and Libya
Operations "Ligl.tfool" and "Supercl.arge"
Instruct rs lteadiri,; this D< ~um nt I't"Q c:·; , t-.. • ~
.o.Jl.i. .\
i ~ _.... _.... ---- -- --r. N " J
and Libya
Phase II: The Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-29
Phase III: The Pursuit 29-30
Appendi~ «A)): Drill for mine detection and clearing . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 31
Appendix « B )) : Drill for collecting wounded through minefields .
. 32
ii
FOREWORD
The lfattle of Eg_vpt was won by the good fighting qualities of the
:wldiers of the Empire . Of all th ese soldiers none were finer
than the fighting m en from New Zealand .
Thi s pa mphlet te ll s th e s tory of the pa r t played by the 2nd
New Zealand DiYis ion in tha t histori c ba ttle. The Division was
spl endidl:v led and foug·ht magnificently; the full s tory of its
achievemenls '"·ill make men and \vomen in th e home countr.v
thrill with pride. Possibly I m yself am the onl~' one who really
knows the ex tent to whi ch the action of the Ne\Y Zealand Divis
ion contril>u ted t<Ywa. rcl s the victorY .
•
\
iii
INTRODUCTION
11y object in \\Titing thi s .Rep or t is to give all offirers.
0:.C .Os. m1<l ui e u a picture of the part pla:1 ed by the New
J:caland J)i,·ision i11 the Octoher NoYember offensive. Thi s
series of <1perntions h<1:-; no count e rpart ]n <>111·
other campaigns and can th erefore he stndied ,,·ith
<1clva11trig<' . Th e re m::' n.: four phases in the l>a
ttle; the initial attack, th e f-i_g·hting during 1·eorganisat ion
. the final nttack to breach the enern:- line. ancl the pnrsuit.
01· t. ~ > n sc General Montgomery's words, '' the brea k:-in .
the dogfight . the hrea k-throngh , and exploitation » . It is the
break-in-« Lightfoot )}-nnd th P brea k-th rough " S up ercharge
11-with which thi s Report is chi efly con cern ed . These twu
set-pi ece attacks demonstrated th e trne value ;md ]W\Yer of
artillery and its co-ordination \Yi th ot her arm s.
The R eport contain s a irn.1Tnti,·e, lessons. maps aud diagnw1 s.
It is not intended to be 11. h istury. Co n1pl cte r ecords of the
pa rt pla:·ccl liy uur units in the fighting are not yet avai lable
and , fo r the ~;1n1c reason. 110 adequate acconnt can be g iven of
the exploits of the forrnationf' who fought a longside u s. The
lrnrra tive and maps have been checked ca refo ll.v hut mistakes.
especiall!· ,,·ith regard to other formations , are inevitable
.
I want all officers to rea d this Report so that the.' · ca 11
explain Lile fighting to their m en and u se the lesson s as a. ba
sis . for sLud:· and tn1ining.
Headquarters, New Zealand Division.
THE NEW ZEALAND :DIVl·SION IN EGYPT AND LIBYA
0 peraI .ions " L·1ghtfooI " · and " S upercharge " .
Defence fo Attack
On 30th August, 1942, Rommel issued a Special Order of the Day in
\\·hich he said : Today the Army. strengthened b~v new divisions,
is movingI(
into the attack for the final annihilation of the enemv "· The
attack failed t.o pierce the El Alamein defences. As before. the·
enemy relied on the i:mperiol"ity of the German armour, but on this
occasion the armour could not get room to manoeuvre and they came
up against our anti-tank gun lines, dug-in tanks, and a very heavy
bombardment of 25-poui.1der and medium artiller.v. Further, since
his columns could not negotiate the soft going by night. they "
·ere forced to move by day under the direct observation of the
R.A.F., whose shuttle " bombing service proved very effective.
11
The enemy's real \\·eakness, however, lay in the fact that his
infantry and artillery were not capable of offensive action. If
they had been. he could have made a hole for his armour just as \Ve
did two months later. The German infantry ancl artillery were not
trained for an infantry attack. That has been neglected, and in its
place they ha.ve developed the Blitz system which succeeded against
less well-equipped troops than themselves. The result is that they
have become tank followers . They have lost their old skill in
handling their personal weapons.
It \Yas obvious after the attack failed that his Army \\·as in a
difficult posit.ion. The Axis forces had insufficient transport and
had either to go right hack at once or st.rt~' and fight. The enemy
decided to stay. \Ve. kqm\· our Germans and, as expected. the~-
missed no opport.unit~· of ma.king their position a s strong as
possible. Minefields and automatic weapon s in depth rnacle an
attack in daylight, even with the strong artillery support
available. a hazardous operation, while the depth to \vhich the
attack ha.cl to prnetra.te .made a night attack most difficult .
The best solu tion, therefore. was to attack in the moonlight. The
Sep tern ber moon \Yas too soon since the new Sherman ta.nks would
not be read~·, and training \Yas needed. The October fu 11 moon,
therefore. \Ya.s fixed for the attack.
On 10th September the Ne\Y Zealand Division "·as withdrn\Yn from
the central sectoi: of the Alamein posit.ion. and officers and men
had four days' leave before commencing intensive training for the
operation 11 Lightfoot ll as it was called. Clear and ye1'>r
concise ctirectives \Ycre issuecl by the Arm~r Commander. upon
which we worked. Pnt shortl~-. the aim of the Eighth Arm~' \Vas to
attack in the Northern sector <luring. the October full moon and
make a gap for our armour to· go through and destroy the German
Panzer DiYisions. Once t.l~a.t \Yas achieved we were to exploit. to
the ·west .
For a 111011U1 there was seemingly little happening on the El
Alamein front, hut behind tho lines hoth sides were preparing for
the next. phase. The enemy were \\·orking feverishly to strengthen
their defences to withstand the expected attack, while the Eighth
Army trained and made preparations for a decisive battle to drive
the enemy out of Egypt and out of Afric
Training The infantry and armoured divisions selected for the
forthcoming
offensive trained intensively during the six weeks before the
attack. The New Zealand Division trained under 10th Corps, which
had a double role, first , of taking part in the initial offensive
to breach the enemy defences, and, secondly, of following up a
successful break through. 10th Corps comprised two armoured
divisions and the New Zealand Division. We were reorganised on the
nevv model, with two New Zealand Infantry Brigades and the British
9th Armoured Brigade under command.
Time being short, we started our training with a full-scale
Divisional rehearsal under conditions as similar as possible to the
actual attack we were to carry out later to capture Miteiriya
Ridge. Complete plans and preparations were made for the « at.tack
»,which we carried out by moonlight on 26th September. Minefields
had been laid in the positions we expected to find them. The guns
had been moved forward by night to positions which had been
surveyed, and by morning were dug in and camouflaged. The infantry
lay up all day. The attack was carried out by moonlight on a
two-brigade front in two phases. On each brig~de front one
battalion was given the task of capturing the first objective, and
two battalions were leap frogged through to the second after an
hour 's pause in the barrage. The infantry attack was carried out
in accordance with an artillery-timed programme, and a diagram
giving the artillery timings was issued down · to company
commanders. To aid the infantry, smoke a~d tracer were fired on the
inter-brigade and inter-divisional boundaries so that the advancing
troops could keep direction. Sappers blew the wire with Bangalore
torpedoes and cleared gaps in the minefields. The route was lit,
anti-tank weapons, mortars, and machine-guns followed as soon as
possible, and a regiment of tanks went through in support of each
brigade.
Following the exercise, brigades carried out brigade and battalion
training to perfect their drill. Each infantry brigade also carried
out a special exercise on the attack in co-operation with tanks and
supported by artillery. All weapons were zeroed and the artillery
meticulously calibrated.
The diijiculties of the operation were brought out, and much was
learnt as a result of our full-scale exercise. It formed the basis
of our planning for the attack.
Preparations and Plans The more it was examined the more apparent
it became that
an infantry attack by moonlight over this fea tureless country
covered by mines, booby traps and wire was a difficult and
complicated operntion. The infantry had to gain their objective and
mop up behind them, the sappers had to sweep for mines and clear
and light lanes forward, and the supporting arms and tanks had to
be brought forward to the Miteiriya Ridge, which was our objective,
to meet a counter-attack. Unless these tasks could be tackled and
completed before dawn the objective might not be held and the whole
offensive might end in failure. The operation required a high
degree of training of all arms and most careful timing. «D» Day was
fixed for 23rd October.
f.NEMY DEFENCES AND DISPOSITIONS (Maps 1 and 3)
Information concerning the enemy defences and dispositions was
supplied by « I » Branch at intervals. From aerial photographs we
knew that the narrow front was heavily mined and carefully planned
in great depth. There was no lack of anti-tank guns, and ·we knew
that the who~e of
our front was covered and had been · registered by field and medium
artillery. Behind the positional troops, the two German Panzer
Divisions. one in the North and one in the South, and the Italian
armour were held in readiness to give a mobile defence in depth to
any point or points which might be threatened. There were two
definite lines of defences, and behind them a third line of
defended localities for anti-tank guns, and dug-in positions for
tanks. The Northern sector of the El Alamein front, therefore, was
the nearest approach to the static defences of the last war yet
seen in North Africa, and it \Vas the technique of 1918 which vrns
used as the basis of the plan for our attack. ·
ARTILLERY Very careful preliminary arrangements \Yere made by both
N.Z.A.
and N.Z.A.S.C. for the dumping of artillery ammunition during the
hours of darkness on five successive nights. The task set the
Divisional Ammunition Company was to dump 48,384 rounds (12,096
rounds for each of four nights) for the 96 guns under command, and
a further 11.000 rounds of 25-pounder and 8,000 rounds of Bofors on
the fifth night. In order to have a simple time table, trucks were
loaded with 168 rounds instead of 184. which enabled one gun per
troop to be completed each night. ConYoys were met b~- artillery
officers, and guided to the gun positions. " ·here the ammunition
\Yas unloaded. dug in and camouflag~d by the gunners and N.Z.A.S.C.
drivers. Gun positions were surveyed and the guns brought in and
camouflaged t"·o nights before the attack. Apparently all this was
accomplished undetected.
