Download pdf - SCIR Fall 2012 Issue

Southern California International Review

Volume 2, Number 2 Fall 2012

Dedicated to the memory of a beloved teacher and respected leader:

Robert L. FriedheimProfessor of International Relations, 1976-2001

Director of the School of International Relations, 1992-1995

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international

studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.

Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues. SCIR also serves as an opportunity for undergraduate students at USC to publish their work. SCIR is managed completely by students and also pro-

vides undergraduates valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.

Copyright 2012 Southern California International Review.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in anyform without the express written consent of the Southern California International

Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.

Southern California International Reviewscinternationalreview.org

StaffEditor-in-ChiefSamir Kumar

Assistant Editor-in-Chief: Andrew Ju

Editors:Natalie Tecimer

Matthew Prusak

Taline Gettas

Rebecca Braun

Cover Design: Samir Kumar

Layout: Rebecca Braun

Contents

1. The 16 Year CrisisSecurity, Geopolitics, and Conflict Management in the Arctic

Kelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturos

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2. Expressions of NationalismExploring the Implications of Russian Gemeinschaft

Tyler D. Tyburski

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3. The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanThe Last Frontier?

Alyssa Min

43

4. Genocide, Identity, and the StateThe Dire Potential for Conflict in Colonial Identities

Erik Peterson

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The capability and dedication of our authors and editors are what make this issue strong, but USCs faith in our abilities is just as valuable. SCIR would not exist without the generous funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim Memorial Endowment, and the support of the School of International Relations. Significant appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert English, and the wonderful faculty and staff that have assisted us over the past three years. I would particularly like to thank Linda Cole for her constant presence and her willingness to see us succeed at our current endeavors and lay the groundwork to aim higher.

Finally, please do not underestimate our receptivity to your comments! We would love to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and sugges-tions at [email protected], and we will do our best to take these into account or offer a thoughtful reply.

Sincerely,

Samir KumarEditor-in-Chief

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fourth issue of the Southern California International Review (SCIR). This bi-annual undergraduate journal based at the University of Southern California seeks to create a unique opportunity for students to publish their research and other academic work in order to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related fields both on campus and throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of the global challenges facing our world today. As our world becomes increasingly intercon-nected through technology, trade, and diplomacy, it is evident that events occurring any-where on the globe have worldwide effects. The need to not only study, but also interrogate, international relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. Thus, this journal desires to contribute unique and innovative ideas to this fascinating and essential field of study.

I am happy to write that this is the second issue in which SCIR accepted article submis-sions from students at universities other than USC. The pieces contained in the journal are written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our six member editorial board. The graphics, templates, and formatting was also designed by our editorial board. In an effort to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety of topics in the realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to interdisciplinary learning.

From a discussion of an emerging threat to international security in the Arctic to an examination of identity manipulation in Rwanda, the content of this issue should engage you and prompt further inquiry into these particular realms of study. As you read, ask your-self, Why is this article important? My hope is that your question is answered, and you find yourself with a host of more incisive questions that would incite enthralling answers. Additionally, in the future, please keep an eye out for the authors published herein, for they might soon be in a position to influence the very issues that they have examined!

A letter from the editor:

The 16 Years Crisis Security, Geopolitics, and Conflict in the Arctic

Kelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturos

We dont talk about conflict or else it might happenJyrki Terva, Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Due to a changing global climate, the Arctic region of our globe is shifting from being ice-capped to ice-free. Though the Arctic region is not regularly on the forefront of most Ameri-cans minds, the untapped resources at the bottom of Arctic Ocean in conjunction with the potential for drastically cheaper shipping options makes the Arctic a region of utmost economic and geostrategic significance for many nations across the globe. Claims on critical natural resources and shipping routes are tenuous at best, which should lead diplomats and leaders to be wary of possible disputes. This research paper finds a startling dissonance between regional states behavior and state officials statements and positions with regards to the status quo of affairs in the Arctic. In addition to a telling denial by diplomats of any potential for conflict, a number of factors indicate a high risk of potential interstate conflict. These security risks in-clude an evident military buildup in the Arctic region; lack of effective governing institutions; post-Cold War tensions and the resulting realist-driven operational codes; internal domestic political pressures; and the uncertainty of the Artic Councils future leadership role. While this report does not seek to be alarmist about a looming world war, it suggests that Arctic conflict management has become increasingly critical to preventing the Arctic from transforming from a zone of peace into a zone of conflict.

Introduction

The Arctic is hot is the fashion in which Russian diplomat Aleksi Ivanov recently described the growing significance of the Arctic to the world.1 The depletion of worldwide

1 Aleksi Ivanov, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.

Kelsey Bradshaw is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.

Jason Finklestein is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.

Nicholas Kosturos is a junior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.

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Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2

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The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturos

oil and gas resources has caused many states around the world to pay increased attention to the Arctic region, which holds 25% of the worlds natural gas2, 13% of its oil3, and 20% of its technologically important rare-earth elements.4 In addition to containing critical natu-ral resources, the Arctics melting ice has allowed for new shipping routes to become more accessible, such as the Northwest and Northeast passages.5 The successful navigation of these passages could result in an up to 40% decrease in shipping costs when compared to conventional shipping routes.6 These new estimates of rich natural resource reserves and increased shipping efficiency possibilities in the Arctic have resulted in the applications of states including China, India, Italy, the European Union (EU), and South Korea to obtain Permanent Observer status in the Arctic Council. With high stakes and numerous states vying for position in the region, the Arctic certainly seems to be growing hot.

In 1939, Edward Hallet Carr published The Twenty Years Crisis, a work central to the canon of modern day international relations theory. Carr advanced the argument that excessively idealistic thinking following the World War I acted as the primary cause for World War II. Carr postulated that world leaders of the period were subject to a crisis of idealism, where they fell prey to the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking: neglect of power. In Carrs eyes, these leaders placed excessive trust in liberal internation-alism and the role of international organizations, and therefore were victim to the classical realist motivations for human behavior. What some may term wishful thinking failed to prevent the rise of fascism and subsequently World War II.

We see this could be considered analogous to the situation developing in both the of-ficial positions and the thought processes of the vast majority of Arctic diplomats. As will be shown in this paper, there is near universal denial among diplomatic officials of any pos-sibility of interstate conflict in the Arctic. While this paper does not intend to be alarmist about a looming World War III, diplomats and researchers who grapple with Arctic issues appear to dangerously disregard the prospect of interstate conflict. This research paper seeks to evaluate the significant security challenges that exist in the Arctic region, specifically the possibility of interstate conflict, and to identify problem areas that, if left unaddressed, could lead the Arctic to become a center of strife in this century. This paper will also propose recommendations to improve multilateral negotiation in the realm of security in order to prevent the possibility of a large-scale armed conflict.

2 Ekaterina Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia, Stockholm International Peace Re-search Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

3 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic, U.S. Geological Survey, ac-cessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.

