1

Survival,Coexistence,andAutonomy:

YezidiPoliticalIdentityafterGenocideGüneşMuratTezcür,ZeynepKaya,BayarMustafaSevdeen

Introduction

IncontemporaryYezididiscourse,violencehasacyclicalcharacter,incontrastto

interpretationsofhistorythatposittheprogressivelydecliningroleofviolenceinhuman

affairs.1AsenseofhistoricalvictimhoodiscentraltotheformationofYezidiscommunal

identitywhoseverysurvivalwasatstakeindifferenttimeperiods.Accordingly,theIS

attacksin2014wereperceivedasthelatestinaseriesofatrocitiesYezidisexperienced

sincethemedievaltimes.Theattacksarecalled“the74rdfirman”implyingcontinuitywith

previousepisodesofmassscaleviolencetargetingthecommunity.WhiletheISattacks

involvingmassexecutionsandenslavementshockedtheconscienceoftheinternational

community,forYezidis,thetragedyofAugust2014wasnotunprecedentedintermsofits

harm.InthewordsofaYezidileader,“[In1832],[t]heytookawayathousandofourgirls.A

thousandwasplenty.Ourpopulationwasmuchsmallerbythat…Younowseelotsof

[Sunni]Kurdsaround.TheirfourthorfifthgenerationancestorswereYezidis.”2Inhiseyes,

Yezidishavehistoricallybeentargetedbecauseoftheirreligiousbeliefsandsubjectto

sexualviolenceandforcedconversions.Themaindifferencebetweenthepastmassacres

andthecurrentonewasthewidespreadpublicitycharacterizingtheISviolencethat

triggeredaninternationalhumanitarianintervention,whichwasinfactunprecedented.

ThisprevailingdiscourseofvictimhoodimpliesthatYezidisweresubjecttoviolent

campaignsprimarilyduetotheirreligiousidentity.Infact,OrthodoxIslamicperspectives

defineYazidisaspolytheistsorunbelieversanddonottreatthemas“PeopleoftheBook,”

unlikeChristiansandJewswhoareentitledtocertainrightsandalimiteddegreeof

autonomyintheirinternalaffairs.Thisliminalstatus,similartotheexperienceofother

religiousgroupsthatemergedaftertheriseofIslamsuchasAlevis,Kakais,andBahais,put

Yezidisinaprecariouspositionandmorevulnerabletoviolencejustifiedonreligious

2

groundsovercenturiesfromthefatwasoftheleadingOttomanjuristEbu's-suudinthe

16thcenturytotheISinthe21stcentury.Fromthisperspective,theveryexistenceof

Yezidisasanon-Islamicgrouphasbeenasourceofmajorsecurityconcernandreligious

challengetothepoliticalorderinMuslimsocieties.Whiletheriseofpoliticalsecularism

withtheformationoftheIraqinationalstateprovidedasemblanceofstabilityforYezidis,

thepost-2003periodwascharacterizedbythecollapseofthestateauthorityandviolent

sectarianismsignifiedthereturnofreligiousviolencetargetingYezidisquaYezidis.

ThischaptersuggeststhattheISattacksof2014,whichexhibitscertainsimilarities

withthepastviolence,hashaduniqueimplicationsforYezidis.Thecontemporaryformsof

Yezidiidentityexhibittwodistinctivecharacteristicsinthepost-genocidalera.First,

Yezidishavegainedunprecedentedrecognitionandinterestintheinternationalarena.

WhileYezidishadalonghistoryofcontactswithWesterndiplomats,scholars,and

travelersgoingbacktothefirsthalfofthe19thcentury,thecommunityasthevictimsof

religiousintoleranceandpersecutionbroughtthecommunityundergloballimelightinthe

post-2014period.Inparticular,captiveYezidiwomensubjecttoextremeformsofsexual

violencehavecometoembodytheexperienceofthecommunity.Thisgenderedexperience

facilitatedacontextforYezidiwomentoexpresstheirperspectivesandbecomevocal

voices,suchasNadiaMurad,tocommunicatetheexperiencesoftheYazidistothe

internationalcommunityandmakepoliticaldemands.Giventhelonghistoryofentrenched

patriarchalpracticesinthecommunity,theincreasedvisibilityofYazidiwomenandtheir

increasedengagementwithissuesthataffecttheircommunityrepresentsaparadoxical

outcomeoftheISviolence.

Next,themassivedisplacementsufferedbythecommunitycontributedtothe

fragmentednatureofYezidipolitics.Thisprocessoffragmentationhastakenplaceattwo

parallellevels.Ontheonehand,Yezidisaresubjecttotheauthorityofanincreasing

numberofpoliticalactorswithopposingagendas.ThefailureandinabilityoftheKurdish

militaryforcestoprotecttheSinjarareaagainsttheISonslaughtinearlyAugust2014

generatedsentimentsofdisillusionmentandresentmentamonglargesectionsoftheYezidi

community.ThisdevelopmentdrewawedgebetweentheYezidisandSunniKurdsdespite

theircommonlinguisticcharacteristics.EveniftheKurdistanRegionalGovernment(KRG)

pursuesapolicyofco-optationandsymbolicempowermenttowardstheYezidis,the

3

debacleofAugust2014hashadastrongnegativeimpactoverthepopularappealofa

hyphenatedidentityof“Yezidi-Kurds.”Meanwhile,theriseofthePKKasasignificant

militaryforceintheSinjarareaandthecaptureofmostpartsoftheSinjarbytheIraqi

governmentandShiitemilitiasledtotheproliferationofpoliticalforces.Ontheotherhand,

therehasbeenanotableincreaseinthenumberofYezidiswhoclaimtospeakonbehalfof

thecommunityandpursuedifferentgoalsbothinIraqandWesterncountries.Ironically,

therelativedemographicandpoliticalweaknessoftheYezidicommunityhascontributed

toitspoliticalfragmentation,asdifferentYezidisseekthesupportofavarietyoflocaland

internationalentities.

ThechapterfirstoffersahistoricaloverviewoftheYezidis’interactionswithlocal

andimperialrulerssincetheriseofthecommunitywithitsdistinctivereligiousbelief

systembythe13thcentury.YezidisalwaysremainedoutsiderstotheOttomanmillet

systemofferinglimitedtoleranceandautonomytonon-IslamicgroupssuchasChristians

andJews.Atthesametime,large-scalemilitarycampaignstargetingYezidiswerenot

exclusivelyorprimarilyreligiouslymotivated.TheOttomanpashasledmanyexpeditions

againstMt.SinjarinhabitedbyseveralYeziditribesprimarilyinordertoprotectthe

caravanrouteslinkingnorthernSyriaandsoutheasternAnatoliawithMesopotamia.With

theadventofthe19thcentury,YezidisbecametargetsofOttomancentralizationefforts

aimingattaxcollectionandconscriptionthatcontinuedaftertheestablishmentoftheIraqi

stateinthe1920s.NextisanarrativeoftheviolenceexperiencedbytheYezidisinthepost-

2003era.ThegeneralatmosphereofsectarianinsecurityandriseofradicalIslamist

groupshavemadeYezidismoredependentontheKRGthatperceivedtheYezidi

communityasanimportantleverageinitsclaimsoverdisputedterritoriesintheprovince

ofNineveh.However,theISblitzkriegin2014underminedthisdependencyandexposed

thevulnerabilityofYezidislackingadefenseforceoftheirown.Theremainingsectionsof

thechapterfocusesontheriseofanethnoreligiousnationalidentityinintersectionwith

genderidentityamongYezidisamidpoliticalfragmentationinthepost-genocidalperiod.