Fighting in featureless desert with i1iaccurate and small-scale
maps nclds greatl~r to the difficulty of staging an offensive.
Artillery support under these couditions is difficult. Although the
artillery can be sm·yevecl into position and can can~c uut a
predicted 'shoot , it is not easy to detern;ine accurateI:v either
the position of the enen\\. F.D.Ls. or the position of our O\Vn
forward troops. A further Jifficult~T is that there is no adequate
observation to register even if registration ,,·ere allmvecl.
The programme for artillery support for the attack on the night
2:3rd / 24th October was as follows:
All artillery on the Corps front \vas nnder command C.C.R.A.. 30th
Corps. 1'he New Zealand Division had four field regiments plus one
medium battery, or 104 guns. covering a front of 2,500 yards at the
first objectiYe an<l opening out to 4,800 yards on t.irn final
objective. \vhich meant a gun to every twenty-four yards on the
first objective and a gun to eYer.v forty-six yrnds on the final
objective . As this \Vas not reall~v sufficient for an
artiller>' barrage, the programme provided for twenty-five per
cent of the guns, or one gun per hundred yards of front, to fire on
a barrage line to keep the infantry on the proper line of advance,
and seventy-five per cent. of the guns to fire timed concentrations
on known enemv defences.
WIRE AND MINES (See Maps and Diagrams 10-14)
Detailed plans for mine clearance were studied. (The orga nisaiion
of mine-clearing squads and the drill we followed appears as
Appendix .c A ll .) The enemy defences were covered by anti-tank
and anti-personnel mines, hool>y traps ant~ wire entanglements.
· The wire was at the far edge of the minefields and consequently
had to be dealt with by the infantry as the:·• advanced. The
minefields on the enemy front stretched back to a depth of 7.000
yards. and although the majority were marked it was known that un
charted minefields existed. Lanes had to be swept behind the
advancing infantry in sufficient time to get forward the supporting
arms and tanks ready to repel the tank counter-attack at dawn
.
There were three known minefields as well as an unmarked one. But
it was not conclusive that there were no others, so it was decided
that the whole of the area from our own F.D.Ls. to the final
objective and through it would have to be swept. The mines had to
be lifted, and the gaps had to be lit and marked, before any
vehicle could go through. It was -estimated that it would take an
additional hour to clear these lanes through to the final
objective. The infantry would not reach the final objective until
0245 hours on the 24th October, and as sunrise was at 0620 hours,
only 2 3/4 hours of darkness would remain after the minefields had
been lifted to bring forward and dig in the supporting arms.
The control of the engineer part of the operation was complicated
by the fact that the Armoured Corps were also clearing lanes on our
front for the passage of the armoured divisions, and 1,000 ,yards
in the middle · of our sector. was reserved for the use of the
Armoured Corps. It was decided that the quickest method was for
Brigades to control their own transport and the tanks in support of
their front. For the initial attack, our engineer resources were
allotted to brigades, who were responsible for the clearing,
lighting and .marking of the lanes forward of their own. F.D,Ls.
and for deciding on the priority of movement forward of tanks and
supporting weapons. Divisional Headquarters was responsible for
lighting and lifting our own minefields up to the F.D.Ls., to be
carried out before the 23rd October. For the work in the forward
areas (which ·was under brigades) the engineers were responsible
for siting all routes, while Provost were responsible for lighting
the axis, and the engineers were responsible for clearing the lanes
and lighting the gaps in the minefields.
INFANTRY
We had little information as to how the enemy were manning the
position, but troops were allotted to the attack on a basis of two
to one, i.e. , where 1,000 men were thought to be holding an enemy
position 2,000 men were put in to attack it. In a long attack such
as « Lightfoot n, going to a depth of 6,000 to 7,000 yards, the
attacking units are liable to become dis organised, and pauses are
necessary at stages to leap-frog fresh units through or reorganise_
attacking units before they go forward to their final
objective.
The control of direction and rate of advance was a matter of great
moment as every yard of the area had to be covered and, if
necessary, attacked the moment the artillery fire lifted from its
barrage line. To control the advance every aid was resorted to for
keeping direction of the attack on to each objective. The plan
provided for Bofors anti-aircraft guns being leap frogged forward
from the assembly area, shooting tracer along the dividing line
between brigades and divisions. To help the attacking troops in the
final stages, rounds of smoke were included in the barrage along
the dividing ' lines.
To control the advance and to ensure that the troops did not lose
the barrage, the bombardment programme included rounds of smoke
right across the front to denote a pause in, and the resumption of
the advance. To ensure that troops did not stop short of the final
objective, it also included rounds of smoke at a fixed distance
beyond that objective.
To make certain that all these points of detail were clearly
understood, a diagram showing the bombardment time-tables with
lifts and pauses was prepared and issued to all attacking sub-unit
commanders, so that they could explain to the N.C.Os. and men the
requisite detail about their own particular part of the battle.
(See Maps and Diagrams Nos. 4 and 7.) To ensure that the plan was
understood by all, orders were given to all commanders to prepare
small diagrams for issue showing the position of all sections in
assembly and the position on the objective with a line joining the
two, and
I
giving the number of paces and the compass bearing they were ·to
advance on. The diagram also showed the · time at which the
hombardment \Yould ' start on the opening line, the time and
duration of any pauses, and also the time it would lift off the
enemy position they were to attack. Every effm.'t · was made to
ensure that everyone knew his part in the plan. ,;.
MOYES TO ASSEMBLY (Map 2)
As already stated, the movement forward of all vehicles,
supp~1:ffng. arms, and tanks from the assembly areas through to the
objectives was a brigade responsibility. The number of vehicles to
go forward in each of o:ur forward brigades w~s approximately 100,
not counting the 150. tanks and 52 · vehicles of the Divisional
Cavalry.
To reduce the number of vehicles on the tracks during the main
attack,· three days' rations and water were dumped or carried
additional to normal · reserves on the fighting vehicles.
SITING Of HEADQUARTERS
Headquarters of brigades and. division were sited as far forward as
possible and close to the divisional axis. A small armoured
Tactical Head quarters equipped with wireless was to go fon.vard
in four Honey tanks so that the decision to commit the Armoured
Brigade could be taken following a personal reconnaissance after
the capture of Miteiriya Ridge.
AIR SUPERIORITY The R.A.F. achieved air superiority before the
offensive. The d,egree
of superiority can be gauged from the fact that on the 23rd October
the R.A.F. established a continuous fighter· patrol over the enemy
fonvard. lcmding grounds ·without interference.
FINAL PREPARATIONS Although we were under 30th Corps for the
assault, we had to be ready
to join i.Oth Corps for the b-reak through. This meant two sets of
orders, which entailed a series of conferences.
Our final conference a t Divisional Headquarters was held at 1100
hours on 23'.rd October. Brigadiers reported that the move up of
the infantry on the preceding night had been carried out smoothiy
and the troops were lying up for the day. The artillery were
alread>T dug in and camouflaged, with survey completed. The
enemy could not have been aware of the presence of the guns since
there had been no shelling or bombing of the gun positions. It
appeared· that the schemes for deception had been:
successful.
Each part of the Divisional Plan was checked through during the
day. The limited amount of time before daylight was again
discussed. \Ve had wanted an earlier start and a quicker artillery
·programme to give a longer period of darkness after the capture of
the final objective, but other divisions would not agree. Timings
left very little margin for getting our essential vehicles through
before it was time to clear the tracks for the use of the. armoured
divisions. As a Brigadier remarked. « Even if it .goes like an
exercise it is virtually impossible! >> It was felt, however.
that the sup porting arms for the infantry, including our o"·n
tank brigade,_ were a first priority, even if it meant delaying :
10th Corns. It \Yas true that the 10th Armoured Division, iwho were
passing through on our front, had. been given the secondary role of
protecting our Northern flank, but this fonn of « protection » by
armoured formations not under our command had ._been experienced in
the past and had been most unsa.tisfactory.
5
The weather gave cause for concern. Heavy rain would probably make
the tracks impassable, and rain of any degree might affect the
efficacy of our mine detectors, in which case the lanes would have
to be cleared by the slower and less eertain method of prodding
with the bayonet. Bangalore torpedoes and grapnels were ready to
deal with wire, and we had a number of « Scorpions ,, (tanks with
heavy flails) to explode mines by beating the ground. Our
engineers, however, were confident that the gaps in the mine
fields would be made, and that the sappers would not be far behind
the assaulting infantry.
We tried to anticipate all situations which might face us at
daylight on the final objective. The enigma of the attack was the
strength of the enemy defences on the far side of Miteiriya Ridge.
We had also to be prepared for an immediate counter-attack by the
enemy armour, for extremely heavy artillery fire at dawn o:ri the
exposed ridge itself, and for further enemy defences and
111inefields beyond our objective. Again, we ·felt that if we
effected surprise and penetrated his held positions, we had to be
ready to exploit success, and to endeavour completely to breach the
enemy defences.
