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February 2017
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+3.1% Y/Y
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SeaIntel Sunday Spotlight April 9, 2017 – Issue 307
Windows User
Content
Editorial: Spot rates continue erosion Page 2
Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections Page 3
Digitization: It is not about technology Page 10
Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times Page 15
Carrier Service Changes Page 30
Carrier Rate Announcements Page 31
SeaIntel products Page 34
Executive Summary
Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections
Both Transatlantic trade lanes will experience a significant injection of capacity
compared to 2016-Q2, with Med-USEC and North Europe-USEC showing a 19.4%
and 5.6% increase, respectively. Further, there does not appear to be any April
capacity shortage.
Digitization: It is not about technology
A trip through the last 20 years of eCommerce history in the container shipping
sector clearly shows that if this was a matter of technology, the whole industry
would have become digital long ago.
Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times
The trade lane will experience a rather positive development in terms of port-
pairs, as 29 distinct port-pairs will be gained against nine lost. The transit times
will improve slightly, but overall the trade lane remains mostly unchanged.
Port of
Klaipeda
February 2017
Container
volumes
38,773 TEU
+20.7% Y/Y
Port of
Incheon
February 2017
Container
volumes
192,981 TEU
+15.1% Y/Y
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
2
Editorial: Spot rates continue erosion SCFI spot rates this week either remained flat or continued eroding in all trade lanes
out of Shanghai, with the exception of the Asia-West Africa trade lane, which saw spot
rates increase modestly by 84 USD/TEU (+4.6%) to 1,911 USD/TEU.
Of biggest concern is the Transpacific trade, where there have been no noteworthy rate
increases since early January, but spot rates have been constantly eroding ever since,
at an erosion rate of close to 100 USD/week. While not quite as horrific as in 2015, at
the current lukewarm rate levels, it won’t take many weeks at this level of erosion
before we move into loss-making territory.
Even more concerning for the carriers, the failure of the April 1st General Rate Increase
will be viewed by many as a gauge of the relative market strength of the carriers, and
whether they will have the resolve to push for compensatory contract rates for the
2017/18 Transpac contracting season which ends at the end of April.
Carriers were likely hoping that the consolidation wave and new alliances would provide
a backdrop of stronger carrier resolve, and try to convince shippers that it would be in
their best interest to close contracts early. It is also not unthinkable, that some carriers
would be using the current alliance restructuring turmoil, to remind shippers and freight
forwarders of what they can expect, if carriers are not charging sustainable freight rates.
Rumours are that many large contracts are still open, as the large carriers are fighting
to keep contract rates above 1,000 USD/FFE. If they manage to stick it out, and not get
lured by market shares and the under-cutting of some of the smaller lines, 2017 may
become the turning point after 6 years of despair.
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
Asia-USWC 12-week Average rate erosion
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
Asia-USEC12-week Average rate erosion
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
3
Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections
Both Transatlantic trade lanes will experience a significant
injection of capacity compared to 2016-Q2, with Med-USEC and
North Europe-USEC showing a 19.4% and 5.6% increase,
respectively. Further, there does not appear to be any April
capacity shortage.
In last week’s analysis, we found that
three out of four trade lanes on Asia-
Europe and Transpacific showed a
significant capacity injection from the
new alliances, with only Asia-USWC
recording a decrease in deployed alliance
capacity.
This week we turn our attention to the
Transatlantic trade, the oft-overlooked of
the main East/West trades. The
Transatlantic trade is usually considered
one of the more stable trades, as the
trade connects two mature economies,
the volumes are significantly lower than
on Asia-Europe and Transpacific, and the
volumes have traditionally been
relatively balanced, although this may be
changing due to long-term economic
stagnation in Europe. From the
perspective of port-pairs offered, transit
times and service frequency, we have
found that the Transatlantic Westbound
trade lanes are relatively stable with few
changes as a result of the new alliance
networks, as analysed in last week’s
issue of the Sunday Spotlight, as well as
in the second article in this issue.
In this article, we will cover the North
Europe-USEC and Mediterranean-USEC
trade lanes, and analyse the impact on
deployed capacity as the new alliance
networks come into effect.
Methodology
The data for this article has been sourced
exclusively from SeaIntel’s proprietary
Trade Capacity Outlook (TCO) database,
where we map out every single vessel
deployed on every service in all the main
deep-sea trade lanes, both historically as
well as 12 weeks into the future.
In this article, we include the historical
alliance and non-alliance capacity from
2015-Q1 when the 2M and Ocean Three
alliances were launched, up to and
including 2017-Q1, which is the last
quarter before the new alliance networks
come into effect. We report the historical
deployed capacity on a quarterly level,
calculated as the average weekly
capacity over the weeks of the given
quarter, and we benchmark the new
alliance capacities against both FY 2016
and 2016-Q2.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
4
We also include medium-term
developments in deployed alliance
capacity, from five weeks prior to the
new alliances are launched in April 2017,
to 12 weeks into the future. As the five
weeks prior to the launch of the new
alliances are in March 2017, there is an
obvious overlap between 2017-Q1 data
and the weekly pre-launch capacity
deployment, and the quarterly to weekly
data should be viewed as overlapping.
It should be noted that the Transatlantic
trade is not offered exclusively by
alliances, but the weekly capacity is
rather supplied by a mix of alliance-
services, non-alliance services operated
by alliance members – both as exclusive
services from a single alliance carrier,
and as Vessel Sharing Agreements
(VSAs) operated by carriers within and
across alliance structures – as well as
services operated by smaller niche
carriers.
This gives rise to a methodological
challenge, as we would need to cluster
the previous and the new services offered
in the two trade lanes into carrier
groupings or alliances. We have opted to
divide the services into alliances –
whenever possible – or into “Others
Global” or “Others Niche”. While “Others
Global” covers services offered by
carriers that are members of an alliance
but the service is not an alliance service,
while the latter group covers services
offered by niche carriers (e.g. ICL, ZIM,
Turkon Line). All the services included in
the analysis are listed in the following
paragraphs.
We have decided to exclude the Europe-
US West Coast trade lane, as the trade
lane only has two dedicated services
deployed, the MSC-operated California
Express and the MCPS/Medpac service
operated by Hapag-Lloyd and Hamburg
Süd, and as neither service has been or
will be operated within an alliance, they
will not be impacted by the new alliance
networks. We have included The
Alliance’s AL5-service, as it also calls
USEC.
