1
Reform of Public Administration in Greece
Evaluating Structural Reform of Central Government Departments in Greece:
Application of the DEA Methodology
Anthony Makrydemetres1, Panagiotis D. Zervopoulos
2,
Maria-Eliana Pravita3
Table of contents
1. The institutional design of the political system in Greece
1.1. An overview
1.2. Structural configuration of the political system
1.3. The tradition of centralism and concentration of power
2. The Greek administrative system
2.1. The governmental structure
2.1.1. The Council of Ministers - Cabinet
2.1.2. The Prime Minister
2.1.2.1. The powers of the Prime Minister
2.1.3. Collegial government organs
2.2. Ministers and ministries
2.2.1. The evolution of Central Government Departments
2.3. Decentralised units
2.4. Local government and regional authorities
2.5. The public sector
2.6. The control of public administration
2.7. Civil service
3. Reforming the administrative structure
3.1. Capacity deficit and reform
3.2. Prospects of reformand modernisation
3.3. Rowing and steering between(the Scylla of) politicisation and (the
Charybdis of) bureaucratic weakness
1 Professor of Administrative Science, University of Athens (Greece).
2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bursa Orhangazi University
(Turkey). 3 Lecturer in Administrative Science, University of Athens (Greece).
2
3.3.1. Parliamentary Clientelism
3.4. An instance of an underdeveloped bureaucracy
3.4.1. Aspects of crisis in the administrative system
3.4.2. Modernism versus tradition: a curious amalgam
3.4.3. The imbalance thesis
3.5. Politics of reform
3.6. Convergence on reform: administrative practices and prospects in Europe
4. The current Greek crisis and administrative reform
4.1. The Administrative Reform 2013
4.1.1. Focus of reform analysis
4.1.2. New structure of the ministries
5. Methodology
5.1. Variable returns to scale DEA
5.2. Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA
5.3. Stochastic DEA
5.4. Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA
5.5. Bias-correction method
5.6. Evaluating AR2013
6. Empirical results
6.1. Efficiency measurement tool
6.2. Measurement of effectiveness
7. Concluding remarks
Indicative references
Appendix
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Abstract
The focus of this study is the attempt to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of
19 Central Government Departments (CGDs) in Greece. To that end, the optimal
inputs are taken into account that lead these ministerial units to improve their
performance and quality of provided services. At the same time a comparison takes
place between the optimal input with those defined by the recent Administrative
Reform 2013 (AR2013).
The results presented in this work are obtained by four Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) models (i.e. Variable Returns to Scale DEA, Targeted factor-oriented
radial DEA, Stochastic DEA, and Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA). A bias-
correction method to the DEA efficiency estimators is also applied. This novel
analytical methodology does more than merely attempt to defend or argue against the
AR2013. It provides a scientific framework for evaluating public organisations
restructuring with managerial implications. This framework is applicable to public
institutions across the board (regardless of political environment or historical
circumstances) for measuring the performance of public organisations services
through targeted actions.
The results reveal that the AR2013 do perhaps achieve a reduction of the
operating cost of the CGDs but not optimal cost cutting. Consequently, the AR2013
effort does not lead the CGDs to substantial increases of overall efficiency and
effectiveness and thus to the amelioration of the predicament with which public
administration in the country is being faced with for a long period of time.
Keywords
Public administration, central government departments, ministries, administrative
reform, public management, public organisations, Data Envelopment Analysis,
efficiency, effectiveness, public services’ performance
JEL classification
C61, C67, D24, H11
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1. The institutional design of the political system in Greece
1.1. An overview
The crucial structural features of the Greek political system have taken shape through
a complex process of change, adaptation and modernisation of the political and social
life in Greece since the third decade of the nineteenth century, immediately after
liberation.
More specifically, the Greek modern State was created as a result of the
successful outcome of the struggle for national independence and the liberation of the
Greeks from Ottoman rule. The fight for liberation lasted for approximately eight
years (1821-1829) and during the course of this struggle the foundations of the
political life of modern Greece were laid. It was at that period that, inter alia, three
different constitutional texts (those of 1822, 1823 and 1827) were introduced and
were marked by an exceptionally liberal character for that time.
The first government of the new born State was that of the Governor Ioannis
Capodistrias, who was elected in April 1827 by the Third National Assembly of
Troezene for a term of office of seven years. His period in office – he took up his
duties in January 1828 – was prematurely cut short by his assassination in September
1831. What followed was a period of internal conflict and unrest which lasted for
about two years.
Finally, in January 1833, the Bavarian Prince Otto ascended the throne of
Greece and ruled the State for some 30 years (1833-1862) in an autocratic manner,
until he was forced to leave the country as a result of the anti-monarchical uprising of
October 1862.
The first period of King Otto’s rule (1833-1843), which took the form of an
absolute monarchy, was however cut short with the outbreak of the army and civilian
revolt of 3rd
September 1843, as a result of which the liberal Constitution of 1844 was
brought into force, together with a new electoral law. The latter provided for virtually
universal suffrage (for men, at any rate) much earlier than in many other countries of
Europe. Thus began the process of liberalisation, albeit partial, of the country’s
political life and the regular holding of parliamentary elections, initially (1844-1864)
every three years, and then (1864 onwards) every four years. More specifically, from
1844 to the present, that is, a period of over 170 years, 64 elections of members of
Parliament have been held. These were interrupted by the periods of abnormality of
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the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936-1940), the German occupation (1940-
1944), and of the dictatorship of the ‘Colonels’ (1967-1974).
Furthermore, the system of parliamentary democracy (namely, the confidence
of Parliament to the Government of the day) was officially proclaimed by the speech
from the Throne to Parliament in 1875, while the principle of the tenure and neutrality
of civil servants was established by the revision of the Constitution in 1911.
In the years which followed, with a period of very acute political conflicts
intervening, the system of the non-monarchical Second Hellenic Republic lasted for
approximately a decade (1924-1935), in the inter-War years. Forty years later, after
the grim decade of the 1940s, with the German occupation and the civil war which
followed it, the political system of the Third Hellenic Republic, currently in force,
was introduced as a result of the referendum of 1974 whereby monarchy was
abolished in Greece.
Subsequently, by the constitutional reform of 1975 and, even more so, by that
of 1986 (and those that followed), the system of the distribution of competences and
of decisive influence within the political system was redetermined, in such a way that
the centre of gravity of the actual functioning of parliamentary democracy focused on
the Government, and particularly on its head, the Prime Minister, with the
corresponding consequences for and effects upon the whole of the country’s political
life (parliamentary ‘primeministerialism’).
The revision of the Constitution, in 1986, removed some of the regulatory
competences of the President of the Republic, the so-called ‘super-powers’ (such as,
for example, the right of dissolving the Parliament, the dismissal of the Government,
and the proclamation of a referendum), and transferred them to the Parliament and the
Government which enjoys a majority in it. In the last analysis, the exercise of these
competences is a direct function of the options and decisive initiative of the Prime
Minister. He, as leader of the Government and of the party with the parliamentary
majority, possesses a complex of powers and competences which render his role, and
legal and political position absolutely vital for the whole operation of the political
system in the country.
Whether a Government remains in office, rests exclusively upon the
confidence of the Parliament and in no way upon that of the President of the Republic,
since the relevant competence of the latter to dismiss the Government, even when that
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enjoyed the confidence of the Parliament, has been abolished (since the constitutional
reform of it).
The President of the Republic is elected by the Parliament through a
reinforced majority (2/3 or 3/5) for a renewable term of office of five years. The
constitutional role he has to perform is essentially to act as the ‘regulator’ of the
political system in the way that is determined by the relevant constitutional provisions
in force (that is, in essence, to maintain the checks and balances of the system)4.
Therefore, it could be said that from the time of national independence
onwards, the State has assumed a decisive role for the shaping of the transformation
of society and economy in Greece. Thus, the model of development which was
adopted in the economic field could not have been undertaken without the
interpolation and active involvement of the State in it. The guiding and coordinating
role of the State at the political level and in the more general process of social
formation has been similarly wide-ranging and decisive. An altogether different
matter is however the degree and extent of efficiency and effectiveness, let alone the
quality, of state action and control of sociopolitical and economic affairs in the
country.
Equally important has been the process of the gradual internal democratisation
and modernisation of the functioning of the State and of the country’s political life in
a general sense. The establishment and strengthening of parliamentarianism,
particularly by the introduction and application in practice of the principle of the
‘declared’ confidence of Parliament in the Government, has resulted (at least since
1875) in the ensuring of the independence of the representative body in the
appointment and maintenance in power of prime ministers and governments.
At the same time, the strengthening and more effective organisation of the
political parties, particularly during the course of the later part of the twentieth
century, has also contributed to the prominence and the leading role of the Prime
Minister and the Government in the operation of the political system as a whole.
According to the constitutional provision of article 37, paragraph 2, as Prime Minister
is appointed the leader of the party which maintains an absolute majority of seats in
4 Since the restoration of democracy in 1974, there have been seven Presidents of the Republic: Mikhail
Stassinopoulos (provisional, 1974-1975), Constantine Tsatsos (1975-1980), Constantine Karamanlis (1980-
1985), Christos Sartzetakis (1985-1990), Constantine Karamanlis (1990-1995), Constantine Stephanopoulos
(1995-2005), Carolos Papoulias (2005-2015), and the newly elected President Prokopios Pavlopoulos (2015-
).
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the House of Parliament. He (the Prime Minister) then determines, within his own
exclusive competence, the composition of the members of the Cabinet and the
Government as a whole, and leads the operation of the country’s governmental and
administrative machinery. He thus combines a complex of powers and competences
which render his position literally unique in terms of actual power and influence
within the political system. This is what renders him essentially the most important
politician in the country (Makrydemetres and Pravita, 2012: 205 ff.).
1.2. Structural configuration of the political system
The Greek governmental system has been shaped, as it was already mentioned before,
through a process of historical evolution covering approximately two centuries, from
national liberation (1830) onwards. In its present form it displays the basic features of
a complex and advanced system for the division of power in Greek political society.
In this context, the rule of law, representative democracy, the market economy, public
services and civil society constitute fundamental elements of the social and political
reality in Greece, as in the most advanced countries of the world, including of course
those which make up the European Union. The above constitutive ‘evolutionary
universals’ (according to Talcott Parsons’ analytical scheme, 1964) reflect the
conceptual nucleus of the acquis communautaire and characterise in an inseparable
manner the physiognomy of the public domain and the politico-administrative culture
of the countries of Europe.
As far as the Greek political system is concerned, it exhibits the basic
‘organisational constant’ of functional and structural differentiation of its constituent
elements or parts, insofar as it is organised in accordance with the principle of the
separation of the powers (Article 26 of the Greek Constitution)5.
Thus, according to this fundamental organisational principle of the
Constitution, the main constituent powers or the organs to which the differentiated
basic functions of the political system are entrusted are as follows: the Electorate, the
Political Parties, the Parliament, the Government, the Administration, and the Courts
of Justice. If, furthermore, the hierarchical character of the political system’s
5 Article 26 of the Constitution, which deals with State functions, lays down that: “1. The legislative powers
shall be exercised by Parliament and the President of the Republic. 2. The executive powers shall be
exercised by the President of the Republic and the Government. 3. The judicial powers shall be exercised by
the courts of law, the decisions of which shall be executed in the name of the Greek people”.
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articulation is borne in mind, the diagrammatic representation of its functional
differentiation can be presented as follows:
9
Constitution
Ele
ctora
te
Poli
tica
l p
art
ies,
Pre
ssu
re g
rou
ps,
Mass
med
ia
Administration
Central
(Ministries)
Πρόεδρος της
Δημοκρατίας
ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΣΜΟ
Σ:
Βουλή
Independent
Authorities
Courts
Decentralised Local
Government
Public Entities
Government
Prime Minister
Parliament
President
of the Republic
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According to the Constitution of 1975 as it is currently in force (after the
revisions of 1986/2001/2008), which provides the master plan of the functioning of
the political system, the Executive is made up of the President of the Republic and the
Government. The latter, in particular, determines and directs the country’s general
policy, while the Prime Minister, as its head, ensures its unity of action and directs its
conduct in the implementation of public policy (Article 82 of the Constitution).
Public administration, at the central, decentralised and local level, forms
(according to Articles 101-104 of the Constitution) the functionally differentiated part
(sub-system) of the political system charged with the consistent and trustworthy
application and implementation of the valid options and programmes of public policy
as these are determined by the responsible organs or parts of the political system
(Political Parties, Parliament, Government) and monitored as to their legality and
constitutionality by others (the Courts of Law).
In fact, the ‘strong’ State in Greece is also shaped, inter alia, through the
functional precedence of the ‘executive’ power over the rest of the major State powers
(Parliament, Courts) and the primary, literally, dominant importance of the
governmental branch of it (Government, Prime Minister, Ministers) as compared with
its other parts (President of the Republic, Public Administration).
1.3. The tradition of centralism and concentration of power
During that formative period immediately after independence and in the first half of
the 19th
century, a period in which Greece along with other states and societies in the
area entered the era of modernity, a number of things of strategic significance had to
be and were decided about the shape and the trajectory of future development of the
newly established State. One of these, without doubt, was the concentration of power
and decision-making authority in the ruling administrative and political leadership and
élite of the State. The unification of authority, through concentration and centralism,
was however made possible at the cost of local autonomy, differentiation and
independence, which was severely circumscribed if not eliminated altogether.
In contrast therefore, to the long tradition of semi-autonomous local
communes under Byzantine and Ottoman rule, let alone the ancient Greek inheritance
of the independent city-States, the modern Greek State was formed and shaped in an
altogether different manner. Thus, centralised state machinery with novel institutions
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was established hastily and in a spirit of urgent need. It is fair to say that Greeks had
never experienced something similar in the past. The central state machinery was
above all promoting uniformity, wiping out local variety and self-determination. The
image of the city-State political diversity of the past gave, therefore, its place in
modernity to that of the uniformity and centralism of the nation-State.
The idea of the centralised nation-State was not, however, a Greek novelty and
peculiarity. It did rather, on the contrary, represent the dominant model of state
building prevailing in most European societies at the time. Moreover, the bitterly
realised experience of weak coordination during the War of Independence and the
need for some kind of unified state authority and administration, made Greeks
certainly more receptive after independence to the new modalities of state
concentration and rule domination. Ever since the centralist model in the
organisational structure and functioning of the modern Greek State has prevailed and
is by and large still in force today. Needless to repeat that the concentrationist
tendency was and has proved to be neither a Greek peculiarity nor an unsuccessful
experience. On the contrary, centralised state authority and institutions seemed to be
an almost universal trend in politics and a rather successful model for state building
and functioning.
The crucial issue becomes then the kind and types of allocation of power and
control among central, decentralised and local authorities and units. And that raises
the major political and administrative issue of vertical division of functions and
responsibilities: what belongs to the central institutions of the State and what to the
decentralised and local ones, as well as the way they get coordinated with each other.
An issue of no decisive resolve as yet.
2. The Greek administrative system
2.1. The governmental structure
Administrative arrangements in a country are considered as a crucial factor for
sustainable development and social well-being, in the sense that they determine – to a
considerable extent – the distribution of institutional power within a state as well as
the implementation of public policy. Thus, public administration is understood as a
structural element and integral part of the political system.
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The Greek administrative system in its current shape and functioning forms an
outcome of a rather longish historical process that has expanded in the time span of
almost two centuries (1820-2015) and it is still undergoing serious change and
transformation. Indeed, rapid adjustment in structure, functions, management
practices and public service personnel is usually being raised as an issue both in
domestic politics and in the European engagements of the country, especially in light
of the fact that Greece is fully participating in the integrated European market place
and its monetary system.
The Government consists, according to the Constitution (article 81, paragraph
1), of the Council of Ministers, which is made up of the Prime Minister and the
ministers. Consequently, all the ministers, including alternate ministers and ministers
without portfolio (or ‘ministers of State’, as they were renamed in 1991), and deputy
ministers, provided that this is stipulated by the relevant provisions of law, belong to
it. In accordance with Law 1558/1985 and Presidential Decree 63/2005 on the
Government and Government Organs (article 1), all members of the Government
except the deputy ministers, who may, however, be invited by the Prime Minister to
take part in its meetings, without voting rights, make up, ex officio, the Council of
Ministers (Cabinet).
All members of the Government in the broad sense, that is, including the
deputy ministers, completely suspend during their term of office any other
professional employment, and are collectively responsible for the overall policy of the
Government, while each is separately responsible for acts and omissions which fall
within his particular competence or jurisdiction (ministerial portfolio). As far as the
liability of members of the Government is concerned, it is of three kinds and can be
distinguished into parliamentary (in accordance with which members of the
Government must have the confidence of the Parliament, be accountable to it, and
resign if the Parliament withdraws its confidence in them), criminal and civil.
2.1.1. The Council of Ministers - Cabinet
The Council of Ministers is the supreme collegial organ of the government, and all the
ministers (including alternate ministers) are its regular members, while deputy
ministers attend when invited by the Prime Minister, without the right to vote.
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The central competence of the Council of Ministers is, according to the
Constitution (article 82, paragraph 1), to “define and direct the general policy of the
country, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws”.
According to article 2 of Law 1558/1985 and Presidential Decree 63/2005 on the
Government and Government Organs, the Council of Ministers is also responsible for
deciding on political matters of more general importance, on any matter within the
competence of the collegial government organs, or on any matter within the
competence of one or more ministers which is referred to it by the Prime Minister,
and for exercising any other relevant competence afforded to it by the Constitution
and the relevant laws and acts of Parliament.
Apart from its general authority of direction, the Government has the right of
legislative initiative (article 73, paragraph 1 of the Constitution) and, given the
majority which it constantly enjoys in Parliament, and the conventional principle of
the party discipline of party members including those who are members of
Parliament, it exercises it in such a way that almost all the legislative material
originates within it. The Government also has the initiative for the issuing by the
President of the Republic of acts of legislative content “under extraordinary
circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need” (Article 44, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution). The competence of assessing the need for an early dissolution of
Parliament and the calling of elections “for a renewal of the popular mandate in order
to deal with a national issue of exceptional importance” also belongs exclusively to it.
Last but not least, it is the Government which guides and directs the whole of the
State’s public services (including the armed forces and the security forces) and
supervises the implementation of public policy by them.
The Council of Ministers is convened by the Prime Minister in regular session
every Wednesday – a practice that has been often violated, especially in the past
(Pravita, 2013). For this purpose an agenda is drafted and official minutes, which
remain classified for 30 years, are kept.
The operation of the Council of Ministers is supported in administrative terms
by the Secretariat General of the Government, which is a distinct public service,
directly subject and responsible to the Prime Minister.
Taking account of the above, the Government is the ‘powerhouse’ and the
‘steam engine’ of the political system, since it holds and plays an absolutely vital role
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in the whole process of the country’s governance, that is, the determination and
implementation of public policy to deal with complex problems which arise in
economy and society and fall within it.
2.1.2. The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister has figured in the governmental and politico-administrative life of
the country almost since the foundational period of the Greek State under the name,
used in the past, of President of the Council of Ministers.
Thus, apart from the impressive initial example of the Governor Ioannis
Capodistrias (1828-1831), whose status in relation to the other members of his
Government was a truly dominant one (approximating that of the President in non
parliamentary democracies), in the two related Decrees of the Regency on the
formation of the Secretariats (1833) and on the competences of the Chief Secretary of
State (1835) there was a special reference to the institution of the President of the
Council of Ministers. Namely, it was laid down in the first of these decrees that the
President of the Council of Ministers, “who shall preside” over it and takes
precedence over the rest of the members, “shall be specially nominated by the King”.
In the second, after a repetition of the provision that “The Chief Secretary of State
shall be President of the Council of Ministers”, it was added that “he shall hold first
rank among the servants of the Kingdom and shall thus have precedence over all”.
Thereafter, the corresponding provisions in the constitutional texts of 1844, of
1864 and 1911 also included references to the institution of the President of the
Council of Ministers, whose role and status was successively elevated to that of the
first Lord of the Government. The Constitution of 1927 for the first time defined the
office of Prime Minister under that name; this was repeated later in the Constitution of
1952, and in the four constitutional texts of the Third Hellenic Republic (1975, 1986,
2001, 2008).