The actual capture by our infantry of the final objective was not
in doubt. We felt confident that we could take it. ·The vital
factor was to prevent the infantry on the objective from being
over-run by tanks. For that reason, as already emphasised, the
supporting arms of the infantry had first priority on the routes
forward. Following them came the Sherman and Grant tanks of 9th
Armoured Brigade with the Divisional Cavalry under command. It was
most important that they should all be clear of the final minefield
before dawn. The tanks were to be prepared to take up hull-down
positions facing West or North-West so that they could intervene at
once in event of an enemy tank attack from those directions. The
Divisional Cavalry had a role of exploitation, if possible to the
South. Objectives were marked for them on the map in the hope that
we might be able to gate-crash behind the enemy position to the
South. Should this prove possible, 9th Armoured Brigade would
follow up the success, which would be further exploited by bringing
forward our artillery. 4th Field Regiment, therefore, which was in
support of 9th Armoured Briga"de, had orders to move forward to
l\.fiteiriya Ridge after 'it had completed its bombardment
programme. To guard against being caught with all our artillery on
the move, it was decided that no other field artillery would be
moved until after the enemy counter-attacks had been repulsed or
failed to eventuate. Our aim was to get the ·artillery forward, if
possible beyond Miteiriya Ridge, covered by our tanks and cayalry,
and keep a gap which the enemy could not close.
11 Lightfoot"
(Maps t· - 5)
On the evening of 23rd October four divisions-the 9th Australian
Division, 51st Highland Division, 2nd New Zealand Division, and 1st
South
· African Division-forming 30th Corps, were ready for the assault,
which it was hoped would « seize a bridgehead in time to pass the
armour through by first light n.
After dusk all tracks, lit with their distinctive signs-Sun, Moon,
Star, Bottle, Boat, &nd Hat-bega.n to 8.11 up with transport in
orderly sequence from too rear areas, the heavy tanks of the
armoured divisions rumbling in the. rear. lt was an impre.ssive
display of armoured strength. It was a brilliant and calm moonlight
night. There was a tense atmosphere as everyone waited.
At 2140 hours all guns, field and medium, opened fire on suspected
enemy batteries; it was a twenty-to-one concentration, twenty
troops of artillery battering each enemy troop. Assembly forward,
which had been proceeding feverishly hut silently since dusk, went
on even more actively. Noise no longer mattered. The bombardment
continued for fifteen minutes, directed against enemy located
batteries, and at 2200 hours s\vitched on to the enemy F.D.Ls.
Meanwhile our infantry, who had assembled on a start line 1,700
yards from the enemy position, went forward to the attack in time
to get right up to the bombardment before it started to lift back.
Retaliation against our guns was negligible, confirming that we had
gained tactical surprise, and demonstrating the efficiency of our
counter-battery ·work.
THE ASSAULT OH MITEIRIYA RIDGE ( Maps 4 and 5 )
Both our infantry brigades got away to a good start, 5th Brigade.
on the right and 6th Brigade on the left. 23rd Battalion attacked
the first objective on the right, and 24th Battalion the first on
the left. 28th (Maori)
.Battalion had the role of mopping up enemy strong points petween
the start line and the first objective over the whole Divisional
front.
Visibility was extremely bad owing to dust and smoke caused by the
barrage, and great difficulty was experienced in keeping touch. The
situation remained obscure, and when the barrage paused at midnight
we did not know whether the first objective had been captured. 5th
Brigade appeared to have succeeded. The situation was still not
clear at 0100 hours on the 24th, but work on the -gaps in the
minefields was being pressed on under fire .and 21st and 22nd
Battalions on the right and 25th and 26th Battalions on the left
had leap-frogged through to attack the second objective.
Meanwhile optimistic reports came in from 51st Division, while 1st
South African Division reported strong opposition on the
inter-divisional boundary. Visibility was reported to be no greater
than twenty to thirty yards uwing to dust and smoke. Under
conditions as they existed the type of success signal we had was
unsatisfactory. In point of fact both battalions reached their
first objectives according to schedule, but no report got through
until m.uch later.
When the capture of the first objective was confirined by both
brigades at 0300 hours, I we1~t forward with Tactical Headquarters
to Miteiriya Ridge. At this time gaps in the first minefield were
through, and leading elements of the Divisional Cavalry and 9th
Armoured Brigade were moving forward .
The assault on the final objectives continued against strong
opposition. Identifications from prisoners of war indicated that
the line was held by elements of the German 164th Division and the
Italian Trento Division. the German troops having relieved Italians
a few days before. Held up by strong resistance ·which caused them
to lose the barrage, the infantry pressed on and although in some
companies all officers became casualties direction was kept.
Shortly after 0400 hours 5th Brigade reached the final objectiYe.
but there vvas no news from 6th Brigade.
Time Vi'as getting short, we were behind schedule, and with the
approach of dawn the situation gave cause for anxiety. At 0530
hours supporting arms had not come up to the infantry and gaps
through the second minefield were not yet complete. On .6th Brigade
front there ·was no definite information except that 25th Battalion
were in touch with 26th Battalion but were held up on the Ridge.
Both routes were through but transport was moving slowly while
sappers searched for stray mines. Small pockets of enemy missed by
the infantry had caused some delay as the sappers had to dispose of
these themselves before carrying on with mine lifting.
7
THE RIDGE IS CAPTURED (Map 5)
At 0600 hours came better news-the gaps on 5th Brigade front were
reported clear. Supporting arms were passing through and the tanks
had begun to move also. The appearance. of the Sherman tanks of 9th
Armoured Brigade \vith their 75 millimetre guns was a great
encouragement to the infantry, who, for the first time in the
campaign, found tanks with them in the F.D.Ls. When daylight came,
leading tanks of 8th Armoured Brigade of 10th Armoured Division
were also passing 'through on the centre lanes reserved for 10th
Corps.
Meanwhile, on 6th Brigade front, 26th Battalion had gained its
objective and was slightly forward of it; 25th Battalion had gained
the crest of the Ridge after hard fighting, but had been unable to
get further forward due to heavy fire from a strong point just
outside the Brigade boundary and another between 25th and 26th
Battalions. 25th Battalion was in touch with 26th Battalion though
there was a gap of some 400 yards between them; but was not in
touch with the South Africans. We found later that the latter had
been held up short of the Ridge. It was getting light when the
transport finally reached units and it was, therefore, not
practicable to send anti-tank guns forward of the Ridge.
By 0700 hours on 24th October the Miteiriya Ridge was in our hands
but the Armoured Division had not got fa r enough forward before
daylight to make a sally possible, especia lly as other unmarked
minefields :were found to exist. Tanks of the Royal Wilts. Yeomanry
had gone forward and ten had become casualties on mines. During the
morning the Royal Wilts. Yeomanry and a regiment of 8th Armoured
Brigade were heavily engaged with enemy tanks and anti-tank guns.
They suffered h eavy casualties in . tanks k nocked out but
repulsed all a ttempts by the enemy armour to make a counter-a
ttack on the 5th Brigade front. The main concentration of tanks of
8th and 9th Armoured Brigades was behind Miteiriya Ridge. It was
clear that the bridgehead could not be exploited by our armour at
this stage and the day was, therefore, spent in re-organising the
position to hold what ·we had gained. The front was heavily shelled
throughout the day but thl:) expected enemy counter-at tack did not
eventuate. The enemy were no doubt hampered by their own minefields
and apart from that the array of big tanks close to our F .D.Ls.
was likely to daunt any a ttacking force.
The medical arrangements for t:tie attack worked smoothly, and the
evacuation of wounded through our M.D.S. reached a record figure,
easily su rpassing any other M.D.S. operating on the front. During
the first twenty-fou r hours of the battle 839 casualt ies had
passed through, including British and South African wounded. (See
Appendix 11 B » for drill followed in collection of wounded during
the attack through the minefields.)
The diversionary operations of 13th Corps and the Navy should be
mentioned here. By attacking Himeimat and making a gap in the
minefields 13th Corps succeeded in keeping the German 21st Armoured
Division in the South. A naval demonstration off Ras El Kenayis
brought the plans of 90th Light Division into operation to counter
a landing which it was never intended to make.
Pl.AMS FOR ARMOUR TO BREAK our (Map 5)
::
8
LA I E were in favour of a resumption of the attack as soon as
possible before the enemy could get further anti-tank gun screens
organised in depth, and the decision was taken that the armour led
by 9th Brigade should go forward on the night 24th/25th
October.
At 2200 hours the attack started, covered by a bombardment of 300
guns. The enemy were expecting us to attack, and the gaps in the
minefields were heavily bombed all night by enemy aircraft using
parachute flares. There was also heavy shelling, and enemy tanks
had come up and were firing across the minefield. Again it was
difficult to ascertain the true position, and requests from Corps
stating that information was vital could not be answered until 0200
hours on 25th October. By that hour the gap was clear, Divisional
Cavalry had gone through and 9th Brigade had followed. The enemy
air attack continued and a heavy Stuka raid was made soon after
first light. An hour later 9th Armoured Brigade were through the
gap and deploying forward to find a good position. 10th Armoured
Division at 0420 hours reported delay in clearing minefields owing
to shell fire and air bombing, but they were going forward . At
day light 9th Armoured Brigade were forward but not in touch with
10th Armoured Division. More mines and anti-tank guns again held up
the armour. Commander 9th Brigade reported tha:t he· was not in a
good position and could n9t improve it by going further until he
rMuelled and carried out maintenance. He wished to withdraw to the
gap for this purpose and then sally forth again. It was decided,
however, that the 9th Armoured Brigade should remain out to
discourage any enemy counter-attack. As day advanced, the front
again became static, but with a considerable .amount of shelling by
both sides, and probing attacks by enemy tanks and infantry, all of
which were repulsed.
At 0915 hours in conversation with the Corps Commander I pointed
out that there was no common front with the armour, and that the
enemy were reinforcing and would be stronger the next day. I also
gave my opinion that it was impossible to exploit South with
infantry after the element of surprise had gone.