We have opted to only look at the
Westbound direction of the Transatlantic
trade, as this is the head-haul of the
trade, and as the capacity developments
on East- and Westbound will be the
same, although offset by a number of
weeks. Further, we have decided to split
the Europe to US East Coast trade into
two separate trade lanes, from North
Europe and Mediterranean, respectively.
For the North Europe-USEC trade lane we
have split the services into six different
groupings, as follows:
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
5
“old” alliance and non-alliance:
2M: TA1/NEUATL1, TA2/NEUATL2,
NEUATL3, TA4/NEUATL4
G6: AX1, AX2, AX3, PA1
Others Global:
- Canada America Express/Saint
Laurent 1 (Maersk Line/CMA CGM),
- TAE/AUE (Evergreen/Yang Ming),
- Victory Bridge/AGX (CMA CGM/APL),
- Liberty Bridge/APNE/NUE1 (CMA
CGM/Hamburg Süd/UASC),
- AT1/GEX1/Montreal Express (Hapag
Lloyd/OOCL/MSC),
- AT2/GEX2 (Hapag Lloyd/OOCL)
Other Niche: Transatlantic Service (ICL)
Future alliance and non-alliance:
2M: TA1/NEUATL1, TA2/NEUATL2,
TA3/NEUATL3
Ocean Alliance: Liberty
Bridge/TAE/AXS, Victory
Bridge/EAG/AGX
The Alliance: AL1, AL2, AL3, AL4, AL5
Others Global:
- Canada America Express/Saint
Laurent 1 (Maersk Line/CMA CGM)
- AT1/GEX1/Montreal Express (Hapag
Lloyd/OOCL/MSC)
- AT2/GEX2 (Hapag Lloyd/OOCL)
Other Niche: Transatlantic Service (ICL)
For the Mediterranean to USEC, we have
chosen to cluster the services into five
different groupings as follows:
“old” alliance and non-alliance:
2M: TA5/MED-USEC, TA6/MED-GULF
Others Global:
- Canada Express 1 (MSC),
- Canada Express 2 (MSC),
- MCA (Hapag Lloyd),
- MGX (Hapag Lloyd/Zim),
- MEDGULF (CMA CGM),
- Amerigo/MENA (CMA CGM / UASC /
COSCON)
Other Niche: ZCA (ZIM), Med-America
Line (Turkon Line)
Future alliance and non-alliance:
2M: TA5/MED-USEC, TA6/MED-GULF
Ocean Alliance: Amerigo/MENA/WMS
The Alliance: AL6
Others Global:
- Canada Express 1 (MSC),
- Canada Express 2 (MSC),
- MCA (Hapag Lloyd),
- MGX (Hapag Lloyd/ZIM),
- MEDGULF (CMA CGM)
Other Niche: ZCA/AL7 (ZIM), Med-
America Line (Turkon Line)
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
6
It should be noted that the AL8 service
offered by The Alliance, is in reality a slot
charterer agreement on the con-ro “A
service” from ACL. As this service is not
included in the trade lane’s capacity
outlook, as a consequence the AL8
service is not encompassed in the
analysis.
North Europe – US East Coast
Figure A1 shows the average weekly
capacity deployed on North Europe-US
East Coast from 2015-Q1 until 2017-Q1,
as well as including the five weeks before
the launch of the alliances and a 12-week
outlook based on the named vessels in
the carriers’ schedules. It is important to
notice that the chart is showing the
cumulative deployed capacity. This
means that, on average, The Alliance will
in the future offer 22,500 TEU per week,
while 2M and Ocean Alliance follow with
19,400 TEU and 14,600 TEU per week,
respectively. The rest of the weekly
deployed capacity will be split between
Other-Global carriers, with three
remaining services and an average
weekly capacity of approximately 10,000
TEU, and the only service from a non-
alliance/niche carrier being ICL, with an
average weekly capacity of 2,500 TEU.
Figure A1 shows that we will see an
increase in weekly offered capacity when
the new alliances will go live. On average,
over the coming 12 weeks, the weekly
capacity shows a significant increase of
7.0% when compared to FY 2016, or
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
March April May June
2015 2016 2017
2M Other-Global Other-Niche OA TA G6
Fig A1: NEUR-USEC Weekly Capacity - New vs Old
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
7
5.6% when compared to 2016-Q2. The
number of services is left unchanged, as
seven services will be withdrawn, while
seven new ones will be launched by the
Ocean Alliance (two) and The Alliance
(five).
Nevertheless, this increase is due to the
fact that some of the remaining services
will see the deployment of larger vessels,
as for instance 2M’s service
TA2/NEUATL2 which will see its average
vessel size increase from 4,800 TEU in
2016-Q2 to 7,500 TEU in the next twelve
weeks.
As the only alliance that will be present
in both the old and new alliance
networks, 2M will be growing faster than
the market, as they will see their
deployed weekly capacity grow 16.8%
compared to 2016-Q2. The capacity
deployed by G6 will be almost taken over
by The Alliance’s new service network,
while Ocean Alliance with their two
services will completely replace the
capacity offered by the closed services
TAE/AUE, Victory Bridge/AGX and Liberty
Bridge/APNE/NUE1.
Last week’s analysis of the other trade
lanes showed a significant drop
throughout the first weeks of April, as
carriers will be re-deploying vessels to
the new alliance services, causing
possible disruption to the global supply
chains.
However, this pattern is not seen for this
trade lane, as we can actually observe a
spike in capacity offered out of North
Europe for the first week of April. This
indicates that the carriers may have been
able to effectively re-design their service
networks to ensure a smooth transition
into the new alliances.
Mediterranean – US East Coast
Figure A2 also shows a significant
capacity injection in Mediterranean to US
East Coast, as the new alliance networks
are launched. The average weekly
capacity over the coming twelve weeks
will be equal to 44,200 TEU, which
corresponds to a 23.0% increase over FY
2016 and 19.4% when compared to
2016-Q2.
The graph clearly shows that the largest
share of capacity on the trade lane will be
offered on non-alliance services from
carriers who are part of an alliance,
indicated by Other-Global, with an
average weekly capacity over the next
twelve weeks of 16,000 TEU. Further, 2M
will have the second largest share of
capacity with an average of 12,300 TEU
per week thanks to their two dedicated
services, while Ocean Alliance and The
Alliance follow with 5,200 TEU and 4,500
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
8
TEU per week, respectively. The two
services operated by non-alliance/niche
carriers will offer a combined average
weekly capacity in the coming twelve
weeks of 6,000 TEU.