ThechapterconcludeswithabriefreflectiononthefutureevolutionofYezidipolitics.

4

ALiminalExistence:YezidisundertheOttomans

Yezidism,primarilyasetofbeliefsandpracticestransmittedorallyacrossgenerations,has

aninherenttendencytodefyorthodoxyassociatedwithreligionswithahistoryof

extensiverecords.AseloquentlyarticulatedbyPhilipKreyenbroek,nodogmaticand

officialformofthefaithexists.ThepursuitofdefiningYezidismaccordinganauthoritative

andcanonicaltextualsourceoverlooksoraltraditionscentraltoitslivedexperience.3

UnlikeMandeanswhoclaimedtohavesacredbooksoftheirown,probablytoescape

persecutioninthehandsofpowerfulMuslimrulers,Yezidiwenttolenghtstohidetheir

purportedbooksfromoutsiders.4Nonetheless,theattempttoidentifythetextualoriginsof

YezidismhasbeenamajoroccupationofbothWesternandMuslimtravelers,scholars,and

intellectualswhooftenperceivedthecommunityasanexoticgroupwithstrangeand

arcanecustomsforanextendedperiodtime.5Inparticular,thewidespreadusageofthe

epithetof“devil-worshippers,”whichconflatesthesacredstatusofPeacockAngelfor

YezidisasanaffronttotheMuslimGod,suggeststhatthecommunityremainedillegiblefor

outsideobserversforcenturies.6

TheYezidisremainedanillegiblecommunityintheeyesofOttomanrulerswho

establishedtheirdominanceoverterritoriesinhabitedbyYazidisintheearly16thcentury.

Atthesametimefarfrombeingdefenselessandhelplesssubjects,Yezidiswere

autonomouspoliticalactorswithsignificantcapacityforcoalition-building,negotiation,

andresistance.TherearenumerousrecordsofYeziditribalchiefsbeingappointedaslocal

OttomanrulersandengaginginallianceswithoragainstSunnitribalchiefs.7The

communitypresentedtwooverlappingbutdistinctchallengestotheOttomanorder.First,

OttomanrulersperceivedMt.Sinjar,anaridandnarrowmountainrangewithcommanding

viewsofthetraderoutesbetweenBaghdadandMosul,inthesoutheast,andAleppo,

Diyarbakir,Mardininthenorthwest,asabastionofinsecurityandbanditry.8They

organizedaseriesofpunitiveexpeditionsagainstYeziditribeswhoengagedinraids

targetingcaravans.Forinstance,EvliyaÇelebi,therenownedOttomantraveler,wasan

observerinsuchanexpeditionin1655.HedescribedYezidisofSinjaras“wildsavages,

rebellious,ghoulfaced,hairyinfidels”whoworshipedablackdog.9Healsonarratesa

5

previousexpeditionbytherulerofDiyarbakirin1640resultedinmassacresand

enslavementofthousandsofYezidis.10

EvliyaÇelebi’sdehumanizationofYezidiswasnotuntypicalandpointedouttoa

seconddynamiccharacterizingtheOttoman-Yezidirelations.Yezidiswiththeir

“illegitimate”beliefsystemremainedoutsideoftheOttomanmoralorder.Evenifthe

campaignsagainstMt.Sinjarwereoftenmotivatedbysecurityconcerns(i.e.,securingthe

caravanroutesandrecoveringstolengoods),largescaleandindiscriminateviolence

againstYezidiswerejustifiedonreligiousgrounds.11Inthisregard,itispossibletodraw

parallelsbetweentheOttomanstate’perceptionofSinjarandtheOttomanandlater

Turkishstate’sperceptionsofDersimineasternAnatolia.12Usingtheconceptdeveloped

byJamesScott,thesetwomountainrangeswiththeirnaturaldefensesagainstinvading

forcescanbedescribedasstatelesszoneswithalonghistoryofindigenouspeopleresisting

orfleeingstateauthorities,YezidisinSinjarandZazakispeakingAlevisinDersim.13Inboth

cases,thestateauthoritiesperceivedastheseregionsasastatelesszoneinhabitedbya

groupwhose“deviant”religiousbeliefsfosterdisloyaltyandmakethempotentially

rebellious.14

ThehistoryofOttoman-YezidiinteractionsduringthelastcenturyoftheEmpire

demonstratesseveraltendenciesshapingtheimperialpoliciesandpriorities.Theadvent

Ottomanmodernizationofthe19thcenturyinvolvedtheimpositionofconscription,

improvementsintaxcollection,andprojectionofcentralstateauthorityintoremote

cornersoftheempire.Meanwhile,theRusso-Turkishwars,especiallytheconflictin1877,

resultedinthousandsofYezidibeingsubjectsoftheRussianEmpire.15The1830sand

1840ssawaseriesofcampaignsagainstSinjarthatremainedageopoliticallyimportant

areacontrollingthelineofcommunicationbetweenDiyarbakirandMosul.16Apermanent

TurkishgarrisoninthemoreaccessiblesouthernSinjarwasestablishedonlyafter1849.17

Atthesametime,theOttomanswerelesssuccessfulinconscriptingYezidis.18Afterthe

powerfulBritishAmbassadorintheOttomancapitalintervenedontheirbehalf,Yezidisof

SheikhanandSinjarwereabletoobtainanexemptionin1850.19Inapetitionsubmittedto

theOttomanauthoritiesandrepresentativesofEuropeanpowers,Yezidileadersdemanded

exemptionfromobligatorymilitaryserviceonreligiousgrounds.Thiswasthefirsttime

Yezidispresentedastylizedversionoftheirbeliefsystemstotheoutsideworldinawritten

6

document.EveniftheOttomanstatecontinuedtotreatYezidisasaliminalminoritynot

qualifiedtobeincludedinthemilletsystem,italsoshowedflexibilityandacceptedthat

YezidismadeapaymentinlieuofservingintheOttomanarmy.