To launch the armour was proving no easy task. Armour must have
room to manoeuvre and must have time. The use of armour was summed
up in Genetal Lumsden' s own words: c<Playing with armour is
like playing with fire . You have got to go carefully. It is like a
duel. If you don't take your time you will get run through the guts
.n
Dust and smoke remained over the battlefield, and there were no
further large-scale engagements during the day. The enemy,
meanwhile, were organising defences behind our wedge. 9th Armoured
Brigade on the left had encountered fresh mines and anti-tank guns
and were heavily shelled. They suffered casualties, but all but
eleven of their damaged tanks were recoverable, and they had
knocked out thirteen tanks and ten guns and taken 300
prisoners.
At 1600 hours on the 25th I h eld a conference at Divisional Head
quarters. The Intelligence Officer first gave his impressions of
prisoners of war. He stated that the Italians of Trento Division
were of good type ~nd compared favourably with the German
prisoners. It was certain that the enemy had been taken by
surprise. Many had been greatly shak'en by the bombardment, but
casualties as a result of it were not high: A Pole, a Yugoslav, and
an Austrian who were interrogated were clearly anti-Nazi. We had
captured 260 prisoners on our front. Only 1,400 were taken on the
whole Corps fron'.t , which showed how thinly held the forward
defences had been.
9
I had called Brigadiers together to explain the cha,nge in policy.
Exploitation to the South was no longer possible, and our main
objective now wa.s to break through on to the enemy's vital line of
communications. 10th Armoured Division were to be withdrawn from
the Ne-vv Zealand sector, as 10th Corps were to try further to the
North, where a thrust w<Ls to be made along the coastal sector
by the Australian Division. This new policy was decided at a
conference at our Headquarters in the morning. I had urged that the
attack should be continued Wesh:-.rards from the bulge with another
timed bombardment to a depth of 4,000 yards. We all knew that the
first attack had just failed to push the enemy off his gun line.
a.nd this further attack would, I considered, take us beyond his
minefields and gun line into an area where the tanks would have
room to ma.noeuvre. Further, the enemy would have to bring Germans
of 90th Light Division in to hold the line, and I considered that
another bombardment and bayonet attack '.vould break them. Although
this would mean further casualties to all our Divisions, it seemed
to offer prospects of a decisive break through on a wide
front.
Pending developments, our orders were to economise in holding the
line to make troops available for the next attack. We wen~ ordered
fo re-organise our front for defence. This was not a difficult
matter-as Commander 6th Brigade said, «It is the first time in our
history that we have been given a short front to defend. n In fact
, we decided to send relays of men back to the beach for a
swim.
No attempt will be made here to cover the Australian attacks on the
night 25th / 26th October. They carried out these with great dash
and their objectives were all captured, but the armour was still
unable to get through and clear of the enemy gun screen. A most
important result of their :tttack was that elements of 90th Light
Division were brought up into the line.
A MEW PLAN
On 26th October we were given a new plan. 10th Corps were
temporarily relieved of responsibility of breaking out, while 30th
Corps were to re-organi&: for another thrust. Commander 30th
Corps came to our Head quarters to explain the plan, and I again
pressed him to attack on a three division front without being tied
to a firm base for which we did not have the troops. I suggested
that the armour should carry out the task of the (l firm base »,
protecting the flanks and joining battle if the enemy armour
attacked away from his gun line.
Briefly, the Corps Instruction was as follows:
1. To secure the Divisional front against any form of
counter-attack.
2. To carry out patrolling to ascertain situation.
3. To tie up flanks with 1st South African Division and 51st
Highland Division.
4. To withdraw from the line any troops which could be spared
preparatory to carrying out a new major attack, possibly to be
delivered -on night 27th/28th.
~· • · . "." , • ...,_ .¥ ·?
·.• , ~. .'"'-: . ,. ,,.
6th BRIGADE STRAIGHTENS THE LIME (Map 5)
On the night uf the 26th, 25th and 26th Battalions of 6th Brigade
attacked to stra.ig·hte11 their line and gai11 the Corps objective
forward of i\liteiriya, Ridge. The South Africans on our left flank
attacked at the same time. The infantry got forward after a stiff
fight, and took 90 prisoners, but at a cost of :)0 casualties. The
situation at fir st was difficult as the gaps in the minefields
were under heavy lll;lchine-gun fire, and it was found impossible
tu get supporting arrns funvard. The ohjective also was under heavy
fire , :ind it was at that stage out of the question to lay mines
to protect thern. Later, ho\ve,·cr , anti-ta1tk gnns were got
forward by making a new gap in the minefield.
\\rhile this attack was he in.Q canied nut a conference was called
at Curps Hea<lq muten; to explain a new plan which provided for
the withdrawal t >ll th e night 27th / 28th October, of 10th
Corps, and the 2nd New Zealand Division (less Divisional Artillery)
into reser ve . The Divisional Artillery \Yere to rernai11 in th e
line to support an Austl'alian attack Northwards on the followi11g
night. Our sector was to be taken ovel' by 1st South African Di
,·!sion as pa.rt uf a geueral side-slip.
Operations on another pa.rt of t h e front w ern being carried out
by 7th }duto1· Brigade and 51st Di vision . It was hoped that the
former might make a breach for the armour, hut , although the
objective was captured, it was on too narrow a front, and the
inevitable enemy gun screen was there to prevent the armour
g'(:>tting through.
27th October \Yas chiefly taken up with arrangements for th e
hand--ove}_' t.o the South Africans. The positi.011 0 11 the front
appeared quite secure . During tlie morning, 5th Brigade reported a
successful tank action on 28th (\faori) Battalion front in whi-ch
the infantry joined with mortars <1nd ma.ch inc-guns. In th e
afternoon, there " ·as heavy shelling of the DiYisiunal sector to
which our guns retaliated. In the North the enemy armour had
com1ter-a ttacked in the Blitz fashion but gained no ground .
There were some enemy fighter-bomber attacks, but the efforts of
the Cernw 1r Air Force paled into insignificance compared \Yith the
shuttle service of the R.A.F. All day on the 27th backwards and
forn·ards went the forniarions of ei~d1tee11 Bostons and
Baltimores, covered l1y fighter S\Yeeps. to harn ss the German
Armoured Divisions. The enern.v homhers found it t uo cu~tl~- tu
ve11ture out except at first and last light.
During the night 27th / 28th October. the hand-over by the infantry
brigades \vas cpmpletecl without incident. and. shortly after
0900 hours on the 2Sth , Divisional Headquarters handed over to 1st
South African Division. All unit s except the Divisional
Artiller>-' mo\Ted some miles back.
"Supercharge" (Maps 6 and 7)
-·-
Orders were given for the immediate preparation of a model by the
engineers, and arrangements were made for a reconnaissance party to
go fonvard to the Australian front next day.
During the 28th, Rommel, who, as we now know, was back in command,
counter-attacked again with his armour in the North, but, bombed
and held at bay by our artillery and anti-tank guns, the enemy
attack failed.
At the rise of the waning moon on the night 28th129th, the
Australians carried out an attack under the heaviest concentration
of artillery to date. We listened to it from the comparative quiet
of the rear area. It was a difficult operation and involved a
complicated artillery programme. On going forward on the 29th, we
found that the Australian battle was still in progress and
reconnaissance forward was not practicable. Five times during the
day the Australians were counter-attacked by infantry and tanks,
but no impression was made on the salient which they had cut in
behind the enemy position.
The situation on the Australian front caused a change in the Corps
Plan. · The attack was to be by two brigades on a 4,000 yards
fro_nt, to a depth of 4,000 yards, on the sector immediately South
of that held by 9th Australian Division. The Australians were to
attack again on the night 30th/31st October, while our attack was
planned for the night 31st - October/1st November. A New Zealand
Brigade was to take over the F.D.Ls., while the assault was to be
.carried out by 151st (Tyneside) Brigade and 152nd Highland Brigade
with our 9th Armoured Brigade and the 23rd Armoured Brigade under
our command. The 1st Armoured Division was to come up a centre
route and break through the gap made by the assault. The
destruction of the German tank forces, by this date estimated at
140 runners, plus the Italians, was envisaged, followed by the
sallying forth of the mobile 2nd New Zealand Division.
Work on plans for carrying out the operation « Supercharge
1>
was commenced at once. Time was short, the assaulting brigades had
not trained with us, the area was not familiar, we had no detailed
knowledge of enemy positions or minefields, and as usual much,
depended on the artillery bombardmeQt. We knew it would be
excellent.
On the 30th October a conference was held at Divisiona,l
Headquarters when the -0utline plan was explained. The C.C.R.A.
30th Corps and our C.R.A. left after the conference to prepare the
greatest artillery concentration of the war in North Africa.
Air bombing of the 90th Light Division and enemy armour plus
fighter support on a large scale wa~ asked for, especially over the
roads to cover our concentration. The use of smoke screens laid by
aircraft was dis cussed, but it was decided that it might
interfere with operations on the Australian front.
During the afternoon of the 30th October Brigades began to move
forward along the tracks to assembly positions behind the line. The
tanks of 9th Armoured Brigade in line ahead were an impressive
spectacle. 6th Brigade at night took over the line without
incident, the relief being perfectly timed but .with nothing to
spare. I spoke to the Corps Commander, and said it was for
consideration whether our attack should not be postponed for
twenty-four hours. Jt appeared to me impossible to prepare for this
most vital operation in 'forty-eight hours.
::
L Australia11 salieut aud were preparing to counter-attack frurn
the West. ~-\. little later I spoke tu the Corps Co1111nandcr, and
he confirmed that the enemy had a11 unti-tank gun line beyond our
proposed objective. Furt.her, tile possibility uf mines cuuld not
be ruled uut. Patrols uf 51st l)i vision reported enemy \vorking
parties busy on their front with pneumatic drills. .:\..fter
considering the situation it was agreed that the attack should be
postpo11ed until the early hours of 2nd November. This decision was
unavoidable, and it eased the strain and made the staging of the
battle less hurried. 011 the other lia.n d. tlie moon waH waning
and zeru hour had to IJc an hour later, thus reducing the time
before daylight.
