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Technology in Military Strategy A Realistic Assessment

Ralph Sanders

ABSTRACT. Today the Military Refotm Movement strongly criticizes the United States military for being mesmerized by technology to the detniment of other- including human -factors. Only in this century have writers given great attention to war technologies. In contrast to strategic thinkers like Sun- Tsv, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Molthe, and Maban, post- World War I theorists like Fuller, Liddell Hart, Doubet, and Mitchell made tecb- nology a key to their strategic concepts. Nuclear war theorists like Brodie, Kahn, and Woblstetter made technology a centrality, wbiie limited war tbeotirts like Osgood and Ktisinger gave it considerable, but less, stress. The reformers place more weight on the art of using militav forces than on weapons, emphasizing mobility and historica/ lessons, ratber than technology. Nuclear war theories rely too heavily on technological dimensions to expect a shift. Somewhat more attention cou/dpro$tably be paid to nontecbnologicai aspects of conventional war, but any violent pendulum swing should be avoided.

Nowhere does the interaction between social forces and technology have greater relevance for humankind than in defense matters. Whatever one thinks about the moral or practical utility of war, because of its abiding or threatened use around the world, we should pay close attention to developments in the relationship between technology and the concepts of war. Therefore, we should examine carefully the significance of a growing number of critics who are challenging the importance that the US armed forces ascribe to the use of technology in war.

Some commentators cautiously warn against relying too heavily on hardware, ’

but strident critics, ,sometimes belonging to the self-proclaimed Military Reform Movement, loudly lambast what they consider to be a dangerous tendency by US defense leaders to overemphasize the benefits of technology. Members of this movement are systems analysts, lawyers, journalists, scholars, congressmen and their aides, and retired military officers.’ Activists seek to alter US military strategy, planning, tactics, weapons acquisition, and the very types of forces that the United States fashions and deploys. Reformers have established an effective network for furthering their views among important decision-makers in Washington. They have proved especially adept at convincing influential congressmen and reporters

Ralph Sanders ri present/y J. Car/ton Ward Jr., Dirtingutihed Professor at #be National Defense University, Indushia/ College of the Armed Fotzes. He has a/so serued at the White House andon the s@of the Secretary of Defense. Hti mny pubhations include International Dynamics of Technology, Science and Technology, and The Politics of Defense Analysis.

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140 Rd’h Sanders

that, if the military establishment does not accept their suggestions, this country might very well undermine deterrence or lose a future war.

If the Department of Defense accepts their proposals, over time this nation would field armed forces that would look quite different from those existing today. Members of the Military Reform Movement do not agree on all points. Yet, in ag- gregate, they tend to convey an overall image of US military forces allowing technology to dominate strategic thinking and choosing the wrong war technologies.

This discussion does not address the latter criticism, namely that US military forces need smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained weapons. Nor does it examine the thorny question of quality versus quantity of weapons that so often accompanies debates in which reformers participate. On the following pages appears a brief summary of this issue. Rather, this analysis focuses on the arguments of some reformers that defense decision-makers should de-emphasize the role of technologies in their military strategies and operational concepts in favor of other - including human - elements. In short, it is concerned with the weight given technology in general and not the specific technologies that military forces choose. The reformers’ fierce onslaught, designed to shift the kind of strategic thinking commonplace since the end of World War II, is viewed chiefly in terms of technology in its generic sense. The questions that reformers have raised in this context deserve careful thought by students and practitioners of the military art.

Nuclear Versus Conventional War

Any sensible answer to the question of technological emphasis must first distinguish between its applicability to general nuclear war in contrast to conventional war. In regard to general nuclear war strategies, we must take into account two facts. First, although concentrating on technology, by no means did even nuclear war strategic thinkers abandon other factors. Above all, they produced a fascinating combination of technology and psychology.

Over the years the giants of military strategic thinking have treated technology with increasing emphasis. 3 Figure 1 summarizes trends of warfare theorists in terms of general concepts as well as of attitudes toward technology.

ClassicaL Theorists

One might suppose that commentators on military strategy have always given explicit thought to the role of technology in war, but such is not the case. Although not ignoring technology, strategic thinkers like Sun-Tsu, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, and Mahan gave it scant attention. They took technology for granted, often assuming its importance, but failing to address this aspect of war either extensively or systematically. They generally made passing references to existing armaments and almost none to the task of designing, develop- ing and acquiring military hardware. These early strategic thinkers failed to antici- pate the growing importance of war technologies.

The often-quoted Sun-Tsu enumerated five fundamental factors about war which the state should study thoroughly: moral influence, weather, terrain, com-

SCHOOL STRATEGIC THINKERS GENERAL CONCEPTS ATTITUDE TOWARD TECHNOLOGY

Classical Theorists

Sun Tsu: Machiavelli; Clausewitz; Jomini; Moltke: Mahan

War Fighting Purposes and Nature of War: Need and Use Military Forces; Command: Morale; Leaderahip

Took Technology for Granted: Little Explicit Articulation

Early Fuller: Liddell Hart: War Fighting Focus on Importance of Internal Technology Douhet; Mitchell Primacy of Mobility and Combustion Engine Vehicles Advocates Manuever: High Attrttlon:

Avoid Defensive Stalemate

Nuclear War Theorists

Kahn: Brodle; Wohlstetter: Schelling. Kaufman; DOD Posture Statements

Deterrence: Assured Destruction; Selected Nuclear Options; Balance of Nuclear Forces: Psychological Factors

Vary Heavy Focus on War Technologies: Capabilities Lmutationa of Technologies; Evolving Technological Comparisons

Limlted War Theorists

Osgood; Kissinger, Collins: Digby; DO0 Posture Statements NATO MC1413

Deterrence and War Fighting Flexible Response: Balance of Conventional Forces; Tactical Nuclear Versus Conventional War

Less Intense. But Still Substanbal Focus on Technology: Technological Superiority to Compensate for Ouantitative lnferlority

Reformers Boyd: Luttwak: Canby. Lind

War Fighting Agility, Mobility and Maneuver I” the Use of Mihtary Forces: Stress Historical Lessons

More Stress on Use of Military Forces than Weapons on the Battlefield; Criticism of Large Technologies Offeron! Maximum Attrition

FIGURE 1.

mand, and doctrine.4 Notice that he made no mention of technology and weapons. To him, these aspects of war did not merit deliberate or intense thought.