4 Matteo Rongione, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

5 Tom Arnbom, Arctic is Hot, World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.

6 Alun Anderson, After the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).

Background InformationBefore exploring current politics and security concerns in the region, it is prudent to

discuss how the history of the region informs the present day. Many explorers have at-tempted to conquer the Arctic and the northern passages, most to no avail. In 1845, Sir John Franklin and two British Navy ships set out to explore the Northwest Passage and never returned. More than forty search expeditions were sent to look for the explorers, but it was not until 1981 that evidence, such as graves and bodies that explained the ships demise, were found near King Williams Island, 70 degrees latitude.7 On April 6th, 1909 another team of explorers, made up of Americans and Inuits, arrived at the North Pole. They had made the long journey from Cape Columbia on Ellesmere Island by dogsled.8 Cold-weather capabili-ties have expanded drastically since that time. Today, explorers investigate the Arctic via icebreaker ships and floating scientific stations and venture off the semi-permanent struc-tures using use aircraft, dog sleds, skis, and snowmobiles to learn more about the region.

While there has been interest in the Arctic as an unexplored region for centuries, it was not until recently that ecological and environmental factors began to capture the awareness a broader audience than explorers. Sea ice coverage fluctuates throughout the year, with the high in March and the low in September. This trend has only increased in its intensity in recent times. Research shows that a sharp decline in summer sea ice occurred in September of 2007, shrinking the total ice-covered area down down to 4.28 million square kilometers, a record low.9 This dramatic decline in summer sea ice opened coastlines throughout north-ern Russia and the northern Canadian islands, making the possibility of using northern sea routes for shipping and tourism more plausible. Furthermore, New deposits for oil and natural gas drilling were discovered because of the shrinking sea ice, and many Arctic states, including Russia, the United States, and Norway, have began researching possible deposits and drilling sites.

However, increased possibilities within the region have not been without their price. The nation-states with Arctic coastlines remain at odds over how to divide up the region, perhaps more so than ever before.10 Both Canada and Russia claim the territory connected to the Lomonosov ridge and have appealed to the Arctic Council with scientific evidence that purportedly shows the ridge extending from their shoreline. Although no decision has

7 Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, Franklin, Sir John (17861847), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2575, accessed 20 October 2012.

8 Robert Peary: To the Top of the World. PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. .

9 Renfrow, Stephanie. Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows. NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.

10 Bennett, Jody R. Vying for Power in the High North. International Relations Security Network. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Oct. 2012.

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been made, and none will be made in the near future, both countries are scouring the ridge to find the natural resources required to bolster their cases for an extension of their Exclusive Economic Zone.

Between other nation-states in the region, a renewal of historical antipathy has oc-curred. The United States and Russia, the two nation-states at the center of the Cold War,, both maintain a significant presence in the Artic and have considerable interest in project-ing power within the region. Russia has already sought to strengthen its Arctic presence by announcing plans to build naval infrastructure hubs along the Northern Sea Route to act as rescue centers and military bases.11 In turn, other states are also ramping up their Arctic military capabilities in order to protect borders, conduct training exercises, and provide search and rescue assistance. This military buildup appears bourn out of a desire to project power rather than to conduct routine patrolling or search and rescue operations. The nature of this arms race will be addressed further in the Security Concerns section of this paper.

Since 2007, the Arctic has once again been identified as a new hot spot for exploration. A renewed effort to conduct scientific studies and to map the region has brought the worlds attention to the tantalizing prospects of a resource-rich Arctic. Arctic states are aware of the economic and geopolitical significance of the region and are putting forth a great effort to secure their national interests.

National InterestsEach Arctic state has significant national interests in the region. As mentioned previ-

ously, the economic factors including oil, natural gas, and fishing stock are major motiva-tions for Arctic states. In addition, strategic interests such as control of crucial shipping territory also play a prominent role. In addition to these incentives, other areas of interest fuel the behavior of the Arctic states. Each Arctic state has outlined their priorities for the Arctic as the region gains greater attention. By looking at these motivations, greater clarity about the overall situation can be attained.

United States The United States defines itself as an Arctic state due to Alaskas location within

the Artic. The United States has publicly identified its Arctic priorities as homeland secu-rity, economic security, international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary finalization, the promotion of international scientific cooperation, maritime transport, and environmental protection. The United States also has publicly stated its desire to strengthen cooperation among the eight Arctic states.12

11 Ibid.12 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 53-57, 68-69, 69, 70-71, 78.

Russian Federation Russias self-proclaimed Arctic strategy revolves around maintaining their role as

a leading power within the Arctic, as roughly half the coastal area of the Arctic Ocean lies within their territory. Besides Russias obvious energy interests in the region, the nation-state has ten strategic priorities relating to the Arctic: active interaction with sub-Arctic states to delimit maritime areas with international law, fostering the creation of Arctic search and rescue regimes, to strengthen bilateral relationships within regional organizations, assist in organization/management/use of cross polar air and sea routes, contribute to international arctic forums, delimit maritime spaces in the Arctic and maintain mutually advantageous presence in Spitsbergen Archipelago, improve state management of social and economic development, improve quality of life for indigenous peoples, develop arctic resource base through technological capabilities, modernize and develop the infrastructure of transpor-tation and fisheries. Russia plans to contribute to international cooperation by strength-ening bilateral relationships with regional organizations and participating in international forums.13

Norway Norway has various national interests in the Arctic, including state security, eco-

nomic development, and regional cooperation. Its declared priorities are helping to pro-mote knowledge about climate change and environmental security, improving monitoring, emergency response, and maritime safety systems, promoting sustainable use of offshore petroleum and renewable resources, promoting onshore business development, further de-veloping infrastructure, continuing to strengthen cooperation with Russia, and safeguard-ing the cultures and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples. It should be noted, however, that Norways foremost diplomatic priority is to maintain stable diplomatic relations with Russia.14

Denmark (Greenland) Denmarks stake in the Arctic and seat on the Arctic Council is driven by its na-

tional interests in Greenland. Denmark and Greenlands joint arctic strategy identifies their priorities as supporting and strengthening Greenlands development toward autonomy and maintaining the commonwealths position as a major player in the arctic. Denmarks plan has four separate priorities: creating a peaceful, secure, and safe arctic; self-sustaining growth and development; developing with respect for the Arctics fragile climate, environment, and

13 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 42-49, 68, 69, 70, 78.14 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 35-42, 68, 69, 70, 77-78.

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nature; and cooperating closely with international partners. Denmark and Greenland also believe that the role of the Arctic Council should be emphasized and extended, and inter-national organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), should be included in international cooperation discussions.15

Finland Finland asserts itself as a natural Arctic power with both a Northern and Arctic

identity. The Finnish government seeks to emerge as a major power in Northern Europe as well. Its priorities in the Arctic are the environment, economic activities such as fishing, transportation and infrastructure advancements, and the protection indigenous peoples. They see international cooperation as a way to lay the groundwork for Finlands activities in the Arctic and promote intergovernmental organization.16

Sweden Sweden emphasizes the historic, geopolitical, economic, environmental, scientific,

and cultural ties connecting them to the Arctic. The priorities of their strategy are climate and environment protection, economic development. Sweden seeks well functioning mul-tilateral cooperation within the Arctic states.17

Canada Canada asserts that being a Northern Country is central to the Canadian

National Identity, and it declares itself a global leader in Arctic science. Exercising arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the Norths environ-mental heritage, and improving and evolving northern governance are Canadas priorities. Canada places a strong emphasis on international cooperation at different levels and wants to cooperate with international organizations and partners.18

