision-making process. While there was much available on the nuclear industry

globally, very little was available in the South African context. In working very

closely with the HSCR who are experts in the field of research, it was decided that a

survey in the form of face-to-face interviews guided by a questionnaire, were most

appropriate.

Large-scale surveys are a common approach to research in business and management,

offering an opportunity to collect large quantities of data or evidence (Saunders et al.,

2003: 56-57). Surveys allow evidence to be gathered concerning ‘who, what, where,


when, why and how many’ or ‘how much’ but are of less value when the researcher is

asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions with an open-ended character.

4.3.4 Time horizons: (cross sectional) To understand, explain, and predict marketplace behaviour researchers ask questions.

Although these questions take many forms, they often appear as items in surveys of

managers or consumers. In recent years, the validity of survey research has become

increasingly concerning. Two issues dominate these concerns:

a. Common Method Variance (CMV): This is identified as a systematic error due to

the use of a single rater or single source.

b. Causal Inference (CI): This is otherwise known as the ability to infer causation

from observed empirical relationship.

Combined these issues present a serious threat to the validity of findings from survey-

based marketing studies. Although the subject of these concerns is generally survey

research, these issues are especially critical for cross-sectional research. Cross-

sectional research surveys may be defined as research being completed by a single

respondent at a single point in time. This rising concern about the validity of cross-

sectional surveys is an important issue because this method represents the most

common form of field research in many areas, and thus provides a critical foundation

for much of the knowledge of these topics.

To reduce the threat of CMV bias and enhance CI, survey researchers typically

recommend three different data collection strategies.

a. Employing multiple respondents;

b. Obtaining multiple types of data, or

c. Gathering data over multiple periods.

All three strategies are capable of creating separation between the collection of

independent and dependent variables, which in theory should reduce the hazard of

CMV and increase CI. Unfortunately, this view is seldom tested because few survey

studies employ any of these data collection strategies.


4.3.5 Data collection methods: Reliability and validity In this study, Seal’s view (1999: 226) is adopted, by focusing on the trustworthiness

of a study: ‘The trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of the issues

conventionally discussed as validity and reliability’. To claim the trustworthiness of

this study, the approach suggested by Yin (1994: 32-38) was followed in using the

conventional criteria definitions and defining research tactics to eliminate, or at least

reduce, possible criticism.

4.3.5.1 Study reliability

Target population: complex sample design

The target population for the survey needs to achieve a national representative

sample as scoped by the Necsa. Therefore, the sample design had to ensure that all

people in South Africa, including individuals aged 16+ years, regardless of race,

class, residential status are included. As a result a complex sample design was used

that included stratification and multi-stage sampling procedures.

The explicit stratification variables that were used in the sample were provinces,

urban/rural population and people living in different types of areas (e.g. informal

settlements, traditional areas, formal urban and farmlands). In addition, to ensure

the sample was representative in terms of the ethnic and cultural diversity of South

Africa, the HSRC’s geo-demographic categories, which have been developed from

the 2001 census data, were used as the implicit stratification variable. These geo-

demographic categories reflect the diversity of the South African population based

on their rural/urban, income, education, “ethnicity” and geographic characteristics.

The 2001 census data, updated with Statistics South Africa 2007 Community Survey

were used as the basis of the sample.

Research instrument: questionnaire

A draft pilot questionnaire was developed by Necsa. The HSRC commented on the

draft pilot questionnaire and gave feedback to Necsa. The questions were formatted

to fit the South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS) format and piloted in a

rural and urban set-up. Subsequent to the pilot, feedback was given to Necsa and a

final questionnaire was designed.


Refer to Appendix A: The Questionnaire. 2011 SASAS module on nuclear energy]

Research sample:

The 2011 sample was updated and drawn by Prof. David Stoker, a statistician who

has also been responsible for many of Statistics South Africa’s national surveys

based on international best practice. The sample had to be updated since the

previous SASAS samples were based on the HSRC’s second master sample EA’s

which was compiled many years before (2003). The new sampling frame was

developed using the 2011 census midyear population estimates. A summary

disaggregated by race and province is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Number of Enumerator Areas selected by Province and Race

Province African Coloured Indians White Total 2011

WC 15 32 3 21 71

EC 32 13 3 12 60

FC 9 14 0 6 29

FS 22 4 0 10 36

KZN 39 6 25 15 85

NW 24 3 2 9 38

GT 43 12 15 33 103

MP 25 2 2 9 38

LP 30 2 1 7 40

Total 2011 239 88 51 122 500

(Source: HSRC SASAS 2011, module on number of Enumerator Areas selected by Province & Race)

Navigation to the selected areas

Once the sample was selected, a navigational toolkit was developed to assist the

field teams in finding the correct areas. These kits assisted the Supervisors and

Fieldworkers to locate the exact EA where the interviews were to take place. The

navigational kits included:

a. Route descriptions, to assist the teams to navigate their way into the selected

EA’s;

b. Maps using aerial photographs as a base, identified the exact geographic location

of the EA’s to be sampled throughout the country;


c. More detailed maps that identified the exact area, pinpointing street names and

places of interest such as schools, clinics, hospitals, etc. selected by the office-

based sampling team, within the EAs where respondents would be interviewed;

and

d. Refer to Appendix C: An example of an Enumerator Area map issued to assist

the field teams to navigate to the correct areas

Introduction of the project to the communities

Prior to starting the actual interviewing process, Supervisors were instructed to visit

the local Police Stations, Indunas’, Chiefs or other leading role players in the various

areas to ensure that the local Authorities were aware of the project and to inform the

communities of their intent. Official letters (Appendix D) described the project and

its duration and relevant ethical issues were distributed to the authorities. This was

done not only as a form of research and ethical protocol, but also to ensure the safety

of the field teams.

Selecting a household and individual

After driving through the EA and introducing the project to the Local Authorities,

Supervisors had to select seven households in each EA. This had to be done in a

random way in order to ensure equal selection probability. The first visiting point

(household) was selected randomly anywhere in the EA by the Supervisor. Once the

random starting point had been selected, the field team needed to select the next

household by counting an interval number of households and using a serpentine way

of systematically moving though the EA. The interval was calculated by dividing

the total number of households in the EA by seven (the number of households

required in each EA).

Once a household had been selected, a household member needed to be selected

randomly as a respondent. This household member (respondent) needed to be

16+years... For the purpose of this survey, the KISH grid was used to randomly

select the respondent in the household. Refer to Appendix E: Kish Grid in the

Questionnaire.


Data collection protocol

The following data-collection gathering protocol guidelines were implemented for:

a. Fieldworkers and Supervisors were required to notify the relevant local authorities

that they would be working in the specific area. The purpose was to assist their

own safety and to reassure respondents, especially the elderly or suspicious, that

the survey was official.

b. They were advised to inform the Inkosi or Induna in a rural traditional authority

area, whilst in urban formal or urban informal areas a visit to the local Police and,

if possible, the local Councillor was to be made prior to commencing work in the

area.

c. They were further advised that farms should be entered with caution and that they

should report to the local AgriSA offices before doing so. Field Supervisors were

issued with ‘Farm letters’ (Appendix F: Farmers Letter) which contained

information on the purpose of the study and contact details in case they had

queries.

d. Consent forms (Appendix G: Consent Forms) were completed upon successfully

conclusion of each interview. While verbal consent was secured from the

respondent before the interview, a written consent form (Appendix G: Consent

Form) had to be signed afterwards.

e. Fieldworkers were issued with name tags and letters of introduction (Appendix H:

Letter of Introduction) to be used in the field. The letters were translated into

different languages.

f. They had to present their identity cards when introducing themselves.

Inter-rater or inter-observer reliability

This is used to assess the degree to which different Fieldworkers agree when

measuring the same phenomenon simultaneously.

a. The questionnaire design for this study was approved by the SASAS Principal

Researchers. These Researchers ensured that the question was clearly phrased by

having internal discussions about the context and meaning of questions. Once

designed, the questions were piloted to make sure that people had a similar

understanding of the meaning of the questions.


b. Research validity and methodology were evaluated by measuring the effectiveness

of the carefully designed questionnaire. Reliability was achieved by ensuring the

dependability and consistency of the data.

c. The research validity of the questionnaire relies on reliability. If the questionnaire

is proven to be reliable, then there is no discussion of validity. For this study,

both the content and construct validity of the questionnaire were established,

thereby confirming the instruments validity to measure what it is intended to

measure.

d. According to Johns (1996) validity is an index of the event to which a measure

truly reflects what it is supposed to measure.

e. The fieldworkers were then trained for a full day to ensure they understood the

concepts been measured. Each question was explained, followed by roll playing

to ensure that each fieldworker interpreted the questions similarly. Notes on each

question were made and captured in a training manual. This ensured inter

fieldworker reliability since the fieldworkers all had the same concept of what is

being measured.

Test-retest reliability

This test compares results from an initial test with repeated measures. The

assumption is that the instrument is reliable if there is close agreement over repeated

tests when the variables being measured remain unchanged. During SASAS a pilot is

undertaken where the questions are fielded and repeated in different circumstances

and different settings. The questionnaires are piloted in rural and urban settings,

among low and high income people and among various language groups. The pilot

results are then analyzed to make sure that there is consistency among findings from

the various sub-groups. Results are correlated to determine if they are consistent.

Parallel-forms or alternate-forms reliability:

This test is used to assess the consistency of the results of two similar types of tests,

which measure the same variable at the same time. Since SASAS is not an

experimental design, two similar parallel instruments were not designed. However,

during the SASAS piloting, various questions measuring the same construct were

tested. These questions are then analyzed and correlated to understand if the meaning

and understanding are clear. An example of such questions in the nuclear study is the


subjective self rated knowledge and actual knowledge questions. These were

correlated and a high correlation was found. This implied that the questions were

reliable, as they measured what they were intended to measure.

Enumerator Areas (EA’s)

Enumerator Areas from the 2001 Census formed the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU).

a. 500 PSU”s or EA’s were selected throughout South Africa;

b. Within each PSU or EA a total of 7 visiting points or households were selected for

interviewing using random sampling.

c. A total of 3500 visiting points or households were sampled for this study.

The following pre-field research logistics were undertaken:

I. Draft questionnaire was developed;

II. Draft questionnaire was piloted;

III. Final questionnaire was designed;

IV. Questionnaire was translated into 6 languages; (From English intoisiZulu,

isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana, and Afrikaans.)

V. Show cards was developed;

VI. Each questionnaire was individually bar coded;

VII. Final questionnaires was printed; and

VIII. Research, using the questionnaires, was completed.

4.3.5.2 Construct validity: In this research study, many sources of evidence were looked for, otherwise known

as triangulation, to obtain a synergistic view of evidence. As mentioned earlier, the

chosen data collect method is the questionnaire and interviews as primary sources

and documentation as secondary sources of data.

Tests for homogeneity or internal consistency

This test ensures that the individual items in an instrument measuring a single

construct give a highly correlated result, which reflects the homogeneity of the

items.


a. The questionnaires were tested for internal consistency, that is, South

Africa should continue to operate its existing nuclear reactors at Koeberg

in the Western Cape; and South Africa should build new nuclear reactors.

Answers to these questions correlated since the same construct, namely

attitudes towards nuclear reactors were being measured. These questions

were tested for internal validity using Cronbach Alfa.

b. Cronbach's α (alpha) is a coefficient of reliability. It is commonly used as a

measure of the internal consistency or reliability of a psychometric test

score for a sample of examinees. Cronbach's alpha statistic is widely used

in the social sciences, business, nursing, and other disciplines. Items that

are manipulated are commonly referred to as variables.

4.3.5.3 Internal validity This may be defined as being of concern in causal and explanatory studies, as the

relationship between different events, can be demonstrated by sound argument even

if all the evidence is not present (Remenyi et al., 2000). Internal validity is the

approximate truth about inferences regarding cause-effect or causal relationships.

a. The SASAS is not a highly controlled, true experimental design (with control or

experimental groups) and internal validity is rather based on correlations or

associations between variables other than on a direct manipulation of the

independent variable. Tests of internal validity were undertaken to understand

the interrelationships between independent variables and its impact on the

dependent variables (perceptions of nuclear).

Research quality control

The Researchers conducted random quality control visits to selected areas and

worked with the Fieldworkers for a period of time, to ensure they adhered to

ethical research practices and understood the intent of the questions and

followed the training received. They also ensured Fieldworkers correctly

selected the identified households and respondents in the household. The

Researchers checked on procedures followed in administering the research


instrument. Follow-up checks were conducted in eight of the nine provinces.

Telephonic follow-up checks were done on 10% of the total sample.

Researcher training

A one-day training session was held in various provinces. The main training

session took place in Pretoria and covered the northern provinces, namely

Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West. All relevant remarks and

instructions discussed during the training session were included in the training

manual. Other training sessions were held in Port Elizabeth, Durban, Kimberley

and Western Cape. The training session included sessions on selection and

sampling of households; fieldwork operating procedures; research protocol; and

ethical considerations. The questionnaire was discussed in detail. The training

was designed to be participatory, practical and interactive, and gave

Fieldworkers the opportunity to seek clarification on questions. A training

manual was developed as part of the training toolkit.

The training manual:

A training manual was also developed that explained difficult concepts in the

questionnaire. The English questionnaire was translated into six languages -

namely, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana, and Afrikaans.

Fieldworkers were issued with hard copies of the translated templates to ensure

consistency of translations for the various languages.

Data capturing and cleaning

The data-capturing function was outsourced to an external company. The

process was carefully monitored by the HSRC’s Data Management Centre and

the HSRC required 100% verification of the data from the data-capturing

company. This meant that all variables were captured twice to ensure 100%

verification. After receiving the data, the Data Management Centre embarked

on a data-cleaning exercise. Data was checked and edited for logical

consistency, permitted ranges, reliability on derived variables and filter

instructions. After the data-cleaning exercise, the analytical team received the

survey realisation rates. A realisation rate of 89% was achieved. This very high


realisation rate was achieved due to the communities being well informed about

the survey as well as the face-to-face interview data collection methodology.

Research data weighting

The final data set was given to the statistician for benchmarking and weighting

purposes. As indicated in Table 1, a total of 3004 people were interviewed

during this study. When weighted, this total represents 33 739 400 South

Africans +16 years.

Table 4: Sample (Unweighted and Weighted)

Unweighted N Percent Weighted N Percent Total 3004 100 33,739,400 100 Age group 16-19 years 209 7 3,264,868 10 20-29 years 737 25 10,712,072 32 30-39 years 632 21 6,929,579 21 40-49 years 544 18 5,363,608 16 50-59 years 415 14 3,560,464 11 60-69 years 297 10 2,578,909 8 70+ years 166 6 1,308,714 4 Sex Male 1240 41 16,015,316 47 Female 1763 59 17,721,084 53 Population group Black African 1883 63 25,878,197 77 Coloured 473 16 3,203,881 9 Indian or Asian 259 9 967,055 3 White 387 13 3,685,596 11 Living standard Low 258 9 3,124,353 10 Medium 1339 49 16,695,651 54 High 1163 42 11,288,378 36 Geographic location Urban, formal 1888 63 18,606,702 55 Urban, informal 243 8 3,224,311 10 Rural, trad. auth.areas 627 21 9,598,195 28 Rural, formal 246 8 2,310,192 7 Province WC 393 13 3,666,989 11 EC 337 11 4,433,710 13 NC 157 5 743,397 2 FS 225 7 1,894,486 6 KZN 579 19 6,933,814 21 NW 220 7 2,162,040 6 GT 591 20 8,009,701 24 MP 232 8 2,399,548 7 LP 270 9 3,495,714 10


The marginal totals for the benchmark variables were obtained from the mid-

year estimates published by Statistics South Africa and the data was weighted

to the 2010 mid-year population estimates. As a result, the estimated South

African population for the applicable year was used as target population. The

final data set (un-weighted and weighted) is disaggregated by key

demographic variables in Table 1: Sample (un-weighted and weighted).

4.3.5.4 External validity External validity is concerned with the degree to which research findings can be

applied to the real world, beyond the controlled setting of the research. The SASAS

survey is externally valid since it is representative of the 16+ population of South

Africa. Just over 3000 adults were interviewed and responses were weighted to the

adult population of South Africa. This defined concern with knowing whether the

findings can be generalized to a wider context beyond the immediate research

environment (Remenyi et al, 2000). For external validity, it may be difficult to

predict from the results in one context what the results will be beyond that context.


5. CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

As discussed earlier, the HSRC has conducted the SASAS on an annual basis since

2003, with the ninth survey completed late in 2011. SASAS is a nationally

representative sample survey of approximately 3,500 adults aged 16+ that

investigated public’s attitudes, beliefs, behaviours patterns and values in the country.