In book Two of The Art of War Machiavelli discusses arms and armor for about three pages, but devotes the remainder of his work to the political aspects of war, military organization, and tactics. ’ He was more interested in the spirit of combat than in its technical character. He has been criticized for failing to grasp the significance of the newly emerging artillery.6 Frederick the Great also concentrated on military organization and tactics. Although he saw the value of artillery, he did not explore its importance in depth, considering it inferior to infantry or cavalry. In his classic work On IV&, Clausewitz talked at length about the nature and theory of war, about strategy and how to engage an enemy, about the importance of the battle, about uncertainties in military operations, about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the defense and offense, and about planning for war. He discusses marches, lines of communication, operating against the flanks, and boldness in combat. He makes little mention of the wherewithal needed to fight. In his discussion of crossing rivers, for instance, he never once identified the means to carry out his prescriptions.’

Jomini touched on the technology of war by briefly examining the role of logistics, and he cast doubt on the value of the balloon for reconnaissance purposes. He reserved, however, most of his commentary for supporting his conclusion that the art of war consists of choosing effective lines of operations in order to hurl maximum forces against an enemy at a decisive point .’ During the Civil War in America a number of technologies were pressed into military service, including railroads, ironclads, telegraph, and mass/standardized production, but American military writers generally did not spin strategies around them. Perhaps more than others Moltke saw the promise of new technologies, recognizing the potential of railways

for improving Germany’s interior lines of communication and the influence of accurate, rapid-fire small arms on the battlefield. Moltke, however, did not dwell on the types and uses of war technologies.g

Here and there Mahan noted differences and similarities between sail and steam, but most of his inferences are from major naval battles. In citing the conditions that affect seapower, Mahan included geographical position, physical conforma- tion, extent of territory, size of population, character of the people, and the nature of the government, but he never mentioned technological competence. ‘O

One should not conclude that during this period no strategic thinkers looked at the interaction of technology and military strategy. Vauban, the famed influential military engineer of Louis XIV, successfully developed, used, and wrote about siegecraft and the defense of the fortress. ” Aware of the rise of mass armies and their devastating firepower in the latter decades of the 19th century, Schlieffen was acutely interested in the progress of modern technology. He surfaced innovative ideas about railways and army railway engineers, mobile heavy artillery, and an air corps. l2 Yet most strategic thinkers largely ignored military technology. An intrigu- ing question is “why?“.

Only approximate explanations for this neglect seem to be available. First, throughout most of history, technologies of war advanced rather slowly and hence did not upset the continuity of ideas about ways of fighting. Second, neither armies nor navies undertook large-scale research and development. Here and there one could find arsenals or laboratories, but few concentrated, systematized efforts. Third, strategists generally considered logistics and weapons development as less important than strategy, tactics, organizations, and operations. In large part, they exhibited a medieval, aristocratic attitude: technology represented “dirty work’ done by lower classes and hence not worthy of mention. Even today armed forces sometimes consider weapons acquisition as something less critical, demanding, and prestigious than fashioning strategy or leading troops in combat. Fourth, armed forces experienced “cultural lag.” Armies esteemed the cavalry long after military technologies made horses obsolete. Only with the dramatic technological advances of the latter half of the 19th century did military strategists begin to come to grips with the new situation, and then only slowly.

Earfy Apostles of Technology

In the present century writers on military affairs have increasingly come to consider the relationship of technology to strategy. No longer do weapons, mechanized transport, and communications receive nominal notice. In World War I the major belligerents organized their research and development establishments with varying degrees of success to aid in the war effort. In the 1920~ four major strategy-makers heralded the shift toward greater consideration of technological factors- Major General J.F.C. Fuller, Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, Guilio Douhet, and William “Billy” Mitchell. All four looked to the internal combustion engine to revolutionize warfare. General Fuller fervently and skillfully preached the value of mechanized ground warfare in the face of highly resistant fellow British army officers and government leaders. l3

Technology in Military Stmtegy 143

Fuller later converted Liddell Hart, a leading British writer, to his crusade. Lid- dell Hart wrote that the static warfare of World War I was an abomination. He stressed that the key to military operations lay in mobility, arguing that the armies of his day had become, contrary to Napoleon’s maxim, mass without velocity. I4 Both Fuller and Liddell Hart looked to the cross-country vehicle, especially to the tank, to become the new way of warfare. By exploiting surprise and demoraliza- tion, these technologies would achieve strategic paralysis of the enemy command. Neither writer consciously embraced technology for its own sake. Yet, in their efforts to convince armies to avoid the bloody stalemate of World War I trench warfare, in effect they preached a solution with heavy technological overtones.‘”

What Fuller and Liddell Hart did for ground warfare, Douhet and Mitchell did

for air warfare. I6 They provided both a vision and a strategic concept. Douhet ex- plained the technological concept of strategy, remarking that, “The form of warfare - and it is the form which is of chief interest to military men - depends upon the technical means available.” ” He postulated that aircraft would prove an invin- cible offensive military technology against which no defense was possible. Aircraft could shatter morale through bombarding population centers. He prophetically saw that military leaders someday would give the destruction of an enemy’s industrial might a very high priority.