The massive increase in deployed
capacity is partly explained by the fact
that the trade lane will see its number of
services increase to 10, compared to nine
services offered prior to the launch of the
new alliances. Moreover, MSC have
upgraded the size of the vessels deployed
on their exclusively-offered Canada
Express 2 service.
As seen in the North Europe to US East
Coast trade lane, shippers should not
experience major capacity shortage
issues as the new alliance networks are
launched, as we are not seeing the
distinct drop in deployed capacity that we
saw on the Asia-Europe and Transpacific
trade lanes.
Conclusion
As the new alliances go live, we will see
a massive injection of capacity in the two
trade lanes connecting Europe to US East
Coast, which is in line with the
conclusions we had in last week’s
analysis on deployed capacity in the main
East/West trade lanes.
North Europe-USEC will see average
weekly capacity grow by 5.6% compared
to FY 2016-Q2. The Alliance will be
leading the trade lane with a capacity
market share of 32.2% and 22,500 TEU
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
March April May June
2015 2016 2017
2M Other-Global Other-Niche OA TA
Fig A2: MED-USEC Weekly Capacity - New vs Old
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
9
in weekly average capacity. 2M will
closely follow with a capacity market
share of 27.9% and 19,400 TEU per
week, while Ocean Alliance will have a
capacity market share of 21.0% and offer
an average 14,600 TEU per week.
Services offered by alliance carriers
outside the alliances will account for
15.4% and 10,800 TEU/week, while
niche carrier ICL will have a capacity
market share of 3.5% and offer 2,500
TEU/week.
The trade lane connecting Mediterranean
to USEC will experience an even larger
capacity injection, as a 19.4% increase is
observed for the next twelve weeks
compared to 2016-Q2. Here, the major
share of capacity, 36.3% or 16,100
TEU/week, is supplied by alliance-carrier
services operated outside the alliance
framework, suggesting a rather
segmented and competitive trade lane.
2M follows with a 27,9% capacity market
share, offering 12,300 TEU/week, while
niche carriers combined come third with
6,000 TEU/week and a capacity market
share of 13.7%. Ocean Alliance comes
fourth with a capacity market share of
11.8% and offering 5,200 TEU/Week,
while The Alliance has the smallest share
at 10.2% and 4,500 TEU/Week
Interestingly, neither of the two trade
lanes showed the same capacity shortage
throughout the first weeks of April that
we could observe for the other East/West
trades. This shows that the alliance
carriers were able to effectively plan the
re-deployment of their Transatlantic fleet
to avoid any major disruption to their
services.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
10
Digitization: It is not about technology A trip through the last 20 years of eCommerce history in container
shipping clearly shows that if this was a matter of technology, the
whole industry would have become digital long ago.
The liner shipping industry is currently
seeing a surge in digitization. Just this
week we saw the launch of Maersk’s new
offshoot, Twill, via their forwarding arm
Damco. However, Twill is not new in a
space of online freight, where players
such as Kontainers, FreightOS, Flexport,
iContainers and a multitude of other
players are emerging.
Additionally, we are seeing other
digitization projects emerge as well,
ranging from enforceable contracts in
NYSHEX, online containers from
TRAXENS, rate benchmarks from Xeneta,
equipment repositioning from BCG
xChange and predictive logistics from
Clearmetal. These are only a sampling of
the companies emerging.
Additionally, more digitized pilots are
coming from the carriers, with significant
market attention recently being levied on
Alibaba’s trials with Maersk Line, CMA
CGM and ZIM, as well as Maersk Line’s
foray into blockchain technology with
IBM.
More initiatives are in the pipeline from
both carriers and independent technology
companies, either being kept under wraps
during development, or simply not having
been picked up by the mainstream
shipping press.
Just to mention one example of the latter,
Maersk is working on a platform named
Fromtu, with some details provided back
in November 2016 on the East Africa
Trade Investment Hub, where it is
presented as platform designed to
connect the African market to
international buyers. It is not possible to
access the site, as that requires login
credentials, yet its existence and purpose
has been known for half a year without
the broader maritime community noticing
it.
All in all, we are facing a 2017 where we
will see an increasing amount of ventures
launched in the maritime domain – either
by independent companies or by carriers.
This is all part of the transition to a new
way of doing business in liner shipping, as
outlined in detail in the book “Liner
Shipping 2025” by Lars Jensen, co-
founder of SeaIntel.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
11
Who will succeed?
Which ones of these many ventures will
then be successful? This is where
significant learning points can be
extracted from the immediate past. Many
of the initiatives launched these days are
actually not new at all. It has all been
done before
And, in reality, many of the initiatives
launched previously quite simply failed.
Hence, it is prudent to take a look at
history, identify why they failed and try to
ascertain what it is they need to do
differently this time.
As this is not intended to be a major
history lesson in maritime eCommerce,
we have chosen only to include a
sampling of past projects in the period
1998-2007 – i.e. all these initiatives were
operational more than decade ago.
2007: Maersk Line launched Youship as a
purely online container carrier, or more
correctly, forwarder. It was possible to
find a suitable schedule, see a spot rate,
book cargo, get instant confirmation,
submit relevant shipment details, pay and
print shipment documents, all online and
within 10 minutes. Youship even won the
2008 web award for outstanding
achievement in web development. In
reality, Youship was first launched in 2004
by P&O Nedlloyd on the Trans-Tasman
trade, but was temporarily mothballed
during the period where Maersk Line
acquired P&O Nedlloyd.
In essence, Youship provided all the
functionality that the new companies
promoting online spot shipping today
offers – only they did it successfully more
than 10 years ago.
2006: Clarkson and Synchronet launched
Global Slot Network (GSN). It was
intended as a neutral electronic trading
platform that facilitated ocean carriers,
shippers and other participants in the
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
12
container transportation industry to buy
and sell container slot capacity and cargo.
Carriers could post products and prices on
GSN, and whenever one offer had been
accepted by a customer, the price of the
other offers would be automatically re-
calculated.
2000: Bolero launched the concept of
purely electronic Bills of Lading in order to
facilitate trade – but that was not even
the first time the industry had seen such
an attempt. Instead, that was seen in
1993:
1993: Bimcom had been launching
electronic messaging capabilities, and
while they did not have a final solution for
the electronic Bill of Lading, it was stated
that the evolutionary process will move
through E-mail to the exchange of
constructed documents, initially within a
single company and eventually to trading
partners. Ultimately, it would be possible
to evolve into the sending and receipt of
more complex documents, central
databases and thence to the exchange of
negotiable instruments.
