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1 The Impact of the Financial Services The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Private Equity Industry Private Equity Industry David Rubenstein, Co David Rubenstein, Co- Founder Founder Super Return Dubai Super Return Dubai October 15, 2008 October 15, 2008

Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Private Equity Industry

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Page 1: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

1

The Impact of the Financial Services The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Meltdown on The Global Economy And The

Private Equity IndustryPrivate Equity Industry

David Rubenstein, CoDavid Rubenstein, Co --FounderFounderSuper Return DubaiSuper Return DubaiOctober 15, 2008October 15, 2008

Page 2: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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The MeltdownThe Meltdown

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How Did This Happen?How Did This Happen?

Page 4: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Excesses in The US Housing And Excesses in The US Housing And Mortgage Markets Are A Root Cause Mortgage Markets Are A Root Cause

ÜÜ SubprimeSubprime loans accounted for 15% of the US loans accounted for 15% of the US mortgage market in 2006 vs. 3% in 2002mortgage market in 2006 vs. 3% in 2002

Subprime Share of Total Mortgage Market (1)

(1) Source: Danske Bank. March 30, 2008.

Page 5: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Excesses in The US Housing And Excesses in The US Housing And Mortgage Markets Are A Root CauseMortgage Markets Are A Root Cause

ÜÜ The more than $600 billion of The more than $600 billion of subprimesubprimemortgages that were issued in the US proved mortgages that were issued in the US proved riskier than anticipated riskier than anticipated

Mortgage Arrears Rates: Prime vs. Subprime (1)

(1) Source: Chicago Fed Letter, August 2007.

Subprime Arrearsrate: ~20%

Prime Arrearsrate: ~3.75%

Page 6: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Excesses in The US Housing And Excesses in The US Housing And Mortgage Markets Are A Root CauseMortgage Markets Are A Root Cause

ÜÜ To compete with private lenders, Fannie Mae To compete with private lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lowered lending standards and and Freddie Mac lowered lending standards and provided mortgage loans to provided mortgage loans to subprimesubprime borrowersborrowers

GSE Mortgage Lending: Total Value & % of Market

(1) Source: A Primer on t he Mort gage Market & Mort gage Finance, St. Louis Fed. Reserve Bank. February 2008.

100%

0%

50%

$3,000 bn

$1,500 bn

$0

Percent Fannie & Freddie

Fannie & Freddie

Private mortgage lending

Page 7: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Excesses in The US Housing And Excesses in The US Housing And Mortgage Markets Are A Root CauseMortgage Markets Are A Root Cause

ÜÜ Easy credit and lax lending standards fueled Easy credit and lax lending standards fueled an unprecedented bubble in house prices an unprecedented bubble in house prices

Median US Home Price Relative to Owner’s Rent

Page 8: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Mortgages Were Packaged Into Mortgages Were Packaged Into Structured Financial ProductsStructured Financial Products

ÜÜ Trillions of dollars of asset backed securities Trillions of dollars of asset backed securities and and CDOsCDOs were distributed throughout the were distributed throughout the financial systemfinancial system

(1) Source: Lehman Brothers, April 2008.

Global Issuance of Structured Financial Products (1)

($ billions)

Ȭ

200

400

600

800

1,000

1995

Q1

1996

Q1

1997

Q1

1998

Q1

1999

Q1

2000

Q1

2001

Q1

2002

Q1

2003

Q1

2004

Q1

2005

Q1

2006

Q1

2007

Q1

2008

Q1

(inȱ$B)

TotalȱCDO TotalȱABS

Page 9: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Financial Institutions Dramatically Financial Institutions Dramatically Increased Leverage Levels Increased Leverage Levels

ÜÜ Investment banks, hedge funds, and even Investment banks, hedge funds, and even commercial banks used borrowed money to commercial banks used borrowed money to

invest in structured financial productsinvest in structured financial products

(1) Source: Citigroup. September, 17 2008.

Bank & Broker Leverage Levels (Assets/Equity)

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Hedge Funds and Private Equity Firms Hedge Funds and Private Equity Firms Increased Their Use of Leverage Increased Their Use of Leverage

ÜÜ Hedge funds and private equity firms control ~$2.5 Hedge funds and private equity firms control ~$2.5 trillion of equity but borrowed several times this trillion of equity but borrowed several times this amount to fund their investmentsamount to fund their investments

Estimated Hedge Fund Leverage (2)

Sources: (1) Morgan Stanley. September 2008. (2) McKinsey, October 2007.

Leverage

Private Equity Leverage Multiples (1)

6.2x

5.4x5.3x

4.8x4.6x

4.0x

3.0x

3.5x

4.0x

4.5x

5.0x

5.5x

6.0x

6.5x

20022002 20032003 20042004 20052005 2007200720062006

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Sovereign Wealth Funds And Central Sovereign Wealth Funds And Central Banks Bolstered Global Liquidity Banks Bolstered Global Liquidity

ÜÜ Petrodollar inflows and exchange rate management Petrodollar inflows and exchange rate management policies resulted in massive capital accumulations policies resulted in massive capital accumulations throughout the developing world throughout the developing world

Global Foreign Exchange Reserves (2)Top Five Sovereign Wealth Funds (1)

($ billions)4,987

4,309

3,822

3,112

2,4752,093

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

$ billions$ billions

20052005 200620062004200420012001 20022002 20032003

Sources: (1) Monitor. May 12, 2008. (2) McKinsey, October 2007.

$108

$200$250

$330

$875

ADIAADIA TemasekTemasekCICCICKIAKIAGICGIC

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Rating Agencies Propagated The Illusion Rating Agencies Propagated The Illusion of A Low Risk Investment Environmentof A Low Risk Investment Environment

ÜÜ They assigned high, investment grade ratings to They assigned high, investment grade ratings to opaque structured financial products and debt opaque structured financial products and debt issued by highly leveraged companiesissued by highly leveraged companies

ÜÜ Since the outbreak of the credit crisis, they have Since the outbreak of the credit crisis, they have downgraded over $1.9 trillion of mortgage backed downgraded over $1.9 trillion of mortgage backed securitiessecurities

841739

23785

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Q3 2007Q3 2007 Q2 2008Q2 2008Q1 2008Q1 2008Q4 2007Q4 2007

Rating Agency Downgrades: Mortgage Backed Securitie s(1)

($ billions)

(1) Source: Citigroup. September, 17 2008.

