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Lidasan v ComelecG.R. No. L-28089   October 25, 1967Sanchez, J.:

Facts:1.   Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached

portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2.  Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3.  Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1.   The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2.  The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3.  The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or

which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4.  The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5.   Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. 

David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSA¶s 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate

actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.

A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.

Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.

Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor General¶s refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situation¶s exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately

shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where ³acts of terrorism´ has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:

(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and

(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YES

Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have

started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, petitioner, vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: CODES

Once again, this Court is confronted with the issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.

Pursuant to Section 19[1] of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag~IBIG Fund

coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan.[2]

On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage,[3] it must have a plan providing for both provident/ retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag~IBIG Fund.

On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan.[4] In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid.[5] Jksm

In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law.[6]

PETITIONER's appeal[7] with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered moot and academic by Board Resolution No. 1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the Pag~IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers.[8]

On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for review[9] before the Court of Appeals. On motion by HDMF, the Court of Appeals dismissed[10] the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the Home Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character as clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A.

No. 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from the Fund coverage. As to the amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, the same are valid. Under P.D. No. 1752 and R.A. No. 7742 the Board of Trustees of the HDMF is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations, as well as amendments thereto, concerning the extension, waiver or suspension of coverage under the Pag~IBIG Fund. And the publication requirement was amply met, since the questioned amendments were published in the 21 October 1995 issue of the Philippine Star, which is a newspaper of general circulation.

PETITIONER's motion for reconsideration[11] was denied.[12] Hence, on 6 November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition before this Court assailing the 1995 and the 1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 for being contrary to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER contends that the subject 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely requires as a pre~condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/ retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. Hence, considering that PETITIONER has a provident plan superior to that offered by the HDMF, it is entitled to exemption from the coverage in accordance with Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. The 1996 Amendment are also void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF. Kycalr

PETITIONER also cites Section 9 (1), Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 9. Public Participation ~~ (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed

rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

Since the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 involve an imposition of an additional burden, a public hearing should have first been conducted to give chance to the employers, like PETITIONER, to be heard before the HDMF adopted the said Amendments. Absent such public hearing, the amendments should be voided.

Finally, PETITIONER contends that HDMF did not comply with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that "[e]very agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it."

On the other hand, the HDMF contends that in promulgating the amendments to the rules and regulations which require the existence of a plan providing for both provident and   housing benefits for exemption from the Fund Coverage, the respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use "and" only instead of "or" in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing "and," the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of "and/or" in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.

As to the public hearing, HDMF maintains that as can be clearly deduced from Section 9(1), Chapter 2, book VII of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, public hearing is required only when the law so provides, and if not, only if the same is practicable. It follows that public hearing is only optional or discretionary on the part of the agency concerned, except when the same is required by law. P.D. No. 1752 does not require that pubic hearing be first conducted before the rules and regulations implementing it would become valid and effective. What it requires is the publication of said rules and regulations at least once in a

newspaper of general circulation. Having published said 1995 and 1996 Amendments through the Philippine Star on 21 October 1995[13] and 15 November 1996,[14] respectively, HDMF has complied with the publication requirement.

Finally, HDMF claims that as early as 18 October 1996, it had already filed certified true copies of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations with the University of the Philippines Law Center. This fact is evidenced by certified true copies of the Certification from the Office of the National Administrative Register of the U.P. Law Center.[15]

We find for the PETITIONER. Calrky

The issue of the validity of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension, has been squarely resolved in the relatively recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF.[16] We held in that case that Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124~B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion, we ruled:

The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or."

In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., "either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs."The term ‘and/or’ means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or"; or that one word or the

other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone."

It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably.

It ... seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the

employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words "and" instead of "and/or." Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans   are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word "or" in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. Slx

It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule~making power as provided in Section 5[17] of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13[18] of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well~settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the

administrative agency.[19] It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.[20]

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement   and   housing benefits  for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule~making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.[21] Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. Scslx

While it may be conceded that the requirement of having both plans to qualify for an exemption, as well as the abolition of the exemption, would enhance the interest of the working group and further strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund in its pursuit of promoting public welfare through ample social services as mandated by the Constitution, we are of the opinion that the basic law should prevail. A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute.[22]

Considering the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of 31 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA~G.R. No. SP~43668 and its Resolution of 15 October 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The disapproval by the Home Development Mutual Fund of the

application of the petitioner for waiver or suspension of Fund coverage is SET ASIDE, and the Home Development Mutual Fund is hereby directed to refund to petitioner all sums of money it collected from the latter.

SO ORDERED. Slxsc

Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares~Santiago, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., no part. Related to a party.

