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Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry Professor Wayne Carroll Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire [email protected] Slides available at www.uwec.edu/carrolwd

Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

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Page 1: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Professor Wayne Carroll

Department of Economics

University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire

[email protected]

Slides available at www.uwec.edu/carrolwd

Page 2: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Roles of Banks in the Economy

Facilitate borrowing and lending Facilitate payments Risk management

Issue financial assets that allow firms to share risks

Provide guarantees and lines of credit

Page 3: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Role of Banks in LendingSources of External Funding for Business

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

bank loans non-bank loans bonds new equity

USA

Germany

Japan

Source: Available online at http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/schwerpunkte/finance/wp/550.pdf

Page 4: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Financial Intermediaries

“Banks” include: Commercial banks Savings and loan associations (S&L’s)

Also sometimes called “thrifts” or “thrift institutions”

Credit unions

Page 5: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Financial IntermediariesAssets at end of 2002 (in billions)

Credit Unions: $553

S & L's: $1,338

Banks: $7,161

Page 6: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Ownership of Banks

U.S. banks are privately owned – no banks are owned by the government.

In most cases a bank’s stock is held by a large number of investors, so a bank has many “owners.”

It is relatively easy to establish a new bank in the U.S.

Page 7: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Market Structure

There are a large number of banking firms in the U.S., but the number is falling due to mergers between banks.

Thousands of U.S. banks are very small, each having only a single office.

Many banks today have multiple branches or offices.

A “bank holding company” is a firm that owns one or more banking firms.

Page 8: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Size Distribution of U.S. Banks

  Commercial Banks

Number of

Deposits (millions)

Asset Size(as of June 30, 2006) Institutions Offices

Less than $25 Million 586 712 $7,661

$25 Million to $50 Million 1,098 1,701 $33,511

$50 Million to $100 Million 1,718 4,007 $105,754

$100 Million to $300 Million 2,427 10,338 $349,740

$300 Million to $500 Million 672 5,088 $211,495

$500 Million to $1 Billion 494 6,322 $265,540

$1 Billion to $3 Billion 275 6,856 $338,909

$3 Billion to $10 Billion 120 6,601 $427,340

Greater than $10 Billion 89 38,848 $3,580,817

TOTALS 7,479 80,473 $5,320,767

Source: www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp

Page 9: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Market Structure: An Example

Wells Fargo & Company is a bank holding company based in South Dakota (with historic roots in Minnesota and California). It includes:28 chartered bank companiesa total of over 3,000 branches in 23

states

Page 10: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Some Wells Fargo branches

Page 11: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Wells Fargo’s Broad Scope

Community Banking

34%

Investments and Insurance

15%

Specialized Lending

15%

Consumer Finance

7%

Home Mortgage and Home Equity

20%

Wholesale Banking/

Commercial Real Estate

9%

Source: www.wellsfargo.com/about/today1

Page 12: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

20 Largest U.S. Banks (as of June 30, 2006)

Rank Institution Name State

HeadquarteredNumber of

OfficesDeposits

(thousands)

1 Bank of America, NA North Carolina 5,781 $563,906,844

2 JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA Ohio 2,679 $434,752,000

3 Wachovia Bank, NA North Carolina 3,136 $306,348,000

4 Wells Fargo Bank, NA South Dakota 3,200 $298,672,000

5 Washington Mutual Bank Nevada 2,167 $209,927,984

6 Citibank, NA New York 267 $142,508,000

7 SunTrust Bank Georgia 1,758 $117,956,301

8 U.S. Bank, NA Ohio 2,525 $117,337,830

9 HSBC Bank USA, NA Delaware 436 $75,588,320

10 World Savings Bank, FSB California 286 $61,321,407

11 PNC Bank, NA Pennsylvania 831 $58,134,805

12 Keybank, NA Ohio 957 $57,327,323

13 Regions Bank Alabama 1,397 $57,231,022

14 Merrill Lynch Bank USA Utah 3 $52,331,967

15 Branch Banking and Trust Company North Carolina 918 $51,246,133

16 Countrywide Bank, NA Virginia 2 $50,657,812

17 ING Bank, fsb Delaware 1 $46,440,495

18 Comerica Bank Michigan 387 $43,081,270

19 Sovereign Bank Pennsylvania 661 $40,829,851

20 The Bank of New York New York 354 $40,014,000

Source: www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp

Page 13: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

A Simple Bank Balance Sheet

Assetsreserves"loans"

securitiesbank loans

Liabilitiesdepositsborrowings

Bank capital (equity)

Page 14: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Detailed Balance Sheet for the Banking Industry

Source: Mishkin, Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 7th edition

Page 15: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Two Important Ratios

Capital/asset ratio – bank capital as a percentage of bank assets. The average capital/asset ratio for U.S. banks

was about 9% at the end of 2002. Reserve ratio – bank reserves as a

percentage of checkable deposits.