Thus, the pre-eminent legal and political position of the Prime Minister’s
office in government practice and in political life was finally reflected in the
provisions of the Constitution, in which it occurs and is described, albeit in a concise
form.
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2.1.2.1. The powers of the Prime Minister
The basic competence of the Prime Minister is, according to the existing Constitution
of the country (Article 82, paragraph 2), to “safeguard the unity of the Government
and direct its actions and those of the public services in general, for the
implementation of government policy within the framework of the laws”.
As to the more important of his individual competences, it is worth pointing
out that, first of all, it is the Prime Minister who decides and determines the
composition of the Government, since it is by his exclusive proposal and choice that
ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic. He does also
define the particular competences and jurisdictions on public policy domain of the
ministers of State, alternate ministers, and deputy ministers. He presides over the
collegial government organs and represents the Government at the highest level,
determines the precise content of government policy within the framework of the
decisions of the Council of Ministers, coordinates the activities of ministers, and
resolves any possible disagreements among them. He exercises general supervision
over the procedures for the implementation of government policy by the public
services and it is no-one else but the Prime Minister who gives permission for the
publication in the Government Gazette of any text which must according to law be
published in it (Makrydemetres and Pravita, 2012: 240 ff.).
To that end, three independent public services (the Secretariat General of the
Prime Minister6, the Secretariat General of the Government, and the Secretariat
General of Coordination), as well as the Central Committee for the Preparation of
Laws are there to assist the Prime Minister in the exercise of his office. In this way,
the organisational and staffing conditions and the infrastructure has taken shape for
the establishment of a small-scale ‘White House’ under the Prime Minister, a fact
which contributes to the stressing and reinforcement of his primary position in
government and political practice as a whole.
It can thus be concluded that the dominant position of the Prime Minister in
the operation of the mechanism of Government and of the country’s political practice
6 About a hundred individuals are directly employed in this bureau, including the heads of the individual
offices and service units which belong to it (Economic, Diplomatic and Legal Bureaus, Strategic Planning
Bureau, Special Policies Bureau, Press Office, European Union and International Relations Bureau, Bureau
for matters of administration and organisation), of the offices of the Prime Minister’s special advisors and
associates, and of the various non-tenured civil servants (secretaries, administrative staff, etc.).
16
also becomes apparent more generally from his pre-eminent legal and political status
in relation to other governmental institutions and organs. This, of course, is dependent
upon the facts of the current socio-political state of affairs (whether, for example, the
Government is formed by a single party or by a coalition) and of the particular
features of his own individual personality, outlook and orientation. The role of the
Prime Minister is unique and the way in which it is exercised varies depending upon
the historical period, the political situation, and the personality of each of its
occupants.
2.1.3. Collegial government organs
Apart from the Council of Ministers, which is the supreme collegial government
organ, whose existence and competences is provided for by the Constitution itself,
there are within the framework of Greek governmental practice and tradition other
individual government organs and committees which serve to ensure a better
preparation and execution of the decisions of the Council of Ministers.
The chief of these is, according to the latest regulation in this connection7, the
Cabinet Council (formerly called Cabinet Committee) which comprises of ten
ministers heads of respective Central Government Departments. Its work is presided
by the Prime Minister.
Apart from the above collegial government organs, a series of individual inter-
ministerial government special purpose committees have also been set up and are in
operation (for example, on privatisations, civil protection, minorities, road safety, and
matters of youth).
2.2. Ministers and ministries
The parliamentary governmental system has raised the role of the Prime Minister at
the centre of the political decision-making process, whereas particular ministers have
the overall supervision of the public services which comprise their portfolio, as well
as the supreme command for the design and the implementation of the public policy
subject to the ministry they are in charge of.
7 Act No. 2 of the Ministerial Council of 6 February 2015.
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The typical structure of a ministry (or department of State) includes General
Secretariats, General Directorates, Directorates, Sections and Bureaus. The political
leadership of a ministry, apart from the minister, often includes alternate ministers,
deputy ministers and secretaries general (or special). Civil servants employed in the
above-mentioned organisational units perform the corresponding duties and
competences.
The ministers are members of the Council of Ministers and of the other
collegial government bodies, but are also senior independent organs of the
administration of the State, each of whom usually is in charge of a unit of public
services which make up the corresponding ministry or department of State or Central
Government Department.
Without precluding the existence of ministers without portfolio or ministers of
State, as they were renamed in 1991 (Law 1943, article 79), ministers of the
Government in the broad sense, including alternate ministers and deputy ministers,
are organically linked with a corresponding unit of the public services and one
separate area or domain of public policy. Thus, as a rule, the number of ministers and
the names of their positions correspond to the ministries of which they take charge –
with the exception of the ministers of State, if, of course, they do not head any
ministry8.
The principle of correspondence of the number of ministers with the ministries
in their charge became fully accepted during the 19th
century and to such an extent
that even the Prime Minister himself was organically associated with some ministry.
The partial abandonment of this practice or convention of full coincidence of the
number of ministers with the ministries in their charge started to take place during the
second decade of the twentieth century with the introduction and inauguration of the
institution of minister without portfolio (1918), and of that of under-secretary or
deputy minister (1918). This was the result of the broadening of the scope and the
functional differentiation of state action, and, naturally, governmental responsibilities
in almost all sectors of public policy. Later, in the post-War period, this practice was
8 According to paragraph 2 of Article 79 of Law 1943/1991 above, “Ministers of State shall be members of
the Ministerial Council and may take charge of ministries”. The office of Minister, or, more usually, Deputy
Minister to the Prime Minister, whenever someone holds it, should be regarded as belonging, generally, to
the same category. In this case, the Minister or Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister performs the duties
and exercises the competences which are assigned to him by the Prime Minister within the framework of the
latter’s own broader role of coordination and direction of the Government and the public services generally.
18
maintained by the establishment of the institution of alternate ministers, initially as
the need arose (1953, 1964), until its use was extended (under the military
dictatorship, but also from 1981 onwards, as in the last all-party Government in the
period 1989-1990). Currently, in the present Government of the country (that of Mr.
Alexis Tsipras) in almost all Government Departments (ministries) there were placed
and appointed often more than one alternate ministers with respective division and
allocation of segments of public policy; rise of the level of differentiation in political
organisation can hardly avoid analogous intensification of problems of coordination,
however.
Thus, the total number of ministers and members of the Government in
general, in the broad sense of the term, is now not subject to any specific delimitation
(numerus clausus) nor is it identical with the number of existing separate ministries,
but often greatly exceeds it (by as much as two or three times).
Ministers have equal status among themselves from a purely legal point of
view. As a general competence, in addition to their capacity as members of the
supreme collegial government body, the Council of Ministers, they have the overall
direction at the highest level of the public services which are subject to the ministry of
which they are in charge. They also assume the supreme command for the design and
the implementation of the area of public policy which falls within the contours of their
department of State (ministry). Their individual and functionally differentiated ratione
materiae competences are determined by the special legislation which applies to the
operation of the State activity which they supervise.
Ministers of State and alternate ministers exercise the competences which the
Prime Minister entrusts to them and specifies by a decision on his part, while the
competences of deputy ministers are determined by a joint decision of the Prime
Minister and the minister competent ratione materiae. Deputy ministers are not
hierarchically the inferiors of ministers; on the contrary, they are legally of equal
standing with them (sharing independent parliamentary and criminal liability).
Nevertheless, they differ from the ministers chiefly from a political point of view and,
consequently, they are subject to their coordinating supervision and authority of
direction as to the specified field of the wider circle of public policy which
corresponds to the ministry. They are also usually deprived of the prerogative of
19
legislative initiative, even for matters falling within their particular field of policy
jurisdiction, which is maintained by the (full) minister himself (Pravita, 2010).
The present composition of the members of the Government of the country’s
current Prime Minister, Mr. Al. Tsipras, as that was arrived at after the last
parliamentary elections, of January 2015, includes 1 vice-president, 10 Cabinet
ministers, 3 ministers of State, 20 alternate ministers and 6 deputy ministers (2 of
which are deputy ministers to the Prime Minister). The size of the Government in the
broad sense is 41 members of the Government, including the Prime Minister. Of
these, 6 are women and 14 (5 ministers, 7 alternate ministers and 2 deputy ministers)
are extra-parliamentary figures, that is, they do not simultaneously hold a seat in
Parliament.
The government machinery is currently structured in Greece into a complex of
10 (giant) separate departments (ministries) among which the members of the
Government, with the exception of the Prime Minister and ministers of State, who are
not in charge of any specific ministry, are distributed.
The ministries of the Greek Government of which the corresponding ministers
are in charge are as follows, in order of precedence:
1. Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reconstruction (with three alternate
ministers and one deputy minister)
2. Ministry of Economy, Infrastructure, Shipping and Tourism (with three alternate
ministers)
3. Ministry of National Defence (with one alternate minister and one deputy minister)
4. Ministry of Culture, Education and Religious Affairs (with three alternate ministers
and one deputy minister)
5. Ministry of Productive Reconstruction, Environment and Energy (with two
alternate ministers and one deputy minister)
6. Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with two alternate ministers)
8. Ministry of Finance (with two alternate ministers)
9. Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (with two alternate ministers)
10. Ministry of Health and Social Security (with two alternate ministers).
The structuring of the government machinery is complemented by a host of
independent public services presided over by general secretaries (who are senior
20
untenured, that is, not permanent, civil servants with the first rank of the special
posts), and various public legal bodies which are subject to the broader circle of
responsibility and supervision of the individual ministry competent.
2.2.1. The evolution of Central Government Departments
The evolution of the ministries in the Greek governmental and administrative
tradition9 can be divided into three main stages or phases:
During the first, and longest, period (1833-1910), the number of ministries
remained fixed and unaltering at the seven first ‘classic’ ministerial departments.
These were initially determined by the Decree of the Regency of April 1833 as seven
secretariats of which corresponding secretaries of State took charge.
The seven first basic ministries or ‘secretariats of State’ as they were then
called, were as follows:
1. The Secretariat for the Royal Household and Foreign Affairs
2. The Secretariat of Justice
3. The Secretariat of the Interior
4. The Secretariat of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Education
5. The Secretariat of Finance
6. The Secretariat of War
7. The Secretariat of the Marine.
Subsequently, although the basic structure of the government mechanism
remained effectively unchanged for some 80 years, on the introduction of the
Constitution of 1844, the secretaries of State were renamed ministers and,
consequently, the secretariats ministries, also in accordance with Special Law
ΛΓ΄/1846 concerning the Organisation of the Ministries. From that point on, these
9 It is worth mentioning that during the revolutionary years leading to independence and in accordance with
respective constitutional provisions, the structure of governmental machinery consisted of eight ministers,
including the chief Secretary of State (stipulated by the Constitution of Epidaurus of 1822). The number of
ministers was reduced to seven by a relevant provision of the Constitution of Astros (1823), whilst in
accordance with the Constitution of Troezene (1827), the ministers were renamed ‘secretaries of State’, their
number was further reduced to six, and they were placed under the guidance of the Governor of the Hellenic
Polity. Finally, on the assumption of the office of Governor by Ioannis Capodistrias and following the
changes which he brought about, mainly by means of Decree ΛΔ΄ of 1829, the central administration of the
State consisted of six ministries presided over by the corresponding secretaries of State. The latter
subsequently, in accordance with the Constitution of 1832, were named ministers - secretaries.
21
names (minister, ministry) prevailed definitively in the Greek political, governmental
and administrative tradition.
The second phase (1911-1951) extended effectively over the first half of the
twentieth century and was marked by the gradual differentiation of the government
machinery by the hiving off or dividing up of areas from the old unified ministries
(the ‘hard core’ of state action) and their elevation into new independent ministries,
and by the setting up of new fields of state activity and public policy, which were
organised into ministries.
Thus, with the radical change in the political scene in the second decade of the
20th
century and the commencement of the period of governance of the country by
Eleutherios Venizelos, the Ministry of the National Economy, within whose scope the
areas of agriculture, commerce and industry were included, was set up for the first
time in 1911. This was followed in 1914 by the Ministry of Public Transport, in 1917
by the Ministries of Health Care and of Agriculture and Supply, in 1922 by the
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, and in 1935 by the Ministry of Labour.
In the early post-War period, the Ministries of Coordination and of Public Order were
set up in 1945 (the latter had been introduced for the first time in 1924 under the name
of ‘Ministry of Lawful Order’).
This period ended with the first systematic codification in almost 100 years of
the morphology of the government mechanism, carried out by Emergency Act
1671/1951, in compliance with which the ministries were organised into 16 basic
areas of government action. These were:
1. Ministry to the Prime Minister
2. Ministry of Coordination
3. Ministry of National Defence
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5. Ministry of Justice
6. Ministry of the Interior
7. Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs
8. Ministry of Finance
9. Ministry of Commerce
10. Ministry of Industry
11. Ministry of Public Works
22
12. Ministry of Transport
13. Ministry of Agriculture
14. Ministry of Social Security
15. Ministry of Merchant Marine
16. Ministry of Labour.
During the third phase of the evolution of the ministries, which brings us down
to the present day (1951-2015), the articulation of the government mechanism has not
undergone substantive structural changes, though some of the older ministries have in
the meantime been amalgamated (e.g. Ministry of the Interior with the Ministry to the
Prime Minister), whereas certain new ones have been set up (for example, the
territorial or ‘regional’ Ministries of Northern Greece, in 1955, which was renamed as
the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace in 1988; of the Aegean, in 1985; of Culture
and Sciences, in 1971, the Ministry of Planning, Housing and the Environment, in
1980, and the Ministry of the Press and the Mass Media, in 1994).
Thus, in accordance with later codifications of the structure of the government
mechanism, Law 400/1976 on the Council of Ministers and Ministries set the number
of the ministries in the period after the restoration of democracy at 19. Some ten years
later, Law 1558/1985 on the Government and Government Organs kept the number of
ministries at 19, but in the following year they were increased to 20 (Makrydemetres
and Pravita, 2012: 290 ff.).
By way of conclusion, it could be said that in the present phase of its historical
development, the structure of the government mechanism in Greece has developed till
recently (January 2015) into 18 distinct ministries. This shows that the somewhat
‘generous’ arrangement of the government structure has continued to remain a
‘constant’ throughout almost all the post-War period and, in any event, during the
period of the Third Hellenic Republic (from 1975 onwards). It would, therefore, not
be unfair to say that this is perhaps indicative both of the wide range of public policy,
which extends into almost all areas of social action and of the magnitude of state
intervention in the social sphere. It also reflects the corresponding need for control of
public bureaucracy by an equally complex and extensive political superstructure, with
numerous government posts and appointed political offices for the guaranteeing of
policy guidance over the administrative infrastructure (bureaucratic machinery).
23
The recent deduction (in Mr. Al. Tsipras’ new Government) of the size or
rather of number of Central Government Departments to 10, a detailed list of which
has been given above (ante, page 19), has been brought about mainly through the
formation of respective ‘giant’ departments by means of the formal merging of
respective units of public services. It remains to be seen, however, whether this kind
of formal delimitation of the number of government departments is reflected in the
necessary adaptation of the corresponding organisational structuring (i.e. the
composition and reshaping of directorates general, directorates, etc.) shown in
organisational charts. The fact that, besides the head of each giant department, have
been appointed alternate ministers in almost all government departments is an
evidence of a rather formalistic than material reduction of the overall size of the
Government.
The Government and the system of public services of the State do in practice
form the core and constitute the most important and extensive part of the executive
power within the framework of the organisation and functioning of the political
system in Greece.
2.3. Decentralised units
The administration of the State is organised according to the principle of
decentralisation. Thus, the administrative division of the country is based on geo-
economic, social and transport conditions. The central government, with the exception
of specific functions, coordinates and supervises the decentalised state organs,
whereas the latter keep effective control over matters that concern their respective
regions, implementing domestic and European policies on economic and social
development within their geographic scope of competence. Furthermore, according to
the Greek Constitution, local affairs are carried out by local authorities while central
government has no autonomous presence and competencies and decentralised
administration has been established.
Since 2010, the country has been divided into 7 decentralised administrative
units of the State: 1. Attica, 2. Thessaly - Central Greece, 3. Epirus - Western
Macedonia, 4. Peloponnese - Western Greece and Ionian Islands, 5. Aegean, 6. Crete
and 7. Macedonia - Thrace.
24
As a result of this long established constitutional provision, which is of an
obligatory nature, the decentralised units of most government departments are set in
the 7 decentralised administrative units of the country. Each one of them is run by a
Secretary General responsible, who is a senior public official appointed freely by the
Cabinet. The 7 Secretaries General of the decentralised administrative units are not
permanent civil servants, they do not enjoy any tenure of office and they are
accountable directly to the Government and in particular to the Minister of the Interior
and Administrative Reconstruction. The Secretary General has a political and
administrative role. He is the representative of the Government and is responsible for
implementing government policy on regional matters. He is in charge of all service
units of the administrative unit, he directs, coordinates and monitors the actions of the
services and their employees. Moreover, he exercises those competencies which have
been entrusted or transferred to the decentralised administrative unit by law.
A respective council ensures representation of local interests with an advisory
role. It is composed of the Secretary General, representatives of the local authorities,
chambers of commerce, trade unions and professional associations.
The decentralised administrative units of government departments assume and
exercise, according to the Constitution and subordinate legislation, general
responsibility and jurisdiction within the confines of the territory of the respective
administrative unit for all matters of policy and administration, except a number of
them, which are exclusively retained by Central Government Departments (for
instance, matters of national defence, foreign policy, nationwide economic matters,
etc.).
2.4. Local government and regional authorities
Below or rather within the 7 decentralised administrative units, the administrative
landscape of the country is further subdivided and differentiated again on a territorial
basis into 13 regions of local or rather regional government being headed by the
Governor of the Region and the regional councils, elected since 2010, directly by the
people. More specifically, according to recent legislative reform, the regions ceased to
form decentralised units of state administration. Instead, they were elevated to the
status of a second tier of local government authorities. As a result, the regions now
form separate legal entities, distinct from the legal entity of the State stricto sensu,
25
they have their own budget and they are run by officials who are elected by the
populace through a universal suffrage and for a 5-year term of office, which is
renewable.
The first level of local government consists of municipalities, which are
responsible for the administration of local matters. These agencies, which incarnate
the timeless Greek communitarian spirit, are, traditionally, viewed upon as the
cornerstone of democracy in the Greek political system, to the extent that they give
way to the participation of the citizens in the local - public affairs. Their competence
include the overall responsibility for the administration of local matters and the care
for the promotion of social, financial, cultural and spiritual interests of their citizens.
Their leaders are elected by the people through a universal and secret ballot.
The first tier of local government in Greece has always been occupied by the
municipalities (demoi) and the communes (koinotites). The pre-Revolutionary
communes were abolished with the establishment of the modern State in the 1830s.
As a result of that reform, there existed in the country about 600 units of local
government during the biggest part of the 19th
century. These were only the
municipalities (demoi). This policy was reversed in the beginning of the 20th
century
(1912) with the aim to render local government more responsible and accountable to
the local human and political community. Communes (koinotites) were accordingly
brought to life again and were recognised by law as the first layer of local government
along with the municipalities.
That was the case until very recently (2010) when the landscape of local
government in Greece was altered once again by reverting to the initial model of
bigger local government units and abolishing by obligatory law all the communes.
The overall size of the local government units was thereby increased and their total
number was reduced to 325 of them.
2.5. The public sector
The final outermost numerous and least homogeneous layer of public administration
in Greece comprises of the multifarious agencies and organisations of the wider
public sector, inclusive of public enterprises, state banks and their offspring’s, public
hospitals, educational and cultural institutions and so on.
The public sector as a whole in Greece is inclusive therefore of:
26
1. Ministries
2. Local Government Agencies (of 1st and 2
nd level or tier)
3. Public Legal Entities, which are organisations established for the accomplishment
of specific public goals. They enjoy administrative and budgetary autonomy and are
supervised by the ministries. They are classified according to their legal status in: i)
legal entities of public law such as hospitals, social security funds, chambers of
commerce, etc., ii) legal entities of private law that pursue public benefit or other
public purposes and are financed or subsidised by the State, iii) public companies,
mixed economy enterprises and banks such as Public Power Corporation, Hellenic
Petroleum Corporation, Bank of Greece, National Bank of Greece, etc.
