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Regime Change by the Book:
Constitutional Toolsto Preserve Democracy
Theodore J. Piccone, Editor
Alexander S. Kirshner, Project DirectorCorey Whiting, Project Assistant
Siham Nurhussein, Project Assistant
Supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i
PREFACE ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
INTRODUCTION 1
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6
RECALL/VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE 9
IMPEACHMENT 12
SUCCESSION 15
CRIMINALIZING COUPS 19
SLIDES 23
PRESIDENTIAL RECALL:
THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 28
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT:
THE CASE OF KOREA 43
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 56
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 69
ARGENTINA 69
CANADA 76
KOREA 83
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NIGERIA 89
ROMANIA 96
RUSSIA 104
SOUTH AFRICA 113
SPAIN 121
THAILAND 129
VENEZUELA 138
APPENDIX
ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY COALITION
PROJECT 148
LIST OF REVIEWERS 151
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Regime Change by the Book
17
Finally Nigeria, Argentina and Venezuela offer mixed systemsunder certain circumstances the successor is permanent and under other
circumstances new elections are held. Under both the Nigerian andArgentine constitutions, when the president is no longer able to serve, a vice
president assumes the presidency and serves out the term with the fullpanoply of powers. If there is no vice president or he or she is unable toserve, then an interim president is named. In Nigeria, the interim presidentis the president of the senate and elections are held within three months. In
Argentina, the Congress determines who assumes power, whether theinterim president will fill out the full term, and when the next election willtake place. In Venezuela, if the president becomes unable to serve out theterm during the first four years of his six-year term, the vice president (who
is handpicked by the president) serves for no more than thirty days; newelections must be held by the end of this period. However, if the presidencyis vacated during the last two years of the term, the unelected vice president
serves out the remainder of the two years.
Recommendations
1) Succession provisions in democratic constitutions should clearlyspecify at least two successors and delineate a process for choosing
the next in line for succession. When a chief executive leaves officebefore his or her term expires, the identity of a replacement should be
clear and predictable. This applies even in temporary instances when theconstitution establishes a short period before a permanent successor ischosen. In Venezuela, Russia, Thailand, and Canada, either only thefirst successor is determined or the succession is handled according to
internal party rules. This situation could lend itself to ad hoc solutionsmanipulable by whomever has the most power at the time of the crisis,rather than being driven by a consensus among the larger body politic.
Further, there are frequently occasions when the first in line is unable orunwilling to serve. To account for these circumstances, clear rules fordesignating the next chief executive should be articulated in order to
respond with a minimum amount of confusion and maximum amount ofdemocratic legitimacy.
2) Constitutions should mandate that positions in the line of successionbe filled when they become vacant and outline a procedure for doing
so that comports with democratic practice. One institutional cause of
the Argentine game of presidential hot-potato that was played in 2001-2002 is that the Argentine constitution neither insists that the viceasefad
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Regime Change by the Book
23
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Succession
Provision4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Impeach-
ment
Provisions3
X
X
X
X
X
X
Recall
Provisions/
MotionofNo
Confidence
forChief
Executives2
Presidential
Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliamentary
Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliam
entary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential1
Mixed
Presidential
Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliamentary
Presidential
Systemof
Government
Venezuela
Thailand
Sp
ain
South
Korea
South
Africa
Russia
Romania
Nigeria
Canada
Argentina
Transfe
rsofExecutivePower
1
TheRuss
iansystemofgovernmenthaselementsofamixedsystem,butinpractice
isconsideredapresidentialsystem.
22
TheTheArgentine,Russian,SouthKoreanandVenezuelanconstitutionsallincludesomefeaturesintheirpresidentialsystem
sthatservethefunctionofamini-
noconfide
ncemotion,forexample,allowingthe
legislaturetoremoveatleastoneme
mberofthepresidentsadministrationonamotionofnoconfidence.
3
WhileCanadaandSpainallowprosecutionoftheirprimeministersforcriminalviolations,theonlymeanstoremovetheprimeministerfromofficeisavote
ofnoconfidence.
4
Canadaa
ndThailanddonothaveconstitutiona
lprovisionstoidentifyanimmediates
uccessortoactasinterimprimeminister,thoughtheydohave
processes
tochooseanewpermanentprimem
inister.Spainssuccessionprovisionscanbefoundinthebasiclawofgovernment,ratherthanthe
constitutio
n.