In a 24-year old article from Lloyds List,
Bimcom is referred to in the following
way: ”BIMCOM, which now has 300
subscribers and is growing at a rate of
more than 15% per month, offers the
shipping industry no less than a complete
information transfer package “
1998 saw Greybox launch
tradexonline.com which was a tool aimed
at reducing the costs associated with
repositioning of empty equipment. In an
article from Computerworld in September
1998 it is stated that the system is
interchanging 1200 containers per month
for 150 customers, and has a growth rate
of 30% per month.
2000: Topflight was launched in the UK
to provide transportation rate
benchmarks, initially for road and air, but
to be followed a year later by deep-sea
rate benchmarks. Data was based on
input from a large panel of logistics
purchasing managers, and the managing
director of Topflight stated: “The web
means only that you can buy freight
transport without seeing the sales reps.
Because we are, through the benchmark
reports, showing them which route they
need to concentrate where the
price/service ration is less than
satisfactory.”
1998/99: The launch of online freight
portal eRateRequest and GoCargo. In
1999 NeoModal acquired eRateRequest
and stated the following: “eRateRequest
was the first mover in the ocean
containerized cargo market and has
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
13
several thousand registered shippers,
intermediaries and carriers that have
collectively conducted over 1,000
transactions," said Randy Paulson, co-
president of NeoModal. "This established
base of users will provide significant
liquidity for the launch of NeoMarket in
July.”
What can we learn?
Reviewing the past history of eCommerce
in the container shipping sector clearly
shows that none of new initiatives being
launched now are truly “new”. Variations
over the same concepts have all been
tried in the past 19 years, and have
largely been met with no success.
But there is a very important lesson to be
learned here for the new players who wish
to be successful.
When one reads the old material from the
time of the previous launches, it quickly
becomes clear that they are often littered
with references to the brilliance of the
technology they are using. Not unlike
some of the new initiatives we are seeing
in 2017.
However, it should by now be clear to
everyone that if this was purely a matter
of technology, we would have already
seen the complete digitization of the
industry. The “old” technology used
previously did indeed work – it got the job
done. Yet that was insufficient to result in
success.
The failure of the past attempts – despite
well-functioning technology – was one of
business processes.
Online freight portals require the buy-in
from particularly carriers to actually post
dynamic and functioning spot rates for all
to see. And even that is insufficient – it
requires that the carriers in question
change their internal processes for setting
prices in the first place to match such an
environment.
Some of the old portals were framed
around the use of freight auctioning – a
concept where, again, the technology
worked well, but the carriers were
strongly opposed to using it on
commercial reasons.
And the reality is very simple – whilst
there are millions on shippers, and some
would always want to try new technology,
there is a relatively limited number of
carriers who control the physical assets,
and no digitized product can succeed
without the support of at least a handful
of the major carriers.
Furthermore, an opinion piece in Lloyds
List in 2001 captures another sentiment
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
14
quite well: “Shipping does not like being
pushed around by ‘entrepreneurs’.”
Conclusion
Just because past attempts have failed,
that does not in any way imply the current
and future attempts will meet the same
fate.
However, the ones who will emerge
successful are those who have learned
from history – and have learned the
lesson that it is not about technology, it is
about business processes. Importantly, it
is about getting the carriers onboard with
embracing changes in business
processes, assisting them in doing this.
And looking at the landscape
emerging right now, it clearly seems
that some players have indeed learned
the lesson and are business focused
instead of technology focused. Others
appear to go out of their way to
explain the brilliance of their
technology without realizing that it is
not the technology which is the most
important part.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
15
Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times The trade lane will experience a rather positive development in
terms of port-pairs, as 29 distinct port-pairs will be gained against
nine lost. The transit times will improve slightly, but overall the
trade lane remains mostly unchanged.
Last week, we turned our attention to
the impact of the new alliance networks
on the Transatlantic trade, which has
been rather overlooked in comparison to
the high-volume Asia-Europe and
Transpacific trades. Our focus last week
was on the port-pairs connecting
Mediterranean to North America.
Our analysis showed a rather stable
trade lane, with limited impact of the
new alliances going forward. Most of the
existing networks will remain
unchanged, and the transit times for the
majority of the port-pairs will also
remain the same. Only six port-pairs
disappeared, four of which originated
from Cagliari. On the other hand, out of
the nine new port-pairs that will be
added, Salerno would gain five.
This week we will extend our analysis of
the impact of the new alliances to the
port-pairs connecting North Europe to
North America, only focusing on the
Westbound calls from Europe. We will
cover the Eastbound trade lanes going
into Europe in the coming weeks.
Methodology
[This is the mostly the same
methodology section as for the Asia-
Europe, Transpacific and Mediterranean
to North America articles in the past
weeks’ issues, so readers already
familiar with it can skip this section,
although there are a few methodological
concerns specific to the Transatlantic
trade]
Transatlantic-specific methodology:
There are few methodological challenges
that are specific to the Transatlantic
trade. Firstly, the other East/West trades
have alliance carriers operate (almost)
exclusively within their alliances, but in
the Transatlantic trade, alliance carriers
are more likely to operate services
outside or across the alliances, than
within the formal alliances. As an
example, Hapag-Lloyd have until April
2017 been an operator on 11 services on
Transatlantic, but only five of these
services were operated within the G6
alliance framework, while the rest were
a mix of exclusively-operated services
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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and vessel sharing agreements with
both alliance and non-alliance carriers,
including OOCL, MSC, Hamburg Süd,
NYK, and CMA CGM.
For Hapag-Lloyd, we find remnants of
the old pre-G6 “Grand Alliance”, but
there is no clear patterns of cooperation,
which also makes it incredibly difficult to
group carriers into distinct
constellations. MSC operates six services
exclusively, five services within the 2M
alliance, and one service together with
OOCL and Hapag-Lloyd. The CKYE and
Ocean Three alliances are not officially
extended into the Transatlantic trade,
but we see a lot of patterns of
cooperation similar to the two alliances,
but then again CMA CGM are on-board
two services that could conceivably be
called “Ocean Three”-like, but also
operate four other services that have
nothing to do with Ocean Three.
