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FIFTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS OF REVIEWby Timothy Crooks

(Updated Mar. 2008)

CAUTION: This document no longer contains citations to denials of certiorari for the citedcases.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION: “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on anerror of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”

United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 860 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Esmark Apparel Co. v.James, 10 F.3d 1156, 1163 (5th Cir. 1994)); accord United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d456, 464 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Mann)

ABUSE OF THE WRIT -- See same subheading under HABEAS CORPUS

ALLEN CHARGE -- See same subheading under JURY INSTRUCTIONS

ALLOCUTION – See same subheading under SENTENCING

APPEAL:

District court's finding that there was/was not “excusable neglect” for the late filing of anotice of appeal: abuse of discretion

United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); UnitedStates v. Clark, 51 F.3d 42, 43 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)):

Whether prior is a qualifying prior under Act: de novo

United States v. Williams, 120 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v.Martinez-Cortez, 988 F.2d 1408, 1410 (5th Cir. 1993)

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

Application of controlling law to facts: de novo

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United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994), citing In re Auclair, 961F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992)

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE:

“We review the district court’s imposition of particular discipline for an abuse of discretion,but consider whether an attorney’s conduct is subject to sanction de novo.”

Sealed Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee 1, 211 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000), citingIn re Sealed Appellant, 194 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1999)

AUDIO RECORDINGS -- See same subheading under EVIDENCE

BATSON [v. KENTUCKY] CHALLENGES:

Credibility: “Determining whether counsel speaks the truth in offering its reasons [for a jurystrike] turns on in-person credibility assessments, so we review for clear error.”

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 349 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

Ruling on motivation for strike: clearly erroneous

United States v. Stedman, 69 F.3d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1372 (5th Cir. 1993)

District court's findings concerning the presence of purposeful discrimination vel non injury selection: clearly erroneous

United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1466 (5th Cir. 1993)

District court’s determination that prosecution gave a race-neutral explanation: clearlyerroneous

United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1206 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

BENCH TRIAL:

Sufficiency of the evidence: court must affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence.

United States v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Jennings, 726 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Davis, 993F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoted in Ybarra)

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BILL OF PARTICULARS:

Denial of bill of particulars: clear abuse of discretion

United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 674 (5th Cir.1995), citing United States v.Vasquez, 867 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1989)

BRADY [V. MARYLAND]:

Brady determinations (whether Brady was violated by government nondisclosure ofexculpatory evidence): de novo, using standard of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667(1985)

United States v. Green, 46 F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1995)

See also United States v. Lowder, 148 F.3d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We review thedistrict court’s Brady determination de novo.”), citing United States v. Dixon, 132F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir. 1997); accord United States v. Hughes, 230 F.3d 815, 819(5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); United States v. Freeman, 164 F.3d 243, 248 (5thCir. 1999) (citing Green)

See also United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Whether disclosuresof impeachment information violate any constitutional or statutory right of the defendant isdetermined as a question of law. This court reviews questions of law de novo.”) (citationsomitted)

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

United States v. Hughes, 230 F.3d 815, 819(5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)

District court’s determination (from in camera review) that presentence reports ofgovernment witnesses do not contain Brady/Giglio material: clearly erroneous

United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 557 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

BRUTON [V. UNITED STATES]:

“We review Bruton issues for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187, 197 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v.Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d840, 860 (5th Cir. 1998) (also citing Beaumont). Bruton error calls for reversalunless it was invited by the defendant or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United

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States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 686, 691 (5 Cir. 2007).th

ALSO:“Bruton issues, failures to remove references to co-defendants, are reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion.”

United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Fletcher, supra)

CLOSING ARGUMENT:

Limitations on time allowed for closing argument: abuse of discretion

United States v. Leal, 30 F.3d 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United States v.Bernes, 602 F.2d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1979)

CLOSURE (of public trial):

Whether a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial was violated by partial closureof his trial: de novo

United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995)

CO-CONSPIRATORS' STATEMENTS:

Admission of co-conspirators' statement into evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E):abuse of discretion

United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1998)

Determinations that statement was made by a co-conspirator and in furtherance of theconspiracy: clearly erroneous

United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

SEE ALSO United States v. Green, 180 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Ruling thata statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy is a factual finding, reversibleonly if clearly erroneous.”), citing United States v Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 434 (5thCir. 1992)

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:

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“The application of collateral estoppel is a question of law that we review de novo.”

United States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted);see also United States v. Yeager, ___ F.3d ____, 2008 WL 698930, *2 (5 Cir. Mar.th

17, 2008)

COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES – See CONSTITUTIONALITY

COMPETENCY -- See INSANITY/INCOMPETENCY

CONFESSIONS:

Generally: “A district court’s determination that a confession is voluntary is a question oflaw and is reviewed de novo, but the factual conclusions underlying the determination arereviewed for clear error.”

United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 170 (5th Cir. 1998)

Findings of fact relative to confession: clearly erroneous

United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1992)

Miranda violation:

“The question of whether Miranda’s guarantees have been impermissibly denied toa criminal defendant is a matter of constitutional law, meriting de novo review.

United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1324 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1990); see also UnitedStates v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287, 292 (5 Cir. 2005).th

Whether there has been a Miranda waiver: clearly erroneous

United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1995)

Ultimate issue of voluntariness of confession: de novo

United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1992)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS -- See INFORMANTS

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST:

Disqualification of defense counsel for conflict of interest: abuse of discretion

United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 791 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Vasquez, 995 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1993)

Finding of a conflict of interest: abuse of discretion

United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296, 308 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 791 (5th Cir. 1996)

Defendants' waiver of conflict-free counsel: reviewed for simple error

United States v. Moore, 37 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United States v.Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1983)

Denial of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 870 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Wild, 92 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1996)

CONFRONTATION -- See also CROSS-EXAMINATION

Generally: The Sixth Amendment prohibits introduction of out of court testimonialstatements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an adequate opportunityfor cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004). The appellatecourt reviews alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause de novo . United States v. Bell,367 F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. McCormick, 141 F.3d 142, 170(5th Cir. 1998)); see also Barnes v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1999) (“This courtreviews de novo constitutional challenges concerning the right to confront adversewitnesses.”) (citing United States v. Grandlund,71 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995)).

See also Gochicoa v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 1997) (habeas)

The government must establish that a confrontation clause error was harmless beyonda reasonable doubt. Under this standard, reversal is required if there was a“reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to theconviction.” United States v. Harper, 514 F.3d 456, 461 (5 Cir. 2008), citing Unitedth

States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 532 (5 Cir. 2007).th

CONSENT -- See SEARCH AND SEIZURE

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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS -- See also CONSTITUTIONALITY

Constitutional claims: de novo

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 333 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d 733, 735 (5th Cir. 1995)

Incorrect application of constitutional standards: de novo

United States v. Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d 733, 735 (5th Cir. 1995), citingUnited States v. Perez-Torrez, 15 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1994); UnitedStates v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1228 (5th Cir. 1991), citing American CivilLiberties Union v. State of Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1990)

Commerce Clause challenges:

“When reviewing an act of Congress passed under the authority of the CommerceClause, we review the statute under the rational basis standard. The burden for thechallenger is high because federal commerce legislation continues to merit a highdegree of judicial deference. In applying this deferential standard, due respect for thedecisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate acongressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded itsconstitutional bounds.”

United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2003) (internalquotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted; emphasis in original)

Due process:

“We review de novo an alleged due process violation . . . .”

United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 439 (5th Cir. 2003) (citingUnited States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,537 U.S. 888 (2002))

CONSTITUTIONALITY: de novo

United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d278, 290 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The constitutionality of afederal statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.”) (citing United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d589, 601 (5th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2003)(“This court reviews a constitutional challenge to a federal statute de novo.”) (citationsomitted)

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ALSO:

“We review the constitutionality of a federal statute and the district court’sinterpretation of a statute de novo.”

United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997)(citations omitted)

Commerce Clause challenges:

“When reviewing an act of Congress passed under the authority of the CommerceClause, we review the statute under the rational basis standard. The burden for thechallenger is high because federal commerce legislation continues to merit a highdegree of judicial deference. In applying this deferential standard, due respect for thedecisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate acongressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded itsconstitutional bounds.”

United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 203(5th Cir. 2003) (internalquotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted; emphasis in original)

Due process:

“We review de novo an alleged due process violation . . . .”

United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 439 (5th Cir. 2003) (citingUnited States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir. 2002))

CONTINUANCE:

Denial of motion for continuance: abuse of discretion

United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1993)

Grant or denial of motion for continuance: abuse of discretion

United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Alford, 999 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1993)

“CRIME OF VIOLENCE”:

Whether a crime constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): de novo

United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.

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Credit, 95 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1996)

CROSS-EXAMINATION -- See also CONFRONTATION

Rulings limiting the scope or extent of cross-examination:

Trial: abuse of discretion

United States v. Alexius, 76 F.3d 642, 644 (5th Cir. 1996), citingUnited States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 1994); UnitedStates v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993); UnitedStates v. Barksdale-Contreras, 972 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992); see alsoDelaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).

Suppression hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1996)

Decision to permit a certain line of cross-examination: abuse of discretion

United States v. Smith-Bowman, 76 F.3d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1977)

DEPORTATION – See REMOVAL, infra

DEPOSITIONS:

Denial of motion to take depositions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a): abuse of discretion

United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1994) DISCOVERY:

Alleged errors in administration of discovery rules: abuse of discretion

United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1049 (5th Cir. 1994, citing United States v.Gonzalez, 967 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Webster,162 F.3d 308, 333 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Mora, 994 F.2d 1129, 1138(5th Cir. 1993)) & Webster, id. at 339 (citations omitted)

Alleged discovery violations: abuse of discretion

United States v. Dukes, 139 F.3d 469, 476 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.