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ÜÜ Total U.S. Credit Market Debt Has Risen to 350% of GDPTotal U.S. Credit Market Debt Has Risen to 350% of GDP

(1) Source: Ned Davis Research, 2008.

Total Credit Market Debt / U.S. GDP (1)

130

150

170

190

210

230

250

270

290

310

330

350

1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

%

The Bottom Line Is That Systemic The Bottom Line Is That Systemic Leverage Rose To Unprecedented HeightsLeverage Rose To Unprecedented Heights

Today

Great Depression

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Warning SignsWarning Signs

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Default Rates Started to RiseDefault Rates Started to Rise

ÜÜ Default rates on certain types of Default rates on certain types of subprimesubprimemortgages had risen to above 20% (vs. 6% at the mortgages had risen to above 20% (vs. 6% at the beginning of 2005)beginning of 2005)

(1) Source: Freddie Mac, March 27,2008.

Mortgage Default Rates (1)

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The Market Prices of Mortgage Backed The Market Prices of Mortgage Backed Securities Fell Precipitously Securities Fell Precipitously

ÜÜ Market prices of mortgage backed securities had Market prices of mortgage backed securities had fallen dramatically by the end of last summerfallen dramatically by the end of last summer

(1) Source: BNP Paribas, September 15, 2008.

Price Performance of Asset Backed Security Indexes (1)

Page 17: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Investment Banks CouldnInvestment Banks Couldn ’’ t Syndicate t Syndicate High Yield LBO Debt High Yield LBO Debt

ÜÜ Private equity deals started to fall apart as debt Private equity deals started to fall apart as debt markets remarkets re--priced risk and rejected complex priced risk and rejected complex structures structures

Large LBO Failures Large LBO Failures

Sallie Mae ($25.5 billion)Sallie Mae ($25.5 billion)

Huntsman ($10.6 billion)Huntsman ($10.6 billion)

Affiliated Computer Services ($8.0 billion)Affiliated Computer Services ($8.0 billion)

Harman International ($8.2 billion)Harman International ($8.2 billion)

Alliance Data ($7.8 billion)Alliance Data ($7.8 billion)

Penn National Gaming ($6.1 billion)Penn National Gaming ($6.1 billion)

United Rentals ($4.0 billion)United Rentals ($4.0 billion)

Acxiom ($2.9 billion)Acxiom ($2.9 billion)

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Investment Funds Lost Billions Betting Investment Funds Lost Billions Betting on Risky Credit Instruments on Risky Credit Instruments

ÜÜ Two of Bear StearnsTwo of Bear Stearns’’ flagship hedge funds flagship hedge funds collapsed in July 2007collapsed in July 2007

The funds had invested $1.5 billion in The funds had invested $1.5 billion in subprimesubprime CDOCDO’’ss

These failures were followed by the collapse of These failures were followed by the collapse of SowoodSowood Capital, a prominent $3 billion hedge fundCapital, a prominent $3 billion hedge fund

ÜÜ Structured Investment Vehicles (Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVsSIVs) ) announced billions of dollars of losses and were announced billions of dollars of losses and were liquidatedliquidated

They had borrowed heavily in the shortThey had borrowed heavily in the short--term debt term debt markets to fund purchases of markets to fund purchases of CDOsCDOs and other longand other long--term, risky debt instruments term, risky debt instruments

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Systemic RiskSystemic Risk

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Financial Institutions Announced Massive Financial Institutions Announced Massive Losses On Mortgages and Credit Instruments Losses On Mortgages and Credit Instruments

ÜÜ Financial institutions have sustained over $500 Financial institutions have sustained over $500 billion dollars of writebillion dollars of write--downs since the credit downs since the credit crisis begancrisis began

The IMF expects that total financial losses will exceed The IMF expects that total financial losses will exceed those of any past crisis those of any past crisis

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

IMF Comparison of Losse s Across Financial CrisesIMF Comparison of Losse s Across Financial Crises (1)(1)

$ $ bilbil

Credit Crisis Credit Crisis (2007(2007-- ??? )??? )

US Savings and Loan US Savings and Loan Crisis (1986Crisis (1986--95)95)

Asia Banking Crisis Asia Banking Crisis (1998(1998--99)99)

Japan Banking Crisis Japan Banking Crisis (1990(1990--99)99)

Minimum Anticipated Future Losses

(1)International Monetary Fund, “Global Financial Stability Report,” April 2008.

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Several Systemically Important Several Systemically Important Institutions Have Failed in the US Institutions Have Failed in the US

ÜÜ Victims of the credit crisis:Victims of the credit crisis:

Bear Stearns (investment bank) Bear Stearns (investment bank) ȩȩ Saved from Saved from bankruptcy by government backed sale to JP Morgan bankruptcy by government backed sale to JP Morgan

Lehman Brothers (investment bank) Lehman Brothers (investment bank) ȩȩ BankruptBankrupt

AIG (worldAIG (world’’s largest insurance co.) s largest insurance co.) ȩȩ Bailed out Bailed out

Washington Mutual (6Washington Mutual (6thth largest US bank*) largest US bank*) ȩȩ Assets Assets seized by the government and sold to JP Morganseized by the government and sold to JP Morgan

Wachovia (3Wachovia (3rdrd largest US bank*) largest US bank*) ȩȩ Sold to Wells Fargo Sold to Wells Fargo after an aborted bid by Citigroupafter an aborted bid by Citigroup

* By deposits

Page 22: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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A Radical Policy Response Seeks To A Radical Policy Response Seeks To Prevent A Systemic Collapse Prevent A Systemic Collapse

ÜÜ Under the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP), the Under the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP), the Treasury Department is:Treasury Department is: Purchasing up to $250 billion in equity stakes in US financial Purchasing up to $250 billion in equity stakes in US financial

institutions, including $20institutions, including $20--25 billion stakes in Bank of America, 25 billion stakes in Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo and $10 billion stakes in Goldman Citigroup, and Wells Fargo and $10 billion stakes in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Sachs and Morgan Stanley

Purchasing up to $700 billion of financial sector assetsPurchasing up to $700 billion of financial sector assets

ÜÜ The FDIC is guaranteeing certain types of bank debt The FDIC is guaranteeing certain types of bank debt and has increased deposit insurance to $250,000and has increased deposit insurance to $250,000

ÜÜ The Federal Reserve has taken extraordinary steps:The Federal Reserve has taken extraordinary steps: Allowed banks to post unconventional assets as collateral Allowed banks to post unconventional assets as collateral

Begun purchasing commercial paper from corporationsBegun purchasing commercial paper from corporations

Extended a $50Bn credit line to money market fundsExtended a $50Bn credit line to money market funds

Begun paying interest on bank reservesBegun paying interest on bank reserves

Page 23: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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EuropeEurope

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The Credit Crisis Has Struck Europe The Credit Crisis Has Struck Europe With A Vengeance With A Vengeance

ÜÜ EuropeEurope’’s economies are in many ways as s economies are in many ways as vulnerable as Americavulnerable as America’’ss

Leverage levels are high, house prices are inflated, Leverage levels are high, house prices are inflated, and financial institutions have suffered deep lossesand financial institutions have suffered deep losses

Bank Leverage: Europe vs. USA (1)

(Assets/Equity)

Source: (1) Citibank, “A Downward Spiral.” 17 September 2008.