All-in-all this means that we have had to
group the carriers in non-alliance and
non-traditional carrier groupings, in
order to have just a little bit of sense,
but these groupings are far from perfect,
and they are a best-effort attempt at
finding commonalities across service
operators. This also means that we do
not have clean groupings like we do in
the other East/West Trades, where we
go from four distinct alliances to three
distinct alliances.
Furthermore, as we are concerned only
with the impact of the new alliances, we
have opted to consider only services that
are offered either as part of an alliance
or are operated by one or more carriers
which are members of one of the
existing or upcoming alliances. This
means that the services operated by the
niche carriers ACL, ARRC, ICL,
StreamLines, Turkon Line and ZIM are
not included in the analysis. Moreover,
we have decided to include also services
that are not purely dedicated to the
Transatlantic trade, but that de facto
provide connections between one or
more ports in Europe and North America,
e.g. the Panama Direct Line service
offered by CMA CGM that connects North
Europe-US East Coast-Oceania.
The service rotations, proforma
schedules and transit times have been
sourced from SeaIntel’s proprietary
vessel schedules database and from the
alliance announcements published by
the carriers. In order to keep the
analysis as consistent as possible, we
have aimed to source the data from as
few carriers as possible, and have mainly
collected the data from the following
carriers:
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Existing alliances:
2M: Maersk Line
G6: Hapag-Lloyd
New Alliances:
2M: Maersk Line
Ocean Alliance: CMA CGM
The Alliance: Hapag-Lloyd
Old and New Non-Alliance services:
CMA CGM
Maersk Line
Hapag Lloyd
Evergreen
We have chosen the sourcing carriers
entirely on the basis of how much detail
they provide in their data, and how the
data is to work with, and our choice of
sourcing carrier does not confer any
opinion on the correctness or data
quality of the carriers’ data.
The “old” alliances are based on their
service networks as they looked at mid-
to-late January, so as to avoid any
undue influence from short-term
network adjustments as the carriers
prepare for the new alliance networks.
As some of the services could not be
grouped within either an alliance or a
single carrier grouping, we have grouped
them under “Other”.
In order to avoid any confusion as to
which services we have included under
which alliance/carrier grouping scope,
we list below all the services included
and how we have designated them.
Existing alliances and carrier groupings:
2M: TA1/NEUATL1, TA2/NEUATL2,
TA3/NEUATL3
G6: AX1, AX2, AX3, PA1
CMA CGM: Panama Direct Line, Victory
Bridge
Other: CAE (Maersk Line), Liberty
Bridge (CMA CGM), AT1 and AT2 (Hapag
Lloyd), TAE (Evergreen)
New Alliances and carrier groupings:
2M: TA1/NEUATL1, TA2/NEUATL2,
TA3/NEUATL3
Ocean Alliance: Liberty Bridge, Victory
Bridge,
The Alliance: AL1, AL2, AL3, AL4, AL5
CMA CGM: Panama Direct Line
Other: AT1 and AT2 (Hapag Lloyd), CAE
(Maersk Line)
It should be noted that, the AL8 service
advertised by The Alliance is not
included, as it is a slot charter
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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agreement on the A service operated by
ACL, and thus not operated by any of
The Alliance carriers.
General methodology:
When calculating the number of port-
pairs, we only count a given port-pair on
a service once, even though there may
in theory be two identical port-pairs, if
one of the ports is called twice as import
and export call. We exclude these
duplicates on a single service, as no
customer would intentionally use the
additional port-pair, e.g. discharging on
an export call.
We have calculated all transit times and
port-pair frequencies based on the
service rotations, rather than the transit
times tables, in order to ensure a
common calculation basis, as we have in
the past seen that carriers using quite
different approaches to calculating
transit times. Further, using the transit
time tables may leave out specific port-
pairs from the frequency overview, that
the carriers have not included in the
transit times tables, as they may not
offer a competitive transit time.
The analysis will focus only on the port-
pairs that are de facto currently
available in the existing networks, and
that will be offered in the future service
networks. Further, we will look at the
best transit time for a given port-pair in
the existing networks, and we will
compare it with the best one offered in
the future networks, as well as see which
of the three alliances will be offering the
most competitive transit times on these
specific port combinations.
Transit times are calculated as integer
calendar days, meaning that if carrier X
departs port A on February 1st at 1:00
AM, and arrives at port B on February
11th at 11:00 PM, while carrier Y departs
port A on February 1st at 11:00 PM and
arrives at port B on February 11th at 1:00
AM, they will both have a transit time of
10 days, even though there is a 46-hour
difference between the two. We have
done it this way, as this is the standard
industry convention, and calculating
transit times by the hour does not
materially alter the conclusions of this
analysis. Further, all transit times are
calculated on the basis of local time
zones, and do not take the time zone
differences into account, as this is also
the industry convention.
When comparing transit times across
alliances, we consistently use the
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
19
shortest transit time offered by an
alliance for a given port-pair, as they
may technically offer longer transit
times, but not actively market them.
In order to have a better overview, we
have split the North Europe-North
America trade lane into a number of sub-
trades based on sub-regions, where
North Europe is split into the following
regions:
North West Coast: Every port in North
Europe except for the UK ports.
UK: All of the UK ports.
We have also split the North America
side into five sub-regions:
North Atlantic: Everything above the
state of Virginia (included): Baltimore,
New York, Norfolk, and Philadelphia.
Canada: Canadian ports on the East
coast: Halifax and Montreal.
South Atlantic: Everything between
North Carolina (included) and Florida
(included), including Bahamas:
Charleston, Freeport, Miami, Port
Everglades, Savannah, and Wilmington.
Gulf: Everything in the US Gulf:
Houston, Mobile, and New Orleans.
Pacific West: Everything on North
America West Coast: Long Beach, Los
Angeles, Oakland, Tacoma, and
Vancouver.
Given the fact that there are very few
services going into North Atlantic, and
Canada from the UK, and to avoid
smaller tables, we have decided to group
North Atlantic and Canada into one sub-
trade for services originating from the
UK. The same has been done for South
Atlantic and Gulf.
For each sub-trade, we list all the port-
pairs offered across the existing and
future alliance networks, and highlight
the following:
Lost port-pairs: these are port-pairs
offered by at least one of the existing
alliances, but will not be offered as a
direct service combination in the new
alliance networks, and will thus only be
serviceable via transshipment. Port-pair
names are marked with Dark Red
Background and White Text. The
sixth column to the right of the port-pair
names (marked with the ∑-symbol)
counts the total number of weekly
services that will be lost on the
disappearing port-pair.
