1
The relationship between political trust, generalized trust
and European identity among adolescents
(Work in progress)
Marc Hooghe, Soetkin Verhaegen, Ellen Quintelier
Centre for Citizenship and Democracy
KU Leuven, Belgium
Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference
Bordeaux 4-7 July 2013
2
Abstract
Identification with the political community and trust within this community are the basis of an
as legitimate perceived political system. Therefore, the EU explicitly recognized the
importance of the citizens of the EU member states by granting them the official status of
‘European citizens’ since the Maastricht Treaty (1992). While this is a formal construct, it
also implied the formalization of a feeling of community among Europeans. In the current
study, we aim to explore what young EU citizens identify with when they identify as EU
citizens. Do they identify with the EU community as a community built on political
institutions, or with a community built on citizens? We test this by investigating the
relationship between political trust and generalized trust with European identity. A multilevel
analysis, on the data of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 among
adolescents in 21 EU member states, shows a stronger relationship between political trust and
European identity than between generalized trust and European identity. This indicates that
citizens rather relate to the political community of institutions than to a European citizenry.
This finding supports the perennial criticism against the European integration project that it is
an elite-based project. Additionally, further analysis on Belgian panel data shows that it is
more likely that European identity leads to political trust than the reverse pattern is likely to
occur.
3
Introduction
A well-functioning democratic system needs to be legitimate. A feeling of political
community is the basis of an as legitimate perceived political system that organizes the
political community because “ legitimacy is derived by the perception of the political process
as originating ‘from the people’ and serving ‘for the people’” (Harteveld, Meer, & Vries,
2013, p. 2). Therefore, the EU explicitly recognized the importance of the citizens of the EU
member states by granting them the official status of ‘European citizens’ since the Maastricht
Treaty. While European citizenship was established as a formal construct – granting people
rights and imposing duties – it also implied the formalization of a feeling of community
among Europeans. This feeling of belonging is referred to as European identity, which has
been a booming field of research since the start of the 21st century (Risse, 2010). This
development caused a so called ‘soft turn’ in European studies moving away from attitudes
and economic explanations for integration towards the more affective trait of identification.
Two main lines of empirical research can be distinguished in the study of European identity.
First, there is a group of studies that tries to find the main sources that drive the development
of a (stronger) European identity. The effect has been studied of cognitive skills, transnational
mobility, media, personal characteristics and even attitudes towards the member state one
belongs to (Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Faas, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Sigalas, 2010). Second,
and more recently, the call is made to first find out more thoroughly what this European
identity actually means to citizens and how it can be measured in all its aspects (Bruter,
2008). Importantly, multiple-item measurements for European identity are proposed and a
distinction is made between regarding being a European citizen as a cultural or as a civic band
among Europeans. In the current study, we want to add a third focus to the research of
European identity by trying to find out more about the conception of the political community
citizens identify with: do they identify with the EU community as based on the political
institutions or based on citizens? From previous insights about political trust, generalized trust
and the link between trust and European identity, we learned that when people hold a sense of
community, they trust this community. But do they trust the political institutions or do they
rather trust their fellow citizens? To answer this question, we aim to get more insight into the
significance of political and generalized trust as explanatory variables for the formation of
European identity.
4
We argue that a relationship between European identity and political trust in the EU would
reflect that the elite-led cooperation within the EU project still marks what people relate to
when they identify as European citizens. This would support the perennial criticism against
the European integration project that it is an elite-based project (Loveless & Rohrschneider,
2011). This would imply that when citizens identify as EU citizens, they relate these feelings
first to the political institutions, exemplified by feelings of political trust. This is what we call
the top-down construction of European identity. This would mean that the political elite first
created EU institutions and then ‘created’ citizens (Shore, 2000). To the contrary, it could also
be that over time this elite-led cooperation and accordingly identification has spilled over into
mutual trust between citizens (Klingemann & Weldon, 2013). This would mean that European
identity is rather linked with feelings towards the community of European citizens such as
generalized trust towards others. This follows the bottom up perspective.
We will test this relationship by using both political trust in EU institutions and generalized
trust to explain levels of European identity. By setting out both types of trust against each
other, we get an indication whether European identity rather means identification with the
political institutions (political trust) or with the community of European citizens (generalized
trust). Especially as we witness decreased levels of political trust during the current recession,
it is important to be aware of the impact this might have on ways people relate to the EU. If
political trust and European identity are related, we should be concerned about the impact
these lower levels of trust might have people’s identification with the EU (Inglehart, 1970). In
a similar way, a decline in generalized trust might have severe complications for the European
identity if both are substantially linked: a decline in generalized trust might limit the chances
to speak of a true European Community (Howe, 2010).
In the following sections we will first present the current state of the art in studies about
political and generalized trust in the EU context and define what we mean when we talk about
European identity, political trust and generalized trust. Second, we describe the data gathered
to test the relationship between both types of trust and European identity. Third, multilevel
cross-lagged and structural equation analyses are carried out to test this relationship and
fourth, the implications for our perception of the European integration project as an elite-
based project will be discussed.
5
Political trust, generalized trust and its relationship with European identity
After a short summary of the way in which we view European identity, we present a review of
the (limited amount of) research so far on generalized trust and political trust, how it is
defined and most importantly its relationship with European identity.