UK Household Debt/ Income (%) (1)

21x

38x

USAUSAEuropeEurope

Page 25: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Large European Financial Institutions Large European Financial Institutions Have Experienced Extreme Distress Have Experienced Extreme Distress

ÜÜ In the United KingdomIn the United Kingdom RBS RBS ȩȩ The British government is recapitalizing EuropeThe British government is recapitalizing Europe’’s largest s largest

bank by assetsbank by assets

HBOS & Lloyds TSBHBOS & Lloyds TSB ȩȩ The UK government is injecting capital The UK government is injecting capital into both banks (Britaininto both banks (Britain’’s 4s 4thth & 5& 5thth largest), having already largest), having already engineered their merger engineered their merger

Northern RockNorthern Rock and and Bradford & BingleyBradford & Bingley ȩȩ Two of the UKTwo of the UK’’s largest s largest mortgage lenders became insolvent and were nationalizedmortgage lenders became insolvent and were nationalized

ÜÜ In Germany In Germany Hypo Real EstateHypo Real Estate ȩȩ Bailed out by the German governmentBailed out by the German government

ÜÜ In France & BelgiumIn France & Belgium FortisFortis ȩȩ EuropeEurope’’s 11th largest bank was sold off piecemeal and s 11th largest bank was sold off piecemeal and

partly nationalized partly nationalized

DexiaDexia ȩȩ France and Belgium were forced to recapitalize France and Belgium were forced to recapitalize EuropeEurope’’s 16s 16thth largest banklargest bank

Page 26: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Other Systemically Important European Other Systemically Important European Banks Are at Risk Banks Are at Risk

ÜÜ Many of EuropeMany of Europe’’s largest banks operate at very s largest banks operate at very high leverage levels high leverage levels

One reason is that many of them have highly One reason is that many of them have highly leveraged investment banking operationsleveraged investment banking operations

European BanksEuropean Banks ’’ Leverage Ratio Compared With CitigroupLeverage Ratio Compared With Citigroup (1)(1)

Citigroup

Source: (1) Greed & Fear, 09 October 2008.

Page 27: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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European Governments Have Been European Governments Have Been Forced To Take Radical Action Forced To Take Radical Action

ÜÜ European governments have pledged a total of European governments have pledged a total of $2.5 trillion to guarantee bank debt and purchase $2.5 trillion to guarantee bank debt and purchase equity stakes in financial institutionsequity stakes in financial institutions

ÜÜ EurozoneEurozone governments have agreed to guarantee governments have agreed to guarantee all new bank debt issuance through 2009all new bank debt issuance through 2009

ÜÜ Ireland, Germany, and Denmark have guaranteed Ireland, Germany, and Denmark have guaranteed

all consumer bank depositsall consumer bank deposits

ÜÜ European central banks are offering unlimited European central banks are offering unlimited dollar funding to banks in order to unclog dollar funding to banks in order to unclog

interbankinterbank lendinglending

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European Governments Have Been European Governments Have Been Forced To Take Radical Action Forced To Take Radical Action

ÜÜ Specific national policies include:Specific national policies include:

The The UKUK Government is guaranteeing bank debt and Government is guaranteeing bank debt and injecting injecting ȰȰ50 billion into banks including RBS, HBOS, and 50 billion into banks including RBS, HBOS, and Lloyds TSBLloyds TSB

GermanyGermany is guaranteeing up to $544 billion of bank debt is guaranteeing up to $544 billion of bank debt and plans to buy equity stakes worth up to $109 billionand plans to buy equity stakes worth up to $109 billion

FranceFrance is creating a state fund to buy stakes in financial is creating a state fund to buy stakes in financial institutions and has guaranteed $435 billion of bank debtinstitutions and has guaranteed $435 billion of bank debt

SpainSpain is guaranteeing up to $136 billion of new bank debt, is guaranteeing up to $136 billion of new bank debt, has set up a facility to purchase equity stakes, and plans to has set up a facility to purchase equity stakes, and plans to buy up to $68 billion of bank assetsbuy up to $68 billion of bank assets

IcelandIceland has nationalized its entire banking system and may has nationalized its entire banking system and may borrow billions of dollars from Russia and the IMFborrow billions of dollars from Russia and the IMF

Source: Wall Street Journal, 14 October 2008.

Page 29: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Emerging MarketsEmerging Markets

Page 30: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Emerging Markets Have Posted Steep Emerging Markets Have Posted Steep Stock Market Losses Stock Market Losses ÜÜ Heightened risk aversion, capital flight, and Heightened risk aversion, capital flight, and

deteriorating economic growth deteriorating economic growth prospects have prospects have

produced dramatic equity price declinesproduced dramatic equity price declines

40

60

80

100

120

Jan-

08

Jan-

08

Jan-

08

Feb

-08

Feb

-08

Mar

-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08

Jun-

08

Jul-0

8

Jul-0

8

Jul-0

8

Aug

-08

Aug

-08

Sep

-08

Sep

-08

MSCI Latin America MSCI Eastern Europe MSCI Emerging Asia

India (SENSEX) US (S&P 500)

Source: (1) Bloomberg, 10 October 2008.