While Douhet proved a dispassionate advocate, Mitchell, a zealot, threw both his intellect and his emotions into the fray. His crusade became so controversial that he not only alienated senior admirals and generals, but finally caused Presi- dent Calvin Coolidge to call him a disturbing liar. ” He rebelled against what he considered ultraconservative, benighted Army leadership, a struggle that led to his famous court martial. Mitchell added his own ideas of tactical uses to Douhet’s concepts of attacks against populations. I9 During tests off the Virginia coast in July of 192 1, his airplanes sank the ex-German battleship Os.t~&&~d, proving that gravity- propelled bombs could send an armored vessel to the bottom. Yet, in World War II, the airplane did not enjoy invincibility. Aerial bombardment never cracked British or German morale and, despite fierce strategic attacks, German production rose in the latter stages of the war. Nonetheless, the airplane did emerge as a key war technology just as Douhet and Mitchell had forecast.

It took the Germans to design an operational strategy that effectively linked internal combustion engine technologies by means of radio. Basing their conclusions on an independent analysis of World War I, Heinz Guderian and other German military thinkers created highly mobile formations that relied heavily, but not exclusively, on a combination of tanks and airplanes. The Luftwaffe supported swiftly moving ground thrusts with the objective of creating terror and shattering the enemy’s will. As is well known, this “blitzkrieg” or “lightning war” strategy achieved success and fame. Although the Germans never settled on a preferred manner of applying mechanized warfare, their military leadership, including Hitler, enthusi- astically supported the mixture of air and tank operations. *O All worked well until Hitler’s armies stalled in Russia.

Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, Mitchell, and Guderian focused their thoughts on the interaction of technology with warfare, chiefly in “war-fighting” terms. Their interest lay in espousing new ways of conducting military operations rather than in

144 Ra&h Sanders

preventing the outbreak of hostilities. The shift to deterrence came about with the strategists who will be discussed next.

Genera/ Nuclear War Theo&s

In August of 1945 American aircraft dropped atomic bombs on Japan, devastating four square miles and killing 80,000 people in Hiroshima and destroying 40 per cent of the buildings and 39,000 people in Nagasaki. At that moment a new chap- ter in strategic thinking began. A new breed of strategic theorists sought to fashion concepts around nuclear weapons. In the 1950s and 1960s thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter created what has been called the “golden age” of deterrence thinking.”

These writers contended with facts like the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear warheads and the severe time constraints on crisis decision-making. They produced a raft of concepts and a new vocabulary. Among other words, deterrence, escaiation, &nage limitation, assured destruction, countervalue attacks (against cities), and counte@rce attacks (against military targets) became standard references. New analytical approaches, such as systems analysis and game theory, helped sort out the novel conditions and options ushered in by the nuclear age.

These contributors to strategic thought vastly increased its technological content. At the core of their ideas were three key technological factors- the throweight of nuclear weapons, yield-to-weight ratios, and circular error of probability (how close to a target a nuclear warhead can theoretically hit). Their writings were filled with references to war technologies like strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, nuclear sub- marines, missile silos, and command, control and communications systems. Mind- ful of the enormous devastation that nuclear war would inllict, they adopted deter-

rence as the centerpiece of their strategic thinking. Defined as the capacity of modern weapons to restrain states from initiating warfare, in its very essence, deterrence has a technological coloration. Its strategic companion piece, assured destruction (i.e., despite damage suffered in an initial attack, a nation retains the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the cities, industrial base, and population of the enemy), likewise rested on technological foundations. Assured destruction made sense only if enough US nuclear strategic forces could survive a first strike and be able to retaliate.

In 1946 Brodie laid down several propositions that rested on technological prem- ises. “The power of the present (atomic) bomb,” he asserted, “is such that any city in the world can be effectively destroyed by one to ten bombs.” 22 The pages of Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War were replete with technological givens.23 In com- paring alternatives associated with nuclear war, Kahn calculated the effects of weapons and their significance. He dwelled upon how many people and how much productive capacity would survive under various nuclear-attack scenarios. He measured what different types of radioactivity (i.e., cesium 137, strontium 90, and car- bon 14) would do to a population and to a nation’s recovery potential.

In his well-known 1959 Foreign A&in article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Wohlstetter noted that, after Sputnik, the United States endeavored to match or overmatch Soviet technology, especially the Soviets’ offensive technology. 24 He was concerned with the yield and accuracy of enemy missiles. Explaining the advan-

Tecbno/ogy in Mditaty Strategy 14.5

tages and disadvantages of various strategic systems, he cited a host of actual or potential war technologies that US decision-makers must consider, including the B-47, B-52, B-58, and B-70 strategic bombers; intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the Snark intercontinental air-breathing cruise missile; the Atlas, Titan, Polaris and Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles; and possible unmanned bombardment satellites.

Strategic thinkers like William Kaufmann, who argued against President Eisen- hower’s strategy of massive retaliation with its heavy reliance on nuclear technology, chiefly shifted their focus to other technologies, namely those associated with conventional arms. 25 They cautioned against an over-reliance on strategic nuclear weapons, especially for the defense of Europe. ”

Limited War Strategists

“A limited war,” observed Robert Osgood, “must be limited in both means and

ends.“” Technology limits war more in means than in ends. It afIects the resources that armed forces use. In part, wars are considered limited because their technologies prove less destructive within a given area and time than those of general nuclear war. Thus, to some extreme, limited war is characterized by its technology. It is not surprising that so much of the literature about the defense of Western Europe deals with the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in terms of the quality and quantity of forces and their weapons.”

