Cyber(in)security: systemic risks and responses

Dr Ian Brown

Oxford University

Non-systemic risks Cyber graffiti: defacement of Web sites

for propaganda and bragging Cyber fraud: so far largely containable

within financial system (low $bns) “Terrorists get better returns from

much simpler methods such as car bombs. Cyber terror is too low key: not enough dead bodies result, and attacks are too complex to plan and execute.” (Dr Juliette Bird, NATO)

Cybercriminals and “patriots”

Market participants - custom virus writers, bot herders, mafias

Nation state attacks (Estonia, Georgia) – how far were “patriotic hackers” coordinated by state?

“Pure” cyber war“The ‘Korean’ cyber incidents … were annoying and for some

agencies, embarrassing, but there was no violence or destruction... Cybercrime does not rise to the level of an act of war, even when there is state complicity, nor does espionage – [which] are the activities that currently dominate cyber conflict... Estonia and Georgia … came under limited cyber attack as part of larger conflicts with Russia, but in neither case were there casualties, loss of territory, destruction, or serious disruption of critical services. ” (Lewis, 2009: 2—3).

“At best, these operations can confuse and frustrate operators of military systems, and then only temporarily. Thus, cyberwar can only be a support function for other elements of warfare” (Libicki, 2009: xiv—xv)

Cyber espionage/sabotage

TITAN RAIN: Incursions into DoD, German chancellory, Whitehall, NASA, Lockheed Martin…

Google attack aimed at “high-tech information to jump-start China's economy and the political information to ensure the survival of the regime” –James Lewis

“[I] listened and lip-synced to Lady Gaga’s ‘Telephone’ while exfiltrating possibly the largest data spillage in American history” -SPC Bradley Manning

Stuxnet/Flame/DuQu

US offensive operations 231 offensive ops in 2011 – “to manipulate,

disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves”

$652m project GENIE to place tens of thousands of “covert implants” each year in computers, routers & firewalls – through equipment interception, access, and hacking (TAO)

TURBINE can manage millions of implants for intelligence gathering and active attack

Implants in the supply chain

NSA/CIA/FBI/DoD Trusted Partners Bloomberg 14/6/13: “Thousands of technology,

finance and manufacturing companies are working closely with U.S. national security agencies, providing sensitive information and in return receiving benefits that include access to classified intelligence”

“Some U.S. telecommunications companies willingly provide intelligence agencies with access to facilities and data offshore that would require a judge’s order if it were done in the U.S.”

NSA partners

How can the democracies…

Design and execute strategic responses that carefully target threats, avoiding where possible tactical arms races?

Get the best return on their security investment?

Enhance the soft power potential of the Internet as a platform for democracy?

Strategic goals Availability & integrity of critical services (CNI) Protection of confidential information Manageable levels of fraud …all in cost-effective form, where costs include

inconvenience, enhancement of fear, negative economic impacts & reduction of liberties (John Mueller, The quixotic quest for invulnerability, 2008)

Counter-terrorism and mass surveillance ~5000 Americans surveilled under Presidential Surveillance

Programme 2001-2005; led to <10 warrants per year “[T]here is not a consensus within the relevant scientific

community nor on the committee regarding whether any behavioral surveillance … techniques are ready for use at all in the counterterrorist context”; –US National Research Council (2008) p.4

“Fifty-four times this and the other program stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe—saving real lives” -Rep. Mike Rogers

Bulk phone record access “has not played a significant role in preventing any terrorist attacks to this point” -Former Acting CIA Director Mike Morrell to US Senate Judiciary Committee

Reducing systemic risk Isolate critical systems from public

Internet and each other, and set much higher security standards

Enhance risk management, robustness and continuity planning in Critical National Infrastructure systems

Use Content Distribution Networks and other load balancing systems to increase performance and resilience of public-facing systems

Redistributing liability ENISA and UK House of Lords S&T Committee:

should liability be shifted to some combination of software vendors, ISPs and financial institutions?

Most software licences disclaim all liability Intended to incentivise much more secure

system engineering (e.g. least-privilege processes, enforced by formally verified security kernel)

Conclusions Security interventions need to be carefully

targeted to minimise costs and maximise long-term RoI

Reducing vulnerabilities and increasing availability is key long-term security response

Liability redistribution is mechanism to force key actors to internalise external costs

New mechanisms needed for verification of security properties of systems

Better security engineering Least-privilege processes, enforced by formally

verified security kernel Verification of device security before providing

network connectivity Two-factor authentication Full Disk Encryption esp. for removable media Perimeter controls to block sensitive data exfiltration Air-gap most sensitive systems eg SCADA;

separate public-facing websites from internal systems

Cross-government action Fund security R&D with INFOSEC agency

participation Use procurement, licensing and standardisation

power to require significantly higher security standards in systems and services

Use diplomacy to pressure state actors behind Russian Business Network, DDoS attacks, classified network incursions etc.

Costs of cybercrime

Ross Anderson, Chris Barton, Rainer B� ohme, Richard Clayton, Michel J.G. van Eeten, Michael Levi, Tyler Moore, Stefan Savage (2012) Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime, Workshop on the Economics of Information Security:•“while terrorists try to be annoying as possible, fraudsters are quite the opposite and try to minimise the probability that they will be the targets of effective enforcement action.” (p.26)•“we should perhaps spend less in anticipation of computer crime (on antivirus, firewalls etc.) but we should certainly spend an awful lot more on catching and punishing the perpetrators.” (p.26)•“cybercrime is now the typical volume property crime in the UK, and the case for more vigorous policing is stronger than ever.” (p.26)

Strategic impact Do security systems support or subvert the emergence of

democracy in authoritarian states? Do systems damage the values the “war on terror” is supposed

to be defending, e.g. by censoring websites or undertaking warrantless wiretaps?

“Techniques that look at people's behavior to predict terrorist intent are so far from reaching the level of accuracy that's necessary that I see them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines.” –Jeff Jonas, Chief Scientist, IBM Entity Analytics

Techie mumbo-jumbo

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Botnets (Secure Computing estimated

150k new zombies per day Q2 2008) Phishing (spear, rock), pharming … generally we already see a strong

response from CERTS, vendors, ISPs

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Art. 7: Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

Art. 8: Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

Art. 10: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Art. 11: Everyone has the right to … receive and impart information and ideas

Art. 12: Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association

Trapping the bot herders? Extremely difficult to track and successfully

prosecute bot herders Do we need Louis Freeh’s packet license-

plates? Better alternatives?

Arrest when extortion demands are paid? Increase bandwidth to and globally replicate key

services using Akamai, anycast and related technologies?

Crowdsourced security (StopBadware)?

Phishing Symantec alone

blocking 8m e-mails daily in 2006

Similar criminal ecology to DDoS - custom virus writers, botnet herders, site operators, spammers, mules

96.6% of attacks are on financial services insitutionsSource: Anti-Phishing Working Group May 2007 report

Taking down the phishers?

Targeted financial services institutions can ask hosts to take down sites

Some hosts still unresponsive

Phishers moving to botnet hosts and more sophisticated frauds (escrow, “sales reps”)

Source: R. Clayton & T. Moore (2007)