ReligiousconsiderationsbecamemorecentraltohowtheOttomanstatedealtwith

theYezidisduringthereignofAbdülhamidII.Theprojectofmakingloyalsubjectsoutof

Yezidisinvolvedsystematicattemptsattheirconversionatatimewhenincreasing

presenceofforeignrepresentationsandmissionariesintheeasternprovincesaggravated

thethreatperceptionoftheOttomanstate.TheconscriptionofYezidiswouldfacilitate

theirIslamization,andmakethemimmunetotheappealofforeigninfluences,andensure

theirloyaltytotheOttomanorder.AnOttomanPashaentrustedwiththetaskofdealing

withthe“Yezidiquestion”whoarrivedinMosulin1892engagedinacampaignofterror

anddestructionthatultimatelybackfired.HundredsofYezidiswerekilled,theLalish,the

spiritualcenterofYezidis,wasconvertedtoamadrasa,sacredreligiousobjectswere

confiscated,mosqueswerebuiltinYezidivillages,leadingfiguresofthecommunitywere

forcedtoconvert.20WhenthewordofthesecoercivepracticesreachedtheOttoman

capital,thepashawasdismissed.Apparently,theOttomanstatedidnotapprovepasha’s

brutalmethodsthatsowdisorderandinsecurityintheregionandrecognizedthelimitsof

violenceinachievingmassconversion.21TheremainingdecadesoftheOttomaneradidnot

seeanylargeanti-YezidiviolenceexceptforbriefexpeditionsagainstSinjarduringWorld

WarI.Overall,thishistoricaloverviewoffersanuancedpictureofYezidivictimhoodunder

theOttomans.WhilereligiousviolenceagainstYezidis,aheterodoxgroupexcludedfrom

thelegitimateOttomanintercommunalsystem,becamesalientincertaintimeperiods,the

communitydevelopedastrongsenseofpoliticalautonomyandoftenachievedsignificant

concessionsviaresistanceornegotiations.

IntheCrossfire:TheFormationofYezidiPoliticalIdentityinPost-2003Iraq

DuringtheMosuldisputebetweenthenascentTurkishRepublicandtheBritishcontrolled

Iraq,mostYezidileaderspreferredIraqunderaEuropeanmandateoveraTurkishorArab

government.22Nonetheless,YezidisremainedonthemarginsofthenewlyestablishedIraqi

state.Conscriptioncontinuedtobeamajorconcernforthecommunityandtriggeredsmall

scaleactsofrebellioninSinjar,whichgainedanewgeopoliticalimportanceasaborder

7

zonebetweenSyriaandIraq.23Ironically,themarginalpoliticalinfluenceofYezidiscould

beamajorreasonfortheabsenceoflarge-scaleviolencetargetingthecommunityinIraq

duringthe20thcentury.24Nonetheless,therisingappealofKurdishnationalismamong

Yezidisstartingwiththeearly1960sledtorepressivepoliciesbytheBaghdad

governments.25TherulingBa’thregimeinitiatedasystematiccampaignofresettlement

andArabizationtargetingtheSinjarregion.26Yezidisofthemountainvillageswereforced

torelocateto11collectivesettlementssurroundedbyArabvillagesreceivingpreferential

treatment.27Inthe1980s,asignificantnumberofYezidisservedintheIraqiarmyandlost

theirlivesinthewarwithIran.Intheearly1990s,theestablishmentofaninternationally

enforcedno-flyzoneandtheformationofdefactoKurdishautonomysawthepartitionof

YezidilandsbetweenBaghdadandErbil.WhiletheSinjarareaandsouthernSheikhan

remainedundertheIraqirule,YezidicommunitiesinDohuk,otherpartsofSheikhan

district,andtheLalishtemplefallundertheKurdishcontrol.

Inthepost-2003order,YezidisbecameacrucialdemographicbloctoKRG’sclaims

overdisputedterritoriesanditspowerpoliticsintheNinevehprovince,oneofthemost

contestedareasintheentirecountry.Inthe2005referendumonthenewIraqi

constitution,around55percentofthevoterssaidnointheNinevehprovincethatalso

includesSinjar.Thiswasstillshortofthetwo-thirdsofthevotethatwouldresultinthe

defeatofthenewconstitution.28SincetheKurdswerethemainbeneficiariesofthenew

constitutionalorder,obtainingtheYezidisupportinNinevehwasessentialtotheirpolitical

goals.Article2oftheconstitutiondraftedin2006andpassedintheKRGparliamentin

2009includedSinjaraspartofIraqiKurdistan.Yezidis,whoweresubjecttoArabization

policiesduringtheSaddamera,alsobenefitedfromtheKurdishpatronage.Forthefirst

time,SinjardistricthadaYezidigovernor.SomeYezidisjoinedtheIraqiarmyor

PeshmergaandworkedastranslatorsfortheUSarmy.OtherYezidisfoundemployment

opportunitiesinDohukandErbilandbenefitedfromtheKurdisheconomicboomthat

lasteduntil2014.29ThesedevelopmentsgeneratedsomeresentmentamongtheSunni

ArabsandTurkomansintheareawholosttheirprivilegedpositionsandincreasingly

perceivedtheYezidisasbeingpartoftheKurdishpowerstructure.30Atthesametime,a

significantnumberofYezidiswereuncomfortablewiththerisingethnictensionsand

KurdishexclusionandrepressionofYezidispoliticalactivismespousinganindependent

8

communalidentity.Theywerefearfulthattheircommunitywasbecomingpawnsinthe

Kurdish-ArabterritorialstruggleandcharacterizedtheKRGpoliciesas“Kurdification”of

Sinjar.31

LikeotherreligiousminoritiesinIraq,thefalloftheSaddamregimein2003

generatedanatmospherethatwashighlydangerousforYezidis.Asearlyas2004,targeted

killingsofYezidisbecauseoftheirreligiousidentitystartedtoproliferate.32Itbecame

increasinglydangerousforYezidistogetservices,workorstudyatMosul,whichemerged

asahotbedofSunnimilitantgroups.33Theself-proclaimedIslamicStateofIraq(ISI)

imposedasiegeonthedeliveryoffood,fuel,andconstructionmaterialstoSinjarasit

consideredYezidisunbelievers.34AfteraYezidigirlwasstonedtodeathherrelativesand

communityforallegedlyhavinganaffairwithaSunnimaninApril2007,theISIurgedits

followerstokillYezidiswherevertheyfindthem.Twoweekslater,armedmenstoppeda

bus,checkedpassengers’identificationdocuments,andorderednon-Yezidisoffthebus.

ThentheydrovethehijackedbustoMosulandexecuted23Yezidisthere.35Themostlethal

terroristattackinpost-2003Iraq,suicidebombingsinAl-Qahtaniya(Girzerik)andAl-

Jazeera(SibaSheikhXidir)collectivetownsinhabitedbyYezidis,killedseveralhundredsof

peopleonAugust14,2007.36

ThesedevelopmentsmadeYezidisofSinjarmoredependentontheKurdish

authoritiesfortheirsecuritywhoincreasedtheircontroloftheareaespeciallyafterthe

2007bombings.Between2005and2009,Kurdishpartiesincreasedtheirvoteshareatthe

expenseofautonomousYezidipartiesinSinjar.WhiletheKurdishAlliancereceived44,224

votes(approximately60percentofthevalidvotes),theYezidiMovementforReformand

Progressreceived17,055votes(app.22percent)intheSinjardistrictandQahtaniya

subdistrictintheDecember2005parliamentaryelections.37Incomparison,theKurdish

alliancereceived101,606votes(app.78percent)whiletwoautonomousYezidiparties

receivedonly7,787votes(app.6percent)intheJanuary2009provincialelections.38By

thattime,theYezidisupportfortheKurdishpoliticalgoalsinNinevehbecameevenmore

importantastheSunniArabsnowstartedtoactivelyparticipateintheelectoralpolitics.