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Democracy Coalition Project
24
Mustoccur
after
the
3rd
year
of
pre
sid
en
tsterm.
20
%ofre
gis
tere
d
votersm
ustsign
petitionfor
a
referen
dum.
Morev
otesm
ustbe
casttorem
ov
ethan
wereinitially
castto
ele
ctthepre
sid
en
t.
Totaln
um
ber
of
votescastm
ustbe
25
%of
thetotal
num
ber
of
regis
tere
dv
oters.
Apetitionm
aybe
filedon
cedurin
ga
termin
offic
e.
Motionm
ustbe
proposedby40%of
theHouseof
Representa
tives.It
mustalsoincludea
candidateto
replace
theprimem
inister.
Majority
ofall
members
ofthe
Houserequiredfor
passage.
Ifvotedoes
notpass,
thememberswho
proposedth
emotion
maynotdo
soagain
insame
parliame
ntary
sessio
n.
Noconfidence
motionspr
oposed
duetoalleged
impeachable
offenses
mustbereferredto
theSena
tefor
impeachmentfirst.
Motionm
ustby
pro
posedby10
%of
theCon
gre
ss.It
mustals
oin
clu
dea
can
did
ateto
repla
cetheprim
e
minis
ter.
Fiv
e-d
ayw
aitin
g
perio
dre
quire
d
beforev
ote.
Majority
of
all
mem
bersre
quire
d
for
passage.
Ifm
otion
doesn
ot
pass,an
ew
on
e
mayn
otbeh
eldin
sam
eparliam
en
tary
session.
Voteof
confid
en
ce
inCabin
etm
aybe
inclu
siv
eor
ex
clu
siv
eof
the
pre
sid
en
t.
Majority
of
mem
bers
of
the
Nation
alA
ssem
bly
require
dfor
passage.
Ifconfid
en
ceis
with
drawn
an
dthe
Assem
bly
cann
ot
ch
oosean
ew
pre
sid
en
twithin30
days,n
ew
parliam
en
tary
ele
ction
sare
calle
d
.
M
otionmustbe
proposedby25%of
the
totalnumberof
deputiesand
senators.
Deb
atebeginsthree
da
ysaftermotion
initiated.
Majorityofall
deputiesand
senatorsrequiredfor
passage.
Newparliamentary
electionsarenot
calledifconfidence
with
drawn,unlessa
new
primeminister
ca
nnotbeagreed
uponwithin60days.
Ifvotedoesnotpass,
an
ewonemaynot
beheldinsame
parliamentary
session.
Majorityv
oteof
the
Houseof
Comm
on
s
require
dfor
passage(by
custom
).
Parliam
en
tary
ele
ction
sm
ayor
mayn
otbecalle
dif
confid
en
ce
with
drawn.
Requirem
ents
Recall
Motion
ofN
o
Confid
enc
e
Motion
ofN
o
Confid
en
ce
Motion
ofN
o
Confid
en
ce
Motion
ofN
o
Confid
en
ce
Motion
ofN
o
Confid
en
ce
Mech
an
ism
Pre
sid
en
tial
Con
stitu
tional
Mon
arch
y/Parl
Con
stitution
al
Mon
arch
y/P
arl
Parliam
en
tary
Mix
ed
Con
stitution
al
Mon
arch
y/P
arl
System
of
Gov
ernm
ent
Venezuela
Thaila
nd
Spain
SouthAfrica
Romania
Canada
PresidentialRecall/ParliamentaryMotiono
fNoConfidence
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26
ForPM:
Untilnew
Government
isformed
ForPM:
InterimPM
chosenby
President
N
N/A
N/A
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
FirstinLine
Elected?
Ifwithin1st
fouryearsof
presidents
term,new
elections
within
30days
Ifafterthe
fourthyear,
successor
servesout
remainderof
presidents
term
N/A
Untiln
ew
Government
ischosen
New
elections
within
60days
Assembly
must
choosenew
president
within
30days
New
elections
within
3months
For
President:
New
elections
within
3months
Ifvice
presid
ent,
remainderof
presidents
term
.
IfSen
ate
Presid
ent,
elections
heldwithin3
months.
Bycustom,
Gov.
General
appoints
actingPM
whoserves
until
replacement
chosenby
majority
party
Ifvice
president,
remainderof
presidents
term.