At 0900 hours on the :Hst October a conference of Brigadiers and
staffs was held in an unfinished <lug-out in the old Alamein
defensive system, where the engineers had iw;talled the plaster
model - marked with the Brigade sectors and enemy defences.
I \\'ent through the plan and the technique of the infantry assault
in detail for the benefit of the t\\·o brigades who were
co-operating with us for the first time. The artillery bombardment
was different fro;rn the first attack, as on this occasion we did
not know the position of the enemy defences. To ensure that all
enemy front positions would be covered by the bom bardment, our
infantry ·were to withdraw to tho surveyed start line marked by
cairns 1,500 yards behind our F.D.Ls. so that our bombardment could
commence on our own front lino. The line of cairns was on a true
survey and was related to the artillery grid. By this means we
could be Cf;lrtain that the infantry would attack the position
which \YH.S being fired on. Ir was a simple bombardment, \Yith a
gun to 111 / 3 yards, a concentration three times heavier than for
the original attack. The barrage was in depth with overlaps for the
diversionary attacks 011 the flanks. All guns were to tire ou the F
.D.Ls. for five minutes, then the mediums and some of the
2;)-pouncl ers were to shift to counter-battery. and later the
25-pounders were to gu back to their bombardment tasks for the
assault . The barrage was to stand on its opening line to give the
infantr~- sufficient time to go forv;·ard . (Map 7 shows the timed
lifts. ) Closest to the assaulting infantry was a barra.u-e uf
25-pounders shooting a gun to twenty yards, behind that another
ba1Tagc. uf 25-pounders about half as heavy, and about 800 yards
behind the front uf the barrage were the mediums. As before, rounds
of smoke were fired to indicate the pauses and lifts of the barrage
:rnd the objective .
The rate of advance was 100 yards iii 2 1/2 minutes. There \Yas a
pause of half an hour on the first objective for re-organisation
and mopping np. AR in the original attack the boundaries were to be
marked b!· tracer from Bofors guns and b:v the firing of smoke.
Diagrams clown to companies were to be issued .
At the conference precise orders were given that the assault had to
go forward at all costs. If enemy tanks were met on the objective
they were to be dealt with hy the armoured brigade. which had
orders to go fonYard as fast as the route could be cleared, with
Shermans and Grants ready to support the infantry if they were held
up. There were no « ifs ii or (( buts ii-it was an all-in battle, «
A Slogging Match )) . It was made clear that the infantry must keep
up with the barrage and should by-pass pockets of tank resistance
rather than lose the barrage. If the pace was too fast and the
barrage slipped awa!- the tanks were to continue to press forward .
the infantry following H1e111 .
According to Intelligence reports it was possible that two enem~-
tauk regiments, one German and one Italian, would be found on the
objectiYe. hut it was thought they would go back to refuel at night
.
13
As in « Lightfoot n supporting arms had to be got forward on to the
objective, and it was decided that after the objective was
captured, 50 per cent. of the anti-tank guns should cover the
forward troops and that the other 50 per cent. should have a
counter-penetration role . It was made quite clear that the
situation after dawn would be difficult, that the salient would be
shelled and bombed and would be under machine-gun fire from three
sides, so that carriers only could get through with supplies to the
men holding ·the line. It was quite possible that the infantry
would be shelled on the start line and trench-mortared during the
advance, while a counter-attack seemed inevitable. ' ·
The role of the armour was explained. They were to emerge as soon
as possible, take up a position on the high ground and engage the,
enemy armour. In addition, three regiments of armoured cars were to
gate~·crash enemy defences in the darkness, go right through and
harass the enemy conf munications in the rear. · · ·
Strict instructions fo1"track discipline were issued and the fact
that the armour had priority was explained to. all drivers.
During the 31st October reports indicated that the enemy were
holding a strongpoint beyond Point 29 on the right flank and it was
decided that the Maori Battalion should come under command 151st
Brigade and carry out an attack on their right flank to capture
this position.
At 0800 hours on 1st November a co-ordinating conference was held.
In view of Intelligence reports that German armour might well be
met within 1,000 yards of the start line, possibly dug-in, it was
decided that the tanks should go forward before the infantry
support weapons. As the Valentine tank was of little use against
the German Mark III, the Shermans and Grants of the 9th Armoured
Brigade were ordered to move first on the thr.ee centre lanes with
a regiment on each. A squadron of Divisional Cavalry w~ts to follow
each armoured regiment for mopping up . I pointed out at th'e
conference that it was clear that the enemy were very hard put to
it to maintain their present position-, and that if we could get
our armou.r forward to attack the battle would be won. The Army
Commander was quite.prepared to accept heavy losses in the 9th
Armoured Brigade · in order to get . 1st Armoured Di.yision
through. ·
Summarising our preparations, the plan was as follovvs:- .
The infantry were to leave· the start line at 0055 hours on 2nd
November.
Zero was fixed at 0105 .ho.urs, which \Ya~. . the · time . ,the a
rtillery fire opened on the enemy F.D.Ls. ... '. ·.: ,. ·. 1 .• • •
..
The objective was to be taken at 0345 - hou.r~; . . ,1
A creeping barrage was to open at 0545 hours .for one hour. during
which the 9th Armoured Brigade would advance a further 2,000 yards
to its objective.
At 0645 hours 1st Armoured Division were due to pass through the
9th Armoured Brigade 's objective. ' • · ·
,.. Our order of battle for this attack, as quoted. in the
operatio~ -0rder,
1
23rd Armd. Bde. 9th Armd. Bde. . : ~
:l40th R.T.R. 3rd H . 50th R.T.R. R. Wilts Yeo. 8th R.T .R.
Warwick. Yeo . 121st Fd. Regt. (16 self - pro 14th
}~oresters
pelled 25-pounders) 31st N.Z. A.Tk. Bty. 168th Lt. A.A. Bty. 295th
Fd. Park Sqn.
2nd N.Z. Div. Cav.
N.Z.A. N.Z.E. 4th N.Z. Fd. Regt. 6th N.Z. Fd. Cov. 5th N.Z. Fd.
Regt. 7th N.Z. Fd. Co.y. 6th N.Z. Fd. Regt. 8th N.Z. Fd. Coy. H.Q.,
7th N.Z. A.Tk. Regt. 5th N.Z. Fd. Pk. Coy. 14th N.Z. Lt. A.A. Regt.
One Fd. Coy., R .E. (31st
(Highland) DiY.) 2nd N.Z. Div. Sigs.
5th N.Z. Inf. Bde. Gp. 6th N.z. Inf. Bde. Gp. 21st N .Z. Bn. 24th
N.Z. Bn. 22nd N .Z. Bn. 25th N.Z. Bn. 23rd N.Z. Bn. 26th N.Z. Bn.
28th N.Z. (Maori) Bn-. 33rd N.Z. A.Tk. Bty. 32nd N.Z. A.Tk. Bty.
One Coy. 27th N.Z. (M.G.) One Coy. 27th N.Z. (M.G.) Bn. Bn.
15lst Inf. Bde. 152nd Inf. Bde. 6th D.L.I. 2nd Seaforths 8th D.L.I.
5th Seaforths 9th D.L.I. 5th Camerons 34th N.Z. A .Tk. Bty. One
1\1.G. Coy. (from ,51st One A.Tk. Bty. (provided by (Highland)
Div.)
30th Corps) One A .Tk. Bty. (from 51st Two Coys. 27th N.Z . (M.G.)
(Highland) Div.)
Bn . ,,
In addition to our own, the field artillery of 5Ist (Highland)
Division, 1st Armoured Division , 10th Armoured Division, one
regiment of 9th Australian Division and two Medium Regiments were
placed under command of our C.R.A.
During the 1st November the R.A.F. had almost con tinuous fighter
cover o.,ver the front and the « eighteen imperturbables >>
went over time after time to « pattern » bomb the enemy wherever he
concentrated. At nightfall the tracks (Diamond, Boomerang and
Square) began to fill up as they had on the 23rd October. Sapper
parties, tanks and supporting arms moved forward .
THE BATTLE FOR THE BULGE (Maps 6 • 8)
At 0105 hours on the morning of the 2nd November every gun on the
Corps front which could reach, opened fire. 15.000 rounds were to
be fired on the 4,000 yards front during the next 4 1/2
honrs.
The attack provided an interesting comparison, as on the left
every- thing went like clockwork while on the right resistance was
stronger and the situation remained obscure for hours. On the left
152nd Brigade Headquarters were in contact throughout with forward
battalions, and encouraging progress reports were received at
Divisional Headquarters from this Brigade as follows:
0148 hours: "\Ne are in touch with both battalions and everything
a.ppears to be going smoothly.
0218 hours : There is light shelling and moderate machine-gun fire
on our front. We have taken some prisoners. a mixture of Italians
and Germans . Evm·ything appe.~1: s to.b~ going according to
plan.
15
02;~5 lwurs : .\e\y}\· laid minefield di ~cuvered.
O;);j9 h ours: On left flank our tank~ are en.gagi n!! <.' nemy
Lr11ik~
between our F.D.Ls . and first object,ivc.
04:17 hours: Hoth battalions have rl'aehed objective a.nu are in
action " ·ith enemy tanks. (Previou s]~· arranged artillery
concentraticm , « Roxborough '), was called for and tired.)
0525 hours : Enemy tanks are melting a\\'ay a,nd batt;.diou~ are
aettino- supportinu arms lll) . One Italian tank ca1Jture<l
intact. ~ ,'.J ~
0535 h ours: He-urganisation of final objective i~ prnceed ing and
battalions are linking up . Right gap is through and left will be
as soon as small rninetield is cleared. Our casualties wrn not
exceed 40 per battalion.
