Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979), and ���

Stephen E. Rosenbaum, “How to be Dead and Not Care” (1986)

PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC

Christina Hendricks

Except images noted otherwise, this presentation is licensed CC-BY 4.0

Nagel: Even if there is nothing after death, is death still a bad thing for the one who dies?

Isn’t it obvious that it is? Why even ask the question?

Epicurus & Lucretius Death can only be bad for a person if they can experience it as bad.

BAD for that person

Nagel’s argument Conclusion: Death is bad for the person who has died. What did you get from his article as to his argument for this?

(Outline it on the board)

Objections 1.  How can we say the dead person has “lost”

anything once they’re dead? They no longer exist.

Reply: think of persons as extended temporally: a combination of their history, their present state, and their future possibilities

Icon  by  Harold  Weaver,  from  the  Noun  Project  

Makes sense of the bad of betrayal?

Objections 2. If death is bad for the person who dies, then

why isn’t the time before birth also bad for him/her? (or is it?)

Reply: If born earlier, wouldn’t be the same person, so couldn’t be bad for him/her.  

Time  1  

Time  2  

Can’t  be  Person  A  

Person  A  

Icon  by  CreaAve  Stall,  from  The  Noun  Project  

Objections 3. Must we take the loss of life as always a bad thing, because a loss of future possibilities, since we are naturally mortal?

Reply: From perspective within our lives, it would be good to have more, even if we recognize (from outside) that we can’t; so loss is still bad.

Icon  by  Harold  Weaver,  from  the  Noun  Project  

…

Summary Death is bad for the person who dies b/c it’s a loss to that person of future possibilities of a good thing (life).

…

Putting it all together Fill out the outline of Nagel’s argument (on other screen)

Rosenbaum: “How to be Dead and Not Care: A defense of

Epicurus” (1986)

Definitions of terms

Dying

Death

Being dead

Experience: one experiences something only if it can causally affect one (124) •  e.g., imagining something ≠ experiencing it

Rosenbaum’s reconstruction of Epicurus’ argument

•  See pp. 121-122 (or 218 in JSTOR version) •  Shown on separate screen

Supporting Premise A

Inductive arguments: claim the conclusion follows from the premises with a significant degree of probability Deductive arguments: claim the conclusion follows from the premises with certainty

o  If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true

Generalization from normal cases (induction)(123)  

Premise  1  

Premise  2  

Premise  3  

Conclusion  

Premise  1  

Premise  2  

Premise  3  

Conclusion  

Supporting Premises C and D

Premise (C): comes from def. of “experience” (124-125) 1.  For a person P to experience a state of affairs, it must have

causal effects on P 2.  States of affairs can only have causal effects on a person

who exists 3.  At death, P ceases to exist 4.  Therefore, “P can experience a state of affairs only if it

begins before P’s death”

Premise (D): “true by definition” (126)

Conclusion follows from the premises? With certainty/necessity or with high probability?

Hint: look at the intermediate conclusions (B) and (E) and their connection to the final conclusion

Premise  A   Premise  D  Premise  C  

Premise  B  Intermediate  conclusion  

Final  conclusion  

Premise  E  Intermediate  conclusion  

Response to Nagel

What in Rosenbaum’s argument does Nagel disagree with? Rosenbaum’s response: •  Deception, betrayal, brain injury example

compatible with (A) o  (A) just requires that P could experience something

Response to Nagel

Nagel: time before birth & after death are different; latter bad, former not

What is Rosenbaum’s response?