Due to on-going requests from government departments and other organisations, the

HSRC decided to make a similar capacity available to external organisations in the

form of a client survey. The client survey runs parallel with the HSRC’s SASAS

survey and follows the same methodological principles. A module on ‘nuclear

energy’ was included for Necsa in the 2011 SASAS. After the project was awarded,

the contract between the HSRC and Necsa was signed and marked the official start of

the project

The first question people were asked in the questionnaire was whether they regarded

themselves as “very knowledgeable”, ”somewhat knowledgeable”, “not very

knowledgeable” or “ not at all knowledgeable” about nuclear energy and nuclear

technology. Respondents were also given the option to respond “don’t know”. This

question was included in order to get a measurement of knowledge based on self

assessment.

This measurement is subjective, but generally serves as a good proxy for actual

knowledge and is often used in studies on attitudinal issues. However, in order to

determine if self rated knowledge correlated with actual knowledge, some factual

knowledge questions (quiz questions) were asked. This section describes the results

of the self rated knowledge question as well as the quiz questions. The empirical

results contained in this report were structured around the following thematic issues:

a. Knowledge of nuclear technology and energy issues;

b. General perception of nuclear technology, including its relative benefits and risks,

and support for its application in different sectors;


c. Nuclear energy perceptions, focusing on people’s general attitude, recognition of

advantages and risks, and future energy preferences;

d. Nuclear safety, entailing risk perceptions of nuclear energy and power plants, the

storage of nuclear waste, and an evaluation of government and nuclear safety

authority efforts;

e. Public views on nuclear proliferation , including support for non-proliferation,

views on ‘Nuclear Weapons States’, and level of agreement with South Africa’s

decision to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons programme;

f. Information on nuclear energy and technology;

g. A final overall assessment of nuclear energy and technology.

5.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s knowledge of nuclear energy and technology

5.2.1 Introduction This section aims to gain an appreciation of the different perceived benefits and

possible. In order to establish a comparative scale for perceived knowledge about

nuclear energy and technology, mean scores were calculated. Scores were recorded to

“very knowledgeable” =4; “somewhat knowledgeable”= 3; “not very

knowledgeable”= 2 and “not at all knowledgeable” =1. “Don’t know” options were

coded as missing data. The scores were then converted to a 0-100 scale. A high score

indicated high levels of perceived or self rated knowledge.

5.2.2 Self rated knowledge in terms of determining the public’s knowledge of Nuclear Energy and Technology Given the limited use and historically restricted dissemination of information about

nuclear issues, it is not surprising that only a small proportion of South Africans

indicate that they are very knowledgeable (3%) or somewhat knowledgeable (15%)

about nuclear energy and nuclear technology issues. Conversely, most say that they

are not very knowledgeable (18%); not at all knowledgeable (34%) or they do not

know (30%). This pattern contrasts sharply with the levels of knowledge about

nuclear issues that Canadians claim; a survey in 2004 found that 8% are very

knowledgeable and 52%, somewhat knowledgeable on these subjects (Ipsos-Reid,


2004). The significance of this study lies in the fact that it fill a gap in nuclear

knowledge globally and especially within South Africa, hence there being a very

limited literature base for comparison.

The differences in perceived levels of knowledge about nuclear energy and nuclear

technology issues vary significantly (p < 0.000) between people of different sexes;

living standard measures (LSMs); levels of education; races; residential locations and

provinces of South Africa. Thus, the highest perceived levels of knowledge occur

amongst people with a tertiary education (39%); and amongst residents of the Western

Cape (37%), where about 40% of energy utilised in the Western Cape is generated at

Koeberg Nuclear Power Station.

There are generally higher than average levels of knowledge amongst Indians (33%);

Whites (31%); people in the high LSM category (29%); residents of urban formal

areas (25%); and males (22%). Differences between age groups are not statistically

significant. Conversely, the lowest perceived levels of knowledge about nuclear

energy and nuclear technology occur amongst people without schooling (2%); low

LSM (4%); residents of the Eastern Cape (5%); or of rural formal and rural,

traditional authority areas (7%); females (15%) and Back Africans (15%).


Table 5: Knowledge about nuclear energy and technology (row percentage & mean score)

Very knowledge

-able

Somewhat knowledge

-able

Not very knowledge-

able

Not at all knowledge

-able Don’t know

Mean score (excl. “don’t

knows”) South Africa 3 15 18 34 30 27.3 Age group 16-19 years 1 16 20 34 29 26.3 20-29 years 3 15 19 34 29 27.1 30-39 years 3 16 19 31 31 29.1 40-49 years 3 17 15 36 29 27.3 50-59 years 5 15 16 40 25 26.0 60-69 years 2 11 17 34 36 23.6 70+ years 2 19 19 24 35 33.0

Sex

Male 4 18 20 30 28 31.4

Female 2 13 16 38 31 23.4 Population group

Black African 2 13 18 34 32 25.1 Coloured 5 17 13 39 27 27.8 Indian 4 29 22 27 18 37.1 White 6 25 22 29 17 36.6 Educational attainment

No schooling 1 1 8 45 46 7.3 Primary 2 4 14 40 40 15.9 Secondary, 2 11 16 38 33 21.5 Matric 3 22 20 31 24 32.3 Tertiary 10 29 27 18 15 45.1 Living standard (LMS)

Low 0 4 12 30 53 15.0 Medium 2 12 16 38 33 22.4 High 5 24 22 30 19 35.3 Geographic location

Urban, formal 4 21 19 33 22 31.8 Urban, informal 4 14 13 41 29 24.5

Rural, traditional. authority Areas

0 7 18 31 43 19.8

Rural, formal 3 4 15 44 34 15.9 Province WC 5 32 16 28 19 39.6 EC 0 5 9 31 55 14.0 NC 7 16 17 33 27 31.7 FS 3 19 22 42 14 26.8 KZN 2 18 31 27 22 31.4 NW 2 10 19 39 29 22.1 GT 4 19 15 39 23 27.8 MP 3 8 15 44 29 19.8 LP 3 4 12 33 48 18.5 (Source: HSRC SASAS 2011, module on nuclear technology and energy attitudes)


5.2.3 Nuclear knowledge quiz for determining the public’s knowledge of Nuclear Energy and Technology

In order to determine actual knowledge, the facts relating to nuclear technology in

South Africa were tested in the survey (Table 4). Thus, 39% correctly said that

there is a nuclear power station in the Western Cape; 27% correctly disagreed that

South Africa has never built nuclear weapons; and 17% correctly said that there is

not a nuclear research centre in Gauteng. (27% said this is true, possibly being

unaware that the centre is close to but outside of the border of Gauteng, and situated

in North West province). Most striking is that 50% or more said that they did not

know the answer in each case.

Table 6: Nuclear Knowledge True False (Do not know)

know)

Total S A has a nuclear power station in the WCWCwesternWestern Cape

39 12 50 100 S A has never built nuclear weapons 20 27 53 100 S A has a nuclear research centre in Gauteng 27 17 57 100

(Source: HSRC SASAS 2011, module on nuclear technology and energy attitudes)

As is the case with perceived levels of knowledge about nuclear energy and nuclear

technology, actual knowledge varies significantly (p<0.000) between people of

different genders; races; levels of education; residential locations; LSM’s; and

provinces of South Africa (Table 5).

The highest occurrence of correct answers about the nuclear power station were

amongst white people (75%); people with a tertiary education (68%); and amongst

residents of the Western Cape (67%); people in the high LSM category (58%);

residents of urban formal areas (47%); and males (42%). Conversely, the lowest

proportions of correct answers occurred amongst females (35%); Black Africans

(32%); residents of urban informal areas (26%); those in the low LSM group (21%);

residents of the Eastern Cape; and people without schooling (14%).

Regarding the nuclear weapons programme, the proportions that correctly said that it

was “false” that ‘South Africa has never built nuclear weapons’ was highest amongst

those with tertiary education (47%); Indians (42%); residents of the Free State (39%);

those in the high LSM group (35%); residents of urban formal areas (32%); and males

(29%). Those that responded incorrectly were most prevalent amongst females (25%);


Coloured people (24%); people with a primary school level of education (19%); living

in rural formal areas (19%); in the low LSM group (17%); and residents of the

Eastern Cape (6%).

Computation of a combined score out of3.1 for each correct response, reveals that62%

scored zero; 14% scored 1; 19% scored 2; and only 5% achieved the maximum

possible ‘knowledge’ score of 3 out of 3. In order to comparatively access knowledge

a means score was calculated and converted to a 0-100 score, portrayed in the radar

diagram (Figure. 10). Together with this actual knowledge score, the self reported

knowledge score as described in Section 4.1 is also portrayed on the same radar

diagram.


Figure 10: Self reported knowledge and actual knowledge of nuclear scores by socio-

demographic attributes

Firstly the results from the radar diagram confirm that the self rated knowledge

(asking people how they rate their level of knowledge) and actual factual knowledge

is generally well correlated. With the exception of KwaZulu-Natal, Free State and

North West, where the actual knowledge scores are much higher than the self reported

knowledge scores, the patterns and scores are fairly similar. In general, no huge

discrepancy between self rated knowledge and actual knowledge is found in this

study.

5.2.4 Conclusion When analysing the mean knowledge scores on nuclear, it becomes apparent that men

are more knowledgeable than women. Socio-economic status variables also matters

with notable statistically significant gradients of difference evident when examining

scores by race, education and LSM. People with a low LSM were far less

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Male

Female 16-‐19 years

20-‐29 years 30-‐39 years

40-‐49 years

50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

Black African

Coloured

Indian or Asia

White

No schooling Primary

Secondary, Matric

Terdary Low LSM

Medium LSM High LSM WC

EC

NC

FS

KZN

NW

GT

MP

LP

Urban, formal Urban, informal

Rural trad. auth. Rural farmworker HH

Self reported knowledge Knowledge score


knowledgeable than people with a medium or high LSM. A similar pattern was found

for education where the incremental gradient showed that a higher education ensured

a better knowledge of nuclear issues. Whites and Indians were also more

knowledgeable than Coloured and Blacks. People residing in urban formal areas were

also more knowledgeable than people in urban informal, rural traditional authority

areas and rural formal areas. Knowledge was lowest in the Eastern Cape and

Limpopo and highest in KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape.


5.3.1 Introduction Asked about whether nuclear technology should be utilised for specific purposes,

almost half said that they do not know (Table 6). Conversely, 42% said that nuclear

technology should be used to generate electricity; 35% agreed that it should be used in

hospitals and clinics; 31% were in favour of it being used for the treatment of cancer;

26% that it should be used in industry and big business; and 21% that it should be

used for military purposes.


Table 7: Views on the use of nuclear technology in the various sectors

Nuclear technology should be used…

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know

Mean Score (excl. don’t

knows) …to generate electricity 16 26 8 4 2 44 72.5 …in hospitals and clinics 11 24 9 8 3 45 64.7 …for cancer treatment 14 17 12 7 4 47 64.4 …in industry and big business i.e. to fix leaks in gas pipelines 9 17 13 10 4 48 58.6 …for military applications nuclear weapons 8 13 9 13 13 45 46.1 (Source: HSRC SASAS 2011, module on nuclear technology and energy attitudes)

Figure 11: South African attitude of the various applications of nuclear energy and

technology)

5.3.2 Support for different applications of Nuclear Technology In order to visually represent responses of the various sub-groups, a radar diagram

(Figure 12) was constructed representing the percentages that strongly agreed and

agreed that nuclear technology should be used to generate electricity, in hospitals in

clinics, for cancer treatment, in industry and for military applications.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Generate Electricity

Used in Hospitals

Cancer Treatment

Used in Industry

Military Applicadons

A5tudes as a percentage on nuclear enegry and technology

Applica0

ons o

f nuclear ene

rgy an

d techno

lgy

Don't know

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly agree


Figure 12: Views on the different applications on nuclear technology by socio-demographic

and other attributes

Results from the radar diagram show that, of the five options, the most preferred

application of nuclear technology is the generation of electricity. Those that were

most likely to agree that nuclear technology should be applied to generate electricity

were those categorised as knowledgeable about nuclear technology. Almost two thirds

(77%) of this group indicated that they agreed that nuclear technology should be

utilised to generate electricity. In addition, large shares of Indian or Asians (65%),

people with a tertiary education (63%) people in KwaZulu-Natal (61%), Whites

(58%), people with a high LSM (55%) and people residing in the Western Cape

(44%) were also in agreement that nuclear should be applied to generate electricity.

The utilization of nuclear technology in hospitals and for the treatment of cancer was

also well supported. Support for the application of nuclear in hospitals and clinics

and for cancer treatment were quite similar for the various subtypes. The highest

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Male

Female 16-‐19 years 20-‐29 years


50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

Black African

Coloured

Indian or Asian

White


Some secondary, Matric or equivalent Terdary educadon

Low LSM Medium LSM High LSM WC

EC NC

FS

KZN

NW

GT

MP

LP

Urban,formal

Urban,informal Rural trad. Auth

Rural formal HH Knowledgeable Not knowledgeable

Hospitals and Clinics Generate electricity In Industry Military applicadons Cancer treatment


support for the application of nuclear in hospitals and clinics were found among those

that are knowledgeable about nuclear technology (65%), Indian or Asians (58%),

people in KwaZulu-Natal (51%), people with a tertiary education (49%) and whites

(48%). Those that were least in agreement that nuclear should be applied in hospitals

were people residing in the Eastern Cape (10%) and those with no schooling (18%).

Similar patterns were found with regards to the application of nuclear for cancer

treatment where those most in favour were those knowledgeable about nuclear

technology (59%), Indian or Asians (53%), Whites (52%), people in Western Cape

(50%) and people with a tertiary education (49%).

The use of nuclear technology for industry was supported mostly by those

knowledgeable about nuclear technology (50%), Asians (39%), people residing in

urban informal areas (39%), in Gauteng (33%) in KwaZulu-Natal (31%) and with a

high LSM (31%).

The use of nuclear technology for military applications was supported by the smallest

proportions of people and mostly by those knowledgeable about nuclear (40%),

Asians (35%), people residing in urban informal areas (33%) and people in the Free

State (30%). This section clearly illustrates that knowledge plays a vital role in

supporting the applications of nuclear technologies in various industries. Once people

are knowledgeable about nuclear, they tend to support the various applications of

technology.

Since a large proportion of the answers consisted of “don’t know” responses, it was

important to understand who the people were that were unaware of the various

applications of nuclear technology. The percentage of people who stated they did not

know of any of the various possible benefits of nuclear technology (i.e. for usage in

hospitals, to generate electricity, for industry, for military applications and for cancer

treatment) was disaggregated by subgroups and is portrayed in Table 7: The

percentages of the subgroups that are above average are shaded


Table 8: A profile of "Don't know" responses, by socio-demographic characteristics

Hospital Electricity Industry Military

Cancer treatment

South Africa 45 44 47 45 47 Age group

16-19 years 44 44 48 42 42 20-29 years 44 42 49 45 45 30-39 years 45 44 46 45 45 40-49 years 47 45 46 46 46 50-59 years 42 42 50 42 42 60-69 years 53 51 47 50 50 70+ years 46 45 53 46 46 Sex

Male 41 40 43 41 41 Female 49 47 51 48 48 Population group

Black 48 47 50 48 48 Coloured 50 48 50 48 48 Indian 22 21 25 22 22 White 28 24 34 24 24 Educational attainment

No schooling 68 67 48 72 72 Primary 57 57 70 57 57 Some secondary 49 48 59 49 49 Matric or equivalent 39 37 50 38 38 Tertiary education 26 23 41 25 25 Living standard

Low LSM 63 62 65 65 65 Medium LSM 49 49 51 49 49 High LSM 34 31 37 33 33 Geographic location

Urban, formal 41 38 43 40 40 Urban, informal 39 39 44 40 40 Rural, trad. auth.areas 53 53 54 54 54 Rural, formal 57 56 59 57 57 Province

WC 28 27 33 28 28 EC 78 73 78 75 75 NC 50 45 52 44 44 FS 35 35 39 33 33 KZN 25 26 28 28 28 NW 48 46 49 47 47 GT 45 42 48 46 46 MP 60 59 62 57 57 LP 55 55 56 55 55


Note: Shaded cells represent higher than average level of “don’t know” responses.


5.3.3 Conclusion Except for nuclear applications in industries, the trends in “don’t know” responses are

almost identical. Consistent with earlier findings, females are less likely to have an

opinion regarding the applications of the various technologies. A socio-economic

gradient and educational gradient is also again notable, with high low LSM groups

having a much higher proportion of don’t know responses than medium and high

LSM groups. Similarly, people with no educational attainment have much higher

proportions of “don’t know” which diminishes as educational levels increases.

Coloured and African Black respondents have the most don’t know responses as well

as people residing in rural formal areas. Eastern Cape has the highest don’t know

responses for nuclear application in generating electricity, for usage in hospitals and

clinics, for cancer treatment and for military application. In terms of the application

of nuclear technology in industry, people in the Northern Cape had exceptional high

levels of “do not know” responses.