The major types of limited war are identified by their technological essence. If armed forces use other than nuclear arms, such wars are called “conventional”; if they employ small fission or fusion warheads, they are labeled “tactical nuclear wars.“29 This technological distinction has become the starting point for modern strategic thinking. The single most discussed question associated with the defense of Western Europe has been if, when and under what conditions NATO forces might resort to nuclear arms. The open literature abounds in discussion concerning the utility and problems of small-yield warheads on delivery systems like Lance missiles, special artillery, tactical aircraft, and atomic demolition munitions.3o The case of the enhanced radiation weapon has triggered intense and widespread com- ment. Whether NATO should deploy theater nuclear weapons-such as Pershing

,and ground-launch cruise missiles, capable of hitting Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union - has become a hotly debated issue.” The need to negotiate arms control agreements concerning theater nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union (along with President Reagan’s “zero-options” proposal to forego deploying these weapons, if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20s) illustrates how technology has become so central to discussions about theater war.

The NATO Military Committee document, MC 1413, adopted in 1967, laid down a doctrine to meet aggression short of general nuclear attack at the conventional or nuclear level chosen by the aggressor and to engage in deliberate, con- trolled escalation.3Z This doctrine of flexible response, in effect, shifts the technological content of war strategies from an emphasis on vast nuclear opemtions against the homeland of the Soviet Union to restricted nuclear or conventional defense usually within the European theatre.

Until the relatively recent coming of computers and electronics and their con-

146 Ralph Sankrs

templated use in land, sea and air combat operations, technological factors have tended to command less attention in limited war strategies than in general nuclear war strategies. Thus, strategists who stress conventional forces as an important part of NATO’s overall deterrent strength generally concentrate on the balance of forces and weapons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the outbreak of hostilities. On the other hand, many military thinkers do talk in war-fighting terms. They do discuss geographic features affecting the defense of Western Europe (or any other place). With little territorial depth, NATO relies on “forward defense,” that is, meeting a Warsaw Pact attack at the border and establishing the Western alliance’s initial defense position as near the Iron Curtain as possible. Limited war strategists talk at length about old-fashioned nontechnological factors, such as the condition and morale of fighting forces, accurate and timely warning, use of available territory, protection of lines of communication, the impact of weather and terrain, the requirements for rapid redeployment (chiefly from the United States), control of the Atlantic sealanes, and offensive military operations. 33

For example, General James H. Polk, former NATO commander, questions conventional wisdom by arguing that the terrain of the North German Plain is not nearly as hospitable to attack as is generally assumed. 34 Within recent years NATO has placed more stress on using rear combat units as potential counterattack forces and increasing the flexibility of all NATO forces. 35 Michael Nacht makes the telling point that the Nixon administration shifted this country’s conventional war doctrine from a two-and-a-half to a one-and-a-half war without any significant change in weapons technology. 36

Despite such attention to geographic, doctrinal and human aspects, strategies of limited war continue to contain a heavy dose of technology. Even in war-fighting concepts, strategists are preoccupied with problems and opportunities associated with weapons systems like tanks, tactical aircraft, naval ships, missiles, and anti- tank arms.

A Question of Dominance

After World War II it appeared that writers on military strategy tended to convey the impression that weapons technology drove military strategy. According to this view, technology had become the centerpiece in military thought, especially concerning nuclear war. Put another way, military strategies had become nothing more than rationalizations of what war technologies allowed.

At first glance one gains an image of technological determinism in defense literature. The commander of the US Air Force Systems Command submitted that “Technical breakthroughs of this century have dictated a subsequent change in the strategy of weapons use. ‘r37 Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that “A strategic doctrine that served well when the United States had only a few dozen nuclear weapons and the Soviets none would hardly serve as well unchanged in a world in which we have about 9,000 strategic warheads and they have about 7,000. “38 In his fiscal year 1980 military posture statement, General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about this country’s loss of strategic superiority, the vanishing US edge in tactical nuclear weapons, and this nation’s

Technology in Mihtaty Strategy 147

need to rely on technology as a force multiplier to offset Soviet conventional quan- titative superiority.39 A year later he spoke of geopolitical factors and about the balance of military forces and weapons4’ ‘1

No one seriously questions the need for devising military strategy concepts. All accept the idea of visualizing beforehand how to prepare for and wage wars. The heart of the problem addressed here is the relative weight that military strategists give to technology rather than to other elements of military power.

Although important exceptions exist, at the nuclear level post-World War II strategic thinkers focused on deterrence (i.e., preventing the outbreak of hostilities); in large part they seemed to stress technological dimensions more than those who paid more attention to “war fighting” (i.e., actually using military forces in combat). Writers on deterrence appeared very concerned about existing or future balances of forces and weapons. Conversely, strategists emphasizing “war fighting” tended to accent the full range of military factors, including the nontechnological elements relating to human and doctrinal aspects. They devoted more attention to such matters as the ways in which commanders deploy, move, support, and moti- vate forces on the battlefield.