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Bullock, 551 F.2d 1377, 1384 (5th Cir. 1977)

Discovery rulings: abuse of discretion

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 336 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

Order for government production of discovery under Rule 16: abuse of discretion

United States v. Mann, 61 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1982)

District court’s grant or denial of disclosure of an informant’s identity: abuse of discretion

United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 85 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 111 (5th Cir. 1996)); United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 111(5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Evans, 941 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1991))

Remedies for discovery violations: abuse of discretion

United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989)

DISQUALIFICATION of defense counsel: abuse of discretion

United States v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1993); see alsoWheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988); United States v.Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990); but see United States v.Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565 (2006)(no showing ofprejudice required for improper denial of choice of counsel).

DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

Collateral estoppel -- See separate topic heading of same name

Denial of motion to dismiss for double jeopardy: de novo

United States v. Botello, 991 F.2d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1993)

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1209 & nn.26, 30 (5th Cir. 1996),citing United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1992)

In habeas case: de novo

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Shute v. State of Texas, 117 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Review of double jeopardy challenges to multiple prosecutions/imposition ofmultiple punishments: de novo

United States v. Cruce, 21 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United Statesv. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1992)

DUE PROCESS:

Generally:

“We review de novo an alleged due process violation . . . .”

United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 439 (5th Cir. 2003) (citingUnited States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir. 2002))

Existence of substantial interference by government with a defense witness: clearlyerroneous

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1997), citing UnitedStates v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 932 (2nd Cir. 1988)

DUPLICITY: de novo

United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 866 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1354 (10th Cir. 1998)

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE -- See WIRETAPS

ENTRAPMENT:

Generally: “We review de novo a trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense ofentrapment.”

United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing UnitedStates v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2003))

Whether evidence is insufficient to support a jury finding that a defendant was not entrapped:

“‘When a jury, which was fully charged on entrapment, rejects the defendant’sentrapment defense, the applicable standard of review is the same as that which

See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (prior to1

admission of 404(b) evidence, district court is required to determine that evidence is (1) relevantto crime charged and (2) not unfairly prejudicial).

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applies to sufficiency of the evidence.’”

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 1997), quotingUnited States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 126 (5th Cir. 1995)

SEE ALSO United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.2003) (“[W]hen a defendant’s properly requested entrapmentinstruction is undergirded by evidence sufficient to support areasonable jury’s finding of entrapment, the district court errsreversibly by not adequately charging the jury on the theory ofentrapment.”) (citing United States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5thCir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and further citation omitted).

EQUITABLE TOLLING -- See HABEAS CORPUS, infra

EVIDENCE:

Admissibility: abuse of discretion

United States v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1993); see alsoUnited States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991)

Review is “heightened in a criminal case.” United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294F.3d 657, 662 (5 Cir. 2004)th

FED. R. EVID. 403 determinations: abuse of discretion

United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United Statesv. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Dula,989 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1993)

FED. R. EVID. 404(b) determinations:

District court must make Beechum findings; if it does, findings are reviewed for1

abuse of discretion. If the trial court "did not articulate its reasoning," court ofappeals may conduct the Beechum analysis itself. If, however, the factors on whichthe Beechum analysis are made are not "readily apparent," remand is required due tothe "uncertainty of the record."

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United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 212-14 (5th Cir. 1983)

BUT SEE United States v. Fox, 69 F.3d 15, 20 (5th Cir. 1995) (admission of 404(b)evidence over objection reviewed under a heightened abuse of discretion standard)(citations omitted); accord United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2003)(noting that, “[i]n criminal cases, our review is ‘necessarily heightened’”) (quotingUnited States v. Gonzalez, 76 F.3d 1339, 1347 (5th Cir. 1996)); United States v.Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 831 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

BUT SEE United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.1995) ("We reviewthe district court's admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) under a 'carefulapplication' of the abuse of discretion standard."), quoting United States v. Anderson,933 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir. 1991)

Rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony:

Abuse of discretion, United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 157 (5 Cir. 2006);th

heightened in criminal cases, United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662(5 Cir. 2004). See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509th

U.S. 579 (1993).

Admission of audio recordings: abuse of discretion

United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 827 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Eakes, 783 F.2d 499, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1986)

Co-conspirators’ statements:

Admission of co-conspirators' statement into evidence under Fed. R. Evid.801(d)(2)(E): abuse of discretion

United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We reviewthe admission f hearsay evidence under the non-hearsay definition of Rule801(d)(2)(E) for abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks and citationomitted); United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 1999)

Determinations that statement was made by a co-conspirator and in furtherance ofthe conspiracy: clearly erroneous

United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

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SEE ALSO United States v. Green, 180 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Ruling thata statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy is a factual finding, reversibleonly if clearly erroneous.”), citing United States v Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 434 (5thCir. 1992)

Decision whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness reliability: abuse of discretion

United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986)

Admission of photographs into evidence: abuse of discretion

United States v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kaiser,545 F.2d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 1977)

Decision whether to allow or disallow polygraph evidence: abuse of discretion

United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1514-15 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

Scientific evidence (Rule 702): abuse of discretion

United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1514-15 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

BUT SEE Eiland v. Westinghouse Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1995) (cited inPettigrew) (admission or exclusion of expert opinion testimony not disturbed unless"manifestly erroneous")

Sentencing:

“We review the exclusion of sentencing evidence for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2004) (citationomitted)

Admission of tape recordings: abuse of discretion

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Determination of trustworthiness of tape recording: abuse of discretion

United States v. Dukes, 139 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1992)

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Admission of transcript of tape recording: abuse of discretion

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir. 1978)

EVIDENTIARY HEARING:

Denial of evidentiary hearing (pretrial motions): abuse of discretion

United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United Statesv. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Harrelson,705 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Poe, 462 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir.1972).

However, an evidentiary hearing is required – and hence a district court perforceabuses its discretion in denying a hearing – where “‘'the defendant alleges sufficientfacts which, if proven, would justify relief.’” United States v. Mergist, 738 F.2d 645,648 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Harrelson, 705 F.2d at 737).

Denial of evidentiary hearing (sentencing): abuse of discretion

United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 927 (5th Cir. 1994)

Denial of § 2255 without holding evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United Statesv. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

New trial motion: Refusal of a hearing on a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion.

United States v. Blackthorne, 378 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting UnitedStates v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 371 n.17 (5th Cir. 2002); internal quotation marks,brackets, and further citation omitted)

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: See BRADY

EXCUSABLE NEGLECT (for failure to timely file notice of appeal): abuse of discretion

United States v. Clark, 51 F.3d 42, 43 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: See SEARCH AND SEIZURE

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EXPERTS: See EVIDENCE

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS -- See also IDENTIFICATION

Decision whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness reliability: abuse of discretion

United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986)

FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

Interpretation of the Rules: de novo

United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1996)

FELON IN POSSESSION:

Whether civil rights have been sufficiently restored to preclude prosecution under 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): de novo

United States v. Dupaquier, 74 F.3d 615, 617 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v.Thomas, 991 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1993)

FINE:

Determination of ability to pay a fine: clearly erroneous

United States v. Thomas, 13 F.3d 151, 153 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1994), citingUnited States v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1993)

FORFEITURE:

Findings of fact: clearly erroneous

Question of whether those facts constitute legally proper forfeiture: de novo

United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United Statesv. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 946 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1991)), aff’d sub nom. Salinasv. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); see also United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d296, 318 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Marmolejo)

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Probable cause:

Findings of fact: clearly erroneous

Whether facts are legally sufficient to constitute probable cause: de novo

United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1998), citingUnited States v. 1988 Oldsmobile Supreme, 983 F.2d 670, 674 (5th Cir.1993)

“The issue of standing [to contest forfeiture] is one of law, and review is plenary.”

United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. $38,750 in U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d 1108, 111 (5th Cir. 1992)

GUILTY PLEA:

District court’s decision whether to accept a plea as factually supported: clearly erroneous

United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Carter, 117 F.3d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1997)

Rule 11 (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11) challenges:

Generally: whether the requirements of Rule 11 were satisfied is a conclusion oflaw and is therefore reviewable de novo

United States v. Scott, 987 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1993); accord UnitedStates v. Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Scott)

District court's finding that there is a factual basis for the plea, as required by Rule11(f): clearly erroneous

United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted);United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)

Validity of plea: de novo

United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000), citing United Statesv. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1997)

Voluntariness of plea: de novo

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United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104, 111 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Amaya andHoward, infra); United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1997) (citingHoward, infra); United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1993), citingMarshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983)

Failure to object results in plain error review. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,59 (2002)

Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea: abuse of discretion

United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Henderson); UnitedStates v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Bounds, 943 F.2d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1991)

HABEAS CORPUS (including § 2255):

GENERALLY:

In reviewing a district court’s grant of habeas relief, we review factualfindings for clear error and issues of law de novo. See Dison v. Whitley, 20F.3d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1994). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewedde novo by independently applying the law to the facts found by the districtcourt, unless those factual determinations are clearly erroneous. See Gray v.Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 266 (5th Cir. 1993).

Lauti v. Johnson, 102 F.3d 166, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1996)

Review of state court findings must show an “unreasonable determination of the factsin light of the evidence presented at the state court proceedings.” Miller-El v. Dretke,545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d)(2)).

