1
Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”
State retrenchments and class dynamics: the “new” middle class under strain
Louis ChauvelPr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France
Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr
2
Explaining (some of) the French problem(s)?Political instability, extreme right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen qualification for the 2nd turn of presidential elections April 21 2002, rejection of the European Treaty May 29 2005, anti-globalisation movements, populist streams, xenophobia, fears, …
« Yes » at two European referendums in France by socio-occupational group (%)
Source : My own computation of CEVIPOF 1995 microdata and CSA postelectoral survey 2005.
Maastricht treaty referendum
20 September 1992
European constitutional treaty referendum
29 may 2005 Change
Professionals & managers 66 67 1
Self employed 49 53 4
Semi prof. and lower managers 55 46 -9
Routine white collars 47 37 -10
Blue collar workers 43 30 -13
Diff = 23% Diff = 37%
Tot = 51% Tot = 46%
3
Plan
Europe as a middle-class exception in the worldObjective degree of inequality and class consciousness:
paradoxical dynamicsThe middle class dynamics and welfare state retrenchmentsConclusion: post-affluent societies and the middle class(es)
4
1. The social specificity of Europe in the world
An affluent and relatively equal clubEurope as a strong middle class (“median class”)Complex evolutions during the last 20 years…
5
Development (per capita GDP PPP)
Inequality (Gini coeff)
Venezuela
Ukraine
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
BelarusBelgium
BoliviaBrazil
Bulgaria
Cambodia Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d`Ivoire
Croatia
Czech R.Denmark
Dom.Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
JapanKazakhstan
Korea R.
Kyrgyz R.
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
PanamaParaguay
PeruPhilippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
SwitzerlandTaiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
TunisiaTurkey
U.K.
U.S.
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851R2 = 0,3085
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1000 10000 100000
(World Income Inequality Database)
(Penn World Tables Database)
Data 2000
Nordic countries
Corporatist countr.
Liberal and Mediterranean countr.
Transitional Eastern Europe
Latin America
6
50
100
Lower income class = poor
200
Median income class =« middle class »
Higher income class = rich
median income
IncomeThe strobiloid
representation of income distribution
7
Comparisons of national strobiloids : national median
Sweden :Median disposable income per year per capita : 23.000 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 25.2 %
Median class = 84 %
US :Median disposable income per year per capita : 32.000 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 34.5 %
Median class = 58 %
Brazil :Median disposable income per year per capita : 6.900 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 59.8 %
Median class = 44 %
Median national income
8
Comparisons of national strobiloids : PPP exchange rate
Sweden :Median disposable income per year per capita : 23.000 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 25.2 %
Median class = 84 %
US :Median disposable income per year per capita : 32.000 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 34.5 %
Median class = 58 %
Brazil :Median disposable income per year per capita : 6.900 $PPP/an
Gini coef.: 59.8 %
Median class = 44 %
9
Development (per capita GDP PPP)
Inequality (Gini coeff)
Venezuela
Ukraine
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
BelarusBelgium
BoliviaBrazil
Bulgaria
Cambodia Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d`Ivoire
Croatia
Czech R.Denmark
Dom.Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
JapanKazakhstan
Korea R.
Kyrgyz R.
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
PanamaParaguay
PeruPhilippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
SwitzerlandTaiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
TunisiaTurkey
U.K.
U.S.
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851R2 = 0,3085
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1000 10000 100000
Data 2000
10
Development log10(per capita GDP PPP)
Inequality (Gini coeff)
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech R.
DenmarkFinland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea R
Malaysia
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland.
Taiwan
TunisiaTurkey
U.K.
U.S.
y = -16,122x + 101,38R2 = 0,3387
20
25
30
35
40
45
3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6
Data 2000
11
Development log10(per capita GDP PPP)
Inequality (Gini coeff)
U.S.
U.K.
Turkey Tunisia
Taiwan
Switzerland.
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia Slovak Rep.
Russia
Romania
Portugal
Poland
Norway Netherlands
Malaysia
Korea, Republic of
Japan
Italy
Israel
Ireland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland Denmark
Czech R.
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
20
25
30
35
40
45
3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6
Australia
Austria Belgium
Canada
Costa Rica
Czech R.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland.
Taiwan
Tunisia
U.K.
U.S.
Venezuela From early 1980’ to 2000
12
Development (per capita GDP - PPP)
Inequality (Gini coeff)
U.S.
U.K.
Turkey Tunisia
Taiwan
Switzerland.
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia Slovak Rep.
Russia
Romania
Portugal
Poland
Norway Netherlands
Malaysia
Korea R
Japan
Italy
Israel
Ireland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland Denmark
Czech R.
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
20
25
30
35
40
45
3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6
Australia
Austria Belgium
Canada
Costa Rica
Czech R.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel Italy
Japan
Korea R
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland.
Taiwan
Tunisia
U.K.
U.S.