New port-pairs: these are port-pairs that
are not offered as direct combinations in
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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the existing alliances, but will be offered
as a direct service port-pair in the new
alliance networks. Port-pair names are
marked with Dark Green Background
and White Text. The twelfth column to
the right of the port-pair names (marked
with the ∑-symbol) counts the total
number of weekly services that will call
the new port-pair, across all three new
alliances.
Slower transit time port-pairs: these are
port-pairs that are offered as direct
combinations in both the existing
alliances and future alliance networks,
but the shortest transit time will
deteriorate from existing to the future
alliances networks. The rightmost
column in each table measures the
increase in shortest transit time. The
port-pair names are marked with Pink
Background and Red Text.
As an example, in Table B3 the fifth port-
pair from the top (Antwerp-Miami) is
currently offered by 2M and CMA CGM at
16 and 15 days transit time respectively.
In the future, this port pair will be
offered by 2M and the Ocean Alliance at
16 days transit time each. The rightmost
column shows that the shortest transit
time has increased by “1” day.
Faster transit time port-pairs: these are
port-pairs that will conversely see the
shortest transit time get even shorter in
the new alliance networks. The
rightmost column in each table
measures the increase in shortest transit
time. Port-pair names are marked with
Light Green Background and Dark Green
Text.
As an example, in Table B3 the port-pair
at the bottom (Hamburg-Savannah) is
currently offered by G6 at 20 days
transit time. In the future alliance
networks, The Alliance will offer this
port-pair with an 11 days transit time,
which is nine days faster than the
current shortest transit time, and the
rightmost column lists “-9” days to
signify this.
Changes in Service frequency: The
fourth column to the right of the port-
pair names lists the number of weekly
services connecting the port-pairs in the
current alliance networks, while the fifth
column sums the number of weekly
direct connections in the current alliance
networks, and if this column is marked
with pink it means that the total number
of weekly services decreased in the new
networks.
The next three columns show the
number of weekly direct service
connections in the new alliance
networks, with column to the right
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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showing the sum of weekly service
connections across the three new
alliances plus carriers groupings, and if
the column is marked light green it
means that the total number of weekly
services increases in the new networks.
Changes in shortest transit time per
alliance: The next five columns show the
shortest transit time offered by each of
the existing alliances plus carriers
grouping, across all their respective
services, with the shortest of the five
marked green and the longest marked
red. The next five columns show the
shortest transit time offered by each of
the future alliances plus carrier
groupings, and again the shortest is
green while the longest is coloured red.
Finally, this analysis is based on the
latest updated (and hopefully final)
alliance networks as announced by the
alliance carriers on or before April 7th,
and that any previous analyses of
alliance port-pairs, service frequency
and transit times was based on the
information published at the time, and
provided with lengthy disclaimers,
clearly stating that our analysis cannot
be more correct than the information
released by the carriers. As a number of
network changes have been announced
by the since our previous analyses,
several of the conclusions may have
changed.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
22
Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in Europe North West Coast to North
Atlantic
Table B1 lists all of the port-pairs being
offered by the old and new alliance
networks in the sub-trade connecting
North West Coast to North Atlantic.
Going forward, the overall outlook of this
sub-trade will be fairly negative.
Hamburg will be the most affected in this
sub-trade, losing connections to New
York and Norfolk – both of which were
offered exclusively by G6 through their
AX1 service. Instead, shippers will gain
two new connections to Philadelphia –
not previously offered on this sub-trade
– from Antwerp and Bremerhaven. Both
of these connections will be offered by
The Alliance through their AL1 service.
Twelve port-pairs will remain across the
old and new alliance networks, and
seven of these port-pairs will see a
decrease in their weekly service
frequency, with the largest decrease
being on Rotterdam to Norfolk (from five
times a week to just two).
Four port-pairs will see an increase in
their shortest transit times, with
Rotterdam to New York increasing by
two days. Only two port-pairs,
Bremerhaven to New York, and Antwerp
to Norfolk, will see a decrease in transit
times, both by two days.
Apart from CMA CGM – which offers only
three port-pairs – all three new alliances
will have a strong presence in the sub-
trade. 2M will be offering ten port-pairs,
while both The Alliance and Ocean
Alliance will offer eight each.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in Europe North West Coast to
Canada
Table B2 shows that the sub-trade
connecting North West Coast and
Canada will see relatively few changes in
the new alliance networks. No port-pairs
will be lost on this sub-trade and there
will be no new port-pairs as well.
As with their old alliance network, 2M
will not offer any services on this sub-
trade going forward. The Alliance will
also offer two port-pairs going into
Halifax, both of which were previously
offered by G6 through their PA1 service.
The three non-alliance services are the
Canada Atlantic Express (CAE)/Saint
Laurent 1 service from Maersk Line/CMA
CGM, and the AT1/GEX1/Montreal
Express operated by Hapag-Lloyd, OOCL
and MSC, and the AT2/GEX2 service
operated by Hapag-Lloyd and OOCL.
These services do muddy the waters a
bit, as we see many of the major alliance
carriers represented, but clearly not in
the formal alliance structures.
Interestingly, neither of these services
currently have any slot charters on-
board, so their port-pairs are offered
relatively exclusively.
All three port-pairs destined for Halifax
will see their transit times increase.
Rotterdam to Halifax will see the largest
increase in transit time, of 11 days,
because the PA1 service offered by G6,
which had the shortest transit time, will
not be a part of the new alliance
networks. On the other hand, all of the
port-pairs going into Montreal will have
the same transit times as before.
In both the old and future networks, this
sub-trade will only see a limited
presence of the formal alliances, rather
the majority of the port-pairs will be
offered by alliance carriers on services
offered outside the alliances.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in Europe North West Coast to South
Atlantic
Table B3 shows a fairly balanced outlook
for the sub-trade connecting North West
Coast Europe to South Atlantic. As seen
in the North West Coast Europe to North
Atlantic sub-trade, Hamburg will lose yet
another port-pair, this time to
Charleston. Wilmington, which was not
offered on this sub-trade in the old
alliance networks, will now be offered
from three different origins – Antwerp,
Bremerhaven, and Le Havre – all of
which will be offered exclusively by 2M
through their TA2 service.
Of the remaining port-pairs, four will see
their shortest transit times increase by
one day. Four port-pairs will see a
decrease in their transit times, with
Hamburg to Savannah improving
significantly by nine days, and Antwerp
to Savannah decreasing by four days.