European identity
In this study, we aim to explore what adolescents identify with when they have a European
identity. Therefore, we use a relatively broad and commonly used definition (and
measurement as will be shown in the following section) of European identity, as a feeling of
belonging to the EU community (Bruter, 2003; Citrin & Sides, 2004; Fligstein, 2008;
Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Risse, 2010). European identity is seen as a social identity which
provides a stable linkage between the individual perception of the self and the social group to
which a person belongs (Brewer, 2001). It places the individual within the structure of a social
group and attaches meaning to this place in the group. We explicitly do not define what would
be the building blocks of this community, as this is the main interest of our research: is
European identity rather built on political institutions (reflected as a stronger relationship
between political trust and European identity), or on a community of citizens (reflected as a
stronger relationship between generalized trust and European identity)? Also, we follow the
theoretical claim that people combine different types of identity (Fligstein, Polyakova, &
Sandholtz, 2012; Risse, 2010; Sen, 2006). A European identity can, for instance, be combined
with a national identity, a gender identity, a religious identity… and all of these aspects
become more or less prevalent in different types of situations.
Political trust
Political trust is trust in “the core institutions of the state, including the legislature, executive,
and judicial branches of government” (Norris, 2011, p. 29). This means that this definition of
political trust does not reflect trust in specific office holders at a certain point in time. It
reflects trust in the institutions in general. Only a limited number of studies in the field of EU
has focused on political trust so far (Arnold, Sapir, & Zapryanova, 2012). These studies
inquired political trust in the EU, more specifically by studying the relationship between trust
in EU institutions and trust in national institutions. Anderson (1998), for instance, stated that
trust in national institutions could be used as a reason to trust representatives at the
international level. He argues that citizens base their assessment of the European Union on
their evaluation of national institutions and, in particular, on satisfaction or dissatisfaction
6
with national politics. In this argumentation, political trust is used as an instrument to value
the functioning of the European institutions. People who trust their national parliament and
government will also support them in European decision-making. However, the above cited
work of Anderson (1998) does not talk about identity, but about support. While this might
work for support for European integration, the question remains whether a rational evaluation
of political trust at the national level would mediate a relationship of a rather abstract feeling
of identification. Norris (2011) suggests this should be the case: “Diffuse support [which is
defined in such a way that it includes political trust] represents more lasting bonds to the
nation-state, as exemplified by feelings of national pride and identity, as well as by adherence
to core regime values and principles. Diffuse support is expected to be particularly important
for stability in fragile states emerging from deep-rooted internal conflict, as well as for
processes of regime transition, by strengthening popular acceptance of the legitimacy of new
constitutional arrangements and the authority of officeholders.” (Norris, 2011, p. 22). In this
way, she argues that political trust should be related to identity, especially among new
regimes such as the European Union. This leads to the first hypothesis that political trust is
positively related to European identity.
Generalized trust
A second stream of research explores the effect of generalized trust on European identity
(Delhey, 2007; Klingemann & Weldon, 2013). It has been argued that to develop a common
European identity, citizens should trust each other. As most people do not know many other
European citizens, generalized trust (towards undefined others) may be used as a prerequisite.
Scheuer and Schmitt even suggest a causal relationship by noting that: “Trust is a
fundamental condition for the development of a sense of community.” (Scheuer & Schmitt,
2009, p. 559). Similar claims have been made by Uslaner (2002), who argued that a certain
level of trust is a prerequisite for a community. Trusters believe in a common culture,
underlying shared values, value diversity and common understanding. People with more
generalized trust have the expectation that people in the community in which they operate
share their norms and values (Kaina, 2004). The feeling to belong to this community is
labeled as a shared group identity. This means that there is a strong connection between
generalized trust and European identity. In this literature, most of the time, researchers
explored the relationship between trust towards specific groups of Europeans (sometimes
referred to as generalized trust towards Europeans), but this should be defined as
7
particularized trust, not generalized trust as it refers to a specific – geographically defined –
group of citizens. Because the interest in our study is about the feeling of belonging to the
community of EU citizens as a whole, we study the relationship with generalized trust.
Research that links the traditional generalized trust question (Rosenberg, 1956) with European
identity, however, is much rarer. Scheuer and Schmitt (2009) concluded in their descriptive
study about trust in people from other member states – measured as dyadic trust among
member states – that the ‘core’ EU member states in the North-West are most trusted, people
in Southern member states follow closely and the newer Eastern member states are regarded
as least trustworthy. Klingemann and Weldon (2013) built on Scheuer and Schmitt’s study
and tried to explain the reason for differences in trust between citizens of different member
states in the long-term. They argue that while cultural and economic differences might be an
obstacle to mutual trust in the short-run, they “can learn to trust one another and build a sense
of community over time’ (Klingemann & Weldon, 2013, p. 457). Also, both studies share the
idea that generalized trust and European identity are related. We therefore formulate the
second hypothesis: generalized trust stimulates a sense of European identity, as generalized
trusters presume that most people they meet share their values.
The reciprocal relationship between trust and identity
In the previous section it is explained why a relationship is expected to exist between political
and generalized trust on the one hand and European identity on the other hand. In this section,
we address the reciprocal relationship between each type of trust and European identity.
As a third hypothesis we argue that generalized trust is more likely to lead to the formation of
a shared identity because identities are built through social interaction (Kaina, 2004). For a
common sense of community to come about, people need to interact - even in the most
abstract way- and this is more likely to happen among people that have a general feeling of
trust in the other. Generalized trust is in this argument seen as the basis of shared experiences
and interaction: “Since the growth of a shared sense of community requires a space of
common experiences, interpersonal relations based on trust create the opportunity structures
of such experiences.” (Kaina, 2004, p. 119). People with generalized trust presume that others
will share the same norms and values because they believe in a common culture, underlying
shared values, value diversity and common understanding (Uslaner, 2002).