Atthesametime,theKRGauthoritiesdonotrecognizeYezidisasadistinct

ethnoreligiousgroupbutasethnicKurdswithdistinctreligiousbeliefs.IntheeyesofKRG

leaders,Yezidismisthe“originalKurdishreligion”thatsetKurdshistoricallyapartfrom

9

Arabs,Persians,andTurks,theirMuslimneighborsMuslimpopulations.Inthisregard,

YezidismwasincorporatedintotheKurdishnationalistdiscourse.39Article6ofthedraft

KRGconstitutionexplicitlymentionsonlyTurkomans,Chaldeans,Assyrians,Armenians,

andArabsasdistinctnationalgroups.Article7statesthattheIslamiclawisoneofthe

sourcesoflegislationwhileindicatingtherightsandfreedomsofChristiansandYezidisand

otherreligionsaretobeprotected.40TheKRGparliamenthas111seatswith11ofthese

seatsreservedforChaldeans,Assyrians,Armenians,andTurkomansandnoneforYezidis.41

Insummary,thefalloftheSaddamregimehadamixedblessingfortheYezidis.On

theonehand,therewasanimprovementinthematerialwell-beingoftheYezidisinthe

post-2003era.SomeYezidis,especiallytheonesservingintheIraqiarmyorworkingfor

theU.S.army,improvedtheireconomicsituation,builtthemselveshousesandpurchased

cars.42Moreover,YezidisaffiliatedwiththeKDP,thedominantpartyintheKRG,gained

accesstogreaterpoliticalpatronageandresources.Ontheotherhand,theriseofsectarian

extremismmadethesituationofYezidis,ahistoricallymarginalizedcommunity,evenmore

precarious.Theyweredisproportionatelytargetedbyextremistgroupsandbecame

increasinglydependentontheKurdishPeshmergafortheirverysurvival.Besides,the

KRG’sattemptstoreconstructYezidiidentitybyemphasizingitscommonlinkageswith

KurdishnessgeneratedsomebacklashamongYezidisofSinjarwhowerefearfulthat

increasingethnicconflictoverdisputedterritoriesinNinevehwouldresultintheir

scapegoating.

AnEthnoreligiousNationalIdentity?

IntheearlyhoursofAugust3,2014,theso-calledIslamicState(IS),whichalready

capturedMosulandthesurroundingareasinlessthantwomonthsago,stageda

coordinatedattackagainsttheSinjarregion.AstheKurdishforceswithdrewinpanic,theIS

quicklyoverrunanyfeebledefenseshowninYezidicollectivetowns.Duringthiscampaign,

atleast1,500Yazidiswereexecutedwhilealmost1,500diedonMt.Sinjarfrom

dehydrationorstarvation.43Around6,400Yazidis,mostlywomenandchildren,were

kidnapped.Manyofthemweresubsequentlysoldas“slaves”byIS.44Womenwereraped

repeatedly;childrenwereforcedtoconvertandbrainwashedtoserveassoldiersfortheIS.

AlthoughotherreligiousminoritygroupsinnorthernIraqwerealsotargetedbyIS,the

10

scaleofanti-Yazidiviolencewasunparalleled.Testimoniesbysurvivorssuggestthatmany

localMuslims,includingformerfriends,“bloodbrothers,”andgodfathersofYezidichildren,

tookanactivepartinthekillingsandkidnappings.Accordingly,mostkillingsand

kidnappingstookplaceintownssuchasSibaSheikXidir,Girzerik,andKochothatwere

closetoArabsettlements.45Yezidisinthenorthernpartofthemountainhadmoretimeto

takerefugeinMt.Sinjar.46TheIScontroloftheSinjarcitycenterendedinNovember2015;

theentireSinjardistrictwasliberatedbyspring2017.Yetthescopeofdestruction,

poisonedintercommunalrelations,andprevailingpoliticalinstabilityhaveprevented

reconstructionefforts.Fiveyearsaftertheattacks,mostYezidisofSinjareitherstayedin

IDPcampsinIraqiKurdistanorsoughtrefugeinWesterncountries.47

ThiscatastrophicdevelopmenthadamonumentalimpactonYezidipoliticalidentity

andhadthreespecificconsequences.First,forthefirsttimeintheirhistory,Yezidis

emergedasapoliticalcommunityattractingsignificantinternationalinterestandconcern.

TheObamaAdministration’sdecisiontoauthorizeairstrikesagainsttheISwastriggered

bythehumantragedyexperiencedbytheYezidisstrandedonMt.Sinjar.48International

organizationsincludingtheUnitedNationsdescribedtheanti-Yezidiattacksasgenocide.49

AYezidisurvivorwoman,NadiaMurad,becametheco-recipientoftheNobelPeacePrizein

2018forherglobalactivismagainstsexualviolenceinwar.TheGermanfederalstateof

BadenWürttemberginitiatedahumanitarianadmissionprogramspecificallyforYezidi

womensurvivorsandtheirchildren(butnotnecessarilyadultmalemembersoftheir

family).50Whileitwouldtakesomeyearstofullyassessitseffects,thisglobalspreadofthe

communityledtothediversificationandinternationalizationofYezidiactivismwiththe

formationofvariousassociationsbyYezidisbasedinWesterncountries.51Withsupport

fromvariousinternationalactors,theseassociationshavemadetwocoredemands

influencedbypoliticalliberalismandtransitionaljusticediscourses:(a)therecognitionof

theISattacksagainstYezidisasgenocideand(b)theformationofinternationaltribuneto

tryandconvictindividualswhoparticipatedintheseattacks.ThefactthattheInternational

CriminalCourt(ICC)doesnothaveautomaticjurisdictionoverIraqandSyria,whichare

notpartoftheRometreatyof2002thatcreatedtheICC,complicatedtheseefforts.52The

capturedISmilitantsweretriedinIraqicourtswheremanyofwhomfoundguiltyand

sentencedtodeath.ThousandsofISfightersfrommanydifferentcountriesweredetained

11

byPYDforcesinnorthernSyriaaftertheliberationofthelastpieceoflandheldbytheISin

March2019.YetnotasingleISmemberwasputontrialforcrimesspecificallycommitted

againstYezidipeople.53

AnotherimportantconsequenceoftheISattacksonYezidipoliticalidentityisthe

strainedlinksbetweenYezidisandtheKRG.Asindicatedbefore,theKRGestablished

politicalandmilitarycontroloverYezidiinhabitedterritoriesandextensivepatronage

networksincorporatingalargenumberofYezidisbetween2003and2014.Howeverthe

panickedwithdrawaloftheKurdishforcesfromSinjarinAugust2014wasamajor

disappointment.WhilesomeYezidisarguedthattheKurdishforceslackedthecapacityto

resistagainsttheISonslaught,manyothersportrayedthewithdrawalasanactofbetrayal

demonstratingthedispensabilityofYezidisfortheKurdishleadership.54Inresponse,the

KRGauthoritiesundertookseveralinitiativesincludingtheestablishmentofanoffice

responsibleforrescuingYezidiskidnappedbytheISanddiplomaticeffortsaimingtohave

theanti-Yezidiattacksrecognizedasgenocide.55Thetermgenocideevokesastrong

emotionalandpoliticalmeaningsforIraqiKurdsgiventhelegacyofSaddamHussein’s

Anfalcampaigninvolvingchemicalweaponsattacks,massacres,sexualviolence,andmass

deportationagainstKurdishpeopleinthelate1980s.ThedescriptionofAnfalasgenocide

hasbeencentraltothelegitimacyofKurdishpursuitofstatehoodandindependencefrom

Iraq.56BylabellingtheISviolenceagainsttheYezidisasanothergenocidevictimizing

ethnicKurds,theKurdishauthoritiessoughtinternationalsupportfortheformationofan

independentKurdistanwherereligiousminoritieswouldbesafefromextremistviolence.