The Critics

Increased emphasis on the technological dimensions of war has led some critics to argue that the technological content of military strategies has become too pervasive. Michael Howard, the noted British historian, warns us not to neglect the social dimensions of modern war,41 while Richard Head points out that a host of nontechnological factors help armed forces exploit technology.42

James Woolsey echoes these sentiments. He discusses the reformers who aim to shift military thinking from focusing on large technologies like tanks and aircraft to more traditional concepts of rapid and fluid maneuver, military cohesion, and shattering the mind of the enemy military commander. These reformers argue that agility of forces counts for more than grandiose technologies designed to achieve maximum attrition. 43 Although not ignoring technology, John Boyd, a former Air Force pilot, prefers to stress the art of conducting actual military operations. He argues for generating a rapidly changing environment requiring quick and clear observations and decisions, a fast tempo, speedy transient maneuvers, and a quick kill. He stresses the need to inhibit an adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment by clouding or distorting the adversary’s observation, orientation, and decisions. The aim here is to confuse, causing over- or underreaction to ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading signals. 44 Edward Luttwak not only champions the use of deception4’ but contends that “in lieu of an operational art of war, we have at- tempted to find high-technology solutions for every problem of war.‘c46 Sun-Tsu, Clausewitz, and Jomini would feel at home with the ideas of these reformers.

Jeffrey Record sees a connection between flaws in thought and failings in the education of military professionals. He criticizes the US military education system for concentrating on war technology and the techniques of command, concluding that inattention to the history of warfare presents the greatest weakness4’ Record and his fellow critics offer a straightforward message: To lay a firm foundation for

148 Ralph Sanders

strategic thought, look to military history with its focus on how forces are used in combat rather than to systems analysis with its stress on the employment and management of war technologies.

The reformers allege that current limited-war strategies have a fixation on technology and rely too heavily on large and complex weapons to achieve maximum firepower at the expense of maneuver. In so doing, military thinking tends to neglect nontechnological factors such as doctrine, tactics, leadership, morale, organi: zation, and social factors. This nation’s allocation of defense resources also has received sharp criticism. Franklin C. Spinney charges that over many years the De- partment of Defense’s devotion to increasing technical complexity, as well as its preference for high technology, has caused the cost of weapons to skyrocket and has reduced combat readiness. Instead of assuring higher performance, advanced technology has lessened reliability and made weapons more difficult to maintain. More- over, limited budgets and high costs compel the armed forces to buy fewer and fewer weapons. 48 The performance of a superior weapon must surpass that of the enemy weapon by a very healthy margin to overcome the stark tactical disadvantages that come with numerical inferiority.

The reformers do not go as far as to argue that in today’s world technology has become irrelevant. Instead, they contend that military thinkers should give much less weight to war’s technologies at the expense of other factors. By looking at war through a technological prism, they assert, strategic thinkers breed faulty reasoning and cause potential errors.

A Need for Change?

Any sensible answer to the question of technological emphasis must first distinguish between its applicability to general nuclear war in contrast to conventional war. In regard to general nuclear-war strategies, we must take into account two facts. First, although concentrating on technology, by no means did even nuclear- war strategic thinkers abandon other factors. Above all, they produced a fascinating combination of technology and psychology. Kahn reminds us that deterrence itself is a psychological phenomenon.49

More than any other contributor, Thomas Schelling emphasized the psychological dimensions of nuclear war. In discussing deterrence he suggested that “strategic behavior is concerned with influencing another’s choice by working on his ex- pectations of how one’s behavior is related to his.” 5o &helling talked in terms of behavior, messages, and perceptions. National leaders must be concerned with the probable response of an enemy to their military option A, B or C. For example, what would the United States do if a Soviet first-strike took out its land-based ICBM force while the Soviets retained a considerable nuclear residual capability? There is little doubt that the psychological element will remain strong in nuclear- war strategies.

Recently, US general nuclear-war strategies have become more flexible. During the Carter administration the United States adopted a “countervailing strategy” designed to respond at a level appropriate to the type and scale of a Soviet attack.5’ This countervailing strategy goes beyond deterrence and assured destruction. It

Technology in Military Strategy 149

stresses the advantages of a counterforce capability (i.e., the ability to destroy nuclear weapons housed in hard, concrete silos) used in discriminating ways. Increased and selected options, targeting flexibility, and improvements in the endurance and survival of nuclear forces takes on more significance. To the degree that the need for greater flexibility in nuclear war strategy gains currency, strategists tend to shift their attention from technologies themselves to how to use them.

Second, general nuclear-war strategies cannot escape a heavy technological coloration. After all, nuclear war by its very nature arises out of a technological reality. Fashioning nuclear-war strategies without focusing on the very weaponry that gives them meaning is like training attorneys without exposing them to the law of con- tracts. Moreover, it can be anticipated that deterrence will remain the cornerstone of this nation’s nuclear-war strategies. Thus, the balance of nuclear forces between the superpowers probably will continue as the greatest influence on the decision whether to go to war.

In conventional war strategies, however, the nation’s concepts could benefit from a measured increase in the attention that military thinkers give to nontechnological factors. Contrary to the charges of the reformers, US military thinking on conventional conflicts does not focus exclusively on technology. For example, the Military Posture Statement of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1982 dwelled extensively on geopolitical aspects of war. The ever present debate over the validity of “forward defense” versus “defense in depth” within Western Europe exhibits old- fashioned, nontechnological arguments. In fact, in its recently developed AirLand Battle Concept, the US Army paid great attention to factors of maneuverability, deception and speed, as well as to massive firepower. The AirLand Battle concept deals at length with the use of highly mobile small units capable of disrupting an enemy’s command decisions and morale. It notes the need for soldiers able to withstand hardships for long periods of time. ‘* Thus, it relates to other than technological conditions. This concept was not prompted by the criticisms of the reformers, but those who participated in the effort very likely knew about their ideas. For the purposes of this discussion, the important point is that the AirLand Battle concept represents an attempt to come to grips with advancing technology and not a flight from technology.

Nonetheless, limited-war strategies could profit from even more thought about the character of military operations, decisive battles or graduated attrition, mass versus velocity, the role of leadership and morale, the ability to withstand hard- ship, and the relationship between logistic support and combat operations.