Other
successors
canfulfillthe
termor
serveuntil
the
legislature
declares
new
elections.
Lengthof
InterimChief
Executives
Term
Yes
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
N/A
Yes
InterimChief
Executive
WieldsFull
Power
Yes
N/A
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
InterimChief
Executiveis
Eligibleto
runforthe
Positionin
Next
Elections
Executive
Vice
President
Successor
chosenby
King
FirstVice
President
Membe
rof
theCab
inet
Prime
Minister
Memberof
theState
Council
Deputy
President
Memberof
theCabinet
Assembly
Speaker
Prime
Minister
For
President:
Senate
President
Chamberof
Deputies
President
Vice
Presid
ent
Sena
te
Presid
ent
Successor
formally
chosenby
Governor
General;
partyin
power
designates
newleader
Vice
President
Subsequen
t
successors
chosenby
the
legislature
Lineof
Succession
Venezuela
Thailand
Spain
South
Korea
South
Africa
Russia
Romania
Nige
ria
Canada
Argentina
Success
ion
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Regime Change by the Book
27
No
N/A
Ye
s
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Prohibition
s
on
Convicte
d
Coup
Particip
an
ts
Holdin
g
Public
Offic
e
Righ
tto
Resist
Non-
con
stitutio
nalA
cts
Crimin
alize
sn
ot
resis
ting
cou
ps
Crimin
aliz
e
snot
inf
ormin
g
aboutcoup
plots
Crimin
alize
sn
ot
informin
g
aboutcoup
plo
ts
Whistle
blo
wer
Pro
tection
Righ
tto
Resist
Non-
con
stitutio
nalA
cts
Law
sthat
En
coura
ge
Resistan
ce
to
Coups
(e.g.
den
un
ciation
of
plo
tsan
d
non-
particip
atio
n
inille
gitim
a
te
gov
ernm
en
t)
X
N/A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Crimin
al
Code
Crimin
aliz
es
Coups
X
X
X
X
Con
stitutio
n
Crimin
aliz
es
Coups
Venezuela
Thailand
Spa
in
South
Korea
South
Africa
Russia
Romania
N
igeria
Canada
Argentina
CriminalizingCoups
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Regime Change by the Book
39
procedures for counting the vote, the role of international observers, andwhether President Chavez could run again in the election if he were
removed from office.
In the predawn hours of August 16, with initial results projecting abig 58-42 percent win, President Chavez appeared before thousands ofpartisans gathered at the presidential palace to declare victory. Leaders ofthe opposition coalition cried foul, claiming this was massive fraud.
48
According to news reports, gunmen fired on an opposition demonstrationlater the same day, wounding seven people including a woman who laterdied.
49 Former President Carter and Secretary General Gaviria quickly
announced that their own quick count had confirmed the official results and
urged the National Electoral Council to allow a transparent audit and toexamine any credible concerns raised by the opposition. After two roundsof audits, and no credible evidence of electoral fraud, the Carter Center
called on all parties to work together to solve the pressing problems of thecountry.
50
Conclusions
1. Venezuelas popular recall mechanism offers a novel constitutional
avenue for removing an unpopular president. However, the complexity of
any recall process and the strain placed on Venezuelas political discourse
and political institutions may outweigh its advantages.
The Venezuelan constitutions unusual recall mechanism (article72) has the potential to act as a popular counterbalance to the broad powers
granted to the chief executive. It offers something like a parliamentarymotion of no confidence but is instead directly controlled, in theory, by the
voters. At the same time, article 72s requirement that a recall cannot occur
until halfway through an officials term in office and thresholds for voterturnout and winning majorities protect against frivolous attempts todestabilize an elected government. The mechanism has provided both sides
an imperfect, but important, incentive to follow the rule of law to settle theirdisputes
48
US Withholds Judgement on Venezuelan referendum, Urges Probe of Fraud Claims,
Agence France Presse, 17 August 2004.
49For example Venezuela to Hold Partial Audit of Recall, The Associated Press, 18
August 2004.50
For a definitive account of the recall process and investigation of the oppositions claims
of fraud, see Jennifer McCoy, What really happened in Venezuela?, The Economist, 2
September 2004; available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3157671
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91
Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice, the NationalAssembly must decide whether the allegation should be investigated.