4. Independent Administrative Authorities. They are entities which lie outside the
hierarchical review or the supervision of the central government. They are equipped
with broad decision-making competencies (regulatory, licensing, arbitration
competencies as well as competencies for sanctions or competencies of review). Some
of these are the following: the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, the
Ombudsman, the Authority for the Protection of Personal Data, the National Radio
and Television Council, the National Telecommunications and Posts Commission, the
Competition Commission, and the Energy Regulatory Authority.
The institutional shape as well as the concrete legal status of the wider public
sector presents great variety and the particular agencies, authorities and organisations,
which fall in this big category, reflect the way of State links and penetrates into the
economy and society. That is, and has been the dominant model of development since
World War II in various forms and aspects of social and economic activities, such as,
for instance, in communication, health, education and culture, public works,
infrastructure, etc. As a result of this kind of development, the Greek economy has
been a mixed one, in the sense that the market economy has been mediated and
regulated, perhaps over-regulated at least occasionally, by the State. The latter has
assumed a preponderant role in development and that largely explains the extent of
the State’s direct or indirect involvement in the creation of the country’s Gross
National Product.
It comes of no surprise, therefore, that the new dominant paradigm of political
economy in Greece – as it is the case elsewhere too – concurs in reversing the role
(‘rolling back’) of the State’s intervention and involvement in the economy and
27
society. A medium term objective, which is not unrealistic, would then be to reduce
the total size of the State’s share in the GNP from over 40% as used to be the practice
until very recently to that of 30% in the near future. It is fair to say that this overall
strategic objective is more or less common property not only among economists, but
among mainstream politicians as well. Let alone the pressure for change induced with
Greece’s accession to the European Monetary Union, which can hardly be neglected.
2.6. The control of public administration
Administrative action must comply with the rule of law. The Greek legal system
traditionally recognises parliamentary control of administrative action, administrative
self-control and judicial control. A consistent effort is made during the recent years, to
further promote transparency and accountability in the Greek political - administrative
system. This important area of reform involves the introduction of new institutions.
Special bodies of inspectors (such as the Administrative Inspectors and the Financial
Crime Confrontation Body), are set up in order to increase public control on
bureaucracy, to fight against corruption and to improve transparency, as well as the
effectiveness of specific public policies.
2.7. Civil service
The Civil Servant’s Code contains the principal regulations that govern the in-service
status of the civil servants (the methods of selection, rights and duties, in-service
changes, the promotion process, liability, the termination of the relation of
employment, etc.). The engagement and in-service status of the military and police
personnel as well as the personnel on a private law contract are governed by a distinct
legal regime. Security of employment for civil servants has been guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Civil servants are being divided into the following categories according to
their legal status: i) regular civil servants, who are governed by norms of public law,
are tenured, and their ranks evolve in accordance with the career system10
, ii) civil
10 It may be reminded at this point that the principle of tenure in the civil service employment was
constitutionally guaranteed in 1911 among a number of reforms initiated then by El. Venizelos, although it
was actually implemented 20 years later along with the reestablishment of the Council of State. It should
also be born in mind that the tenure principle along with the meritorious system of appointments in the civil
service through examinations were regarded and long sought after as major modernisation measures aimed at
28
servants with a term of office, whose status, during their term, is assimilated to that of
the preceding category, iii) civil servants on a private law contract of a fixed period,
intended to deal with either unforeseen and urgent or transitory needs, iv) non-tenured
civil servants, who enjoy the personal trust of those who appoint them and can be
dismissed at any time without special guarantees and compensation (the political
bureaus of the Prime Minister and ministers are staffed by non-tenured civil servants),
v) civil servants on a private law contract in organic posts (experts, auxiliary or
technical staff).
The selection of civil servants takes place by competitive examinations or by
virtue of objectively assessed qualifications (experience, academic qualifications,
social criteria, etc.). The selection and recruitment process is entrusted to an
independent administrative authority, the Supreme Council for the Selection of
Personnel (Civil Service Commission).
Civil servants are recruited at the starting rank provided for the relevant
position and are promoted to the other ranks in the hierarchy, if they have completed
the required time of service and if they have the formal qualifications required. Apart
from seniority, academic qualifications and performance appraisal are important
criteria for career advancement. The posts of the personnel are classified in the
following categories: Special Posts category, University Studies category, Technical
Studies category, Secondary Education category and Compulsory Education category.
3. Reforming the administrative structure
One of the crucial factors delaying reforms in economy and society in Greece is the
poor condition of public administration. Namely, the administrative system of the
country exhibits certain curious aspects and features which are conducive to
remarkable weaknesses of performance and rather limited capacity of achieving
results (Mergos et al., 2012: 195 ff.).
The poor quality of public administration in Greece has been identified over
the years by numerous experts’ reports, pieces of academic analysis, and public
opinion. The main factor responsible for this quality deficit is not only the overall
and capable of breaking the vicious circle of clientelism, the application of the spolia victoribus rule and the
low level of professionalism and efficiency in the civil service thus. The first efforts for establishing the
merit principles were initiated by Charilaos Trikoupis’ reforms in the 1880s let alone the promulgation and
the formal enrichment of the principle of merit by the constitutional documents of the revolutionary period.
29
extent of public intervention in economy and society, which is excessive by any
means and standards of comparison, but also the long tradition of legalism, rigidity
and formalism of administrative behaviour almost at any level and aspect of state
action. Furthermore, the infiltration of political or rather party-political concerns into
the operation of state agencies and organisations at the centre and the periphery of the
administrative machinery of the country does only aggravate the condition of limited
professionalism and civil service ethos and mentality in public administration.
Excessive size, political dependence, legalistic culture and lack of professionalism in
administration, if combined as they actually do, are factors which explain much of the
present predicament of public administration in Greece.
Whether administrative crisis is a persistent phenomenon in a developing
country like Greece remains the basic question. The reason is that despite various
reforms and interventions which have taken place over the last 40 years or more and
the widespread consensus for the modernisation of the political system as a whole,
state bureaucracy and administration has failed to improve in a substantial way. Nor
the worst symptoms of maladministration and bureaupathology have been overcome.
On the contrary, the features and characteristics of crisis seem to persist, if not
intensify, and manifest themselves not only in the widening gap or deficit of public
finance but also in the nearly negative efficiency and effectiveness of the
administrative behaviour in the public sector. Related aspects of the administrative
crisis include the size and the limited professional expertise of public employment,
the outmoded and ill-shaped organisational structures, the virtual absence of modern
management methods, principles and techniques, the prevailing legalism, formalism
and underdevelopment of professional ethos in the administrative culture of modern
Greece. As a result, a sense of implementation failure tends to prevail in almost every
sector of state activity and performance.
The above factors of administrative crisis linked as they are among themselves
as well as with others in adjacent social systems (i.e. education, party politics,
urbanisation, weak industrialisation, etc.) produce the particular symptoms of the
endemic pathology and incapacity of state bureaucracy. Accordingly, the
administrative crisis does also seem to reflect and perpetuate a wider inertia and
weakness of the public sector as a whole. The causes of this inertia ought, however, to
30
be sought at the structure and foundations of the political system rather than a
particular coincidence.
For analytical purposes, it is perhaps warranted to distinguish between two
main categories of concurring factors or causes of administrative crisis in the Greek
case. Namely, the limited external differentiation of the administrative domain from
politics, political control and party dominance. And secondly, the insufficient internal
development and differentiation of the administrative subsystem in terms of
structures, functioning and personnel professionalism which amounts to an overall
capacity crisis of state bureaucracy and administration.
It does, therefore, seem to be the case that an inverse relationship tends to
obtain among the above identified factors. That is, the tendency for politicisation and
concentration of power, on the one hand, and the level of organisational
underdevelopment and differentiation of the administrative subsystem, on the other.
Thus, the intensification of political control and domination over state bureaucracy
tends in the longer term to undermine the conditions of steady development and
professional advancement – including meritocracy – in the administrative structure
and culture. As a result, crisis phenomena tend to perpetuate themselves, which in
turn creates the need for more political intervention and control, and so on in a vicious
circle. It comes of no surprise, therefore, that the perception of failure and
ineffectiveness of reform measures could be regarded as an instance of the
phenomenon of ‘crisis of the crisis management’.
The fact that the administrative system in its present shape and condition
presents itself as an obstacle rather than as a tool and helpful instrument for advancing
and serving reforms in economy and society needs hardly to be emphasised. Indeed, it
is increasingly being realised that unless and until administrative reform and
modernisation is rapidly and effectively advanced, economy and society will be left
unhelped in the desert of backwardness and dependence. Requisite types and forms of
administrative reform are indispensable, in order to open up new possibilities and
unleash forces, which will contribute to further development in the economic,
political and social spheres in the country.
31
3.1. Capacity deficit and reform
As a result of the trajectory of development in Greece that has prevailed in the past, a
point of imbalance has been reached between the size and scope of state activity and
its capacity to deliver efficiently and effectively. Namely, the size of the state
intervention in society and economy has grown and been overstretched in a manner
that tends to be improportional to its functional capacity to deliver and implement
accordingly. Thus, prevails a situation whereby a rather biggish and oversized state
machinery – with a multitude of rules and regulations, of agencies and civil servants –
is accompanied by limited capacity for qualitative administrative action and
performance. The quality or capacity deficit refers to a sort of reverse relationship that
tends to obtain between the size and scope of state activity, on the one hand, and its
capacity or potential to deliver, on the other. That is, the capacity deficit forms more
certainly a kind of root cause for maladministration in Greece.
As far as the prospects of reform are concerned, the optimal strategy would
then rather tend to focus on increasing and improving the capacity and quality of state
machinery. That would perhaps have to entail to a certain extent taking measures to
reduce the overall size and scope of state involvement and intervention in economy
and society. The overstretched and oversized state involvement looks likely as
necessary to be reversed and rolled back to more manageable proportions. At the
same time a relevant precondition – a conditio sine qua non – for further development
would relate to the substantial amelioration of the quality and professionalism of
public services. Namely, the capacity of the state to act efficiently and effectively, in a
manner that is responsible and accountable to the people and civil society at large.
The twin strategy of size reduction and capacity improvement lies at the heart
of the more inclusive policy ideal of reform and ‘re-founding’ or reconstructing the
state. Re-founding or re-establishing the role and functions of the state would then
entail striking a new balance in its relations with market economy and civil society.
Above all, the idea to ‘re-found’ and reconstruct the state machinery in the face of
new challenges would involve a special emphasis and attention on the capacity and
quality of the administrative machinery. The quality of state performance in the
various branches of Government and public administration forms an indispensable
condition for sustainable development. And development ought to be understood in
qualitative terms too; that is, as the way forward towards an open and more
32
democratic policy enriched with public services and institutions that function well and
respond to people’s desires and demands in the context of the rule of law.
Overall a kind of a ‘paradigmatic shift’ is underlying the whole effort to
‘reinvent’ public governance and administration in contemporary times. Thus, a new
emphasis is more than visible on the need to circumscribe the institutional monopoly
of the centralised state administration by attempting to reduce and optimise its
regulatory intervention in the economy and society.
3.2. Prospects of reform and modernisation
Society and economy essentially expect from the state the provision of the appropriate
legal and institutional means and infrastructure for their functioning and self-
regulation as well as the necessary human personnel in quantity and quality –
inclusive of knowledge and experience – appropriate for novel social and economic
activities. As a result, the role of the state vis-à-vis the economy and society is
currently undergoing a rapid and drastic transformation. The state is thereby called to
cease or seriously curtail its overtly interventionist operations and replace them with a
more supportive role. That is to say, state institutions are invited to maintain and even
improve the quality – but not necessarily the quantity – of their regulatory functions in
the context of the rule of law, while at the same time reduce or even abolish excessive
direct involvement in the productive sector of the economy.
Last, but not least in significance, the internal structuring of public
administrative systems is also confronted by related challenges of reform and reshape.
The traditional centralised model of administration and public management tends to
give way to a very significant extent to more decentralisation and autonomy in local
government and administration. Accordingly, the central institutions of the state are
challenged to assume and contain themselves to more programmatic or regulatory
functions and responsibilities. And they are expected to offload and transfer the rest of
the more executive functions and their implementation to decentralised agencies, to
local government authorities as well as to institutions flourishing in civil society.
‘Steering and governing but not rowing’ is the prevailing model idea for the
state functions and outlook by the turn of the century. ‘Governing’ and ‘steering’
mean providing the essential guidelines, the human one, and above all the spirit and
motivation. And ‘rowing’ entails implementation under conditions of relative
33
autonomy and discretion but in harmony and coordination as well of the executive
functions of the state. Governing and rowing take place in the same vessel, however.
And that suggests that they need to be correlated and coordinated too.
3.3. Rowing and steering between (the Scylla of) politicisation and (the Charybdis
of) bureaucratic weakness
Given the over-inflation of political and state functions, institutions and
responsibilities in a peripheral country such as Greece, the question presented is why
the State has failed, not totally perhaps, but to a considerable extent, to undertake a
more positive and creative role and help accelerate overall development and
modernisation in a more efficient, effective and qualitative way.
The mode of organisation of state machinery that has prevailed over the time
has resulted in a huge, oversize bureaucracy of gargantuan proportions11
which is,
however, at the same time very weak and impotent in terms of strategy, policy making
and management capacities. The giant bureaucracy with the weak ‘mind’ (weak in the
sense of steering capability) presents an obstacle and hindrance to development and
modernisation, rather than a tool and weapon for it.
The explanation of this kind of failure or rather the slow rate of modernisation
(in qualitative terms) would have, of course, to refer to more inclusive social factors
and determinants of the developmental predicament. These factors have included,
especially in the past, the backwardness and the pre-modern or pre-capitalist structure
of the economy, the mode of the organisation of the agriculture and the articulation of
the primary with the secondary sector of the economy, the poor industrialisation and
the limited differentiation of civil society. Extremely important are also the
particularities of State’s political and administrative structures and infrastructures,
which perhaps may be held to account for the failures or deficiencies in economy and
society.
These are factors whose occurrence has resulted to the exaltation of the role of
the State and the significance of political mediations and interventions; and even
more, to the bitter realisation of the limited capacity of the state agencies to shape and
guide development in an intelligent, efficient and effective way. The paradox of
11 For instance, public expenditure has been on the raise for a number of decades amounting at certain points
of time, especially in the 1980s, to almost 50% of GNP.
34
coincidence and conflation on the level of state political and administrative
institutions of great expectations only to be followed by comparable disenchantment
and failure accounts to a very significant extent for the interpretation of the Greek
case.
By the same token, however, reforms and transformations at the political and
institutional level have proved to be of limited use and effectiveness because of the
persistence of backwardness and retardness at the socio-economic level. This kind of
developmental lag, schism and imbalance or discrepancy between the political -
institutional and the socio-economic level results to the limited modernising value of
reforms. That is to say, the reform interventions, which are ceaselessly being
produced and reproduced by the government of the day, tend to assume a highly
symbolic function and usually be contained at a purely legal - rational façade. They
help, of course, sustain the mythology and ideology of reform and modernisation but
they become rather shallow and formalistic and they prove to be largely irrelevant at
the practical level.
Despite the fact that Greek society entered the modern era at a rather early
stage (at the beginning of the 19th
century), it has always lagged behind not only the
more advanced Western European societies but also with regard to some late comers
but more successful performers in late development and modernisation (for instance,
Australia, Japan and the four ‘Asian Tigers’ as well as most of the Scandinavian
Countries). And that in spite of the ‘cognitive’, so to call, advantage of late comers, in
the sense of being provided with a historically mapped developmental route and
paradigm, which could perhaps allow them both to compress developmental and
evolutionary stages (thanks to the exponential nature of subsequent growth) and to
avoid others’ mistakes and failures. As a matter of fact, however, a remarkable degree
of affluence did take place during the 30 years of rapid-economic growth (1950-1980)
in the post-World War II period and an unprecedented improvement in the standard of
living conditions for a big part of the population was made possible mainly through
tourism, émigré capital transfers, construction, petty bourgeosie and small market
activities – by and large in the margins of a shadowy economy. But these changes in
living conditions failed to affect in a significant way the basic political -
administrative infrastructure of the country. Instead, the main features of an
essentially clientelist political culture and practice were maintained and indeed were
35
found to be quite ‘functional’ in the unplanned and unregulated in desired ways
growth of the economy, which is stained by a nouveaurichism ethic and the
widespread vulgarism. Thus, it took place in recent times a remarkable improvement
in the standard of living and consumption if not affluence, but without modernising
influence and consequences in politics and the administration. On the contrary, this
type of affluence was made possible at the expense of state modernisation. That is
made evident, for instance, in the persistent failure on the part of the state to design
and implement a thorough and effective mechanism for the collection of taxes and to
combat bribery of state organs including police and security, tax officers, doctors,
teachers, etc.
3.3.1. Parliamentary Clientelism
A broader look is therefore warranted at the structure and functioning of the type of
Parliamentary Clientelism that has prevailed in the form of political participation in
Greece. That in turn accounts in a very basic way for the limited positive and creative
role that the state administration has managed to undertake in the developmental
process. ‘Super-politicisation’ may pose as a distinct feature of modern political life
in Greece, but ought to be understood not as an innate characteristic of Greek mind
and psyche; but rather as a ‘functional’ element in clientelist politics and the
prevailing political culture. Thus, people’s politicisation, that is politicisation on the
part of the public, comes about because it is essentially through this medium (i.e.
attachment to political party or a personality) that people may be able to obtain state
subsidies and benefits – including appointment in the civil service, especially in the
not too distant past.
On the other hand, politicians’ politicisation is a feature of politics as a
profession for a considerable segment of the middle class who in order to maintain
their position in the political limelight and the benefits ensuing thereof tend to ‘sell’
their services to their clientele on a very thin ideological or principle’s base.
Moreover, as much as politicisation is a cause of bureaucratic dependency and
inefficiency it does also form a consequence of these conditions, which in turn
accelerate politicisation, and so in a vicious circle.
The state apparatus, including the size of the personnel approximating 650.000
public employees in the wider public sector and the direct involvement in the
36
economy, is nonetheless very weak and ill-equipped with the requisite professional
and strategic capacity and authority to function as an instrument and rational agent for
reform and modernisation. Despite the over inflated size and role of the state
bureaucracy, it has failed to acquire distinct and appropriate developmental features
which would enable it to act as the engine and driving force for intelligent service and
advancement of the society as a whole. Instead of designing and shaping the strategy
and the overall policy for rational and long-term development, state bureaucracy in
Greece undertook usually the backward and traditional role of satisfying the short
term clientelist needs and expectations at the expense of a creative and flexible role
and function. Administrative bureaucracy took on a top-heavy and grotesque shape of
gargantuan proportions ill-structured and ill-equipped for the complexity of the tasks
and the challenges of the process of development and modernisation.
On the other hand, the prevailing mode of dirigiste politics has, basically,
failed despite certain notable exceptions to provide the appropriate leadership and
creative role in development and modernisation – even when trusted with wide
popular support. That may well be the result of a problem of supply of political
leadership or of the internal, oligarchic structuring and patterns of domination in the
political parties. It may, also, have had to do with the extreme concentration and
manipulation of power on the part of a crust of decisive political élites such as the
prime ministers, the leaders of the political parties, the strong ministers and party
barons. The prime objective of these élites has naturally been to maintain and
perpetuate their hold of power, which, however, only partially correlates with
modernisation and reform of state machinery and organisation.
As a whole, a dirigiste and highly autocratic mode of political conduct comes
about which, despite the concentration of power that it entails, is nonetheless hardly
capable for ensuring modernisation and development in the desired pace and form.
3.4. An instance of an underdeveloped bureaucracy
Greek bureaucracy has been in such a state of affairs for a rather long period of time.
Suffice it to mention here that Spyridon Eulamblos, who wrote a book in 1894 under
the very insightful title Maladministration in Greece (he was actually the first Greek
author who used this term), was even then talking about the crisis of bureaucracy in
37
Greece, its deficiencies and pathologies, which he thought that they could be
redressed by wide radical reform and modernisation.