Indeed, the US military already is engaged in a “firepower versus maneuver” doctrinal debate, the outcome of which could have great impact on war technologies. 53 It could gain from increased attention to the merits of frontal versus Banking attacks, concentration and dispersal, cover and deception, all traditional subjects of classical military doctrine. US strategic thinkers must explore more deeply the conduct of combined and joint operations especially for theater war. Of equal importance, NATO’s limited-war suategies should give more thought to how nations truly can conduct coalition warfare. Here all that is intended is to acknowledge the need for such a shift.

A violent pendulum swing, leading to a disregard for technological dimensions

150 Ralph Sanders

would, however, thwart the fashioning of sensible military strategies. Such a dramatic oscillation will not take place, it is hoped. As noted, general nuclear-war strategic thinkers cannot escape a technological focus. Neither can those who fashion conventional-war strategies abandon technological concerns. To conduct even the reformers’ preferred war of maneuver requires not less technology, but different kinds. Today precision-guided munitions, including those little affected by weather and dust, could have a profound influence on NATO’s strategic concepts. s4 Ex- ploiting new technologies in warfare management, according to some authorities, could create in Western Europe a genuine electronic theater battlefield.s5

The impact of the technologies of the computer, automatic data processing, and command, control, and communications on the concepts and conduct of nuclear or tactical warfare has been great. All military forces today understand the value of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft. Very high-speed inte- grated circuits give promise of producing electronic components that will make possible a new generation of advanced weapons. In addition, nations are equipping their armed forces with electronic warfare technologies that help identify targets and enable defenders to act promptly on that information before the enemy weapon comes into lethal range. These technologies seek to blind, bafHe and de- ceive an enemy by emitting a barrage of “noise” over radio waves. This output blankets an adversary’s radar screens, jamming his weapons. The US Army is devel- oping artillery shells designed to black out an enemy’s communications with a blast of electronic noise. EE- 111 jamming aircraft are being designed to blind a hostile radar while a jamming device aboard a ship could “move” that vessel many miles from the actual location as seen on the foe’s radar.

Time and again experience on the modern battlefield validates the importance of technology, and especially electronic technologies. In 1982, in military operations against the Argentines by the British in the Falkland Islands and against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Syrians by the Israelis in Lebanon, advanced technologies proved essential for victory. These technologies did not dras- tically revolutionize conventional warfare. In both cases, highly trained, motivated, determined, and well-led military forces, exploiting traditional military virtues including exceptionally well-thought-through planning, helped ensure victory. Nonetheless, technology proved critically important. The British and the Israelis expertly used ships, tanks, aircraft and artillery, some of them of older design (such as amphibious landing craft), to achieve their military effects. Electronic warfare became indispensable for conducting combat operations. The British inability to counter newer Argentine radar and their lack of airborne early warning contributed to Britain’s losses at sea.56 Military specialists credited the Israeli use of sophisti- cated electronic technologies, including drones, of high performance F- 16 and F- 15 fighter aircraft, and of the latest version of air-to-air Sidewinder missiles for Israeli success in wiping out Syrian antiaircraft missile batteries and clearing the skies of aircraft. ” Electronics will inevitably play a key role in future battles.

Yet, in the continuing debate some protagonists might very well succumb to the temptation to downplay excessively technological factors. If so, they would be making a serious mistake. In strategic thinking today, neglecting technological realities could easily lead to military defeat if war should break out.

Tecbno/ogy in Mditaty Sttutegy 151

Summary

The importance that strategic thinkers have given technology in war since the end of World War II is now under sharp attack by the reformers. To gain insight into the meaning of this development, one should fitst apply some historical perspec- tive. Throughout most of history military strategists have given short shrift to technology as a key element of warfare. Conversely, during the 20th century they have accorded technology an important and sometimes a dominant position in their scheme of things. Since the end of World War II technology has become central to concepts of deterrence and nuclear-war strategies. In limited-war strategies the focus on technological dimensions has proven less pervasive. Critics like the reformers allege that a preoccupation with things technological leads to a faulty view of war and, indeed, results in inappropriate defense resource allocation.

The reformers are right in contending that the importance of technology in military strategy has grown remarkably. Certainly the technological dimensions of war now receive greater attention than ever before. However, these critics exaggerate the degree to which strategic thinkers, including those in the US military establishment, consider technology as the determinant of the outcome of armed hostilities. Nuclear war theorists give great weight to psychological factors, while those concerned with concepts of conventional war still take into account many old-fashioned, nontechnological matters.

In the foreseeable future, general nuclear-war strategies most likely will experience, at most, only a modest shift away from the level of emphasis now accorded technology. Limited-war strategies, on the other hand, could stand additional emphasis on nontechnological factors. Yet, in either case, given the nature of today’s technological world, strategic thinkers must continue to speculate about military hardware and its momentous consequences for the art of war.

Notes

1. The views of two “restrained” critics can be found in Michael Howard, ‘The Forgotten Dimension of Stmt-

cgy,” Foreign A#&, vol. 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979). pp. 975-986, and Colonel Richard G. Head, “Technol-

ogy and the Military Balance,” Foreign Afftin, vol. 56, no. 3 (April 1978) pp. 544-563.

2. The reformers include former military officers like Colonel John Boyd of the US Air Force; defense analysts

like Pierre Sprey, Charles Spinncy and Thomas Christie; present and former Congressional staff members like

William Lind and Jeffrey Record; academicians like Edward Luttwak; and populizers like James Fallows, who

wrote the widely read book, NationrJ Defense (New York: Random House, 1981). For a critical view of the

Military Reform Movement see Walter Kross, “Military Reform: Past and Present,” Air Uniuersity Review, vol. 32, no. 5 (July-August, 1981). pp. 101-108.