IcelandIceland is the only country that claims to be located entirely within the Arctic. As a mar-

itime nation, it depends on resources from the surrounding seas, including a large supply of fish. Iceland prioritizes international cooperation, security, resource development and

15 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 17-23, 68, 69, 77.16 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 23-28, 68, 69, 77.17 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 49-53, 68, 69, 70, 78.18 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 13-17, 68, 69, 76-77.

environmental protection, transportation, peoples and cultures, and research and moni-toring. International cooperation, specifically with Nordic states can be considered one of Icelands top Arctic priorities.19

European Union The European Union also wants a stake in the energy-rich Arctic. It places a high

priority on protecting/preserving the Arctic environment and population, promoting sustainable use of resources, and contributing to enhanced multilateral governance. The governing body promotes international cooperation and is seeking Permanent Observer status.20

These Arctic states and regional bodies share similar priorities in the region. Each state declares a peaceful desire to foster environmental responsibility, multilateral governance, among other noble priorities. However, each state also has momentous economic and politi-cal interests in the region, such as the natural resource deposits and shipping routes available in the Arctic. An examination of current Arctic security issues reveals that the political and economic interests in the region seem to overshadow other appealing priorities, including the promotion of global governance and ecological security. Indeed, the actions of these states even seem to contradict their official priorities. Geopolitical and economic interests have driven states to sacrifice cooperation in favor of national interests, an shift that has led to serious security concerns in the region, including the possibility of heavy militarization.

Security ConcernsThere exists strong evidence of a military build-up in the Arctic on part of every nation-

state within the Arctic Circle. A report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic, reveals enlighten-ing information regarding this militarization.21 Canada is increasing Arctic troop levels and setting up new bases in the Arctic region facing Greenland. Denmark adopted a special Arctic strategy in 2011 and has since developed a military Arctic Response Force com-prised of aircraft and naval vessels adapted for the Arctic climate. Norway, a member of NATO, has directed its Arctic defense policy towards Russia, according to SIPRI. Norway seems more interested in maintaining formidable military presence in the Arctic Circle. It has completed 5 military training exercises with NATO in the Arctic since 2006 and moved

19 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 29-34, 68, 69, 70, 77.20 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 57-64, 71, 78-79.21 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.

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its armed forces headquarters nearer to the Arctic Circle in 2009. Russia has also increased military presence in the Arctic region by regularly deploying bomber aircraft and reconnais-sance missions over the Arctic after a 15-year hiatus. In 2011, the U.S. also conducted in a submarine warfare exercise, and the U.S. Coast Guard has been deploying more National Security cutters to the Arctic region. According to an article published by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether, The[se] new military programs have been geared towards combat capabilities that exceed mere constabulary capacity.22 This information suggests Arctic states may be bolstering their militaries to prepare for conflict between state actors, not just for routine offshore patrolling purposes.

This militarization brings about a security dilemma, where a perceived or actual mili-tary build-up in one state instills insecurity in another, causing an escalating arms race to ensue. There exists a high potential for this security dilemma to become a reality among Arctic states if high-intensity militarization continues. The build up itself seems contradic-tory to the hopes for a state of continued peace. If, no one thinks about Arctic as a mili-tary zone, such an emphasis on preparing national armed forces for an Arctic engagement would not be occurring. Militarization in conjunction with diplomats downplaying any security threats is certainly dangerous. These non-transparent and security maximizing at-titudes on behalf of states are a threat to peace- however natural this process may be.

Despite the grim indications of the continued regional militarization, the possibility for armed interstate conflict is vigorously denied or downplayed by diplomats and researchers. Beyond cursory nods, Dr. Siemon T. Wezeman of SIPRI places little emphasis on the threat of interstate conflict despite a notable military build-up. Dr. Wezeman writes the changes have little or nothing to do with power projection, and may instead be aimed at the patrol-ling and protecting of recognized national territories that are becoming accessible, includ-ing for criminal activities, or towards supporting civilian research.23 When questioned further about his report, Dr. Wezeman stated, no one is planning to go to war.24 Kristopher Bergh, another SIPRI researcher, stated, Security is not a concern to the U.S. when it comes to the Arctic.25 On April 12th and 13th, a meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff- a grouping of Arctic nations military commanders for the region occurred at what is known as the Goose Bay Conference. However, this conference did not discuss issues of hard

22 Rob Huebert, et al., Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2012: 23. 23 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.

24 Siemon Wezeman, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

25 Kristopher Berg, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

security, as defined by Professor Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University as security issues relating to defense against state actors.26 Instead, the discussed security issues focused solely on search and rescue, northern environmental challenges and military-aboriginal relations.27 Ambassador Gustav Lind, the Swedish chair of the Arctic Council, recently opened an informational presentation with a proclamation that any rumors of conflict were simply media exaggeration. In regards to a possible military build-up in the Arctic region, Ambassador Lind stated, Military resources are only being used to support civilians.28 Russian Ambassador to Sweden Igor Neverov was adamant about the impossibility of mili-tarization when he said, No one thinks about militarization of the Arctic.29 The Russian Ambassadors top political adviser, Aleksi Ivanov, added, The Arctic is a zone of peace, and, No one thinks about the Arctic as a military zone.30 When discussing a possible resurgence of a 20th century great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Ivanov noted how the two nations are totally in sync and have aligned interests.31 Dr. Ekaterina Klimenko, a Russia expert at SIPRI, added that there is nothing to be scared of in the Arctic.32 These statements seem to suggest that there exists no possibility whatsoever of any interstate con-flict occurring in the Arctic. Perhaps, as the Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Jyrki Terva suggested, simply talking about conflict is the first step to bringing it about.33 With this principle in mind, any talk regarding conflict is avoided and vigorously denied by official representatives of each Arctic state.

Some scholars and diplomats, however, acknowledge that there is high tension in the region. Consul General Aasheim took a less optimistic view about current interstate rela-tions in the Arctic. He stated, in response to questioning on security and cooperation in the Arctic, There is a fight there is a battle.34 Especially prominent is a Cold War legacy re-sulting from the East-West divide that dominated the region for forty years. As Dr. Wezeman stated, The Cold War is not over.35 Tom Arnbom of the World Wildlife Fund Sweden is

26 Nikita Lomagin, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation, Lecture with University of Southern California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.

27 Olin Strader, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-staff.html?m=1 (April 6, 2012).

28 Gustav Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.

29 Igor Neverov,, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.

30 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.

31 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.

32 Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia.

33 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.

34 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, May 28, 2012.

35 Wezeman, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic.

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wary that, Canada is going to be very nationalistic when it takes the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.36 SIPRI expert Dr. Neil Melvin believes that Greenland is one oil strike away from independence.37 These numerous pressures create stark divisions between Arctic states and heighten tensions that are continuously denied by diplomats. The acknowledge-ment of certain conflict potential and the denial of overall security challenges show a certain dissonance that deserves further exploration.

The current militarization of the Arctic seems obvious, but many officials counter that the buildup is necessary for combating soft security issues such as illegal fishing. However, a closer look at the nature of the preparations show them to be more geared toward the possibility of interstate conflict rather than routine offshore patrolling. Indeed, no serious threat of transnational crime exists in the Arctic and there has been no evidence to suggest that transnational crime has increased in recent years in the region. While some states and researchers declare the Arctic to be an undisputed zone of peace, other researchers seem to doubt such an optimistic assessment and comment on the areas of tension. Though in-terstate-armed conflict on a grand scale does not seem likely, diplomatic rows and military skirmishes are possible, which could lead to increasingly volatile circumstances. These cir-cumstances could in turn cause these newly reinforced military forces to engage in conflict and turn the Arctic into a zone of instability.