3.4.1. Aspects of crisis in the administrative system
The fact that the Greek administrative system is undergoing a crisis is an open secret
among professionals, academics and the public. A number of official reports have also
been addressed to the biggest malady of the country, as it is often called, and have
tried to identify the symptoms and the means of redress (Makrydemetres and
Michalopoulos, eds, 2000). These reports have not differed greatly in the diagnosis
nor indeed as far as the reform recommendations were concerned.
To go a little bit backwards, according to Kyriakos Varvaressos, who
produced his influential report on the “Greek Economic Problem” in the beginning of
the 1950s, the inefficiency of the public services posed as the hardest problem that the
country was confronted with in the general effort for reconstruction and development
at the aftermath of the war and the crisis period of the 1940s. He did then also
underline that administrative dysfunction rendered practically impossible the
amelioration of the economic condition of the country. Among the most serious
factors of administrative pathology K. Varvaressos considered the following:
(a) the uneven distribution of personnel in the various governmental services and
institutions which resulted in their concentration in the central departments placed at
the capital and the very weak staffing of the regional and decentralised units. The
problem was further aggravated by the unabated preservation of an unorthodox
system of position classification which rendered virtually impossible the interagency
transfer and circulation of personnel
(b) the long established practices of clientelism, favouritism and patronage, the
blatant violation of meritocracy and the widespread corruption, bribery and low
morale even among the top ranking officials and administrators, and
(c) the prevalence of legalism, formalism and bureaupathology in the functioning
and performance of public services which not only inhibited initiative and creativity
in tacking the nation’s problems but also severely troubled and pestered citizens,
especially those of the lower and more vulnerable classes and strata of the society.
Along with proposing concrete measures and reforms to meet these particular
drawbacks, K. Varvaressos insisted in unmistakable terms that an essential indeed
38
sine qua non conditio to overcome the acute administrative plight would be to
maintain genuine impartiality and the cease of party interference in the affairs of the
civil service (including appointments and promotions). For that purpose he strongly
recommended the establishment of an independent Commission of Experts that would
oversee and evaluate the reform measures and strategy.
At about the same period Georgios Marangopoulos, who subsequently became
President of the Conseil d’État, drafted a blueprint for the new “Methods of
Recruitment and Training of the Civil Service Personnel” (1950) providing for the
generalised application of a system of meritocratic appointments in the public service
based on competitive examinations, the establishment of a distinct class of senior
administrators and the continuous in-service training and perfection of public
employees.
A few years later, F.M.G. Willson, an OECD consultant and university
professor from Great Britain, analysed the “Machinery of Government in Greece”
(1964), pinpointed at the structural deficiencies of the central departments of
Government, the weak coordination among them and the inadequate development of
decentralisation.
At about the same time, another OECD consultant, professor Georges Langrod
from France, did also produce the most comprehensive so far report on the
“Reorganisation of Public Administration in Greece” (1965). G. Langrod identified
the capacity deficit of the civil service at the structural, the procedural and the
personnel level and components of the administrative system. He even underlined the
fact that the operational inadequacy and failure of the civil service contrasted sharply
with the requirements posited by Greece’s eventual accession to the European
Community with which Greece had already, since 1961, signed an association
agreement (this agreement provided for the first time for a full accession date 20 years
later, and that was what actually happened in 1981). G. Langrod in his report strongly
emphasised the need for raising the level of professionalism in administration with all
that it entails, the intensification and professional re-orientation of the educational
component at the secondary and tertiary level as well as the updating and proliferation
of in-service training and developmental opportunities.
Other commentators in the meantime and in view of Greece’s entrance to the,
then, EEC had pointed out the impotence of Greek bureaucracy and kept arguing that
39
it posed more as an obstacle than as a factor for development and modernisation (inter
alia, Argyriades, 1970).
The last three reports which will very briefly be referred to here are the
“Report on Public Administration” produced in 1988 by a team of experts who were
brought together by the Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), the
white paper on the “Reform and Modernisation of the Civil Service” produced in
1990 by another team of experts under the auspices of the Department of Public
Administration and, finally, the Mikhail Decleris’ Report on “Greek Administration
2000” that formed the basis of a Cabinet resolution which was, however, never
implemented.
Understandably, perhaps, after each report was published and promulgated, a
number of reform measures were announced or even enacted in accordance with the
recommended interventions. But they hardly affected the practical horizon of
administrative (ill)performance.
3.4.2. Modernism versus tradition: a curious amalgam
Modernisation has always been an objective of the reformers and state builders in the
modern history of Greek political life. Even during the War of Independence from
Ottoman rule in the second decade of the 19th
century one of the most persistent and
acutely fought conflicts and differences was that between modernisers and
traditionalists (Petropulos, 1985; Diamandouros, 1972). In a rather schematic
description of them, the former (modernisers) sought to install elaborate political and
administrative institutions in the newly born State which were largely inspired from
patterns observed in more advanced western societies; the latter (traditionalists), on
the other hand, preferred to preserve and maintain as much as possible the long
established fabric of the society with minor perhaps adjustments and alterations.
Moreover, this counter poise if not contradiction between the new and the old,
modernity versus tradition, cut across another set of opposites, that is between the
alien and the imported, on the one hand, and the indigenous and the local, on the
other.
As a whole, therefore, it is the case that modernism and tradition have
established themselves as a set of dominant cultural trends, and the most inclusive and
significant ‘pattern variables’ in Greek political life over the last two hundred years.
40
In case one wonders what was the outcome of this conflict eventually that
went on during the whole of the 19th
century and is still going on unabated, it rather
seems to be a draw or an indecisive contest. It may also be an instance of the
phenomenon of ‘cultural columnisation’, whereby the respective cultural systems
(modernity and tradition) tend to oppose each other and perpetuate their own self-
referential and reflexive autonomy. More apposite seems to be the case, however, of a
curious amalgam and a syncretism of various elements in the material structure and
composition of the political and administrative system of the country. Thus, there can
rather easily be observed numerous instances of modern and advanced institutions and
reforms having been established in the administrative machinery of the State and the
political system as a whole. Yet, real life in politics and administration continues to a
very significant extent to be attached to more traditional or backward forms and
patterns of conduct with regard to state functions.
It is understandable, therefore, that in such a context institutional reforms
which bear the mark of modernity (mostly influenced from the more advanced
western prototypes) surely do not exhaust nor do they fully shape the reality of Greek
political and administrative life. As a matter of fact, it is usually the case that legal -
rational reforms tend to be or rather become very formalistic in their outlook and
consequences (Mouzelis, 1978: 134). It is a peculiar kind of formalism which is
manifested in what Fred Riggs (1964, 1973) has described as ‘prismatic’ societies and
refers to the gap or discrepancy between the formal - legal prescription or provision,
on the one hand, and the reality of administrative or political life, on the other.
Presumably, the latter is only to a limited extent shaped or determined by the formal -
legal provision.
If that is the case, then, one may wonder whether we ought to be talking of an
altogether failure of reform efforts or preferably of a highly complex even fractal
framework of partial failure and partial success – a patchwork of modern alongside
pre-modern, traditionalist forms, structures and practices in politics and most certainly
in public administration. As a matter of fact, the experience of administrative reform
in Greece abounds of examples of this kind of modernity cum tradition patchwork or
variety.
What this kind of institutional variety and heterogeneity, then, suggests is the
existence in parallel, but not necessarily in harmony, of practices and attitudes which
41
may be modern, rational and reformist, and others which may be quite obsolete,
backward, traditionalist, even reactionary. In the context of this line of argumentation,
therefore, civil service reforms in the Greek case have seldom failed or succeeded on
the whole in a clear cut zero-sum fashion. Needless to say that there may be found
examples of either extreme case as well, that is total failure or absolute success.
Usually, however, the picture that emerges from the experience of
administrative reform is a hybrid model or rather a pattern of partial failure and
limited success (Makrydemetres, 1995). Reform and modernisation may succeed in
the sense that it is enacted and implemented in a legal - rational fashion at the
institutional level. And given the normative and paradigmatic function and potential
of both law and reform, they may affect and to a certain degree influence the shape
and conduct of the bureaucracy. But reforms may also fail to the extent that they do
not succeed in creating irreversible changes. Instead, they can easily be modified in
practice after a while, they may also be assimilated and adapted without any great
influence on the practices and tradition; or they may get neutralised and pushed to the
margins of the administrative system.
3.4.3. The imbalance thesis
A further plausible explanation of the reform failure is that reforms go wrong and
flunk because they are too advanced and disassociated from the acceptability level in
the societal system which they are designed to reform. In that case, transplanting
institutional structures and processes from advanced, industrialised societies is rather
likely to fail to affect in significant ways a backward bureaucracy in a peripheral or
semi-peripheral society which is traditionally attuned to different forms and practices
of institutional and political association.
Thus, whenever the modernisers attempted to install novel political and
administrative institutions drawing largely upon western (American included) models
of state building and organisation, not only did they meet resistance but often the
reforms and innovations did not manage to get rooted and assimilated; or rather in
their application they got transformed and became dysfunctionalised. That was due to
the background character of the more inclusive societal system. Namely, society was
experiencing and perceiving them as alien adjuncts which were neither organically
42
related nor genuinely reflecting deeper values and needs prevailing at the time in
society.
This kind of modernisation discrepancy or imbalance may be used to explain,
for instance, the distorted application of such contemporary and modernising
institutions such as the male suffrage (gained as early as in 1844) in the face of the
context of an essentially traditional, undifferentiated and underdeveloped political
culture, a pre-capitalist and unindustrialised economy in a backward society. The
installation of advanced institutional formations in backward pre-capitalist societal
conditions could not help setting off a number of dysfunctional consequences, from
the point of view of administrative and organisational rationality and efficiency. Such
as, for example, the flaring up of clientele practices, the patronage and spoils system
in state employment and, in general, the overgrowth of the size of the administrative
machinery of the State which has been as a rule staffed with excessive personnel.
The introduction of universal franchise, which was a novel reality and a
substantial factor in political life even since the middle of the 19th
century, it so
operated however, in the context of the Greek political and social life, that the
application of this modern and democratic institution was followed by adverse (or
dysfunctional) consequences with regard to the staffing and functioning of the civil
service. Since the political parties were largely formed by a number of notables, that
is, strong political personalities who represented particular areas and clienteles in the
country, and very broadly agreed on certain basic political lines, these personalities
operated mainly as patrons towards their constituency. Thus, there emerged a mutual
relationship of support (on the part of the local client) and protection (on the part of
the patron - politician) (Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoukalas, 1977).
The basic, underlying contradiction that explains the above was the
incompatibility between the weak development or rather underdevelopment in the
primary and secondary, the business and the industrial sector of the economy, on the
one hand, and the liberalisation of political institutions and the opening up of the
political process, on the other. That is, of course, an instance of the difference and
incongruence, if not contradiction, between civil society and the state or the political
system. Whereas the state institutions presented to underdevelopment of business and
industry, political parties and politicians in general have proved to be ideal mediators
43
on the basis of widespread clientelism, spoils system practices, even corruption and
graft.
Evidently the mode of political leadership that is nourished and emerges from
the unbridelled clientelist pattern of political domination leaves much to be desired in
terms of public policy making capability, strategic vision and reform orientation,
which would be necessary to guide and monitor effective reform and modernisation.
(The opposite has, as a result, been usually the exception rather than the rule).
The public, on the other hand, tends to get demoralised and become quite
cynical in their perception of interest and attitude towards the state. Indeed, a curious
process of transformation occurs: the object of desire, namely the appointment to a
state position or the appropriation of some kind of state benefit, subsidy or contract
can very quickly become a despised object of ridicule and exploitation through illegal
or corrupt ways and means. The realisation on the part of individuals that the
satisfaction of the clientelist demand usually followed by miserable returns and bad
working conditions led to further demoralisation and cynicism. After all, clientelist
dependence has had a cost or a guilty repulsion on both sides (Tsoukalas, 1993).
These underlying social conditions do, therefore, go a long way in explaining
the virtual failure of reforms to rationalise and modernise state bureaucracy and
administration – such as, for instance, to reduce the size of unnecessary and of poor
quality personnel and distribute it more evenly in the public service, to decentralise
the top-heavy and over concentrated bureaucracy, to establish the merit principle in
state employment, to professionalise and streamline the bureaucracy, to equip it with
requisite managerial methods and techniques, to render it more effective and efficient.
3.5. Politics of reform
It is of no surprise that politicians, party leaders and parties will usually support,
initiate and implement big scale reform and modernisation in the civil service only in
so far as this is conducive to their political or re-election prospects. The political
survival imperative requires that the cost (of reform) should not exceed the benefit (of
survival and re-election). The adherence to this ‘imperative’ of political influence and
survival usually results, however, to certain reforms which are often mutually
exclusive and very seldom form a comprehensive strategy which is rationally
designed, implemented and evaluated.
44
The significance, on the other hand, of political agents can hardly be disputed
thanks to the predominance and the unparallel concentration of effective power and
control in the hands of politicians in Greece. Some other factors that mitigate the
effectiveness of politically conditioned reform have not only to do with the profile
and personal qualifications of particular politicians; but also with internal organisation
of political parties in government and in opposition; the policy making features and
capability that each party is equipped with; the fact that usually civil service
modernisation and reform does not form a significant factor in the electoral choices of
the public despite the widespread dissatisfaction with its performance; the conflict and
fight among the political parties with regard to the reform issue whereby one or some
parties may be more pro-reform oriented than others (thus, Charilaos Trikoupis’
liberal reforms in late 19th
century were fiercely opposed by his rival’s, Theodoros
Deliyannis, more traditionalist attachments; or, in the first part of the 20th
century,
Eleutherios Venizelos’ liberalism was opposed by Royalist Conservativism); last but
not least in significance there may also be considered the difference if not
contradiction between pro-reform oriented politicians and their populist or
traditionalist counterparts within the major political parties. Needless to say that in the
last case, modernisers across the political spectrum may have closer albeit
unacknowledged affinity among themselves than with their ideological companions
(Mouzelis, 1994).
If the above sounds rather pessimistic with regard to the prospects of reform, it
should not be construed as suggesting that the reform of bureaucracy is unattainable
and that all or any reform effort is doomed to fail; nor that the crisis of bureaucracy
will necessarily be followed by its break up and demise. Given the plasticity of social
institutions (public bureaucracy included) and their high immortality record that is
very unlikely to occur.
What we are actually suggesting is the slow rate and pace of reform, limited
modernisation and fledgling adaptation in complex social conditions and
circumstances. This kind of relative incongruence or mismatch between requisite and
available institutional complexity and problem solving capability lies really at the
heart of the matter. It forms an adaptation lag which is maintained by the limited
provision of positive or corrective feedback on the part of the social agents involved.
45
That is why it was argued earlier in this paper that administrative crisis is sustained by
a sort of more inclusive, second order ‘crisis of the crisis management’.
Nonetheless, the prevailing attitudes of mass consumption and pop culture are
comparable to types and measures which are present even in more advanced societies.
It is, also, possible that even in a relatively backward country there may be present
elements of the wider trend of modernity. That is a sign of a universal trend nowadays
owing to the transferability on a global scale innovations and the penetration of
information in all societies however remote. Nevertheless, if one moves from the
technological to the behavioural, the institutional and the value and belief system,
modernisation becomes less unequivocal in its consequences and requirements. The
reason is that values, customs and long cherished traditions being deeper rooted in the
socio-political culture are less amenable to change and reform.
In conclusion, Greece or rather the Greek politico-administrative system and
culture seems to lack so far the appropriate strategic (or ‘cybernetic’) capacities and
tools to lead the overall development and modernisation of the country in an
intelligent and efficient way, which in turn must account for the failure or the limited
success story of modernisation and reform. Moreover it must account for the
widespread quandary and confusion with regard to options and challenges of the
future.
3.6. Convergence on reform: administrative practices and prospects in Europe
Convergence on reform efforts in public administration is usually related nowadays,
as it was already mentioned, to either deregulation policies and projects or to the
advent of new public management methods and spirit in the organisation and
especially the functioning of public services. Naturally, both issues form a matter of
concern and an object of deliberation to analysts and practitioners.
Underlying all this, however, is an almost pan-European devotion to a more
comprehensive concept of modernisation. A concept and an idea whose scope of
application expands far beyond the contours of public administration. Nonetheless,
modernisation in public administration presents an area and a subject matter on which
and by means of which a lot can be done in the direction of possible cooperation
among European states; but also of eventual convergence in their systems and
practices.
46
It does seem though that modernisation as a general catchword refers to and is
inclusive of a rather big variety of policies and orientations in the institutional
domains of public administration in the European states. What is also usually
observed is a divergence of concepts, attitudes and practices among state departments
and policy sectors even within a single country.
Understandably, therefore, administrative convergence remains an imprecise
and elusive concept that is not easily susceptible to clear cut definitions and
classifications. Analysing convergence is part of the wider discipline of comparative
administration and the empirical evidence required to substantiate conclusions is far
from being complete and conclusive. Even more, most available evidence is country
specific reflecting legacies of the past, varieties of culture and historical experience,
as well as differing legal and political contexts.
On the other hand, whenever some degree of possible convergence in
administrative matters (whether in theory or in practice) is being detected, that should
not be a cause of great surprise; after all most governments and administrations face
similar problems and challenges, as well as constraints. Indeed, past experience has
shown that administrative arrangements may be copied and transferred more easily
than political ones, especially if they are couched in clear cut and comprehensible
terms. To a certain extent, therefore, a degree of some basic or rather ‘minimal’
convergence in administrative structuring and organisation is hardly surprising in the
era of modernity and in a number of countries.
Thus, taking an example from the Greek administrative history, it had proved
relatively easier to install in the first decade after Independence (1833-1843)
administrative arrangements such as, for instance, the prefectural system of
decentralisation in public administration, which was patterned after the French model,
than to establish genuine representative institutions of governance. That became,
however, possible in the period that followed the bloodless army and civil revolt of
1843 and through the exertion of many efforts for founding genuine parliamentary
governance in the decades of 1870s and 1880s.
In a more general sense, too, historically speaking administrative convergence
had proven to be rather high in the course of the 19th
century when, for instance, the
Napoleonic model of administrative construction spread almost all over Europe.
Accordingly, drafting codes of law, organising local government and decentralisation,
47
professionalising the civil service, and establishing councils of State (i.e.
administrative courts and tribunals) were seen as key features and factors for
modernising state function and organisation. At least at the formal or institutional
level if not in actual practice and performance.
Indeed, the French administrative model and the British parliamentary system
of government formed the two dominant yet hard to combine paradigms of
governance in Europe in the 19th
century. Needless to mention that modernisation in
politics and public administration did follow separate ways and trajectories of
development in various countries resulting in distinct systems if not models of
governance and administration. Yet, modernisation has nonetheless been an
overarching ideal and a trend all along. And the degree of institutional convergence or
even ‘isomorhism’ emanating from the wider trend cannot be dismissed as
insignificant.
On a broader theoretical basis one may even argue that among the
fundamental preconditions for modernising contemporary societies are included
chiefly those most basic reforms described by Parsons in his famous set of the key
‘evolutionary universals’ (1964): namely, the combined presence of an articulate
system of rule of law, of representative democratic institutions in the political domain,
of market economy in the productive sphere, and of organised public services. The
implication being that, unless and until particular countries and societies adopt and
adapt to the above set of crucial presuppositions of social and political progress and
development, they will fail to meet the challenges and requirements of modernity and
they will be deprived of the benefits accruing thereof.
If the above may have sounded somewhat too far flung in the past, there is
little doubt now in the first decades of the 21st century that the aforementioned set of
the ‘evolutionary universals’ seem to bear a wider significance. Indeed, they mark a
new era in the art and practice of organising public affairs in the context of which the
essential preconditions of modernity in politics, society and administration are indeed
converging to an extent unknown in the past. To that regard trends and tendencies of
‘globalisation’ in economy, technology, transport and communication may have
exerted an influence that is particularly strong and undeniable.