YTD Performance of EM Equity MarketsYTD Performance of EM Equity Markets (1)(1)

S&P 500: S&P 500: (38.8%)(38.8%)

India: India: (48.1%)(48.1%)

E. Europe: E. Europe: (62.2%)(62.2%)

Asia: Asia: (52.2%)(52.2%)

Lat. America: Lat. America: (60.9%)(60.9%)

Page 31: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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The Credit Crisis Has Disrupted Capital The Credit Crisis Has Disrupted Capital Markets and Exposed Fiscal Weaknesses Markets and Exposed Fiscal Weaknesses

ÜÜ Regions and countries with major fiscal Regions and countries with major fiscal imbalances have been hit hard imbalances have been hit hard

Many emerging markets rely on foreign capital Many emerging markets rely on foreign capital inflows to finance large current account deficitsinflows to finance large current account deficits

They have funded domestic credit growth with They have funded domestic credit growth with foreign borrowing foreign borrowing

Some developing economies are heavily Some developing economies are heavily commodity dependant and will weaken as commodity dependant and will weaken as commodity prices fallcommodity prices fall

ÜÜ Capital flight is a major risk for these Capital flight is a major risk for these economies economies

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Certain Emerging Markets Are Vulnerable Certain Emerging Markets Are Vulnerable

ÜÜ Emerging markets with high current account Emerging markets with high current account deficits and tight banking sector liquidity could deficits and tight banking sector liquidity could experience fullexperience full--blown financial crises blown financial crises

ÜÜ Regions/Countries at risk include: Regions/Countries at risk include:

Central & Eastern EuropeCentral & Eastern Europe ȩȩ The Baltic states, Bulgaria, The Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Hungary have large current Romania, Ukraine, and Hungary have large current account deficits and have experienced unrestrained account deficits and have experienced unrestrained credit growth credit growth

Latin AmericaLatin America ȩȩ Countries including Brazil, Peru, Countries including Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela could see their fiscal positions Argentina, and Venezuela could see their fiscal positions deteriorate if commodity prices fall further deteriorate if commodity prices fall further

PakistanPakistan ȩȩ The countryThe country’’s credit ratings have been cut s credit ratings have been cut due to its deteriorating external liquidity situation and due to its deteriorating external liquidity situation and dwindling foreign reserves dwindling foreign reserves

Page 33: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Certain Emerging Markets Are Vulnerable Certain Emerging Markets Are Vulnerable

ÜÜ Eastern European current account deficits and Latin Eastern European current account deficits and Latin American commodity dependency are key American commodity dependency are key vulnerabilities vulnerabilities

Certain CEE countries will experience credit contractions, Certain CEE countries will experience credit contractions, reduced investment, and slower growthreduced investment, and slower growth

Latin American governments may have to raise taxes or cut Latin American governments may have to raise taxes or cut spending as commodity related revenues fallspending as commodity related revenues fall

Lat. Am. Fiscal Balances Pro-Formafor Commodity Prices at 10 Yr Avg. (2)

CEE Current Account Deficits (1)

(2007)

1.7%

8.7%

-2.0%

1.1%

-2.6%

1.8%

-5.0%

-8.1%

2007 Pro2007 Pro--formaforma

2007 Actual2007 Actual

Peru Peru BrazilBrazil ChileChileArgentinaArgentina

Sources: (1) Economist Intelligence Unit, 13 October 2008; (2) Morgan Stanley, 30 September 2008.

-5.3%-4.9%

-13.7%

-18.2%

-22.0%-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

RomaniaRomaniaBaltic Baltic StatesStates

HungaryHungaryBulgariaBulgaria United United StatesStates

Page 34: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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What About India? What About India?

ÜÜ India has benefited from rapidly increasing capital India has benefited from rapidly increasing capital inflows since 2000, but these are set to fallinflows since 2000, but these are set to fall

Capital inflows funded investment and boosted GDP growth Capital inflows funded investment and boosted GDP growth above its longabove its long--term sustainable rate term sustainable rate

ÜÜ ButBut India should prove relatively resilient due to India should prove relatively resilient due to growing domestic demand low reliance on exportsgrowing domestic demand low reliance on exports

Growth is likely to moderate to a more sustainable rate of Growth is likely to moderate to a more sustainable rate of ~6~6--7% (from a 37% (from a 3--year average of 9.3% as of March 2008)year average of 9.3% as of March 2008)

Sources: (1) Morgan Stanley, 30 September 2008; (2) Carlyle Analysis.

Capital Inflows Received by IndiaCapital Inflows Received by India (1)(1)

98

3921

10

0

50

100

20002000--2 Avg.2 Avg.

$ billions$ billions

2006200620032003--5 Avg.5 Avg. 20072007

Page 35: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

35

What About China? What About China?

ÜÜ Of the worldOf the world’’s major economies, Chinas major economies, China’’s is s is best best positionedpositioned to weather the storm to weather the storm

Key reasons include:Key reasons include:

1.1. China has amassed China has amassed $1.8 trillion of foreign currency $1.8 trillion of foreign currency reservesreserves as a result of its persistently high current as a result of its persistently high current account surplusesaccount surpluses

2.2. The economy benefits from a very The economy benefits from a very low level of leveragelow level of leverageand low external debt and low external debt ȩȩ debt levels for households and debt levels for households and the government are only 13% and 33% of GDP, the government are only 13% and 33% of GDP, respectivelyrespectively

3.3. Domestic banks remain Domestic banks remain awash with liquidityawash with liquidity as a result as a result of deposit growth and reserve accumulationof deposit growth and reserve accumulation

4.4. The banking system in China operates on a conservative The banking system in China operates on a conservative basis with low leverage levels and basis with low leverage levels and without without securitizationsecuritization

Sources: (1) Morgan Stanley, 07 October 2008; (2) Carlyle Analysis.

Page 36: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Recession in The West Will Affect Recession in The West Will Affect Chinese Growth ProspectsChinese Growth Prospects

Transmission mechanisms include:Transmission mechanisms include:

ÜÜ Trade Trade

Western economies are key consumers of Chinese Western economies are key consumers of Chinese exportsexports

ÜÜ InvestmentInvestment

Western investors have supplied much of the capital Western investors have supplied much of the capital that has been used to grow Chinathat has been used to grow China’’s companiess companies

ÜÜ Opportunities for International ExpansionOpportunities for International Expansion

Many of ChinaMany of China’’s most successful companies s most successful companies –– such as such as LenovoLenovo and Bank of China and Bank of China –– are expanding abroadare expanding abroad

Page 37: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

37

But China Will Continue to Grow Rapidly But China Will Continue to Grow Rapidly

ÜÜ Domestic growth will offset weaker external demandDomestic growth will offset weaker external demand

An increasing proportion of GDP derives from domestic demand An increasing proportion of GDP derives from domestic demand

ChinaChina’’s growing middle class has rapidly increased its s growing middle class has rapidly increased its consumption of items like cars and electronicsconsumption of items like cars and electronics

Abating inflationary pressures will allow ChinaAbating inflationary pressures will allow China’’s central bank s central bank to further loosen monetary policy to further loosen monetary policy

Chinese Retail Sales (% Change YoY)Chinese Retail Sales (% Change YoY) (1)(1)

(1) Source: China Statistics Bureau, August 2007.