The at tack had gone like a drill , both objectives bein~ taken
according to schedule. It was a very fin e performance.
On the right flank there was greater resistance, and 15lst Brigade
H eadquarters \Vas out of touch with the at.tacking battalions. .
Due to a misunderstanding they reported that the sappers (one of
our own engineer companies) had not come up to make g;aps in the
minefield. It 'vas not until 0400 h ours that it \\·as confirmed
that the gaps had been made exactly as arra nged, ::rnd that tanks
and supporting arms were passing through satis iact.orily. Nut unt
il 0525 hours could \\·e inform Corps that 151st Brigade had
definitely reached their first objective, a lthough other sources
had indicated that the Tynesiders \\·ere getti ng fonntrd despite
stiff oppositioll. An h our earlier Corps was told that it was
proba hle that t.he attack " ·as
.. successful on the whole front.
28th (Maori) Battalion had captured the area \.Vest of Point 29
atHl had linked up with the Australians on their right and handed
over to them their prisoner s. The operation \Vas a. typical
assault by the ~faori Bnttalioll . carried out efficientl>·
against a strongl:·-held position.
OBJECTIVES CAPTURED '
The situation on the right was cleared up just before 0600 Jwur:-;,
when 151 st Brigade reported they "·ere on their final objectiYe
and that the Xorthern gap " ·as through. Up to this stage it had
appeared possible that the armour would not be able to u se the
right or centre Divisional tracks, "·hich, of course, would
jeopardise the whole object of the operation to launch 1st Armoured
Division. Corps had been warned of the possibility, and it was
recommended that the three a,rmoured car regiments 8hould go out by
the two Southern routes. Even when the objectives were taken we did
not paint too rosy a picture, for re-organisation had to be carried
out and 1mpporting arms dug in. Daylight would provide the answer,
as we well knew.
During the night the armour had been moving slO\\-'ly but steadily
forward a long the lane swept and marked by the engineers and
provost. 9th Armoured Brigade were held up on the left short of the
first objective by some anti-tank guns, but the main opposition was
reported a little later from the North. The advance of the armour
was too slow, and at 0500 hours I gave orders to press on \Vith the
Divisional Cavalry carriers in front., and not to wait for the
ground to be sv;ept for mines. The barrage to cover the advance of
9th Armoured Brigade to their final objective had to be post poned
for half an hour, i..e.. to 0615 hours. This was a great pity. Had
we ha<l another hour's darkness 9th Armoured Briaade might have
aot through
0 0 before first light.
r '
: .. ·:·1
t, J .! "1."' . ;, :
ard Hussars had heavy casualties from shellfire during the advance,
and when they reached the infantry objective they had no anti-tank
guns. The regiment reached the Rahman track just before first
light. The Royal Wilts in the centre also reached the Rahman track.
The Warwickshire Yeomanry went too far South, mistaking high ground
South-east of Tel el Aqqaqir for that feature. The three tank
regiments were out of touch with one another and at first light all
were hotly engaged by dug-in tanks and anti-tank guns at close
range. In most cases the squadron leaders' tanks were blown up;
wireless control was lost and tanks fought individually. 3rd
Hussars were reduced to three Crusaders and nine Shermans or
Grants, but they knocked out fifteen anti-tank guns from 50 mm.
upwards, and later· a further five tanks and two 88-mm. guns. The
tanks of the Royal Wilts were nearly all knocked out, but they
accounted for fourteen anti-tank guns. The \Varwicks were engaged
on three sides. They accounted for all anti-tank guns firing on
them, but had only seven runners left at the end of the battle. It
was a grim and gallant battle right in the enemy gun line. Although
the 9th Brigade did not reach its objective and had heavy
Clisualties, the action \Vas a success as the enemy gun line was
smashed. It may be argued that it was a costly and incorrect method
of using armour; but if one is to believe General Von Thoma it may
well prove to have been the deciding factor in breaking the German
·1ine, though ad vantage was not taken of the breach until
later.
From Tactical Headquarters, it appeared to me that 1st Armoured
Division would not get forward before full light to take advantage
of the gap. During the first hours of daylight the position did not
improve-in fact, by 0900 hours 9th Brigade had withdrawn somewhat
East of the Rahman track, and the position seemed to me to be
becoming static. Meanwhile, the· whole area was being heavily
shelled and the tanks were within range of enemy anti-tank guns
from the flank.
ROMMEL'S COUNTER-ATTACK
At 0935 hours Corps informed us that 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions
were preparing to cou nter-attack the bulge. From the disposition
of enemy armour and anti-tank guns it was clear that Rommel's plans
to meet our thrust had been wrong. He had expected us to attack
along the coast. This mistaken appreciation gave us more time to
re-organise, and gave our_ armour time to get into position. To
meet the threat 10th Corps ordered 1st Armoured Division to move
North from the bulge. and at 1040 hours 2nd Armoured Brigade and
8th Armoured Brigade were reported to be moving forward.
The salient \Yas not an easy place to hold if the enemy could mount
a. strong counter-attack. It was as flat as a billiard table and
was being so heavily shelled that the armour could not remain out
i.n fron t. Casualties were mounting in 151st Brigade and in the
Maori Batta lion.
The remnants of our 9th Armoured Brigade had linked up as_ a·
composite unit with 1st Armoured Division and were behind the F
.D.Ls. in support of the infantry. ·
The enemy armour counter-attacked in the early afternoon of the
2nd. At one stage they broke across the salient and back again, but
their losses in this battle were very heavy, the Sherman, the Grant
with its new ammunition , and the 6-pounder Crusader, when
mechanically efficient, proving more than a match for the German
Mark III and IV Specials. 2nd Armoured Brigade claimed 25 enemy
tanks knocked out after the first encounter, 18 of which were left
burning.
17
l\leH 11 \\·hi lc. ith Annoured Division had CL)llle up from our
~outhern f'ec tor with the role nf going straight t.hrough to
Ghazal Station. and plans \.\·ere also being ma.de to widen the So
uthern s ide of the bulge by a daylight attack to be carried out hy
51st Highland Divis ion . The a.illl then wa s to launch the armour
w the 'Vest aud ~ont h-west.
From the H.l'l1luurl'J cars of t ho Royals behind the enemy lin e
came reports of succe;-;sful raids 0 11 enem y suft-skin11ed t
ranspor t.
The even ing attack h:· 152ncl Krigade under :->1s t Division
was a cumplete success. They did a very fast advance of 1,;)00
,Y<trds in just over twent:- minutes su ppodt:>tl b.\" t.lie
Army ta.nks of ;)0th Royal Tank Regiment. The;· had no casu al ties
and took abou t 100 It a lian pl'i:-;011 ers.
On :2nd Xovemher. i11 t h e battle fo r th €' hnlge. the total
munber of prisoner::; taken \Vas something apprnachi11 .~ 2,000.
including 200 who surrendered after a raid by Rtn-al Air Force n(~s
ton::-; . Bv the end of the da.y it \vas clear that the enei;1 :·
,,.;ts cnwking. I warned ·Brigadiers and tl;e C'.R.A. to consider
getting their transplH·t. read:· for exploitation, a s I was
certain that the enemv must ''"i thdrn\\·. I felt certain that.
t.he war ou our front wn s over.
Later developme nt!::' in th e Corp:-:; P lan required the relief
of 151st Briga.Lle for an attack elsewhere. This had to be done by
6th Brigade. It was out of the question to cany out tihe relief by
day, and it was <1. difficult operation by night. particularly
in \'Le\\- o f the absence of m oon and the confused situation .
The battalions of J;')ls t Bl'igade ha.cl been heaYily she lled
dnring the da:·. their exact positions were no t known. ancl nu
reliable s ignal communications \H're functionin g. It wa~ not a
fhm base, and Corps were \Yarned that our front on the rnorning· of
th e :~rd November migh t prove a distinct liabilit;.- . 24th and
26th Batta lions holding the tirm base were to be r elieved b;.·
22nd Battalion and 7th Black ' Vatch respectively. and 28th Maori
Battalion were to remain in the line. The remaining runners of 8th
Royal Tank Regiment·s Va lentines. and our 9th Armoured Bri,gade.
had the role of su pporting'.the infanti·:· in the defence of th e
~orthern flank of the salient.
During the nigh t 2nd / 3rd ~ovemhe r. ()th Brigade relieved 151st
Brigade. The same night i th :\1otor Brigade attacked South a11d \
Vest of ·,1s. but \Yns onJ:- partiall;.~ successfn l. ~o hreach was
m ade.
ENEMY WITHDRAWING
On the morning uf th e 3rd ~ovember I sa \\. th e Army Cumma11cl er
, who was Yisiting Corps H eadquarte rs, and ask ed hiru to make up
fJth Armoured Brigade in tanks . He agreed to J o so hut it was
found impossihlr.. :-rnd the remaining tanks were handed over to
one regiment while the per r;onnel of the others were withdrawn to
refit. Various operations to get further elhow-room fo r the a
rmour ·were carri eLl out during the day . 2nd and 8th Armoured
Brigades nrnde progres:-; and there was considern.lile shelling by
both sides.
On goin .!l· round the fomt I saw a grea t change. Everything
seemed fo point to -a geuera l enemy withdrawa, J. Di\'isional
Cavalry found the enemy were moving back from the North of the
salient. The amount of fighting that had taken place was eviden t..
The artil lery harrage had certainly covered the area. \iany dug-in
tanks had been destroyed and there \va.s a considerable amount of
equipment and many German <lend m No Ma.n 's Land.