8
For an abstract, large and foremost relatively new community as the European Union,
however, we have argued that political institutions probably play a role in the formation of a
European community and the associated European identity as well. As interaction with a
wider group of European citizens is less likely to occur, people can rely on the fact that they
are governed by political institutions which agree upon a set of shared norms and values they
believe in within the larger European society. Therefore, we expect that people that trust the
political institutions more will develop a stronger European identity. This proposed
mechanism follows a functional reasoning about trust, assuming that trust is built on
expectations (Kaina, 2004). These expectations help to reduce the complexity of social
interaction and are built on common values and norms. Accordingly, we argue that first a
relation of trust needs to be established with the political institutions we are familiar with that
guard a common set of values and norms and then we can use these expectations to start
identifying with the European community the political institutions engaged in. In a later
stadium European identity, as identifying with a political community, can also function as
some kind of a feedback loop, encouraging people to trust the political institutions that agreed
upon engaging in a common European community, because they are part of this community
(Harteveld et al., 2013). These processes can take place simultaneously. For example, political
trust is not expected to stop contributing to a common European identity at a certain point. A
reciprocal relationship is expected to develop after a certain amount of time when European
identity gets stronger. As a fourth hypothesis we therefore state that, in causal terms, the
relationship between political trust and European identity will be stronger than that European
identity induces political trust because the EU is still a relatively new construct.
9
Data and methods
We use the data of the European module of the International Civic and Citizenship Education
Study (ICCS) 2009 to test the first and the second hypothesis that political trust and
generalized trust are positively related to European identity (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, & Burge,
2009). The data were gathered between February and May 2009 among 70,502 adolescents
(average age of 14.4 years) in 21 EU member states.i The respondents filled out a self-
administered paper survey at school. At least 150 schools were selected in each country by
using a random sample proportional to school size and in each school one class of the ninth
grade was randomly sampled. The average response rate was, after replacement, 89.5%. As
adolescents are clustered in countries, we use a 2-level regression analysis to account for
national differences that could explain a difference in European identity between countries.
For the test of the reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and political trust on the
one hand (hypotheses 3 and 4), and European identity on the other hand, a cross lagged
structural regression analysis is carried out on the data of the Parent-Child Socialization Study
2012-2013 (Hooghe, Quintelier, Verhaegen, Boonen, & Meeusen, 2012). This is a panel study
among adolescents for which the data was collected once during spring 2012 (T1) and once
during spring 2013 (T2) in 59 schools in the Flemish region of Belgium. In total, 2,825
adolescents took part in both waves of the panel study. The average age of the adolescents
was 15 years old in 2012 and 16 years old in 2013. As this is a panel study, we can use these
data to get more insight in the specific relationship between trust and European identity
because there is a time-lag in the data. Also, the same questions were included in both the
ICCS 2009 and PCSS 2012-2013 study and the ninth grade was surveyed in both studies, so
data are comparable. Analyses are performed with the programs Stata version 12.1 and Mplus
version 7.
Measurements
All indicators are measured with the very similar survey questions in both the ICCS 2009
survey and in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey. In this way the comparative part of the analysis
fits the analysis about the reciprocal relationship between political and generalized trust and
European identity. In the following section an overview will be presented of the used items
and the results of the factor analyses testing the validity of the theoretically assumed factor
10
scales underlying the survey items for all three measurement points in time (ICCS 2009,
PCSS 2012 and PCSS 2013).
European identity is measured with the items presented in Table 1 with response options
ranging on a 4-point Likert scale. Principal component analysis (PCA) is used on the different
datasets to test whether all four items measure one single underlying concept, as theoretically
expected. The high factor loadings, the Cronbach’s α of 0.756 and the Eigenvalue of 2.326
indicate that these items indeed form a reliable and internally consistent measure for the ICCS
2009 data. The same conclusion can be drawn from the results of the PCA on each wave of
the PCSS 2012-2013 data.
Table 1. Factor loadings and significance tests of principal component analysis (PCA) and
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) European identity Observed indicators ICCS 2009 Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013
I see myself as European 0.721 I see myself as a citizen
of the EU
0.764 0.776
I am proud to live in
Europe
0.793 I am proud to live in
Europe
0.822 0.818
I feel part of the EU 0.757 I feel part of the EU 0.791 0.779
I am proud my country is a
member of the EU
0.794 I am proud that Belgium
is a member of the EU
0.788 0.808
Cronbach’s α 0.762 Cronbach’s α 0.798 0.805
Eigenvalue 2.350 Eigenvalue 2.506 2.529
Explained variance 59% Explained variance 63% 63%
N 68,405 N 3,218 3. 176
Source: ICCS 2009; PCSS 2012-2013.
Note: The question asked in the ICCS 2009 survey was: “How much do you agree or disagree with the
following statements?” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree).
The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Indicate to what extent these statements about
the EU agree with your opinion.” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree). Indicators are treated as
ordinal variables.
Both the ICCS 2009 survey and the PCSS 2012-2013 survey included 4 indicators to measure
political trust. Slightly different survey items were used in the two studies (see Table 2), but
both tap into a wide spectrum of political trust. We excluded trust in European institutions,
because that would give us a tautological measurement, if we look at its relationship with
European identity. Building on the work of Hooghe (2011), we expect that most of the
variance of all these observed indicators will be explained by a single factor. This factor is
expected to measure political trust which can be defined as “a comprehensive evaluation of
the political culture that is prevailing within a political system and not as an evaluation of
each and every actor individually.” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). The PCA to test the validity and
11
one dimensionality of the scale. As expected, the Cronbach’s α and Eigenvalues indicate that
these expectations are met by the data for every measurement point in time.