If ‘global convergence’ would amount to no less than a ‘global illusion’ or
‘useful myth’, it is however the case that some kind of moderate or ‘minimal’
48
convergence does seem to be taking place. That can be noticed in several aspects of
state administrations around the world and most certainly in Europe. Regardless of
whether the West or the East may be unique or not, modernity on its part is universal
at least as a general trend and an ideal of the people of the world. It may well form a
kind of preferred ‘evolutionary path’ for social reform, but it is not of a rectilinear
nature in its forms of application and implementation in various social contexts and
historical circumstances.
Regarding present day developments and the potential of a certain
convergence on reform one may distinguish for comparative and analytic purposes
among four approaches to administrative modernisation that are being pursued in one
way or another in many European countries. These are the following:
(a) an approach anchoring on the reduction of the overall size of the public sector
by lessening public expenditure, curbing rising cost and in general seeking economy
and rationalisation in managing scarce resources. Being an outcome of the cut back
management philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s the need for economy in public
affairs still looms large and dominates to a considerable extent reform efforts in quite
a few European administrations12
(b) secondly, modernisation efforts often appear to venture steering a kind of a
new course in the interface of state - society relations. Thus, strengthening and
empowering civil society – where and to the extent that it was not so developed or
articulated – entails among other things an adherence to the principle of the subsidiary
role of the state vis-à-vis economy, culture and society. That is to say, the old
fashioned model of an excessively interventionist role of the state through
nationalisation of the means of production and the direct assumption of commercial
and entrepreneurial activities is rapidly abandoned. As a result, the public sector is
increasingly restricted and areas of economic activity that used to be under its
immediate control are transferred to the private sector of the economy through
privatisations, outsourcing and contracting out. While the state on its part is being
confined to a more cybernetic role of overall guidance, evaluation and direction in
policy setting and rule making.
12 In particular, for the Euro-economists real convergence is being measured or estimated on the basis of
comparable units of purchasing power as a percentage of the GNP per person. Nominal convergence, on the
other hand, refers to the set of criteria defined in the Treaty of Maastricht; namely, the extent of public
deficit, inflation long-term interest rates and participation to the monetary union.
49
Reversing, however, the tradition of state control and domination over economy and
society for a more balanced perspective in their interaction is a huge task lying ahead
especially in those countries where the state had assumed in the past a preponderant
role in social and economic performance and development
(c) thirdly, rationalising and modernising the administrative machinery itself and
the complex armoury of the state entails among other things (for instance, the
extensive use of information technology) advancing professionalism in public
services through combating clientelist practices, revamping recruitment patterns,
career prospects, ethics and morality, training and constant reskilling of personnel.
Equally significant for streamlining bureaucracy are measures for decentralisation by
means of which executive functions and competences are delegated and devolved not
only to independent administrative agencies, but also to territorial units of regional
administration and local government. The latter are thereof empowered to proceed in
the delivery of services to satisfy local needs and requirements. Of course, the degree
of centralism or decentralisation and devolution varies a lot among the European
countries reflecting different concepts and traditions of state building and political
culture
(d) fourthly, the emerging almost worldwide orthodoxy of new public
management endeavours to steer a new course for the public sector away from
traditional rule and politics dominated models of public administration towards a
more managerial and entrepreneurial profile of public services. To the extent that
public management pursued by various sorts of ways in several countries around the
world and certainly in Europe keeps on a truly moderate track in the middle way
between business and politics, then it has a lot to offer as a tool for invigorating
performance and outlook in the public services. But not as a procrustean stretcher
ironing out in a mechanical manner all differences and variations.
Needless to stress that the above distinctions are of a rather general and
analytic nature which may be useful for comparative purposes. In practice, however,
administrations present all kinds of mixtures and combinations among the
perspectives which have just been distinguished.
The variation of reform strategies and orientations is of course an outcome of
the fact that public administration was and still is considered as core and kernel of
national sovereignty in each state. European Union too still lacks a concrete and
50
coherent policy of administrative harmonisation and convergence, subject perhaps to
certain exceptions. The latter may include, for instance, the accessibility of foreign
nationals as employees in the public services of other states save to positions
involving the exercise of public authority and the safeguarding of the national
interests.
Thus, the skeptical attitude on the issue of convergence would tend perhaps to
the conclusion that there seems to be far more talk about convergence than there is
real convergence in action. Talk and action, theory and practice form parallel regimes
on this as in many aspects of life.
Thanks, therefore, to the cherished principle of subsidiarity of community
functions and institutions vis-à-vis those of the member states, national
administrations are let to proceed on their own ways and by their own means towards
requisite modernisation and convergence. As a result, various countries go about
attempting to modernise their public services with differing speed and modalities
reflecting their respective national cultures, traditions, habits, circumstances and
interests. At the community level, though, what is still prevailing is a kind of an
implicit assumption, occasionally nearing wishful thinking, that European integration
being an overall comprehensive objective will eventually cause a sort of spill over
effect to participating administrative systems and it will not be limited to economic
matters and policies only.
It is hardly surprising, then, that a sort of realist or rather minimalist scope of
convergence ensues from that in the sense that it takes the form of restricting or
eliminating extreme instances of divergence among national administrations. For the
rest, administrative cultures and practices keep following the path of national
diversity.
Clearly, the variety of contexts cannot be stressed enough and hardly needs
explaining. What has been and still is a product of long historical conditioning cannot
be readily abolished nor ignored. On the contrary, administrative models in Europe
and elsewhere not only vary a lot and diverge among themselves but they also
compete for domination and influence (especially the stronger and the more
prestigious ones, none of which, however, has attained a status of undisputed global
or pan-European superiority).
51
Unlike managerial dicta seeking global application in the business world, there
is no ‘one best way’ of running state administration and organisation. As there is not a
single size of shoes fitting all feet, similarly there is not a single nor a best model or
type of administration appropriate for all systems and countries in all times and
circumstances. Instead, there exist numerous tested and valuable administrative
systems and traditions, which may nonetheless share certain common elements and
features.
In conclusion, if full unity is at the moment impossible or even undesirable,
total collapse and divergence does also seem to be equally inconceivable and
unacceptable. Europe, after all, has suffered a lot in the past of the extremities of one
kind or the other. Thus the present state of affairs in Europe is best conceived by what
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once said referring to the European heritage: “We are fond
of and we like diversity, but diversity which is conducive to a unity”. That is an
equally appropriate remark to describe the nature and the prospects of convergence on
administrative reform efforts and plans in Europe at present.
4. The current Greek crisis and administrative reform
The modernisation of public administration formed one of the structural policies that
Greece assumed the responsibility to implement in the context of the Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policy (confirmed by Law 3845/2010), with the aim to
contain expenses as well as to improve the effectiveness of public services. It was
envisaged inter alia that the Greek Government would collaborate with the European
Commission in order to “launch an independent external functional evaluation” of
central administration of the country. In subsequent Law 4024/2011, enacted by the
Government of the then Prime Minister Georgios A. Papandreou, it was specified that
evaluation of structural units and the personnel is necessary for the rationalisation of
public administration and, in particular, the reconstruction of public services by
means of drafting new organisational charts of ministerial structures, the merger of
service units, the transfer of personnel and the abolishment of redundant posts. For
that reason a special Committee was set up in each ministry (article 35).
Despite the change of Government in 2011 and again in 2012, the country
continued to be under the obligation to close and downsize general government units
(Law 4046/2012), which is suggestive of the fact that rather little of previous
52
obligations had been efficiently and effectively implemented. Therefore the effort for
reorganising public administration was maintained. In this context and taken account
of the concrete schedule for the implementation, it was considered as necessary the
establishment at the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance οf a stable
structure for Inter-Ministerial Coordination, which would provide better guidance and
break the intra-Ministry attitude of neglect and inertia (European Commission, 2012:
12-13, 38). Equally necessary was considered the setting up of a high-level
transformation steering group, under the Prime Minister’s authority, with the
responsibility to “supervise, monitor and ensure the implementation of administrative
reforms”: it is about the Governmental Council of Administrative Reform which has
assumed the responsibility of policy design for the improvement of organisation,
functioning and effectiveness of public services as well as of the evaluation of the
results achieved and the decisions taken on them.
Additionally, various Committees in distinct departments of State comprised
of civil servants in the Greek public administration and their colleagues from other
European countries (e.g. France) prepared reports on the reshaping of the internal
structure of ministries which were further elaborated by the Ministry of
Administrative Reform and E-Governance. They were even further revised after a
certain period of time elapsed by the Governmental Council of Administrative
Reform, which finally approved them.
4.1. The Administrative Reform 2013
As it is highlighted in the Greece: Review of the Central Administration (OECD,
2011: 24), a fundamental role is played by the Central Government Departments,
“which are formally responsible for the supervision of all other entities of the public
sector”. As a matter of fact, however, government departments are characterised by
organisational sprawl which leads – among others – to poor quality of public services
and ineffectiveness (Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance, 2012:
39).
The Administrative Reform 2013 is the most recent reform project for the
Greek public administration, the details of which were announced by the Ministry of
Administrative Reform and E-Governance in late April 2013. Administrative Reform
2013 aimed to reform the administrative machinery of the State regarding the central
53
government, adopting the principle of the ‘unity of direction’ and attaining the
appropriate span of control for a more effective public management.
The government machinery in Greece, as that was shaped after the
government reshuffling of June 24th
2013, under the premiership of Mr. Antonios
Samaras, has been structured into a complex of 18 separate central departments
(ministries)13
among which the members of the Government, with the exception of the
Prime Minister and Minister of State, who were not in charge of any specific ministry,
were distributed.
The Central Government Departments consist of agglomerations of public
services and respective jurisdictions at the central level of the government, under the
leadership of members of the Government, and function with the aim of the
formulation and implementation of goals of public interest and respective spaces of
public policy. The respective forms and names of departments of State delineate and
share basic branches of public services at the central level of the government as it is
the case in most contemporary and in particular European countries. They develop a
guiding role in the formulation of public policy including the design and the
implementation of the legal and regulatory framework that envisages the various
activities and services. As a result government departments represent not only the
most basic pillars of the organisation of the central administrative machinery of the
State but also the most crucial institutional components in the process of formulation
and implementation of public policy. Thus, it comes of no surprise that the great part
of policy making takes place in association with or within them.
Taking account of the historical evolution of the Central Government
Departments (ante, pages 20-23), they include major institutional components in
respective policy areas, such as: home administration and security of the State, foreign
policy and defence, economic policy, public works and infrastructure, social policy,
education, national heritage and culture. Despite the fact that the size and extent of
policy composition of state machinery may vary along the time and the political
orientations of the social forces, nonetheless the core element of the Government
composition is being formulated in respective ministerial or departmental structures
and services.
13 See infra, page 65: Table Ι. Configuration of the General Government structure.
54
The Administrative Reform 2013 placed emphasis on the operational
restructuring (downsizing) of the following Greek Central Government Departments
and Secretariats General14
:
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport and
Networks
Heretofore:
Ministry of Development and Competitiveness
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Culture and Sport
Heretofore:
Ministry of Education and Religion
Ministry of Culture and Sports
Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare
Ministry of Rural Development and Food
Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change
Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights
Ministry of Tourism
Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean
Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace
Secretariat General of Information and Communication, and the Secretariat
General of Mass Media.
The scope of the Administrative Reform 2013 was the enhancement of
performance, efficiency and control over the expenses of these particular public
bodies, the reduction of their size through the alteration of their structure, and the
amelioration of the quality of the related public services. In addition, it was regarded
by the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance as the basis for the
implementation of mobility and the dismissal of civil servants.
14 See http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/other_pages2/dioikitiki_metarithmisi_2013.htm.
55
Taking into account that the Greek economic crisis is mainly due to fiscal
problems, the importance of the Administrative Reform 2013 was significantly high
for the Greek economy and public administration. The significance of this
administrative reform and its immediate implementation were made explicit in the
reports of the European Commission (2013) that reviewed the Second Economic
Adjustment Programme for Greece, and in the press releases of the Ministry of
Administrative Reform and E-Governance.
4.1.1. Focus of reform analysis
Analysing the internal environment of public administration referrs to parameters and
processes which characterise a complex system as such. Former analysis of the
internal structure of the administrative system is usually inclusive of the following
elements:
(a) operational activities which pertain to description of professional structuring,
categories of the public that is being served, relations with relative institutions, etc.
(b) organisation and functioning of the dominant administrative structure
inclusive of political guidance and control, organisational charts of the basic service
units as well as description of the function at the level of directorates general,
directorates, sections and the rest of the service units
(c) human and material resources inclusive of the personnel and their skills,
competencies and capabilities (moral, professional and intellectual), technical and
informational infrastructure, financial resources.
The following analysis adopts a structured approach that is based on the
collection and classification of information concerning the above in an organised and
methodical manner, including flowcharts, budgetary information and size of
personnel.
The analysis of the internal environment is being conducted at a certain depth
and scope which may perhaps facilitate the identification of a series of strong and
weak points. The research of the internal environment of the administrative system
aimed, particularly, at the following elements or aspects of its functioning, on the
basis of which may be extracted the necessary conclusions:
(a) depicting the existing organisation and structure of the central service units of
the government departments on the basis of the available legal documents envisaging
56
it (legal enactments and the rest of presidential decrees referring to the administrative
structure of Central Government Departments)
(b) extracting the relevant information resulting from the above in the form of
organisational flowcharts, span of control of units at the various administrative
hierarchy
(c) describing and analysing jurisdictional demarcations along the lines which the
policy space of the respective departments is being defined and organised
(d) a certain element of comparative evaluation and benchmarking is being also
aimed at the empirical administrative analysis of the available material that may
contribute to the more objective evaluation of the manner of the organisation and
functioning of the system under examination.
4.1.2. New structure of the ministries
New organisation charts of the ministries were issued (in the form of presidential
decrees) by the end of August 2014 and were put on force about two months later (by
the beginning of November 2014). As it was announced by the Ministry of
Administrative Reform and E-Governance, the overall reduction of the size of the
service units in the ministries exceeded 40%, which led to respective reduction of the
expenses contributing in such a way to efficiency and effectiveness of public
administration. Presumably, contraction of the structure of the services facilitates the
coordination of the units. In the OECD edition Review for Greece (2011: 57) it was
underlined that the need for drastic reduction of administrative structures in the
central level of governance, as well as the rationalisation of their internal organisation
would help increase the productivity of the administration.
In the process of restructuring of the organisational charts an effort was made
so that certain concrete principles of administrative science were taken into account. It
was expected therefore that the criteria of internal differentiation of the ministries
would follow the precepts of ‘unity of direction’ and ‘unity of command’ as well as
the optimisation of ‘span of control’. As far as the ‘unity of direction’ is concerned, it
is worth mentioning that the units of administrative support of the central services of
the ministries were merged with those of secretaries general which existed in the
various departments of State. The same occurred with the service units with the
responsibility regarding matters of finance and information technology.
57
Concerning the span of control within the central administrative structure of
the country, it has been identified as a particularly “problematic aspect of the Greek
central administration” (Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance, 2012:
40-41). It has been seen, for instance, that in one out of five sections the head of the
respective unit had no subordinate employees at all or one in three sections has only
one employee (OECD, 2011: 26, 56).
The standard span of control of 1/5-7 with regard to the head of the section
and its subordinates may be overcome, when that is necessary and is required by the
particularities of the subject matter of the service unit. In the new organisational
charts it has been often adopted a rather narrow span of control while it is not seldom
observed a ratio of ½, which can hardly be sustained: such are, indicatively, the cases
of the Directorate of Elections in the Ministry of the Interior (Presidential Decree
105/2014, article 16) as well as the Directorate of Buildings Infrastructure in the
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks (Presidential Decree 109/2014,
article 47). Related examples are those of the Directorate General of University
Education in the Ministry of Education and Religion (Presidential Decree 114/2014,
article 35), the Directorate General of Personnel Administration in the Ministry of
Administrative Reform and E-Governance (Presidential Decree 99/2014, article 13),
and the Directorate General of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights in the same
titled Ministry (Presidential Decree 101/2014, article 5). The Directorate General of
Public Investment in the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness is comprised
by a single Directorate, the one of Public Investment (Presidential Decree 116/2014,
article 37).
Nevertheless, the criticism that has been exerted regarding the whole effort has
pointed that the process of reform seems to be rather fragmentary and placing special
emphasis mainly to the numerical reduction of the service units without taking
account to the necessary extent of the functional complementarity of administrative
units as well as the overlapping of competences even within the same ministry and
even more among different ministries. Moreover, since the restructuring was based on
the then existing government scheme without examining the possibility of each
reform in the direction of the reduction of the number of ministries themselves or an
alternative agglomeration of various sectors of public policy. Otherwise, internal
restructuring of particular ministries which form part of a rather extended or
58
fragmented governmental structure (comprised of a rather biggish number of
ministries headed by full ministers or alternate ministers, not to include deputy
ministers) seems to have little impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Government as a whole. That’s why, although the number of Central Government
Departments has been reduced, the phenomenon of scattered office locations has not
been dealt with at all15
.
5. Methodology
In this study, there is attempted the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness on
the part of 19 Central Government Departments; accordingly, a comparison takes
place between the outputs of this measurement and those of the Administrative
Reform 2013. The measurement of efficiency and effectiveness draws on four Data
Envelopment Analysis models: i) Variable Returns to Scale DEA (VRS DEA), ii)
Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA (Targeted DEA), iii) Stochastic DEA, and iv)
Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA (QE-DEA).
DEA is a widely applied non-parametric method for measuring the relative
efficiency and performance of operational units. Based on the seminal paper of
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), standard DEA programmes use linear
programming to evaluate the production process of operational units. Conventional
DEA programmes are either input-oriented, where the objective is the minimisation of
inputs while holding the outputs fixed, or output-oriented, where the objective is the
maximisation of outputs while the inputs remain unchanged.
Since the AR2013 suggests a decrease of inputs of the CGDs, in this paper an
application takes place of four input-oriented DEA expressions. The scope of the
study is to assess whether the input levels of the 19 CGDs, as defined by the AR2013,
lead these units to efficiency, optimal economy and effectiveness. This assessment
draws on a comparative analysis between the input levels identified by the AR2013
and those measured by the four DEA expressions. The VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and
Stochastic DEA measure efficiency, under different assumptions, while the QE-DEA
measures effectiveness.
15 Regarding the sitting of the administrative centre, see Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance, 2012: 65 επ., OECD, 2011: 63-64.
59
Prior to the presentation of the four DEA expressions, it is useful to provide an
analytic description of the notions efficiency and effectiveness, and the way they are
perceived and applied in the context of the present study:
Efficiency of a unit refers essentially to the production of as many outputs as
possible from a given set of inputs (output-oriented efficiency) or the utilisation of as
few inputs as possible to produce a fixed amount of outputs (input-oriented
efficiency) (Farrell, 1957). In the case of single-output and single-input, the measure
of efficiency points to the ratio of output over input. Drawing on the theory of linear
fractional programming, output-oriented efficiency is measured by the maximum ratio
of the sum of weighted outputs to the sum of weighted inputs as long as that ratio for
every unit under evaluation is less than or equal to unity (Charnes et al., 1978).
Similarly, input-oriented efficiency is measured by the minimum ratio of the sum of
weighed inputs to the sum of weighted outputs as long as that ratio for every unit
under evaluation is greater than or equal to unity (Charnes et al., 1978). It is evident
then that efficiency is regarded as an operational measure; as it only takes into
account the inputs and outputs of a production process.
Effectiveness, on the other hand, refers essentially to the capacity to achieve
desired results (Sherman and Zhu, 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Poister, 2003).
Effectiveness goes then beyond efficiency as the latter can be one of the goals that a
unit is expected to achieve. An objective for the administrative units forms the
provision of high perceived - quality services that satisfy users (i.e. citizens) (Ferlie et
al., 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).
In this study, effectiveness is defined as referring to the attainment of
efficiency and employees’ satisfaction from the work environment, too. Employees’
satisfaction is regarded as the users’ perspective of the performance of the unit.
Citizens’ satisfaction is not, however, an appropriate measure for evaluation since
there is usually no interaction between citizens and CGDs, but mainly between
citizens and the decentralised units of the government departments as well as the local
agencies.