Six port-pairs will see their weekly
frequency decrease by one or two.
As seen in the North West Coast to North
Atlantic sub-trade, all three alliances will
have a strong presence in this sub-trade
2M will offer 18 port-pairs, having the
shortest transit time on 14 of them.
Ocean Alliance will offer 12 port-pairs,
and The Alliance will offer 11.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in Europe North West Coast to US
Gulf
Table B4 shows a quite positive
development for the sub-trade
connecting Europe North West Coast to
US Gulf. No port-pairs will be lost and
there will be no new additions either.
Seven out of the twelve port-pairs
offered on this sub-trade will see an
improvement in their shortest transit
times, while only Rotterdam to New
Orleans will see a deterioration. Antwerp
to Mobile will be offered with its shortest
transit time improved by six days due to
the addition of The Alliance’s AL4
service, which will offer a much shorter
transit time than 2M. Five of the
remaining port-pairs will see their transit
times improve by two days, while the
last, Le Havre to Houston, will see a
transit time improvement of only one
day.
The weekly service frequency of all the
services going into Mobile will increase
by one due to the AL4 service offered by
The Alliance.
Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in North West Coast to Pacific West
Table B5 shows that the sub-trade
connecting North West Coast to Pacific
West will see some major changes in the
new alliance networks. In the old
networks, only G6 was offering a service
on this sub-trade, whereas in the new
alliance networks, only The Alliance will
offer a service on this sub-trade.
While four port-pairs will be lost,
fourteen new ones will be offered. On
the origin side, Bremerhaven will lose
both its connections to Pacific West. On
the destination side, Los Angeles will
lose all three of its connections to North
West Coast in favour of Long Beach.
What we can ascertain from this table –
when taken together with the North
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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West Coast to North and South Atlantic
sub-trades – is that Hamburg will lose
major connectivity to the East Coast in
favour of the West Coast. Charleston,
New York, and Norfolk will de facto no
longer be offered from Hamburg, while
Long Beach, Oakland, Tacoma, and
Vancouver will gain direct connections
from the German port.
With the addition of the new port-pairs,
Antwerp, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Le
Havre will all gain connections to Long
Beach, Tacoma, Oakland, and
Vancouver. Previously, only two of these
connections existed – Rotterdam to
Oakland, which will see a one day
increase in transit time, and Antwerp to
Oakland, which will see a decrease in
transit time by six days.
All of these new port-pairs will be offered
by The Alliance’s AL5 service. It is
interesting to note that previously, G6
offered a similar network with their PA1
service. The main difference is that while
the PA1 service went up to Halifax and
New York before heading towards the
West Coast, the AL5 service will instead
connect with Savannah on the East
Coast before moving towards the West
Coast. This is the reason that we see a
shorter transit time from Antwerp to
Oakland.
Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in UK to North Atlantic and Canada
Table B6 shows the impact of the new
alliances on the sub-trade connecting UK
to North Atlantic and Canada.
Southampton will be the most affected
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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on this sub-trade – losing one port-pair
(to Halifax), seeing a decrease in weekly
service frequencies (to New York and
Norfolk), and an increase in transit times
(seven days to New York, and six days
to Norfolk).
London Gateway, on the other hand, will
benefit the most from the new alliance
networks, gaining four new connections,
all of which will be offered by The
Alliance through their AL1 (Norfolk,
Philadelphia, Halifax, New York) and AL2
(New York) services.
This sub-trade is fairly segmented
because out of the twelve available port-
pairs, where only one is being offered by
more than one alliance.
Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in UK to South Atlantic and Gulf
As seen in table B7, the sub-trade
connecting the UK to South Atlantic and
Gulf will be positively impacted by the
new alliance networks going forward.
As we saw in the previous sub-trade,
London Gateway will gain another new
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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connection (to Charleston), giving it a
total of five new connections. On the
destination side, Mobile, which benefited
from increased service frequency in the
North West Coat to US Gulf sub-trade,
will yet again benefit, this time with a
new connection from Southampton.
Wilmington gains another new port-pair,
making it a total of four new connections
from North Europe.
Felixstowe to Wilmington will be offered
exclusively by 2M through their TA2
service, while The Alliance will offer both
London Gateway to Charleston and
Southampton to Mobile through their
AL2 and AL4 services, respectively.
Of the remaining port-pairs, two will see
their shortest transit times being
lowered. Southampton to New Orleans
will decrease by two days, while
Southampton to Savannah will decrease
by six days. The weekly service
frequency will only change for
Southampton to Charleston (from four
weekly services to two), and
Southampton to Savannah (from five
weekly services to three).
2M and The Alliance will be the strongest
alliances on this sub-trade, offering six
and seven port-pairs respectively, while
Ocean Alliance will offer just two port-
pairs.
Port-Pair and Transit Time changes
in UK to Pacific West
As in the previous sub-trades,
Southampton will once again be in the
focus. As seen is table B8, Southampton
to Los Angeles will no longer be offered.
On the other hand, shippers will be able
to choose from three new port-pairs
originating from Southampton (to Long
Beach, Tacoma, and Vancouver).
Southampton to Oakland, which was one
of the two port-pairs previously offered,
will see its shortest transit time improve
by two days. All of the aforementioned
port-pairs will be offered exclusively by
The Alliance.
What is not clearly evident from this
table is that – taken with the other sub-
trades – Los Angeles has lost all
connectivity to North Europe, losing all
four of the existing port-pairs that were
being offered. Long beach on the other
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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hand, now has five connections from
North Europe, none of which existed in
the previous sub-trades.
G6 exclusively offered Los Angeles in the
old networks, but after the alliance
shake up, the newly formed The
Alliance, which has remnants of G6, has
opted for Long Beach instead.
Conclusion
Table B9 shows how the changes in the
North Europe to North America trade
lane will compare against the other East-
West trade lanes once the dust settles
and the new alliance operations take
effect.
The developments in this trade lane will
be fairly positive, as we see a gain of 29
distinct port-pairs against a loss of just
nine. The increased connectivity comes
from the inclusion of London Gateway in
Europe, and Philadelphia, Wilmington,
and Long Beach in North America. As
discussed previously, the inclusion of
Long Beach in the new alliance networks
comes at the expense of Los Angeles,
which will lose all of its direct
connections to North Europe. 25 out of
the total 29 new distinct port-pairs can
be attributed to services being offered
by The Alliance.