Cold War PoliticsA major obstacle to cooperation and coordination between Arctic states is the result of

a post-Cold War tension that exists between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states and the weakened Russian Federation. The conclusion of the Cold War has resulted in a great power rivalry between Russia and the United States. This rivalry is a major contributing factor to the lack of communication and mistrust on hard security issues in the region. Indeed, as Dr. Nikita Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University noted, We are still hostage to the Cold War.38 The recent developments of Russias general distrust of NATO forces, especially the United States, is driven by the presence of NATO forces in former Soviet territory. This already existing wariness of NATO was exacerbated when U.S. forces broke an agreement made with Russia over the reunification of East and West Germany by subsequently including former Soviet satellites in the NATO coalition.39 Because of the dis-mantling of the USSRs military forces at the conclusion of the Cold War, Russias apparent

36 Arnbom, Arctic is Hot.

37 Neil Melvin, Conflict and Cooperation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 22, 2012.

38 Lomagin, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation.

39 Robert English, German Reunification, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA), May 16, 2012.

top priority is showing to the world that it can match the United States in broadly defined power capabilities and projections. This Russian mindset, referred to as an inferiority com-plex by Dr. Lomagin hampers communication efforts between Russia and NATO states in regards to its behavior in the Arctic.40 The legacy of the Cold War is still very prevalent in the region and has led to a divide between Russia and Western states.

The extant Cold War tensions continue to dominate foreign policy decisions made on behalf of NATO-affiliated states and Russia. Russian energy security researcher, Konstantin Leschenko of St. Petersburg State University, noted that this presence of NATO missiles and strategic commands in central Europe is a key factor in promoting distrust between Russia and NATO states.41 This lack of trust is reflected in Russias decision to bolster its military forces in the Arctic. As noted in SIPRIs report, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Russias decision to increase its military presence is driven by a desire to balance the situation with NATO forces in the Arctic.42 Russian Diplomat Aleksi Ivanov called this military bolstering a natural response to protect Russian sovereignty.43 It is no surprise Russia would want to project power in the region since NATO forces have carried out military exercises in the region that have excluded Russia.44

While this storied tension may seem obvious, it is important to recognize the inhibitory effect it is having on military coordination and cooperation in the Arctic region. If Russia continues to feel that it is marginalized or needs to prove its power, the Arctic could trans-form into an area of heightened tension and result in, at the very least, intense diplomatic conflict reminiscent of Soviet and American tensions during the Cold War.

Structural Obstacles to Multilateral Security CooperationWhile many countries claim to be working multilaterally on all issues related to the

Arctic, there remains no official forum for security cooperation. The only official forum, the Arctic Council, is ill-suited to mediating security concerns in the region. The institutional structure lacks the critical decision-making or communicative bodies pertaining to military action. The Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, included a clause stating that the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.45 Therefore, no forum currently exists for the Arctic states to address these critical issues. As of now, the Arctic Council functions more as a chat shop rather than a decision making body; when it comes to producing diplomatic accords, it has passed only a single legally

40 Nikita Lomagin, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 1, 2012.

41 Konstantine Leschenko, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.

42 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, 9.

43 Ivanov, interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.

44 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, 7.

45 Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: The Ottawa Declaration - 1996, (Ottawa: Arctic Council, 1996), 2.

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binding agreement.46 Indeed, because of the Ottawa Declarations footnote, this chat shop is prohibited from even discussing security matters. Even though Ambassador Lind has stated the Arctic Council is a decision shaper but is evolving into a decision-maker, the region still lacks a decision-making body and a forum for addressing security challenges.47 Dr. Neil Melvin explained that the Arctic states need to choose whether or not they are will-ing to have the Arctic Council as a union with decision-making power and legally binding agreements, if a decision is left unmade, the nation-states of the Arctic risk predicating se-curity challenges for decades to come.48

Conflict of IdeologiesOne key determinant in shaping the future of the region rests in the philosophies of

the involved nation-states: the dominant realist philosophy these countries follow may pose a threat to continued peace. The bolstering of armed forces occurring in the Arctic region is partly a result of a realist operation code that emphasizes military power projection as a means of protecting sovereignty. Though a potential security dilemma has already been mentioned, an examination of its underlying theoretical and philosophical issues is war-ranted in order to understand the motivations behind the status quo.

As briefly mentioned, realism became the worlds dominant philosophy following World War II. Political theorists such as E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr, pushed a renaissance of realism to the forefront of international relations theory. These writ-ers looked critically at the causes of the second World War, and settled largely on several fundamental mistakes made by thought-shapers and policy makers in the interlude follow-ing World War I. Concisely, this new strain of thought emphasized the ubiquity of power and the competitive nature of politics among nations49 E.H. Carr looked at institutions and diplomatic proclamations and saw that rather than ameliorating conflict, they were in fact impeding the goal of peace. These conditions were dangerous because they created a false belief that exceedingly complex interstate conflicts could be smoothly dealt with by the cre-ation of a community of states that held shared interests and goals.50

A solid realist identity is held by states such as the Russian Federation, United States, and Canada when it comes to Arctic policy. Through actions across the world, both recently and historically, the U.S. and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated these tendencies. There are few that would argue that the operational code of realism does not dominate U.S. or Russian decision makers.

46 Therese Jakobsen, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 24, 2012.

47 Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, May 23, 2012.

48 Melvin, Conflict and Cooperation.

49 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens The Globalization of World Politics, 81.

50 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis.

For Russia, their vast stake in the Arctic region fuels this realist mindset. Russia has the longest coastline of any Arctic state; in fact, this coastline encompasses nearly half of the land surrounding the Arctic Ocean. This heightens security concerns: a lack of ice provides easy access to Russias coastal borders. Since maintaining state security and sovereignty is a chief concern of Russia, potential access to its borders could open up a Pandoras box of security concerns. Russias stake in the Arctic is further motivated by its economic interests, which is severely dependent on natural resources. Russia is the worlds chief producer and exporter of oil, and ranks second in natural gas output. Despite government attempts to decrease dependence of the energy sector, Russias economy continues be held hostage to global energy prices. With a decreasing population, rampant corruption, poor infrastruc-ture, and lack of capital beyond the energy sector, Russias economic diversification attempts have not yielded significant results and the current economic outlook in this area appears bleak.51 According to estimates of Russias currently tapped oil and gas reserves, projections show that energy output is headed for a dramatic decrease over the next twenty years. In order to salvage its economy, Russia increasingly looks northwards to exploit new resources, where, as mentioned previously in this paper, a large portion of the worlds untapped oil and gas reserves lie. With such vital economic and security concerns in the Arctic, Russia is acting and is expected to act with a realist mindset.

