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Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ A member of MUFG, a global financial group
Populism & the Politics of Rage – the Case of the UK & US*
Amir KhanEconomic Research | London Desk
November 2016*Data sourced from Macrobond & IMF/World Bank unless otherwise stated
Coverage
► Politics of Rage I – Brexit
- Why it matters?
- Market reaction
- Likely implications (S-T & L-T)
► Politics of Rage II – Trump Victory
- Background
- Areas of concern
- Areas of comfort
- Taking stock & what next?
► Policy Implications & Gauging Spill-over Effects
2 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
3 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Politics of Rage I – Brexit
1. Why it matters? (i) – Business & trade concerns
4 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
*Scale ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 stands for no risk & 100 for the highest possible risk. (Source) Deloitte CFO Survey Q3 2016
57
54
50
47
46
45
43
42
50
48
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49
40
41
50
0 20 40 60
Effects of Brexit
Weak demand in the UK
Deflation & economic weakness in theEA
Prospects of higher interest rates
Poor productivity/weak competitiveness
US presidential elections
Housing &/or other bubbles
Weakness or volatility in EMs
Chart 1: Risks cited by UK CFO's*
2016-Q3 2015-Q4
Why it matters? (ii) – Policy concerns
5 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
0
200
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1200
Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Jan/
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Chart 3: UK Policy Uncertainty Index spiked in the aftermath of the Brexit vote
United Kingdom
World
(Index)
Why it matters? (iii) – Market concerns
6 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan/
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Feb/
16
Mar
/16
Apr
/16
May
/16
Jun/
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Jul/1
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Aug
/16
Sep
/16
Oct
/16
Chart 4: Heightened market volatility was evident in the UK in the run-up to the Brexit vote though it has
subsided somewhat recently
FTSE 100 VolatilityIndex
GBP Volatility Index
(%)
Why it matters? (iv) – Staking stock
► Against the above backdrop, walking away is proving to be difficult.
7 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
2. Market Reaction (i) – Sterling took a pounding…
82.5
76.670
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91
Chart 5: The falls endured by sterling are broadly comparable to that seen after the global financial crisis...
Post brexit Post financial crisis
No. of days after Brexit/financial crisis
(Index rebased)
► Pound sterling has fallen to the tune of c.20%, which is broadly in line with what was seen in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Over a longer-time horizon, while there is a view that sterling has fallen to, or below, it fair value, past experience suggests that it has scope to fall further.
8 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
11.21.41.61.8
22.22.42.62.8
19
71
19
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80
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Chart 6:...But it's too soon to say that the currency has hit a bottom
+/-1 Standarddeviation bands
(GBP/US$ Ex. rate)
Market Reaction (ii)…But UK stocks fared much better…
► After experiencing a sharp fall in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, UK equities have largely taken Brexit intheir stride & are firmly in positive territory since the vote was held. This is in sharp contrast to what we sawin the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
9 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
109.7
80.9
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91
Chart 7: UK equities have held up much better post-Brexit than in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
FTSE-100 post-Brexit FTSE-100 post financial crisis
No. of days since Brexit/financial crisis
(Index rebased)
10 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Market Reaction (iii) …Helping to ensure that a 2008-style market panic was avoided
While the outcome of the Brexit vote was unexpected, its actual impact has been rather muted so far relative to what we saw in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Why?
► No systemic banking collapse or freezing up of the interbank money markets
► Early & decisive central bank action
► Smooth political transition in the UK following resignation of PM Cameron
► UK still a member of EU until Article 50 invoked
► The fall of the currency seen as a “shock absorber”
3. Implications (i) – Near-term impact has been contained…
► Contrary to expectations, the real economy has continued to hold up well, with PMI surveys firmly in positive territory. Meanwhile, the buoyancy of retail sales remains intact.
11 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
3035404550556065
Jan/0
7
Jan/0
8
Jan/0
9
Jan/1
0
Jan/1
1
Jan/1
2
Jan/1
3
Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Chart 8: PMI surveys have bounced back after the Brexit vote...
Services Manufacturing Composite
(Reading >50 denotes expansion)
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jan/0
7
Jan/0
8
Jan/0
9
Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Jan/1
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Chart 9:...While retail sales continue to retain their upward trend
Retail sales
12-month moving average
(%, y/y)
Implications (ii) …With Q3 GDP growth confounding expectations
12 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Actual BoE forecast
Chart 10: Q3 GDP has surprised on the upside
(%, q/q)
Implications (iii) – Beyond the immediate-term the outlook remains rather bleak…
► Once Article 50 is invoked, the impact of UK’s decision to leave the EU will start to be more keenly felt. In fact, most international forecasters think that growth will take a hit over the long-run as result of Brexit.
► Elsewhere, market expectations of future inflation have also started to spike upwards.