Investigation requires approval of two-thirds of each house in theAssembly.
180
Within seven days of a National Assembly decision to investigatethe charges, the Chief Justice of Nigeria must appoint a non-partisan, seven-
person panel to conduct the investigation. The panel must report its findings
within three months of its appointment. If the panel concludes that thecharges have not been proven, impeachment proceedings cease. If the panelfinds grounds for impeachment, then the National Assembly has fourteendays to adopt the report, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of
each house. If adopted, the president is immediately removed from office.There is no right of appeal.
181
Nigerias impeachment provision has been tested several timessince the adoption of its latest constitution. The National Assembly hasthreatened to impeach President Obasanjo three times since his election in
1999.182
The most recent and most serious of the cases occurred fromAugust to November 2002. It began when the House of Representativesgave Obasanjo an ultimatum to resign or face impeachment proceedings on
charges of inadequacies, ineptitudes, persistent disregard for the rule of law,and the obvious corruption being perpetrated in the presidency.
183 At the
end of the two weeks, the House and the Senate each drew up a list ofallegations of constitutional violations.
184 Much brinksmanship and
political infighting within Obasanjos own party ensued. The situation grewso heated that, given Nigerias history of military coups, some became
concerned the confrontation could lead to another military takeover, despitea pledge by the countrys top military leader that the armed forces weredfg
180Ibid: Article 143
181Ibid
182See Obasanjos Impeachment Threat Provokes Uproar in Parliament,Panafrica NewsAgency, 19 April 2000, and Nigerias Senate Seeks to Impeach President,Xinhua News
Agency,7 June 2002.183
Nigerian Parliament Threatens to Impeach President Obasanjo,Xinhua News Agency,13 August 2002.184
The majority of the allegations in the last two impeachment efforts seemed to have arisenover the 2002 budget process and accused the president of not implementing the 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2002 budget acts. This latest effort, however, adds a more serious charge ofordering the massacre of innocent civilians to the list of impeachable offenses. See NigerianSenate Joins Plot to Impeach Obasanjo,Panafrican News Agency,27 August 2002, andNigerian Lawmakers Accuse Obasanjo of Ordering Army Massacres,Associated Press,4
September 2002.
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98
designate a candidate for prime minister in consultation with the parties inthe parliament.
207 New parliamentary elections are not called.
The government may also initiate a vote of confidence by assuming
responsibility for a program, general policy statement, or bill presentedbefore a joint session of the parliament. Upon such a presentation, theparliament has three days to initiate a motion of censure. If passed, thegovernment is dismissed. If the motion is not passed, the bill before the
parliament is considered passed or the program or general policy statementbecomes binding on the government.
208
The only time the parliament can be dismissed is when it has failed
to grant confidence to a new government within 60 days after the firstproposed government was presented and at least two requests for investiturehave been made. In such instances, the president, after consultation with the
presidents of both chambers of the parliament and the leaders ofparliamentary groups, may dissolve the parliament and call new electionswithin three months.
209 The parliament cannot be dissolved more than once
in the same year, during the last six months of the presidents term in office,or during a state of emergency or siege.
210
Impeachment
The President
There are two constitutional provisions authorizing the parliamentto remove the president from office. The first provision is used in cases
where the president is accused of grave infringements of the constitution.The president may be suspended from office for such acts by a majority voteof deputies and senators after they have consulted with the Constitutional
Court.211
At least one third of the members of parliament must initiate amotion for the presidents suspension and he or she may explain his or heractions before the parliament. If the motion to suspend the president passes,
a referendum must be held within 30 days, allowing the public to determinewhether to remove the president permanently.
212
207Ibid: Article 110(3)208Ibid:Article 114209Ibid: Article 89(1) and 63(2)210Ibid: Article 89(2) and (3)211Accordingly, in Article 146 the Constitutional Court is authorized, inter alia, to give
advisory opinion on the proposal to suspend the President of Romania from office.212Ibid: Article 95
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since the generals had ordered their troops to stay in the barracks, they hadnot forced Chavez to resign. The majority portrayed the generals actions as
simply that of filling a power vacuum created by the resignation of thepresident. The court, however, did not address the generals active
participation in undermining the constitution, with respect to theappointment of Carmona and the dissolution of Venezuelas politicalinstitutions, throughout the crisis. Following this ruling, the AttorneyGeneral, Isaias Rodriguez, ended investigations into sixteen other military
officials who had taken part in the coup.