TheKRGauthoritiesorganizedpollingstationsinIDPcampsandstronglyurgedYezidis

displacedfromSinjartovoteinthereferendum.57Inthisregard,therecognitionofYezidi

victimhoodhasbeenmadecentraltoKurdishvictimhoodandpursuitofindependence.At

thesametime,thefailureofKurdishforcestoprotectYezidisfostereddemandsforthe

formationofanautonomousregionforreligiousminoritiesinNinevehunderinternational

supervision.Forinstance,Yazda,oneofthemostwell-knownYezidihumanitarianand

lobbyingorganizations,explicitlycallsforsuchautonomy.58Similardemandswerealsoput

forwardbyvariousChristiangroups.59

AfinaltransformationfollowingtheISattacksconcernstheendoftheKRGcontrol

overSinjar.WhiletheKRGforcesgainedbackpartsofSinjarfromtheIS,theywithdrew

12

completelyfromtheareainthefaceoftheIraqiandShiitemilitiaadvancesinOctober

2017.Asaresult,forthefirsttime,aShiitepoliticalforceassertedmilitarysupremacyover

YezidislandsandaimedtocultivateitsownpatronagenetworksamongYezidisbytaking

advantageofintra-Yezididivisions.60Besides,thePKK,aKurdishnationalistforcewitha

historyofrivalrywiththeKDP,madesignificantinroadsamongYezidisinthepost-2014

period.61Duringtheattacks,thePKKmilitantsplayedahighlyvisibleroleinopeningupa

humanitariancorridorbetweenMt.SinjarandtheSyrianbordercontrolledbythePYD,a

PKKaffiliate.ThiscorridorenableddesperateYezidiswhotookrefugeinMt.Sinjartoreach

safety.ThePKKestablishedapermanentpresenceintheareaandsuccessfullyrecruiteda

significantnumberofYezidimenandwomen,whoweredisenchantedwiththeKDP,toits

militia.62LiketheKDP,thePKKalsoemphasizesKurdishnessofYezidis,butoffersadistinct

ideologicalalternative.Inparticular,thePKKwithitssecular,equalitarian,andgender

progressiveplatformspresenteditselfasavehicleofempowermentforYezidiwomen

subjecttoextremelevelsofsexualviolenceandpatriarchalpractices.63Moreover,thePYD

forcesrescuedmanykidnappedYezidiwomenandchildrenfromtheIScaptivityin

northeasternSyria.Buildingonablueprintthatwasimplementedsuccessfullyinnorthern

Syria(andunsuccessfullyinKurdishareasofTurkey),thePKKdeclared“democratic

autonomy”forSinjarandsoughtinternationalsupport.TheriseofthePKKasaviableforce

vyingforsupportamongYezidiscontributestofurtherfragmentationofYezidipolitical

identityandcomplicatestheformationofaunifiedstanceamongYezidiswhoaremore

spreadoutthaneverbefore.

Gender&PoliticsamongtheYezidis

IS’sattacksagainsttheYezidisrevealedonceagainthecentralityofgenderinpolitical

violence.Indeed,sexualviolencehasbeenusedasadeliberateandsystematictoolto

commitgenocideandethniccleansingagainstreligiousandethniccommunitiesinmany

othercontextsinrecentdecadesaswell,suchasinBosnia,Kosovo,Rwanda,Sudan,Uganda

andtheDRC.64GroupssuchasISusespecific,typicallypatriarchal,gendernormsin

intersectionwithidentityperceptionstowardsreligiousorethnicgroupstojustify

violence.65TheprecariouspositionoftheYazidiminorityinIraq,asexplainedearlierinthe

chapter,playedanimportantroleinIS’stargetingofthiscommunity.Thelawlessnessand

13

insecuritycreatedbysectarianviolenceinIraqfurtherexacerbatedexistingdiscriminatory

attitudestowardstheYezidis,aswellasotherminoritycommunities.66

ISexplicitlyjustifieditsgenderedviolenceagainsttheYezidisthroughits

interpretationofcertainIslamicrulesandpractices.ItdefinedtheYezidisasa“pagan”

minorityandnon-believersandtreatedthemdifferentlyfrommembersofotherreligions

suchasChristians.AccordingtoISideology,ChristiansandJewsareconsideredasthe

“PeopleoftheBook”whocanbetreatedasimmunefromcertainpracticesduringwar,such

asabductingandrapingfemalemembersofthesecommunities.67ISbelievedthatitwas

allowedtokillmalemembersoftheYezidicommunityiftheydonotconverttoIslam,and

toabduct,rapeandselltheYezidiwomenandgirls,andforcethemtodohouselabor.68

Aftertheircapture,theYezidiwomenandchildrenweresharedamongstISfightersthat

participatedintheoccupationofSinjarandafterthatonefifthofthecaptives,inIS

terminology‘slaves’,weretransferredtotheISauthoritiestobedividedas‘profit’.69

CapturedYezidiwomenandgirlslivedundercircumstancesinwhichtheyhadnocontrol,

andtheywereentirelystrippedofftheirabilitytocontroltheirlife,bodyanddignity.