5.1. Variable returns to scale DEA
An extension of the original Constant Returns to Scale DEA (CRS DEA) programme
put forth by Charnes et al. (1978) is the Variable Returns to Scale DEA (VRS DEA)
60
programme introduced by Banker et al. (1984). The input-oriented VRS DEA
programme is defined as follows:
1 1
minm s
i r
i r
s s
1
. . 1,...,n
j ij i io
j
s t x s x i m
1
1,...,n
j rj r ro
j
y s y r s
1
1n
j
j
0 1,...,j j n (1)
where (0 1) is a scalar and represents efficiency, ijx stands for the ith input of
the jth unit and rjy denotes the rth output of the jth unit. The iox and roy are the ith
input and rth output of the unit under evaluation, respectively. In addition, j are
non-negative scalars. The non-zero optimal j identify the benchmarks for the unit
under evaluation. Furthermore, ε denotes an infinitesimal quantity, and is and rs
express the input and output slacks, respectively.
A unit under evaluation is efficient only if the optimal 0 and 0i rs s
for all i and r . Otherwise, if the optimal 1 , then the unit under evaluation is
inefficient.
5.2. Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA
The Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA (Targeted DEA) programme developed by
Lim and Zhu (2013) incorporates target levels in DEA. In addition to traditional
inputs and outputs, variables which have a specific target level are introduced in the
DEA programme. In conventional DEA programmes, the objective is either the
minimisation of inputs (input orientation) or the maximisation of outputs (output
orientation). In the Targeted DEA programme, the objective for inputs and outputs
remains the same as that of the conventional DEA programmes. The novelty in the
61
Targeted DEA programme is the introduction of a third type of variables, called
‘factors’, which can move in two directions (i.e. increase or decrease) aiming to reach
a targeted level that is set by the decision-makers. In this study, when the Targeted
DEA programme is applied, the variable ‘Budget 2013’ is treated as a factor, and its
target level is the ‘Budget 2014’.
The input-oriented Targeted DEA programme developed by Lim and Zhu
(2013) can be written as follows:
min
1
. . 1,...,n
j ij io
j
s t x x i m
1
1,...,n
j rj ro
j
y y r s
1
1,...,n
j tj t to t
j
z w z w t h
1
1n
j
j
0 1,...,j j n (2)
where represents efficiency, ijx and rjy express the ith input and the rth output,
respectively, of the jth unit, tjz stands for the tth factor of the jth unit, and tw denotes
the targeted level for the tth factor.
5.3. Stochastic DEA
Stochastic DEA (Charnes and Cooper, 1963; Land et al., 1993; Olesen and Petersen,
1995; Dyson and Shale, 2010) deals with measurement and specification errors by
introducing stochastic inputs and outputs in DEA. The uncertainty that is present both
to the input and output data, which raises doubts about their accuracy, and to the
economic environment inside which the units operate, leads to the utilisation of a
stochastic DEA programme to capture this uncertainty. The application of traditional
(i.e. non-stochastic) DEA programmes in cases where uncertainty is possible leads to
biases in the measurement of efficiency.
62
In this study, stochastic DEA was applied in order to test an alternative
scenario of evaluating the efficiency of the 19 CGDs, which takes into account
possible ‘noise’ in data. The stochastic DEA programme applied here is as follows:
min
1/2
1 1 1 1
. . ( ) cov( , ) 1,...,n n n n
j ij j ij ij j l ij pl io
j j j l
s t x E x x x x x i m
1/2
1 1 1 1
( ) cov( , ) 1,...,n n n n
j rj j rj rj j l rj ql ro
j j j l
y E y y y y y r s
0 1,...,j j n (3)
where expresses efficiency, ijx and rjy represent the ith input and the rth output,
respectively, of the jth unit, 1( ) denotes the normal distribution function,
is the level of significance (e.g. .05 ), and j are non-negative scalars. In
addition, ( )ijE x and ( )rjE y are the means of ijx and rjy , and cov( , )ij plx x and
cov( , )rj qly y stand for the covariance of ,ip jx and ,rq ly , respectively.
5.4. Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA
The Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA (QE-DEA) method (Zervopoulos and
Palaskas, 2011; Brissimis and Zervopoulos, 2012; Zervopoulos, 2014) introduces
exogenous variables in DEA, such as users’ satisfaction. Exogenous variables are
those that are either non-controlled or partially controlled by the unit. The exogenous
variables should be equal to or greater than a threshold value set by decision makers.
The measurement of efficiency is constrained by this threshold value for the
exogenous variables. In other words, the minimum inputs defined by the QE-DEA
method cannot violate the threshold value. In the case that the exogenous variables are
inversely related to efficiency, which means that the former are directly related to
inputs, the optimal inputs should not cause the optimal levels of the exogenous
variables to drop lower than a minimum acceptable value.
In this study, use is being made of one exogenous variable (i.e. employees’
satisfaction) inversely related to efficiency. The threshold value set for employees’
63
satisfaction is 0.800, which is the percentage transformation of a rating of four on the
five-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 – very dissatisfied, 2 – dissatisfied, 3 – neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied, 4 – satisfied and 5 – very satisfied). The QE-DEA method defines the
minimum inputs that simultaneously satisfy the threshold value of the exogenous
variable. Consequently, the minimum inputs defined by the QE-DEA model are
expected to be greater than those obtained from the VRS DEA. The lower the
satisfaction scores assigned by employees to the CGDs, the lower the reductions that
are expected to apply to the inputs as the priority of the QE-DEA method is to satisfy
the threshold value, which is set to the exogenous variable.
The QE-DEA model draws on an algorithm comprised of four-steps:
Step 1: Apply VRS DEA (i.e. model (1)) to define the efficiency scores of the units.
Step 2: The efficient units that are assigned employees’ satisfaction scores lower than
the threshold value (i.e. 0.800) are put through an adjustment process. This
leads the employees’ satisfaction score at least to the threshold value while
proportionally decreasing the efficiency score according to the inverse
relationship between employees’ satisfaction and efficiency. The adjustment
process is expressed by the following formula:
1/222 2 '
'
22 2 2 2'
1
1 1
o o o
o
o o o o o
s s s s
s s s s s s
(4)
where ' stands for the adjusted efficiency score, o is a user-defined cut-off
level for the efficiency score (e.g. 0.200), s denotes the employees’
satisfaction score, os stands for a user-defined cut-off level for the satisfaction
score (e.g. 0.200), and 's is the adjusted employees’ satisfaction score, which
should be equal to or greater than the threshold value (e.g. 0.800).
The adjustment of the efficiency score (i.e. ' ) requires modification of the
inputs:
' ' 1( ) 1,...,i ix x i m (5)
where '
ix denotes the modified inputs, and ix the original inputs. From
expression (5), it is straightforward that '
i ix x as ' 1 .
Step 3: The adjusted inputs ( '
ix ) replace the original ones in the dataset, and VRS
64
DEA is re-applied.
The QE-DEA model ensures that the benchmarks both are efficient and are
assigned employees’ satisfaction scores equal to or greater than a threshold value.
More details on the QE-DEA model are provided in Zervopoulos and Palaskas
(2011).
5.5. Bias-correction method
Since DEA is a non-parametric method, its efficiency estimators are sensitive to
sampling variations of the production frontier and the dimensions of the input-output
space. Banker (1993) proved the overestimation of DEA efficiency scores for a finite
sample size. DEA estimators resemble the actual efficiency scores online in large
samples (Banker, 1993; Grosskopf, 1996; Banker and Natarajan, 2011). Cooper et al.
(2007) presented a ‘rule of thumb’ to reduce overestimations of DEA efficiency
scores, which is as follows: max , 3( )n x y x y , where n denotes the number of
units, and x and y stand for the inputs and outputs, respectively.
Our sample consists of 19 units that use five inputs to produce one output.
According to the ‘rule of thumb’ of Cooper et al. (2007), the minimum number of
units in our sample should be 18. The total number of units in our sample (i.e. 19) is
regarded as marginally acceptable; however, it is not enough to prevent bias in the
efficiency estimators. The problem of overestimations becomes more significant in
the second sample that is used in this study, which consists of 12 units. This problem
is associated not only with higher efficiency estimators than the actual efficiency
scores but also with input levels that require further reduction than that defined by the
four DEA programmes that are applied in order to project the units to the real
efficiency frontier.
A widely used method for correcting the bias of DEA efficiency estimators is
the smoothed bootstrap method developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000).
In this work, an advanced expression of the smoothed bootstrap put forth by Kneip et
al. (2011) is applied. Details and additional information on this advanced expression
of the smoothed bootstrap method are available in Kneip et al. (2008, 2011).
65
5.6. Evaluating AR2013
The following analysis is focusing on the existing government composition
(government departments) and the basic internal units (general directorates,
directorates, sections), the size of the staff, the elements of the budget and the legal
enactments:
DEPARTMENT OF
GENERAL
DIRECTORATES -
2013
DIRECTORATES -
2013SECTORS - 2013
GENERAL
DIRECTORATES -
Dec 2014
DIRECTORATES -
Dec 2014
SECTORS - Dec
2014
TENURED
STAFF -
Dec 2013
TENURED
STAFF - Oct
2014
BUDGET - 2013 BUDGET - 2014LAWS -
2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 56 175 8 56 175 2004 1969 308759655,00 292808000,00 13
2 FINANCE 16 119 410 13 73 285 15836 15156 613304369,37 585185000,00 22
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 15 60 4 15 60 88347 87073 3321263557,79 3067296000,00 14
4 INTERIOR 6 22 75 5 14 48 654 642 25783721,00 30181000,00 1
5 DEVELOPMENT & COMPETITIVENESS 14 78 257 13 36 132 1685 1683 23650714,00 19387000,00 4
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 57 209 10 31 115 177547 171946 3885112754,78 3682781000,00 4
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 41 177 6 32 99 7563 7254 334617635,87 297950000,00 1
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & E-GOVERNMENT 9 35 139 5 22 88 822 803 81603046,32 32998000,00 2
9 HEALTH* 5 27 92 4 19 63 86063 80833 23403726,16 20841000,00 6
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & WELFARE* 8 53 161 7 21 79 17150 16757 512313541,14 536940000,00 3
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 49 270 6 29 105 2155 2073 722813921,04 506317000,00 4
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT & NETWORKS 10 60 160 9 36 134 4597 4472 774554245,30 560737000,00 16
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE 12 58 208 9 30 110 830 787 70393146,00 70230000,00 13
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & HUMAN RIGHTS* 4 13 31 3 9 31 15233 15726 36781173,60 25965000,00 9
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN'S PROTECTION* 1 6 25 1 6 25 62722 63003 1789703384,70 1742378000,00 0
16 TOURISM 2 10 30 2 8 30 831 778 32804872,35 26966000,00 4
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 27 100 4 19 71 8124 8012 317228294,00 295243000,00 4
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 8 34 1 4 19 132 123 7038063,00 5597000,00 1
19
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION / SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 2 10 33 2 5 20 449 435 42952755,57 41570000,00 1
SUM = 134 744 2646 112 465 1689 492744 479525 12924082576,99 11841370000,00 122
OECD AVERAGE PER MINISTRY = 10 60 240
Table I. Configuration of the General Government structure
As far as Table I is concerned, it needs to be explained that there have been
taken account of:
the ministerial structures that emerged after the government reshuffle of June
2013 (ante, page 54), as a result of which two ministries were divided and the total
number of CGDs rose to 18 (from 16); in that number has to be added the distinct
Secretary General of Information and Communication along with that with Mass
Media responsibility
the evaluation of the internal structure of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
National Defence, and Public Order and Citizen’s Protection has not led so far to any
significant reorganisation; for that reason the data referring to the years 2013 and
2014 do not present any difference whatsoever
the number of organisational units (Directorates, etc.) refers exclusively to
those at the central services of the ministries (i.e. they are not inclusive of the
decentralised ones). It is worth mentioning that, as it was emphasised within the
OECD Review concerning the Central Government in the country (2011: 57), it is not
unlikely that administrative practice may not reflect the legal provisions regarding
66
ministries’ competences, whereas the organisationl charts which are presented in the
website of each one have many differences from the legal and the actual
administrative structures (OECD, 2011: 57)
in the overall number of Directorates General there have been included the
Secretariats General which comprise of Directorates only
as far as the number of permanent civil servants is concerned, the respective
data have been searched in the Public Employees Record (www.apografi.gov.gr),
which however presents the total number of civil servants in the ministries including
those employed in central services, in decentralised units and in public bodies and
agencies. The Record is constantly being revised taking account of the personnel
transfer and mobility, so that certain variations may be seen in the passage of time
a special case is that of the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human
Rights since in the personnel there are included the judicial functionaries, who are
nevertheless not considered as civil servants in the strict sense of the term; similar is
the case of the Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean, in the personnel of which there
are included civil and military staff
with regard to the budgetary documents there have been accounted resources
referring to the central services of the ministries, solely, excluding decentralised units,
public bodies and agencies supervised by the ministries, as well as the related
independent authorities
nonetheless, in certain cases that was not attainable: for instance, in the
Ministry of Culture and Sports, because in the central government budget reference is
being made to culture services, only (which is most likely inclusive of the
decentralised units, as well). Similar are the cases of the Ministry of the Environment,
Energy and Climate Change, the Ministry of Tourism, etc.
ministries with regard to which the above mentioned variations
may occur are being signified with an asterisk
regarding the promulgating legal documents the research and crossreference
have been based on the websites of Hellenic Parliament as well as the Government
Printing Office.
67
6. Empirical results
6.1. Efficiency measurement tool
The aforementioned methods and programmes were applied to Central Government
Departments to measure their efficiency and effectiveness, and define their optimal
input levels. These input levels, holding the output (i.e. laws) fixed (input-oriented
analysis), ensure the attainment of efficiency (i.e. efficiency score equal to unity) and
effectiveness (i.e. effectiveness score equal to unity) for every CGD. In addition, the
optimal inputs obtained from the application of the methods and programmes (1) - (5)
are compared against the inputs defined by the AR2013 for the 19 CGDs. The reason
for this comparative analysis is to examine whether the AR2013 leads the CGDs to
efficiency and effectiveness or only aims to reduce public spending.
The methods and programmes (i.e. VRS DEA, Targeted DEA, Stochastic
DEA, QE-DEA and Bias-corrected DEA) were applied to both the 19 CGDs, which
comprise the complete sample under reform, and a subsample of 12 CGDs. The
CGDs excluded from the second sample (ante, page 66) are presented with an asterisk
(*) following their name in the Tables that include 19 CGDs (i.e. Tables 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
11 and 13).
The efficiency scores of the 19 CGDs and the 12 CGDs are displayed in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. In particular, in both Tables, columns 3, 4 and 5 present
the efficiency scores defined by the application of the VRS DEA, the Targeted DEA
and the Stochastic DEA programmes, respectively. Column 6 illustrates the
effectiveness scores determined by QE-DEA, which balance efficiency and civil
servants’ perception of quality of their work environment. The last three columns,
under the title ‘Bias-corrected’, display the bias-corrected efficiency scores on the
left-hand side, and the lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval of these
efficiency scores in the middle and right-hand side columns, respectively.
The calculation of the VRS DEA efficiency scores drew on the 5 inputs and 1
output of our dataset (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). To determine the Targeted DEA
efficiency scores, a target was set for the input variable ‘Budget 2013’, which is the
input variable ‘Budget 2014’. According to the AR2013, no CGD should spend more
than the amount determined in ‘Budget 2014’. The Stochastic DEA programme yields
efficiency scores, which take into account the possibility of ‘noise’ in the data. The
68
presence of ‘noise’, which is not unlikely in data from public organisations, is
responsible for significant distortion of the results. Such flaws are particularly
associated with non-parametric techniques (e.g. DEA), which are sensitive to data
irregularities.
Unlike the previous three DEA programmes, which only take into account
input and output variables, the QE-DEA method yields scores that incorporate
exogenous variables, such as employees’ satisfaction, in addition to input and output
variables. The QE-DEA scores are associated with effectiveness since they express a
balance between the operational perspective (i.e. efficiency) and the environmental
perspective (i.e. employees’ satisfaction). Employees’ satisfaction is regarded as an
environmental variable since it cannot be directly or fully controlled by the
management of the unit (i.e. CGD). However, employees’ satisfaction affects the
outputs of the unit (i.e. CGD).
The last DEA programme (i.e. bias-corrected) estimates the efficiency scores
for the sample CGDs considering the unknown population of CGDs. Hence, based on
the bias-corrected efficiency estimators, even sample CGDs that are regarded as
efficient by the VRS, Targeted and Stochastic DEA programmes may need reforms.
In Tables 1 and 2, the efficient CGDs are assigned efficiency scores equal to
unity, which is equivalent to 100% of efficiency. CGDs with efficiency scores lower
than unity are regarded as inefficient and in need of operational reform. In other
words, taking into account the orientation of AR2013 and of this study, the inefficient
CGDs should reduce their inputs to a certain level to become efficient.
69
Table 1. Efficiency and effectiveness scores (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Efficiency & Effectiveness scores
VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA Bias-corrected
C.I. lower C.I. higher
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8205 0.3392 0.9888
2 FINANCE 1.0000 1.0000 0.8914 1.0000 0.6872 0.1805 0.9894
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7147 0.2256 0.9898
4 INTERIOR 0.4442 0.4597 0.3807 0.6688 0.3844 0.1717 0.4398
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
0.9223 0.6579 1.0000 1.0000 0.8022 0.4293 0.9126
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 0.1689 0.1678 0.1803 0.2846 0.1553 0.1369 0.1670
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 0.1944 0.4999 0.1643 0.2656 0.1748 0.1227 0.1927
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
0.3104 0.3734 0.3357 0.5400 0.2686 0.1453 0.3071
9 HEALTH* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8479 0.3909 0.9901
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
0.2042 0.5097 0.2761 0.3808 0.1857 0.1352 0.2021
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 0.2947 0.9992 0.3807 0.5545 0.2605 0.1881 0.2914
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7606 0.2201 0.9901
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7034 0.1955 0.9899
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6991 0.2107 0.9894
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8288 0.5241 0.9901
16 TOURISM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7534 0.3649 0.9895
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 0.3926 0.6419 0.6057 0.7934 0.3572 0.2425 0.3888
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7068 0.2306 0.9885
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
0.9771 1.0000 0.8849 1.0000 0.8839 0.6531 0.9665
70
According to Table 1, the four DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted,
Stochastic and QE-DEA) recognise as efficient and effective the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs (ID #1), National Defence (ID #3), Health (ID #9), Infrastructure, Transport &
Networks (ID #12), Environment, Energy & Climate Change (ID #13), Justice,
Transparency & Human Rights (ID #14), Public Order & Citizen’s Protection (ID #
15), Tourism (ID #16), and Macedonia & Thrace (ID #18). Accordingly, the
Ministries that need significant reform are those assigned the lowest scores, such as
the Ministries of Education & Religion (ID #6), Culture & Sports (ID #7), Labour,
Social Security & Welfare (ID #10). However, it should be noted that the first and
third Ministries cannot be directly compared with the other Ministries that have no
asterisk indication following their name, since a significant number of their tenured
staff is employed in decentralised departments and public entities supervised by the
Ministries (e.g. primary and secondary schools, social security offices).
The bias-corrected efficiency estimators of all sample CGDs lie below unity,
implying that no Ministry is efficient. Consequently, reforms are needed for all
CGDs. The CGDs that report the lowest deviation from unity are the Secretariat
General of Information & Communication/Secretariat General of Mass Media (ID
#19) followed by the Ministries of Health (ID #9), of Public Order & Citizen’s
Protection (ID #15), of Foreign Affairs (ID #1) and of Development &
Competitiveness (ID #5). For instance, the Secretariat with ID #19, which has an
estimated efficiency of 0.8839 (or 88.39%), is required to reduce its resources by
0.1161 (or 11.61%) to become efficient. Similarly, drawing on the bias-corrected
efficiency estimators, most CGDs need to decrease their resources even more than
recommended by the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA, Stochastic DEA and QE-DEA
approaches.