5.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 3: To establish the South African public’s perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear technology

5.4.1 Introduction This section aims to gain an appreciation of the different perceived benefits and

possible concerns that South Africans tend to associate with nuclear technology. It

draws on similar questions that have been asked of Canadian citizens in regular

surveys designed to monitor nuclear attitudes over the last decade.

5.4.2 What survey respondents were asked in terms of perceived benefits and concerns of Nuclear Technology Respondents to the survey were asked “What benefits, if any, do you associate with

nuclear technology?” A set of ten coded options listing different benefits was

provided, together with an additional “other benefit” category, and an option to

capture the responses of those stipulating that there are no benefits to nuclear

technology.


Overall we find that 50% of South Africans indicated that they “don’t know” whether

or not there are benefits to be derived from nuclear technology. The share of ‘don’t

know’ responses was highest for residents in the Eastern Cape (77%), those with no

schooling (76%), those with low living standards (67%) and residents of rural formal

areas (63%).

In fact, of the “don’t know” responses to the questions on benefits to nuclear

technology, 54% answered “don’t know” to the self-reported knowledge question,

with a further 39% indicating that they are not at all knowledgeable and 5% not very

knowledgeable.

In terms of the level of support and rank order of the listed benefits, we find that 44%

of South Africans cite at least one benefit, with the potential of nuclear technology in

relation to electricity generation emerging as the most commonly mentioned (20%)

(Table 5) This is followed by job creation and gains for the economy (16%), the use

in medical diagnostics and research (14%), energy production efficiency (14%) and a

sense that nuclear energy is relatively less harmful to the environment than other

energy sources (12%). Lesser mentioned benefits included nuclear technology as a

cost-efficient alternative (9%), (an option that is more cost-effective than other energy

sources) a safe technology or energy source (9%), a non-fossil fuel (7%) and a

plentiful/ renewable resource (6%). Finally, slightly less than a tenth (7%) of

respondents indicated that nuclear technology provides no benefits.

Table 9: Benefits of nuclear technology (Multiple response percentage) Benefits of nuclear technology (ranked in descending order) Percent Produces power/electricity/energy 20 Creates jobs/helps economy 16 Medical diagnostics/research 14 Energy production efficiency 14 Less harmful to the environment than other energy sources 12 Cost-efficient alternative to other energy sources 9 It is a safe technology/energy source 9 It is a non-fossil fuel 7 Advanced technology/research 6 Plentiful/renewable 6 Other 0 None/no benefits 7 Do not know / No answer 50



Note: Multiple responses allowed, so total may sum to more than 100%.

The benefits of nuclear technology as an energy or electricity source was mentioned

most frequently by residents of KwaZulu-Natal (28%), the Western Cape (26%) and

Northern Cape (25%), as well as people in formal urban areas (24%)

Table 10: Benefits of nuclear technology by province (Multiple response percentage) WC EC NC FS KZN NW GP MP LP All Produces power/electricity/energy 26 12 25 24 28 11 19 17 17 20 Creates jobs/helps economy 18 6 12 16 22 15 18 13 16 16 Medical diagnostics/research 10 1 10 24 21 16 22 5 5 14 Energy production efficiency 24 3 17 18 17 14 16 9 9 14 Less harmful to the environment than other energy sources

9 5 8 9 30 13 8 6 4 12

Cost-efficient alternative 21 3 10 8 15 7 8 4 1 9 It is a safe technology/energy source 9 2 10 16 16 8 7 6 7 9 It is a non-fossil fuel 17 1 2 10 12 6 4 5 4 7 Advanced technology/research 11 3 7 7 5 7 6 7 6 6 Plentiful/renewable 13 1 2 6 8 4 5 2 4 6 Other (specify) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 None/no benefits 7 3 8 9 7 7 6 7 10 6 (Do not know / no answer) 38 78 53 41 28 57 50 62 63 50

Source: HSRC SASAS 2011, module on nuclear technology and energy attitudes. Note: Multiple responses allowed, so total may sum to more than 100%.

It is also more frequently cited as a benefit among white and Indian respondents (32%

and 29% respectively), those with either a tertiary or matric level education (34% and

26% respectively), and those in households with a high LMS (30%). Also of interest

is the emphasis that 16-19 year-olds place on the use of nuclear technology in the

energy sector (27%), which is higher than for any other age group. Similar

educational, living standard, race and geographic patterns are observed in relation to

those referring to job creation / economic gain and medical diagnostic and research

benefits.

Almost half (47%) could not articulate their concerns with nuclear technology (Table

9). The concern most frequently mentioned – in response to the list of concerns read

out by the survey Fieldworker - was the safety of nuclear power plants (21%). This

was highest amongst residents of KwaZulu-Natal (33%) and the Western Cape (27%).


The safety was far more likely to be a concern amongst Indian (37%) and White

people (32%) than amongst coloured (25%) or Black African (18%) people; and

amongst those with tertiary education (34%).

Table 11: Concerns associated with nuclear technology (Multiple response percentage)

What concerns, if any, do you associate with nuclear technology? Percent The safety of nuclear power plants 21 The disposal of nuclear waste 17 The effects of radiation exposure or effects of nuclear accidents 16 Weapons or warfare 15 Dangerous or frightening 13 Lack of knowledge of implications 11 The environmental effects of producing nuclear electricity 11 The cost of nuclear generated electricity 9 Misuse or abuse of nuclear technology 9 Lack of controls or regulations 6 Incompetence or improperly managed 5 Overall negative or against it 3 Other 0 None or no concerns 7 Do not know or no answer 47


Other concerns were, in descending order of mention: the disposal of nuclear waste

(17%); the effects of radiation exposure or of a nuclear accident on workers and the

community (16%); a lack of knowledge of the implications (15%); the cost of

nuclear-generated electricity (13%); terrorist access to nuclear weapons (11%); and

the environmental effects of producing nuclear electricity (11%). Less mentioned

were the misuse or abuse of nuclear technology (9%); weapons or warfare (9%); that

it is dangerous or frightening (6%); lack of controls or regulations (5%); and

incompetence or improper management (3%). Seven percent mentioned other

concerns that could be summarised as potentially destructive effects.

In order to visually represent responses to benefits and concerns mentioned by the

various sub-groups, a radar diagram (Figure. 10) was constructed with three

categories - those mentioning benefits, those mentioning concerns and those

responding “don’t know”.


Figure 13: Concerns and Benefits of nuclear technology mentioned by socio-demographic

attributes

Those people who are generally knowledgeable about nuclear issues 89%, who are

favourable towards nuclear energy (87%) or who generally regard nuclear technology

as a benefit (88%) were much more likely to mention the benefits of nuclear

technology than the other socio demographic sub groups (89%; 87%; and 88%

respectively). Within the socio-demographic sub-groups the benefits of nuclear

technology were mostly acknowledged by people with a tertiary qualification (70%),

residence of KwaZulu-Natal (69%), Indians (67%), Whites (60%), the high LSM

group (57%) and residence of the Western Cape (55%).

Interestingly, the same groups that mentioned benefits were also most likely to

mention concerns. The highest proportions mentioning concerns were those

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100 South Africa

16-‐19 years 20-‐29 years 30-‐39 years


60-‐69 years

70+ years

Male

Female

African

Coloured

Indian

White

No schooling

Primary

Some secondary Matric

Terdary Low LSM Medium LSM High LSM Urban formal

Urban informal Rural trad. auth. areas

Rural formal

WC

EC

NC

FS

KZN

NW

GP

MP

LP

Knowledgeable

Not knowledgeable Favourable Unfavourable

More as benefit More as risk

Concern mendoned Benefit mendoned (Don't know to benefits & concerns)


knowledgeable about nuclear technology or energy (90%), those favourable towards

nuclear energy (88%) or who see nuclear technology as a benefit (86%). Within the

socio-demographic sub-groups, benefits of nuclear technology were mostly

acknowledged by people with a tertiary qualification (70%), residence of KwaZulu-

Natal (69%), Indians (67%), Whites (60%), the high LSM group (57%) and residence

of the Western Cape (55%).

Half of the respondents did not mention any benefit associated with nuclear

technology. This “don’t know” response was most prevalent among residents of the

Eastern Cape (73%), people with no schooling (68%), people with a low LSM (64%),

rural farm workers (55%), and people residing in Limpopo (57%).

5.4.3 Conclusion While the share that expresses no opinion in reporting benefits may seem

exceptionally high, it is important to emphasise from a comparative perspective that,

even in the Canadian context, a notable share provides ‘do not know’ values. In

surveys conducted on behalf of the Canadian Nuclear Association (CNA) in 2002 and

2003, between a quarter and a half of respondents offered no opinion on the benefits

question (Ipsos-Reid, 2003).

This declined to slightly less than a fifth (18%) of Canadian respondents by 2008

(Hrobsky & Wright, 2008), though the point remains that even in developed

countries, on technical subjects such as nuclear technology, there tends to be a higher-

than-average level of item non-response. As such, it remains somewhat unsurprising

that approximately half of South Africans aged 16 years and older should report no

opinion on the advantages of nuclear technology and that this assumes a strong

gradient on the basis of socio-economic status variables.


5.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: To clarify the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear energy.

5.5.1 Introduction The biggest benefit that people see for nuclear technology is that it is a viable option

for the production of power, electricity and energy (Figure5). In order to determine

sentiment towards nuclear energy, people were asked how “favourable” or

“unfavourable” they are of nuclear as a source of energy.

Figure 14: Koeberg Nuclear Power Station

5.5.2 General view of Nuclear Energy Overall sentiment about nuclear energy in South Africa emerges as 42% ‘don’t

know’; 23% neutral; 23% in favour; and 13% against (Figure 15). In comparison, the

British population are 30% neutral; 40% in favour; 18% against; and only 11% do not

know (Figure. 15) (IPSOS MORI, 2011).


Figure 15: General views of nuclear energy in South Africa and Britain mentioned by socio-

demographic attribute (percentage)

In South Africa, sentiments vary significantly by province, race, education level, sex, and

LSM group and settlement geo-type (Figure 15).

Figure 16: People that favour or disfavour nuclear energy (percent)

When “favourable” and “unfavourable responses are disaggregated by socio-

demographic variables, it is found that those most in favour of nuclear energy are

people that tend to see the benefits of nuclear (62%), are knowledgeable of nuclear

(61%), live in the Western Cape (41%); with tertiary education (37%); whites (35%);

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

"Don't know" "Neutral" "In favour" "Against"

South Africa

Bridsh

9

4

31

19

30

23

14

6

4

7

11

42

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

UK 2011

South Africa 2011 Very favourable

Mainly favourable

Neutral

Mainly unfavourable

Very unfavourable

Don’t know


Indians (34%); people in the high LSM group (31%); those living in informal

settlements (29%); in KwaZulu-Natal (29%) and those that have a matriculation(29%)

(Figure. 17).

Figure 17: Responses in favour of nuclear energy by socio-demographic attributes (percent)

Those least in favour of nuclear as an energy source, are people residing in the

Eastern Cape (6%), people with no (7%) or primary education (9%), people that have

a low LSM (14%), or who reside in Limpopo (14%) (Figure17). In terms of

geography, people that reside in rural traditional area or on rural farms (15% each) are

much less likely to support nuclear than people residing in urban areas.

Having discussed the favourable and unfavourable views of technology by socio-

demographic attributes, we now turn to other variables that might influence

favourable / unfavourable perceptions of nuclear. As can be seen in the Table 5,

knowledge of nuclear has an impact on whether people view nuclear as favourable or

unfavourable. More than a tenth, (61%) of the people who are knowledgeable of

nuclear technology view nuclear were in a favourable. Conversely, only 20% of the

people in the “not knowledgeable” category view nuclear favourably. Slightly more

than one in ten people (12%) that are knowledgeable of nuclear view it in a negative

light.

6 7 9 14 14 15 15 16

18 18 19 19 19 20 21 21 21 21 22 22

24 24 24 24 24 25 25 26 29 29 29 31

34 35 37

41

61 62

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

EC

No scho

oling

Prim

ary

Low LSM

LP

Rural trad. auth

Rural farmworker

60-‐69 years

Coloured

MP

Med

ium LSM

FS

NW

Not kno

wledgeable

Female

40-‐49 years

Black African

Second

ary,

50-‐59 years

NC

Male

16-‐19 years

20-‐29 years

30-‐39 years

70+ years

South Africa

GT

Urban, formal

Matric

KZN

Urban, informal

High LSM

Indian or A

sia

White

Terdary

WC

Know

ledgeable

See nu

clear a

s a


Table 12: Portrayal of support for nuclear technology by self-reported knowledge and

perceptions of risks and benefits (row percent)

Favourable

Neither favourable nor unfavourable Unfavourable

Don’t know Total

Knowledge of nuclear issues

Knowledgeable 61 25 12 2 100 Not knowledgeable 20 32 18 30 100 No opinion / don’t know 3 4 6 87 100 Overall view of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology More as benefit 62 26 8 5 100 More as risk 20 33 37 10 100 Indifferent 26 45 13 16 100 No opinion / don’t know 4 8 5 82 100


Similarly, people view nuclear favourably if they believe that it is more of a benefit

(63% of people who viewed nuclear more as a benefit viewed it favourably).

Conversely, those that viewed nuclear more as a risk rated it less favourably (37% of

those that felt it was a risk viewed it unfavourably). Favourable and unfavourable

assessments of nuclear are therefore definitely influenced by knowledge of nuclear as

well as perceived benefits and risks of nuclear.

5.5.3 Benefits and disadvantages of nuclear energy In relation to the benefits of nuclear energy as a source of electricity, 50% indicated

that they do not know (Table 12); in comparison with only 25% saying they do not

know in a similar survey in the United Kingdom, (2010). Just under one-quarter

(23%) said that it ensures a reliable supply of electricity (highest in KwaZulu-Natal:

(36%), and the Western Cape: (29%), (Table 12), while a similar proportion to the

19% with this view in the UK, (2010).

One-sixth (16%) said that it helps to combat climate change (19% in UK, 2010); 14%

that it offers an unlimited supply of power; 14% that nuclear energy is not more

expensive than other fuels (20% in UK, 2010); 13% that it is a proven technology that

already exists; and 11% that it is a cleaner source of energy with less impact on the

environment (18% in UK, 2010). Nine percent were of the view that only a small

amount of waste is produced and 8% said that it uses less fossil fuels or natural


resources. Five percent indicated that there are no benefits of the use of nuclear

energy as a source of electricity (7% in UK, 2010).

Table 13: Benefits of nuclear energy as a source of electricity What do you believe are, if any, the benefits of nuclear as a source of electricity?

Percent

It ensures a reliable supply of electricity 23 Helps to combat climate change 16 Nuclear energy is not more expensive than other fuels (costs are competitive) 14 It offers an unlimited supply of power 14 It is a proven technology that already exists 13 It is a cleaner source of energy with less impact on the environment 11 Only a small amount of waste is produced 9 It uses less fossil fuels or natural resources 8 None (there are no benefits to nuclear energy) 5 Other 0.3 Do not know 50


The main specific disadvantages of nuclear energy as a source of electricity were

perceived to be (Table 13) the risk of accidents (34%); the long term disposal of

nuclear waste (20%); the risk of radiation or contamination (19%); the general impact

on the environment (17%); or the ugliness of nuclear power stations (6%). Five

percent said there are no disadvantages. A massive 49% said that they do not know of

disadvantages to the use of nuclear energy as a source of electricity.


Table 14: Disadvantages of nuclear as a source of electricity

What do you believe are, if any, the disadvantages of nuclear energy as a source of electricity?

RSA 2011 % UK 2010 %

Risk of accidents 34 29 The long term disposal of nuclear waste 20 37 Risk of radiation or contamination 19 22 General impact on the environment 17 10 Cost is too high 14 7 Nuclear power stations are ugly to look at 6 3 Other .3 3 None (there are no disadvantages to nuclear energy) 5 6 Do not know 49 19


The highest proportions of people mentioning all three of the top three risks were in

KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape (Table 13). Those with tertiary education were most

likely to nominate the risk of accidents (47%); the long-term disposal of nuclear waste (41%);

and the risk of contamination (37%) as disadvantages.

In order to visually represent responses to benefits and concerns mentioned by the various

sub-groups, a radar diagram (Figure. 18) was constructed with three categories; those

mentioning benefits, those mentioning concerns and those responding “don’t know”.