In comparison, Canada is generally thought of as a more moderate state, but under the leadership of Stephen Harper, it has chosen the Arctic as an area in which to heavily pursue its national interests. Harpers has proved himself capable of inducing people to rally round the flag, forcing a hardline policy towards the Arctic. Canadas realist operational code is illustrated through a territorial dispute over the Northwest Passage, a new potential ship-ping route along Canadas north rim. This route could dramatically reduce transcontinental shipping costs and be very profitable to the state that controls the waterway. The U.S. and Canada currently have an unresolved conflict over this passageway. The U.S. and Canada share one of the most amicable international borders in the world, and for the two states to publicly disagree about this issue reveals how important this waterway would serve each of their national interests. Canada believes its sovereignty is directly threatened by the current territorial disputes in the Arctic, and will therefore work to defend its perceived borders and retain as much territory as possible.

The remaining littoral Arctic stakeholders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, and Norway fall into somewhat more murky territory concerning their governing philosophies. Many consider these social democracies to be more in favor of liberal institu-tionalism. However, these states remain under the realist umbrella, albeit in a different form. Realism is primarily concerned with great powers -- after all, John Mearsheimer,one of the

51 The World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html

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chief realist thinkers of the 20th century, entitled his seminal work on realism The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Acts of power projection by minor states tend to be ignored, so they band together in order to have their positions heard on the international scale. In pursu-ing realist goals, these weaker states have no choice but to embrace liberal internationalist policies.

These Nordic states have also shown themselves willing and able to pursue their nation-al interests through other means other than traditional realist power projection. Norway, for example, has a long-standing and historical dispute with Russia over fishing territory. With much to gain from a stake in Arctic oil, Norway is offering the technological expertise of its parastatal oil company Statoil (formerly StatoilHydro) to Russian Gazprom concerning the Shtokman drilling project. In this way, Norway advances its national interests without directly challenging a great military power.

Another example of a non-great power using other sources of leverage besides military might is Greenland, Denmarks land within the region.. Greenland is endowed with the second largest amount of rare earth minerals in the world. Since these minerals are crucial to the functioning of technology and therefore the trappings of modern life, Greenlands deposits are extremely valuable commodities in the Arctic. These resources are not currently being tapped for several reasons, including a lack of technological expertise. According to rare earth minerals expert Dr. Matteo Rongione, the only way for Greenland, a 58,000-person state that lacks full independence from Denmark, to mine these minerals would re-quire enlisting outside help. One source it is currently considering is China; Reports indicate that Greenland may be reaching out to China to assist in the mining of these rare-earth ele-ments, a state eager to increase its stake in the Arctic region. By allowing great powers such as the EU and China to bid for its rare earth minerals, Greenland is increasing its relative power and wealth. Even if they bypass traditional realist tactics to reach their goals, smaller states continue to hold the same end goal of increasing power and influence in the Arctic.

Despite the evidence that realist theory dominates decision-making among Arctic states, diplomats and leaders continue to make statements that imply otherwise. Arctic rhet-oric continues to tend toward a more liberal internationalist viewpoint. The chairman of the Arctic Council, Ambassador Gustav Lind, is documented to believe the efficacy of the Arctic Council is increasing. His belief that the Arctic Council will move towards more binding decisions, goes against the tenets of the dominant realist thought in the region and world. It is well known that states are very hesitant to sacrifice sovereignty, so his assertion seems to be overly optimistic under a realist paradigm. In addition to Ambassador Lind, diplomats including state officials of Russia, Finland and Norway say they would a more powerful Arctic Council. Indeed, many state priorities, as shown earlier in this paper, suggest a desire to increase cooperation with the Arctic Council.

However, Arctic state actions show that the rhetoric may be more wishful thinking than serious policy changes. Despite the call for more binding agreements, only one has been passed regarding search and rescue. Though the argument can be made that such low politics issues can encourage more proper integration, the dominant realist mindsets that are apparent in these Arctic states, especially the U.S. and Russia, indicate that fruit-ful, legally binding agreements do not seem likely. To a realist, these agreements in very low politics areas- those that do not relate to security- represent a willful attempt to placate diplomats and liberal internationalist observers without sacrificing any state sovereignty. Perhaps the footnote in the Ottawa Declaration excluding military issues from the Arctic Councils agenda is the best indicator of a dominant, state-centric realist attitude towards security issues. In preventing security from being discussed at this regional institution, real-ist powers made sure that they would not sacrifice any state sovereignty. Based on this, the Arctic nation-states unwillingness to move beyond realist operational codes may in fact be doomed to repeat the same mistakes of their post-WWI counterparts.

Domestic Factors and Diplomatic ChallengesInternational relations are not the only area running the risk of destabilizing the Arctic;

domestic concerns also pose a threat to Arctic peace and stability. The connection between domestic factors and international politics comes to light when examining state behav-ior using two-level games theory, a concept coined by Dr. Robert Putnam of Harvard University. These two-level games occur when leaders bargain on one level with their own citizens and on the second with other foreign leaders.52 These are dangerous games to play when the fate of the Arctic Circle is at stake. In Canada, the issue is already at the forefront of the Canadian psyche. As Dr. Michael Byers suggests, the Arctic is dear to the Canadian people. Discussing the Arctic is a personal, even emotional experience, because the Arctic gets into [Canadians] hearts and minds and becomes part of who [they] are.53 Mr. Byers also remarks that, Conceptions of sovereignty are often wrapped up in national identities, and nowhere is this more true than with Canadas North, for even the national anthem emphasizes The True North Strong and Free.54 Byers introduces the concept of Harpers politicization of the Arctic, stating that Mr. Harper has made Arctic sovereignty part of his successful election campaigns.55 Harper told the National Post on May 16 that, nothing comes before [Arctic sovereignty].56 In 2010, Harper proclaimed to CBC that, The first

52 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42(Sum-mer 1988):427-460.

53 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010), 19.54 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 20.55 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 23.56 John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool Off,

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and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty. And as I have said many times before, the first principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose it.57 Harper seminally adds that Canadas Arctic sovereignty is non-negotiable. These and other statements by Mr. Harper show a dangerous politicization of Arctic security, in which the Canadian people could be clamoring for hardline solutions for the slightest of Arctic problems or territorial infringements.

While Canada has an extremely strong Northern identity, Russia expert Dr. Robert English of the University of Southern California, raises the point that Russia may have a claim even more intrinsic to its national identity. With 18% of their territory, 20,000 kilo-meters of border, and 95% of their oil and gas reserves in the north, the Russian Federations fate is tied closely to that of the Arctic.58 Russian President Vladimir Putin has also taken a similar political tack. Harper and Putin have both put themselves in quite complicated positions when it comes to international bargaining. In the event that some small security issue does arise in the Arctic, we may see Canadian and Russian citizens pushing for more aggressive action, domestic pressures which could complicate multilateral cooperation at the international level. Indeed, when Canada assumes the chair of the Council in 2013, its nationalistic behavior and policy may reverse Swedens previous gains setting the stage for multilateral cooperation. Also, a change in U.S. leadership following the 2012 presidential election could have similar effects either immediately or when the U.S takes the helm of the Arctic Council in 2015. Without leadership advocating for cooperation, the Arctic will inevitably become a zone of increased tension.