Page 16: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Information on U.S. Banks

It is easy to get a lot of financial data on U.S. banks.

A great source:www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp

Page 17: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Data on Wells Fargo

Page 18: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

What Can Go Wrong?

“Bank failure” – the bank goes out of business. Bank depositors might lose some of their

funds. Bank creditors might lose some of their

investment Bank owners lose their capital.

The bank suffers significant losses – the government might have to help.

Page 19: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Reasons for Bank Regulation

Banks must be regulated because: a bank failure can be devastating to depositors. there’s a risk of systemic failure: the failure of

one bank can make it more likely that other banks will fail.

depositors can’t monitor how the bank invests their funds, creating a moral hazard problem.

government assistance to a bank can be very costly.

Page 20: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Reasons for Bank Regulation

Banks are less stable than other businesses because:

bank liabilities tend to be short-term – many depositors could withdraw their funds with little notice.

bank assets tend to be longer-term – reserves and other liquid assets are only a small share of the total.

the behavior of depositors depends on their confidence that the bank is sound, and this confidence can be easily shaken.

Page 21: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

A Closer Look at Bank Failure

Two reasons for bank failure: The value of bank assets falls, so

assets<liabilities. Deposit outflow: A large number of depositors

withdraw their funds from the bank, exhausting the bank’s cash (reserves) and other liquid assets.

Therefore a bank is more likely to fail if it has a low capital/asset ratio or a low reserve ratio.

Page 22: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

A Closer Look at Bank Failure

Tradeoff between higher income and a lower risk of failure:

Holding other things constant, the bank’s net income is higher if its capital/asset ratio and reserve ratio are lower, since then it holds relatively more interest-earning assets.

If the bank’s capital/asset ratio and reserve ratio are higher, it’s less likely that the bank will fail (so it’s less likely that the stockholders will lose their capital.)

Page 23: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

A Closer Look at Bank Failure

If there were no government regulation of banks:

each bank would choose a capital/asset ratio and a reserve ratio to maximize the value of the bank.

depositors would want to deposit their money in banks that are well managed, so banks would have an incentive to choose capital/asset ratios and reserve ratios that reduce the threat of bank failure.

“market discipline”

Page 24: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

A Closer Look at Bank Failure

But if there were no government regulation of banks:

banks would choose capital/asset ratios and reserve ratios that are too low from society’s standpoint.

banks would take on too much risk, so there would be too many bank failures, and the government would have to spend too much money to assist troubled banks.

Page 25: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Continental Illinois Bank failed in 1984. The federal government paid billions of

dollars to keep Continental Illinois from closing.

This was the biggest bank “resolution” in U.S. history.

Page 26: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Before it failed, Continental Illinois Bank: was the largest bank in Chicago. was the seventh-largest bank in the U.S. had 57 offices in 14 states and 29 foreign

countries.

Page 27: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Why did Continental Illinois fail? Starting in the late 1970s, the bank grew fast, with

lots of loans to businesses. Poor quality loans Too many loans to firms in the oil industry Too many loans to borrowers in Latin America “Continental Illinois is willing to do just about anything

to make a deal.” High cost of funds

Large share of funds borrowed from other banks Relatively small reliance on domestic deposits Heavy borrowing in foreign money markets

Page 28: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

The Bank’s Troubles By 1984 the bank’s nonperforming loans

(loans on which payments were late) rose to $5.2 billion (over 10% of total loans).

May 1984: an electronic “bank run” – depositors withdrew billions of dollars in deposits

The FDIC and the Federal Reserve System pledged their support for the bank and lent over $5 billion.

Page 29: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Dangers Many smaller banks had deposits at

Continental Illinois, so the failure of Continental Illinois could have caused some of them to fail, too.

Other depositors (including many important corporations) could lose some of their funds

Foreign investors would lose confidence in U.S. banks

Page 30: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Rescuing Continental Illinois Bank Continental Illinois Bank had $3 billion in

insured deposits and $30 billion in uninsured deposits. The FDIC promised to guarantee all deposits.

The FDIC assumed the Bank’s 3.5 billion debt to the Federal Reserve.

The FDIC bought $1 billion in Continental Illinois stock – the FDIC “owned” the bank.