Table 2. Factor loadings and significance tests of principal component analysis (PCA) and
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) political trust Observed indicator ICCS 2009 Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013
National parliament 0.840 Belgian parliament 0.916 0.926
Local government 0.735 Regional parliament
(Flemish or Brussels
parliament)
0.898 0.914
National government 0.830 Belgian government 0.884 0.905
Political parties 0.818 Political parties 0.871 0.855
Cronbach’s α 0.820 Cronbach’s α 0.913 0.921
Eigenvalue 2.603 Eigenvalue 3.185 3.242
Explained variance 65% Explained variance 80% 81%
N 67,969 N 3,207 3,165
Source: ICCS 2009; PCSS 2012-2013.
Note: The question asked in the ICCS 2009 survey was: “How much do you trust each of the following
institutions?” (1= not at all, 4= completely).
The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Can you indicate for each of the following
institutions whether you trust it or not?” (0= totally no trust, 10= a lot of trust).
Generalized trust is measured with the ICCS 2009 item: “How much do you trust other
people” (1= not at all, 4= completely). This variable should be treated as an ordinal variable.
The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Generally speaking, would you say
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people or that most people can be trusted?” with a
11-point scale that ranges from 0 (you can’t be too careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted).
This variable can be treated as a continuous variable.
Controls are included for political interest, SES, gender and citizenship status because
previous research suggests they are related to both the exogenous and the endogenous
variables of interest in this study. First, people that are more interested in political and social
matters are found to identify more strongly as European and have more trust in political
institutions and other people (Inglehart, 1970; Munoz, Torcal, & Bonet, 2011; Wallace,
Datler, & Spannring, 2005). Therefore, political interest could be a confounding factor
between political and generalized trust and European identity, so we should control for
political interest in order to estimate the path between political and generalized trust and
European identity without this influence. In the ICCS 2009 survey, political interest is
measured by 5 different items. These items all load on one underlying factor, which we label
as political interest. The individual factor loadings derived from a principal component
analysis are presented in Appendix 1. We use this factor scale in our multilevel analysis.
12
Political interest is measured in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey by the item “How interested are
you in social problems and politics?” measured on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from not
being interested to being very interested. Second, a higher socio-economic status seems to be
related to a stronger EU identity because this group is more likely to benefit from explicit
benefits of European integration, such as traveling or working abroad (Fligstein, 2008). Also,
it is found to be positively related to both political trust and generalized trust (Berg & Hjerm,
2010; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2008). Therefore, we include a measure of the
number of books each adolescent reports to have at home. Magazines, comics and
schoolbooks are not included in this count. This is a common indicator used to measure socio-
economic status in similar studies (Flanagan, 2012). In the ICCS dataset the response options
ranged from 1 to 6 (from having 0-10 books to having more than 500 books at home). In the
PCSS study this is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from having no books at home to
having more than 500 books at home. Third, previous studies indicated that females tend to
have a weaker European identity, that they are less interested in political and social matters,
and that they have higher levels of political trust and generalized trust (Agirdag, Huyst, &
Van Houtte, 2012; Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2008; Munoz et al., 2011). Gender is
included as a dummy variable where boys are coded as zero and girls are coded as one.
Fourth, adolescents that were not born in the EU tend to have a weaker European identity
(Agirdag et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the data of ICCS 2009 only allow making a distinction
between native respondents (born in the country of test in which they filled out the survey)
and immigrants (born in another country). A distinction between intra-EU immigrants and
extra-EU immigrants is not possible with these data. Correspondingly, we constructed the
same categories for the PCSS 2012-2013 dataset. These categories are included in the analysis
as dummy variables. Adolescents born in the country of test (ICCS 2009) or in Belgium
(PCSS 2012-2013) are the largest group and thus selected as the reference category.
In the first analysis, we control for the clustering of respondents within different member
states. As a control variable on the country level, we first include the measure ‘control of
corruption’ from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), retrieved from the
Worldbank. This indicator measures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption” (Worldbank,
2013). We use the mean score of corruption control for all 21 member states included in the
ICCS 2009 dataset. The data of the GWI were collected among citizens, entrepreneurs and
experts in the public, private and NGO sectors. It is important to control for this variable as it
13
has been shown that corruption levels are highly salient and influence people’s attitudes about
the EU and political trust (Harteveld et al., 2013; Munoz et al., 2011). It is argued here that
citizens of more corrupt member states tend to search for compensation of the bad governance
in their country (Arnold et al., 2012). In our study, this would mean that a higher level of
corruption in a member state would lower the level of political trust and lift people’s affinity
with the EU. By controlling for this, we measure the relationship between political trust and
European identity among respondents, regardless of this difference between member states.
Additionally, corruption is also found to be negatively correlated with trust in other people, so
controlling for corruption seems to be appropriate (Delhey, 2007). Second, we control for the
general climate in the member state towards or against European integration based on data of
Eurobarometer 72.4 (spring 2009). The question was asked whether respondents perceive the
European membership of their country as ‘a good thing’, ‘neither a good nor a bad thing’, or
‘a bad thing’ (Eurobarometer 72.4). A scale was constructed by attributing the value 0 to the
statement that ‘membership is a good thing’, 0.5 to ‘neither a good nor a bad thing’ and 1 to ‘a
bad thing’, which resulted in an average score between 0 and 1 for every member state
(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005).
Analyses
We are interested in both the relationship of political trust and generalized trust with
European identity in a comparative setting in different EU member states and in the specific
reciprocal relationship between political trust and generalized trust and European identity.