ConclusionIn analyzing the behavior of Arctic states, this report finds that the Arctic region has

a high likelihood of future instability. Each Arctic state involved has strong economic and geopolitical interests in the region; to defend their interests, these states have contributed significant resources to building up their Arctic military forces and improving regional de-ployment capabilities only further compounding the issue. In spite of this clear military buildup, state officials have continuously denied any possibility for interstate conflict. The singular comprehensive governing body in the region, the Arctic Council, is insufficiently structured to mediate security disputes if a conflict should it arise. Moreover, The strong tensions and great power rivalry vestiges of Cold War, especially between Russia and NATO countries, also represents a threat to international cooperation. A dominant realist mindset seems to frame the decision making of leaders in all involved states, causing national inter-est to triumph over liberal institutionalism cooperation. Applying two-level games theory

57 Peter Sheldon and Terry Mileweski, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html. (August 23, 2010).

58 Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia.

to each Arctic state can reveal how harsh political rhetoric can hurt state officials ability to negotiate with each other and mitigate disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council is due for changes in leadership that will lead to greater uncertainty. A combination of these factors may result in diplomatic crises and small-scale armed disputes among involved states, which could potentially result in a large-scale armed conflict. Because of the core risk involved in ignoring these serious security risks, dialogue between Arctic states is critical.

With this dire scenario in mind, it is critical to posit ways to reduce the prospect of future instability. The singular most important factor to avoiding conflict is that open com-munication and acknowledgement of risk. Since the Ottawa Declaration prohibits the Arctic Council from addressing any security issues, an additional forum for hard and soft security matters should be established. This forum must dedicate itself to addressing security con-cerns and must include representatives from the civilian and military leadership of each Arctic state. Since another semi-legislative regional organization seems implausible due to the realist philosophies dominating each states behavior, a conference or summit that in-cludes all Arctic states would be a more likely multilateral channel in which to open dialogue on security matters. The goal of this much-needed security summit would be to build posi-tive relations and lay the groundwork for further cooperation.

This research paper does not assert that major interstate conflict will necessarily occur, however, it does suggest that small skirmishes and diplomatic tensions between state actors are possible. These, in turn, could spark Arctic nations to engage in armed and/or diplomatic conflict due to lack of coordination and communication. Arctic states need to increase their efforts in seeking consensus in the realm of hard and soft security matters in order to prevent tensions from rising in the region. If this recommendation is not met, an Arctic crisis of alarming magnitude could result, and the world may face a war that is very cold indeed.

Works Cited 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arc-

tic, U.S. Geological Survey, accessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.

Alun Anderson, After the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).Arnbom, Tom, Arctic is Hot, World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.

Bennett, Jody R. Vying for Power in the High North. International Relations Security Net-work. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Oct. 2012.

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Berg, Kristopher, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy, Stockholm In-ternational Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

Byers, Michael, Who Owns the Arctic, (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010), 19.Carr, Edward Hallet, The Twenty Years Crisis

Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: The Ottawa Declaration - 1996, (Ot-tawa: Arctic Council, 1996), 2.

English, Robert, German Reunification, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA), May 16, 2012.

Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, Franklin, Sir John (17861847), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2575, accessed 20 October 2012.

Heininen, Lassi, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012)

Huebert, Rob et al., Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellweth-er, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2012: 23.

Ivanov, Aleksi, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stock-holm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.

Jakobsen, Therese, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 24, 2012.

John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool Off, http://fullcom-ment.nationalpost.com/2012/05/17/john-ivison-stephen-harpers-arctic-sovereignty-legacy-starting-to-cool-off/ (May 17, 2012).

Klimenko, Ekaterina, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

Leschenko, Konstantine, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.

Lind, Gustav, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.

Lomagin, Nikita, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation, Lecture with University of Southern California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.

Lomagin, Nikita, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Peters-burg, Russia, June 1, 2012.

Melvin, Neil, Conflict and Cooperation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 22, 2012.

Neverov, Igor, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.

Putnam, Robert Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, Inter-national Organization 42(Summer 1988):427-460.

Renfrow, Stephanie. Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows. NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html

Robert Peary: To the Top of the World. PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. .

Rongione, Matteo, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements, Stockholm In-ternational Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

Sheldon, Peter and Mileweski, Terry, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html. (August 23, 2010).

Strader, Olin, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-staff.html?m=1 (April 6, 2012).

Terva, Jyrki, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.

The World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html

Wezeman, Siemon, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Re-search Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.

Wezeman, Siemon, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm Inter-national Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.

Expressions of Nationalism Exploring the Implications of Russian Gemeinschaft

Tyler D. Tyburski

Nations, nationalism and national identity are complex forces in the contemporary inter-national system. This study seeks to explore the phenomenon of nationalism as it has occurred within one of the most notoriously nationalist states of modernity: Russia. Toward this end, the first order of business will be to construct the conceptual edifice of nationalism that is necessary for pursing such process tracing. Following this introductory section, the paper will sketch the history of Russias primordial nationalism. This historical look at Russias utiliza-tion of nationalism as a tool will be cast over the broad sweep of time extending from the pre-communist period up to the yet unraveling years of the Putin era. The discussion will highlight what will be termed the critical periods of Russian nationalism. Interlocking these elements will bind tightly the theoretical principles of nationalism and their real-world implications for Russia. This will provide a conceptually durable basis for preliminary conclusions and future research. Ultimately, it will be contended that outbreaks of Russian nationalist fervor occur at times when the rule of strong, autocratic leaders intersect with a weak economy; and further, that in almost every such instance, an outside other is blamed to absorb populist backlash that would otherwise thrash the Russian state itself. The paper closes with a brief reflection on contemporary Russian nationalism, the significance of this study and what is at stake for those pursuing continued research.

Conceptualizing the Notion of Nationalism: An Introduction

The discourse of nations and nationalism is necessarily rooted in that of the modern state. In the flow of history following from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the state has come to assert itself as the most efficient organizer of power in the international system. Today, almost every inhabited area on earth is assigned to a state. But what, exactly, is the state? Max Weber, in his 1919 Politics as a Vocation, dubbed the state, in its most minimalist sense, the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory1. This, definitionwhich has garnered great consensus across academia since its conceptionwill be employed hereafter. In accepting Webers conclusion, one comes to view nationalism as neither natural nor essential, but as a product manufactured by state authority. Often times, it is so skillfully produced that it ensures its continued reproduction by taking emotional

1 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33.

Tyler Tyburski is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in Political Science and International Relations.

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Tyler D. Tyburski 31


Expressions of Nationalism

possession of the peoples to which it is peddled. As E.J. Hobsbawm argued, an esteemed pioneer of nationalist thought, it is almost always the case that a state will forge its nation2.

A states ability to do so, however, is bound by its authoritative capacity. States that only achieve Webers definitional threshold might be thought of as weak states, whereas those well surpassing it can be called strong states. Some characteristics of state weakness include low tax revenues, [flagrant] corruption, and a lack of law and order3. Others, in-clude a weak military, a low gross domestic product, and high debt. The opposite qualities are perceived as natural indicators of state strength. This is not to say that strong states are entirely without any of the characteristics of weak ones; they simply counterbalance their weaknesses with other points of exceptional strength. Especially in strong states, the notion of the nation is a concept with which all peoplesthinkers and tinkerers alikefind themselves intimately familiar. This speaks to the underlying desire of state-based power structures to expand and deepen their influence. Indeed, leaders in weak states share this same goal, but are without comparable resources and influence. Therefore, It could, be sug-gested that an engrained sense of national identity ought to be counted among the qualities of a strong state, and vice versa for weak states.

