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The Role of Informal Institutions for Institutional Co-evolutionThe Case of the Wind Energy Industry in Germany and Britain
Camilla M. Chlebna MSc#12112222, Department of Planning
Supervisors:Prof. James SimmieDr. Dave VallerSellafield Nuclear Power Station, Cumbria, NW-England, UK
• Introduction• Theory Background
• Key Themes• Cases and Methodology
• Analysis• Framework• Findings
• Conclusions
PRESENTATION STRUCTURE
Influenced by economic geography as well as evolutionary, political and institutional economics
• Economy = open system with emergent properties(Sayer, 2000; Boschma & Frenken, 2007; Martin & Sunley, 2015)
• Co-evolution of formal institutional arrangements and technology(Polanyi, 1957; Perez, 1983; North, 1996; Nelson, 1998; Strambach, 2010)
• Consideration of individuals and society beyond the firm(Garud et al., 2007; Jackson, 2010; Bristow & Healy, 2014; Hassink et al., 2014)
Informal institutions shape individuals’ behaviour and are thus pervasive on all levels of society -> need explicit consideration
THEORY BACKGROUND
CASES & METHODOLOGY
Main Fieldwork36 semi-structured expert interviews in 2015
• 4 pilot interviews with academics• 32 interviews in main fieldwork
• 18 German, 18 British• 26 face to face, 10 phone
Used both as signposts and as immediate evidence+ descriptive, secondary data drawn in to ‘thicken the plot’
Fieldwork Research QuestionsWho tried to shape formal institutions over the years?
What motivated them?Were they successful?
Why? Why not?What are the interactions with and between institutions?
GER
MA
NY
BR
ITA
IN
(Global Wind Energy Council, 2015)
ANALYSIS
employers
Form
al in
stitu
tions
Org
anis
atio
nal f
orm
s of
in
stitu
tions
Info
rmal
inst
itutio
ns
Policy makers
Civil society agents
employers
Policy makers
Civil society agents
impact
impact
impactIndirect power
Indirect power
Power to change
Ongoing dynamic of re(production)
pressure
pressure
???
???
Con
text
???
???
FINDINGS
What motivated inventors and investors? Profit vs ideology
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Wind power related applications as share of total applications [1978 – 2012, per mill]
GER GermanyGB Great Britain
“The governments have deliberately promoted and supported innovation through [tax. A]s an inventor I only have to pay 10% capital gains tax, rather than 40% when I sell my shares. That’s a fantastic incentive.” (interviewee B2)
(OECD, 2013)
“And this creates momentum. I know a lot of people, who, with this attitude [against nuclear power] invested in wind power, independent of whether they are going to become rich or not.” (interviewee G15)
BR
ITA
IN
GE
RM
AN
Y
FINDINGS
“I guess there is something within German society, a deep desire to manage without nuclear energy. Because this is apparent in all these surveys that three quarters of Germans oppose nuclear energy. This has been like that for a long, long time when there weren’t even such strong alternatives.” (interviewee G2)
approve strongly
approve somewhat
disapprove somewhat
disapprove strongly
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
Approval: The anti-nuclear movement [1990]
Germany
Great Britain
Elitism
Attitud
es to
wards
RE-A
gains
t RE
Energ
y Sec
urity
Energ
y Affo
rdab
ility
Care f
or th
e env
ironm
ent-V
isual
attrib
utes
Attitud
es to
wards
RE-F
or R
E
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Other informal institutions most associated with 'positive attitude towards nuclear power' [per-
centage coverage]
“Most of our politicians come from Oxbridge […] and most of the chairmen of our big organisations and our financial institutions are of the same class of people.” (interviewee B3)
(EVS, 2015)
BR
ITA
INGE
RM
AN
Y
= Varied SME dominated industry in Germany vs
industry dominated by large, often foreign ruled companies in Britain
CONCLUSIONS
Germany
Rejection of nuclear power influenced behaviour across society leading to institutional co-evolution
• Motivated inventors and (independent) investors
• Drove citizens to put pressure on policymakers
• Triggered politicians to implement change (i.e. become institutional entrepreneurs)
• Consumer pressure but also change in management led to changes of business strategies
Britain
No comparable strength of sentiment, instead elitism and neoliberal ideology hindered institutional co-evolution
• Inventors/entrepreneurs focused on profit or lacking independent funding
• Citizens at best ambiguous at worst campaigning against wind energy
• No ‘champions’ for this industry amongst policymakers
• Lack of new entrants to challenge incumbents
THANK YOU FOR LISTENING
Camilla M. Chlebna [email protected]
Please do not hesitate to contact me with any suggestions or feedback that you can offer.
International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics: http://www.isipe.net/
Fieldwork supported by
Slide 1Atomkraft Nein Danke!: Schoolmann S. http://www.nordland-virus.de/wordpress/?p=94. Hamburg, Germany. Accessed on 23rd February 2016. Nuclear Power Station, Sellafield, Cumbria, UK: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/utilities/article3247657.ece The Times Online, London, UK. Accessed on 19th May 2016.Slide 3Boschma RA and Frenken K (2007) Introduction: Applications of Evolutionary Economic Geography. In: K. Frenken ed. Applied evolutionary economics and economic geography. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 326.Bristow G and Healy A (2014) Regional Resilience: An Agency Perspective. Regional Studies. 48 (5), 923–935.Garud R, Hardy C and Maguire S (2007) Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency : An Introduction to the Special Issue. Organization Studies. 28 (7), 957–969.Hassink R, Klaerding C and Marques P (2014) Advancing Evolutionary Economic Geography by Engaged Pluralism. Regional Studies. 48 (7), 1295–1307.Jackson G (2010) Actors and institutions. In: G. Morgan, J. L. Campbell, C. Crouch, O. K. Pederson, & R. Whitley eds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 63–86.Martin R and Sunley P (2015) Towards a Developmental Turn in Evolutionary Economic Geography? Regional Studies. 49 (5), 712–732.Nelson RR (1998) The Co-evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Supporting Institutions. In: G. Dosi, D. Teece, & J. Chytry eds. Technology, Organisation and Competitiveness - Perspectives on Industrial and Corporate Change. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 319–335.
BIBLIOGRAPHY & SOURCES I
Slide 3 continuedNorth DC (1996) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University PressPerez C (1983) Structural Change and Assimilation of New Technologies in the Economic and Social Systems. Futures. 15 (5), 357–375.Polanyi K, Arensberg CM and Pearson HW eds. (1957) Trade and Market in the Early Empires - Economies in History and Theory. Glencoe, IL, USA: The Free Press & The Falcon’s Wing Press.Sayer A (2000) Realism and Social Science. London, UK: SAGE Publications LtdStrambach S (2010) Path dependence and path plasticity: the co-evolution of institutions and innovation - the German customized business software industry. In: R. Boschma & R. Martin eds. The Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 406–429.Slide 4Global Wind Energy Council (2015) Global Wind Report - Annual Market Update. Brussels, BELSlide 6eurostat (2016) Foreign ownership of domestic inventions in patent applications to the EPO by priority year. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/pat_ep_nfgn.OECD (2013) REGPAT database, July. Available at: www.oecd.org/sti/ipr-statistics.Slide 7EVS (2015) European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0. Available at: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=4804&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12253.Slide 9Rethinking Economics Conference, London, 2015, author’s photo
BIBLIOGRAPHY & SOURCES II