Therefore, the first analysis performs a test of which type of trust correlates more strongly
with European identity among adolescents across 21 EU member states. The second analysis
of the PCSS 2012-2013 panel study allows for a closer look into the reciprocity of the
relationship between both types of trust and European identity.
European identity as identification with political institutions or with a citizenry? A
comparative analysis
First, we provide a few descriptive statistics about the dependent variable (European identity)
and the main explanatory variables (political trust and generalized trust). On average, the
respondents have a score of 3.059 on 4 on the European identity scale. The lowest mean score
14
is found in Latvia (2.757/4) and the highest mean score is found in Italy (3.330/4). The mean
score of political trust is 2.625/4 and the mean score of generalized trust is 2.667 on 4. At first
sight, political trust is most strongly correlated with European identity (Pearson’s correlation=
0.261; p<0.001 in contrast to 0.114; p<0.001 between generalized trust en European identity).
These significant correlations show that it is useful to perform a more sophisticated analysis
of these relationships.
The multilevel model is built in three steps. First the null model is estimated, in which only
the 2-level structure of the data is included. This model is the Null model (presented in Table
3) and the intra-cluster correlation (ICC), which is calculated from the variance at each level,
shows that 4.9% of the variance in European identity is explained by the country in which a
respondent lives. Therefore, it is a logical step to take this structure of the data into account.
The likelihood ratio test also indicates that the multilevel model is significantly better than a
simple regression model.
As a second step, the control variables are added to the model. As expected, female
respondents have a slightly weaker European identity than male respondents and adolescents
that were born outside the country of test identify less as European as well. Respondents with
a higher socio-economic status and respondents that are more interested in political and social
matters have a stronger European identity. On the country level, we see that adolescents tend
to have a weaker European identity if they live in a member state where the general climate
among the population is more Eurosceptic. So even at a young age, people adapt to the
political culture of a nation. These relationships meet our expectations, but it is surprising
that no significant relationship is found between the level of corruption in a member state and
European identity. The variance in European identity among individuals is lowered by 3.4%
by including these control variables. The unexplained variance on the country level is lowered
by one third by including the level 2 control variables. This decrease is caused by the
inclusion of the measure of Euroscepticism.
In the third step, the explanatory variables are added. Political trust and generalized trust both
prove to be significantly and positively correlated with European identity. However, the
relationship is over four times stronger with political trust. This indicates that a European
identity rather reflects a bond with the political institutions, than with a European citizenry.
The inclusion of the trust variables to the model lowers the unexplained variance between
respondents with 4.9% in comparison to the model with control variables only. The rise in log
15
likelihood also shows that this model is better than the second model. In an additional test (the
results can be obtained from the authors), we ran Model III without the inclusion of political
trust. In this model, the coefficient of generalized trust was higher (β =0.095; SE=0.004). This
indicates that part of this relationship with European identity should actually be attributed to
political trust.
Table 3. Multilevel model European identity
Model I
Null model
Model II
Controls
Model III
Trust
β SE β SE β SE
Intercept -0.009 0.052 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.039
Individual level
Female -0.042*** 0.004 -0.040*** 0.004
Books at home 0.015*** 0.004 0.025*** 0.004
Political interest 0.161*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.004
Immigrant -0.082*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.004
Political trust 0.212*** 0.004
Generalized trust 0.052*** 0.004
Country level
Corruption 0.040 0.044 -0.014 0.040
Eurosceptic
climate
-0.140** 0.042 -0.133** 0.038
Variance level 2 0.057 0.038 0.032
Variance level 1 0.944 0.912 0.867
ICC 4.9% 4.0% 3.6%
Log likelihood -87900.252 -86803.649 -85212.741
Source: ICCS 2009 and Eurobarometer 72.4.
Note: N (level 1)= 63,201; N (level 2)= 21; Standardized coefficients (β) are given in order to be
able to compare the size of the effects; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
The reciprocal relationship between political and generalized trust and European identity.
A two wave panel analysis
Again, we start with a few descriptive statistics about the main variables of the analysis. In
2012 the mean score on European identity is 2.89 on 4 and in 2013 the mean score is 2.87 on
4. The mean score of generalized trust is 5.10 on 10 in 2012 and 4.80 on 10 in 2013. For
political trust, we find a mean score of 5.09 on 10 in 2012 and 4.94 on 10 in 2013. The three
variables are also significantly correlated. The Pearson’s correlation between generalized trust
at T1 and European identity at T2 is 0.054 (p=0.009), between political trust at T1 and
European identity at T2 it is 0.228 (p=0.000) and generalized trust and political trust strongly
correlate as well (Pearson’s correlation is 0.149 with p=0.000 at T1 and r=0.142 with p=0.000
16
at T2). As already shown by the previous analysis, the correlation between political trust and
European identity is higher than the correlation between generalized trust and European
identity.
The test of the reciprocal relationship between political trust and generalized trust on the one
hand, and European identity on the other hand, is carried out by using structural regression
modeling in different steps (Kline, 2011). We start with identifying an adequate measurement
model using confirmatory factor analysis and then proceed by estimating a cross-laged
structural regression model. This stepwise approach contributes to the reliability of the cross-
lagged structural regression model.