The concept of nationalism, however, remains in its relative infancy. In fact, Hobsbawm indicates that, the notion of gobierno (government) was not specifically united with the concept of the nacin (nation) until 1884, more than two centuries after the forging of the Westphalian Peace4. Moreover, this association did not develop similarly or simultaneously all throughout the international system. Nor has it since developed regularly even within the borders of particular states. To be sure, there is little consensus among Americans about what it means to be American. Nationalism, therefore, cannot be envisaged as a homog-enous construct. Rather, it must be considered a multifaceted abstraction. Indeed, it emerges differently in different places, and it has the ability to express itself in a variety of unique ways.

Primarily, nationalism presents itself in two forms, both of which were first explored and explained in 1887 by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies. Gemeinschaft. The base and primordial face of nationalism stems from the notion that every person within a nation carries with them attachments, which are both tangible and real. Blood bonds, shared linguistic roots, adherence to common cultural customs, hereditary territorialism and the defense of an essential community are the essence of this primal theory of nationalism. Contrarily, gesellschaft offers a more civic design of nationalismone that is constructed

2 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 44.3 Neil Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, in Journal of Peace Research, (2009), 163.4 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 15.

though common education and is constituted by both legality and shared virtues5. Although united by common objectives, these two theories of nationalism are deeply divergent with regard to the means that they suggest to best achieve these objectives. This is to say that, while gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are similarly employed toward the authorship of a grand myth, intended to unite disparate peoples into a people, or the people, they approach this task with fundamentally different tactics. In his 1992 inquiry into French and German citizenship, Rogers Brubaker, a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, characterized those of the former as strong-armed government policies and the im-plementation of programs for divisive ethno-national citizenship. Those of the latter, he said, are tied to state-based assimilation into in a philosophically-rooted political community6.

Provided these understandings, one might come to better grasp the canonized defi-nition of nationalism that was first proposed by the late French philosopher, Ernst Gellner. In his Nations and Nationalism, a work that inspired the subsequent writings of Hobsbawm, it was offered that nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and national units should be congruent7. This definition which, to be sure, is first and foremost a political definition, carries with it truly great implications. It insinuates that the political duty of a given people is, first and foremost, to its polity, and that this duty to the polity necessarily supersedes all other national obligations8. Indeed, it is this degree of intensity that distinguishes nationalism as an extreme form of group identity that is capable of com-manding the radical power of mass mobilization towards state-centric endgames.

In harnessing the forces of social construction, strong states masterfully produce and manipulate the raw power of nationalism vis--vis goals relating to self-preservation, secu-rity, economy and international prowess. In doing so, they most usually come to rely on the existence ofor the invention ofa distinctive other. The sociological principle underly-ing this trend is the essential relativity inherent within every notion of the self. Indeed, as was famously noted by Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at Cornell University, the existence of an us is essentially contingent upon the notion of a them9. When conceptualizing this abstract notion, it can be useful to think of how people often define their associations to sports teams. In many cases, one will define their athletic allegiances by making reference to the teams they denounce rather than those that they sup-port. Love of the us thereby becomes conflated with hatred of the them.

5 Vladimir Tismaneau, Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, in Envisioning Eastern Europe, (1994), 118. 6 Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 35.

7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 8 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 9.9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London, UK: Versa, 2006), 25.

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Some theorists, such as Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, and Sander Hoogendoorn, be-lieve that there exists a particular set of variables that can be examined to explain broader trends of nationalism within particular states and individuals10. This claim is contentious because it attempts to model a complex relationship by applying a single, simple formula. Such a broad attempt to understand nationalism makes use of too wide a scope. As Brubaker suggests, nationalism in France is not at all analogous to nationalism in Germany nor is nationalism in the United States an analog for nationalism in Iraq. This being the case, it is sensible to a refine this broad-based approach by tracing the historical development of nationalism within the context of only a single state. Cross-examination between such case studies could then provide a truly durable basis for comparative analysis. Abiding by this logic, from here onward, Russia11 will become this papers sole frame of study.

The Russian state has fluctuated in its authoritative capacity over time, reaching its height as a Great Power during the Cold War years (roughly 1947-1991). Having since de-clined in stature following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there is today an ongoing debate about whether Russias status as is that of either a strong or weak state. However, when it comes to Russias its ambitions of self-strengthening, there is no debate. This aspect of the Russian identity has remained a constant since the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792) to win control over Ottoman-controlled, warm-water ports in the Black Sea. Indeed, Russia has developed into one of historys most uniquely nationalist states, and, as such, has long been subjected to a great degree of truly transformative politi-cal processes. Nevertheless, Russian nationalism has not been painted in even coats; rather, layers of varying thicknesses and composition have colored the national identity differently over time. Certain critical periods, however, do seem to stand out as clear checkpoints in the development of Russian nationalism. The following will examine the forces at play during three such time periods: (1) the Tsarist Era (1721-1917), (2) the Stalinist Era (1924-1953) and (3) the Putinist Era (2000-present).

Considering the Russian Context However, despite its fractures, in many ways, the development of Russian national-

ism can be viewed as a single, coherent phenomenon. Trends from the distant past seem to be echoed in both recent times as well as the present. Therefore, to understand the contem-porary dynamics of Russias identity-driven politics, one must first indulge in an examina-tion of the historical development of Russian nationalism. This rhetorical framework neces-sitates that special attention be paid to the role of ideology. Often conceived of as secular

10 Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, Sander Hoogendoorn. Nationalism and Its Explanations, in Political Psychology, (2003), 349.

11 For the purposes of this essay, Russian will refer to whatever lands fell under the central authority of the Kremlin during the particular time that is being discussed.

religion, and famously referred to by Karl Marx as false consciousness, ideology has always been a central tool of the state in manufacturing the formal constructs implemented towards the mass production of Russian identity12. To be sure, historically, it has always been a well-bred faith in, and of, the stateeven more so than the doctrines of Orthodox Christianitythat controls Russian culture. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Russia has branded its own denomination of orthodoxy that is headed by the Church in Moscow: Russian Orthodoxy.

Channeling Hobsbawm, one is compelled to conceive of Russians as true inventions of the Russian state. Historically, there was never a definite and recognized Russian homeland, culture, or essence. Rather, Russia began as collection of cities, belonging to various king-doms, which gradually coalesced into something like a state around the time of Ivan the Terrible13. Russian history was imbued with an abbreviated and fractured nature due to its turbulent experiences with regime changes, revolutions and invasions. This unstable politi-cal environment only exacerbated preexisting societal splintering which had already spelled difficulty for the cohesion of a unified people.

Considering the intense forces of discontinuity that have been so long at work, stand-ing governments were led to pursue more overt and deliberate methods of social unification to overcome them. Especially in the early phases of Russificationthe process by which Russian identity was (and is) createdthe tactics of gesellschaft were simply not viable. Given the lack of a binding social contract, a strong civil society and stable borders, these more civic approaches would have been difficult to implement and unlikely to succeed. The realities of Russian political history, combined with the centralizing tendencies of fluctuat-ing governments, prompted the adoption of the more primordial methods of gemeinschaft-based nationalism. Once steadily in place, and proven to be effective (at some point roughly between 1868-1873), these programs began to propagate themselves, even across shifting regimes14. In fact, although these rotating governments were different structurally as well as ideologically, the precedent of gemeinschaft-based nationalism received their universal adherence.