TheYezidicommunity’sowngendernorms,especiallytheembodimentofmen’s

andfamilies’‘honor’inwomen’sbodies,madetheseattacksparticularlyunsettlingforthe

community.Yezidis’gendernormswereusedasatoolbyIStodiscourageabductedYezidi

womennottoescape.Yezidisurvivorswerereportedtosaythattheircaptivestoldthem

thatiftheyreturnedtotheircommunities,theywouldbekilled,referringtothepracticeof

‘honor’killing,orwouldnotbeacceptedbackhome.70TheYezidis,includingYezidileaders,

considerthesexualviolenceperpetratedbyISagainstYezidiwomenandgirlsasanattack

againstthewholeofthecommunity.AsMîrTehsînSeîdBeg,thehereditaryleaderofthe

YezidisstatedtheYezidiscouldhavemaybereconciledandwentbacktolivingwiththeir

Arabneighborsevenafterkillings;butIS’treatmentofthousandsofYezidiwomenand

girlswouldmakeitveryhardtoreconcile.71TheexperiencesoftheYezidisleftlastingscars

forthecommunityandledtoextremelevelsofpost-wartraumaandPTSD.72

SexualandotherformsofviolenceexperiencedbytheYezidiscannotbetreatedas

simplyanoutcomeofIS’sextrememethodsortheresultofconflict.Thereisawider

contextofinequalityandstructuresinplacethatmadesuchviolencethinkableand

feasible.InterviewswithmembersoftheYezidicommunitysuggestthatthecommunityis

14

awareofthesewidercircumstances.Theyassociatetheirexperiencesofviolenceand

sexualviolencetothelong-termdisadvantagesofbeingaminoritygroupinthedisputed

territoriesinIraqandthehistoricalprejudicesagainsttheircommunity.Likemanyother

minoritycommunitiesinIraq,alargesectionoftheYezidicommunityislocatedin

disputedterritories(betweentheKurdishregionalgovernmentandtheIraqigovernment),

Beinginthislocationputstheminaprecariouspositionbecausetheseareasaretypically

neglectedintermsofinfrastructure,economicinvestmentandprovisionofsecurityand

protection.Moreover,thehistoryofreligiousprejudiceagainstthecommunityandthe

distrustbetweenYezidisandIraqiandKurdishhaveexacerbatedtheprecariousnessof

theirposition.Gendernormsalsoplayedakeyroleintheseoutcomes.Theideathat

womencanbeboughtandsoughtforsexualpurposeslikeacommodityandthattheycan

beentirelystrippedofftheiragencyisaclearexampleofthis.Thisextremeformof

discriminationandviolencepracticedagainstYezidiwomencanbeseenaspartofa

continuumofwiderdiscriminativepracticesandviolencesperpetratedagainstwomenin

Iraqingeneral.73

Yet,alongsidethis,thecommunity’sexperienceofgenderedviolencebyIShashada

transformativeimpactonthepoliticalandsociallifeamongtheYezidicommunity.These

impactscanbeanalyzedinthreeinterrelatedaspects.First,IS’sattacksanditsviolence

againstYezidiwomenhadsignificanteffectonYezidiattitudesaboutsurvivorsofsexual

violence.FemalesurvivorswhowereheldcaptivebyISandexposedtosexualandother

formsofviolencewereinitiallyhesitantaboutreturningtotheirfamiliesandcommunities.

Theyfearedtheywouldberejectedorkilledfor“tainting”the“honor”ofthefamily.74With

theFebruary2015DeclarationbytheYazidireligiousauthorities,survivorwomenaswell

aswomenandmenwhowereforcedtoconverttoIslamwerere-acceptedtothe

community.Afterthisdeclaration,numberofwomenandgirlsreturningtotheir

communityincreased.However,thisdoesnotmeanstigmaaroundbeingsexuallyassaulted

havedisappearedandlifeafterreturnhasbeeneasyforreturnees.Moreover,manyof

thesewomenandgirlscontinuetolivewithuntreatedtraumaandindifficultconditionsof

displacementawayfromtheirhomes.SomeofthesewomenhavemigratedtoEuropean

countriesandexperiencingotherdifficultiessuchasbeingawayfromhomeandfamily,and

15

adjustingtolifeinadifferentculture.75Finally,thesituationofchildrenborntoYezidi

womenrapedbytheirIScaptorsisaparticularlychallengingissue.76

AnothersignificantimpactofsexualviolenceagainstYezidiwomenandgirlsisthat

taboosaroundtalkingaboutsexualviolenceintheYezidicommunityhasweakenedafter

thisexperience.Generally,sexualviolenceisconsideredasadifficultissuetomakepublic

andacknowledgeinmostsocieties,aspreviouscasesofsexualviolenceinarmedconflicts

acrosstheworldshowed.77Therehasbeenapublicsilenceabouttheexperiencesof

KurdishwomensexuallyassaultedduringtheAnfalcampaign.78Insharpcontrast,sexual

violencehasbecomepartofthepublicdiscourseandYezidisintegrateditintotheir

communicationwithoutsidersandIraqiandKurdishauthoritiestoexplaintheirsituation,

requestsupportandexpresstheirneedsanddemands.Malecommunityleaders,and

brothers,fathersandhusbandsofsurvivorsofsexualviolencehaveopenlydiscussedthe

issue.Thisisaninterestingdevelopmentbecauseratherthanshyingawayfromit,Yezidis

areopenlytalkingaboutsexualviolenceinnationalandinternationalplatforms.Nadia

Murad,aYezidisexualviolencesurvivorherself,isseenasaspokespersonfor

communicatingYezidis’experiencesandneeds,anddemandjusticeandprotectionforher

community.ThesenoveldevelopmentsareunprecedentedinthehistoryoftheYezidi

community.

Finally,thereareindicatorsofchangingperceptionsaboutwomen’sroleand

positioninsocietyamongtheYezidicommunity.Thisisfortworeasons.First,the

experienceofgenocideandsexualviolencemadethecommunityonceagainrealizethat

theirpositionasacommunityinIraqisprecarious.Theydonothavethenecessarysupport

politicalandeconomicstructuresandprotectionmechanisms.Therefore,someofthe

communitymembersbelievethatempoweringgirlsthroughenablingthemtoaccessto

educationandjobscanprovidethemsomeformofprotection.Anumberofinterviewees

saidthatiftheirpeopleinSinjarweremoreeducatedandmoreawareoftheirlifeoutside

theircommunities,thegenocideagainsttheircommunitywouldnothavehappened.79The

secondfactorthatcontributedtochangingperceptionsaboutwomen’spositionis

displacement.DisplacedSinjariYezidisinSheikhanandDuhokwereabletomeetwith

YezidislivingintheseareasandinteractwithmembersoftheYezididiaspora.Yezidisin

Sinjarhavegenerallymoreconservativenormsaboutwomen’spositioninsociety

16

comparedtoYezidisintheDuhokregionthathavebeenunderKurdishrule.Afterthe

attacks,severaleducatedandexperiencedlocalYezidiwomeninDuhokandSheikhan

begantoworkwithwomen’srightsorganizationsandhumanitarianorganizationsto

providesupportforsurvivinganddisplacedSinjariYezidisandmetandworkedwiththem.

OneoftheinterviewedhumanitarianNGOworkers,whoisaYezidiherself,said“the

Shingali80womenwereinitiallyreluctantbutthenstartedtoparticipateintrainingand

evenstartedworking.”Sheattributedthispartlytotheexpositionofthemoreconservative

SinjariYezidicommunitiestothemoreopenlifeoftheYezidisinDuhok:“theShingali

communitybecamemoreopentowardswomenbecausetheysawotherYazidiwomen,like

thosefromSharia.Theysawthattheirwomenareopen,theygotowork,theygotoschool,

sotheythoughttobealittlebitmoreopenwiththeirwomenaswell.”81

Conclusion

Thegeneralfeelingofinsecuritycharacterizingpost-SaddamIraq,theriseofSunni

extremism,theconflictbetweentheKRGandIraqicentralgovernmentinvolvingYezidi

lands,andthefurtherfragmentationofthecommunityviamigrationsandforced

displacementshavemadeitincreasinglydifficult,ifnotimpossible,forYezidistoseek

politicalaccommodationasanon-assertiveminoritygroup.Thegenocidalattacksin2014

hasstronglyreinforcedthistrendandcontributedaproliferationofvoicesandplatforms

aboutdistinctiveYezidiidentityatlocal,national,andinternationallevels.Inthisregard,