13 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
-7.8
-7.5
-5.1
-3.5
-3.2
-8 -6 -4 -2 0
LSE
HM Treasury
OECD
CBI/PWC
NIESR
Chart 11: Estimates of long-term effects of Brexit on growth
(% change in GDP compared with remaining in the EU)
1.11.151.21.251.31.351.41.451.51.55
1.51.71.92.12.32.52.72.93.13.3
Jan/1
6
Fe
b/1
6
Ma
r/16
Apr/
16
Ma
y/1
6
Jun/1
6
Jul/16
Aug
/16
Sep
/16
Oct/1
6
Nov/1
6
Chart 12: UK five year breakeven inflation rate vs. sterling exchange rate
Market implied Inflation (%, LHS) GBP/USD (RHS)
UK Brexit vote
Implications (iv)….Though the impact at the global level is set to be negligible
14 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
0
1
2
3
4
5
EMs World Adanced countries
Chart 13: Despite Brexit the IMF's global growth projections for 2017 have not been materially affected
Pre-Brexit
Post- Brexit
(%, y/y)
15 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Politics of Rage II – Trump Victory
1. Background – We’ve been here before
► A lot of parallels can be drawn between the election of Trump & Brexit.
16 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Areas of concern
Going by what Trump has said during the campaign, the following are some areas of concern:
► Trade policy
► Immigration
► Fed independence
► Expansionary fiscal policy & its impact on US public finances
17 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Areas of comfort
► The US political system has sufficient checks & balances which should prevent very extreme policies.
► With both the presidency & Congress now in Republican hands this could help to reduce “policy gridlock” that was evident under the Obama administration.
► The US economy is in good shape & Trump will not want to reverse this.
► Trump’s expansionary fiscal plans, with their focus on tax cuts & infrastructure spending, could be beneficial for growth & help to arrest low productivity growth in the US economy.
18 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Taking Stock & what next?
► Contrary to expectations, market reaction to the Trump win was sanguine, in part reflecting the conciliatory tone which Trump adopted in his acceptance speech.
► Going forward, two things are worth watching: i) any change in tone form the President-elect; and ii) who he appoint to key portfolios within his government.
19 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
*Change in Treasury yields is expressed in percentage points
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
S&P 500 Exchange rate 10-year Treasury yield*
Chart 14: Three day performance of different US asset classes in the aftermath of Trump's victory
(% change, unless stated otherwise)
Policy Implications & Gauging Spillover Effects
20 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Policy Implications (i) – Post-crisis policy framework under scrutiny
21 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Policy Implications (ii) – New focus on fiscal policy
► After doing most of the heavy lifting since the financial crisis, monetary policy appears to have reached its limits.
► New emphasis has shifted towards a more activist fiscal policy stance in both the US & UK, with a key focus on infrastructure investment.
► Implications for interest rates: “lower for longer” mantra has given way to a belief that rates will have to rise faster than markets are currently contemplating, especially in the US.
22 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Spillover (i) – EU will need to reconfigure itself post-Brexit
> Brexit to remove obstacles to further EU integration> Common deposit insurance, fiscal union etc.
Confrontational UK exit Amicable UK exit
> Brexit would be a "long, costly, messy divorce" > Swift negotiations of future UK/EU relations, > EU to defend its interests, set disincentives for in good atmosphere others to follow the UK > UK integration to remain at a high level> Damage to the UK would be bigger, but the EU > UK might continue to contribute to the EU would also suffer budget> UK payments to the EU budget would cease
EU disintegration
> Brexit as a "dangerous precedent"> Strengthening of nationalistic, secessionist parties> Absence of UK in EU policy debate would lead to a weakening of EU governance> EU disintegrating, more member states leaving, damage to EZ> Major damage to financial market/private confidence
Closer EU integration
23 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
24
Spillover (ii) – Populist movements are being emboldened
Key election/political events ahead in 2016/17
Low/moderate Moderate High
Italy: 4 Dec referendum on constitutional reform – a “No” vote undermines PM Renzi & benefits the Eurosceptic Five-Star Movement. “No” vote is in the lead, a wide margin loss could trigger early elections.
Austria – Re-run of presidential election (4 Dec) could vote in aEurosceptic head of state (albeita mostly ceremonial role)
Germany: Federal elections Sept/Oct 2017. Mainstream coalition govt likely to win, but theresult of the far-right AfD needs to be closely monitored.
France: Presidential elections Apr/May 2017. Possible good result for National Front’s Marine Le Pen in the 1st round. Unlikely to win run-off, though outcome is rather uncertain.
Netherlands: Mar 2017 General election could see a strong result from Geert Wilder’s far-right PVV, but unlikely to be able to form a govt.
Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Spillover (iii) – US to become more inward-looking
Key areas to watch:
► US commitments under NATO in question.
► Global regional security – APAC, MENA etc.
► Iran nuclear deal.
► UN funding/climate change.
Consequences:
► Relations with traditional US allies in the MENA/APAC region likely to be adversely affected.
► The global community’s efforts to reset relations with Iran may take a knock.
► Conversely, Russia is set to benefit with Trump looking to bolster ties with that country.
25 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Spillover (iv) – Backlash to global trade (protectionism)
Campaign promises:
► To slap tariffs of ~45% on goods emanating from the likes of China.
► To revise/dismantle the NAFTA trade agreement.
► To repatriate jobs created by US companies abroad.
Constraints:
► However, the Republican party is traditionally a free trade supporter and within this context political buy-in from the wider party will be required to push through such policies.
► Additionally, pursuit of such policies will be negative for growth both for the US & global economy.
26 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
27 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 2016
Q&A
28 Populism & the Politics of Rage – The case of the UK & US | November 201628
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