71
Table 2. Efficiency and effectiveness scores (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Efficiency & Effectiveness scores
VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA Bias-corrected
C.I. lower C.I. higher
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8414 0.4455 0.9910
2 FINANSE 1.0000 1.0000 0.9736 1.0000 0.7324 0.2026 0.9911
3 INTERIOR 0.4442 0.4597 0.3896 0.6688 0.3981 0.1897 0.4407
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
0.9673 0.8185 1.0000 1.0000 0.8586 0.4140 0.9587
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 0.1951 0.6645 0.1805 0.2663 0.1781 0.1217 0.1938
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
0.3104 0.3735 0.3357 0.5400 0.2757 0.1607 0.3078
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 0.2947 0.2947 0.3807 0.5545 0.2645 0.1909 0.2921
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7984 0.2878 0.9910
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7289 0.2103 0.9915
10 TOURISM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7591 0.3476 0.9912
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7452 0.2714 0.9912
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
0.9771 1.0000 0.8880 1.0000 0.9006 0.7192 0.9687
In Table 2, the CGDs that are regarded as efficient and effective, according to
the four DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted, Stochastic and QE-DEA) are the same
as in Table 1. The scores presented in Table 2 are expected to be higher than these in
Table 1. This expected upward movement is due not to a true efficiency and
effectiveness change but to the decrease of the sample size while the dimensions of
the input-output set remain unchanged. However, there may be some exceptions, such
as the Targeted DEA efficiency score assigned to the Ministry of Rural Development
& Food (ID #7). This score is significantly lower (i.e. 0.2947) compared to the
corresponding efficiency score assigned to the same Ministry (i.e. 0.9992) when the
sample consisted of 19 CGDs. The decline of this particular efficiency score is
72
explained by the change of the benchmark CGDs for the Ministry of Rural
Development & Food (Tables 3 and 4). In particular, in the case of the 19-CGD
sample, the production process of the Ministry of Rural Development & Food was
dominated by the production process of the Ministry of Tourism (ID #16) and the
Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace (ID #18). In other words, the latter two Ministries
were regarded as benchmarks for the Ministry of Rural Development & Food. In the
case of the 12-CGD sample, four Ministries are defined as benchmarks for the
Ministry of Rural Development & Food, which are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(ID #1), the Ministry of Environment, Energy & Climate Change (ID #9), the
Ministry of Tourism (ID #10), and the Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace (ID #11).
Regarding the bias-corrected efficiency estimators displayed in Table 2, all
CGDs need to be reformed in order to become efficient. The CGDs that need the
minimum intervention in the production process is the Secretariat General of
Information & Communication/Secretariat General of Mass Media (ID #12) since its
efficiency is estimated to be 0.9006. The most significant reforms should be made to
the Ministries of Culture & Sports (efficiency estimator: 0.1781), Administrative
Reform & E-Governance (efficiency estimator: 0.2757), and Interior (efficiency
estimator: 0.3981).
Tables 3 and 4, particularly columns 3 - 6, illustrate the benchmark CGD(s)
for every dominated CGD presented in column 2. It should be noted that the
production process of the benchmark CGDs does not have the same impact on all of
the dominated CGDs, which are inefficient. The efficient CGDs are self-dominated.
For instance, there is a single benchmark CGD for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which is efficient according to the VRS, Targeted and Stochastic DEA programmes
(Tables 1 and 2), and effective according to the QE-DEA method, that is the same
Ministry (Tables 3 and 4).
73
Table 3. Benchmarking (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Benchmarks (IDs)
VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 1 1 1
2 FINANCE 2 2 1, 12, 14, 16 2
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3 3 3 3
4 INTERIOR 16, 18 18, 19 13, 14, 16 18, 19
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
13, 14, 18 13, 14, 18 5 5
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 14, 15, 16, 18, 3 3, 15, 16, 18 3, 14, 16 3, 14, 18, 19
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 14, 15, 18 3, 12, 18, 19 1, 14, 16 3, 15, 18, 19
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
13, 16, 18 1, 13, 18 13, 16 1, 13, 16, 18
9 HEALTH* 9 9 9 9
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
16, 18, 3 3, 12 18 1, 14, 16 1, 14, 18
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 1, 13, 16, 18 16, 18 1, 13, 16 1, 16, 19
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
12 12 12 12
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
13 13 13 13
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
14 14 14 14
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
15 15 15 15
16 TOURISM 16 16 16 16
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 16, 18, 3 3, 12, 16, 18, 19 1, 14, 16 1, 14, 16, 18
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 18 18 18 18
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
16, 18 19 1, 14, 16 19
74
In Table 3, drawing on the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and QE-DEA results,
the CGD that appears most frequently as a benchmark is the Macedonia & Thrace (ID
#18). In particular, VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and QE-DEA identify this Ministry as a
benchmark 10 times, 8 times and 6 times, respectively. In the VRS DEA context, the
second most dominant production process is that of the Ministry of Tourism (ID #16),
which appears 7 times as a benchmark for the inefficient CGDs. In the case of the
Targeted DEA and QE-DEA, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of
Infrastructure, Transport & Networks (ID #12) are benchmarks for 3 inefficient
CGDs. According to the Stochastic DEA results, the two most dominant CGDs are
the Ministry of Tourism (ID #16) and the Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human
Rights (ID #14), which are identified as benchmarks 9 times and 7 times, respectively.
Table 4. Benchmarking (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Benchmarks (IDs)
VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 1 1 1
2 FINANCE 2 2 1, 8, 10 2
3 INTERIOR 10, 11 11, 12 9, 10 11, 12
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
11, 9 9, 11 4 4
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 11 8, 11, 12 1, 8, 10 11, 12
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
10, 11, 9 1, 9, 11 9, 10 1, 9, 10, 11
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
FOOD
1, 10, 11, 9 1, 9, 10, 11 1, 9, 10 1, 10, 12
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS
8 8 8 8
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
9 9 9 9
10 TOURISM 10 10 10 10
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 11 11 11 11
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
10, 11 12 1, 10 12
75
In the case of the reduced sample, the Ministries of Macedonia & Thrace and
Tourism remain the most dominant for the inefficient CGDs (Table 4). The Ministry
of Macedonia & Thrace is also identified as the most dominant for the ineffective
CGDs. In particular, the Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace is identified as a
benchmark 6 times and 5 times by the VRS DEA programme and the Targeted DEA
programme, respectively. The same Ministry is regarded as a benchmark 3 times by
the QE-DEA method since it is efficient and reports a high level of employees’
satisfaction. According to the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes, the
Ministry of Tourism dominates the production process of 4 inefficient CGDs and 6
inefficient CGDs, respectively. In addition to these two Ministries, the Ministry of
Environment, Energy & Climate Change is identified many times as benchmark by
the three DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted and Stochastic).
The following Tables (i.e. Tables 5 - 14) present the actual input levels before
the implementation of the AR2013 (column 3), the input levels suggested by AR2013
programme, and the change in the input levels before and after the implementation of
the AR2013. In addition, in Tables 5 - 14, columns 6 - 14 illustrate the optimal input
levels as defined by the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes.
On the right-hand side of the columns with the optimal inputs, the change between the
actual and optimal input levels, and the one between the AR2013 input levels and
optimal input levels is displayed.
76
Table 5. Optimal number of General Directorates (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs General Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 8 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 16 0.00 0.23 16 0.00 0.23 13 -0.19 0.00
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 4 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.00
4 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 1 -0.83 -0.80 2 -0.67 -0.60 2 -0.67 -0.60
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
14 13 -0.07 3 -0.79 -0.77 4 -0.71 -0.69 14 0.00 0.08
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 10 -0.09 2 -0.82 -0.80 2 -0.82 -0.80 2 -0.82 -0.80
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 1 -0.86 -0.83 3 -0.57 -0.50 1 -0.86 -0.83
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
9 5 -0.44 2 -0.78 -0.60 2 -0.78 -0.60 2 -0.78 -0.60
9 HEALTH* 5 4 -0.20 5 0.00 0.25 5 0.00 0.25 5 0.00 0.25
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
8 7 -0.13 2 -0.75 -0.71 4 -0.50 -0.43 2 -0.75 -0.71
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33 3 -0.67 -0.50 9 0.00 0.50 3 -0.67 -0.50
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 10 9 -0.10 10 0.00 0.11 10 0.00 0.11 10 0.00 0.11
77
& NETWORKS
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
12 9 -0.25 12 0.00 0.33 12 0.00 0.33 12 0.00 0.33
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
4 3 -0.25 4 0.00 0.33 4 0.00 0.33 4 0.00 0.33
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
16 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.00
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 4 -0.20 2 -0.60 -0.50 3 -0.40 -0.25 2 -0.60 -0.50
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
2 2 0.00 1 -0.50 -0.50 2 0.00 0.00 1 -0.50 -0.50
78
Focusing on the number of general directorates for every CGD, the AR2013
programme suggested a decrease between 0.07 (or 7%), which applies to the Ministry
of Development and Competitiveness, and 0.44 (or 44%), which applies to the
Ministry of Administrative Reform & E-Governance. In addition, there are four CGDs
that do not need to limit the number of their general directorates, namely, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public Order &
Citizen’s Protection, and the Ministry of Tourism.
The three DEA programmes regard as optimal the actual number of general
directorates for the four CGDs mentioned above. In particular, VRS DEA and
Stochastic DEA programmes hold unchanged the number of general directorates of 10
CGDs (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of
Health). The number of general directorates that was optimal in 2013 increases to 11,
according to the Targeted DEA programme; however, it should be noted that these
results are sample-based since they are defined through the comparative analysis of
the sample CGDs. Hence, the reforms suggested by the three DEA programmes lead
the inefficient CGDs to efficiency, which is defined by the 19 CGDs, or the 12 CGDs.
In the case where the attainment of global efficiency is sought, which is defined by
population data rather than sample data, reforms should be implemented even to
CGDs that have sample-based optimal input levels. The average reduction of the input
levels is defined by the bias-corrected efficiency estimators presented in Tables 1 and
2.
According to Table 5, the most significant decrease in the number of general
directorates should be introduced in the Ministries of Education & Religion, and
Culture & Sports. Only the VRS DEA programme suggests the same significant
decrease in the number of general directorates for the Ministry of the Interior. It is
clear from Table 5 that the levels of adjustment that should be applied to the number
of general directorates vary depending on which DEA programme we use for the
evaluation of the activity of the CGDs. The Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA
programmes are better at expressing either a fundamental target of the Greek public
administration, which is control over the spending of the CGDs, or the ‘noise’ that the
data of the CGDs is likely to contain.
Through the DEA-based evaluation that was applied in this paper and the
associated research that was conducted, it can be identified how the optimal number
79
of general directorates deviates from the level introduced by AR2013, which applies
to most of the CGDs in Table 5. It is noteworthy that the deviations are not only
negative but also positive. Negative deviations of the optimal number of general
directorates, or, in general, of the optimal input levels, from the level of the
corresponding input as defined by AR2013 imply the need for an additional decrease
in this input to ensure the attainment of efficiency by the CGD. In the case of positive
deviations, an increase in the level of input, compared to that determined by AR2013,
is required to ensure the efficiency of the CGD.
80
Table 6. Optimal number of General Directorates (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs General Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 8 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 16 0.00 0.23 16 0.00 0.23 14 -0.13 0.08
3 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 1 -0.83 -0.80 2 -0.67 -0.60 2 -0.67 -0.60
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
14 13 -0.07 4 -0.71 -0.69 4 -0.71 -0.69 14 0.00 0.08
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 1 -0.86 -0.83 5 -0.29 -0.17 1 -0.86 -0.83
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
9 5 -0.44 2 -0.78 -0.60 2 -0.78 -0.60 2 -0.78 -0.60
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33 3 -0.67 -0.50 3 -0.67 -0.50 3 -0.67 -0.50
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
10 9 -0.10 10 0.00 0.11 10 0.00 0.11 10 0.00 0.11
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
12 9 -0.25 12 0.00 0.33 12 0.00 0.33 12 0.00 0.33
10 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.00
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
81
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
2 2 0.00 1 -0.50 -0.50 2 0.00 0.00 1 -0.50 -0.50
82
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture & Sports remain
among those that need the greatest adjustment to the number of their general
directorates even when the sample size is reduced to 12 CGDs (Table 6). In particular,
based on the VRS DEA programme, the optimal number of general directorates for
the Ministry of the Interior is 1, whereas it was 6 before the AR2013 and dropped to 5
after the implementation of the AR2013. When the Targeted DEA and Stochastic
DEA programmes are taken into account, the optimal number of general directorates
for the same Ministry is 2. Nevertheless, generally speaking, taking account of the
fact that the optimised span of control is defined by the ratio 1/5-7, the above
mentioned provides evidence for the need that the Ministry should not be a distinct
department but it should be merged with other service units. On the contrary, the three
DEA programmes define as optimal the 12 general directorates for the Ministry of
Environment, Energy & Climate Change, which were operating before the
implementation of the AR2013.
Deviations between optimal levels of resources and the corresponding levels
defined by the AR2013 are present in most CGDs. However, there is consensus
between the AR2013 and the programmes about the number of general directorates of
the three Ministries (i.e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Tourism and
Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace). This consensus appears only in cases where there
is no need for adjustment.
83
Table 7. Optimal number of Directorates (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 56 0.00 56 0.00 0.00 56 0.00 0.00 56 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 119 73 -0.39 119 0.00 0.63 119 0.00 0.63 74 -0.38 0.01
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 15 15 0.00 15 0.00 0.00 15 0.00 0.00 15 0.00 0.00
4 INTERIOR 22 14 -0.36 8 -0.64 -0.43 9 -0.59 -0.36 8 -0.64 -0.43
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
78 36 -0.54 18 -0.77 -0.50 19 -0.76 -0.47 78 0.00 1.17
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 57 31 -0.46 10 -0.82 -0.68 10 -0.82 -0.68 6 -0.89 -0.81
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 41 32 -0.22 8 -0.80 -0.75 20 -0.51 -0.38 5 -0.88 -0.84
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
35 22 -0.37 11 -0.69 -0.50 13 -0.63 -0.41 11 -0.69 -0.50
9 HEALTH* 27 19 -0.30 27 0.00 0.42 27 0.00 0.42 27 0.00 0.42
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
53 21 -0.60 9 -0.83 -0.57 25 -0.53 0.19 8 -0.85 -0.62
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 49 29 -0.41 14 -0.71 -0.52 49 0.00 0.69 18 -0.63 -0.38
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 60 36 -0.40 60 0.00 0.67 60 0.00 0.67 60 0.00 0.67
84
& NETWORKS
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
58 30 -0.48 58 0.00 0.93 58 0.00 0.93 58 0.00 0.93
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
13 9 -0.31 13 0.00 0.44 13 0.00 0.44 13 0.00 0.44
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
6 6 0.00 6 0.00 0.00 6 0.00 0.00 6 0.00 0.00
16 TOURISM 10 8 -0.20 10 0.00 0.25 10 0.00 0.25 10 0.00 0.25
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 27 19 -0.30 10 -0.63 -0.47 17 -0.37 -0.11 11 -0.59 -0.42
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 8 4 -0.50 8 0.00 1.00 8 0.00 1.00 8 0.00 1.00
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
10 5 -0.50 9 -0.10 0.80 10 0.00 1.00 6 -0.40 0.20
85
Focusing on the number of directorates, when 19 CGDs are under evaluation
(Table 7), the most significant adjustment is required by the Ministries of Education
& Religion, Culture & Sports and Labour, Social Security & Welfare. In most cases,
adjustments aimed toward the attainment of efficiency lead to a significant decrease in
both the number of directorates as defined before and after the implementation of the
AR2013. The significance of the adjustment depends on the priorities set by policy
makers and consequently by the particular DEA programme being applied.
According to the three DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted and Stochastic),
the majority of the CGDs should keep the same number of directorates, as they were
defined before the implementation of the AR2013.
86
Table 8. Optimal number of Directorates (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 56 0.00 56 0.00 0.00 56 0.00 0.00 56 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 119 73 -0.39 119 0.00 0.63 119 0.00 0.63 91 -0.24 0.25
3 INTERIOR 22 14 -0.36 8 -0.64 -0.43 9 -0.59 -0.36 8 -0.64 -0.43
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
78 36 -0.54 21 -0.73 -0.42 21 -0.73 -0.42 78 0.00 1.17
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 41 32 -0.22 8 -0.80 -0.75 27 -0.34 -0.16 7 -0.83 -0.78
6 ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
35 22 -0.37 11 -0.69 -0.50 13 -0.63 -0.41 11 -0.69 -0.50
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT
& FOOD
49 29 -0.41 14 -0.71 -0.52 14 -0.71 -0.52 18 -0.63 -0.38
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT &
NETWORKS
60 36 -0.40 60 0.00 0.67 60 0.00 0.67 60 0.00 0.67
9 ENVIRONMENT,
ENERGY & CLIMATE
CHANGE
58 30 -0.48 58 0.00 0.93 58 0.00 0.93 58 0.00 0.93
87
10 TOURISM 10 8 -0.20 10 0.00 0.25 10 0.00 0.25 10 0.00 0.25
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 8 4 -0.50 8 0.00 1.00 8 0.00 1.00 8 0.00 1.00
12 SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/
SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS
MEDIA
10 5 -0.50 9 -0.10 0.80 10 0.00 1.00 5 -0.50 0.00
88
In a reduced sample of 12 CGDs (Table 8), drawing on the results of the three
DEA programmes, the Ministries that should considerably decrease their number of
directorates are the Interior, and the Rural Development & Food. Significant
downward adjustment of the number of directorates should also be applied to the
Ministry of Culture & Sports, the Ministry of Development & Competitiveness, and
the Ministry of Administrative Reform & E-Governance.
89
Table 9. Optimal number of Sections (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Sections
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 175 0.00 0.00 175 0.00 0.00 175 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 410 0.00 0.44 410 0.00 0.44 214 -0.48 -0.25
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 60 60 0.00 60 0.00 0.00 60 0.00 0.00 60 0.00 0.00
4 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 33 -0.56 -0.31 34 -0.55 -0.29 28 -0.63 -0.42
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
257 132 -0.49 67 -0.74 -0.49 71 -0.72 -0.46 257 0.00 0.95
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 209 115 -0.45 35 -0.83 -0.70 35 -0.83 -0.70 19 -0.91 -0.83
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 34 -0.81 -0.66 88 -0.50 -0.11 16 -0.91 -0.84
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
& E-GOVERNANCE
139 88 -0.37 43 -0.69 -0.51 52 -0.63 -0.41 40 -0.71 -0.55
9 HEALTH* 92 63 -0.32 92 0.00 0.46 92 0.00 0.46 92 0.00 0.46
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL
SECURITY & WELFARE*
161 79 -0.51 32 -0.80 -0.59 82 -0.49 0.04 21 -0.87 -0.73
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
FOOD
270 105 -0.61 50 -0.81 -0.52 270 0.00 1.57 57 -0.79 -0.46
90
12 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS
160 134 -0.16 160 0.00 0.19 160 0.00 0.19 160 0.00 0.19
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
208 110 -0.47 208 0.00 0.89 208 0.00 0.89 208 0.00 0.89
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY
& HUMAN RIGHTS*
31 31 0.00 31 0.00 0.00 31 0.00 0.00 31 0.00 0.00
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
25 25 0.00 25 0.00 0.00 25 0.00 0.00 25 0.00 0.00
16 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 30 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 0.00
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 100 71 -0.29 31 -0.69 -0.56 64 -0.36 -0.10 32 -0.68 -0.55
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 34 0.00 0.79 34 0.00 0.79 34 0.00 0.79
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
33 20 -0.39 32 -0.03 0.60 33 0.00 0.65 17 -0.48 -0.15
91
Table 9 presents the number of sections for the 19 CGDs before and after the
implementation of the AR2013. In addition, Table 9 illustrates the optimal number of
sections obtained by the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes.
According to these three programmes, the most significant reductions to the number
of sections should be made to the Ministries of Education & Religion, and Culture &
Sports. Drawing on the results obtained by the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA
programmes, the Ministries of Labour, Social Security & Welfare, and Rural
Development also need to significantly adjust their number of sections to achieve
efficiency.
