UNCLASSIFIED MEXICO 00002281

VZCZCXRO7419 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #2281/01 0942224 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 042224Z APR 05

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2515 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC BT UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 002281

DEPT FOR CA/FPP FSI FOR CONSULAR TRAINING E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD, CVIS, KCRM, ASEC, PTER, MX

SUBJECT: MOST POTENTIAL ILLEGALS DON'T EVEN TRY FOR VISAS REF: 2004 MEXICO 08680

1. SUMMARY: We recently analyzed data regarding the

225,172 people intercepted by Customs and Border Protection

(CBP) while attempting to enter the U.S. without inspection

(EWI), from September to November 2004 along both the

northern and southern border. Checking their names against

CCD, we learned that fewer than five percent had ever

applied for an NIV. Aliens with other nationalities were

more likely to have tried to obtain visas than Mexicans.

Not unexpectedly we learned that almost 80% of the EWIs

were between the ages of 18 and 35, and significantly more

than half were male. Also the majority were Mexicans, most

of whom were apprehended in the Arizona Sector. Fewer than

seventy of the aliens had “special interest alien”

nationalities. END SUMMARY

97 PERCENT OF APPREHENDED EWIs DID NOT APPLY FOR A VISA

2. In December, we received a list of 225,172 CBP

apprehensions that took place in all CBP sectors, including

the Mexican and Canadian borders. Interceptions were

highest along the southern border. CBP sectors in Arizona

accounted for 51.5% of all intercepts, Texas accounted for

33%, and California had 13.5%. The northern border

accounted for only 1% of EWIs intercepted, while Miami, New

Orleans and Puerto Rico combined accounted for another 1%.

3. With assistance from CA/EX/CSD, we checked the names

against the Combined Consular Database (CCD) to see how

many had previously applied for a visa of any type. The

answer was fewer than five percent. Thus 95 percent of the

225,172 intending illegal entrants from the CBP list never

tried to apply for a visa. This indicates that the

overwhelming majority of people who intend to enter the

U.S. illegally don’t even try to fool a consular officer

about their intent. Rather they see applying for a visa as

hopelessly futile.

4. Analyzing the list, we noticed that there were a number

of duplicate names. Our CBP colleagues indicated that

multiple apprehensions of the same individuals were the

most likely source of the duplication. To refine results,

we eliminated duplicate entries in the original CBP list,

and were left with 202,552 as the number of apprehended

EWIs. Of this figure, 176,927 were Mexicans, or 87% of the

total. The remaining 25,615,or 13% of the total, were

third country nationals, usually referred to as “other than

Mexican” (OTM). We then removed duplicates from the list

of NIV applicants and found that the numbers changed to

5,217 who had previously applied for NIVs, or 2.6% of EWIs

apprehended. Of those who had applied for visas, 3,886

were Mexicans and 1331 were OTMs. In percentage terms,

2.2% of the 176,927 Mexican EWIs had applied for an NIV, as

compared to 5.2% of OTM EWIs. Considering that OTMs must

travel much greater distances before reaching a U.S.

border, it is not surprising that OTMs would prefer to have

a visa and so would also have a higher rate of NIV

application than Mexicans. Indeed, we expected that the

OTM application rate would be greater than 5%.

NIV REFUSALS APPARENTLY GIVE UP, THEY DO NOT TRY THE DESERT

5. During the same September to November period, 96,799

NIV applicants were refused in Mexico. Comparing these

names with the 2,476 EWIs who had been refused under

section 214(b), it appears that fewer than 3 percent of our

refusals will be apprehended trying to cross the desert

with a coyote. While no one knows the exact proportion of

apprehensions compared to those who are successful at

getting past CBP, the most often invoked ratio is one

apprehension for every three attempts to cross. Using that

formula, a formula we are aware is subject to challenge, we

can extrapolate that something on the order of 606,000

people attempted to enter during the sample period, of whom

7,500 would be NIV refusals. Restated as a percentage,

this would yield an expectation that 8 percent of those

refused an NIV could be expected to try the desert. Hence

these numbers tell us that approximately 92% of refused NIV

applicants do not/not try to enter without inspection.