Possibly encouraged by the STJs ruling, members of the military
have taken aggressive public positions against the government in the monthsfollowing that decision. In November 2002, a group of military officers,labeling themselves Comacates, publicly threatened pro-Chavez military
officers. Around the same time, 14 senior officers peacefully assumedcontrol of a public square and called for the resignation of President Chavez.The ranks of those who occupy the square include some who took part in
the April coup. The officers have argued that their actions amount toneither rebellion nor insubordination. They assert under Article 350 of theconstitution that their actions are legitimate.
358
Instead of prosecuting anyone directly involved in the coup, in atleast two instances, Venezuelan authorities have stretched the laws aimed at
deterring seizures of power to target members of the opposition. Forexample, two leaders of the massive anti-Chavez strikes of 2002-2003,Carlos Fernandez, leader of the business association Fedecamaras, andCarlos Ortega, president of the countrys largest labor union, were indicted
on charges of treason, rebellion, and inciting violence for their participationin the economically-crippling strike.
359 Pending an appeal of his case,
Fernandez fled to the United States. Similarly, Ortega has spent a
controversial tenure as a political refugee in Costa Rica. While the STJaffirmed the indictments of rebellion and instigation of violence, both menremain abroad.
Conclusion
The Venezuelan constitution has ushered in novel forms of directdemocracy which Chavez has effectively manipulated to centralize power.It is poorly drafted and vaguely worded, with obscure provisions and
358Joseph Contreras and Phil Gunson, Division in the Ranks,Newsweek, 4 November
2002.359
Judge Orders House Arrest for Chavez Foe,Associated Press, 23 February 2003.
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Democracy Coalition Project
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THE DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT
The Democracy Coalition Project is an independent nongovernmentalorganization that conducts research and advocacy relating to democracy
promotion policies at the national, regional and global levels. Begun in June2001 as an initiative of the Open Society Institute, the Democracy CoalitionProject relies on an international network of civil society organizations,
scholars, foreign policy experts and politicians committed to democracypromotion as an essential element of international peace and humandevelopment.
The Projects policy agenda covers such areas as:
Improving international responses to democratic crises
Encouraging the donor community to support emerging democracies
Promoting reform of the UN through greater collaboration among
democratic governments
The Democracy Coalition Project also plays a leadership role in encouraginga more transparent and active Community of Democracies, an association ofdemocratic states established in 2000 to promote and protect democracy. Its
flagship publication, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of ForeignPolicy Trends 1992-2002, which Foreign Policy magazine called one of themost comprehensive research and evaluation tools available on democracy,
examines the democracy promotion records of forty governments.
The Democracy Coalition Project was inspired by the inaugural meeting of
the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000, in whichover 100 governments participated. In an effort to advance their commoncommitment to democratic principles, they endorsed the Warsaw Declaration,which commits them to build an association of democratic states dedicated to
strengthening democratic values and institutions at home and abroad.
The Democracy Coalition Project is a strategic partner of the Club of
Madrid, an independent organization dedicated to strengthening democracyaround the world by drawing on the unique experience and resources of itsMembers - democratic former heads of state and government. In partnership
with other organizations and governments that share its democracy-promotion goals, the Club of Madrid provides peer to peer counsel, strategic
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support and technical advice to leaders and institutions working towardsdemocratic transition and consolidation.
Ted Piccone, who designed and edited the report, is Executive Director andCo-Founder of the Democracy Coalition Project. A lawyer and international
relations expert, he has written and edited books and articles on democracy,human rights and foreign policy.
Democracy Coalition Project
International Advisory Board
Asma JahangirPakistan, Co-Founder of the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan and the Women's Action Forum.
Aung San Suu KyiBurma, Secretary-General of the National League for
Democracy in Burma. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize inrecognition of her tireless effort in the struggle for democracy in Burma.
Bronislaw GeremekPoland, Member of the European Parliament, formerForeign Minister of Poland and a former Member of the Polish Parliament.
Emeka AnyaokuNigeria, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the LondonSchool of Economics' Centre for the Study of Global Governance. Mr.Anyaoku is the former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (1990-2000).
Emma BoninoItaly, Member of the European Parliament and the formerEuropean Commissioner of Humanitarian Affairs and Fisheries.