The transit times on the other hand are
fairly balanced. We see seventeen port-
pairs with improved transit times, and
the same number of port-pairs with an
increased shortest transit time. The
difference between the ‘time saved’ and
the ‘time lost’ is also the same, since we
will see transit times increase by a total
of 52 days, and decrease by the same
number as well.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Carrier Service Changes CMA CGM to become operator on
EURAF5/WEWA service
This week CMA CGM has announced that
they will become an operator on their
EURAF5 service, currently operated solely
by NileDutch as WEWA. The carrier will
deploy two vessels on the service, while
the remaining six vessels will be provided
by NileDutch. The changes will be
effective from 5th April 2017.
The vessels deployed on the
EURAF5/WEWA service will call the
following ports (12 port calls):
Antwerp – Le Havre – Lisbon – Algeciras
– Tangiers – Pointe Noire – Luanda –
Lobito (fortnightly) – Namibe (fortnightly)
– Douala (fortnightly) – Abidjan –
Algeciras – Antwerp
Yang Ming to start TSE service
Yang Ming will combine their two services
of TBS and SE2 into one single service,
which will be called TSE. The changes will
be implemented with “Ibn Al Abbar”
departing from Taichung on 22nd April
2017. The carrier will deploy 4 vessels on
the service with an average vessel size of
1,700 TEU.
The port rotation of the new TSE service
is as follows (12 port calls):
Taichung – Kaohsiung – Hong Kong – Hai
Phong – Da Nang – Ho Chi Minh –
Singapore – Port Klang – Cat Lai – Da
Nang – Hai Phong – Hong Kong -
Kaohsiung
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Carrier Rate Announcements
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
33
Tradelane Carrier Rate increase Effective date
India-Mozambique (SB) CMA CGM 150 USD/TEU April 10, 2017
ISC/ MEA-Indian Ocean (SB) CMA CGM 200 USD/TEU April 10, 2017
Iran-East Africa (SB) CMA CGM 300 USD/TEU April 10, 2017
Asia-East Africa (SB) CMA CGM 300 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Asia-Red Sea (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Asia-ISC (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Asia/ Australia/ New Zealand-Arabian Gulf (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
ISC/ MEA-West Africa (WB) CMA CGM 100 USD/TEU April 16, 2017
Asia-West Africa (SB) CMA CGM 500 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
Asia-Australia (SB) AADA 300 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
Asia-Caribbean/ East Coast Central America/ Gulf of Mexico (WB) Hapag Lloyd 1050 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
Asia-New Zealand (SB) Hamburg Sud 100 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
ISC/ MEA-North America (WB) Hapag Lloyd 500 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
USEC-ECSA (SB) Hamburg Sud 150 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
ECSA-Central America/ North America (NB) Hamburg Sud 400 USD/FFE May 1, 2017
North America-West Africa (EB) Maersk Line 250 USD/FFE May 1, 2017
North America-East Africa (EB) Maersk Line 40 USD/FFE May 1, 2017
North America-South Africa (SB) Maersk Line 50 USD/FFE May 1, 2017
Tradelane Carrier Rate level Effective date
Asia-Mediterranean (WB) Hapag Lloyd 1750 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Mediterranean-MEA (EB) CMA CGM 900 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Mediterranean-ISC (EB) CMA CGM 800 USD/TEU April 15, 2017
Turkey-West Africa (SB) CMA CGM 1300 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
North-Europe-Asia (EB) Hapag Lloyd 1525 USD/TEU May 1, 2017
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Annual subscription: 2000 Euro. Order at: [email protected]
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Port-to-Port Schedule Reliability
Detailed fact sheets providing schedule reliability information at a carrier/service level for your
chosen port-port pair. The fact sheet includes:
- Monthly data series for the past 6 months
- Data broken down by carrier and service
- On-time reliability based on arrival +/- 1 day from schedule
- Average number of days late for delayed vessels
- More than 1500 port-port pairs are covered.
Fact Sheet price: 100 Euro. 10 Sheets: 900 Euro. Monthly subscriptions and larger
packages are available on request.
Order at: [email protected]
Mystery Shopper
Do you know which experience new prospective customers get when they contact you? Are you sure,
that the experience is what you intend it to be? If not, SeaIntel Maritime Analysis can provide you
the real picture from a new customer point of view.
- The approach is anonymous
- Results are only provided to senior management and is kept confidential
- Standard test is completed within 4 weeks
Test of 5 locations: 700 Euro. Test of 20 locations: 2500 Euro. Order at: [email protected]
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Tailor-Made Analysis
Our core belief is that anything in this industry can be analysed – and analysed well. However, the
solution to a particularly difficult problem often rests in the ability to think out of the box and
develop new analytical viewpoints. Doing this is our key strength.
At SeaIntel Maritime Analysis we have a combination of extensive practical industry experience,
combined with strong academic analytical skills. We have served a wide range of customers looking
to gain insights into the container shipping industry including:
- Container carriers
- Freight forwarders
- Financial institutions
- Cargo owners
- Ports
- IT companies
- Equipment manufacturers
- Non-governmental interest organizations
Contact [email protected] to discuss how we may assist you with tailor-made analysis.
How to subscribe to SeaIntel Sunday Spotlight?
Send an email requesting the subscription to [email protected] stating whether you want a quarter or a full
year subscription. Your subscription will be available immediately, and you will receive an invoice with bank
payment details.
Subscription options:
- One quarter: 500 Euro
- One year subscription: 1600 Euro – this is a 20% discount, equal to getting ten weeks for free.
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information
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Copyright and Disclaimer Editor:
CEO and Partner, Mr Alan Murphy – [email protected]
Analysts:
Shipping Analyst, Ms Jasmin Slovackova – [email protected]
Shipping Analyst, Mr Giulio Gentilezza – [email protected]
Shipping Analyst, Mr Odvidijus Voronkovas – [email protected]
SeaIntel Maritime Analysis
Vermlandsgade 51, 2
2300 Copenhagen S
Denmark
www.seaintel.com
Tel: +45 6068 77 44 or +45 6018 0122 l E-mail: [email protected]
© Copyright – SeaIntel Sunday Spotlight is for use exclusively by the subscribing
company. Any redistribution by any means (including electronically and printed) outside
the subscribing company is strictly prohibited. Redistribution is a violation of the terms
and conditions of sale, and an infringement of the copyright conditions. We reserve all
rights in case infringements are detected.