Certificate of appealability should be issued if “reasonable jurists would find thedistrict court’s assessment of the constitutionality clearly debatable or wrong.”Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003)

Denial of motion to abate/hold in abeyance: abuse of discretion

Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

Dismissal for abuse of the writ: abuse of discretion

Dupuy v. Cain, 201 F.3d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30146), citing Rodriguezv. Johnson, 104 F.3d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1997)

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AEDPA:

Applicability of AEDPA: de novo

Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 772 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Kiser v.Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1999)

District court’s decision to decline to invoke equitable tolling: abuse of discretion

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and footnotewith further citations omitted)

Denial of equitable tolling (where not based on error of law): abuse of discretion

Molo v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnote with citationsomitted)

Limitations:

Whether a petition is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations: de novo

Foreman v. Dretke, 343 F.3d 336, 2004 WL 1900408, *1 (5th Cir.Aug. 27, 2004) (citing Giesberg v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 268, 270 (5thCir. 2002); Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted)

Whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations is jurisdictional or an affirmativedefense: de novo

Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Denial of motion to alter or amend (Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)): abuse of discretion

Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnote with citationsomitted)

Denial of leave to amend petition after answer is filed: abuse of discretion

Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 1995) (§ 2254 petition)

United States v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (§ 2255motion)

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United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)(allowance of leave for government to amend answer to § 2255 petition)

Coerced verdict (Allen charge issue): de novo

Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d876, 882 (5th Cir. 1994)

Competency: mixed question of law and fact

Whether a petitioner suffers from a mental disorder or incapacitating mentalillness: question of fact, reviewed under clearly erroneous standard

Ultimate competency finding: reviewing court takes a “hard look” (quasi-de novo?)

Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945, 951 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

Whether admission of hearsay evidence violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right ofconfrontation: de novo

Gochicoa v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Denial of review based upon state procedural ground: de novo

Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)

Discovery requests under Rule 6: abuse of discretion; "however, a court's blanket denialof discovery is an abuse of discretion if discovery is 'indispensable to a fair, rounded,development of the material facts.'"

East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1995)

Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b): abuse of discretion

Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnote with citationomitted)

Dismissal of § 2241 petition on the pleadings: de novo

Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Venegas v. Henman, 126F.3d 760, 761 (5th Cir. 1997)

Dismissal of § 2254 petition as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d): abuse of discretion

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McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998), citing Hamilton v.Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996)

Dismissal based on presence of unexhausted state claims: abuse of discretion

Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

Double jeopardy claims: de novo

Shute v. State of Texas, 117 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Equitable tolling -- See topic heading of same name under AEDPA, supra

Denial of § 2255 without holding evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United Statesv. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

Findings of fact in a § 2241 (habeas corpus) petition: clearly erroneous

Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d760, 761 (5th Cir. 1997)

Findings of fact in a § 2254 petition: clearly erroneous

Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 337 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Findings of fact in a § 2255 motion: clearly erroneous

United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

Dismissal of § 2254 petition as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d): abuse of discretion

McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998), citing Hamilton v.Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996)

District court’s harmless error determination: de novo

Johnson v. Cain, 215 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d128, 132 (5th Cir. 1994)

Decision whether to hold a hearing on a § 2255 motion: abuse of discretion

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United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 530 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1995), citing UnitedStates v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992)

"Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which we review denovo."

Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Greenv. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Salazar v. Johnson, 96 F.3d789, 791 (5th Cir. 1996) (§ 2254)

ALSO

United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Flores-Ochoa, 139 F.3d 1022, 1024(5th Cir. 1998) (§ 2255)

BUT: “[Although] the district court’s conclusion is reviewed de novo . . . itsunderlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error.”

Jones v. Jones, 163 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)(petitioner mustshow counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudice)

Denial of investigative funds under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q): abuse of discretion

Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760,769 (5th Cir. 2000)

Jurisdiction: “We review de novo the district court’s determination of its jurisdiction.”

Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)

Jury instructions: In evaluating a constitutional challenge to a jury instruction, a reviewing court must "inquire'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instructionin a way' that violates the Constitution." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991), quotingBoyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see also Estelle v. McGuire, id. at 72 n.4(expressly disapproving seemingly contradictory standards of review in previous cases). Thecourt must determine "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial thatthe resulting conviction violates due process." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973).

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Issues of law:

(§ 2241/habeas corpus): de novo

Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d760, 761 (5th Cir. 1997)

(§ 2254): de novo

Clark v. Scott, 70 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d634, 636 (5th Cir. 1992); Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1995)(citation omitted)

(§ 2255): de novo

United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995)

Limitations:

Whether a petition is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations: de novo

Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations is jurisdictional or an affirmative defense:de novo

Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Due process claim of knowing use of perjured testimony:

Underlying facts: clear error

Conclusions from the facts: de novo

Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Prison discipline:

Whether there was any evidence to support the prison disciplinary board’s guiltyfinding: de novo

Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 535 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)

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District court’s determination respecting procedural bar: de novo

Johnson v. Cain, 215 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2000), quoting and citing Boyd v. Scott,45 F.3d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1994)

Procedural default (district court's denial of federal habeas corpus on state proceduralground): de novo

Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Amos v.Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Adequacy of state procedural rule (whether state procedural rule is applied regularlyand evenhandedly enough to constitute procedural default): de novo

Reed v. Scott, 70 F.3d 844, 846 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Amos v. Scott,61 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Grant of review of claims defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent andadequate state rule: de novo

Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Denial of motion for reconsideration: abuse of discretion

Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 1995)

Denial of motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b): abuse of discretion

Behringer v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1996), citing Fackelman v. Bell,564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977)

Stay of execution:

Refusal to grant stay: abuse of discretion

Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); seealso Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Delo v. Stokes,495 U.S. 320, 322 (1990)

Stay of execution under 28 U.S.C. § 2251: abuse of discretion

Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Delo v. Stokes, 495U.S. 320, 322 (1990)

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Successive petitions:

Dismissal of second or subsequent petition (§ 2254): abuse of discretion

Rodriguez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted);James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

Denial of successive § 2255 motion: abuse of discretion

United States v. Espinoza, 82 F.3d 640, 642 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1993)

Summary judgment:

§ 2255: de novo

United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Kopycinskiv. Scott, 64 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1995)

§ 2254: de novo

Fisher v. State of Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Kopycinskiv. Scott, 64 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1995)

SEE ALSO Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1170 (5th Cir. 1995) (citationomitted) (where no state court findings entitled to presumption of correctness,grant of summary judgment reviewed de novo)

Whether judicial decision announces “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, thus prohibitingretroactive application to cases already final at time of announcement of new rule: de novo

United States v. Shunk, 113 F.3d 31, 34 (5th Cir. 1997) (§ 2255)

Dismissal based on presence of unexhausted state claims: abuse of discretion

Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

HEARING -- See EVIDENTIARY HEARING

HYDE AMENDMENT:

Decision whether or not to award attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment: abuse

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of discretion

Legal determinations underlying the district court’s decision: de novo

United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 905-06 (5th Cir. 2000)

IDENTIFICATION:

Whether identification evidence and the fruits therefrom are admissible at trial (i.e., whethera defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated by the introduction of impermissiblysuggestive and inherently unreliable photographic identification evidence): de novo

Underlying factual findings: clearly erroneous

United States v. Honer, 225 F.3d 549, 552 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); seealso United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 459 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing UnitedStates v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 1997)), vacated on other grounds, 165F.3d 1020 (1999) (en banc)

IMPEACHMENT:

“Whether disclosures of impeachment information violate any constitutional or statutoryright of the defendant is determined as a question of law. This court reviews questions oflaw de novo.”

United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

INDICTMENT:

Sufficiency of indictment (where objected to in district court): de novo

United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999), citing UnitedStates v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Asibor, 109F.3d 1023, 1037 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v. Green, 964 F.2d 365, 372,(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1993), citing UnitedStates v. Aguilar, 967 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1992)

See also United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We review denovo . . . ‘whether an indictment sufficiently alleges the elements of an offense.’”)(citing United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Sufficiency of indictment (where first raised on appeal): indictment to be read with

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"maximum liberality"

United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999), citing UnitedStates v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 879F.2d 1247, 1251 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989). Failure to object results in plain error review.United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)

Denial of motion to strike language from indictment: abuse of discretion

United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1550 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v.Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1971)

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:

"Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which we review denovo."

Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (§ 2254)

ALSO

United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Flores-Ochoa, 139 F.3d 1022, 1024(5th Cir. 1998) (§ 2255)

BUT: “[Although] the district court’s conclusion is reviewed de novo . . . its underlyingfactual findings are reviewed for clear error.”

Jones v. Jones, 163 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)(deficientperformance and prejudice)

INFORMANTS:

Grant or denial of disclosure of an informant: abuse of discretion

United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 85 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding standard is abuseof discretion) (citing United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 111 (5th Cir. 1996));United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 111 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.Evans, 941 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1991))

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INSANITY/ INCOMPETENCY:

Competency: mixed question of law and fact

Whether a petitioner suffers from a mental disorder or incapacitating mentalillness: question of fact, reviewed under clearly erroneous standard

Ultimate competency finding: reviewing court takes a “hard look” (quasi-de novo?)

Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945, 951 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

Whether district court should sua sponte order competency hearing: abuse of discretion

Jury instruction:Whether defendant has produced sufficient evidence to entitle him to an insanityinstruction: de novo

United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 403 (5th Cir. 1999)

Existence of "reasonable cause" to put court on notice that defendant might be mentallyincompetent: abuse of discretion

United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303-304 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

Whether insanity acquittee should be released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243: clearlyerroneous

United States v. Jackson, 19 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1994)

INTERPRETERS:

Appointment of interpreters: abuse of discretion

United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 2004) ( “We review the decisionto appoint an interpreter for abuse of discretion.”) (citing United States v. Ball, 988F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1993)

INVENTORY SEARCH:

Whether search is a valid inventory search: de novo

United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 91 (5th Cir. 1995), quoting and citing UnitedStates v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 1991)

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JENCKS ACT:

“We review a district court’s decisions regarding discovery under the Jencks Act for clearerror.”

United States v. Hodgkiss, 116 F.3d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United Statesv. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1979)), judgment vacated on other groundssub nom. Hodgkiss v. United States, 522 U.S. 1012 (1997); see also United Statesv. Ramirez, 174 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Martinez, 87F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1996)

Whether written materials constitute a "statement" under the Jencks Act: clearly erroneous

United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 899 (5th Cir. 1992)

BUT where a district court's conclusion that written materials are not Jencks Actstatements is based upon an error of law, that conclusion is not subject to clearlyerroneous review, and remand is required.

United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1987)

AND “The trial court’s finding will constitute clear error where such finding either restsupon an incorrect rule of law or is inconsistent with the facts upon which it purportsto rest.”