18
In the early afternoon of 3rd November I saw the Army and Corps
Commanders and said that the battle was over, that the enemy were
broken, ::tnd that there \vould be no more fighting. So certain was
I that I drafted a cable to the Ne,,- Zealand Governmen·t giving
them early news of the battles we had fought. In the final
paragraph I wrote:
« Present situation here is shaping well. I feel it is rash to make
forecast regarding fighting here in "Western Desert, which has been
productive of so many disappointments. For information of
Government perhaps it would help if I gave my opinion for what it
is worth. I fee l future here is bright. I believe German
resistance was finally broken by last attack and cumulative effect
artillery fire during last ten days. I feel present German position
is precarious, that we shall push him back in near future to
frontier , and later under certain conditions I am led to hope we
:nay eventually clear Africa. »
The Pursuit ( Maps 8 and 9)
At 1415 hours a Warning Order that the Division was to take part in
a mobile operation was received. I spoke to the Army Commander by
telephone and told him \Ve were ready to go, but that it would
assist if we were given some armour. We were allotted 4th Light
Armoured Brigade.
Late in the afternoon a conference of Brigadiers was held to
consider our pursui t role. I outlined the existing situation,
which I had just received from Corps with our orders.
There was much movement reported on the Rahman-Daba road, which was
being bombed. 7th Motor Brigade had crossed the Rahman track. 7th
Armoured Division were moving in behind Rahman, supported by 1st
Armoured Division. 11th Hussars were reported to be moving on to
Ghazal Station. Squadrons of Royals were reported to be operating
against soft stuff in the enemy rear . The Germans had lost many
tanks and were estimated to have remaining no more than 75 runners,
plus 160 Italian. At first W(\ were to go South through the gap in
the bulge, headed by the 4th Light Armoured Brigade. with the
object of cutting off the six It::iJian divisions and the small
German group in the South.
. To concentrate brigades a n<). move as a formed body fro~ the
forward area ·was an impossibility. It was only possible to move
out through the gap in a single line of vehicles, the armour
leading. Supply problems, petrol, food, ammunition and water, and
the use of tracks were settled. We carried with us eight days '
water and rn.tions and 360 rounds of ammunition per 25-pounder, and
200 rounds per medium gun.
Later that day orders were changed, and we were instructed to move
vVest on Fuka. This raised a new problem; we might be cut off from
our supply line, and arrangements were made for landi ng supplies
on beaches. Speed of movement at this stage was essential. If we
did not follow up quickly the enemy v.rould slip away.
We moved ont on 4th NovembeT. It was a confused and difficult
operation. 4th Light Armoured Brigade passed through the gaps to
lead the pursuit, but owing to congestion they were four hours
late. 9th Armoured Brigade and 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade
moved only with great difficulty into the forward area. Our own
Provost Company was out in front marking the thrust line. There was
no attempt at control at the gaps and traffic congestion was bad.
But for our air superiority we should have been heavily
punished.
19
l .. .
In the early afternoon 4th Light Armoured Brigade, leading the
advance on the thrust line, reported opposition which, however,
they were able to deal with, and the rest of the Division followed.
We avoided the armoured battle which was taking place on our
Northern flank, although the heavy tanks of the 4th Light Armoured
Brigade became involved. It was during this ba ttle that General
Von Thoma, Commander of the Afrika Korps, was captured. He had
undertaken a personal reconnaissance to convince an incredulous
Rommel that he \.Yas being outflanked by a British force.
There were many signs of a defeated enemy as we moved Westwards -
burnt-out vehicles, tanks and guns destroyed, and large and small
groups of prisoners marching East under escort.
Concentrating a force in the desert after dark, especially when it
has moved from several different areas in the front line, presents
difficulties. We got behind schedule, and when darkness came only
4th Light Armoured Brigade and Tactical Headquarters had reached
the rendezvous. Main Divisional Headquarters came in later,
directed by Verey pistol, and then 5th Brigade, 9th Armoured
Brigade, and the Divisional Cavalry followed. 6th Brigade, which
were not able to leave the gap until 1700 hours, came much later.
During our wait in the dark a skirmish took place. A small enemy
column machine-gunned us while we were in close harbour with
vehicles nose to tail. An ammunition truck of 5th Brigade was hit
and we suffered some casualties before the opposition was dealt
with by 23rd Battalion.
6th Brigade arrived in the early hours of the morning, having been
directed by wireless to rendezvous at the burning truck.
ADV.AHCE OH FUKA (Map t)
Two hours before dawn on 5th November the whole force was on the
move in desert formation with the high ground West of Fuka for our
objective. Von Thoma has said that our advance was a surprise to
Rommel. It was certainly a surprise to the enemy on our route. 4th
Light Armoured Brigade surprised a German column at preakfast and
knocked out eight of the latest German Mark III and IV tanks iit as
many minutes. Two were captured intact, but had to be destroyed
since we could not leave them. Small groups of transport were seen
in the distance making off at their best speed. The General Officer
Commanding Trento Division and his second in command were captured
trying to escape in a car, and odd bands of enemy were captured
during the day. Along the coast in the North explosions and fires
marked the route of the retreating Axis Army.
4th Light Armoured Brigade met no serious opposition until they
reached a minefield running from North to South from the Fuka
escarpment. Covered by this minefield was an enemy position, from
where leading elements of 4th Light Armoured Brigade were heavily
shelled by 105 mm. and 88 mm. guns. This caused delay, and we
deployed part of the Divisional Artillery and the mediums.
Late in the afternoon 4th Light Armoured Brigade made a gap, went
through the minefield, and turned North to cut the road. They were
still opposed by 88 mm. guns, and 5th Brigade were brought forward
and sent North. Divisional Headquarters, 9th Armoured Brigade, and
6th Brigade
moved up to the minefield ready to prevent the enemy breaking out
from the Fuka escarpment to the South. It was considered quite
likely that the enemy would withdraw along the main road during the
night, as he was obviously merely covering the withdrawal of the
last of his retreating force. Accordingly, 5th Brigade were ordered
not to get heavily involved, as a fast move to Bagush to secure
landing grounds might be necessary on the following day. 7th
Armoured Division were already moving through to our South, and
22nd Armoured Brigade had been directed to go to the West of Bagush
Box. 1st Armoured Division were also moving West. The policy was
not to get involved, but, if possible, to position our forces to
cut the enemy off.
OM TO BAGUSH (Map I)
The night of 5th /6th November passed quietly. At firE!t light on
the 6th the Division opened out into desert formation. 6th Brigade
had a slight diversion while still halted early in the morning,
when the tail was fired on by an enemy column. Two-pounder
anti-tank guns of 26th Battalion retaliated, and a chase by
two-pounders, carriers of ·25th Battalion, and machine-gunners resu
ted in a haul of some 600 prisoners (500 Italian and 100 from 90th
Light Division) and the release of some personnel of «B» Echelon of
22nd Armoured Brigade, who had been captured the previous
evening.
On 6th November , 4th Light Armoured Brigade proceeded by bounds on
a, thrust line to the South-East corner of the Bagush Box. At 1300
hours, Commander 10th Corps, to which we had passed the day beforei
arrived at Divisional Headquarters and gave us the following tasks
in order of priority :- ·
1. To seize and hold the landing grounds in the Bagush area, and
garrison them to allow the R.A.F. to establish and operate.
2. To clear the coastal area up to and including Bagush. 3.,. To
clear the area from Bagush to Charing Cross, but to remain in
the Bagush area as long as necessary to ensure that the R.A.F.
could operate undisturbed.
THE RAINS CAME
The Corps Commander' s final comment before departing to call on
some other part of his command stretching over 60 miles of desert
was: « Spare neither the whip nor the spur."· However, during the
race for high ground South of Bagush, light showers developed into
a deluge. Water began to lie in sheets, and many vehicles were
caught in the mud. By evening the force was concentrated South of
Bagush escarpment, but it was obvious we could move no further if
the rain continued.
Fresh orders had been received, however, and that night an Opera
tion Instruction was prepared for an advance through the minefields
South of Matruh. ·
The rain continued during the night, and on 7th November the units
of New Zealand Division were hopelessly bogged or unable to move
far without encountering going which was impassable to wheeled
traffic. Not only were we held up by the going, but our ·petrol and
supplies were several miles behind in a similar predicament.
21 .
E I The only part of the force which could move were certain
elements of
4th Light Armoured Brigade, who went down the Coast Road -to
reconnoitre the approaches to Matruh. We had to inform Corps that
we were temporarily incapable of further action.
Reports indicated that the enemy were making full use of this
respite, but that they had to abandon guns and other equipment
which were in the flooded areas.
MATRUH-SIDI BARRAHl-HALFAYA-BARDIA (M•p 9)
Sunday, 8th November, was fine, and the force moved West. The going
was still soft in many parts, so that our speed was affected
through not being able to move on a general thrus·t line in desert
formation. At about 1600 hours 4th Light Armoured Brigade reported
that the minefield South of Matruh.was clear of the enemy and
Matruh was also reported clear. Our next Qrders were to move on
Sidi Barrani and take and garrison. Mischiefa Aerodrome. 4th Light
Armoured Brigade were given orders to move through Charing Cross
and advance on Sidi Barrani with all speed. The Division
bivo1,1acked on the night of 8th/9th November on the Road to Rome,
and on the 9th (less 6th Brigade) moved across the Siwa Road
through the minefield, and then in desert formation, South of the
Coast Road. 6th Brigade were ordered to take over Matruh, the main
reason being the difficulty of maintenance beyond that point.
4th Light Armoured Brigade encountered another enemy rearguard
covering Sidi Barrani. This enemy position was disposed of by dusk;
some guns, including an 88 mm., were destroyed, and 60 prisoners
were taken. Preparations were made to outflank Sidi Barrani next
day, but any enemy in the vicinity were expected to retire during
the night.