Yezidisarelatecomerstotheglobalpoliticsofrecognitionchallengingallegedlydifference-

blindpoliciesanddemandingdignityforparticulargroupidentities.82

TheYezidipoliticsofrecognitionrepresentsamajorchangeinthecommunity’sself-

identificationandrepresentationgiventhelonghistoryofYezidisasaliminalcommunity

lackingofficialrecognitionduringtheOttomantimesandwidespreadprejudicesabout

theirbeliefsystemspersistinguntilnow.Itentailsastrongemphasisonthedistinctive

natureofYezidiidentityandhistory,andarequestforaccountabilityofthecrimes

committedagainstYezidisinformedbydiscoursesoftransitionaljusticeandfeminism.This

requestforrecognitionalsoentailsastronggenderdimension.Thetraumaticexperienceof

systematicsexualviolencepushedthecommunitytoquestiongender-relatedtaboosand

normsandwomen’spositioninprivateandpubliclife,andtoinitiatesomechanges.In

17

theirdemandsforprotectionandrecognition,Yezidiadvocacygroupsandactivistshave

explicitlyincorporatedYezidiwomen,genderdimensionandsexualviolence.Allthese

haveledtosignificantsymbolicgainsthatelevatedYezidisfromanobscureminorityinto

aninternationallyrecognizedreligiousminoritysufferingfromcrimesagainsthumanity

anddeservingrespectandprotection.

Ironically,thisriseofautonomousYezidipoliticsisaccompaniedwithanincreasing

communalfragmentationanddispersionand,aninvolvementofanevengreaternumberof

externalactorsinYezidiaffairs.Thepost-warconditionsinSinjarremainprohibitivefor

therevitalizationoftheYezidilifethere;geopoliticalrivalriesinvolvingmultiplelocaland

regionalforcesmaketheformationofanautonomouszoneforYezidishighlyimplausible.

Underthesecircumstances,onecanexpectthatYezididiasporawouldincreasinglyplaya

moreimportantroleinsustainingYezidicollectiveidentity,shapingitsglobalimage,and

transformingrelationswithinthecommunity.

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1Pinker2011.2HeisreferringtotheatrocitiescommittedbyalocalKurdishruler,MirMohammadofSoran.InterviewedconductedinSheikhaninSeptember2017.3Kreyenbroek1995.4Khenchelaoui1999,23-5.5Allison2008.6Aslateas1935,TheNewYorkTimesdescribedYezidisas“devil-worshippers”inanarticleaboutapunitiveIraqiexpeditiontoMt.Sinjar.“RebelliousYezidisaresubduedinIraq,”TheNewYorkTimes,October26,1935.7MirMohammadofSoran,whoseviolentcampaignleftastronglegacyinYezidioraltraditions,attackedYezidisbecausetheywerealliedwithhisrival,theBehdinanEmirate.Layard1850,276-7;Longrigg1925,28;Guest1993,67-9.8InYezidihistoriography,thesecampaignsmakeapluralityoffirmanstargetingthecommunity.CindîReşo2014.9Çelebi2013,50.Kreyenbroek(1995,36)observesthattheviolenteventsbetweenthe14thcenturyandthecampaignofMirMohammadofSoranin1832leftlittletraceincollectivememoryoftheYezidis.10Ibid,51-4.HewritesthatthiscampaigntooktherevengeofKarbala(54).Infact,thereisawidespreadassociationbetweenYezidisandCaliphYazidwhosesoldiersmassacredthegrandsonofProphetMohammadandhisfollowersinKarbalain680.ThismonumentaleventgraduallyledtotheschismbetweenSunniandShiiteMuslims.ForadetailedandnuanceddiscussionofthereverenceshowntoYazidinYeziditradition,seeKreyenbroek,37.11Gölbaşı2013,3-4.12Dersimwasthesceneofstate-ledmassacresin1937and1938.FortheOttoman/TurkishperceptionofDersimanditspeople,seeGoner2017,chp1.13Scott(2009,13)callsthegreatmountainouszoneinSoutheastAsia,Zomia,as“oneofthelargestremainingnonstatespacesintheworld,ifnotthelargest.”14ThisinterpretationdisagreeswithGülsoy(2002)whoarguesthatreligiousdifferencesneverhadprimaryinfluenceontheOttomantreatmentofYezidis.HearguesthatOttomanstargetedYezidisonlywhentheythreatenedthepublicorder(134-5).15ForYezidisincontemporaryTranscaucasia,especiallyArmenia,seeNicolausandYuce2019.16ABritishofficervisitedSinjarduringthisperiod(Forbes1839).17Fuccaro1999,4.18Gölbaşı(2009)providesahighlyinformativenarrativeoftheOttoman-Yezidirelationsregardingconscription.19Guest,104;Gölbaşı2009,95.20Erdem(1996,46,59-60)writesthatthepost-1856TanzimaterabroughtanendtotheOttomanpracticetoenslavementofdisobedientpopulations.Atthesametime,Parry(1895)observesthatthisfindesiècle

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campaignentailedthekidnappingsofYezidiwomenandgirlsandtheirforcedmarriagetotheOttomansoldiers.21Deringil1999,71-5.TheOttomanstateeventuallyreturnedthepossessionoftheLalishtempleandsacredobjectstotheYezidireligiousleadership.22LeagueofNations1925.23Fuccaro1997.24TherewaslittlemodernpoliticalparticipationamongYezidis.Forinstance,theCommunistPartyofIraqthatattractedmarginalizedethnicandreligiousgroupssuchasChristians,Kurds,andShiiteArabshadverylittleYezidirepresentation.Batatu1978,1190.25Ali2019.26ItalsoaimedtogenerateahistoriographylinkingYezidistotheUmayyadcaliphateandarguingfortheirArabicroots.SeeMajidAliHassanchapterinthisvolume.27Savelsberg,Hajo,andDulz2010.28Heavymajorities(morethantwo-thirds)inAnbarandSalahuddinvotedno.HadthenovoteinNinevehalsoreachedthetwo-thirds,theconstitutionwouldberejected.BBC2005.29AYezidipoliticianaffiliatedwithaKurdishpartyresembledDinjartoDarfurregionofSudangivenitsunderdevelopment.InterviewwithXXX,May2018-XXX.30InterviewwithKhidirDomle,May2019.-XXX.31UNAMI2009(WethankPeterBartuforsharingthisdocumentwithus);HRW2009.AUSdiplomaticcablefrom2008publishedbyWikileaksnotesthatMirTahsinSaidBeg,theforemostYezidileader,wasworriedwithforcefultransferofYezidipropertytoKurdishownershipinSheikhanwiththegoalofincreasingthenumberofKurdsinthedisputedterritoriesofNineveh.Availableathttps://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD3776_a.html. 32UNHCR2005.33UNAMI200934UNAMI2009.AccordingtoUNHABITAT(2015),theSinjarregionhadapopulationof339,000beforetheAugust2014attacks.Yezidismadearound74percentofthispopulation.35HRW2009.36SomeYezidislabeltheseattacksas“the73rdfirman.”37ThisYezidipartywontheparliamentaryseatallocatedforYezidisinthe2005Iraqielections.38UNAMI2009;USIP2011.TherewasasignificantincreaseinthenumberofvotersinSinjarbetween2005and2009leadingtotheallegationsofvotingfraud.39Spät(2018,426)observesthisideaoffusionbetweenKurdishandYezidiidentitiesfoundalessreceptiveaudienceamongtheYezidisofSinjarthantheYezidislivingeastoftheTigris,whohavealongerandmoreintensehistoryofcontactwiththeKurds.40ThisdraftconstitutionalsotalksaboutreligiousfreedomofYezidisinArticles65and124.Forananalysisofandtextofthedraft,seeKelly2010.41TherewasasingleYezidipoliticianaffiliatedwiththeKDP,SheikhShamo,intheKRGparliamentelectedin2013.TwoYezidisonefromKDPandanotherfromPUK,gainedseatsintheSeptember2018parliamentaryelections.TheinabilityofYezidisfromSinjar,manyofwhomlivedincampsintheDuhokprovince,significantlyundermineselectoralpowersoftheYezidisintheKRGelections.Ironically,thesedisplacedYezidiswereallowedtovoteintheKurdishindependencereferenduminSeptember2017.42Dinç2017.43Cetorellietal.,2017.44AsofAugust2019,3,509ofthesecaptiveswereliberated,mostlythroughransompayments,accordingtothestatisticsannouncedbytheKRG.45Kocho,wheretheworstatrocitiestookplace,remainedundersiegeuntilAugust15whentheISmilitantsraidedthetown,executedadultmalesingroups,andenslavedwomenandchildren.Accordingtosurvivortestimonies,ISmilitantsincludedArabsfromneighboringvillages.46TheexceptiontothispatternisthetownofHerdan,locatedinthenorthwesternpartofMt.Sinjar,whichwasattackedbytheneighboringSunniTurkomans.47AsofFebruary2017,therewerearound36,000familiesinIDPcampsintheDohukprovinceoftheKRG.Around77percentofthesefamilieswereYezidis(BRHA2017,18).