Venezuela From early 1980’ to 2000
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Construction européenne et croissance des inégalités
European enlargement
step European Gini(exchange rate)
European Gini
(PPP)
6 29% 28%
12 32% 30%
15 31% 30%
25 42% 33%
28 58% 43%
31 59% 43%
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2. Objective intensity of inequality and class consciousness: paradoxical dynamics (in the French case)
Distinction between objective and subjective class systemsClass system without class consciousnessThe spiral of social classes
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Objective and subjective intensity of class system
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1810-1819
1820-1829
1830-1839
1840-1849
1850-1859
1860-1869
1870-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899
1900-1909
1910-1919
1920-1929
1930-1939
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1810-1819
1820-1829
1830-1839
1840-1849
1850-1859
1860-1869
1870-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899
1900-1909
1910-1919
1920-1929
1930-1939
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
« classe ouvrière » or « classes sociales »
« classes sociales »
Source : Bibliothèque nationale de France catalogue
Number of Book Titles in the catalogue of Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF) containing « classes sociales » or « classe ouvrière » (20-years mobile average of per decade occurrences)
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1960 to 1980 decline in income inequality and stability after
Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation ERF
Inequality measure : Interdecile ratio D9/D1 1954 to 2002
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
17
Independence of objective and subjective dimensions : a typology
Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation ERF
Victory of proletariat Class Society
Classless society Alienation
Strong degree of subjectivation of
inequalities
Weak degree of subjectivation of
inequalities
Weak objective degree of inequalities
Strong objective degree of inequalities
18The historical social classes spiral
Objectivity of class: Intensity of Inequalities
Subjectivity of class: consciousness
movments, and class struggle
F 1890
F 1950 F 1970
F 1989
F 2000
Victory of proletariat
classless society Alienation
Class society
F 1830
‚
ƒ „
F 1982 Decommodification
Recommodification
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3. The middle class dynamics and Welfare state expansions and retrenchments
Back to Schmoller : the state and the “new middle class(es)”Post-affluent societies:
the lost paradise of the new middle class The fate of generational dynamics
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The state and the “new middle class”SCHMOLLER G. 1897, Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstande? Hat er im
19. Jahrhundert zu oder abgenommen?, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Against the Marxist theory of absolute pauperization :
=> Late Nineteenth century and the expansion of large state and private technical, managerial and expertise bureaucracies – supported and institutionalized by increasing social rights – foster the constitution of a culturally educated and economically comfortable “neu mittelstand”
Educational ressources
Economic Ressources
Higher strata
Lower Strata
New higher middle class
Old higher middle class
New lower middle class
Old lower middle class
=> The state is not simply an equalitarian ruler, a provider of decommodified resources, it could be also a specific employer
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Post-affluent societies: the lost paradise of the new middle class
Artisans
Commerçants
Chefs d'entreprises de 10 salariés et plus
Professions libérales
Cadres de la fonction pub.
Professeurs, professions scientifiques
Cadres administratifs
d'entreprise
Ingénieurs
Instituteurs ou assimilés
Professions intermédiaires de la santé et du travail social
Professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique
Professions intermédiaires administratives
entreprisesTechniciens
Contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise
Employés fonc pub,
agents de service Policiers et militaires
Employés
entreprisesEmployés
Personnels des services directs aux particuliers
Ouvriers qualifiés de type industriel Ouvriers qualifiés de
Chauffeurs
Ouvriers qualifiés, manutention, magasinage, transport
Ouvriers non qualifindustriel
artisanal
Ouvriers agricoles
The Bourdieu scheme
Educational ressourcesdominant
Economic Ressourcesdominant
Higher strata
Lower Strata
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-0,4-0,3-0,2-0,100,10,20,3
0,2-0,3
0,1-0,2
0-0,1
-0,1-0
-0,2--0,1
-0,3--0,2
-0,4--0,3
-0,4-0,3-0,2-0,100,10,20,3
0,2-0,3
0,1-0,2
0-0,1
-0,1-0
-0,2--0,1
-0,3--0,2
-0,4--0,3
1992 to 2002 densification on the Bourdieu scheme
50 to 59 Years old 30 to 39 Years old
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Available explanations ?
Decline in the return to educational assets (and not to economic assets) — is it really a “knowledge society”?
State as an employer is more and more a state as a pension system for former civil servants (strong decline in hiring for the newer generations)
The fate of generational dynamics: the newer generations are the children of a gifted generation (first cohorts of the baby-boom) which was massively new middle-class, but the newer generations have little room in the “new” middle-class
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The fate of generational dynamics
first cohorts of the baby-boom
their children
their parents
Upward and downward mobility rate (cohort diagrams) - male population
Upward mob rate Downward mob rate
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
3035404550
Age %
Cohorte0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
3035404550
Age %
Cohorte
25
4. Conclusion: Farewell to the “new” middle class?
What is ever “new” with new middle class, 1 century later?A social backlash after affluence?Which consequences?Which are the adequate social policies:
feeding the poor (bread and circuses), or rehomogeneisation of Europe?
Were are sociologists in terms of new/old higher/lower middle class : are we the next slice of the salami?
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Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”
THE ENDLouis Chauvel
Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France
Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr