A Causal Theory of Knowing

Author: Alvin I. Goldman

Ganesh Bharate PhD student 14400261

Purpose of the paper

To add causal connection as additional requirement to the traditional analysis viz. S knows that p

Concerned boundaries

The paper restricts to the knowledge of empirical propositions only and presupposes that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of non-empirical truths.Goldman regards traditional analysis as adequate for knowledge of non-empirical truths.

Differences in Traditional, Clark and Goldman's
analysis of knowledge

GoldmanA necessary condition of S's knowing p is that his believing p be connected with p by a causal chain.Causal chain between the fact that makes p true and S's belief of p.Thus the requirement of a causal connection to the traditional analysis of Knowledge as Justified True Belief.

TraditionalKnowledge as Justified True Belief.Fact should correspond to S's belief of p.

ClarkEach belief in S's chain of inference be true.Fact should correspond to S's beliefs on which he based his belief of p.

Perception, Remembering and Testimony

PerceptionThe Simplest form of causal chain connecting a fact p with someone's belief of p is perception.

So perceptual knowledge is connecting the presence of p with S's belief of p

Goldman accepts the causal theory of perception as espoused by H. P. Grice.

For all purposes of exposition perceptual knowledge is regarded as non-inferential i.e. independent of any inference

Remembering

Like perceiving Remembering is also a causal process.

A causal connection between earlier belief of p and later belief of p.

A causal connection can exist between belief as well as between events.

So a event or a belief may cause a memory of p. So knowledge by combination of perception and memory or only memory and memory is possible.

Inference is used usually when explicit reasoning takes place but Goldman calls remembering as inferential in a broader sense of the term contrasting it with non-inferential perception.

Testimony

p causes a person T to believe p, by perception. T's belief in p gives rise to T's asserting p. T's asserting p causes S, by auditory perception, to believe that T is asserting p. S infers that T believes p and from that, in turn, infers that p is a fact.

So there is continuity in the chain from p to S's believing p.

We assume that S's inferences are warranted, thus S can be said to know p.

Knowledge of cases dealing with future

So far we dealt with if S knows p, the fact that p is the cause of one's belief in p

Question arises with future cases because of causal asymmetry as the condition we have given is causal connection, one should accept backward causation to support causal theory of knowing.

But the analysis requires that there be a causal connection between p and S's belief in p, not necessarily that p be cause of S's belief.

Both p and S's belief of p can have a common cause.

Intending, as the cause

(p) = T's going down town. (q) = T's intending to go down town. (r) = T's telling S that he will go down town. (u) & (v) are background propositions pertaining to T's honesty etc. Diagram shows that (q) is the cause of p and S's belief of p. Goldman calls these as pattern 2 cases ?

Problematising cases of future

When predictions are made for example of Halley's comet, that it comes every 76 years, there are relevant causes taken into consideration.

So there are causal reasons to believe in knowing that Halley's comet, just for example; will arrive at a certain time.

So we don't need to accept backward causation to accept the period of Halley's comet. One can say one can have knowledge of future in a restricted sense.

In the earlier example definitely the cause was not natural one but T's intention to go down town.

So necessity of causal connection in important .

Conclusion, criticisms and remarks

List of appropriate causal processes is left open, as some controversial causal processes may later become appropriate and therefore knowledge producing.

Knowledge of our own mental states is again a controversial issue. A difference can be made between mental states and subjects belief that one is in a mental state.

My being in pain and my believing that I am in pain can hardly be stated as distinct cases.

Here Goldman regards identity as degenerate/limiting case of causal connection, just as 0 is a degenerate case of number.

Possible objections and their justification

Does the causal analysis adequately provide the meaning of the word 'knows' or 'S knows that p'.

Goldman states clearly that he is not interested in giving the meaning of 'S knows p' but only it's truth conditions.

Truth conditions should not be confused with verification conditions. The causal analysis does not purport to give procedures for finding out whether a person knows a given proposition

By giving Truth conditions one is not entitled to answer sceptical problems.

Goldman defies that epistemological problems are questions only of logic or justification, not causal or genetic questions.