An early reconnaissance of Sidi Barrani on the 10th showed it was
still unoccupied. Tanks and abandoned vehicles, which were still
smoulder ing, and jett~soned equipment of all kinds, marked the
main road, which we followed in the next lap of the advance. Again
4th Light Armoured Brigade encountered road blocks and shell fire,
but no serious resistance until the minefield East of Halfaya was
reached. Here, too, the enemy withdrew before we could deploy to
attack. No attempt was made to close the gaps in the minefield,
which showed how disorganised they were.
On the evening of the 10th, plans were made to capture Halfaya
Pass. Once again de·spite the natural strength of the defensive
position at the summit of the defile, it was thought that the enemy
would retire. 4th Light Armoured
· Brigade reported, however, that it was held, and a surprise
infantry night attack was decided upon. Without any artillery
support and without their mortars, 110 men of the 21st Battalion
went up the Pass and caught the -enemy completely unawares. In this
operation they suffered but two casualties. They captured this very
formidable defensive position from its most difficult approach, and
took 612 prisoners and all their equipment intact. The prisoners
were mostly Italian with a stiffening of Germans, the Italians
belonging to the Pistoia Division, whose motto is: « I am valiant
even unto Death ! »
With the capture of Halfaya on 11th November, all organised
resistance in this phase of the campaign ended. Capuzzo, Salum,
Bardia, and Sidi Azeiz were not contested. The advance further
afield was carried out by the armoured forces, and the Division
remained in the Bardia.area for re-organisation and training.
. ..,...,,., ' i ·
GENERAL
The lessons arising from operations in Egypt and Libya between 11th
September and 11th November, 1942, may be considered under three
heads:
Phase I- --Planning and Preparation (11th September-23rd
October).
Phase II-The Attacks (2:3rd October-3rd November).
Phase III-The Pursuit (3rd-11th November).
It must Le realised that m••Y of these lessons are only applicaLle
to lighting in countries siMilar te the Western Desert.
Phase I-Planning and Preparation
DECEPTION The attack on 23rd October achieved tactical surprise, at
least. This
was in no small measure due to the use of ((cover)) movements to
mislead the enemy, efficient concealment and camouflage during
training, and carry ing out all abnormal movement up to the moment
of joining battle during the h,ours of darkness.
SECURITY
The persons to whom, and the dates at which the plan for the
offensive could be divulged, \Vere laid down by Army and all leave
was cancelled before the plan became generally known. . In the
Division, of course, it was very soon obvious that we were training
for an operation. A working compromise between security and the
needs of preparing for the attack .is the only solution to enable
planning, reconnaissance, and training to be carried on. The vital
need for secrecy was explained to all ranks to whom details of the
operatio;n uLightfoot )) had to be divulged, and this trust was not
misplaced. Once the plan was generally known, no contact with
civilians, Base, L. of C. units, or other channels of communication
with the rear areas was permitted.
REHEARSALS The full-scale Divisional rehearsal before our unit.
training began, which
was carried out on groti.nd, and under conditions similar to the
actual operation, proved a satisfactory method. Such an exercise
should include the co-operation of tanks and all supporting arms
firing live ammunition. By this means weaknesses in training,
organisation, and procedure become apparent while there is still
time for their correction, and Brigadiers and Commanding Officers
are able to develop a sound ubattle drilln when they know by
experience the practical difficulties of the operation.
SCALE MODELS
As usual, it was found that models of the ground over which the
eventual operation is to take place are of the greatest assistance.
Plans can be explained, possible action subsequent to the attack
can be discussed, and commanders gain a clearer impression than
from studying a map. The more complicated phases ,of the approach
marches, and assembly, and the moves of transport can be clearly
demonstrated. In every case it reduces the possibility of a
misunderstanding of the commander's plan.
EC A I INTELLIGENCE
1. The collection and interpretation of intelligence data from all
sources is vital to any plan. The value of patrol reports covering
the frontage of attack up to the last moment is great, but patrols
should not be carried out by -troops whose presence in the line is
to remain secret.
2. Full information of enemy dispositions is necessary before
artillery fire can be applied with maximum effect, since plans can
then be made for the bombardment of enemy strong points. Such
information also gives our infantry an opportunity of planning
details of an attack. The value of air photographs from which
overprints can be prepared is_considerable.
3. Intelligence concerning enemy defences must be issued right down
to the individual soldier by sketches and similar means. He is then
prepared, as far as possible, for what he will actually encounter
during the attack and will understand how he is expecteq_ to
overcome resistance.
APPROACH MARCH 1. The moves of formations to their assembly areas
for the attack is ·a
complicated operation. The marshalling of transport, « marrying it
up »
with the troops, the order of march; allotment of routes, lighting
and traffic control, all require most careful and detailed
planning. Limitations in these matters may well affect the method
of deploying for the attack. Good preliminary arrangements inspire
confidence.
2. During the recent operations, moves were planned under
Divisional arrangements as far as the infantry start lines, and
from there forward were under brigade control. This proved
satisfactory.
Phase 11-Tlie Alfaclcs
FITNESS FOR ATTACK The psychological effect upon infantry of
holding a defended area,
which is really a fortress, is to lower the military efficiency and
physical fit ness of these troops. Troops which have_been in a
fortress need re-training before they ~re used for an attack. They
should, if possible, be withdrawn behind the line for
re-organisation and intensive training.
TANKS 1. With the increase in the number and power of anti-tank
guns the
technique of employing tanks in the attack has changed. Tanks were
originally introduced as a weapon for crushing wire and assisting
the infantry on to the objective. After « Lightfoot » and «
Supercharge » it is now clear, if there was any doubt before, that
tanks cannot be used as an offensive weapon until the anti-tank gun
line is neutralised, and until a passage has been cleared -through
the minefields to enable them to break out into « open » country
suitable for manoeuvre. 'If this is 'true of battles in the Western
Desert, which is a « tank commander' s Paradise», then it is for
consideration whether in enclosed country between equally matched
forces the tank can be used as an offensive weapon.
... ~~· ~.. ,
:3. Where tanks are used in support of infantry in a night attack
against an organised defensive position, they should work along the
same axis as the infantry, and sl:ould be under command of the
infantry commander until the infantry have re-organised.
4. If, as in « Supercharge,)) a night attack by infantry makes a
bridgehead beyoL~ the enemy minefields but leaves an anti-tank gun
line beyond the infantry objective, a further attack to break that
gun line may lrnve to be carried out by tanks. Such an attack
should be by daylight, ::;upported by the full weight of the
artillery barrage to neutralise the anti tank guns. The daylight
attack is less hazardous, as in the half light tanks will be beaten
by dug-in anti-tank guns. In daylight, armour is much easier to
control and in the absence of mines, Grant and Sherman tanks,
supported by artillery, should be able to deal with anti-tank gun
positions with fire and movement.
5. In a tank attack under a barrage, mopping-up troops are
essential. For this purpose an armoured carrier for mopping up
troops must be provided, so that they can move. with the tanks and
dispose of the enemy anti-tank gun detachments. ·
6. Artillery O.Ps. from field ·regiments supporting tanks must be
given the thickest and most reliable armour to ensure, as far as
possible, that they will be at the right place ·when required.
Field regiments which are to support tanks must train and should
live with them, so that they will under stand perfectly the
technique of the armoured battle. The value of full co-operation
between tanks and artillery cannot be over-stressed.
7. Un 1es s the circumstances so demand, tanks should not be
committed to battle unless completely battleworthy. Defects, for
example, in wireless and compasses may have costly results.
8. It was again obvious that men cannot continue for many days to
fight their tanks by day and carry out their maintenance by night.
Reserve tank units must at all times be kept in hand for relief
purposes.
9. The need for an armoured vehicle to remove casualties from the
battlefield was again distressingly obvious.
ANTI-TANK MINES IN DEFENCE
Ant.i-tank mines are an excellent defensive weapon against tank
attack, but their use has the disadvantage of restricting the
movements of our own tanks. If it is envisaged that our tanks
\.Vill be required to operate offensively over a particular sector,
the laying of mines there paralyses manoeuvre. If a sector is not
covered by minefields, however, tanks must be used in depth in the
forward defences in support of the infantry during
re-organisation.
.ARTILLERY
1. The co-ordination of the artillery plan and the infantry assault
requires special attention in the featureless desert. The barrage
should, as far as possible, be kept at right angles to the line of
infantry advance throughout. As the artillery programme for a
barrage virtually controls the movement of the infantry, it should
be issued in simple form down to sub-unit commanders in sufficient
time for it to be explained in full to the individual soldier. (See
Maps 4 and 7.)
2. When the exact position of the enemy foremost posts is unknown.
infantry should be withdrawn from the F.D.Ls. just prior to the
attack. so that the artillery barrage can be put down immediate ·
ont of our F.D.Ls., thus · ensuring that no portion of the enemy de
ombardment.
3. In addition to its bombardment role, it was found that artillery
fire can be of considerable assistance in aiding infantry to
maintain direction and position. Rounds of smoke on
inter-divisional and inter-brigade bound~1:ies at reaular intervals
indicate these boundaries. Tracer from Bofors guns flnng along the
inter-cliYi sional and inter-brigade boundaries indicates
direction. Pauses and lifts in the artillery barrage can be
indicated by smoke along the line just before a long pause or lift,
as also can the objective itself by a line of smoke fired at a
fixed distance beyond it.
4. A recognised method of determining an actual position is the
firing of smoke shell. Five rounds of smoke from a. surveyed gun
v'ill determine the position to within 25 yards .
5 . Artillery survey as it works forward can be continued up to the
F.D.Ls. Survev work . even under these conditions, can be
guaranteed accurate to \Yithin 100 ~;ards. It can be done quickly
and easily, and in the desert it should assist other arms to fix
their position and get an accurate pictur