This number is subject to challenge based on the one in

three formula.

IDENT HELPS DETER IDENTITY FRAUD

6. The possibility intercepted EWIs were using false names

posed a risk to our conclusions. Accordingly, we discussed

this problem with colleagues in CBP, who feel that

widespread IDENT fingerprinting had significantly increased

the risks of presenting a fraudulent identity and that this

resulted in a decrease in EWIs using fraudulent identities.

This would hold true even if some of those intercepted were

not fingerprinted, if we accept that the probability of

fingerprinting and likelihood of prosecution would act as a

deterrent. Additionally, since names of those intercepted

are not currently passed on to the CLASS database, there is

little risk in giving their true name at time of

apprehension.

WHO IS TRYING TO CROSS, DEMOGRAPHICS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

7. CBP identified 87% of the 202,552 EWIs apprehended as

Mexicans. This tracks with other estimates that most

illegal migrants in the U.S. are from Mexico. Of the

remaining other than Mexican apprehensions, OTMs, the

second largest group was 18,309 people from Central

America, or 9%. The country breakdown shows Honduras with

8,886, El Salvador with 5,921, and Guatemala with 3,232

people respectively. After the Central Americans, Brazil

accounted for 2% of the total; Cuba and China each had 0.3%

of the EWIs; Nicaragua had 0.2%.

8. Recent press reports note the risks of Middle

Easterners trying to cross into the U.S. using the

traditional routes of illegal aliens. However, neither CBP

records nor Mexican immigration statistics show any large-

scale efforts on the part of Middle Easterners. There were

only 69 SIAs in the total or .0035% of the CBP

apprehensions. The breakdown shows that of the five

Afghans, three were apprehended near our southern border.

Likewise one of the six Algerians, seven of the eleven

Egyptians, eight of the nine Iranians, six of the seven

Iraqis, three of the 28 Pakistanis, two Syrians and one

Yemeni were intercepted near our southern border. Thus of

69 SIAs, 31 individuals, or 45% of the SIAs, were

apprehended along our southern border. By contrast, 98% of

the total 202,552 CBP apprehensions were intercepted at or

near our southern border.

9. We would like to note that the overwhelming majority of

apprehensions by Mexican immigration (INM) officials are

also from Central America. Of the 148,361 apprehensions

made by INM in all of Mexico from January to August of

2004, 96% were Central Americans. (See reftel). It is

important to note that Mexico does not require visas of

Brazilians, but they also accounted for 3857 INM

detentions. INM also intercepted 389 Chinese.

10. Ages for those intercepted by CBP ranged from infants

to centenarians. As expected, the vast majority, or 73%

were aged 18 to 35. 20,041, or 10%, were under 18 years

old; 34,443, or 17% were over 35. Children under 11

accounted for an incredible 6,243 apprehensions.

11. Gender was not noted in the apprehension data.

However, we selected a random sample of 383 from the

202,552 (total apprehensions) and by checking first names,

it appeared that approximately 80% of those apprehended

were male. We next selected a random sample of 378 for

gender from the 25,625 OTMs. Gender proportions were not

as striking among OTMs as within the total. Our random

sample showed 63% of OTMs were male. The most likely

explanation for the differential is that the goal of OTMs

is more likely to be permanent immigration rather than

short-term work which is still most likely to be the intent

of Mexican EWIs.

12. Caveat: We appreciate that this is a snapshot of what

took place during a three-month period at the end of 2004.

While we believe the data are indicative of current trends,

it is possible that data collected for a full year or

during a different quarter of the year might yield

different results. We believe the trends are worth

reviewing periodically in order to better assess our

vulnerabilities and strengths.

BT #2281 NNNN UNCLASSIFIED MEXICO 00002281