14%

16%

18%

20%

22%

24%

AugAug--0808

JulJul--0808

JunJun--0808

MayMay--0808

AprApr--0808

MarMar--0808

FebFeb--0808

SepSep--0707

NovNov--0707

JanJan--0808

OctOct--0707

DecDec--0707

JulJul--0707

AugAug--0707

JunJun--0707

Page 38: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

38

The Middle EastThe Middle East

Page 39: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

39

The Middle East Is Likely To Prove The Middle East Is Likely To Prove Resilient Resilient

ÜÜ The credit crisis is affecting the Middle East but not The credit crisis is affecting the Middle East but not as much as other regions as much as other regions

The IMF forecasts only a slight moderation of GDP growth to The IMF forecasts only a slight moderation of GDP growth to 6.0% in 2009 (vs. 6.5% in 2008)6.0% in 2009 (vs. 6.5% in 2008)

ÜÜ Nevertheless, the credit crisis in the West has Nevertheless, the credit crisis in the West has precipitated a regional liquidity contractionprecipitated a regional liquidity contraction

Foreign banks in the region have stopped lending moneyForeign banks in the region have stopped lending money

Regional stock markets have posted dramatic declinesRegional stock markets have posted dramatic declines

Local banks are generally healthy Local banks are generally healthy

ÜÜ This cloud has a silver liningThis cloud has a silver lining

The credit downThe credit down--cycle and falling food and energy prices cycle and falling food and energy prices are moderating inflationary pressures are moderating inflationary pressures

Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2008; Emerging Markets Monitor, 6 October 2008

Page 40: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Oil Price Declines Are Significant But Not Oil Price Declines Are Significant But Not Disastrous Disastrous

ÜÜ Economic growth is being sustained mainly by nonEconomic growth is being sustained mainly by non--oil oil sectors including construction, retail, transportation, sectors including construction, retail, transportation, and financial servicesand financial services

Middle Eastern GDP Growth: Oil vs. NonMiddle Eastern GDP Growth: Oil vs. Non --Oil Sectors Oil Sectors (1)(1)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2008

%

Page 41: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

41

Oil Price Declines Are Significant But Not Oil Price Declines Are Significant But Not Disastrous Disastrous

ÜÜ Most government budgets and investment programs Most government budgets and investment programs in the Middle East will remain intact unless oil falls in the Middle East will remain intact unless oil falls below $50/barrelbelow $50/barrel

A prolonged drop below $50 is highly unlikely because A prolonged drop below $50 is highly unlikely because global demand for oil continues to rise while supply is global demand for oil continues to rise while supply is largely static largely static

ÜÜ Middle Eastern governments have amassed huge Middle Eastern governments have amassed huge reserve funds which they could deploy to support reserve funds which they could deploy to support regional growth if the outlook darkensregional growth if the outlook darkens

Middle Eastern government saved 70% of their surplus oil Middle Eastern government saved 70% of their surplus oil revenues over the past five yearsrevenues over the past five years

Sovereign wealth funds in the MENA region have over $1.5 Sovereign wealth funds in the MENA region have over $1.5 trillion at their disposaltrillion at their disposal

Sources: Monitor Group, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the MENA Region,” 12 May 2008; Carlyle research & analysis.

Page 42: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

42

The Current SituationThe Current Situation

Page 43: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

43

Central Banks Have Responded With Central Banks Have Responded With Coordinated Global Rate CutsCoordinated Global Rate Cuts

ÜÜ On October 8On October 8thth, 21 countries around the world , 21 countries around the world simultaneously cut interest ratessimultaneously cut interest rates

The Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate by 50 The Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 1.50%basis points to 1.50%

October 8October 8 thth : Key Interest Rate Cuts: Key Interest Rate Cuts (1)(1)

Source: (1) Financial Times, 08 October 2008.

Page 44: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

44

Credit Market Stress Remains At Credit Market Stress Remains At Unprecedented Levels Unprecedented Levels

ÜÜ But global interest rate cuts have done But global interest rate cuts have done not hing not hing to encourage private sector lendingto encourage private sector lending

The spread between US Treasuries and the The spread between US Treasuries and the interbankinterbanklending rate remains at all time highs lending rate remains at all time highs

TED Spread: 3 month LIBOR TED Spread: 3 month LIBOR –– 3 month T3 month T --BillBill (1)(1)

Source: (1) BNP Paribas, 10 October 2008.

Page 45: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

45

Global Equity Markets Have CrashedGlobal Equity Markets Have Crashed

ÜÜ Global stock markets are testing multiGlobal stock markets are testing multi--year lows year lows

The MSCI World index has fallen by over 40% since its The MSCI World index has fallen by over 40% since its 2007 high 2007 high

MSCI AC World IndexMSCI AC World Index (1)(1)

Source: (1) Greed & Fear, 09 October 2008.

Page 46: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

46

Commodity Prices Have RetreatedCommodity Prices Have Retreated

ÜÜ The price of oil has fallen by 40% since its peak The price of oil has fallen by 40% since its peak in July 2008in July 2008

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

Jan-

08Ja

n-08

Feb-

08Fe

b-08

Feb-

08M

ar-0

8M

ar-0

8Ap

r-08

Apr-

08M

ay-0

8M

ay-0

8Ju

n-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Jul-0

8Au

g-08

Aug-

08Au

g-08

Sep-

08Se

p-08

Oct

-08

Oil Price/Barrel Since January 1Oil Price/Barrel Since January 1 stst (1)(1)

Source: (1) Bloomberg, 10 October 2008.

Page 47: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

47

Consumer Access to Credit Is Dwindling Consumer Access to Credit Is Dwindling

ÜÜ US Consumer credit fell by a record $7.9 billion US Consumer credit fell by a record $7.9 billion in Augustin August

This was the first drop since 1998 and the largest This was the first drop since 1998 and the largest monthly decline monthly decline in hist ory in hist ory

Monthly Net Increase in Consumer Credit OutstandingMonthly Net Increase in Consumer Credit Outstanding (1)(1)

Source: (1) Greed & Fear, 09 October 2008.