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48“ObamaallowslimitedairstrikesonISIS,”TheNewYorkTimes,August7,2014.Availableathttps://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-military-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html. 49OHCHR2016.50McGee2018.51Themostwell-knownoftheseassociationsareYazdaandFreeYezidiFoundation.52TheICChasjurisdictionovercrimescommittedbyISmilitantswhoarecitizensofthecountriesthataremembersofthecourt.ItisalsopossiblefortheUNSecurityCounciltoreferacasetotheICC,asithappenedwithatrocitiesinDarfurin2005.Becauseofthisreferral,theICCProsecutorissuedanindictmentofthenSudanesePresidentOmaral-Bashirandaccusedhimcommittingthecrimeofgenocide.YettheTrumpadministration,whichisopenlyhostiletotheICC,wasnotwillingtoreferthecaseofISatrocitiestotheinternationalcourt.53HRW2017.54InterviewsinDohuk,May2018.55InastatementdeliveredonthefourthanniversaryoftheISattacks,then-KRGPrimeMinisterNechirwanBarzanidescribedtheevents“asoneofthemostbarbaricgenocidesofthe21stcentury.”Rudaw,August3,2018.Availableathttps://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/030820182. 56BaserandToivanen2017.57WhilemanyYezidiswereagnosticabouttheKurdishreferendumin2017,MirTahsinSaidBeg,whodiedinJanuary2019,askedYezidistosupportKurdishindependence.“JiMîreÊzidiyênCîhanêbangareferandûmê”Rudaw,September23,2017.Availableathttps://www.rudaw.net/kurmanci/kurdistan/230920175.58YazdaPressRelease,May15,2016.Availableathttps://www.facebook.com/yazda.organization/posts/yazda-press-releasea-statement-about-recent-political-developments-in-shingal-si/484781928398425/. 59DemandsforautonomyhavealonghistoryamongtheAssyriansgoingbacktotheformativeyearsofIraq.Joseph1961,chp8.60ICG2018.ShiiteviewsofYezidisarecomplicatedbythewidespreadperceptionthatYezidisarefollowersofCaliphYazid,themosthatedfigureintheShiitehistoriography.Atthesametime,thereisnohistoryofYezidi-Shiiteintercommunalconflictinrecenthistorygiventheirlimitedgeographicalcontact.Infact,YezidisandShiitesofSinjarwereparticipatinginsimilarritualsandveneratingthesameshrineinthepost-2003period.Dirasat2016,95.Moreover,ShiiteauthoritiesstronglycondemnedtheIScrueltyagainstYezidisandAyatollahAliSistanimetwithaYezididelegation.Ibid,404-5.61ForanoverviewofKDP-PKKtensionsoverSinjar,seeYılmaz2018.62ThePKKpresenceinSinjaraggravatedthreatperceptionoftheTurkishstatethatconductedairstrikesintheareainnumeroustimes.63ForthemotivesofwomenjoiningthePKKanditsgenderpolitics,seeTezcür2019.64Jefferson2014.65DaviesandTrue2015,505.66Maisel2008;Oehring2017.Shi’iiteTurkmenwomenandgirls,albeitatasignificantlylowerscale,werealsoamongminoritiesinIraqthatwereexposedtosexualviolencebyIS.Bor2019.67Inpractice,thisdistinctionwasnotalwayskept.ISmembersdidalsokidnapped,raped,andenslavedChristianwomen.“ChristianwomenkidnappedbyISreunitedwithfatherafterfouryears,”Kurdistan24,April5,2018.Availableathttps://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/987a77c3-56c3-44b7-a8f9-e6a8d63d0e00.68Dabiq2014,Issue4,pp.14-15.69Dabiq2014,Issue4,p.15.70InterviewswithmembersofYezidicommunity,May2018,Duhok.71InterviewwithPrinceHassan,May2018,Prince’sHouseinSheikhan.72Erdener2017;Kizilhan2018.73GenevaInternationalCentreforJustice2015,pp.18-22.74InterviewwithtwoYezidisexualviolencesurvivors,Sharyacamp,Duhok,May2018.75McGee2018.76AccordingtothreedifferentNGOsources,thenumberofmotherswithchildrenfromISISwasaround200asofMay2018.SomewomengavetheirchildrentothePKKandsomeofthemreturnedandtookshelterwiththeirchildunderthePKK.Yazidisurvivorswithchildrensometimesfinddifferentstrategiestonavigatein

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thissituation.Someclaimtotheirfamiliesthattheymetahusband(usuallydeadormissing)atsomepointandthechildwashis.Eventhoughthisisnottrue,andthefamilyknowsthis,theyacceptit.Somemotherswanttokeepthechild;somedonot.InterviewsinDuhokandSheikhan,May2018.ThetopicremainshighlycontroversialamongYezidis.OnApril24,2019,YezidiSupremeSpiritualCouncilissuedadeclarationacceptingthesechildrentothecommunitybeforereversingitthreedayslater.77Jefferson2014;Turshen2001,p.66.78Moradi2016.79InterviewswithYezidicommunitymembers,December2017andMay2018,Duhok.80ShingalisthelocalnameforSinjar.81InterviewwithaYezidifemalehumanitarianNGOstaff,May2018,Duhok.82Fromthisperspective,thelackofrecognitionofmisrecognitioncanbeaformofoppressionTaylor1994.