Figure 18: Disadvantages and benefits of nuclear energy by socio demographic and other

characteristics

The groups most likely to mention benefits associated with nuclear energy were highest

among those favourable to nuclear energy (92%), who perceived it more of a benefit than a

risk (91%) and who were knowledgeable about nuclear (90%). In terms of socio-

demographic characteristics people with a tertiary qualification (70%), residence of

KwaZulu-Natal (69%), Indians (67%), Whites (60%), people with a high LSM (57%), or

residence from the Western Cape (55%) were most likely to mention benefits associated with

nuclear energy. Interestingly, similar response patterns were found when asked about the

disadvantages associated with nuclear energy. People who mentioned a benefit were also

able to mention a disadvantage. Figure 18 illustrates that people who venture opinions about

nuclear are cognitively able to cite the benefits and disadvantages of nuclear energy.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100 RSA

16-‐19 years 20-‐29 years 30-‐39 years


60-‐69 years

70+ years

Male

Female

Black African

Coloured

Indian

White

No schooling

Primary

Some secondary Matric or equivalent

Terdary Low Medium High Urban formal

Urban informal Rural, trad. auth. Rural formal

Western Cape

Eastern Cape

Northern Cape

Free State

KwaZulu-‐Natal

North West

Gauteng

Mpumalanga

Limpopo

Knowledgeable

Not knowledgeable Favourable

Unfavourable More as benefit More as risk

Disadvantage mendoned Benefit mendoned


5.5.4 Future energy preferences Two-fifths (40%) of South Africans “agree” or “strongly agree” (Table 14) that the

nuclear reactors at Koeberg should continue to operate (44% “don’t know”). Thirty-

eight percent think that South Africa should construct new nuclear reactors to

generate more electricity in the country (42% “don’t know”). More than a third

(36%) thinks that renewable energy sources such as solar or wind energy can take the

place of nuclear power in South Africa (42% “don’t know”). Just over a quarter

(27%) is of the view that coal and gas is worse for the environment than is nuclear

power (45% “don’t know”).

Table 15: Agreement with future energy preference statements Strongly

agree Agree Neither

agree nor disagree

Disagree Strongly disagree

Don’t know

Total

SA should continue to operate its existing nuclear reactors at Koeberg, Western Cape

14 26 9 6 2 44 100

SA should build new nuclear reactors to generate more electricity in SA

15 23 11 6 3 42

100

Renewable energy sources (solar or wind) can take the place of nuclear power in SA

16 20 15 5 2 42 100

Coal and gas are worse for the environment than nuclear power

11 16 14 10 4 45 100


Two fifths of people want South Africa to continue operating the nuclear reactors in

Koeberg. Those that are most supportive of Koeberg continuing its operations are that

proportion (Table 14) of people with a tertiary qualification (62%), people residing in

KwaZulu-Natal (61%), Indians (59%), Whites (58%), or people resident in Western

Cape (57%). People least in favour are those residing in the Eastern Cape (11%),

Limpopo (23%), who have a low LSM (23%) or who have no schooling (24%). In

terms of South Africa building new nuclear reactors, people residing in KwaZulu-

Natal (61%), or educated with a tertiary qualification (55%), Indians (50%), Whites

(47%), or with a high LSM (45%) were most in favour of this statement.


Those who were least in favour of the building of new nuclear reactors were Eastern

Cape residents (12%), people with no schooling (23%), residents of Limpopo (24%),

those with a low LSM (27%)or with a primary schooling (27%).

Figure 19: South Africans least in favour of the building of new nuclear reactors

“New findings on wind farms,” reported on in NEWS 24 on 29 April 2012 in London

(Reuters, April 2012). “Large wind farms may have a warming effect on the local

climate, research in the United States shows, casting a shadow over the long-term

sustainability of wind power. Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from

burning fossil fuels contribute to global warming, which could lead to the melting of

glaciers, a rise in the sea level, ocean acidification, crop failure and other devastating

effects,” said scientists.

To reduce emissions, nations are moving towards cleaner energy sources such as wind

power. The world's wind farms last year had the capacity to produce 238 gigawatts

electricity at any one time; a 21% rise on 2010. According to the Global Wind

Energy Council, capacity is expected to reach 500 about gigawatts by the end of 2016,

as more, and bigger farms spring up. Researchers at the State University of New

York at Albany analysed the satellite data of areas around large wind farms in Texas,

where four of the world's largest farms are located, over the period 2003 to 2011.

Eastern Cape Residents

People with no Schooling

Residents of Limpopo

Low LSM

Primary Schooling

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

South Africans least in favour of the building of new nuclear reactors


Results published in the journal Nature Climate Change, showed a warming trend of

up to 0.72ºC per decade in areas over the farms, compared with nearby regions

without the farms. "We attribute this warming primarily to wind farms," the study

said. The temperature change could be due to the effects of the energy expelled by

farms and the movement and turbulence generated by turbine rotors, it said. "These

changes, if spatially large enough, may have noticeable impacts on local to regional

weather and climate," the authors said. Efforts to reduce carbon dioxide and other

GHG emissions are not sufficient to stop the planet heating up beyond 2ºC this

century, a threshold scientists say risks an unstable climate in which weather extremes

are common.


Table 16: Future energy preferences, by socio-demographic characteristics (percent that

strongly agree or agree)

To what extent do you strongly agree or agree that ...

SA should continue to operate its

existing nuclear reactors at Koeberg

SA should build new nuclear reactors

Renewable energy sources

can take the place of nuclear

power in SA

Coal or gas are worse for the environment than nuclear

power

South Africa 40 38 36 27 Age

16-19 years 44 39 39 25 20-29 years 38 40 38 29 30-39 years 40 36 36 27 40-49 years 38 36 33 23 50-59 years 40 40 37 30 60-69 years 41 36 37 26 70+ years 38 37 33 30 Sex

Male 44 41 40 30 Female 35 35 33 25 Population group

Black African 37 37 34 24 Coloured 34 31 36 33 Indian 59 50 53 43 White 58 47 48 40 Living standard

Low 23 27 23 14 Medium 35 35 34 24 High 51 45 43 36 Educational level

No schooling 24 23 14 17 Primary 30 27 31 19 Some secondary 33 33 35 25 Matric 46 44 41 31 Tertiary 62 55 45 40 Geographic location

Urban, formal 44 40 39 32 Urban, informal 44 41 45 37 Rural, trad. auth.areas 31 33 30 17 Rural, formal 31 29 30 23 Province

WC 57 39 53 47 EC 11 12 18 9 NC 35 33 41 36 FS 35 38 35 28 KZN 61 61 52 41 NW 37 33 23 21 GT 42 40 34 24 MP 27 32 30 20 LP 23 24 28 14


Those who stated renewable energy can take the place of nuclear power in South

Africa were (Table 15) Indians (53%), residents of the Western Cape (53%) or


KwaZulu-Natal (52%) or White (48%). Those that thought renewable energy would

not take the place of nuclear energy in South Africa are mostly among those who have

no schooling (14%), from the Eastern Cape (18%), with a low LSM (23%), or

resident in North West (23%).

Residents of the Western Cape (47%), Asians (43%), residents of KwaZulu-Natal

(41%), Whites (40%) who have a tertiary qualification (40%) (Table 15) were most

likely to think that coal or gas are worse for the environment than nuclear. Opposite

sentiments came from people residing in the Eastern Cape (9%), low LSM (14%)

from Limpopo (14%), from rural traditional author areas (17%) or who have no

schooling (17%).

Table 17: Future energy preferences by self-reported knowledge, support for nuclear energy

and perceptions of risk (percent)



existing nuclear

reactors at Koeberg




power in SA


power Knowledge of nuclear issues

Knowledgeable 78 69 68 54 Not knowledgeable 43 44 41 29 Support for nuclear energy Favourable 85 82 66 57 Unfavourable 37 32 53 29 Overall view of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology More as benefit 81 81 60 56 More as a risk 46 41 65 37


Almost half (49%) of (Table 16) “don’t know” whether the current level of nuclear

energy as a proportion of all energy sources should be reduced, maintained at the

same level or increased. About one in eight (12%) think that it should be reduced;

25% that it should be maintained at the same level; and 15% that it should be

increased. The comparative figures for Europe in 2010 were to reduce by 34%;

maintain at the same level 39%; increase by 17%; and ‘don’t know’ was 10%. The

strongest sentiment in favour of increasing the proportion of energy from nuclear


sources in was Poland (30%); Estonia (29%); Hungary and the United Kingdom (both

27%).

Table 18: Perceptions of the levels of nuclear energy by socio-demographic characteristics

Reduced

Maintained the same

Increased

Don’t know

Total

South Africa 12 25 15 49 100 Age groups 16-19 years 12 25 19 45 100 20-29 years 11 26 15 48 100 30-39 years 11 26 15 48 100 40-49 years 11 24 13 52 100 50-59 years 15 24 15 46 100 60-69 years 11 23 13 53 100 70+ years 14 17 16 53 100 Sex Male 12 26 17 44 100 Female 11 23 13 53 100 Population group Black African 11 25 14 51 100 Coloured 12 18 13 57 100 Indian 23 24 25 27 100 White 16 32 22 31 100 Educational level No schooling 5 14 8 72 100 Primary 13 17 8 61 100 Some secondary 11 24 12 54 100 Matric or equivalent 12 28 18 42 100 Tertiary education 14 33 26 27 100 Living standard Low 6 16 10 68 100 Medium 10 22 13 55 100 High 13 32 20 35 100 Geographic location Urban, formal 12 28 17 43 100 Urban, informal 8 26 20 46 100 Rural, trad. auth.areas 12 20 11 57 100 Rural, formal 8 19 9 64 100 Province WC 13 38 16 33 100 EC 11 8 3 77 100 NC 13 18 12 58 100 FS 14 32 9 45 100 KZN 16 39 17 29 100 NW 12 19 13 56 100 GT 8 24 21 47 100 MP 11 13 19 57 100 LP 9 13 14 64 100


The highest proportions of people who wanted nuclear energy reduced were found

amongst Indians (23%), people from KwaZulu-Natal (16%), Whites (16%) and

people with a tertiary qualification (14%). Similarly, and somewhat unexpected, the


same subgroups that wanted nuclear reduced also stated that it should be increased.

Those most in favour of increasing nuclear energy as a proportion of other energy

sources were found among people with a tertiary education (26%), Indians (25%),

Whites (22%), people residing in Gauteng (21%) or people with a high LSM (20%).

This somewhat contradictory finding can be ascribed to a sense of ambivalence, also

found in other surveys, where people exhibit conditional acceptance of nuclear

energy. They do acknowledge the need for nuclear energy but at the same time are

weary of the possible risks associated with nuclear technologies and energy.

Figure 20: Perceptions of the levels of energy by select socio-demographic characteristics

Having discussed whether nuclear energy should be reduced or increased by socio-

demographic attributes, we now turn to other variables that might influence decisions

regarding the increase or reduction of nuclear energy (Table 17). Knowledge seems

0

5

10

15

20

25 Male

Female 16-‐19 years 20-‐29 years


50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

Black African

Coloured

Indian or Asian

White


Some secondary, excluding Matric or equivalent Terdary educadon

Low LSM Medium LSM High LSM WC

EC NC

FS

KZN

NW

GT

MP

LP

Urban,formal

Urban,informal Rural trad. auth. Rural farmworker HH

Knoweldgeable Not knowledgeable

Reduced Increased


to play an important role in deciding whether a person would nominate for nuclear

energy to be reduced or increased. People who are knowledgeable on nuclear issues,

wants the levels of nuclear at the very least to remain the same (48%) or to be

increased (26%). Less than a fifth (17%) of this group wants the levels of nuclear

energy supply to be reduced. Those who are not knowledgeable about nuclear issues

mostly do not want to venture an opinion (41%) or alternatively wants the status quo

to be maintained (27%).

As would be expected, those favourable towards nuclear energy want the levels to be

maintained (45%) or increased (36%). A sizeable proportion (35%) of those ‘not in

favour of nuclear energy’ wants the levels of nuclear energy to be reduced. Perceived

risks of nuclear energy also plays a role in whether people would nominate the levels

of nuclear energy to be increased. If a person perceived nuclear issues generally as a

risk, they would not want it to be increased (35%). The opposite also holds true-if

people perceive nuclear as a benefit, they would want current levels to be increased

(40%) or maintained (40%).

Table 19: Support for levels of nuclear as a source of energy by self-reported knowledge,

support for nuclear energy and perceived risks

Reduced

Maintained the same Increased

Don’t know Total


Knowledgeable 17 48 26 8 100 Not knowledgeable 14 27 20 41 100 No opinion / don’t know 4 6 3 87 100 Support for nuclear energy

Favourable 13 45 36 6 100 Neutral 15 47 18 20 100 Unfavourable 35 24 12 28 100 No opinion / don’t know 1 2 2 94 100 Overall view of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology

More as benefit 13 40 40 6 100 More as risk 35 37 12 14 100 Indifferent 10 45 18 27 100 No opinion / don’t know 1 4 3 92 100



5.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: To clarify the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear safety

5.6.1 Introduction The nuclear incident at the Japanese Fukushima I Nuclear PPT in March 2011, which

involved equipment failure, nuclear meltdowns and the associated release of

radioactive materials in the aftermath of an earthquake and tsunami, represents the

most notable nuclear accident since those in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986 and Three

Mile Island in the United States in 1979.

Analysis of opinion poll trend data in developed countries has suggested that these

accidents resulted in increased levels of opposition to nuclear energy (de Boer

&Catsburg, 1988; Eiser et al., 1990; Nelkin & Pollak, 1981; van der Plight, 1992;

Corner et al., 2011). The Fukushima incident also had demonstrable effects from an

energy policy perspective. For instance, the German government has permanently

closed a number of its reactors and has pledged to close the remainder by 2022

(ScienceInsider, May 2011) Japan and Taiwan (Tsuyoshi Inajima & Yuji Okada,

Bloomberg, October, 2011) (Yu-Huay Sun, Bloomberg, April 2011) have expressed

an intention to scale back their reliance on nuclear energy, while the Swiss (nytimes,

2011) and Spanish (thedailybeast, 2011) governments have banned new nuclear

reactor construction.

Therefore, this South African assessment of attitudes to nuclear technology and

energy, which was conducted six months after the Fukushima accident, occurred in a

context of intensifying global nuclear safety debates. There was more negative public

sentiment towards the future of nuclear energy options coupled with relatively strong

state policy responses. In the absence of trend data on attitudes towards nuclear

issues in South Africa, it is not clear what effect the Fukushima disaster may have had

on public opinion. Nevertheless, it would be fair to assume that it would have

provoked some concern about domestic nuclear safety considerations, especially for

those that are generally more knowledgeable of nuclear issues. This section will

examine views on several aspects of nuclear safety.


5.6.2 Portrayal of nuclear risks in media and the public In order to understand people’s perception about media reporting on the issue of

nuclear incidents, people were asked if they thought the messages about the safety

issues of nuclear are exaggerated and not realistic by the media. The results (Figure

21) demonstrate that nearly a quarter of South Africans (24%) expressed the view that

nuclear risks are either somewhat or strongly exaggerated at the time of interviewing,

in comparison with approximately a fifth (19%) that tends to consider nuclear risk as

underestimated. 6% percent say that nuclear risks are wrongly perceived. However, a

majority (52%) say that they do not know whether or not nuclear risks are

exaggerated or underestimated.

Figure 21: Perceived nuclear incidents sometimes raise major concerns in the media and the

public. In your opinion, compared to other safety risks, would you say that nuclear risks are?

In terms of socio-demographic differences in the relation to whether nuclear risks are

exaggerated or not, it was found that for most sub-groups the portions declaring that

the risks are strongly exaggerated and underestimated are broadly comparable, with a

modest inclination towards the former (Table 1). There is not much difference on the

basis of age or sex, though there does again appear to be a relationship in the basis of

class, partly due to the now familiar pattern associated with the distribution of “no

opinion” / “don’t know” responses. Therefore, it was found that notably higher levels

of reported exaggeration and underestimation of risk among Whites and Indians as

well as better-educated respondents, together with those with higher living standards

and residents in urban areas. Those most likely to report that the representation of

nuclear risks is over exaggerated are citizens in the Western Cape (38%) and those

with a tertiary education (38%). The latter finding concerning the Western Cape is

7 17 14 5 5 52

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

South Africa, Sep

-‐Oct 2011 Strongly exaggerated

Somewhat exaggerated

Somewhat underesdmated

Strongly underesdmated

Nuclear risks are perceived correctly (Do not know)


noteworthy given that the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station is located in that province,

which raises questions about the role of proximity and experience of nuclear power

and power plants in assessments of risk.