Page 48: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

48

The United States Is Falling Into Recession The United States Is Falling Into Recession

ÜÜ Unemployment rose to 6.1% in August from 5.7% in July Unemployment rose to 6.1% in August from 5.7% in July

The 1.1% surge in the unemployment rate over the past 4 The 1.1% surge in the unemployment rate over the past 4 months is the fastest in 22 years months is the fastest in 22 years

ÜÜ Retail sales fell by 0.3% in August and were down 0.7% Retail sales fell by 0.3% in August and were down 0.7% excluding automobile sales excluding automobile sales

ÜÜ The main index of US manufacturing activity fell 13% in The main index of US manufacturing activity fell 13% in September September

The current level has only been seen before during fullThe current level has only been seen before during full--blown blown recessionsrecessions

ÜÜ US GDP growth is slowing significantly, and outright US GDP growth is slowing significantly, and outright contraction is likelycontraction is likely

Goldman Sachs forecasts US GDP growth of 1.5% in 2008 and Goldman Sachs forecasts US GDP growth of 1.5% in 2008 and --0.2% in 2009 (vs. 2.0% in 2007) 0.2% in 2009 (vs. 2.0% in 2007)

Page 49: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

49

Much of the Rest of the World May Much of the Rest of the World May Follow in AmericaFollow in America ’’ s Footsteps s Footsteps

ÜÜ Economists are ratcheting down global growth Economists are ratcheting down global growth

estimatesestimates

Key factors likely to suppress growth: Key factors likely to suppress growth:

Decreased global liquidityDecreased global liquidity

Lower capital flows to emerging marketsLower capital flows to emerging markets

Reduced GReduced G--7 demand for imports 7 demand for imports

Lower demand for commoditiesLower demand for commodities

ÜÜ Key 2009 GDP growth forecasts*Key 2009 GDP growth forecasts*

* Goldman Sachs, 10 October 2008.

2009E 2008E 2007A

Euroland 0.5% 1.1% 2.6%

United Kingdom 0.4% 1.0% 3.0%

Japan 0.5% 0.7% 2.1%

China 8.7% 9.8% 11.9%

Brazil 3.3% 5.6% 5.4%

Page 50: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

50

WhatWhat ’’ s Next?s Next?

Page 51: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

51

Markets Will Recover From Recent Lows Markets Will Recover From Recent Lows

ÜÜ Investor panic had driven valuations to levels Investor panic had driven valuations to levels which were not warranted by fundamentalswhich were not warranted by fundamentals

ÜÜ MondayMonday’’s rally may mark the beginning of a s rally may mark the beginning of a medium term rally medium term rally

It marked the largest ever oneIt marked the largest ever one--day point gain for the day point gain for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the largest Dow Jones Industrial Average and the largest percentage increase since 1933 percentage increase since 1933

ÜÜ But this does not mean that equity markets But this does not mean that equity markets wonwon’’t touch recent lows again in the futuret touch recent lows again in the future

Volatility may return as the Volatility may return as the deleveragingdeleveraging cycle cycle continues and as a consumer recession sinks in continues and as a consumer recession sinks in

Page 52: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

52

A Broader Recession Will EnsueA Broader Recession Will Ensue

ÜÜ Tighter credit and lower house prices will severely Tighter credit and lower house prices will severely depress consumption depress consumption

Sources: (1) Zellman and Associates. September 2007; (2) The Federal Reserve Bank Officer Lending Survey, July 2008

-17%

66%

-12%

20%

-35%

-15%

5%

25%

45%

65%

85%

19901990--9595 19961996--0606 20072007--PresentPresent

19831983--8989

Home Price % ChangeHome Price % Changevs. Previous Cycle vs. Previous Cycle (1)(1)

% of US Banks Tightening % of US Banks Tightening Consumer Credit Consumer Credit (2)(2)

-10%

10%

30%

50%

70%

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Credit cards Other consumer loans

Page 53: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

53

The The DeleveragingDeleveraging Process Will Be Process Will Be Unpleasant And Will Take Time Unpleasant And Will Take Time

ÜÜ Debt levels need to become more sustainable before an Debt levels need to become more sustainable before an economic recovery can ensue economic recovery can ensue

(1) Source: Ned Davis Research, 2008.

Total Credit Market Debt / U.S. GDP (1)

130

150

170

190

210

230

250

270

290

310

330

350

1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

%

Page 54: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

54

The Future Is Still Bright: Extraordinarily The Future Is Still Bright: Extraordinarily Positive LongPositive Long --Term Macro Trends Exist Term Macro Trends Exist

ÜÜ Rapid growth of emerging markets Rapid growth of emerging markets

Billions of people will achieve relative prosperityBillions of people will achieve relative prosperity

Opportunities for investment and development will aboundOpportunities for investment and development will abound

ÜÜ Technological innovationTechnological innovation

Technology is evolving at a more rapid pace than at time in Technology is evolving at a more rapid pace than at time in human historyhuman history

This will increase productivity and living standards globallyThis will increase productivity and living standards globally

Improvements in science and medical technology will directly Improvements in science and medical technology will directly benefit millions of people benefit millions of people

ÜÜ Global peace and stabilityGlobal peace and stability

The world is a more stable place than it has been for most of The world is a more stable place than it has been for most of the past thousand yearsthe past thousand years

Page 55: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

55

Impact on Private EquityImpact on Private Equity

Page 56: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

56

Existing Investments Will Be Affected Existing Investments Will Be Affected

ÜÜ 20002000--20052005

LBO activity boomed but leverage levels and acquisition LBO activity boomed but leverage levels and acquisition multiples remained reasonable multiples remained reasonable

Most deals done during this period will prove resilient Most deals done during this period will prove resilient

Leverage vs. Acquisition Multiples (1)

(of EBITDA)Global LBO Activity 2000-2005 (1)

291

247

142110

65

102

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

20042004 20052005

$ Billions$ Billions

20002000 20012001 20022002 20032003

Sources: (1) Dealogic. (2) Standard & Poor’s.