As a first step of the analysis, the factor scales were tested by confirmatory factor analyses. In
the structural regression analysis, CFA is used to explore the variation and co-variation
between the survey items that are hypothesized to reflect European identity. Accordingly, a
one factor measurement model is tested with the weight least squares estimation method for
ordinal variables. The errors of the indicators measuring proudness of living in Europe and
that one’s country is a member of the EU are allowed to correlate. Both indicators measure
the affective value people attribute to their EU membership. Consequently, these indicators
are more strongly correlated. The CFA in Table 4 shows that all items load on one factor at
both measured points in time, as expected by our theoretical expectations. In general, the
comparative fit index (CFI) ranges from 0 to 1 and a CFI of 0.95 or higher indicates a
reasonably well fit (not a perfect fit as assumed in the stricter χ²-test). The root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) also indicates reasonably well fit and as the RMSEA values
in our model are lower than 0.05, the close-fit hypothesis is accepted as well (Kline, 2011).
The test of our theoretical assumption that all observed indicators are largely explained by the
latent factor European identity therefore closely fits reality.
17
Table 4. Factor loadings and significance tests of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA)
European identity
Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013
I see myself as a citizen of the EU 1.000 1.000
I am proud to live in Europe 0.934 0.898
I feel part of the EU 1.058 0.987
I am proud that Belgium is a member of the
EU
0.869 0.871
χ² (df; p) 2.977 (1; 0.084) 4.245 (1; 0.039)
CFI 1.000 1.000
RMSEA 0.029 0.037
N 2,410 2,428
Source: PCSS 2012-2013.
Note: The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Indicate to what extent these
statements about the EU agree with your opinion.” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree).
Indicators are treated as ordinal variables.
A similar test is performed for the measurement scale of political trust. In the PCSS 2012-
2013 data 4 indicators were observed. Building on the work of Hooghe (2011), we expect that
most of the variance of all these observed indicators will be explained by a single factor. This
factor is expected to measure political trust which can be defined as “a comprehensive
evaluation of the political culture that is prevailing within a political system and not as an
evaluation of each and every actor individually.” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). A CFA was used to
test the structure of the data and is presented in Table 5. The maximum likelihood estimation
method was used for the indicators of the PCSS 2012-2013 survey as they can be treated as
continuous measures because they are measured on a 11-point scale. In the analyses of the
PCSS 2012-2013 data, covariance between trust in the Belgian parliament and trust in the
regional parliament were allowed because both measures are explained by trust in the
parliament. The highest significance level of the χ²-test is met and CFI values are close to 1,
so we can assume that the measurement scale meets the expectation of one dimensionality.
18
Table 5. Factor loadings and significance tests of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) political
trust Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013
Belgian parliament 1.000 1.000
Regional parliament (Flemish or Brussels
parliament)
0.939 0.955
Belgian government 1.129 1.074
Political parties 1.016 0.897
χ² (df; p) 32.198 (1; 0.000) 89.540 (1; 0.000)
CFI 0.995 0.988
RMSEA 0.115 0.191
N 2378 2426
Source: PCSS 2012-2013.
Note: The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Can you indicate for each of the
following institutions whether you trust it or not?” (0= totally no trust, 10= a lot of trust).
As all constructed factor scales proved to meet the criteria, we can be confident that each
group of indicators measures one latent concept (theoretically labeled as European identity or
political trust measured at a certain point in time).
As a second step, all latent variables are estimated using confirmatory factor analysis in the
same model, allowing for all possible covariances between the factors. The model fit proves
to be strong (χ²= 763.213 with df=44 and p=0.000; CFI= 0.874; RMSEA= 0.082), indicating
that the measurement model adequately fits the structure of the data and can be used for a
structural regression analysis.
As a third step, the structural regression model is estimated. The resulting model is presented
in Figure 1. The direct effects between generalized trust at time 1 (T1) and generalized trust at
time 2 (T2), between political trust at T1 and political trust at T2 and between European
identity at T1 and at T2 indicate the persistence of these attitudes and of European identity
between the two measure points in time. A highly significant positive relationship is found
between each pair of variables. At T1 all exogenous variables are allowed to covary.
Generalized trust and political trust are highly correlated, as already indicated by the simple
Pearson’s correlation, presented earlier in this section. In accordance with the findings of the
multilevel analysis, we also see here that political trust is more strongly correlated to
European identity than generalized trust is. While in the ICCS 2009 data the latter relationship
is found to be much weaker than the relationship between political trust and European
identity, we do not even find a significant relationship between generalized trust and
European identity in the PCSS 2012-2013 data (controlling for correlations with political
19
trust). At T2 the disturbance terms of generalized trust, political trust and European identity
are allowed to correlate and findings are very similar to the findings at T1 (S. E. Anderson &
Williams, 1992).
The cross-lagged effects are of main interest in this study as they present the test of the
reciprocal relationship between both political and generalized trust on the one hand, and
European identity on the other hand. These effects are indicated with the letters A, B, C and D
in Figure 1. All cross-lagged relationships are included in the same model, because these
attitudes and European identity are strongly related to each other. Separate tests – without the
control for other paths – are therefore not sufficient. By estimating the relationships between
generalized trust at T1 and European identity at T2 (path A) and between political trust at T1
and European identity at T2 (path D) in the same model as the relationships between
European identity at T1 and generalized trust at T2 (path B) and between European identity at
T1 and political trust at T2 (path C), these parameters can be compared with each other.