Table 20: Portrayal of risk in the media and public, by socio-demographic characteristics

Strongly / somewhat

exaggerated

Strongly / somewhat

underestimated

Nuclear risks are perceived

correctly Don't know Total




Black African 23 18 5 54 100 Coloured 17 15 7 61 100 Indian 38 27 7 28 100 White 30 29 6 35 100 Educational level

No schooling 12 14 2 72 100 Primary 17 14 5 64 100 Some secondary 21 16 6 57 100 Matric or equivalent 27 22 6 45 100 Tertiary 38 26 6 30 100 Living standard

Low 17 11 3 69 100 Medium 21 18 5 56 100 High 32 22 6 40 100 Geographic location

Urban formal 28 21 5 46 100 Urban informal 28 20 5 47 100 Rural, trad. auth. Areas 17 16 6 61 100 Rural formal 17 11 6 66 100 Province

WC 38 18 5 39 100 EC 7 5 3 86 100 NC 16 17 5 63 100 FS 23 26 7 44 100 KZN 38 31 4 27 100 NW 22 19 4 55 100 GT 25 20 4 51 100 MP 12 14 11 63 100 LP 10 12 13 66 100



Compared with the aforementioned differences in risk perception based on a range of

socio-demographic attributes, from (Table 20), it would appear that psychological

variables have more explanatory power in determining one’s position in relation to

nuclear risk. For instance, those who report that they are informed or knowledgeable

of nuclear issues are substantially more likely to report that the representation of

nuclear risks are strongly exaggerated than those professing that they are not

knowledgeable on this subject matter (60% versus 22% respectively) (Table 19).

This finding is interesting as it suggests that for those with a reasonable familiarity on

matters concerning nuclear technology or energy, there is a fairly broad-based sense

that the portrayal of risk associated with nuclear incidents is somewhat inflated,

especially relative to other technologies. The same pattern is evident for those with a

favourable disposition towards nuclear energy, and for those that perceive nuclear

technology more as a benefit than a personal risk.

Table 21: Portrayal of risk in the media and public, by levels of self-reported knowledge and

support for nuclear technology and energy

Strongly / somewhat exaggerated

Strongly / somewhat underestimated

Nuclear risks are perceived correctly

Don’t know Total


Knowledgeable 60 25 5 10 100 Not knowledgeable 22 25 7 45 100 No opinion / don’t know 4 4 2 89 100 Support for nuclear energy

Favourable 55 28 5 12 100 Neutral 36 33 8 23 100 Unfavourable 20 33 15 32 100 No opinion / don’t know 2 2 1 96 100 Overall view of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology

More as benefit 56 26 6 12 100 More as risk 34 34 13 19 100 Indifferent 29 33 7 31 100 No opinion / Do not know 3 4 1 92 100


Having established a reasonable level of insight into how South Africans feel about

nuclear risk in general and how this varies when examining a range of different


characteristics it is important to consider the extent to which, as a society, South

Africa’s sense or risk approximates or diverges from that in other countries.

In (Figure 21) the South African results are compared to findings from a Special

Euro-barometer survey on nuclear safety conducted in late 2009. The South African

position in relation to nuclear risk differs markedly on aggregate from that derived

from 27 European Union member countries. On average 47% of Europeans believe

that nuclear risks are underestimated, 38% feel that they are exaggerated, with less

than a tenth (7%) reporting that the risks are being correctly portrayed and a

comparatively low 8% indicating that they do not know. The share of EU citizens

stating that risk is exaggerated is 0.8 times the share reporting exaggerated risk. This

prevailing sense of underestimated risk is evident in a majority of countries in the

study, including countries that rank among the top producers and consumers of

nuclear energy, such as France and Germany.

Table 22: Future energy preferences by self-reported knowledge, support for nuclear energy

and perceptions of risk (percent)



existing nuclear

reactors at Koeberg




power in SA


power Knowledge of nuclear issues

Knowledgeable 78 69 68 54 Not knowledgeable 43 44 41 29 Support for nuclear energy Favourable 85 82 66 57 Unfavourable 37 32 53 29 Overall view of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology More as benefit 81 81 60 56 More as a risk 46 41 65 37


In South Africa, the share reporting exaggerated nuclear risk is 1.3 times higher than

the share declaring that the risks are underestimated. This places the views of South

Africans alongside a small subset of European nations that feel similarly. The latter


include Sweden, Bulgaria, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Finland, the

Netherlands, Czech Republic and Poland. If we were to focus exclusively on South

Africans that are knowledgeable about nuclear issues and residents of the Western

Cape, the ratio between those claiming exaggerated and underestimated risk (2.4 and

2.1 respectively) would place our country alongside Sweden and Bulgaria.

Figure 22: Ratio of the share of citizens reporting exaggerated nuclear risk to the share

perceiving underestimated risk in South Africa and Europe (ratio)

Note: The actual percentages reporting exaggerated, correct and underestimated risk in the

EU and South Africa are presented in Appendix B.

In South Africa, a high proportion (52%) of respondents report “no opinion” or “do

not know” in several European countries, specifically Malta (33%), Portugal (31%)

and Ireland (21%). However, in contrast with the South African situation, for those

expressing an opinion in these three states, those perceiving an underestimation of

risk outnumber those suggesting exaggerated risk.

5.6.3 Assessment of level of nuclear risk Having examined general risk perceptions of nuclear energy, all respondents were

asked to what extent they feel that the nuclear plants in South Africa present a risk to

2,3 2,1

1,7 1,6

1,5 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2

0,9 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,3

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5


them or their families in order to gain a better understanding of their level of concern.

As conveyed by Figure 3, lack of knowledge was again the most common response in

respect of the perceived risk of nuclear plants to respondents and their families.

Almost half (48%) of the South African adult population does not know whether such

plants in the country represent a risk. One-eighth (12%) of South Africans see nuclear

plants as a significant risk, while a further 23% feel they present some risk. By

contrast, 12% believe they pose ‘not much of a risk’ and 4% ‘no risk at all’.

Therefore, although the informed public seems to believe the nuclear risks in general

are overstated, when thinking more specifically about the risk of nuclear power plants

to themselves and their immediate family, the sense of risk is approximately double

that those perceiving a low or no risk (35% versus 17%) (Figure 1).

By comparison, although there are many more fearful than confident Europeans when

reflecting on the personal risks of nuclear plants (52% versus 40%), there is a

significantly lower ratio between the two attitudinal stances than in the South African

context due to reality that two-fifths of Europeans say that the power plants represent

little or no risk (Euro-barometer 2010).

Figure 23: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family in South

Africa and Europe

With respect to the socio-demographic correlates of risk awareness, we find that the

national pattern is consistent for virtually all subgroups. Irrespective of whether one

examines differences on the basis of respondent age, sex, population group, and

14

12

38

23

31

12

9

4

8

48

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

EU 27, Sep-‐Oct 2009

South Africa, Sep-‐Oct 2011 Big risk

Some risk

Not much of a risk

No risk at all

(Do not know)


education level (Table 21), there is a greater expression of fear than confidence. The

same applies when examining geographic differences in perceptions. In terms of the

extent to which the personal and family risk exceeds a sense of safety, there is a

negligible age effect and only marginal differences by sex and rural/urban location. A

more notable gradient of difference can be discerned when examining the results by

educational attainment.

The level of those perceiving a low or no risk at all is above average for those with a

matriculation 20% or tertiary education 36% respectively to those with lower

education levels (all around 10%), though even for these South Africans there is a

sizable contingent that acknowledge the presence of risk associated with nuclear

power plants. The same association is found between views on risks to oneself and

one’s family and LSM.


Table 23: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family, by socio-

demographic characteristics

A big risk + Some risk

Not much risk + No risk at all Don't know Total

South Africa 35 17 48 100 Age group



Black African 33 15 52 100 Coloured 35 13 52 100 Indian 54 20 27 100 White 40 33 27 100 Educational level

No schooling 19 12 69 100 Primary 30 10 60 100 Some secondary 36 11 53 100 Matric or equivalent 38 20 42 100 Tertiary 39 36 25 100 Living standard

Low 22 10 68 100 Medium 34 13 53 100 High 41 25 35 100 Geographic location

Urban formal 37 20 43 100 Urban informal 35 17 47 100 Rural, trad. auth. Areas 32 12 56 100 Rural formal 28 14 58 100 Province

WC 58 13 28 100 EC 17 3 80 100 NC 29 19 52 100 FS 26 27 47 100 KZN 56 19 25 100 NW 26 21 53 100 GT 29 20 50 100 MP 23 19 58 100 LP 23 16 61 100


There are important nuances pertaining to population group differences in perspective

(Table 21). For both black and coloured respondents there is a near identical result,

with approximately a third declaring a risk, less than a fifth reporting low/no risk and

around half unable to provide an opinion. Indian and white respondents have


markedly lower proportion of “don’t know” responses, which translates into greater

apprehension in the case of the former, but an enhanced sense of confidence among

white South Africans. Another observation of note is the fact that residents of the

Western Cape reported the highest level of fear of all the provinces (58%) while only

13% are confident about the operations of nuclear power plants. This is in spite of the

fact that people residing in this province were most inclined to mention that nuclear

risks were inflated in the previous section. It would thus seem that recognising a

tendency of the media and society to generally amplify nuclear risk does not preclude

cautiousness about the possibility of personal risk.

Figure 24: Perceived level of risk of nuclear power plants to you and your family, by levels

of self-reported knowledge and support for nuclear technology and energy

This relationship is again observable when examining variation in risk perceptions by

levels of self-reported knowledge of nuclear issues, general attitude to nuclear energy

and technology (Figure 20). As one would intuitively anticipate, those with more

knowledge, a more positive general outlook on nuclear energy, and those that

perceive nuclear technology more as a benefit than risk provide more favourable than

average evaluations of nuclear power plants. Yet, again it must be stated that even

57 41 49

58 67

48 43

81

35

18

43 21 14

41

29

11 8

41

8 21 19 11

28 8

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Know

ledgeable

Not kno

wledgeable

Favourable

Neu

tral

Unfavou

rable

More as ben

efit

Indiffe

rent

More as risk

Nuclear knowledge Evaluadon of nuclear energy Nuclear as benefit or risk

Big / some risk Not much / no risk at all (Don't Know)


among South Africans exhibiting such traits, deep-set concerns remain about the risk

for them and their families.

5.6.4 Perceived likelihood of a nuclear accident In further understanding public perceptions on nuclear safety, people were asked a

third nuclear safety measure that focused on the extent to which they agree or disagree

that the possibility exists of a nuclear accident happening in South Africa. The

national results in (Figure21) indicated that concern outweighs a sense of security on

this matter. Slightly over a quarter (27%) “strongly agrees” or “somewhat agrees”

that there is a prospect of a nuclear incident occurring in the country, with nearly a

fifth (18%) neutral, and a mere 7% indicating that this is an unlikely scenario.

As is evident throughout the attitudinal module on nuclear technology and energy, we

find that around half the population (48%) were unable to offer an opinion on the risk

of a nuclear accident. While we are unable to determine the scale of the effect that the

2011 Fukushima incident has had on such perceptions, it is worth re-emphasising that

this serious nuclear accident is likely to have resulted on aggregate in a strengthening

rather than a reversal of people’s positions.

Figure 25: Belief in the possibility of a nuclear accident in South Africa

Socio-demographic analysis of the results again reveals modest variation by age and sex of respondents, with LSM differences more pronounced (Table 24: Perceived risk of a nuclear accident occurring in South Africa, by socio-‐demographic characteristics

8 19 18 6 1 48

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

South Africa, Sep-‐Oct 2011

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

(Do not know)


Those with higher education levels report lower item non-response and a more

developed appreciation of the risk of a nuclear accident in the country. Among those

with a tertiary education, the share agreeing with the statement on the chance of a

nuclear accident is 5.1 times higher than the share that disagree (41% versus 8%).

Acknowledgement of the likelihood of a nuclear accident in South Africa are also

conspicuously higher than average among those with a high LMS (34%), residents of

the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape and Free State (50%, 38%, 33%

and 31% in turn), Indian and White respondents (45% and 34%), as well as those

living in formal urban areas (30%).

There is again evidence of substantial differences in perspective on the possibility of

nuclear accidents in the country based on levels of knowledge of nuclear issues. Half

of those professing knowledge of nuclear issues are of the view that a nuclear accident

could happen, compared to only 30% of those of South Africans admitting that they

have limited or no knowledge.

The level of non-response to the question on the possibility of a nuclear accident

happening in South Africa is most prevalent amongst those living in the Eastern Cape

(84%), those with no schooling (73%), people with low living standards (67%), those

in rural formal areas (62%), and among coloured and female respondents (54% and

53% respectively).


Table 24: Perceived risk of a nuclear accident occurring in South Africa, by socio-

demographic characteristics

Agree Neutral Disagree (Don't know) Total




Black African 25 17 7 51 100 Coloured 28 11 7 54 100 Indian 45 15 12 27 100 White 34 28 9 29 100 Educational level

No schooling 12 10 5 73 100 Primary 19 15 8 59 100 Some secondary 27 16 5 52 100 Matric or equivalent 29 19 9 43 100 Tertiary 41 26 8 25 100 Living standard

Low 15 16 3 67 100 Medium 25 16 7 53 100 High 34 22 9 36 100 Geographic location

Urban formal 30 20 8 43 100 Urban informal 30 16 9 45 100 Rural, trad. auth. Areas 21 15 7 57 100 Rural formal 19 18 2 61 100 Province

WC 50 13 6 30 100 EC 7 5 3 84 100 NC 33 4 8 55 100 FS 31 21 8 41 100 KZN 38 32 6 25 100 NW 18 21 7 54 100 GT 24 21 8 48 100 MP 19 10 14 57 100 LP 20 9 10 62 100 Knowledge of nuclear issues

Knowledgeable 50 28 14 8 100 Not knowledgeable 30 22 8 40 100 Do not know 7 4 2 87 100



5.6.5 Attitudes towards the storage of nuclear waste From an international perspective, the issue of managing nuclear waste has emerged

as a critical environmental consideration in the debate surrounding nuclear power

(Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 2009).

Radioactive waste is a hotly debated and emotional issue in today's society. Few other

topics can polarise a community faster than the discussion of what to do with

radioactive waste or whether we should be generating any at all.

In the South African context, the 2008

National Radioactive Waste Disposal

Institute Act makes provision for the

creation of a National Radioactive Waste

Disposal Institute that will manage

radioactive waste disposal in the country.

Nuclear waste disposal has to date been

the mandate of Necsa and (since 1986),

has operated the Vaalputs Radioactive

Waste Disposal Facility on behalf of the

government (Figure26).

Figure 26: Vaalputs Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility

Vaalputs is the only South African facility designed for the storage of low and

intermediate-level radioactive waste, and is located on a site approximately 100

kilometres south-east of Springbok in the Northern Cape. Some low and intermediate-

level waste from hospitals, industry and Necsa itself, as well as high level spent Safari

fuel, is stored at Necsa's Pelindaba site. Spent fuel, high level waste is stored at

Koeberg.


Figure 27: Level of concern about the storage of nuclear waste from South African reactors

To assess the attitudes of South Africans towards the management of nuclear waste in the country, survey respondents were explicitly asked to specify their level of concern with how radioactive waste from the country’s nuclear reactors is being stored. From the responses represented in (Figure 27: Level of concern about the storage of nuclear waste from South African reactors

It can be observed that around one third (33%) of South African adults are very or

somewhat concerned about the disposal of nuclear waste, with a further quarter (23%)

stating that they are only a little concerned or not worried at all about this matter.

Again, the dominant share (44%) simply does not know how to respond. For those

expressing an opinion about nuclear waste, many more are concerned than reassured

about the management of radioactive waste from nuclear reactors. Nonetheless, this

does not negate the fact that a significant proportion still declare that nuclear waste is

not a source of much anxiety.

Statistically significant (p < 0.000) differences in response are identifiable across

knowledge levels, provinces, races, sexes, settlement geo-types, education levels and

LSM groups (Figure27). The highest proportions who are very concerned about the

storage of nuclear waste occur amongst those who said they are knowledgeable about

nuclear technology and energy (68%), Indians (56%), residents of the Western Cape

(55%) or people with a tertiary qualification (49%).

13 20 14 8 44

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100


Very concerned

Somewhat concerned

A lille concerned

Not at all concerned

(Do not know)


Figure 28: Level of concern about the storage of nuclear waste from South African reactors,

by socio-demographic attributes

The highest “don’t know “responses (Figure. 28) was among residents from the

Eastern Cape (75%), people with no schooling (66%), those with a low LSM (65%),

and Limpopo (59%) rural farm workers (56%).