United States v. Ramirez, 174 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotationmarks omitted), quoting United States v. Martinez, 87 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1996)

See also United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Whether disclosuresof impeachment information violate any constitutional or statutory right of the defendant isdetermined as a question of law. This court reviews questions of law de novo.”) (citationsomitted) [quote made in context of Jencks Act challenge]

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal: de novo

United States v. Muñoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Greer, 137 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 228(5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325, 1330 (5thCir. 1994)

“We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to

30

entertain [defendant’s] third posttrial motion for judgment of acquittal.”

United States v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)

JURISDICTION:

Challenges to a district court’s jurisdiction: de novo

United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2003), citing United Statesv. Sims Bros. Const., Inc., 277 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2001)

Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: de novo

United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1996), citing Matter of Bradley, 989F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1993)

Jurisdiction generally: “We review the issue of the district court’s jurisdiction de novo.”

United States v. Lynch, 114 F.3d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1997), citing In re United StatesAbatement Corp., 39 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1994)

Legal determinations: “We review legal determination regarding the subject matterjurisdiction of a district court de novo.”

United States v. Urrabazo, 234 F.3d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United Statesv. Alvarado, 201 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Fernandez,379 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We review the district court’s legal conclusionsregarding jurisdiction de novo.”)

Jurisdiction to resentence: de novo

United States v. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United Statesv. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997)

Subject matter jurisdiction: de novo

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 115 F.3d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted);United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d 831, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1996), citing In re UnitedStates Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1994)

JURY:

Empanelment of anonymous jury: abuse of discretion

31

United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1995)

Decisions regarding jury bias: abuse of discretion

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 342 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 407 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066,1068 (5th Cir. 1997)

Denial of challenge for cause (conclusion that prospective jurors could perform their dutiesas jurors: manifest error

United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 925 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 547 (5th Cir. 1982)

Eleven-member jury:

“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to permit an eleven-member jury to return a verdict after the district court has dismissed the twelfth jurorfor just cause.”

United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Fed. R.Crim. P. 23(b) and United States v. O’Brien, 898 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir.1990)

Excusal of juror: abuse of discretion

United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir. 1992)

Extrinsic influences:

Conclusion/determination that jury was not improperly tainted by extrinsicevidence: clearly erroneous

United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

Evidentiary hearings:

No hearing held: decision not to hold a hearing at all is reviewed for abuseof (broad) discretion.

United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978), citedin United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1153 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1995)

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Limited hearing held/scope of hearing limited: reviewed for abuse of(broad) discretion (Chiantese standard)

United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1995)

Handling of such complaints generally: abuse of discretion

United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 794 (5th Cir. 1996)

SEE ALSO United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1999)(district court’s choice of methods to investigate possibility of extrinsictaint reviewed for abuse of discretion) (citations omitted)

“Fair cross section”:

Trial court’s factual determination that there was no systematic exclusion of minoritymembers from venire: clearly erroneous

United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 1995)

Decision whether or not to dismiss a juror for lack of impartiality: clear abuse of discretion

United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1554 (5th Cir. 1993)

Denial of motion for mistrial based on allegation of improper extrajudicial conduct byjurors: abuse of discretion

United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1996)

Refusal to permit post-trial interviews of jurors: abuse of discretion

United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 794 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving N.D. Tex. Loc.R. 8.2(e); citations omitted)

Denial of motion for mistrial based upon jurors’ failure to disclose relevant informationduring voir dire: abuse of discretion

United States v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1390, 1398 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

Juror misconduct:

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Decision whether or not to hold evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

Denial of new trial based upon juror misconduct: abuse of discretion

Procedures used to investigate allegations of juror misconduct: abuse of discretion

United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1057-58 (5th Cir. 1996) (citationsomitted)

Motion to strike jury panel:

Determinations of fact: clear error

Determinations of law: de novo

United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United Statesv. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1995)

JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

Overall test: Court reviews to determine whether the court's charge, as a whole, is a correctstatement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of lawapplicable to the factual issues confronting them.

United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1993)

Standard of review for alleged errors in instructions: abuse of discretion

United States v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993), citing UnitedStates v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 1992)

Refusal to give a requested instruction: abuse of discretion

United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1365 (5th Cir. 1994); United Statesv. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1991)

Giving of Allen charge to deadlocked jury: abuse of discretion

United States v. Rivas, 99 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993)

Elements of crime:

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“[W]e review de novo whether the jury instruction misstated an element of thestatutory crime.”

United States v. Morales-Palacios, 369 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2004) (citingUnited States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 605 (5th Cir. 2002))

Whether district court directed a verdict on an element, de novo. United States v.Simkanian, 420 F.3d 397, 403-04 (5 Cir. 2003)th

Entrapment:

Generally: “We review de novo a trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on thedefense of entrapment.”

United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing UnitedStates v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2003))

Whether evidence is insufficient to support a jury finding that a defendant was notentrapped:

“‘When a jury, which was fully charged on entrapment, rejects thedefendant’s entrapment defense, the applicable standard of review is the sameas that which applies to sufficiency of the evidence.’”

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 1997),quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 126 (5th Cir. 1995)

SEE ALSO United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.2003) (“[W]hen a defendant’s properly requested entrapmentinstruction is undergirded by evidence sufficient to support areasonable jury’s finding of entrapment, the district court errsreversibly by not adequately charging the jury on the theory ofentrapment.”) (citing United States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5thCir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and further citation omitted).

Whether defendant has produced sufficient evidence to entitle him to an insanityinstruction: de novo

United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 403 (5th Cir. 1999)

Refusal to give a lesser included offense instruction: two-prong test:

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Whether elements of lesser included offense are a subset of the greater offense: denovo

Whether jury could rationally find lesser offense and acquit on the greater: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 450 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.Harrison, 55 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1995)

Refusal to give requested specific unanimity instruction: abuse of discretion

United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir. 1993); UnitedStates v. Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 477 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Beros,833 F.2d 455, 458 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1987)

“Whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the giving of a particular charge is a ‘fact-intensive’ question and thus is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.”

United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1990)

Refusal to give a requested “theory of defense” instruction: de novo

United States v. Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Gentry, 839 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1988)

SEE ALSO United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[W]herethere is an evidentiary foundation for a theory of defense that, if credited by the jury,would be legally sufficient to render the accused innocent, it is reversible error torefuse to charge on that theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT:

Decision to excuse an individual juror under the Act: abuse of discretion

Interpretation of the Act’s language: de novo

United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997)

JUVENILES:

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Certification of juveniles for federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 5032: de novo

United States v. Male Juvenile, 148 F.3d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1998); see also UnitedStates v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 225 F.3d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Male Juvenile)

NOTE: “The need certification under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is a jurisdictionalrequirement; therefore, a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the certification filedin the present case can be raised at any time.”

United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 225 F.3d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 2000) (citingMale Juvenile)

Interpretation of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq.): de novo

United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997), on reh’g en banc onother grounds United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)

Decision whether to transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032:abuse of discretion, provided that court employs and makes findings as to the six criteriaoutlined in § 5032

United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995), citingUnited States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1994)

Speedy trial (18 U.S.C. § 5036):

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

Conclusions of law: de novo

United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 192 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1999)

LAW:

Questions of law: de novo

United States v. Dupaquier, 74 F.3d 615, 617 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v.Thomas, 991 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.1993)

LAW OF THE CASE:

“Whether the law of the case doctrine foreclosed the district court’s exercise of discretionon remand and the interpretation of this court’s remand order present questions of law that

37

this court reviews de novo.”

United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

LIMITATIONS: See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

MENS REA:

Whether a statute contains a particular mens rea requirement: de novo

United States v. Privett, 68 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1995)

“The question of to which elements of the offenses the word ‘knowingly’ applies is aquestion of pure statutory construction which we review de novo.”

United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Snyder, 930 F.2d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991)

MISTRIAL:

Grant or denial of a mistrial generally: abuse of discretion

United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v.Coveney, 995 F.2d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 1993)

Denial of motion for mistrial based on allegation of improper extrajudicial conduct byjurors: abuse of discretion

United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1996)

Denial of motion for mistrial based upon jurors’ failure to disclose relevant informationduring voir dire: abuse of discretion

United States v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1390, 1398 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

Midtrial publicity (whether publicity during a trial is so prejudicial as to require amistrial): abuse of discretion

United States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 1993)

Motion for mistrial based upon an alleged prejudicial comment by the prosecution:abuse of discretion

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United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United States v.Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1378 (5th Cir. 1993)

MULTIPLICITY: de novo

United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Brechtel, 997F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir. 1993)

NEW TRIAL:

Characterization of district court’s ruling (i.e., grant of new trial, or grant of judgment ofacquittal?): de novo

United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1997)

Denial of motion for new trial based on alleged extrinsic influence on jury: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 608 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1058 (5th Cir. 1996)

Procedures used to investigate & whether evidentiary hearing is granted: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 608 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1058 (5th Cir. 1996)

Denial of motion for new trial generally: abuse of discretion

United States v. Blackthorne, 378 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2004) (citingUnited States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1997)); United Statesv. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1120 & n.54 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.Baytank (Houston), 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Arroyo,805 F.2d 589, 599 (5th Cir. 1986)

Evidentiary hearing: “Refusal of a hearing on a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuseof discretion.”