3. For an excellent survey of modern strategic thinkers, see Edward Mead Earlc, ed., M&erJ ofModem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Earl& book discusses more than these theorists contributing to

military thought in the modern period, but the author has selected these as the most influential.

4. Sun-Tsu, On the Art of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). pp. 64-65. 5. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of Wm (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965).

6. Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War” in Earle. Ma&err of Modem Strategy, p. 14. 7. Karl von Clause&z, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince-

ton University Press, 1976). pp. 532-534.

8. Baron de Jomini, The Art of Wm(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971) originally published by J.B.

Lippincott of Philadelphia, 1862). 9. Hajo Holbron, “Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School” in Earlc, Muters of Modem Strategy,

pp. 184-186.

152 Ra/pb San&n

10. Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upofi Hirtoty (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957). p. 25. 11. Henry Gucrlac, “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” in Earlc, MaAcrs of Moabn Stmtegy, pp. 30-34. 12. Holbron in Earlc, Me&ers of Modern Strategy, pp. 186189. 13. Irving hi. Gibson, “Maginot and Liddell Hatt: The Doctrine of Dcfcnsc” in Earlc, llirrArr of Mob Strat-

egy, pp. 374-387, and J.F.C. Fuller. Tan&t in the Great War (London: John Murray, 1920). 14. See Captain B.H. Liddcll Hart, The Remahg of Modem Armies (London: John Murray, 1927) and John

Whcldon, Meehine Age Armies (London: Abclard-Schuman. 1968) pp. 33-40. 15. Edwatd N. Luttwak, “The Operational Lcvcl of War,“Inrnation~Secn~~, vol. 5. no. 3 (Winter 1980181).

p. 62. 16. Fuller did see utility in employing aircraft along with tank, artillery, and infantry formations, but did not

develop strategies of aerial warfarc as did Douhct and Mitchell (Whcldon. Meebine Age Armies, p. 37). 17. General Guilio Douhct, translated by Sheila Fischer, The Commandof the Air (Rome: Rcvista Aeronautica,

1958) p. 5. 18. Alfred F. Hurlcy. Sirl, M&he//: Crarder for Air Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975),

pp. 64-66. 19. Edward Warner, “Douhct. Mitchell, Scvcrsky: Theories in Air Warfare” in Earlc, Makerr of Modem Strategy,

pp. 485-501. 20. Whcldon, Mac&e Age Armies, pp. 60-81. In fact, Hitler proved a stronger advocate of air power than even

Hcrmann Gocring. 21. For examples of the works of these strategic thinkers xc Bernard Brodic. cd., The Absolute Weapon (New

York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946); Herman Kahn, On Tbermonvch Wur(Princcton: Princeton Univcr- sity Press, l%l); and Albert Wohlstcttcr, “The Delicate Balance of Terror.” Foreign Affah, vol. 37, no. 2 &unuuy 1959) pp. 211-234. See also William W. Kaufmann, M&ary PoiicyandNationrrlSecnrity (Princc- ton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence andDefensc: Towarda Theory of Natthd Sect&y (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

22. Brodic, Absolute Weapon, p. 24 and p. 34. 23. Kahn, On Tbermonuc/ear War, pp. 40-101. 24. Wohlstcttcr, “Delicate Balance of Terror.” pp. 2 1 l-234. 25. William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton: The Center for International Studies,

Princeton University, 1954). 26. Alain C. Enthovcn and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969

(New York: Harper&Row, 1971), pp. 122-123. 27. Robert E. Osgood, “The Post-War Strategy of Limited War: Before, During and After Vietnam” in Laurence

Martin, cd., Strategic Thought in the N&ear Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 28. See John M. Collins, “American and Soviet Armed Services, Strengths Compared 1970-1976,” CongressioMl

Record, August 5, 1977. SI4091; Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/ Warsaw Pact Military Bdance (Washington: Government Printing Office, December, 1977); and International Institute for Stra- tegic Studies, The Mditaty Bdance, 197%1980 (London: IISS. 1979) pp. 108-117; The Military Bdance, 1978-1979, pp. 108-118; and The M&zry Bdance, 1977-1978, pp. 102-110.

29. The issue of tactical nuclear weapons has spawned a large literature. For example. xc Henry A. Kissinger, N&ear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper 8r Row, 1957); Robert E. Gsgood, Limi>ed War: The Cbdhge to Ametin Stmtegy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Klaus Knorr and T. Read, Limited Strategic War (New York: Pracgcr, 1962); Morton H. Halpcrin, Limi2ed War in the N&ear Age (New York: Wiley, 1363); Herman Kahn, On Ere&tion (New York: Pracgcr, 1%5); Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Mi&aty Power in the N&ear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Alex Gliksman, “Three Keys for Europe’s Bombs,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1980), pp. 40-57; Stanley Sicnkicwicz. “Foreign Policy and Theater Nuclear Force Planning,” The Journd of Strategic StudieJ, (May 1979). pp. 17-33; and Alton Frye, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe: No Exit from Ambivalence,” Survitid, (Mayjune 1980). pp. 98-106.

30. John Marriot, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” The Army Qnarterij a~dDefense /our&, vol. 108. no. 2 (April 1978). pp. 142-148, and C.E. Nordcn, “The Debate on Thcatcr Nuclear Weapons and Limited Nuclear War -And the Future,” The Army Qurtedy andDefense Jon&, vol. 108, no. 4 (October 1978). pp. 391-403.