5.6.6 Evaluation of government’s and nuclear authority’s efforts in ensuring nuclear safety More than half (51%) of South Africans “do not know” how much the government

and the nuclear safety authorities are doing to ensure the safety of South African

reactors (Figure29). Only 23% think they are doing enough, while 26% are of the

view that they are doing too little.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80 RSA


30-‐39 years

40-‐49 years

50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

Male

Female

Black African

Coloured

Indian

White

No schooling

Primary Some secondary

Matric or equivalent Terdary Low Medium High

Urban formal

Urban informal

Rural, trad. auth. areas

Rural formal

Western Cape

Eastern Cape

Northern Cape

Free State

KwaZulu-‐Natal

North West

Gauteng

Mpumalanga

Limpopo Knowledgeable

Not knowledgeable

Very / somewhat concerned A lille / not at all concerned (Do not know)


Figure 29: Assessment of efforts by government and nuclear authority in ensuring nuclear

safety in South Africa

Statistically significant (p < 0.000) differences in perceptions are identifiable across

knowledge levels, provinces, races, sexes, settlement geo-types, education levels and

LSM groups (Table 23). South Africans who think that enough, or more than enough

is being done to ensure the safety of the reactors occur disproportionately higher

amongst people knowledgeable of nuclear (56%), with tertiary education (31%);

Indians (30%); residents of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (both 28%); people in the

high LSM group (28%); people with a matric or equivalent (28%), urban formal

residents (26%); and males (25%).

South Africans who think that “too little” or “far too little” is being done to ensure

nuclear safety are highest among residents in KwaZulu Natal (41%), Whites (40%),

and residents of the Western Cape (40%), Indians (37%) or people with a tertiary

qualification (37%).

4 19 17 9 51

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100


More than enough

Enough

Too lille

Far too lille

(Do not know)


Table 25: The public's perception of nuclear safety

Evaluation of government and nuclear energy authority efforts to ensure nuclear safety, by

socio-demographic characteristics

More than enough + Enough

Too little + Far too little Don’t know Total

South Africa 23 26 51 100 Age group



Black African 24 24 52 100 Coloured 13 27 61 100 Indian 30 37 33 100 White 27 40 34 100 Educational level

No schooling 12 16 72 100 Primary 18 21 61 100 Some secondary 20 26 54 100 Matric or equivalent 28 27 45 100 Tertiary 31 37 31 100 Living standard

Low 15 16 69 100 Medium 22 24 54 100 High 28 32 40 100 Geographic location

Urban formal 26 28 47 100 Urban informal 24 29 47 100 Rural, trad. auth. areas 20 23 57 100 Rural formal 15 26 58 100 Province

WC 26 40 34 100 EC 6 13 81 100 NC 20 19 61 100 FS 22 34 43 100 KZN 28 41 31 100 NW 22 23 55 100 GT 28 23 49 100 MP 21 18 60 100 LP 24 13 63 100 Knowledge of nuclear issues

Knowledgeable 56 34 11 100 Not knowledgeable 23 34 43 100 DK 3 8 89 100



5.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To understand the South African public’s views on nuclear energy in a global context

5.7.1 Introduction Respondents’ views about whether nuclear weapons programmes should be pursued

or not were tested in a set of three questions. Sentiments were either against nuclear

weapons or neutral in the sense of not knowing; relatively few expressed support for

nuclear weapons programmes (Table 24).

Thus, almost half (45%) think that all countries should dismantle their existing

nuclear weapons programmes; 36% think that America, Russia, China, the UK and

France should not be allowed to have the right to make nuclear weapons; and 41%

think South Africa made the right decision in 1989 to stop its nuclear weapons

programme.

A Weapons Index was computed by quantifying sentiment either in favour, neutral or

against (Table 24). The combined outcome was that 47% gave a set of responses that

could be construed as being against nuclear weapons programmes; 43% did not know

or were neutral on the issue; and 10% were in favour of such programmes.


Table 26: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Strongly

agree Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree Strongly disagree

Do not know

Total

All countries should dismantle their existing nuclear weapons programmes

21 24 8 9 3 36 100

America, Russia, China, UK, France should be allowed to have the right to make nuclear weapons

4 12 11 19 17 36 100

South Africa made the right decision in 1989 to stop its nuclear weapons programme

18 22 11 5 3 40 100

OVERALL PERCEPTION

AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS

47.1%

NEUTRAL OR DON’T

KNOW 42.8%

IN FAVOUR OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

10.1


As with all previous questions, statistically significant (p<0.000) differences in

sentiment are identifiable across the provinces, races, sexes, settlement geo-types,

education levels and LSM groups (Figure24). Opponents of nuclear weapons

programmes were most highly represented amongst the White population (70%) and

Indian population (58%); residents of the Western Cape (67%) and KwaZulu-Natal

(66%); amongst those with tertiary education (64%); the high LSM group (58%);

urban formal area residents (53%); and males (50%). Conversely, those in favour

were best represented amongst Indian people (17%); and those in Limpopo (16%).


Figure 30: Distribution of views about nuclear weapons programmes (percent)

27 11

29 13

29 14 14 18

12 22

11 15 15 16 20 25

37 10 11 15

23 33

16 14

27 17 17 22

17 22

16 24

20 17

40 19

26 28

37 27 31 21

13 31

36 21

30 27

33 33

33 23

29 29

27 31

19 29

31 27 31 25

27 30

35 24 30

27

30 69

42 49

24 47 41

46 59

38 43

51 48

46 41

25 25

62 54 45 39

25 58 46

33 47 41 44

44 39 43 50

39 46

3 1 3

10 6 12 13

8 13

8 10

9 6

9 6

14 5 5

3 9 10 11 4 9 8 9

10 7

11 8 5 2

8 8

0 0 0 0

4 0 1

7 3 1 0

4 1 2 0 3 0 0 3 2 2

3 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 3 2

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

WC EC NC FS

KZN NW GT MP LP

Urban formal Urban informal

Tribal Rural formal Black African

Coloured Indian or Asian

White No schooling

Primary Some secondary

Matric or equavalent Terdary educadon

Low Medium

High 16-‐19 years 20-‐29 years 30-‐39 years 40-‐49 years 50-‐59 years 60-‐69 years 70+ years

Male Female

Province

Geotype

Race

Educad

on

LSM

Age

Gend

er

Strongly against Against Neutral/Dk In favour Strongly in favour


5.8. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African public trust for information on nuclear

5.8.1 Introduction Most trusted to provide information regarding nuclear energy, is Necsa (18%);

followed by the South African government (14%); scientists (8%); energy companies

that operate nuclear power plants (7%); and international organisations working on

issues of nuclear technology (5%).

However, a sizeable 36% do not know who they would trust for such information. A

completely different picture emerges in Europe, where surveys across 27 countries

reveal that 46% of Europeans would trust scientists the most; 30% would trust the

national nuclear safety authorities; and 24% would trust international organisations

working on issues of nuclear technology.

Table 27: Trust in sources of information

Who would you trust most to give you information regarding nuclear energy? Percent

South African Nuclear Energy Corporation Ltd 18 The South African Government 14 Scientists 8 Energy companies that operate nuclear power plants 7 International organisations working on issues of nuclear technology 5 Journalists (TV, radio, newspapers) 2 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 2 Regional and local authorities 2 Schools 1 The African Union .6 Friends and family .9 Other .5 None 4 Don’t know 36 Total 100


A minority (14%) of South Africans have recently seen or heard the advertising

campaign from Necsa during 2010/2011; 62% have not and 24% do not know

whether they have seen or heard such advertising.


Those most likely to have seen or heard Necsa advertising are amongst people who

have knowledge of nuclear issues (38%), who have a tertiary education (28%);

Indians (24%); whites (20%); high LSM people (21%); the people of the Northern

Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (both 21%) and the Western Cape (20%); residents of urban

formal areas (17%); and males (16%).

Figure 31: People most likely to have seen or hear Necsa advertising in the various

categories

The highest proportions of people who reported that they have not seen or heard any

advertising from Necsa was recorded for people living in the Free State (80%), people

who live in rural farm worker households (78%). People who maintain they are “not

knowledgeable” about nuclear issues (77%), residents of Gauteng (71%), Whites

(68%), and Indians (67%). For most of these subgroups, the ages of “no” never heard

of Necsa are inflated due to lower “don’t know” percentages. This finding should

therefore be interpreted within the context of the question.

The highest “do not know” percentages were found among residents of the Eastern

Cape (47%), Limpopo (45%), and people with no schooling (40%) or a low LSM

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40

People most likely to have seen or heard Necsa adverting in the various categories


(37%). The lowest “don’t know” responses were found among people who are

knowledgeable about nuclear (2%), Indians (9%), people not knowledgeable of

nuclear (10%), Whites (12%), residents of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal

(both 13%), people with a tertiary qualification (13%) or high LSM (14%).

Table 28: Have you recently heard or seen any advertising from the SA Nuclear Energy

Corporation Ltd?

Yes No (Don't know) Total

South Africa 14 62 24 100

Age group

16-19 years 20 57 24 100

20-29 years 12 65 23 100

30-39 years 14 63 23 100

40-49 years 17 58 25 100

50-59 years 15 64 21 100

60-69 years 8 65 27 100

70+ years 13 56 31 100

Sex

Male 16 63 20 100

Female 12 61 27 100

Population group

Black African 12 62 26 100

Coloured 18 62 20 100

Indian 24 67 9 100

White 20 68 12 100

Educational level

No schooling 7 53 40 100

Primary 8 60 32 100

Some secondary 11 64 25 100

Matric or equivalent 16 63 21 100

Tertiary 29 58 13 100

Living standard

Low 5 58 37 100

Medium 11 61 28 100

High 21 65 14 100

Geographic location

Urban formal 17 65 18 100

Urban informal 11 67 22 100

Rural, trad. auth. Areas 11 52 37 100

Rural formal 6 78 17 100

Province


WC 20 67 13 100

EC 5 48 47 100

NC 21 49 30 100

FS 6 80 14 100

KZN 21 67 13 100

NW 16 61 23 100

GT 13 71 17 100

MP 14 56 29 100

LP 8 47 45 100


Knowledgeable 38 60 2 100

Not knowledgeable 12 77 11 100

DK 3 37 60 100


Almost half (47%) of all South African adults hold the view that the nuclear industry

in the country should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear technology. This

view is most prevalent, and statistically significantly so, amongst Indians (71%);

people with tertiary education (69%); the people of KwaZulu-Natal (64%); high LSM

people (58%); Whites (57%); residents of the Western Cape (56%); and those living

in urban formal areas (53%).

Just under two fifths (39%) responded “don’t know” to the question. The people,

who opted for this option, were mostly among residents of the Eastern Cape or people

with no schooling (both 69%), low LSM people (61%), people from rural traditional

authority areas (52%) or with a primary education. Although these groups generally

have low levels of knowledge of nuclear, they also do not have a desire to want any

information on the subject- at least not information promoting the benefits of nuclear

technology. This trend where people with lower education levels shy away from

more information on technical or scientific issues, are not uncommon.


Figure 32: Nuclear industry in SA should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear

technology, by socio-demographic attributes.

Having discussed the views on promoting the benefits of nuclear technology by socio-

demographic attributes, we now turn to socio-psychological variables. As can be seen

in Error! Reference source not found., these variables have sizeable explanatory power

in determining whether people feel the benefits of nuclear technology should be

promoted. More than three quarters (78%) of people knowledgeable of nuclear issues

were of the opinion that the nuclear industry should do more to promote the benefits

of nuclear technology. A sizeable proportion, that is (54%) of those people who are,

by their own admission, not knowledgeable about nuclear, also wanted to see more

promotional material on the benefits of nuclear technology.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80 RSA


30-‐39 years

40-‐49 years

50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

Male

Female

Black African

Coloured

Indian

White


Some secondary Matric or equivalent Terdary Low Medium

High

Urban formal

Urban informal

Rural, trad. auth. areas

Rural formal

Western Cape

Eastern Cape

Northern Cape

Free State

KwaZulu-‐Natal

North West

Gauteng Mpumalanga

Limpopo

Yes No (Do not know)


Figure 33: Nuclear industry in SA should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear

technology, by levels of self-reported knowledge and support for nuclear technology and

energy

Those in favour of nuclear technology are substantially more likely to want Necsa to

promote the benefits of nuclear technology (83%) whilst the opposite is true of those

that are unfavourable towards nuclear technology where a sizeable 43% don’t want

the industry to promote the benefits of nuclear. Those who had a neutral stance, and

were neither favourable nor unfavourable, generally erred towards the positive,

wanting the industry to promote the benefits of nuclear technology. Almost all (93%)

of the people who regarded nuclear more as a benefit than a risk were in favour of

Necsa promoting the benefits of nuclear technology. Interestingly thought, was the

finding that more than half of South Africans that perceived nuclear as a risk still felt

that Necsa needed to promote the benefits of nuclear technology. Although this group

felt nuclear posed more of a risk than a benefit, they seem to potentially see the value

of nuclear technology. The majority of those that were indifferent (62%) still felt they

would want Necsa to promote the benefits of nuclear technology.

78 54

83 68

41

93

62 52

15

19

12 15

43

6

21 38

7 27

5 16 16 17 10

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Know

ledgeable

Not kno

wledgeable

Favourable

Neu

tral

Unfavou

rable

More as ben

fit

Indiffe

rent

More as risk

Nuclear knowledge Evaluadon of nuclear energy Nuclear as benefit or risk

Yes No (Do not know)


5.9. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 8: To evaluate the South African public’s final assessment of nuclear energy and technology

5.9.1 Introduction Very similar results emerged in another overall question. One-fifth (20%) said that

they see nuclear energy and nuclear technology more as a benefit; 18% see it more as

a risk; 18% are indifferent; and 43% do not know. This differs markedly with views

in Europe, where 50% see it more as a risk; 36% as a benefit; with only 8%

indifferent and 6% not knowing. The majority (>70%) of people in Greece, Austria

and Cyprus see it as a risk; whereas most (>60%) people in the Czech Republic,

Slovakia and Finland see nuclear energy and nuclear technology more as a benefit.

Figure 34: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy in

South Africa and Europe

In terms of other demographics, the highest occurrence of people that see nuclear

energy and nuclear technology more as a benefit, is amongst those with tertiary

education (40%); Indians (38%); residence from KZN (31%), Whites (31%) or those

with a high LSM (28%). . Conversely, the highest occurrence of those who see it

more as a risk are amongst residence of the Western Cape (32%), Coloured or Indian

people (23%)or White people (22%). The highest proportions of those who do not

know occur in the Eastern Cape (73%); among those with no schooling (70%), among

those with a low LSM (64%), or residence of Limpopo (59%).

Table 29: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy, by

socio-demographic characteristics

More as a More as a risk Neutral / Do not know Total

36

20

50

18

8

18

6

43

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

EU 27, Sep-‐Oct 2009

South Africa, Sep-‐Oct 2011 More as a benefit

More as a risk

Neutral / indifferent

(Do not know)


benefit indifferent

South Africa 20 18 18 43 100

Age group

16-19 years 25 14 18 43 100

20-29 years 19 19 17 45 100

30-39 years 22 18 19 40 100

40-49 years 18 20 18 45 100

50-59 years 21 19 22 38 100

60-69 years 16 19 18 47 100

70+ years 21 16 15 48 100

Sex

Male 23 18 19 40 100

Female 17 18 18 47 100

Population group

Black African 18 17 18 46 100

Coloured 16 23 14 47 100

Indian 38 23 14 26 100

White 31 22 23 24 100

Educational level

No schooling 5 6 18 70 100

Primary 10 20 18 52 100

Some secondary 17 20 16 47 100

Matric or equivalent 24 18 19 39 100

Tertiary 40 17 21 22 100

Living standard

Low 14 10 11 64 100

Medium 17 18 17 48 100

High 28 20 21 31 100

Geographic location

Urban formal 22 19 22 38 100

Urban informal 25 19 14 43 100

Rural, trad. auth. Areas 16 17 14 53 100

Rural formal 17 20 12 51 100

Province

WC 22 32 16 30 100

EC 5 15 8 73 100

NC 21 19 11 50 100

FS 25 14 22 40 100

KZN 31 20 21 27 100

NW 16 17 23 44 100

GT 21 17 23 39 100

MP 19 13 19 50 100

LP 13 15 13 59 100



Having discussed the views on promoting the benefits of nuclear technology by socio-

demographic attributes, we now turn to other variables that might influence

perceptions of risks versus benefits. As can be seen in the figure below, knowledge of

nuclear has an impact on whether people see nuclear as a benefit or a risk. Almost

half (45%) of the people who are knowledgeable of nuclear technology see nuclear

technology and energy as a benefit.

Conversely, only 21% of the people in the “not knowledgeable” category of see it as a

benefit. Similar proportions of the “knowledgeable” and “not knowledgeable”

categories (23% and 24% respectively) perceive nuclear more as a risk. Almost a

quarter (23%) among both the “knowledgeable” and “not knowledgeable” were

indifferent. Almost a third (32%) of the “not knowledgeable” group did not know if

they regarded nuclear as a benefit or a risk. If this group are targeted and become

knowledgeable about nuclear, they are most likely to convert to perceiving nuclear as

a benefit.

Figure 35: Overall assessment of benefits versus risks of nuclear technology and energy, by

levels of self-reported knowledge and evaluation of nuclear energy.