Gemeinshaft Begins: The Tsarist Era

The two centuries preceding the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were dominated by the rule of the Russian Tsars. These autocrats, seeking to expand their influence and unify their peoples, began the tradition of Russian gemeinschaft. In so doing, their primary goal was to differentiate between those groups which they thought could and could not be easily

12 Robert Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 111. 13 Vilhelm Thomsen, The Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin of the Russian State. (New York, NY: Burt Franklin, 1877), 12.

14 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 4.

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Russified. Thus, they set themselves to the task of developing a certain pan-Russian identity that these groups would then be given the opportunity to either accept or reject. By doing so, the autocrats hoped to be able to differentiate members of the Russian us from those who would be relegated to association with the contemptible them. The rationale behind creating this stark divide was twofold: (1) it provided a baseline population for the Russian nation and (2) it satisfied the us-them that dynamic that is critical to identity formation. Indeed, had the Tsars simply pursued a totalistic policy of forced Russification, the resulting national identitydevoid of a clear other with which to contrast itselfwould have likely collapsed under the weight of its own ambiguity.

The identity that the Tsars chose to create was designed to unite the Russian people (the us) under two overarching criteria: (1) an unqualified submission to the [Orthodox] Church and (2) the same devotion and obedience to the ruler [(the Tsar)].15 By anchoring Russian identity to an already formalized and well- respected institutionthe Churchthe Tsars endowed it with a certain degree of intrinsic legitimacy. Moreover, this divine con-nection provided a sort of moral imperative for individuals to associate themselves with the Russian identity. This group-based system of identification established the process of Russification and a means for induction into an imagined community that has been emu-latedin Russia and elsewhereacross the generations.

Interestingly, this system of social sorting seemed to accelerate itself as Russia pro-gressed into the later phases of Tsarist rule16. In fact, by the time that Russia transitioned from Tsarist domination to Bolshevik domination, the formulation of the us-them di-chotomy had reached a crescendo. This is almost certainly linked to the fact that, at that very time, the country found itself plunging into relative chaos. In fact, in 1917, Russia was in the throes of not only World War I, but also a severe economic downturn and a bloody revolution. These troubles were all interconnected, and, when mixed, spelled out the perfect recipe for intensified Russification. The Tsar spun the situation as a national hardship that required a national solution.

In so doing, Nicholas II (1868-1918)the last Tsar of the Russian Empirekept with the imperial traditions of his 18th Century predecessors by labeling his great war, World War I, an expansionist conflict17. The Tzar expressed his unyielding determination to fight on, at all costs, toward the goal of expanding Russian territory, population and regional influ-ence. Stalwart commitment to the same quickly became the hallmark of a good Russian. Thus, the nation was mobilized under the idea of the state, carrying with it some religious undertones, dictated directly by the ruler. This theme was to be echoed in generations to

15 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I, in The Russian Review, (1960), 39. 16 Andrey Sinyavsky, and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism, in The Massachusetts Review, (1990), 477. 17 Peter Gatrell, Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History. (New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 2.

come. Indeed, the very forces that came to replace the Russian Tsars later employed similar directives to produce still greater centripetal forces of nationalism. Moreover, their wars of conquest would continue to organize themselves around the notion of the nation combating others under the banners of state leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, these patterns would only come to strengthen themselves as the states powers and capabilities evolved. The Tsars, although they were the founders of Russian gemeinschaft, never expe-rienced the power of their invention to the same extent that later generations of Russian leaders would. Indeed, the Tsars were, in a sense, bound by an inability to reject their own traditions. The Soviets, having had ousted the Tsars, were not.

Gemeinschaft in Action: An Examination of Stalinist Era Nationalism Joseph Stalin replaced Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)the famed leader of the

Bolshevik Revolutionin 1924. A native Georgian, he ruled the Russia-based Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) between 1924 and his death in 1953. His tenure was one marked by bitter brutality. To mask and soften the violence, Stalin relied on the forces of primordial nationalism, Soviet Great Power status and the popular effects of substantial economic advancements. Assuming power in the wake of Bolshevik rule, Stalin sought to rebrand Russians in his own image. To do so, he made use of a variety of classic tools and tactics. For instance, as noted in David Rowleys Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, Stalin masterfully leveraged the idea of the other by repeatedly portraying the West,18 spe-cifically the United States, as an enemy to be feared and hated.19 Undeniably, his onslaughts of rhetoric and paraphernalia were effective hypnotizers for a society already inundated by fear flowing from the Kremlins oppressive and sadistic policies. However, beyond simply drawing on the politics of fear, he relied heavily upon bold ideological claims and promises of economic growth to further his nationalist program. Thus, the Soviet people were met with an impossible choice: work toward Soviet success, either out of love or fear. Death was the only alternative. Moreover, if opting to work, their personal motive had always to appear genuine and trustworthy.

Indeed, these tacticsalthough reprehensible and corruptwere well tailored to the contexts in which Stalin was operating. For instance, the interbellum period between 1918 and 1939 was ripe for the extreme exploitation of emotion and the practice of intense othering. Just as Hitler in Germany was condemning the Jews, Stalin in Russia cursed the capitalists of the West. Moreover, being that the Soviet economy had significantly retract-ed in the post-World War I years, Stalins radical collectivization plans came across not as frightening, but as hopeful. Indeed, at least immediately, his infamous five-year plans were

18 For the purposes of this essay, the West will be limited to the United States and the democracies of Western Europe.

19 David Rowley, Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, in The American Historical Review, (1994), 156.

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gazed upon with great appeal as retail prices in Moscow [had] doubled in the first two years of the war and then accelerated dramatically in 1916 and early 1917.20 Indeed, Stalins scare tactics seized upon the melancholy zeitgeist of interwar Russia. Later, he adapted them to inspire mobilization during the Second World War.

In the throes of World War II, Joseph Stalin, an atheist, invigorated a campaign of anti-German gemeinschaft by allowing a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church. This ma-neuver, however, was not a move towards liberalism. Rather, it was a coy political ploy aimed at exploiting the nationalist feelings of the religious Russian peasantryand it worked.21 What one sees here is an impressive display of state power. Indeed, the Kremlin, a body that had ruthlessly pushed a program of non-religion, was able to forcibly shape Orthodoxy, a holy faith, into a facet of the secular ideology of nationalism. Ultimately, this resulted not in a Russian religious revival, but in a spike of nationalist sentiments, rooted in a shared reli-gious affiliation, and a dramatic increase in the enlistment rate of the Russian Red Army. A testament to the power of the states gemeinschaft, in Russia, World War II came to be known as The Great Patriotic War. In fact, Daniel Chirot, an esteemed sociologist and Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington, has suggested that, even until 1975, the only remaining old-fashioned European empirewas the Russian one.22 The term old-fashioned, it seems, is quite apt when describing the character of Russian nationalism. Indeed, the complexities of gesellschaft, which were not viable at the outset of the Russian experiment with statehood, never developed parallel to the Russian stategemeinschaft was always reinforced.

Stalins tactics of gemeinschaft were exceptionally base. They might well be conceived of more simply as the ruthless promotion of a particularly volat