United States v. Blackthorne, 378 F.3d 449, 455 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting UnitedStates v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 371 n.17 (5th Cir. 2002)); internal quotation marks,brackets, and further citation omitted)

Denial of motion for new trial (generally): abuse of discretion

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United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 2004)

Denial of motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence: clear abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Simmons, 714 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1983)

BUT SEE United States v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1997) (citationomitted) (standard is “abuse of discretion”)

Grant of motion for new trial: abuse of discretion

United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993)

Questions of law: de novo

United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 893 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Munn v. Algee,924 F.2d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 1991)

Mixed questions of law and fact:

Underlying facts: abuse of discretion

Conclusions to be drawn from those facts: de novo

United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 893 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Ornelasv. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996)

Motion for new trial based on weight of the evidence: clear abuse of discretion

United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993)

OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENTAL MISCONDUCT:

Decision to dismiss or not on basis of alleged due process violation from outrageousgovernmental misconduct: de novo

United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United Statesv. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. 1997))

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United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v.Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 68 F.3d 899,902 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1995) (also citing Graves)

Decision not to hold evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United Statesv. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 1976))

PAROLE:

Review of decisions of United States Parole Commission:

“This court’s review of the decision of the Parole Commission is‘quite circumscribed.” Villareal v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 985 F.2d835, 839 (5th Cir. 1993). The court ‘simply ask[s] whether there issome evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision.’Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Parole Commission’sdecision will be affirmed unless its action ‘is flagrant, unwarranted,or unauthorized.’ Maddox v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 821 F.2d 997,1000 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted).”

Van Etten v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 96 F.3d 144, 145 (5th Cir. 1996)

Review of Sentencing Guidelines decisions made by Parole Commission in treaty transfercases:

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

Guidelines determinations: de novo

Rosier v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 109 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1997), citingMolano-Garza v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 965 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1992)

PHOTOGRAPHS:

Admission of photographs into evidence: abuse of discretion

United States v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kaiser,545 F.2d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 1977)

PLAIN ERROR:

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Failure to object in the trial court results in review solely for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5 Cir. 1994) (en banc).th

An appellate court will find plain error “only if: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear andobvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Calverley,37 F.3d 160, 163-64 (5 Cir. 1994), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).th

When these elements are present, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to correct the errorif it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Calverley,37 F.3d at 164.

PLEA AGREEMENT:

Alleged breach of plea agreement: de novo

United States v. Saling, 205 F.3d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnote with citationsomitted); United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 836 (5th Cir. 1998) (citationsomitted); United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1998) (citationomitted); United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

But defendant must prove breach by preponderance of the evidence, United Statesv. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 434 (5 Cir. 2002)th

Existence of a plea agreement: clearly erroneous

United States v. Chagra, 957 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)

District court’s findings as to the underlying facts that constitute breach: clearlyerroneous

United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 836 n.24 (5th Cir. 1998)

BUT NOTE: Where district court fails to make any factual findings, appellate court “mustconduct a de novo review of every aspect of [the defendant’s] purported breach.”

United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 836 n.24 (5th Cir. 1998)

Findings with respect to plea discussions/negotiations, existence and terms of pleaagreement, and whether promise induced plea: clearly erroneous

United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987)), judgment aff’d by an equallydivided en banc court, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

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Rejection of a plea agreement: abuse of discretion

United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY:

Generally: “The district court’s factual determinations are reviewed only for clear error; itsconclusions of law, de novo.”

United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1994))

Entitlement to discovery/evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1997)

Findings of prejudice vel non: clearly erroneous

United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 868 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Beszborn,21 F.3d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1994)

PRESENCE:

District court's finding that a defendant is voluntarily absent from her trial: clear error

Decision to proceed without a voluntarily absent defendant: abuse of discretion

United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)

PRESENTENCE REPORT:

Decision to publicly disclose presentence report: abuse of discretion

United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995)

PRO SE REPRESENTATION:

Whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel and elected toproceed pro se is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo.

Crandell v. Brunnell, 25 F.3d 754, 754 (9th Cir. 1994).

PROBATION:

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Revocation of probation: abuse of discretion

United States v. King, 990 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fryar,920 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1990)

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT:

Improper remarks in closing argument: court reviews allegedly improper prosecutorialremarks to determine whether they were both inappropriate and harmful. In order toconstitute reversible error, the offending remarks must have affected the defendant'ssubstantial rights, and must have contributed to the guilty verdict.

United States v. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1988)

GRIFFIN error (comment on defendant's failure to testify): de novo

“We review de novo whether a prosecutor’s argument is an impermissiblecomment on the defendant’s right not to testify.”

United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 299 (5th Cir. 1999) (citationomitted)

Improper remarks:

“In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court applies atwo-step analysis. We must first decide whether or not the prosecutor‘made an improper remark.’ In determining whether a prosecutor’scomment was improper, it is necessary to look at the comment in context. If an improper remark was made, we must then determine whether theremark ‘prejudiced the defendant’s substantive rights.’ The prejudicedetermination involves ‘(1) the magnitude of the statement’s prejudice, (2)the effect of any cautionary instructions given, and (3) the strength of theevidence of the defendant’s guilt.’ ‘The determinative question is whetherthe prosecutor’s remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’sverdict.’”

United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2004) (citationsomitted)

Interference with attorney-client relationship: decision to dismiss on this basisreviewed de novo

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United States v. Johnson, 68 F.3d 899, 902 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1995), citing UnitedStates v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977)

Substantial interference with defense witnesses: clearly erroneous

United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 2004)

Use of perjured testimony (violation of Napue v. Illinois):

Underlying facts: abuse of discretion

Conclusions to be drawn from those facts: de novo

United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 893-94 (5th Cir.1997)

Prosecutorial vindictiveness: See VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION

PUBLICITY:

Denial of evidentiary hearing on pretrial publicity: abuse of discretion

United States v. Smith-Bowman, 76 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1996)

Whether publicity during trial requires mistrial: abuse of discretion

United States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 1993)

Denial of request for voir dire on midtrial publicity: abuse of discretion

United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir. 1994)

RECUSAL:

District judge's decision to recuse him- or herself from case: abuse of discretion

United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426. 437 (5th Cir. 1995), citing UnitedStates v. MMR Corp., 954 F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1992)

District judge's failure to recuse him- or herself from case on proper motion: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d

45

152, 156 & 158 (5th Cir. 1995)

REDUCTION OF SENTENCE:

Motion to reduce sentence (pre-Guidelines version of Rule 35): gross abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Sinclair, 1 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (retroactive reduced Guidelines range):

Decision whether to reduce sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) forretroactive Guidelines amendments: abuse of discretion

United States v. Mueller, 168 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 1999), citing UnitedStates v. Townsend, 55 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.Levay, 76 F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v. Townsend,55 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007,1009 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 430 (5thCir. 1994) (per curiam)

Findings of fact on a § 3582(c)(2) motion: clearly erroneous

United States v. Levay, 76 F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir.1996), citing UnitedStates v. Mimms, 43 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1995)

REMOVAL:

Constitutional challenge to prior removal under United States v. Mendoza-Lopez: de novo

United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2000) (citationomitted)

REOPENING PROCEEDINGS:

Denial of motion to reopen: abuse of discretion

United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985)), reinstated in relevant part on reh’gen banc, 104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (trial)

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United States v. Hassan, 83 F.3d 693, 696 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Hobbs,31 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 1994) (suppression hearing)

United States v. Kubosh, 63 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. granted andjudgment vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996), reinstated in relevantpart on remand, 120 F.3d 47 (5th Cir. 1997) (sentencing; statutory penaltyenhancement proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 851)

RESENTENCING -- See subheading of same name under SENTENCING

RESTITUTION:

Generally:

“Restitution, a criminal penalty, is reviewed de novo.”

United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1135 (5th Cir. 1997), citingUnited States v. Hayes, 32 F.3d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1994)

Legality of restitution order: de novo

United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (MVRA);United States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We reviewthe legality of a restitution order de novo.”) (citing United States v.Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451 (5th Cir. 1992))

If sentence is legal, award of restitution reviewed for: abuse of discretion

United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2004)(MVRA); United States v. Reese, 998 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.1993) (VWPA); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451-52(5th Cir. 1992)) (VWPA)

Sentencing court's compliance with the statutory requirements of the Victim andWitness Protection Act (VWPA): abuse of discretion.

United States v. Reese, 998 F.2d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.Barndt, 913 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990)

Propriety of restitution payment schedule: abuse of discretion

United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 419 (5th Cir. 2002), citing United States

47

v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 436 (5th Cir. 1998)

Whether a person or entity is a “victim” under the VWPA: de novo

United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 419 (5th Cir. 2002), citing United Statesv. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)

RETURN OF PROPERTY (FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)):

District court’s factual determination of lawful possession, or ownership: clearlyerroneous

District court’s interpretation of Rule 41(e): de novo

United States v. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)

REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS -- See PROBATION and SUPERVISED RELEASE

RULE 32 -- See topic subheading of same name under SENTENCING, infra

RULE 35:

Motion to correct sentence (pre-Guidelines version of Rule 35): gross abuse ofdiscretion.

United States v. Martinez, 19 F.3d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1994), citing UnitedStates v. Hanyard, 762 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)

Motion to reduce sentence (pre-Guidelines version of Rule 35): gross abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Sinclair, 1 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

RULE 43:

Whether Rule 43 requires defendant’s presence at midtrial voir dire of jury on allegedjury tampering incident: de novo

United States v. Lampton, 158 F.3d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)

"SAFETY VALVE": See subheading of same name under SENTENCING

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SANCTIONS:

Whether an attorney’s conduct is subject to sanction: de novo

A district court’s imposition of a particular sanction: abuse of discretion

In re Sealed Appellant, 194 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Brown, 72 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1995)

HOWEVER: “That discretion is abused if the ruling is based on ‘an erroneousview of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’”

United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 28 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Chaves v. M/VMedina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: See also WARRANTS

General: Factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and thedistrict court's conclusions of law on legal questions are reviewed de novo.

United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)

Determination whether a person is acting as an agent for the government: factual findingsubject to clearly erroneous review

United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 480 (5th Cir. 1995)

Chimel [v. California] determinations of immediate control (whether an item is withinthe "immediate control" of an arrestee for purposes of search pursuant to arrest): de novo

United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1994), granting reh'g in partto and clarifying 16 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1994)

Consent:

District court's ultimate determination of consent: clearly erroneous

United States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 1298, 1304 (5th Cir. 1994), citing UnitedStates v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 997 (5th Cir. 1993)

Scope of consent: de novo

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United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 687 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995), citingUnited States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1993)

Voluntariness of consent to search: clearly erroneous

United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnotewith citations omitted); United States v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1390, 1394 (5thCir. 1996), citing United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1995)

BUT SEE United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1997)(“We review de novo the voluntariness of consent to a search.”)