45 21

55

23 12

23

24

16

27 52

23

23

21

36 18

8 32

8 15 18

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Know

ledgeable

Not kno

wledgeable

Favourable

Neu

tral

Unfavou

rable

Nuclear knowledge Evaluadon of nuclear energy

More as a benefit More as a risk Neutral / indifferent (Do not know)


The majority of people (55%) that are favourable of nuclear technology and energy

also see it as a benefit. Conversely, the majority (52%) of those who are not

supportive of nuclear see it as a risk. The logical deduction to make is therefore that

the drivers of unfavourable sentiments about nuclear is based on perceptions of risk,

which again is driven by knowledge of nuclear. The perceptions of risks, and safety

regulations undertaken to address the risks needs to be communicated clearly to the

public.

Unfavourable sentiment can be turned into favourable sentiment if associated risks are

addressed in the minds of the people. Safety measures and safety standards that the

nuclear industry adheres to needs to be communicated to the public at large in order to

realistically portray risks associated with nuclear.

5.9.2 A composite profile of support and opposition to nuclear energy and technology For the purposes of characterising variations in perspective of nuclear energy and

technology issues, the adult population of South Africa can thus be sub-divided into

six categories. By far the largest (52%) are in the category ‘Uniformed with No

Opinion’. They scored less than 2 out of 3 for the nuclear knowledge questions and

they “do not know” whether nuclear energy and technology is more of a risk or a

benefit.

A further 10% scored well in the knowledge questions (2 or 3 out of 3) but likewise,

have “no opinion” on the risk-benefit dichotomy. There are two categories that see

nuclear energy and technology more as a benefit: the uninformed supporters (11%)

and the informed supporters (9%). Similarly, there are two categories that see nuclear

energy and technology more as a risk: the uninformed opponents (13%) and the

informed opponents (5%).


Figure 36: Profiling supporters and opponents of nuclear energy and technology

The composition of people in each category varies significantly by province, sex,

LSM group, settlement geo-type, race and level of education. The next figure shows

the distribution of categories within each province, sex, race, geo-type, LSM, age and

educational group. The highlighted percentages show the proportions of “informed”

people within each demographic variable. “Informed Supporters” of nuclear energy

and technology are thus disproportionately represented amongst South African

Indians (26%); people with tertiary education (25%); and residents of KwaZulu-Natal

(18%). These would be the groupings likely to be most in favour of the increased use

of nuclear energy in South Africa. “Informed Opponents” are disproportionate

amongst Whites (11%) and residents of KwaZulu-Natal (10%). The two

“Uninformed” categories form the largest percentages amongst the people of the

Eastern Cape (92%); people with no schooling (88%) and Black Africans (65%). This

indicates where Necsa should target an information campaign.

11,1%

9,0%

51,9%

9,6%

13,2%

5,2%

Uninformed Supporters Informed Supporters Uninformed with No Opinion

Informed with No Opinion Uninformed Opponents Informed Opponents


Figure 37: Attitudinal Categories by Demographic variables

5.9.3 Multivariate Analysis (MVA) Multivariate analysis was used to deal with the statistical analysis of the data collect

on more than one (response) variable. These variables were correlated with each

other, and their statistical dependence taken into account when analyzing the data.

In order to enrich the report, regression analysis were undertaken using the SASAS

2011 attitudinal data on nuclear technology and energy. This multivariate

methodology was carried out to understand and explore the relationships between

9%

7% 2%

10% 9% 18%

12% 6%

8% 6%

11% 7%

7% 7%

26% 17%

11% 4%

8% 7%

3% 7%

15%

10% 7% 11% 7% 14% 9%

8%

2% 4%

7% 9%

25%

10%

9% 2%

4% 11%

13% 16% 13%

7% 4%

10% 9%

10% 8% 7%

12%

12% 6% 7%

9%

6% 8%

12%

11% 10% 10% 9% 10% 8% 9%

6% 7% 8% 12% 11%

5%

6% 1%

5% 4%

10% 6% 4% 3% 3%

7% 4%

4% 5% 8%

11%

5% 4% 6% 4%

6% 4% 6%

3% 4% 7% 5% 7% 6% 6%

1% 5% 5% 5% 8%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

TOTAL

WC

EC

NC

FS

KZN

NW

GT

MP

LP

Male

Female

Black African

Coloured

Indian or Asian

White

Urban formal

Urban informal

Tribal

Rural formal

Low

Medium

High

16-‐19 years

20-‐29 years

30-‐39 years

40-‐49 years

50-‐59 years

60-‐69 years

70+ years

No schooling

Primary

Some secondary

Matric or equivalent

Terdary educadon

PROVINCE

SEX

RACE

AR

EA

LSM

AGE

EDUCA

TION

Uninformed Supporters

Informed Supporters

Uninformed with No Opinion

Informed with No Opinion

Uninformed Opponents

Informed Opponents


certain dependant variables and basic characteristics (independent variables) of the

survey respondents. More specifically, the following four regressions were

undertaken.

a. The first regression (ordered logistic regression) explores the relationship between

knowledge of nuclear technology/energy and socio demographic variables.

b. A second ordered logistic regression explores the relationship between support for

nuclear energy and socio demographic variables.

c. A third regression (logistic) explores the “don’t know” responses to the overall

perception of nuclear energy.

d. A fourth logistic regression explores the relationship between exposure to nuclear

advertising and socio-demographic variables.

5.9.4 Self-Reported Knowledge of Nuclear Technology and Energy Issues The first regression, explaining the relationship between self-reported knowledge and

socio-demographic characteristics revealed that knowledge is significantly lower for:

a. Those aged 40-49 years relative to those 70 years and older;

b. Women relative to men;

c. Those with a matriculation education or lower compared with those with a tertiary

level education;

d. Those with a low living standard relative to those with a high living standard;

e. Those in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West and Gauteng

relative to the Western Cape; and

f. Those that have not recently seen or heard advertising relating to nuclear issues.

No significant difference is found in knowledge levels based on population group or

geographic location (geo-type). Knowledge is critical when participating in any form

of debate pertaining to nuclear energy or nuclear technology. As was illustrated in this

report, people that rated themselves as knowledgeable were much more able to

articulate the benefits as well as the risks of nuclear energy and technology. They

were thus able to express an informed opinion. Education plays a critical role in

determining whether people are knowledgeable about nuclear issues.


An exponential increase is found when observing knowledge of nuclear issues and

educational attainment. As levels of education incrementally increase, so does

knowledge of nuclear issues. Education is thus critical when developing a strategy of

promoting nuclear technology and nuclear energy. An opportunity exists to influence

young cohorts through formal school curricula. Other forms of more informal

educational methods should also be pursued since an information void also exists

among people with a low living standard. The challenge would be to package

information in a way that people with a low living standard (and low education level)

are able to absorb and understand.

Women are also significantly less knowledgeable of nuclear issues. Women generally

tend to be wary of any science or technological subjects and educational material that

are presented to women should be presented in less technical terms. The focus could

for instance be on the benefits of nuclear technology such as the treatment of cancer

patients, children and other vulnerable groups. If provincial road shows are envisaged

as a method of promoting knowledge of nuclear technology and energy, Eastern Cape,

Mpumalanga and Limpopo should be targeted first. These are the provinces where the

lowest levels of nuclear knowledge were found.


Table 30: Ordered logistical regression on self-reported nuclear knowledge

Coefficient Standard Error

Z P>z [95% Confidence Interval]

16-19 years -0.063 0.240 -0.260 0.793 -0.533 0.407

20-29 years 0.040 0.173 0.230 0.818 -0.299 0.379 30-39 years -0.007 0.176 -0.040 0.967 -0.352 0.338 50-59 years 0.054 0.206 0.260 0.793 -0.350 0.458 60-69 years 0.192 0.225 0.850 0.394 -0.250 0.634 70+ years 0.549 0.236 2.330 0.020 0.087 1.011 Female -0.358 0.114 -3.140 0.002 -0.581 -0.135 Black 0.216 0.205 1.050 0.292 -0.186 0.619 Coloured -0.269 0.236 -1.140 0.254 -0.731 0.193 Indian 0.171 0.212 0.810 0.420 -0.245 0.587 No schooling -2.400 0.365 -6.580 0.000 -3.115 -1.686 Primary education -1.445 0.268 -5.400 0.000 -1.970 -0.920 Some secondary -1.035 0.194 -5.340 0.000 -1.415 -0.655 Matric or equivalent -0.510 0.189 -2.700 0.007 -0.879 -0.140 Low living standard -0.628 0.312 -2.010 0.044 -1.240 -0.017 Medium living standard -0.303 0.165 -1.840 0.066 -0.627 0.020 Urban informal -0.147 0.232 -0.630 0.526 -0.602 0.308 Rural trad. auth. Areas -0.192 0.181 -1.060 0.290 -0.547 0.163 Rural formal -0.557 0.298 -1.870 0.062 -1.142 0.028 Eastern Cape -1.846 0.335 -5.510 0.000 -2.502 -1.189 Northern Cape -0.472 0.305 -1.550 0.121 -1.069 0.125 Free State -0.314 0.272 -1.150 0.249 -0.847 0.220 KwaZulu-Natal -0.339 0.210 -1.610 0.107 -0.752 0.073 North West -0.956 0.262 -3.650 0.000 -1.470 -0.443 Gauteng -0.861 0.215 -4.000 0.000 -1.284 -0.439 Mpumalanga -1.333 0.286 -4.670 0.000 -1.893 -0.773 Limpopo -1.364 0.287 -4.760 0.000 -1.925 -0.802 Recent exposure to nuclear advertising 1.776 0.146 12.120 0.000 1.489 2.063 /cut1 -1.05489 0.27777

-1.5993 -0.51047

/cut2 0.145396 0.276215

-0.39597 0.686767 /cut3 2.425028 0.296204 1.844479 3.005576 Ordered logit estimates log likelihood = --25814387; number of obs = 2728; LRχ2 (28) = 489.4; Prob> χ2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R2= 0.1508

(Note: The dependent variable is based on a reversed scale where 1=not at all knowledgeable, 2=not very

knowledgeable, 3=somewhat knowledgeable and 4=very knowledgeable. For analytical purposes ‘do not know’

responses were combined with the ‘not at all knowledgeable’ category. The base categories are: 40-49 year-olds,

male, white, tertiary education, high LSM, formal urban areas, and the Western Cape.

5.9.5 Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Energy The regression in this section, explains the relationship between support for nuclear

energy and socio-demographic characteristics Model I and also. Model II explains the

relationship between support for nuclear energy and socio demographic


characteristics, but also includes variables measuring knowledge, believes about

environmental benefits; proliferation of nuclear weapons and perceptions of risk.

The base Model I show that among those that expressed an opinion on nuclear energy,

the following are significantly more likely to express a favourable view of nuclear

energy, controlling for other socio-demographic factors:

a. Black South Africans relative to coloured and white South Africans;

b. Those with a tertiary, matric or incomplete secondary education relative to those

with no schooling;

c. Those in formal urban areas and informal urban settlements compared to those

living in rural, traditional authority areas; and

d. Those in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Free State,

North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga relative to those in the Eastern Cape.

Differences on the basis of age, sex and living standard were not statistically

significant after controlling for other factors.

In Model II, four additional attitudinal variables were introduced, namely self-

reported knowledge of nuclear technology and energy issues, belief in environmental

gains to nuclear energy, opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and

belief in the personal/family risk of operating nuclear plants in South Africa. The

following conclusions can be made:

a) Those professing knowledge of nuclear issues are considerably more likely to

offer a positive evaluation of nuclear energy than those lacking such knowledge;

b) Those identifying that there are environmental gains to using nuclear energy for

electricity purposes are also more likely to have an overall favourable view of

nuclear energy;

c) Those who are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons are less supportive

of nuclear energy;

d) A recognition of the inherent risks of nuclear power plants to oneself and one’s

family does not result in a significant dampening effect in support of nuclear

energy;


e) Black South Africans continue to express more favourable views of nuclear

energy than coloured citizens, though the black-white difference falls away;

f) The educational gradient underlying attitudes towards nuclear energy is no longer

evident;

g) Again, there is a negligible age effect, with the only significant difference being

that 40-49 year-olds possess a less favourable outlook with regard to nuclear

energy than 16-19 year-olds;

h) Similarly, there continues to be no significant difference in perception based on

LSM; and

i) Most of the provincial differences observed in the base model are retained.

The regression results illustrate that knowledge of nuclear technology and energy is

critical in assessing nuclear in a positive way. Support for nuclear technology and

initiatives ultimately depend on knowledge. Results also show that people are

opposed to nuclear if they perceive it as a part of a weapons programme or perceive it

as being a risk. Turning to the socio-economic characteristics it is evident that Black

South Africans remain more favourable towards nuclear than Coloureds. People

residing in the Free State, Limpopo and Eastern Cape are least favourable towards

nuclear energy.


Table 31: Ordered logit regression models on overall perception of nuclear energy

Model I Model II

Coef. Coef.

20-29 years -0.052 -0.144 30-39 years -0.057 -0.116 40-49 years -0.239 -0.464 * 50-59 years 0.029 -0.147 60-69 years -0.058 -0.394 70+ years 0.290 -0.061 Male 0.019 -0.132 Coloured -0.704 *** -0.738 *** Indian -0.274 -0.334 White -0.499 ** -0.278 Primary education 0.135 -0.006 Some secondary 0.757 * 0.411 Matric or equivalent 0.913 ** 0.469 Tertiary 0.959 ** 0.384 Medium living standard -0.322 -0.433 High living standard -0.095 -0.125 Formal urban areas 0.375 * 0.270 Informal urban settlements 0.596 ** 0.802 *** Formal rural areas 0.158 0.223 Western Cape 1.425 *** 1.360 *** Northern Cape 1.448 *** 1.494 *** Free State 0.716 * 0.596 KwaZulu-Natal 1.067 *** 0.878 *** North West 0.705 * 0.741 * Gauteng 0.851 *** 0.695 ** Mpumalanga 0.571 * 0.763 * Limpopo 0.599 * 0.390 Knowledgeable of nuclear technology/energy issues

1.172 ***

Believes in environmental benefits to nuclear energy

0.880 *** Opposed to proliferation of nuclear weapons

-0.008 ***

Believes nuclear plants pose a risk to oneself and family

-0.129 /cut1 -0.515 -1.526 /cut2 0.239 -0.604 /cut3 2.051 1.401 /cut4 4.263 3.871 Ordered logit estimates log likelihood -2136.318 -1804.2856 Number of observations 1564 1402 LRχ2 121.44 320.06 Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0276 0.0815

Note: The dependent variable is based on a reversed scale where 1=very unfavourable, 2=mainly unfavourable,

3=neutral, 4=mainly favourable, and 5=very favourable. For analytical purposes ‘do not know’ responses were

Since almost half of South Africans do not know if they are favourable or

unfavourable toward nuclear, a regression was undertaken to determine the

relationship between don’t know answers and overall perceptions of nuclear energy.


With regard to those that provided ‘do not know’ responses to the evaluative question

on nuclear energy, the base logistic regression model (Model I) shows that,

controlling for other socio-demographic attributes:

a. Coloured and Black South Africans are respectively 2.7 and 1.6 times more likely

than White South Africans to express no opinion;

b. Those with a matric or lower level of education are significantly more likely to

provide ‘do not know’ responses than those with a tertiary education;

c. Those with low and medium living standards are more likely to report no opinion

than those with high LMS; and

d. Those in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Gauteng and

North West are all more likely to offer no opinion on nuclear energy than

residents of the Western Cape.

No significant differences are discernible on the basis of age, sex or geographic

location (geo-type) when controlling for other factors.

In Model II we add one attitudinal variable to the base model, namely self-reported

knowledge on nuclear technology and energy issues.

a) Those with knowledge of nuclear issues are less likely to report item non response

to the evaluation of nuclear energy question;

b) The population group differences remain unchanged;

c) The education differences weaken somewhat, with only those with no schooling

or primary education more likely than those with a tertiary education to report no

opinion;

d) The difference between those with low and high LSM remains, but those with

medium LSM are no longer different from those with high LSM; and

e) Those in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, and Limpopo, continue to be more

inclined to offer no opinion on nuclear energy than residents of the Western Cape,

while residents in KwaZulu-Natal become less likely than their Western Cape

counterparts to voice no opinion.

The regression results illustrate that the lack of knowledge is one of the most

significant drivers of “don’t know" answers. Coloured and Black South Africans are

more likely than the other two race groups to state “don’t knows” This is also true for


people with lesser education, with a low living standard and people residing in the

Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, and Limpopo.