Page 31: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

An Example: Continental Illinois Bank

Lessons from Continental Illinois Bank Banks have an incentive to take on too much

risk, so they need closer supervision The failure of a very large bank could have

broader negative effects Rescuing a large bank can be expensive for

the government

Good sources: www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/contents.pdf -- Part II, Chap. 4 http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol1.html -- Chap. 7

Page 32: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Regulation: An Overview

In the U.S. the government regulates banks in many ways:

Federal deposit insurance Imposing capital requirements (minimum

capital/asset ratios) Imposing reserve requirements (minimum

reserve ratios) Restricting the types of assets that banks

may hold Performing bank examinations (periodic

auditing reviews)

Page 33: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Primary bank regulators in the U.S.: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)

part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury Federal Reserve System – the U.S. central bank Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) State bank regulators

Bank Regulation: An Overview

Page 34: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Federal Deposit Insurance

The U.S. Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933, after the bank failures in the Great Depression.

Today the FDIC guarantees each bank deposit up to a maximum of $100,000.

FDIC insurance is funded by a small fee paid by banks based on their deposits.

Page 35: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Failures in the Great Depression

Annual Number of Bank Suspensions

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Page 36: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Effects of Federal Deposit Insurance

Deposit insurance prevents bank runs Prevents losses by small depositors Reduces “systemic risk” in the banking

system

Deposit insurance gives banks incentives to:

hold riskier assets. hold less capital. manage the bank’s assets less carefully.

Page 37: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Incentive Effects of Deposit Insurance:A Closer Look

Deposit insurance increases the supply of deposits (within the insurance coverage limits). Therefore banks can attract deposits more easily and can pay lower interest rates on their deposits even if they pursue risky strategies that increase the risk of bank failure.As a result, deposit insurance reduces banks’ incentives to avoid risk.

Page 38: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Capital Requirements

When there’s deposit insurance, banks have an incentive to hold too little capital.

Therefore the government imposes capital requirements to ensure that banks hold sufficient capital.

Page 39: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Capital Requirements

A simple capital requirement would require that a bank’s capital/asset ratio be greater than or equal to a specified level.

Example: capital/asset ratio ≥ 0.05.

Problem: Not all assets are equally risky. A simple capital requirement gives a bank an incentive to hold more risky assets.

Page 40: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Risk-weighted Capital Requirements

At an international conference in Basel, Switzerland in 1988, bank regulators from the world’s affluent countries agreed to impose risk-weighted capital requirements:

Classes of assets are assigned risk weights between 0% and 100%.

Risk-free assets carry a weight of 0%, and more-risky assets carry higher weights.

Capital requirements then set a minimum for the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets.

Page 41: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Risk-weighted Capital Requirements:An Example

Assets Amount Risk weight Weighted assets

Cash $10,000,000 0% $0

T-bills $190,000,000 0% $0

Municipal bonds

$50,000,000 20% $10,000,000

Mortgages $300,000,000 50% $150,000,000

Home equity loans

$40,000,000 100% $40,000,000

TOTALS $590,000,000 $200,000,000

Page 42: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

In this example, if regulators require the bank to maintain its risk-weighted capital ratio at a level of at least 8%, then the bank’s capital must be at least $16,00,000 (or 8% of $200,000,000).

If the bank acquires another $1 million in capital, it could invest up to: $12.5 million more in home-equity loans $25 million more in home mortgages $62.5 million more in municipal bonds

So risk-weighted capital requirements give the bank an incentive to hold less-risky assets.

Risk-weighted Capital Requirements:An Example

Page 43: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Proposed Capital Requirement Reform: Basel 2

Problem: Assets within a risk class might expose banks to different amounts of risk.

Bank regulators have designed a new system of bank capital requirements – Basel 2 – that will provide better incentives for banks to manage their risks in a way that promotes bank stability.

Basel 2 will take effect in some countries in 2007.

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm

Page 44: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Reserve Requirements

The Federal Reserve System requires banks to hold reserves that are greater than or equal to a specified percentage of their checkable deposits: 3% for smaller banks 10% for larger banks

Page 45: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Reserve Requirements

But reserves are higher than they need to be to promote stability of the banking system.

Today reserve requirements are more important in macroeconomic policy – they tie bank reserves to deposits, so the central bank can try to control deposits by controlling reserves.

Page 46: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Restrictions on Asset Holdings

Bank regulations include the following: Banks cannot hold common stock. Banks cannot invest too large a share of their

deposits in a single loan or in loans to businesses in a single industry.

Banks cannot lend funds to bank directors, managers, or principal shareholders at below-market rates.

Page 47: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Examinations

Banks are visited on a regular schedule by bank examiners from the OCC, the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, or other agencies.

Bank examiners review the bank’s financial statements and its confidential accounts.

The results are summarized in a “CAMELS” rating given to the bank.

Page 48: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Examinations

Capital adequacy Asset quality Management Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity to market risk

Page 49: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

CAMELS ratings

1 Sound in every respect

2 Fundamentally sound, but with modest weaknesses that can be corrected

3 Moderately severe to unsatisfactory weaknesses; vulnerable if there’s a business downturn

4 Many serious weaknesses that have not been addressed; failure is possible but not imminent

5 High probability of failure in the short term

Page 50: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Examinations

CAMELS ratings are disclosed to bank management, but not to the public.