Exigent circumstances:

Factual findings regarding presence of exigent circumstances: clearlyerroneous

United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1997) (enbanc); United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1994)

See also United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 409 (5 Cir. 2008); United Statesth

v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Whether exigent circumstances existis a question of fact, reversible only if the district court’s factual findings areclearly erroneous.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Rodea, 102 F.3d 1401,1404 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Exigent circumstances vel non is a factual findingreviewed for clear error.”) (citation omitted)

Manufactured exigency:

Whether law enforcement officers engaged in unreasonable investigativetactics, thus manufacturing exigent circumstances: de novo

United States v. Rodea, 102 F.3d 1401, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996)

Denial of Franks v. Delaware evidentiary hearing: de novo

United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United Statesv. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1990)

Whether good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies: de novo

United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1198 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing UnitedStates v. Satterwhite, 981 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992)), aff’d sub nom. Salinas

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v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997)

Independent source doctrine: two part analysis

(1) Does the warrant affidavit, when purged of tainted information gained throughan initial illegal search, contain sufficient remaining facts to constitute probablecause? (“Probable cause”) (Reviewed de novo)

(2) Did the illegal search affect or motivate the officers’ decision to procure theeffect of the search warrant? (“Effect of the illegal entry”) (Factualdetermination reviewed under clearly erroneous standard)

United States v. Hassan, 83 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1996) (citationsomitted)

Whether search is a valid inventory search: de novo

United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 91 (5th Cir. 1995), quoting and citing UnitedStates v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 1991)

Reasonableness of investigatory stop/frisk: de novo

United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 2000), citing United States v.Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1999)

Ultimate conclusion that probable cause exists/ does not exist: de novo

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. Chappell, 6F.3d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)

BUT: Factual findings supporting probable cause determination:clearly erroneous

United States v. Ho, 94 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996), citingUnited States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995)

Determination of probable cause after purging of unconstitutionally obtainedinformation from warrant: de novo

United States v. Blount, 98 F.3d 1489, 1495 (5th Cir. 1996) (footnote withcitations omitted), on reh’g en banc, 123 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 1997) (enbanc)

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“Reasonable belief” that subject of arrest warrant is inside residence, permittingentry: clearly erroneous

United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1997)

Reasonable expectation of privacy:

Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable under the circumstances: de novo

United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1992)

Determination of reasonable suspicion: de novo

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)

HOWEVER, while “as a general matter determinations of reasonablesuspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal ... areviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical factonly for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from thosefacts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.”

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)

Ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: de novo

United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United Statesv. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993)

Reasonableness of investigatory stop/frisk: de novo

United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 2000), citing United States v.Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1999)

Reasonableness of an officer’s reliance on a warrant: de novo

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1214 & n.55 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Satterwhite)

Standing:

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Legal question of whether a defendant has standing to challenge an allegedlyillegal search as violative of the Fourth Amendment: de novo

Factual findings of the district court supporting its determination on the standingquestion: clearly erroneous

United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir. 1990)

Sufficiency of affidavit supporting warrant: de novo

United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United Statesv. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1987)

Conclusions of law related to the sufficiency of the warrant: de novo

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d65, 68 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Terry stops (and frisks):

“The reasonableness of an investigatory stop and frisk is reviewed de novo.”

United States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1999) (internalquotation marks omitted), citing United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838,841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); accord United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d447, 448 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Campbell)

Untimely filed motion to suppress: “A decision to deny a suppression motion asuntimely under Rule 12(f) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, giving due consideration tothe movant’s reason for missing the relevant deadline, and any prejudice the refusal mightoccasion.”

United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1996) (footnotes withcitations omitted)

SENTENCING:

General: "How the Guidelines are to be interpreted is a question of law, which[this Court] review[s] de novo. However, factual findings under the Guidelinesare reviewed only for clear error." United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1230& nn.10,11 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946,

53

953 (5th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Williams, ___F.3d ___, 2008 WL615503, *6 (5 Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (post-Booker and Gall, infra)th

In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005), the Supreme Courtdeclared the Guidelines to be advisory and directed appellate courts to review for“reasonableness” in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a). Allsentences are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. UnitedStates, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594 (2007); see also United States v. Herrera-Garduno, ___F.3d ____, 2008 WL 625010, *2 (5 Cir. Mar. 10, 2008).th

An appellate court must first ensure that the district court “committed nosignificant procedural error,” and then consider the “substantive reasonableness”of the sentence imposed. Herrera-Garduno, 2008 WL 625010 at *2 (quoting Gall,128 S.Ct. at 597). In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, the court ofappeals must give “due deference” to the district court. Id. (quoting Gall, 128S.Ct. at 595). The fact that an appellate court might “reasonably have concludedthat a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of thedistrict court.” Id. (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597).

Enhancement/ adjustment for abuse of position of trust (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3): clearlyerroneous

United States v. Fisher, 7 F.3d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v.Ehrlich, 902 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155,1161 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5thCir. 1991)

District court's finding as to whether defendant qualifies for acceptance of responsibility(U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1): even more deferential than a pure clear error standard

United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v.Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 551 (5th Cir. 1993)

(BUT NOTE: Circuit jurisprudence indicates conflicting holdings as toapplicable standard of review. See United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1379& n.39 (5th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases with varying standard of review))

AND ALSO NOTE: United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004)(noting that court “appl[ies] a standard variously described (but without anypractical differences) as ‘clearly erroneous,’ ‘without foundation,’ or ‘greatdeference’”) (citing United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 123 (5th Cir.1995))

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Whether a particular prior conviction is an “aggravated felony” for purposes ofU.S.S.G. § 2L1.2: de novo

United States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir.1997) (citation omitted); United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 95 F.3d369, 371 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

Allocution:

“This court reviews de novo whether a district court complied with [the allocutionrequirement of] Rule 32(c)(3)(C).”

United States v. Echegollen-Barrueta, 195 F.3d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1999),citing United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1998); accordUnited States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 2000) (also citingMyers)

District court’s ruling as to what the most analogous guideline for a given offense is: denovo

United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Smertneck, 954 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir. 1992)

Application of the Guidelines:

“In examining the sentence imposed, we review the trial court’s application of thesentencing guidelines de novo.”

United States v. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1999), citing UnitedStates v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 1999)

ALSO:

“We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the SentencingGuidelines de novo.”

United States v. Ramirez, 367 F.3d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2004) (citingUnited States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc))

Career offender: court “review[s] the interpretation of § 4B1.1 de novo, and the factualfindings for clear error.”

United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.

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Shano, 955 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1992)

See also United States v. Brewster, 137 F.3d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Thedistrict court’s determination that Brewster is a career offender under § 4B1.1 ofthe Sentencing Guidelines is subject to de novo review.”) (citation omitted)

Child pornography guidelines:

Whether a visual depiction of a minor constitutes a “lascivious exhibition of thegenitals or pubic area” under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E): clear error

United States v. Boudreau, 250 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)

Choice of guideline: de novo

United States v. Principe, 203 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Hornsby,infra); United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Smertneck, 954 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Leed, 981F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1992)

Classification of prior conviction as “crime of violence”: de novo

United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635, 636 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on othergrounds, United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)

Whether collateral attack of priors is permitted: abuse of discretion

United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1992)

Finding that conduct is part of a common scheme or plan: clearly erroneous

United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1991)

District court decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentences generally: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Reyes-Lugo, 238 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 2001), citing UnitedStates v. Richardson, 87 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We generally review the impositionof a consecutive sentence only for abuse of discretion, if the court relied onpermissible factors.”).

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(BUT whether district court properly applied relevant sentencing guideline: denovo)

United States v. Reyes-Lugo, 238 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 2001), citingUnited States v. Richardson, 87 F.3d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 1996)

See also United States v. Lynch, 378 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2004) (“While adistrict court’s decision to impose a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence isreviewed for abuse of discretion, this court reviews de novo the district court’sapplication of the sentencing guidelines.”) (citing United States v. Rangel, 319F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3: de novo

United States v. Alexander, 100 F.3d 24, 25 (5th Cir. 1996) (citationomitted)

Compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) and the Guidelines: de novo.

United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2004)

Conspiracy:

End date of a conspiracy for purposes of determining applicable Guidelineversion: clearly erroneous

United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1371 (5th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted)

Whether a defendant is on the verge of completing the substantive offense thatis the object of the conspiracy (U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2): clear error

United States v. Waskom, 179 F.3d 303, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999)

How the Sentencing Guidelines apply to a particular conviction: de novo

United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 95 F.3d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted)

Witness credibility determinations: clearly erroneous

United States v. Ocana, 204 F.3d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 2000), citing United States v.Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 558 (5th Cir. 1996)

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Departures and Variances:

A “unitary abuse-of-discretion standard”

Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594 (2007); see also Koon v. UnitedStates, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996)

Drug quantity: clearly erroneous

United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2004); UnitedStates v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 609 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Leal, 74 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d1350, 1369 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442,445 (5th Cir. 1990)

Enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851:

Meaning of term "prior conviction": de novo

United States v. Liquori, 5 F.3d 435, 436 (9th Cir. 1993)

Sufficiency of § 851(a) information: question of law, thus de novo

Adequacy of government's compliance with § 851(a): de novo

United States v. Steen, 55 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1995)

Whether an offense qualifies as a “felony drug offense”: de novo

United States v. Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Sandle, 123 F.3d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 1997)

Evidence:

“We review the exclusion of sentencing evidence for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted)

Denial of evidentiary hearing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v.Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 927 (5th Cir. 1994)

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Determination of ability to pay a fine: clearly erroneous

United States v. Thomas, 13 F.3d 151, 153 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1994), citingUnited States v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1993)

Grouping of multiple counts: "Whether and how to group a defendant's offenseare legal questions subject to de novo review."