Table 32: Logistic regression models of 'do not know' responses to overall perception of

nuclear energy question

Model I Model II

Odds Ratio Odds Ratio

16-29 years 0.723 0.651 20-29 years 0.914 0.854 30-39 years 0.968 0.916 50-59 years 0.913 0.947 60-69 years 1.032 0.972 70+ years 1.118 1.193 Female 1.220 1.095 Black African 1.648 * 1.999 ** Coloured 2.693 *** 3.353 *** Indian 1.382 1.880 * No schooling 3.252 *** 2.184 * Primary education 2.728 *** 1.996 * Some secondary 2.036 *** 1.566 Matric or equivalent 1.547 * 1.480 Low living standard 2.668 *** 2.633 *** Medium living standard 1.464 * 1.362 Informal urban settlements 0.883 0.869 Rural, traditional authority areas 0.945 0.826 Formal rural areas 1.541 1.166 E C 6.340 *** 4.454 *** NC 2.589 *** 2.290 ** FS 1.074 0.876 KZN 0.753 0.510 ** NW 1.830 * 1.235 GT 1.908 *** 1.378 MP 2.524 *** 1.670 LP 3.207 *** 2.099 ** Knowledgeable of nuclear technology/energy issues

0.028 ***

Logistic estimates log likelihood -18282219 -16209399 Number of observations 2746 2735 LRχ2 251.61 289.68 Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.1278 0.2241

Note: The dependent variable is based on a dummy variable where 0= opinion provided and 1= ‘do not know’

response. For analytical purposes ‘do not know’ responses were excluded from consideration. The base

categories are: 40-49 year-olds, male, White, tertiary education, high LSM, formal urban areas, and the Western

Cape. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels respectively.


5.9.6 Recent exposure to nuclear energy or technology advertising From a science communication perspective, it is crucial that the South African public

has at least a basic level of information about nuclear technology and energy issues.

This assumes more importance given the plans for nuclear energy in the country’s

electricity generation mix in the future. To better understand the areas of greatest need

in providing basic information to the public, we modelled exposure to recent media

advertising on nuclear technology and energy. The base logistic regression Model I

shows that:

a. 16-19 year-olds are more likely to report having seen such advertising than those

in their 20s, 30s and 60s;

b. Those with tertiary education are more inclined to have been exposed to such

advertising than those with lower educational level;

c. Those with low living standards are less likely to have been exposed to such

advertising than those with high LSM;

d. Those in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng and Mpumalanga are less likely to

have seen or heard nuclear advertising that residents in the Western Cape; and

e. There are no significant differences on the basis of sex, population group, or

geographic location.

In Model II, four additional attitudinal variables were introduced, namely self-

reported knowledge of nuclear technology and energy issues, belief in environmental

gains to nuclear energy, opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and

belief in the personal/family risk of operating nuclear plants in South Africa. The

following can be observed:

a) Those reporting that they are knowledgeable of nuclear issues are 4.1 times more

likely to have seen nuclear advertising than those without such knowledge;

b) Those who believe that there are environmental benefits to using nuclear energy

for electricity generation are 2.7 times more likely to report exposure than those

who do not perceive such environmental gains;

c) Views on nuclear proliferation and on the risk of nuclear power plants to oneself

or one’s family do not exert a significant influence on reported exposure to

nuclear advertising controlling for other factors;


d) The age effects noted in the base model remain, though the significant difference

between 16-19 year-olds and those in the 30s has fallen away. The LSM findings

also remain intact;

e) The educational variation in reported exposure loses significance once the

attitudinal variables are introduced into the modelling;

f) Those in the Eastern Cape and Free State continue to be less likely to have seen or

heard nuclear advertising than residents in the Western Cape. The differences

between Mpumalanga, Gauteng and the Western Cape fall away.

Again, as with the previous regressions, the importance of knowledge is emphasised.

People who are knowledgeable are much more likely to be perceptive to messages

promoting the benefits of nuclear technology. People that believe nuclear is

beneficial to the environment are also more likely to have seen advertisements

promoting the benefits of nuclear technology.

Interestingly the youngest cohort (16-19 year olds) is more likely than other age

groups to have heard or seen advertising promoting the benefits of nuclear. Residents

from Eastern Cape and Free State were the least likely to have heard any advertising

on the benefits of nuclear.


Table 33: Logistic regression models of recent exposure to nuclear energy or technology

advertising

Model I Model II

Odds Ratio Odds Ratio

20-29 years 0.429 ** 0.429 ** 30-39 years 0.525 * 0.547 40-49 years 0.671 0.636 50-59 years 0.579 0.528 60-69 years 0.317 *** 0.278 *** 70+ years 0.594 0.502 Female 0.757 0.859 Black African 1.040 1.004 Coloured 1.187 1.319 Indian 1.210 1.160 No schooling 0.359 * 0.780 Primary education 0.342 ** 0.633 Some secondary 0.406 *** 0.634 Matric or equivalent 0.585 * 0.724 Low living standard 0.352 * 0.376 * Medium living standard 0.679 0.706 Informal urban settlements 0.846 0.892 Rural, traditional authority areas 1.132 1.233 Formal rural areas 0.542 0.687 EC 0.209 *** 0.413 * NC 1.093 1.380 FS 0.302 ** 0.315 ** KZN 1.158 1.175 NW 0.821 1.237 GT 0.526 * 0.678 MP 0.791 1.322 LP 0.446 * 0.692 Knowledgeable of nuclear technology/energy issues

4.149 ***

Believes in environmental benefits to nuclear energy

2.712 *** Opposed to proliferation of nuclear weapons

1.001

Believes nuclear plants pose a risk to oneself and family

1.091 Logistic estimates log likelihood -11362831 -10176513 Number of observations 2730 2721 LRχ2 120.29 265.59 Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0903 0.1844

Note: The dependent variable is based on a dummy variable where 0= no recent exposure to nuclear advertising

and 1=exposure to nuclear advertising. For analytical purposes ‘do not know’ responses were excluded from

consideration. The base categories are: 16-19 year-olds, male, white, tertiary education, high living standard,

formal urban areas, and the Western Cape. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and

0.001 levels respectively.


5.9.7 Conclusion The results generated in this study, in particular by the base logistic regression Model

I demonstrate clearly that positive public opinion regarding nuclear energy is

significantly influenced by younger age groups in combination with higher standards

of education and LSM. This is borne out by the abject lack of knowledge that was

measured in South Africa’s poorer provinces.

Model II also highlighted that nuclear advertising has a significant positive impact on

public awareness, as doe’s environmental education. When read together, these

results underscore the imperative stated in the Nuclear Energy Policy, that Necsa

should actively pursue public awareness programmes to demystify nuclear energy

amongst the general public.

In terms of the IRP2010, the same imperative would seek to underpin the nuclear new

build with general public support. Positive public perceptions could be of critical

value, given a relatively high negative perception that was registered with regards

South Africa’s nuclear history and the legacy of our nuclear weapons programme.

The need for a heightened public participation programme is further underscored by

the fact that a high the “no knowledge” and “don’t know” categories, by far exceeded

the “knowledgeable” proportion, meaning that a positive result is the most likely

consequence of a focused public awareness programme.


6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary of findings One of the major requirements for sustaining human progress is an adequate source of

energy. The current largest sources of energy in South Africa are coal, oil and natural

gas. Due to the environmental effects of these fossil fuels, the finite nature of the

sources and concern about climate change, the use of nuclear power is currently being

re-evaluated. Globally, nuclear energy continues to be a controversial issue and a

challenge from the point of view of public opinion, especially because nuclear power

often raises concerns about the associated risks.

Against the background of this current debate, it is extremely important to develop a

better understanding of the views of civil society on nuclear technologies, how their

risks are perceived and how to establish effective communication between all the

stakeholders prior to decision-making.The following discussions of results from the

SASAS survey offer some insight into the views of South Africans on nuclear energy

and nuclear technology:

6.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the South African public’s knowledge of nuclear energy and technology

South Africans exhibit particularly low levels of knowledge about nuclear energy and

technology issues. Only a select few claim to be very knowledgeable (3%) or

somewhat knowledgeable (15%), with greater proportions reporting that they are ‘not

very’ (18%) or ‘not at all’ knowledgeable (34%). Almost a third (30%) were unable to

express an opinion, instead opting to provide a ‘do not know’ response. From a

comparative perspective, the knowledge levels of South Africans are much lower than

those observed in Canada and Europe.

When analysing the mean knowledge scores on nuclear, it becomes apparent that men

are more knowledgeable than women. Socio-economic status variables also matter

with notable statistically significant gradients of difference evident when examining

scores by race, education and LSM. People with a low LSM are far less

knowledgeable than people with a medium or high LSM. A similar pattern is found

for education where the incremental gradient shows that a higher education ensured a


better knowledge of nuclear issues. Whites and Indians are also more knowledgeable

about nuclear than Coloureds and Blacks. People residing in urban formal areas are

also more knowledgeable than people in urban informal, rural traditional authority

areas and rural formal areas. Knowledge is lowest in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo

and highest in KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape.


South Africans were asked about their level of support for energy and certain non-

energy related applications of nuclear technology. For those able to express an

opinion, the highest level of acceptance vested in different uses of nuclear technology

is reported in relation to electricity generation (42%).

The medical application of nuclear technology, both in hospitals and clinics as well as

for cancer treatment, is favourably evaluated by approximately a third of respondents

(35% and 31% respectively). Industrial usage is supported by an estimated fifth of

South Africans, while the level of rejection exceeds acceptance in respect of military

applications on nuclear technology.

6.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 3: To establish the South African public’s perceived benefits and concerns associated with nuclear technology

Approximately half (44%) of South Africans are able to cite at least one benefit of

nuclear technology, with slightly less than a tenth (7%) indicating that it offers no

benefits. Again, a large share of South Africans (50%) provided ‘no-opinion’

responses due to a lack of knowledge. The production of energy or electricity is the

most commonly cited benefit of nuclear technology, mentioned by a fifth of South

Africans.

A similar pattern of responses is evident in relation to perceived disadvantages of

nuclear technology: 47% mention at least one concern, 7% report no concerns and

47% provide no opinion. The issue of safety features as a significant consideration,

with the safety of nuclear power plants, the disposal of nuclear waste, and risk of


radiation exposure in the event of a nuclear accident ranking as the top three

disadvantages of nuclear technology mentioned by South Africans.

6.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: To ascertain the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear energy

Turning specifically to nuclear energy, nearly a quarter are in favour, an equivalent

share are ambivalent, while barely more than a tenth hold negative views. A

substantial proportion (two-fifths) is again unable to offer an opinion. While we

approximate European attitudes in the relatively high shares, offering positive than

negative evaluations, the level of non-response is nearly four times higher in South

Africa. This finding reinforces the importance of science communication and

awareness raising initiatives to address the lack of information that persists around

nuclear energy issues.

As with nuclear technology, the survey asked respondents to identify what they

believe to be the disadvantages and benefits of nuclear energy as a source of

electricity in the country. South Africans are most inclined to perceive nuclear energy

primarily as a means of ensuring a reliable supply of electricity and as an energy

source that will assist in combating climate change (cited by 23% and 16%

respectively). Safety risks and nuclear waste disposal are the predominant concerns

among the public: the risk of accidents is referred to as a disadvantage of nuclear

energy by a third (34%), while the long-term disposal of nuclear waste and the risk of

radiation or contamination are issues cited by a fifth of respondents.

The Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Policy (2008) and Integrated Resource

Plan for Electricity (IRP, 2011) provide the government’s vision of a future energy

mix that is more diversified and less fossil-fuel dependent, with nuclear and

renewable energy alike playing a more instrumental role. Several questions were

posed to survey respondents pertaining to the future role of nuclear energy. Two-

fifths of South Africans agree that the nuclear reactors at Koeberg should continue

operating in future, with around one tenth ambivalent, a similar share voicing

opposition, and the remainder providing “don’t know” responses.


Even greater support is evident among Western Cape residents, where nearly every

one in six argues for the continued existence of Koeberg. A consistent pattern is

observed with regard to levels of support for the construction of new nuclear reactors

in the country. The IRP proposes a new nuclear fleet of at least six units that will

provide an additional 9600MW of capacity by 2030 alongside that currently provided

by the Koeberg reactors. Again close to two-fifths of South Africans approve of such

a proposal for new nuclear build, with a considerably smaller share against the idea.

As with preceding sections, a lack of information prevents a sizable share from being

able to declare a position on the matter.

In spite of these fairly positive assertions about the future of nuclear energy, South

Africans were generally more moderate in their final opinion on the level of nuclear

energy in the future energy mix. Less than one-fifth believes that the share of nuclear

energy in the energy mix should be increased, whilst marginally more than one-tenth

wants it reduced. The largest segment among those able to offer an opinion prefers to

maintain the current level of nuclear energy as a proportion of all energy sources,

while an estimated half of South Africans lack the knowledge to be able to respond.

The highest proportions of citizens saying that the share of nuclear energy should be

increased are found among those with self-reported nuclear knowledge and

demonstrating a generally partial outlook on nuclear energy and technology, in

addition to the tertiary educated, those with high LMS, residents of Gauteng, and

Indian and White respondents.

6.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: To clarify the South African public’s perceptions of nuclear safety

Conducted six months after the nuclear incident at the Fukushima I Power Plant in

Japan, the survey unequivocally demonstrates the importance that the South African

public attaches to issues of safety when referring to nuclear technology and energy.

More than two-fifths of South Africans believe that nuclear safety risks are not being

correctly perceived in the media or the public. A quarter (24%) feel the portrayal of

risk is exaggerated, while slightly under a fifth (19%) considers it to be

underestimated. Less than one in ten South Africans believes that nuclear risk is

accurately perceived nowadays.


Risk features prominently in the minds of South Africans when they think about the

issue from a personal point of view. More than a third (35%) believes nuclear power

plants’ pose either “some risk” or “a big risk” to them or their families, with less than

a fifth seeing them as “no risk.” Half of South Africans could not answer the question

about personal risk. Therefore, although the informed public feels that nuclear risks

are generally overstated, when explicitly thinking about themselves and their families,

the share of South Africans expressing concern about the risk of nuclear power plants

is double that of those perceiving either a limited or no risk.

Consistent with this finding, South Africans are almost four times more likely to agree

with than refute the claim that there is a possibility of a nuclear accident occurring in

the country (27% versus 7%), with approximately a fifth ambivalent and half

providing ‘don’t know’ responses. Furthermore, among those able to express an

opinion, there is a greater tendency for respondents to exhibit concern than

reassurance about the management of radioactive waste from nuclear reactors.

South African opinion is quite divided in evaluating government and nuclear

regulatory authority efforts in ensuring nuclear safety in the country: while 23% feel

that such efforts are adequate, 26% assert that more needs to be done in addressing the

challenge posed by nuclear waste. Proximity to or experience of nuclear power plants

in the country does appear to exert some influence on perceptions, as illustrated by the

strong views that are consistently voiced by South Africans based in the Western

Cape.

6.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 6: To comprehend the South African public’s views on nuclear energy in a global context

Views on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Half of South Africans are against a nuclear

weapons programme, just under half do not know or feel neutral about the issue and a

minority 10% is in favour of such a programme.


6.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7: To establish who the South African public trust for information on nuclear

In terms of the sources that South Africans ‘would trust the most’ in providing

information on nuclear energy, South Africans placed greatest confidence in the South

African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), followed by the South African

government, and scientists. Less than 5% mentioned different media sources, non-

governmental organisations and informal sources such as friends and family.

At the time of the survey, only a nominal share of South Africans (14%) reported

having recently heard any advertising from Necsa. There is a resolute belief that the

nuclear industry should do more to promote the benefits of nuclear technology (cited

by 47%), with 14% disagreeing and 39% unable to provide an opinion.

6.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 8: To evaluate the South African public’s final assessment of nuclear energy and technology

An overall assessment of whether South Africans see nuclear technology more as a

benefit or as a risk revealed a split vote of roughly a fifth between “a risk”, “a benefit”

or “neither a risk nor a benefit” The rest, just under half, did not venture an opinion

due to a lack of knowledge.

The high share of the adult population that offers no opinion (‘don’t know’ responses)

to the questions on knowledge of nuclear technology and nuclear energy is perhaps

unsurprising given the technical and scientific nature of the subject matter and the

relatively poor mathematics and scientific literacy levels in the country in general.

In light of these facts, there emerges a very strong motivation for the South African

governments to provide funding for the Necsa Visitor Centre (NVC), to provide the

much needed information and education services to the South African public on

behalf of the nuclear industry.

However, given the emphasis that is being placed on nuclear energy in the IRP 2010

and the importance this decision will have on the lives of ordinary citizens, it is

imperative the government, the nuclear industry and non-governmental stakeholders


alike invest in conveying to the general public sufficient basic information about the

nuclear options for the country. This is critical for deliberative democracy and to

ensure that the energy decisions that are made are discussed and debated by the

public.

In line with the emphasis in the 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy on raising public

awareness about the country’s nuclear energy programme, including the associated

risks and benefits, the survey results suggest a sustained, differentiated and targeted

science communication is required.


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