Theoretically, we expect that identification with the EU can be built on trust in political
institutions and on trust in other people. As the EU is mainly built by the political elite in the
wake of World War II, we also expect that this relationship will be strongest between political
trust and European identity. The results from our cross-lagged structural regression model
show that this relation indeed not even significantly exists between generalized trust and
European identity. For the relationship between political trust at T1 and European identity at
T2 we find a positive significant result (path D: b=0.029; p<0.010). However, we also find a
significant relationship between European identity at T1 and political trust at T2 (path C:
b=0.164; p<0.010). The introduction of a time lag and path C therefore indicates that the
correlation found in the comparative analysis not only shows that people with more political
trust tend to have a stronger European identity (path D), but it also indicates that European
identity would induce political trust (path C). This finding challenges our expectation that it is
mainly political trust that leads to the strengthening of European identity, instead of that the
strengthening of European identity increases trust in political institutions.
To establish whether path C is stronger than path D, we estimate a model where we impose
the constrain that the relationship between path C is equal to path D. If this constrained model
fits the data less well than the model without constrains, we know that the parameters are not
equal. In that case, this indicates that either the path from political trust to European identity
or the path from European identity to political trust is stronger. If the constrained model does
20
not fit the data less well than the model without constrains, this shows that the reciprocal
relationship between political trust and European identity does not have a dominant direction.
We use a difference test based on the χ² of the unconstrained and the constrained model
because the factor measuring European identity affects ordinal variables (Muthén & Muthén,
2012). This test shows that the constrained model fits the data significantly worse (χ²=6.691;
df=1 ; p=0.010) than the unconstrained model, so we can conclude that the path that indicates
that respondents with a stronger European identity at T1 will develop more political trust at
T2 is stronger than that respondents that trust political institutions more will develop a
stronger European identity.
Discussion
From these two analyses we can conclude that European identity rather reflects identification
with political institutions than with a citizenry, but that the relationship is stronger from
European identity to political trust than the other way around. In addition to these main
results, we also found that generalized trust in significantly related to European identity, but
that this relationship is reduced or even absent when political trust is included in the equation.
This means that the first hypothesis is confirmed by the data. The stronger relationship of
European identity with political trust confirms our expectation that the history and the nature
of the EU as a relatively young and abstract community is reflected in the European
community people identify with. People that identify more as European, relate more to the
political institutions that engaged their national communities in the European community.
This supports the idea of the EU being built by a political elite instead of its emergence from
the people. The weakness (and even absence in the structural regression model) of the
relationship between generalized trust and European identity rejects the second hypothesis
and goes against Deutsch’s statement (1966) that the sense of community in the EU consists –
amongst others – of both interpersonal trust and political identification. However, it is hard to
state that people that identify as European do not relate to the EU as a community of citizens
at all. The results of the additional test rather suggest that the trust people have in the
generalized other is largely connected to the extent to which they trust the political institutions
as the reference and guardians for shared norms and values. The incorporation of this test in
our study meets the concern raised by Harteveld et al. (2013) that it is unclear whether
political trust is based on interpersonal trust. Our tests gave more insight into this relationship,
21
but further research that has its main focus on this issue is needed to get a really clear view on
how these two types of trust interact. For the test of the third hypothesis concerning the
reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and European identity, we did not even find
significant paths. The fourth hypothesis is rejected by the finding that the relationship is
stronger from European identity to political trust. This suggests that the feedback-loop that
could come about in a later stadium of community building already starts to materialize
among adolescents.
As noted in the first part of this paper, research into the relationship between trust and
European identity is relatively scarce. However, the highly significant relationship between
political trust and European identity highlights the importance of the question what this means
and how this relationship works. The current research explored part of this relationship in
both a geographically comparative design and with a panel design in which the same group of
respondents was surveyed at two points in time. This study focused at a specific segment of
the population: adolescents. They are an interesting group for this kind of research tapping
into the development of a social identity, because this mainly develops and then consolidates
during adolescence. However, we do not believe that all is said about this topic yet, so more
research should definitely address this relationship in the future, both theoretically and
empirically.
22
Figure 1. Cross-lagged structural regression model
Source: PCSS 2012-2013.
Note: N= 2,420. χ²=489.720, df= 69, p=0.000. CFI= 0.950. RMSEA= 0.050. (ns) not significant; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Unstandardized estimates
are presented with standard errors between parentheses. For the control variables only significant relationships are presented. As no significant relationship
was found with socio-economic status (books at home) and with citizenship status (being born outside Belgium), these variables are not presented in the
figure.
0.6
24 (
0.6
29)*
**
0.404 (0.020)***
0.236 (0.023)***
0.035 (0.028) (ns)
0.519 (0.022)***
0.693 (0.025)***
0.372 (0.029)***
0.051 (0.031) (ns)
Political trust
T1
Generalized trust
T1
Generalized trust
T2
European
identity T1
Political trust
T2
European
identity T2
0.3
45 (
0.0
60)*
**
Gender (1=
female)
Political
interest
23
References:
Agirdag, O., Huyst, P., & Van Houtte, M. (2012). Determinants of the Formation of a
European Identity among Children: Individual- and School-Level Influences. JCMS:
Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(2), 198–213. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2011.02205.x
Anderson, C. J. (1998). When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and
Support for European Integration. Comparative Political Studies, 31(5), 569–601.
doi:10.1177/0010414098031005002
Anderson, S. E., & Williams, L. J. (1992). Assumptions About Unmeasured Variables With
Studies of Reciprocal Relationships: The Case of Employee Attitudes. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 77(5), 638–650.
Arnold, C., Sapir, E. V., & Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European
Union: A cross-country examination. European Integration online Papers, 16(2).
doi:10.1695/2012008
Berg, L., & Hjerm, M. (2010). National Identity and Political Trust. Perspectives on
European Politics and Society, 11(4), 390–407. doi:10.1080/15705854.2010.524403
Brewer, M. B. (2001). The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications Political Psychology.