United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1992); see alsoUnited States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1995) (citingPatterson); accord United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir.2000) (“We also review de novo the district court’s application of theSentencing Guidelines grouping rule.”) (footnote with citation omitted).

Gun possession (enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)): clearly erroneous

United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 828 (5th Cir. 1996), quoting and citingUnited States v. Rodriguez, 62 F.3d 723, 724 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.Siebe, 58 F.3d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

SEE ALSO: United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 558-59 & n. 5 (5th Cir. 1996)(breaking down § 2D1.1 determination into two component parts [possession ofgun and foreseeability of co-conspirator’s gun possession] and applying clearlyerroneous standard to both)

Interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines: de novo

United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d234, 237 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnote withcitation omitted); United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1998), citingUnited States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 193 (5th Cir. 1993)

ALSO:

“We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the SentencingGuidelines de novo.”

United States v. Ramirez, 267 F.3d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2004) (citingUnited States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)

Legality of a criminal sentence: de novo

United States v. Byrd, 116 F.3d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v.Fonts, 95 F.3d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hughey, 877 F.2d 1256,

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1259 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hughey v. United States,495 U.S. 411 (1990); United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 247 (9th Cir. 1988)

Application and legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines: de novo

United States v. O’Callaghan, 106 F.3d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnote withcitation omitted); United States v. Quinonez-Terrazas, 86 F.3d 382, 382 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v. Domino, 62 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1995)

SEE ALSO United States v. Mueller, 168 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Wereview de novo the district court’s legal determinations regarding the applicationof sentencing guidelines.”) (citing United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1506(5th Cir. 1992))

Post-Booker same standard applies to legal interpretation, United States v.Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5 Cir. 2005).th

Amount of loss: clearly erroneous

United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 545 (5 Cir. 2005); United States v. Calhoun,th

383 F.3d 281, 2004 WL 1900592, *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2004), citing UnitedStates v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Caldwell,302 F.3d 399, 418 (5th Cir. 2002), citing United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Chappell, 6 F.3d 1095, 1101 (5thCir. 1993) (citation omitted); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir.1993), citing United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 1992) andUnited States v. Sowels, 998 F.2d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 1993)

BUT -- method of calculation of loss: de novo

United States v. Deavours, 219 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2000), citingUnited States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997); UnitedStates v. Randall, 157 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 1998) (also citing Saack);see also Olis, 429 F.3d at 545

AND -- question of legal interpretation as to whether undisputed amountsare to be considered a “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1: de novo

United States v. Izydore, 167 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing UnitedStates v. Randall, 157 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 1998); other out-of-circuitcitation omitted)

Finding that defendant played a managerial role in offense: clearly erroneous

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United States v. Rivas, 99 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Narvaez, 38 F.3d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Lewis, 476F.3d 369 (5 Cir. 2007)th

Determination of whether a defendant played a mitigating role in an offense as a minimalor minor participant (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): clearly erroneous

United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 437 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Zuniga, 18 F.3d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Badger, 925 F.2d101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)

Finding that defendant has engaged in more than minimal planning: clearly erroneous

United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.Perrien, 274 F.3d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155,1159 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Barndt, 913 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 854 (5th Cir. 1998) (citingBrown)

Notice:

Whether Guidelines or Rule 32 require notice of intention to reject presentencereport recommendations on adjustments: de novo

United States v. Knight, 76 F.3d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1996)

Obstruction of justice (USSG § 3C1.1): clearly erroneous

United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 265 (5th Cir. 2004)

But see United States v. Surasky, 976 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted)(“contrary to law or clearly erroneous”)

Finding that defendant acted with the intent to obstruct justice: clearly erroneous

United States v. Calhoun, 383 F.3d 281, 2004 WL 1900592, *2 (5th Cir.Aug. 26, 2004) (citing United States v. Chavarria, 377 F.3d 475, 477 (5thCir. 2004)

Finding of obstructive conduct for purposes of obstruction of justiceenhancement: clearly erroneous

United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United

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States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1481 (5th Cir. 1993))

Finding that a defendant is an organizer/leader: clearly erroneous

United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 944 (5th Cir. 1994), citingUnited States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 550 (5th Cir. 1993)

Presentence report:

Decision to publicly disclose presentence report: abuse of discretion

United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995)

Prior conviction:

Whether a prior conviction is covered/counted under the Guidelines: de novo

Factual matters concerning prior conviction: clearly erroneous

United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1993)

Whether the Sentencing Guidelines apply to a prior conviction: de novo

United States v. Vasquez-Balandran, 76 F.3d 648, 649 (5th Cir. 1996),citing United States v. Garcia-Rico, 46 F.3d 8,9 (5th Cir. 1995)

Sufficiency of proof of prior convictions: de novo

United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 1994), citing UnitedStates v. Martinez-Cortez, 988 F.2d 1408, 1410 (5th Cir. 1993)

Factual finding of reckless endangerment (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2): clearly erroneous

United States v. Lugman, 130 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Related cases:

Under “consolidated for trial or sentencing” prong: deferential (clear error)

Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 60, 64, 66 (2001); United States v.Moreno-Arredondo, 255 F.3d 198, 203 n.10 (5th Cir. 2001)

Under the “occurred on the same occasion” prong: de novo

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United States v. Moreno-Arredondo, 255 F.3d 198, 203 & nn.9,10 (5thCir. 2001)

(FORMERLY, all “related cases” determinations were reviewed de novo in theFifth Circuit, although there was some intracircuit tension on the standard ofreview. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 996 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1993), citingUnited States v. Garcia, 962 F.2d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1992).)

Relevant conduct:

“We review the trial court's determination ‘that conduct is relevant to the offenseof conviction ... under a clearly erroneous standard.’”

United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir. 1995), quotingUnited States v. Cockerham, 919 F.3d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1990); see alsoUnited States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 609 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066 (5th Cir. 1997)

SEE ALSO United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding thateach of the factual components of relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B) -- “reasonable foreseeability,” “in furtherance,” and the existenceof “jointly undertaken criminal activity” -- is factual and therefore is reviewedunder the clearly erroneous standard)

Legal interpretation of scope of relevant conduct provisions: de novo

United States v. Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1998)(citation omitted)

Resentencing:

Jurisdiction: “We consider de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction toresentence.”

United States v. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 1998), citingUnited States v. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997)

Scope of remand, de novo: United States v. Williams, ___F.3d___, 2008 WL 413303, *1 (5 Cir. Feb. 18, 2008)th

Decision whether to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Mueller, 168 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United

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States v. Townsend, 55 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.Levay, 76 F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v. Townsend,55 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007,1009 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 430 (5thCir. 1994) (per curiam)

Restitution: SEE TOPIC HEADING OF SAME NAME ABOVE

Generally: “Restitution, a criminal penalty, is reviewed de novo.”

United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1135 (5th Cir. 1997), citingUnited States v. Hayes, 32 F.3d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1994)

SEE ALSO: United States v. Reese, 998 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Thelegality of a restitution order is reviewed de novo, and, if the sentence is legal, theaward is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”), citing United States v. Chaney, 964F.2d 437, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1992)

SEE ALSO: United States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Wereview the legality of a restitution order de novo.”), citing United States v.Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451 (5th Cir. 1992)

Sentencing court's compliance with the statutory requirements of the Victimand Witness Protection Act (VWPA): abuse of discretion.

Reese, 998 F.2d at 1281, citing United States v. Barndt, 913 F.2d 201 (5thCir. 1990)

Propriety of restitution payment schedule: abuse of discretion

United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 419 (5th Cir. 2002), citing UnitedStates v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 436 (5th Cir. 1998)

Whether a person or entity is a “victim” under the VWPA: de novo

United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 419 (5th Cir. 2002), citing UnitedStates v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)

Rule 32 violations: de novo

United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United Statesv. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 874 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We review the district judge’simplementation of Rule 32(c)(1) de novo.”) (citing Myers).

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"Safety valve" (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2):

Application of “safety valve” provision: "A sentencing court's refusal to apply§ 5C1.2 is a factual finding, which we review for clear error."

United States v. Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 433 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1995), citingUnited States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995)

Factual findings pertaining to a § 5C1.2 reduction: clearly erroneous

United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 910 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1997)

Legal interpretation of “safety valve” provision: de novo

United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 910 (5th Cir. 1998) (citationsomitted); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996),citing United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995)

“Sophisticated laundering [of money]” (USSG § 2S1.1(b)(3)): clearly erroneous

United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 2004)

“Sophisticated means” (U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2)):

“The district court’s factual determination that Powell used sophisticated means isreviewed for clear error.”

United States v. Powell, 124 F.3d 655, 666 (5th Cir. 1997), citing UnitedStates v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1340 (5th Cir. 1996)

“Special skill” (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3): clearly erroneous

United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 1998)

Stipulations: meaning and effect of any factual stipulations on a sentence: de novo

United States v. Domino, 62 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Supervised release:

Conditions of supervised release:

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“This Court reviews a district court’s entry of special conditions ofsupervised release for an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 684 (5th Cir. 1997) (citationsomitted); see also United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 940 (5thCir. 1998)

Threats:

Determination that conduct evidences intent to carry out a threat (U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(1)): clear error

United States v. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1999), citing UnitedStates v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 129 (2nd Cir. 1997)

“Violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process”(U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)): de novo

United States v. Izydore, 167 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997)

Vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1: due deference

United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1993)

BUT SEE United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1188 (5th Cir. 1995) (alsociting Brown, 7 F.3d at 1160, court held vulnerable victim finding reviewed underclearly erroneous standard)

Preclusion of witnesses from testifying at sentencing: abuse of discretion

United States v. Narvaez, 38 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1994), citing FED. R. CRIM. P.