5.34.84.6

4.04.14.2

8.1

7.06.7

6.4

5.8

6.4

3.0x

4.0x

5.0x

6.0x

7.0x

8.0x

9.0x

20002000 20012001 20022002 20032003 20042004 20052005

LeverageLeverage

AcquisitionAcquisition

Page 57: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

57

Existing Investments Will Be Affected Existing Investments Will Be Affected

ÜÜ 20062006--1H 20071H 2007

A bubble developed in the private equity market A bubble developed in the private equity market

Debt and acquisition multiples rose above historical normsDebt and acquisition multiples rose above historical norms

Some companies bought during this period may experience Some companies bought during this period may experience financial difficulties financial difficulties

Leverage vs. Acquisition Multiples (1)Global LBO Activity (1)

Sources: (1) Dealogic, Standard & Poor’s, Morgan Stanley Financial Sponsors Group, Carlyle Analysis.

693

160

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

20002000--2005 Avg.2005 Avg. 20062006--2007 Avg.2007 Avg.

$ billions$ billions

8.7x

6.7x5.8x

4.5x

0.0x

2.0x

4.0x

6.0x

8.0x

10.0x

20002000--20052005Avg.Avg.

20062006--77Avg.Avg.

0.0x0.0x

2.0x2.0x

4.0x4.0x

6.0x6.0x

EBITDA MultipleEBITDA Multiple

20002000--20052005Avg.Avg.

20062006--77Avg.Avg.

Page 58: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

58

Existing Investments Will Be Affected Existing Investments Will Be Affected

ÜÜ 2H 20072H 2007

After the credit crisis hit, many deals met with difficulty After the credit crisis hit, many deals met with difficulty

Investment banks could not syndicate LBO debt and a Investment banks could not syndicate LBO debt and a massive $389 billion debt backlog developed massive $389 billion debt backlog developed

Many deals were pulled; others were renegotiated on more Many deals were pulled; others were renegotiated on more favorable terms favorable terms

Restructured Deals (1)Busted Deals (1)

Source: (1) Morgan Stanley Financial Sponsors Group.

Company Value

Sallie Mae $25.5 billion

Huntsman $10.6 billion

Harman Int. $8.2 billion

ACS $8.0 billion

Alliance Data $7.8 billion

Penn National $6.1 billion

Company Value

ClearChannel $27.3 billion

First Data $26.3 billion

Harrah's $26.2 billion

Biomet $11.4 billion

HD Supply $8.5 billion

Thomson $7.8 billion

Page 59: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

59

New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ Private equity deals are Private equity deals are smallersmaller

Average Deal Size Average Deal Size (1)(1)

134155

97

143171

519

294

422

251

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

$ Millions$ Millions

2007 Q32007 Q3 2007 Q42007 Q42007 Q22007 Q22006 Q32006 Q3 2006 Q42006 Q4 2008 Q12008 Q12007 Q12007 Q1 2008 Q32008 Q32008 Q22008 Q2

Credit Crisis

Source: (1) Dealogic.

Page 60: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

60

New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ Private equity deals involve Private equity deals involve more equitymore equity

Average Equity Contribution (% of Purchase Price) Average Equity Contribution (% of Purchase Price) (1)(1)

26%

28%

30%

32%

34%

36%

38%

40%

2Q082Q081H081H08200720072006200620052005200420042003200320022002200120012000200019971997 19981998 19991999

Credit Crisis

Page 61: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ Private equity deals involve Private equity deals involve less favorable debt termsless favorable debt terms

Average Spread of Leveraged Buyout Loans Average Spread of Leveraged Buyout Loans (1)(1)

(vs. LIBOR)(vs. LIBOR)

250

300

350

400

450

bpsbps

19971997 19981998 19991999 20002000 20012001 20022002 2Q082Q081H081H0820052005 20062006 2007200720032003 20042004

Credit Crisis

Source: (1) Standard & Poor’s.

Page 62: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ Private equity deals are Private equity deals are fewer in numberfewer in number

Number of Private Equity DealsNumber of Private Equity Deals

Source: (1) Standard & Poor’s.

410

448

582

550

620

655

613615

666

585582

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

700

Q4 06Q4 06 Q2 07Q2 07Q1 07Q1 07 Q4 07Q4 07Q3 07Q3 07 Q3 08Q3 08Q2 08Q2 08Q1 08Q1 08Q3 06Q3 06Q2 06Q2 06Q1 06Q1 06

Credit Crisis

Page 63: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

63

New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ Private equity deals are Private equity deals are less debtless debt--dependant dependant

Minority Investment by Financial Sponsors Minority Investment by Financial Sponsors (1)(1)

Source: (1) Dealogic.

10

24

10

13

1615

10

8

1010

7

0

5

10

15

20

25

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Minority InvestmentsMinority Investments($ billions)($ billions)

% of Total PE% of Total PEDeal VolumeDeal Volume

% of Total PE Deal Volume% of Total PE Deal Volume

Minority InvestmentsMinority Investments

Q3 08Q3 08Q2 08Q2 08Q1 08Q1 08Q4 07Q4 07Q3 07Q3 07Q2 07Q2 07Q1 07Q1 07Q4 06Q4 06Q3 06Q3 06Q2 06Q2 06Q1 06Q1 06

Page 64: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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New Private Equity Deals Look Different New Private Equity Deals Look Different

ÜÜ More private equity firms are investing alongside More private equity firms are investing alongside corporate corporate partnerspartners or sovereign wealth fundsor sovereign wealth funds

Recent examples include Blackstone and NBC UniversalRecent examples include Blackstone and NBC Universal’’s s $3.5 billion joint acquisition of the Weather Channel$3.5 billion joint acquisition of the Weather Channel

ÜÜ Holding periodsHolding periods will rise as private equity firms will rise as private equity firms spend more time improving portfolio companiesspend more time improving portfolio companies’’operational performance operational performance

Many exits will be delayed until the financial crisis Many exits will be delayed until the financial crisis subsidessubsides

Source: (1) Dealogic.

Page 65: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

65

Private Equity Returns May Rise Private Equity Returns May Rise

ÜÜ Private equity deals done during periods of economic Private equity deals done during periods of economic difficulty tend to outperformdifficulty tend to outperform

U.S. Buyout Funds - Vintage Year Returns

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000² 2001 2002 2003 2004

Vin

tage

Year

IRR (

%)

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

S&P 5

00 A

nnualize

d R

etu

rn (

%)

Median Upper Quartile 5-Year Forward-Rolling S&P 500¹

Source: (1) Morgan Stanley Financial Sponsors Group.