If the CAMELS rating for a bank is unfavorable, regulators can take actions like these: Require banks to disclose unfavorable information

in their public financial statements Issue a “cease and desist” order requiring the

bank to stop doing things that cause financial troubles and to correct problems.

Impose fines (up to $1,000,000 per day).

Page 51: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Examinations

Page 52: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Bank Examinations

Good sources on bank examinations and the FDIC:www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/index.html

www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/1999oct/1_v12n2.pdf

Page 53: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

The Banking Crisis of the 1980s

Hundreds of savings and loan associations (S&L’s) and banks failed in the 1980s and early 1990s.

This episode illustrates: how changes in the market environment and a

loosening of regulations can lead to a bank crisis. how government regulators can handle

widespread bank failures. how regulations and supervisory standards can be

improved to address new problems.

Page 54: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Magnitude of the Crisis

From 1980 through 1994, over 2,900 banks and S&L’s failed. 1,617 banks with total assets of $302.6 billion 1,295 S&L’s with total assets of $621 billion

On average, a bank or S&L failed every 15 days from 1980 to 1994.

During this period, about one out of every six banks or S&L’s (holding a total of over 20% of the assets of the system) was closed or got government assistance.

Page 55: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Magnitude of the Crisis:Number of Bank Failures Per Year

Page 56: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Causes of the Banking Crisis

The banking crisis had many causes, including: changes in the market environment looser regulations that gave S&L’s more

competitive options

Page 57: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Causes of the Banking Crisis:Changes in the Market Environment

As a result of financial innovations in the 1960s and 1970s: banks and S&L’s faced more competition

from other financial firms (such as mutual funds).

new kinds of financial assets (such as futures and other derivatives) made it possible for investors (including banks and S&L’s) to take on more risk.

the financial market environment was more complicated and harder for regulators to monitor.

Page 58: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Causes of the Banking Crisis:Changes in Regulation

The banking industry was partially deregulated in the early 1980s: S&L’s had mostly been restricted to home

mortgage lending before, but now they were allowed to invest in commercial real estate and consumer loans.

S&L’s were allowed to invest in junk bonds (low-quality, high-risk commercial bonds) and common stocks.

Page 59: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Causes of the Banking Crisis:Changes in Regulation

Source:www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/421_476.pdf

Page 60: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Causes of the Banking Crisis

As a result, S&L’s held more risky assets, resulting in huge loan losses.

S&L management had little expertise in managing risks from new kinds of assets.

Regulators had little experience in monitoring the new risks.

Since S&L deposits (up to $100,000) were protected by federal deposit insurance, depositors had little incentive to monitor S&L risks.

Page 61: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Regulatory Failures in the Crisis

Regulators of S&L’s did not close insolvent institutions and end the crisis quickly. The deposit insurance fund wasn’t large

enough to cover losses.(The S&L deposit insurance fund had a balance of -$75 billion in 1988.)

Regulators wanted to encourage the growth of the S&L industry, not close S&L’s.

Regulators hoped the crisis would pass without revealing their failures.

Page 62: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Managing the Crisis

In 1989 the government created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to handle S&L’s that were failing.

Functions of the RTC: Took over assets of failing S&L’s and sold

them to recover as much of their value as possible.

Issued bonds to fund the costs of covering S&L losses.

Page 63: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Who Paid the Cost?

Bank and S&L stockholders Some depositors who had large

deposits that exceeded the deposit insurance limits

Taxpayers, who ultimately will pay higher taxes to pay off bonds that were issued to fund the costs of the crisis.

Page 64: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Regulatory Reforms Following the Crisis Some regulatory agencies that had not been

effective were eliminated, and their powers were given to other agencies.

Earlier restrictions on assets holdings by S&L’s were reinstated.

S&L’s were required to raise their capital/asset ratios.

Now bank examiners visit banks more frequently than before.

Regulators were required to act more quickly when a bank or S&L is failing.

Page 65: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Regulatory Reforms Following the Crisis

Source:www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/421_476.pdf

Page 66: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

Lessons from the Banking Crisis

The U.S. banking crisis in the 1980s was similar to bank crises in other countries:

Financial liberalization allowed banks to take more risks, but there was not yet adequate government regulation and supervision of those risks.

A government “safety net” created moral hazard problems and eliminated some market discipline.

Page 67: Market Structure and Regulation in the U.S. Banking Industry

The Banking Crisis of the 1980s

Two excellent sources: Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC

Experience www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/index.html

History of the Eighties - Lessons for the Future www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html