Frene Ginwala South Africa, Speaker of the National Assembly of the
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa since 1994.
George Soros United States, Chairman of the Open Society Institute and thefounder of a network of philanthropic organizations that are active in morethan 50 countries.
John Lewis United States, Member of the U.S. Congress since 1986.
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Jose Ramos-HortaEast Timor, Foreign Minister of the newly independentTimor Leste. In 1996 Mr. Ramos-Horta was awarded the Nobel Price for
Peace in honor of his efforts against the oppressive Indonesian control of his
homeland.
Madeleine AlbrightUnited States, Chairman of the National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs. She previously served as Secretary of Stateof the United States and as the United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations.
Michel RocardFrance, Member of the European Parliament and former
Prime Minister of France from 1988-1991.
Mohamed SahnounAlgeria, is a Special Advisor to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations. Previously Mr. Sahnoun was Co-chair of theInternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
Pavol Demes Slovakia, Director for Central and Eastern Europe of theGerman Marshall Fund of the United States based in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Samira A.S. OmarKuwait, an environmental activist and advocate for
women's rights.
Sergey KovalevRussia, Member of the Russian Duma. In 1993 he was
elected as national ombudsman by the Russian Parliament. He is the formerChairman of the President's Human Rights Commission.
Sonia Picado Sotela Costa Rica, President of the Inter-American Instituteof Human Rights. She was the first woman judge on the Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights and served as its Vice-President from 1992-1994.
Surin PitsuwanThailand, Member of the Parliament of Thailand and former
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Valentin PaniaguaPeru, the interim President of Peru after the collapse ofthe Fujimori regime. He was first elected to Parliament in 1963.
Wangari MaathaiKenya, founder of the Green Belt Movement andcurrently Kenya's Deputy Environment Minister. In 2004, she received the
Nobel Prize for Peace.
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LIST OF EXPERT REVIEWERS
*Affiliation for identification purposes only
Diego Hidalgo, President, Fundacion par las Relaciones Internacionales y elDialogo Exterior, Spain
Jorge Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs,Harvard University, United States
Kim Campbell, Secretary General, Club of Madrid, Canada
James Klein, Thailand and Laos Representative, The Asia Foundation,
United States
Thomas Remington, Professor and Chair of the Political ScienceDepartment, Emory University, United States
Yuri Dzhibladze, President, Center for the Development of Democracy andHuman Rights, Russia
Rotimi Suberu, Professor of Politics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Rut Diamint, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella,
Argentina
Jack Greenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia University, United States
Robert Mattes, Director, Democracy in Africa Research Unit, University ofCape Town, South Africa
Christina Murray, Professor of Law, University of Cape Town, South
Africa
Daniel Berzosa Lopez, Adjunct Professor of Law, Universidad Complutensede Madrid, Spain
Joseph Tulchin, Director, Latin American Program, Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars, United States
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Steven Levitsky, Associate Professor of Government and Social Studies,Harvard University, United States
Gabriel Negretto, Research Professor, Centro de Investigacin y DocenciaEconmicas, Mexico
George Rogers, Attorney, Inter-American Development Bank, United States
Debora Benchoam, Principal Specialist, Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, United States
Sook-Jong Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute, Republic of Korea
Jeong-Ho Roh, Director, Center for Korean Legal Studies, ColumbiaUniversity, United States
Derek Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia Project, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, United States
Christopher Sabatini, Senior Program Officer, Latin America and theCaribbean, National Endowment for Democracy, United States
Peter Quilter, former Senior Advisor, Organization of American States,United States
Ruben Perina, Coordinator, Unit for Promotion of Democracy, Organizationof American States, United States
Pedro Villagra Delgado, Coordinator for Strategic Projects, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Argentina
Enrique Ter Horst, former United Nations Deputy High Commissioner of
Human Rights, Venezuela
Richard Simeon, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada
Elizabeth Clark, Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,Georgetown University, United States
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Acting President, Romanian Academic Society,Romania
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Sergey Kovalev, Member of the Russian Duma, Russia
Margaret Crahan, Dorothy Epstein Professor of Latin American History atHunter College, City University of New York, United States
Charles Sampford, Director, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice andGovernance, Griffith University, Australia
Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies, Indonesia
Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice, Israel
Morton Halperin, Director, Open Society Policy Center, United States
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