31. Kevin N. Lewis, “Intermediate-Range Nuclcat Weapons.” Scientrjic American, vol. 243, no. 6 (December 1980), pp. 63-73.

32. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO: Facts and Figvrcr (Brussels:, NATO Information Service, October 1971). p. 92, and Richatd Hart Sinnrcich, “NATO’s Doctrinal Dilemma,” Orb& vol. XIX, no. 2. pp. l-9.

33. See Rear Admiral Sayrc Swartztraubcr, USN, “The Potential Battle of the Atlantic,” UnitedStates Navdln- stitvte Proceedings, vol. 10515/915 (May 1979). pp. 108-125.

34. General Jamcs H. Polk, USA (Ret.), “The North German Plain Attack Scenario: Threat or Illusion?” Strategic Ret&w, Summer 1980, pp. 60-66.

Tecbno/ogy in Mditmy Strategy 153

35. For a discussion of Central Front considerations see Justin G&n, “Restoring the NATO-Wusaw Pact

Balance: The Art of the Impossible," ArmedFoncs]o~~~ (September 1978). pp. 32-46 and 54; “Keeping

the Tram-Atlantic Bargain: The Iast Chance for Forward qcfcnse?” AnncdFonesJonnrrJ (December 1978).

p. 30; and General Robert Close, Enmpe Without Defense: 48 Hours That Could Change the Face of the Wodd(Ncw York: Pcrgamon Press, 1979). For the northern flank. see William K. Sullivan, “Soviet Strategy

and NATO’s Northern Flank,” NM& War College Review, July-August 1979. pp. 26-37. For the southern

fIank, see James Brown, “Challenges and Uncertainties: NATO’s Southern Flank,” Air University Review,

May-June 1980, pp. 3-16.

36. Michael L. Natch, ‘Technology and Strategy,” Nationa/ Defense, vol. LXI, no. 339 (November-December

1976). p. 200. 37. General William J. Evans, “The Impact of Technology on U.S. Deterrent Forces,” Strategic Review, vol. IV,

no. 3 (Summer 1976), p. 40. General Evans would have perhaps shown a different mindsct had he entitled

his article, “The Impact of US Deterrent Forces on Technology” and gone on to stress how this country’s

concept of deterrence affects its development of nuclear weapons.

38. US Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Harold Brown, Ann&Report: Fiscuf Year l%,? (Washington: Department of Dc-

fcnsc. January 19, 198l), pp. 38-39. 39. General David C. Jones. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of St&, UnitedStates Mditary Postrrre, FY 1980: An

Overview (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979). pp. v-vii.

40. General David C. Joncs, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UnitedStutes Mihtury Posture, FY 1982: An Over&w (Wuhington: US Government Printing Office, 1981). pmim.

41. Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affirs, vol. 57. no. 5 (Summer 1979).

pp. 983-984. 42. Colonel Richard G. Head, “Technology and the Militvy BaJancc,” Foreign Aftis, vol. 56, no. 3 (April

1978). pp. 245-246.

43. R. Jamcs Woolscy. “A New Kind of Reformer,” The Washington Post (March 13, 1981). p. A15.

44. John Boyd has cxprcsscd his thoughts in an omnibus oral briefing and has not published in the open literature.

45. Lutnvak, ‘The Operational Lcvcl of War.” pp. 75-76.

46. Edward N. Lumvak. “Introduction.” Steven L. Canby ct al., An Aftemative Amdysis of the State of U.S.

Gene& Purpose Forces: The Needto Resmcture for Combat Effectibeness (Washington: The Heritage Foun-

dation, 1981).

47. Jeffrey Record, ‘The Fortunes of War,” H@er’s, April 1980, p. 19.

48. Franklin C. Spinncy, Defense Fats of Life (Washington: Department of Dcfcnsc, 1980).

49. Kahn, On Thrmonnc/crrr War, pp. 40-101.

50. Thomas C. &helling, The Stfakgy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960), p. 15.

51. US Department of Defense AnnwdRepoq Fircal Year 1931 (Washington: US Government Printing Office.

1980). pp. 65-66. See also Jan M. Lodal. “Deterrence and Nuclear Stmtcgy.” Due&us, Fall 1980, pp. 155-157.

52. “The New Army with New Punch,” U.S. News and WorldReport, September 20. 1982. pp. 59-62.

53. See Russell F. Wciglcy, Eirenhower’s Licuknunts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981) for an in-

cisive discussion of the “firepower versus maneuver” question of World War II.

54. Natch. “Technology and Stmtcgy”; James Digby. “New Non-Nuclear Military Technology: Implications and

Exploitable Opportunities,” Air University Review, vol. XXXX. no. 1 (November-December 1977), pp.

46-50; Colonel Stanley D. Fair, “Precision Weaponry in the Dcfcnsc of Europe,” NATO’s Fifteen Nutibns,

vol. 20, no. 4 (August-September 1975). pp. 17-18, 20, 22, 24 and 26; and Richard Burt, “New Weapons

Tcchnologics and European Security,” Or&r, vol. XIX, no. 2 (Summer 1975). pp. 514-532.

55. William H. Kincadc, “Over the Technological Horizon or the Evolution of Militvy Technology.” Daedzins,

vol. 110, no. 1 (Winter 1978), p. 115. The validity of the “clcctronic battlefield” by no means enjoys a con-

sensus.

56. Jonathan Alford, “The Latest Wars: What They Have Told the Generals,” The Wusbington Post, (June 17.

1982). p. A19.

57. Michael Gztlcr. “Superior Weapons. Pilots, Tactics Seen as Key to Ismcli Victories.” The Warhingtor Post, (June 11, 1982), p. A19.