Page 66: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Private Equity TrendsPrivate Equity Trends

Page 67: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

67

Several Key Trends Will Affect The Several Key Trends Will Affect The Private Equity Industry Private Equity Industry

ÜÜ Fewer lenders Fewer lenders will provide debt to fund acquisitionswill provide debt to fund acquisitions

ÜÜ Private equity firms will face Private equity firms will face less competition less competition from from investment & commercial banksinvestment & commercial banks

ÜÜ DistributionsDistributions to limited partners will fall in the medium to limited partners will fall in the medium termterm

ÜÜ Decreased global liquidity will result in Decreased global liquidity will result in reduced reduced commitmentscommitments to new private equity fundsto new private equity funds

ÜÜ There will be There will be more comore co--investmentinvestment opportunitiesopportunities

ÜÜ There will be fewer PE commitments from There will be fewer PE commitments from high net worth high net worth individualsindividuals

ÜÜ The The termsterms of private equity partnerships may changeof private equity partnerships may change

ÜÜ Public perceptionsPublic perceptions of the PE industry will improve of the PE industry will improve

Page 68: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Four Big Questions Confront The Industry Four Big Questions Confront The Industry

1.1. Will governments intensify the regulation of Will governments intensify the regulation of the private equity industry?the private equity industry?

2.2. Will tax rates on private equity distributions Will tax rates on private equity distributions rise? rise?

3.3. How will the industryHow will the industry’’s public image evolve?s public image evolve?

4.4. Can the basic private equity business model Can the basic private equity business model still work? still work?

Page 69: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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Opportunity & ChallengeOpportunity & Challenge

Page 70: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

70

Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge

ÜÜ Opportunity:Opportunity: To use its capital and expertise to To use its capital and expertise to save companies and turn them aroundsave companies and turn them around

An enormous number of companies will now need An enormous number of companies will now need fresh capital fresh capital ȩȩ private equity has the necessary private equity has the necessary capitalcapital

Low prices can yield attractive returns Low prices can yield attractive returns ȩȩ perhaps perhaps the best ever the best ever

Page 71: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

71

Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge

ÜÜ Challenge:Challenge: Overcoming the widespread Overcoming the widespread conception that private equity firms are short conception that private equity firms are short term investorsterm investors

The industry needs to recognize that turnarounds The industry needs to recognize that turnarounds will not be easy will not be easy

Private equity firms will be operating under an even Private equity firms will be operating under an even greater level of public scrutiny greater level of public scrutiny

Maintaining investor confidence will be critical Maintaining investor confidence will be critical

Page 72: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

72

The Opportunity And The Challenge Are The Opportunity And The Challenge Are Particularly Great In Financial Services Particularly Great In Financial Services

ÜÜ Opportunity:Opportunity: To help strengthen financial To help strengthen financial institutions around the world, often working institutions around the world, often working closely with governments in this endeavorclosely with governments in this endeavor

ÜÜ Challenge:Challenge: To restore confidence in financial To restore confidence in financial institutions during times of unprecedented institutions during times of unprecedented market disruption market disruption

Page 73: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

73

Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Private Equity Now Has Its Greatest Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge Opportunity And Its Greatest Challenge

ÜÜ Bottom Line:Bottom Line: This could well turn out to be This could well turn out to be private equity's finest hour private equity's finest hour ȩȩ if the industry if the industry moves carefully and skillfully to help with the moves carefully and skillfully to help with the global economic turnaround, partnering at global economic turnaround, partnering at times with corporations, sovereign wealth times with corporations, sovereign wealth funds, and governments funds, and governments

Page 74: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

74

Private Equity in the MENA RegionPrivate Equity in the MENA Region

Page 75: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

75

Key Predictions Key Predictions

ÜÜ Private equity activity may moderate but will remain Private equity activity may moderate but will remain strongstrong

ÜÜ Demand for investment capital from companies in the Demand for investment capital from companies in the region will riseregion will rise

ÜÜ Local private equity firms will be the most active Local private equity firms will be the most active investors investors

ÜÜ Some new global players will enter the market Some new global players will enter the market

ÜÜ Minority state transactions will predominate Minority state transactions will predominate

ÜÜ Investment opportunities will be better than beforeInvestment opportunities will be better than before

ÜÜ Sovereign wealth funds in the region will focus more of Sovereign wealth funds in the region will focus more of their attention on the regiontheir attention on the region

Page 76: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

76

Lower Stock Market Valuations Could Be Lower Stock Market Valuations Could Be A Boon For Private Equity Investors A Boon For Private Equity Investors

ÜÜ Regional stock markets have fallen because they were Regional stock markets have fallen because they were previously overpreviously over--inflated inflated

Investors had pushed up valuations to unsustainable levels Investors had pushed up valuations to unsustainable levels

Many of them have withdrawn capital because the credit Many of them have withdrawn capital because the credit crisis has increased risk aversion and demand for cashcrisis has increased risk aversion and demand for cash

GCC Stock Market Performance GCC P/E Ratios

Page 77: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

77

Lower Stock Market Valuations Could Be Lower Stock Market Valuations Could Be A Boon For Private Equity Investors A Boon For Private Equity Investors

ÜÜ Private equity investors can now buy assets at Private equity investors can now buy assets at prices that are very attractive from a longprices that are very attractive from a long--term term perspective perspective

The MENA regionThe MENA region’’s robust growth prospects and s robust growth prospects and insulation from the credit crisis make it one of most insulation from the credit crisis make it one of most attractive areas in the world for private equity attractive areas in the world for private equity investmentinvestment

Page 78: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

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ConclusionsConclusions

Page 79: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

79

Key Conclusions Key Conclusions

ÜÜ The world of private equity will change The world of private equity will change –– for for many years many years –– as a result of the credit crisis and as a result of the credit crisis and the unfolding economic slowdownthe unfolding economic slowdown

ÜÜ The MENA region will be affected by changes in The MENA region will be affected by changes in the United States and Europethe United States and Europe

ÜÜ The appeal of the MENA region will increase The appeal of the MENA region will increase ȩȩalthough investment activity may moderate, it although investment activity may moderate, it will be higher than in many other regions will be higher than in many other regions

Page 80: Caryle Group: Financial Crisis 2008

80

The Impact of the Financial Services The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Meltdown on The Global Economy And The

Private Equity IndustryPrivate Equity Industry

David Rubenstein, CoDavid Rubenstein, Co --FounderFounderSuper Return DubaiSuper Return DubaiOctober 15, 2008October 15, 2008