Executive Secretary vs Southwing Heavy Inds. Inc

Facts:

EO 156 was issued by PGMA in 2002, prohibiting the importation into the country of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. Article 2, Section 3.1 enumerates the vehicles excluded/exempted from the prohibition. Three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed before an Olongapo RTC, asserting that Article 2, Section 3.1 is unconstitutional and illegal. The RTC granted all the petitions and declared the EO unconstitutional.

Issue:

W/N EO 156 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

EO 156 is VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic because

1. Its promulgation is actually authorized by the legislature (Tariff and Customs Code, Omnibus Investment Code, Safeguard Measures Act); and

2. It is presumed that the EO duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law, absent any strong evidence to the contrary.

However, the proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside

the Freeport and he inclusion of said zone within the ambit of prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). When the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires but also for being unreasonable.

For an administrative issuance to be valid, it must comply with the following:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

4. It must be reasonable.

Primicias vs Municipality of UrdanetaFacts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.

2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

Drilon vs Lim

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of

the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:The issues in this case are(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent

merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

 Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc,

.Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal

of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment  proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." 

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of

separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and

administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

 Tanada v. Tuvera

GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)Facts:On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place,which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).Issue:Whether publication is still required in light of the clause ³unless otherwise provided´.Held:The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to thedate of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event beomitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directlyconferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a citynotwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects onlythe inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in the details´ of the CentralBank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.Reasoning:

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upontheir approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by thelegislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

Leonardo PaatvsCourt of Appeals, et. Al.GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997266 SCRA 167

FACTS            The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE

            Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD            The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.

            The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative

forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

Aisporna v CA (1982)Aisporna v CA (1982)

FactsMapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued  Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited theapplication form.In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husband’s desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services)Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court.In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating that she didn’t violate sec 189 of the insurance code.In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:

1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitionerIssues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the 2nd paragraph of the said section. OrIs it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that “No insurance company doing business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as herein after provided.No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner.Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject.Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section.

The court held that the 1st  par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authorityfrom the commissionerIn the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulatedThe third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rulesThe appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she didn’t receive compensation wasn’t an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under par 1.The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph.The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent.The SC said that this was a reversible error.The CA said that Aisporna didn’t receive compensation.The SC said that  the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1st and third paragraphs.DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the consideration of the statute as a whole. The words shouldn’t be studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning  of any of its parts in order to pronounce the harmonious whole.Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the

company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court held that the definition of an insurance agent in the 2nd paragraph was applicable in the 1stparagraph.To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph.The appellate court said that she didn’t receive compensation by the receipt of compensation wasn’t an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph.The SC said that this view wasn’t correct owing to the American insurance laws which qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited insurance (Texas code and snyder’s law)   

CHINA BANKING CORP vs. OrtegaG.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

Facts: Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held: No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade

payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)

Facts:On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusivecollective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firmbefore the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of theunion, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/orrestraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition forcertiorari.Issue:Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.Held:The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation

comeonly after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statutein force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to moneyclaims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained thesuit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 orderissued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Board of Administration of the P.V.A. vs. Bautista

Facts:

Calixto Gasilao was a veteran who was disabled during the last war. He filed his claim with the PVA board as early as July 1955, but hisclaim was denied because his supporting papers were incomplete. Itwas in only 1968 that Gasilao was able to complete all the necessary papers and the Board thereafter approved his pension, starting from the date of approval.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the board to recover the pension which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved.

CFI Ruling:The trial court granted the amount claimed. The Board filed a petition to review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of 1968?

Petitioner's (PVA Board) Contention:

Petitioner cited Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 65 (Veteran's Bill of Rights)which provides:

"Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the rights andprivileges provided for in this act should file his application withthe Board"

Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly required that the application filed should first be approved by theBoard of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commencefrom the date of approval of application.

Held:

The stand to the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and the intent of law. Considering that R.A. No. 65 is aveteran's pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights,privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions is government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension forthe incapacitated, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical care benefits.The purpose of the Congress in granting veterans pensions is to compensate, as far as may be, a class of men who suffered in theservice for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in the line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war and revolution, by extending to them regular momentary aid. For this reason, it is a general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitledpension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretationand a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particularlanguage. On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent upon thediscretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. The noble and humanitarian purposesfor which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated.

Gasilao's claim was sustained.

People v. Mapa GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur Facts:Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower courtrendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated tothe Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt from the requirement of having a license of firearmHeld:The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretationcome only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speakswith authority to the extent

that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a µpeace officer equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore, the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasGR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.

When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Republic v. CA and MolinaGR 108763, 13 February 1997

Facts:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel

consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held:

The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological

incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.