32(c)

SEQUESTRATION:

“We review a district court’s compliance with Rule 615 for abuse of discretion, and wewill only reverse if the appellants can demonstrate prejudice.”

United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United Statesv. Payan, 992 F.2d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1993)), relevant portion reinstated onreh'g en banc, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

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District court’s decision to allow the testimony of a witness who has violated asequestration order: abuse of discretion

United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 871 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 976 (5th Cir. 1990)

SEVERANCE: abuse of discretion

United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lopez, 979F.2d 1024, 1035 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Cortinas, 142 F.3d 242,248 (5th

Cir. 1998)

Denial of motion for severance due to prejudicial joinder (Rule 14): abuse of discretion

United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1214 & n.59 (5th Cir. 1996), citing UnitedStates v. Capote-Capote, 946 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir. 1991)

BUT: Improper joinder/misjoinder under Rule 8: “reviewable on appeal as a matterof law” (thus presumably de novo review)

United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1429 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

SHACKLING of defendant: abuse of discretion

United States v. Hope, 102 F.3d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

SPEEDY TRIAL:

District court’s compliance with the Speedy Trial Act: de novo

United States v. Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515, 526 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnote withcitations omitted)

District court's findings in applying Barker v. Wingo four factor balancing test(constitutional speedy trial claim): clear error

United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Robinson v.Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1993)

Factual findings supporting a Speedy Trial Act ruling: clearly erroneous

United States v. Bailey, 111 F.3d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d

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1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049, 1051(5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Juveniles (18 U.S.C. § 5036):

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

Conclusions of law: de novo

United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 192 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1999)

Legal conclusion in application of Speedy Trial Act: de novo

United States v. Bailey, 111 F.3d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049, 1051(5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); United States v. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d 156,158 (5th Cir. 1991)

Decision to dismiss with or without prejudice under Speedy Trial Act: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Blevins, 142 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted);United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted)

STANDING: See SEARCH AND SEIZURE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:

Whether a defendant was prosecuted in violation of the statute of limitations: plenaryreview (de novo)

United States v. Manges, 110 F.3d 1162, 1169 (5th Cir. 1997), citing UnitedStates v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996)

Factual findings underlying the district court’s decision to toll the statute of limitations(under 18 U.S.C. § 3292): clearly erroneous

United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2001), citing United States v.Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1998)

STATUTES:

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Application of a statute: de novo

United States v. Camp, 343 F.3d 743, 744 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The district court’sapplication of the statute is reviewed de novo.”) (citing United States v. Jennings,195 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1999))

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: de novo

United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d257, 262 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Courtney, 979 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing UnitedStates v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 1988)), aff’d sub nom. Salinas v.United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); United States v. Courtney, 979 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir.1992)

Also

“We review the constitutionality of a federal statute and the district court’s interpretationof a statute de novo.”

United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: de novo

United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1996)

Whether a statute contains a particular mens rea requirement: de novo

United States v. Privett, 68 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1995)

ALSO

“The question of to which elements of the offenses the word ‘knowingly’applies is a question of pure statutory construction which we review denovo.”

United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1996), citingUnited States v. Snyder, 930 F.2d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991)

Whether a statute is a penalty/sentence enhancement or separate, substantive offense: de novo

United States v. Chandler, 125 F.3d 892, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations

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omitted); see also United States v. Matthews, 178 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1999)(applying de novo review to question whether 18 U.S.C. § 521 is a separateoffense or merely a sentence enhancement statute)

STAY OF EXECUTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2251: abuse of discretion

Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 322(1990)

SUBPOENAS:

“We review a district court’s decision granting a motion to quash or modify a subpoenafor abuse of discretion.”

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 115 F.3d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Tiberiv. CIGNA Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994)

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE:

Generally: sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo

United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1993)

But see United States v. Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 885 (5 Cir. 2002) (en banc)th

(plain error review if specific trial objection does not address issue raised onappeal)

Bench trial: court must affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence, i.e.,evidence sufficient to justify the trial judge, as trier of fact, in concluding beyond areasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty

United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)

SEE ALSO:

United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2000); UnitedStates v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United States v.Jennings, 726 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Davis, 993 F.2d 62,66 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoted in Ybarra)

Entrapment:

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“When a jury, which was fully charged on entrapment, rejects the defendant’sentrapment defense, the applicable standard of review is the same as that whichapplies to sufficiency of the evidence.”

United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 1997), quotingUnited States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 126 (5th Cir. 1995)

Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal: de novo

United States v. Muñoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Greer, 137 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222,228 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325, 1330(5th Cir. 1994)

Jury trial: the reviewing court need only determine that a reasonable trier of fact couldfind that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidencein the light most favorable to the verdict.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (conviction must be allowed to stand if, "after viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution," the reviewing court findsthat "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimebeyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis in original).

BUT: "If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution givesequal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory ofinnocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the convictions."

United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992) (internalquotation marks and citations omitted)

SUPERVISED RELEASE:

Conditions of supervised release:

“This Court reviews a district court’s entry of special conditions of supervisedrelease for an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 684 (5th Cir. 1997) (citationsomitted); see also United States v. Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir.2004) (“We review a court’s imposition of discretionary conditions for anabuse of discretion.”) (footnote with citation omitted)

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Review of constitutional challenge about right of confrontation of adverse witnesses insupervised release revocation hearing: de novo

United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 509 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (citationomitted), clarified, 77 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 1996)

Decision to reduce or terminate term of supervised release: abuse of discretion

United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1998)

Decision to revoke supervised release: abuse of discretion

United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 509 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (citationomitted), clarified, 77 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. McCormick, 54F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

SUPPRESSION -- See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Motion to suppress based on live testimony at a suppression hearing: clearly erroneous

United States v. Garza, 118 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

Untimely filed motion to suppress: “A decision to deny a suppression motion asuntimely under Rule 12(f) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, giving due consideration tothe movant’s reason for missing the relevant deadline, and any prejudice the refusal mightoccasion.”

United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1996) (footnotes withcitations omitted)

SURREBUTTAL:

Decision to permit or deny surrebuttal: abuse of discretion

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 351 n.59 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing UnitedStates v. Alford, 999 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Moody,903 F.2d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 1990))

THEORY OF THE DEFENSE INSTRUCTION -- See subheading of same name underJURY INSTRUCTIONS, above

TREATIES:

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"[T]he interpretation of treaty provisions is a question of law, freeing us to review thedistrict court's conclusion de novo."

Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1994)(footnote with citation omitted); see also United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Kreimerman)

TREATY TRANSFER:

Review of Sentencing Guidelines decisions made by Parole Commission in treatytransfer cases:

Factual findings: clearly erroneous

Guidelines determinations: de novo

Lizama v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 245 F.3d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 2001), citingMolano-Garza v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 965 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1992);Rosier v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 109 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1997) (alsociting Molano-Garza)

VAGUENESS:

Whether a criminal statute is void for vagueness: de novo

United States v. Nevers, 7 F.3d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)

VENUE:

Intradistrict change of venue, or denial of same: abuse of discretion

United States v. Gourley, 168 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. McKinney, 53F.3d 664, 673 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

Sentencing venue: question of law that is reviewed de novo

United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2004)

Transfer of venue, or denial of same: abuse of discretion

United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 755 (5th Cir. 1994), citing United Statesv. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1005 (5th Cir. 1970)

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VINDICTIVENESS:

Judicial vindictiveness:

“We review the question of whether a sentence is vindictive, and thusunconstitutional, de novo.”

United States v. Campbell, 106 F.3d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1997)

Prosecutorial vindictiveness:

Factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness: clearly erroneous

Legal principles which guide the district court: de novo

United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Johnson, 91 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir.1996) (citations omitted)

VOIR DIRE:

Challenges to district court's conduct of voir dire and determinations of impartiality: clear abuse of discretion

United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)(opinion of Smith. J.); United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631 (5thCir. 1992)

Manner in which voir dire is conducted: clear abuse of discretion

United States v. Rowe, 106 F.3d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United Statesv. Shannon, 21 F.3d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1994)

Decision whether jurors should be questioned collectively or individually: abuse ofdiscretion

United States v. Beckner, 69 F.3d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United Statesv. Delval, 600 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1979)

Review of scope and method of voir dire: abuse of discretion

United States v. Beckner, 69 F.3d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir. 1995), citing FED. R.

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CRIM. P. 24(a) and United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1176 (5th Cir.1993)

WARRANTS:

Denial of Franks v. Delaware evidentiary hearing: de novo

United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v.Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1990)

Determination of probable cause after purging of unconstitutionally obtainedinformation from warrant: de novo

United States v. Blount, 98 F.3d 1489, 1495 (5th Cir. 1996) (footnote withcitations omitted), on reh’g en banc, 123 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

“Reasonable belief” that subject of arrest warrant is inside residence, permittingentry: clearly erroneous

United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1997)

Reasonableness of an officer's reliance on a warrant issued by a magistrate (Leon goodfaith issue): de novo

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1214 & n.55 (5th Cir.1996), citing United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992)

Sufficiency of affidavit supporting warrant: de novo

United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United Statesv. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1987)

Conclusions of law related to the sufficiency of the warrant: de novo

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998), citing United States v.Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d65, 68 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

WIRETAPS:

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Affidavit:

“We review for clear error the district court’s decision with respect to a motion tosuppress recorded conversations because of deficiencies in an affidavit offered insupport of the wiretap authorization.”

United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998), citing UnitedStates v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1376 (5th Cir. 1995)

Minimization (whether investigating agency properly minimized under 18 U.S.C. §2518(5)): clearly erroneous

United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1999), citing United Statesv. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 112 (5th Cir. 1996) (district court’s determination that the“Government’s conduct in minimization was both objectively and subjectivelyreasonable” is a fact determination subject to clearly erroneous review) (citationomitted)

BUT SEE United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (review isde novo)

WITHDRAWAL (from representation):

“The district court’s denial of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw is reviewed forabuse of discretion.”

United States v. Wild, 92 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); seealso United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 870 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Wild)