Political Psychology, 22(1), 115–125.
Bruter, M. (2003). Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols
on Civic and Cultural European Identity. Comparative Political Studies, 36(10), 1148–
1179. doi:10.1177/0010414003257609
Bruter, M. (2008). Identity in the European Union – Problems of Measurement , Modelling &
Paradoxical Patterns of Influence. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 4(4),
273–285.
Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2004). More than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New
Europe. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse, & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities:
Becoming European in the EU (pp. 161–185). Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Delhey, J. (2007). Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive ? An Analysis
of Trust between EU Nationalities. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(2), 253–279.
Deutsch, K. W. (1966). Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the
Foundations of Nationality. (T. Press, Ed.). Cambridge: Massa.
Duchesne, S., & Frognier, A.-P. (2008). National and European Identifications: A Dual
Relationship. Comparative European Politics, 6(2), 143–168.
European Commission (2012) Eurobarometer 72.4 (2009) TNS OPINION & SOCIAL,
Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4994 Data file Version
3.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.11141
24
Faas, D. (2007). Youth, Europe and the Nation: The Political Knowledge, Interests and
Identities of the New Generation of European Youth. Journal of Youth Studies, 10(2),
161–181. Retrieved from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13676260601120161
Flanagan, C. A. (2012). Teenage Citizens: Political Theories of the Young. Harvard: Harvard
University Press.
Fligstein, N. (2008). Euroclash: The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). European Integration, Nationalism and
European Identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(1), 106–122.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02230.x
Harteveld, E., Meer, T. van der M., & Vries, C. E. D. V. (2013). In Europe we trust?
Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union. European Union Politics, (1), 24.
doi:10.1177/1465116513491018
Herrmann, R., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the
EU. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse, & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities:
Becoming European in the EU (pp. 1–22). Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Hooghe, M. (2011). Why There is Basically Only One Form of Political Trust. The British
Journal of Politics & International Relations, 13(2), 269–275. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
856X.2010.00447.x
Hooghe, M., Quintelier, E., Verhaegen, S., Boonen, J., & Meeusen, C. (2012). Parent-Child
Socialization Study (2012) Technical Report. Leuven.
Hooghe, M., Reeskens, T., Stolle, D., & Trappers, A. (2008). Ethnic Diversity and
Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study. Comparative Political
Studies, 42(2), 198–223. doi:10.1177/0010414008325286
Howe, P. (2010). Citizens Adrift. The Democratic Disengagement of Young Canadians.
Vancouver: UBC Press.
Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. Comparative Politics,
3(1), 45–70.
Kaina, V. (2004). European identity, legitimacy, and trust: conceptual considerations and
perspectives on empirical research.
Kerr, D., Sturman, L., Schulz, W., & Burge, B. (2009). ICCS 2009 European Report ICCS
2009 European Report - Civic knowledge, attitudes, and engagement among lower-
secondary students in 24 European countries. Design.
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and Practice of Strucutral Equation Modeling. New York:
The Guilford Press.
25
Klingemann, H.-D., & Weldon, S. (2013). A crisis of integration? The development of
transnational dyadic trust in the European Union, 1954-2004. European Journal of
Political Research, 52(4), 457–482.
Loveless, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2011). Public perceptions of the EU as a system of
governance. Living Reviews in European Governance, 6(2), 1–37.
Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2005). Political versus instrumental Euro-scepticism: mapping
scepticism in European countries and regions. European Union Politics, 6(2), 223–242.
Munoz, J., Torcal, M., & Bonet, E. (2011). Institutional trust and multilevel government in the
European Union: Congruence or compensation? European Union Politics, 12(4), 551–
574. doi:10.1177/1465116511419250
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2012). Mplus User’s Guide. Los Angeles.
Norris, P. (2011). Democratic Deficit. Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Risse, T. (2010). A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rosenberg, M. (1956). Misantropy and Political Ideology. American Sociological Review,
21(6), 690–695.
Scheuer, A., & Schmitt, H. (2009). Dynamics in European Political Identity. Journal of
European Integration, 31(5), 551–568. doi:10.1080/07036330903145856
Sen, A. (2006). Identity and violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Identity and violence :The
Illusion of Destiny (pp. 149–197). New York: Norton.
Shore, C. (2000). Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London:
Routledge.
Sigalas, E. (2010). Cross-border mobility and European identity: The effectiveness of
intergroup contact during the ERASMUS year abroad. European Union Politics, 11(2),
241–265. doi:10.1177/1465116510363656
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Wallace, C., Datler, G., & Spannring, R. (2005). Young People and European Citizenship.
Reihe Soziologie.
Worldbank, (2013). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm#sources.
26
Appendix
Appendix 1. Factor loadings principal component analysis on interest in political and social
issues Interest in political and social issues
Interest in political issues in the community 0.777
Interest in political issues in the country 0.864
Interest in social issues in the country 0.800
Interest in politics in other countries 0.786
Interest in international politics 0.819
Eigenvalue 3.278
Explained variance 66%
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.868
N 63,201
Source: ICCS 2009.
Notes
i The research was carried out in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, UK, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. It is important to remark that the national
educational authorities were responsible for financing this research. More precisely this meant
for Belgium that only the Dutch language community participated. The French speaking
community did not allocate financial resources to participate. In the UK only England
participated, not Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Netherlands did originally take
part in the study, but the Dutch research team failed to meet the required response rate and
therefore the Dutch data are not included in the dataset and the current analysis. The ICCS
was also implemented in various countries outside Europe, but self-evidently these
questionnaires did not include questions about European citizenship.