It should be noted that the Targeted DEA programme identifies less restrictive
optimal levels for the number of sections of the 19 CGDs compared to the VRS DEA
and Stochastic DEA programmes. This is because the target budget for the CGDs, as
determined by the AR2013 and established as a constraint to the optimisation problem
of the Targeted DEA programme, is not optimal (minimal). On the contrary, the VRS
DEA and Stochastic DEA programme define unconstrained optimal (minimal)
budgets for the CGDs. Further discussion on the effect of introducing a target
(constraint) in the evaluation follows in Tables 13 and 14.
92
Table 10. Optimal number of Sections (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Sections
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 175 0.00 0.00 175 0.00 0.00 175 0.00 0.00
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 410 0.00 0.44 410 0.00 0.44 276 -0.33 -0.03
3 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 33 -0.56 -0.31 34 -0.55 -0.29 29 -0.61 -0.40
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
257 132 -0.49 78 -0.70 -0.41 78 -0.70 -0.41 257 0.00 0.95
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 34 -0.81 -0.66 118 -0.33 0.19 20 -0.89 -0.80
6 ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
139 88 -0.37 43 -0.69 -0.51 52 -0.63 -0.41 40 -0.71 -0.55
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT
& FOOD
270 105 -0.61 50 -0.81 -0.52 50 -0.81 -0.52 57 -0.79 -0.46
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT &
NETWORKS
160 134 -0.16 160 0.00 0.19 160 0.00 0.19 160 0.00 0.19
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY
& CLIMATE CHANGE
208 110 -0.47 208 0.00 0.89 208 0.00 0.89 208 0.00 0.89
93
10 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 30 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 0.00
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 34 0.00 0.79 34 0.00 0.79 34 0.00 0.79
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL
OF INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
OF MASS MEDIA
33 20 -0.39 32 -0.03 0.60 33 0.00 0.65 17 -0.48 -0.15
94
In the case of the 12-CGD sample, the Ministries that need the most
significant adjustment to their number of sections are the Rural Development & Food,
the Administrative Reform & E-Governance, and the Interior. In addition, the
Ministries of Development & Competitiveness, and Culture & Sports should also
significantly reduce the number of their sections. However, there is no consensus
among the three DEA programmes on such significant reduction for these two
Ministries. In particular, if a priority for the policy makers is control over the
spending of the Ministries to the level defined by the AR2013, then the Ministry of
Development & Competitiveness should reduce its sections to 78 from 132, which
was the number of sections after the implementation of the AR2013. If policy makers
admit a possible presence of ‘noise’ in the data of the CGDs, then the Ministry of
Development & Competitiveness should increase the number of its sections from 132
to the amount that existed before the implementation of the AR2013 (i.e. 257). A
similar analysis of the optimal number of sections applies to the Ministry of Culture &
Sports.
It should not be ignored that for the majority of the 12 CGDs, the number of
sections that were operating before the AR2013 is currently regarded by the three
DEA programmes as the optimal amount. However, if the goal of the CGDs is the
attainment of efficiency that is not restricted at the local level (sample-based
efficiency measurement) but takes into account a global perspective (population-based
efficiency estimation), then downward adjustments to the number of sections,
compared to the number of sections operating before the AR2013, are needed. For the
CGDs that were assigned the optimal number of sections equal to those before the
implementation of the AR2013, such adjustments will not cause the former levels to
be lower than the levels determined after the implementation of the AR2013.
95
Table 11. Optimal number of Staff (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Staff
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2004 1969 -0.02 2004 0.00 0.02 2004 0.00 0.02 2004 0.00 0.02
2 FINANCE 15836 15156 -0.04 15836 0.00 0.04 15836 0.00 0.04 14114 -0.11 -0.07
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 88347 87073 -0.01 88347 0.00 0.01 88347 0.00 0.01 88347 0.00 0.01
4 INTERIOR 654 642 -0.02 252 -0.61 -0.61 301 -0.54 -0.53 249 -0.62 -0.61
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
1685 1683 0.00 1554 -0.08 -0.08 1109 -0.34 -0.34 1685 0.00 0.00
6 EDUCATION &
RELIGION*
177547 171946 -0.03 19372 -0.89 -0.89 22297 -0.87 -0.87 21649 -0.88 -0.87
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7563 7254 -0.04 1470 -0.81 -0.80 3781 -0.50 -0.48 1243 -0.84 -0.83
8 ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
822 803 -0.02 255 -0.69 -0.68 307 -0.63 -0.62 276 -0.66 -0.66
9 HEALTH* 86063 80833 -0.06 86063 0.00 0.06 86063 0.00 0.06 86063 0.00 0.06
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL
SECURITY &
WELFARE*
17150 16757 -0.02 2736 -0.84 -0.84 8741 -0.49 -0.48 4734 -0.72 -0.72
96
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT
& FOOD
2155 2073 -0.04 635 -0.71 -0.69 2153 0.00 0.04 820 -0.62 -0.60
12 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT &
NETWORKS
4597 4472 -0.03 4597 0.00 0.03 4597 0.00 0.03 4597 0.00 0.03
13 ENVIRONMENT,
ENERGY & CLIMATE
CHANGE
830 787 -0.05 830 0.00 0.05 830 0.00 0.05 830 0.00 0.05
14 JUSTICE,
TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
15233 15726 0.03 15233 0.00 -0.03 15233 0.00 -0.03 15233 0.00 -0.03
15 PUBLIC ORDER &
CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
62722 63003 0.00 62722 0.00 0.00 62722 0.00 0.00 62722 0.00 0.00
16 TOURISM 831 778 -0.06 831 0.00 0.07 831 0.00 0.07 831 0.00 0.07
17 SHIPPING & THE
AEGEAN*
8124 8012 -0.01 3190 -0.61 -0.60 5215 -0.36 -0.35 4920 -0.39 -0.39
18 MACEDONIA &
THRACE
132 123 -0.07 132 0.00 0.07 132 0.00 0.07 132 0.00 0.07
19 SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF
INFORMATION & COM-
MUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
449 435 -0.03 439 -0.02 0.01 449 0.00 0.03 397 -0.12 -0.09
97
In Tables 11 and 12, adjustments are being examined which were made to the
number of tenured staff employed in the 19- and 12-CGDs samples, respectively,
towards the attainment of efficiency.
Drawing on the results displayed in Table 11, the Ministries that should
considerably reduce their staff are the Education & Religion, Labour, Social Security
& Welfare, Culture & Sports, Administrative Reform & E-Governance, and the
Interior. These significant reductions are supported by all three DEA programmes.
The Ministry of Rural Development & Food should also decrease its number of
tenured staff. However, this adjustment is supported by the VRS DEA and Stochastic
DEA programmes while the Targeted DEA programme regards as optimal the number
of tenured staff in this Ministry before the implementation of the AR2013 (i.e. 2155).
The most noticeable adjustments for the tenured staff, which are directed to the
Ministry of Education & Religion, and the Ministry of Labour, Social Security &
Welfare, should not be taken into account since the number of staff introduced in the
DEA programmes included employees who are appointed in decentralised offices or
distinct public legal entities of the two Ministries. As already mentioned (ante, page
66), quite distinct is the case of the Ministry of Shipping & the Aegean.
98
Table 12. Optimal number of Staff (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Staff
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2004 1969 -0.02 2004 0.00 0.02 2004 0.00 0.02 2004 0.00 0.02
2 FINANCE 15836 15156 -0.04 15836 0.00 0.04 15836 0.00 0.04 4446 -0.72 -0.71
3 INTERIOR 654 642 -0.02 252 -0.61 -0.61 301 -0.54 -0.53 124 -0.81 -0.81
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
1685 1683 0.00 307 -0.82 -0.82 307 -0.82 -0.82 1685 0.00 0.00
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7563 7254 -0.04 132 -0.98 -0.98 1388 -0.82 -0.81 383 -0.95 -0.95
6 ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
822 803 -0.02 255 -0.69 -0.68 307 -0.63 -0.62 276 -0.66 -0.66
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT
& FOOD
2155 2073 -0.04 635 -0.71 -0.69 635 -0.71 -0.69 820 -0.62 -0.60
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT &
NETWORKS
4597 4472 -0.03 4597 0.00 0.03 4597 0.00 0.03 4597 0.00 0.03
9 ENVIRONMENT,
ENERGY & CLIMATE
CHANGE
830 787 -0.05 830 0.00 0.05 830 0.00 0.05 830 0.00 0.05
99
10 TOURISM 831 778 -0.06 831 0.00 0.07 831 0.00 0.07 831 0.00 0.07
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 132 123 -0.07 132 0.00 0.07 132 0.00 0.07 132 0.00 0.07
12 SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/
SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS
MEDIA
449 435 -0.03 439 -0.02 0.01 449 0.00 0.03 365 -0.19 -0.16
100
Focusing on the reduced sample of 12 CGDs (Table 12), the Ministries that
should make the most significant modifications to their number of staff are the
Culture & Sports, Development & Competitiveness, Rural Development & Food,
Administrative Reform & E-Governance, and the Interior. The only Ministry for
which there is no consensus among the three DEA programmes about the need for a
decrease in staff is the Development & Competitiveness. The remaining CGDs, with
the exception of the Secretariat General of Information & Communication/Secretariat
General of Mass Media, which should make minor adjustments to its number of
employees, should increase their number of staff to the levels that were in place
before the implementation of the AR2013.
The average reduction of staff in the 12 CGDs that was realised by the
AR2013 was 4% (Table 13). Based on the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic
DEA programmes, the optimal number of staff would be much lower than the number
of staff before the implementation of the AR2013.
Concerning the issue of further reduction of the size of the personnel of civil
service, it ought to be noted that it results and originates from the fact of the primacy
and preponderance of financial indicators in the assessment of efficiency and
effectiveness of public services. If, however, a shift of emphasis was attempted – for
instance, in the reshaping of administrative structures – it is likely that other
considerations would deserve attention, especially those contributing to greater
effectiveness, and not simply efficiency or cost reduction (infra, pages 108 ff.). Thus,
the total size of the civil service personnel, and especially its better allocation along
the administrative space, might be positively affected by transfers and a radical policy
of replacements, rather than outright dismissals and disbandments. The latter as such
can hardly be seen as a measure of creative reconstruction of administrative
performance.
Nevertheless, the above mentioned significant inconsistency between the
AR2013 level and the optimal levels for the number of staff of the 12 CGDs is not
found in other input variables (i.e. general directorates, directorates, sections, and
budget). It should also be pointed out that the 4% cut of the number of staff, which
was implemented by the AR2013, differs greatly from the reductions in the number of
general directorates (i.e. -14%), the number of directorates (i.e. -36%), the number of
101
sections (i.e. -34%) and the budget (i.e. -15%), which were also applied by the
AR2013.
Table 13. Average change of inputs before and after the adjustments
(12 Central Government Departments)
Inputs Change
AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic
General Directorates -0.14 -0.36 -0.26 -0.30
Directorates -0.36 -0.31 -0.25 -0.29
Sections -0.34 -0.30 -0.25 -0.32
Staff -0.04 -0.32 -0.29 -0.33
Budget -0.15 -0.33 -0.15 -0.30
Results similar to those in Table 13 are presented in Table 14, which refers to
the sample of 19 CGDs.
Table 14. Average change of inputs before and after the adjustments
(19 Central Government Departments)
Inputs Change
AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic
General Directorates -0.13 -0.35 -0.23 -0.31
Directorates -0.33 -0.32 -0.22 -0.31
Sections -0.29 -0.31 -0.21 -0.34
Staff -0.03 -0.28 -0.20 -0.26
Budget -0.13 -0.32 -0.13 -0.34
According to the results presented in Table 15 regarding the optimal budget
allocated to the 19 CGDs, the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes identify
significant reductions to the budget of the Ministries of Rural Development & Food,
Culture & Sports, Education & Religion, and Labour, Social Security & Welfare. In
contrast, the VRS DEA programme assigns a higher optimal budget than that defined
by the AR2013 to 11 of the 19 CGDs in the sample. According to the VRS DEA
102
programme, a significantly higher budget than that defined by the AR2013 should be
allocated to the Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human Rights, the Ministry of
Infrastructure, Transport & Networks, and the Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace. For
these three Ministries, the 2014 budget should have remained the same as that of the
previous year (i.e. actual budget displayed in column 3 of Table 15). It should also be
noted that the VRS DEA regards the 2013 budget as optimal for 2014 for the Ministry
of Health. Consequently, the budget reduction introduced by the AR2013 for this
Ministry was unnecessary from the perspective of efficiency.
The Stochastic DEA programme identifies 10 out of the 19 CGDs in the
sample that can be allocated a higher budget than that defined by the AR2013. The
most significant budget increase beyond that defined by the AR2013 was found in the
Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human Rights, the Ministry of Infrastructure,
Transport & Networks, and the Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace. As in the VRS DEA
programme, the budget of the Ministry of Health should not have been reduced from
the 2013 level since this Ministry was already efficient. The Ministry of Health was
mentioned due to its crucial role in public health and society. In this context,
unnecessary budget reductions and public health reforms in general are likely to have
a significant impact on society.
103
Table 15. Optimal Budget (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Budget
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 308759655 0.00 0.05 292808000 -0.05 0.00 308759655 0.00 0.05
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 613304369 0.00 0.05 585185000 -0.05 0.00 538733747 -0.12 -0.08
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3321263558 3067296000 -0.08 3321263558 0.00 0.08 3067296000 -0.08 0.00 3321263556 0.00 0.08
4 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 11453002 -0.56 -0.62 30181000 0.17 0.00 9816658 -0.62 -0.67
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
23650714 19387000 -0.18 21811921 -0.08 0.13 19387000 -0.18 0.00 23650714 0.00 0.22
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3885112755 3682781000 -0.05 656002291 -0.83 -0.82 3682781000 -0.05 0.00 700595199 -0.82 -0.81
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 44121179 -0.87 -0.85 297950000 -0.11 0.00 24002146 -0.93 -0.92
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
81603046.3 32998000 -0.60 13548212 -0.83 -0.59 32998000 -0.60 0.00 17223636 -0.79 -0.48
9 HEALTH* 23403726.2 20841000 -0.11 23403726 0.00 0.12 20841000 -0.11 0.00 23403726 0.00 0.12
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
512313541 536940000 0.05 104589111 -0.80 -0.81 536940000 0.05 0.00 27006497 -0.95 -0.95
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 34269389 -0.95 -0.93 506317000 -0.30 0.00 84693214 -0.88 -0.83
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 774554245 560737000 -0.28 774554245 0.00 0.38 560737000 -0.28 0.00 774554244 0.00 0.38
104
& NETWORKS
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
70393146 70230000 0.00 70393146 0.00 0.00 70230000 0.00 0.00 70393146 0.00 0.00
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
36781173.6 25965000 -0.29 36781174 0.00 0.42 25965000 -0.29 0.00 36781174 0.00 0.42
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1789703385 1742378000 -0.03 1789703385 0.00 0.03 1742378000 -0.03 0.00 1789703383 0.00 0.03
16 TOURISM 32804872.4 26966000 -0.18 32804872 0.00 0.22 26966000 -0.18 0.00 32804872 0.00 0.22
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 317228294 295243000 -0.07 121477126 -0.62 -0.59 295243000 -0.07 0.00 44990368 -0.86 -0.85
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 7038063 0.00 0.26 5597000 -0.20 0.00 7038063 0.00 0.26
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
42952755.6 41570000 -0.03 18344659 -0.57 -0.56 41570000 -0.03 0.00 23213683 -0.46 -0.44
105
Focusing on the sample of 12 CGDs (Table 16), in order to attain efficiency,
the Ministries of Rural Development & Food, Culture & Sports, and Administrative
Reform & E-Governance should significantly reduce their budget from the level
defined by AR2013 and also from the actual level (i.e. 2013 budget). Respecting the
criterion of efficiency, the VRS DEA programme identifies unnecessary budget cuts
for half of the sample CGDs, which were decided by AR2013. According to the
Stochastic DEA programme, unnecessary budget cuts were implemented in 7 of the
12 CGDs in the sample (e.g. Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport & Networks,
Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace, Ministry of Tourism).
106
Table 16. Optimal Budget (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Budget
Actual AR2013 Change VRS Change Targeted Change Stochastic Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013 Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 308759655 0.00 0.05 292808000 -0.05 0.00 308759655 0.00 0.05
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 613304369 0.00 0.05 585185000 -0.05 0.00 597115698 -0.03 0.02
3 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 11453002 -0.56 -0.62 30181000 0.17 0.00 10044113 -0.61 -0.67
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
23650714 19387000 -0.18 22876834 -0.03 0.18 19387000 -0.18 0.00 23650714 0.00 0.22
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 7038063 -0.98 -0.98 297950000 -0.11 0.00 48611514 -0.85 -0.84
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
81603046 32998000 -0.60 13548212 -0.83 -0.59 32998000 -0.60 0.00 17223636 -0.79 -0.48
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 34269389 -0.95 -0.93 506317000 -0.30 0.00 84693214 -0.88 -0.83
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
774554245 560737000 -0.28 774554245 0.00 0.38 560737000 -0.28 0.00 774554244 0.00 0.38
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
70393146 70230000 0.00 70393146 0.00 0.00 70230000 0.00 0.00 70393146 0.00 0.00
10 TOURISM 32804872 26966000 -0.18 32804872 0.00 0.22 26966000 -0.18 0.00 32804872 0.00 0.22
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 7038063 0.00 0.26 5597000 -0.20 0.00 7038063 0.00 0.26
107
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
42952756 41570000 -0.03 18344659 -0.57 -0.56 41570000 -0.03 0.00 22386450 -0.48 -0.46
108
6.2. Measurement of effectiveness
The VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes measure
efficiency while taking into account only operational variables (i.e. inputs and
outputs). In the case of implementing an input-oriented strategy (i.e. minimisation of
resources), the attainment of efficiency is associated with control over spending (i.e.
economy).
The QE-DEA method incorporated both efficiency and users’ perspective
about the operation of the units under evaluation (e.g. CGDs). Users’ perspective is
measured by questionnaires. In the case of the CGDs, the users who participated in
the satisfaction survey were only civil servants. We conducted one independent
satisfaction survey for each CGD. The surveys were solely directed to civil servants
since citizens interact not often directly with the ministries, but primarily with their
decentralised units, and with public bodies and legal entities supervised by them (e.g.
tax offices, police stations, citizen service centres, hospitals), or with local agencies
and authorities.
The determinants of satisfaction that we incorporated in the survey were as
follows: i) workload, ii) professional development, iii) team spirit, iv) organisational
structure, and (v) infrastructure. Users’ responses were measured on a five-point
Likert scale, which stands for: 1 – very dissatisfied, 2 – dissatisfied, 3 – neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 – satisfied and 5 – very satisfied.
According to the results of the users’ satisfaction survey (Table 17), the civil
servants of any CGD are not satisfied. In particular, there is no average satisfaction
score at least equal to 4 that denotes satisfaction in the five-point Likert scale. The
highest satisfaction scores were assigned to the Ministry of Health (3.5333), the
Ministry of Public Order & Citizen’s Protection (3.4667), and the Ministry of
Administrative Reform & E-Governance (3.2250). The CGDs that were assigned the
lowest satisfaction scores were the Secretariat General of Information &
Communication/Secretariat General of Mass Media (1.7500), the Ministry of
Environment, Energy & Climate Change (2.2083) and the Ministry of Culture &
Sports (2.5500).
109
Table 17. Employees’ satisfaction scores
ID CGDs Satisfaction determinants Average
Workload Professional
development
Team
spirit
Organisational
structure
Infrastructure
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 3.4444 2.6667 3.3333 2.6667 3.5000 3.1222
2 FINANCE 3.3590 1.9615 3.1731 2.6154 2.8846 2.7987
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3.0000 1.7500 3.3333 2.5000 2.8333 2.6833
4 INTERIOR 3.3030 1.9773 3.4318 2.7727 2.5909 2.8152
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
2.7500 2.3125 3.7500 2.6250 3.5000 2.9875
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3.2500 2.0417 3.2917 2.2083 3.2500 2.8083
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 2.5000 1.7500 3.0000 2.7500 2.7500 2.5500
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
3.5000 2.2500 3.3750 2.9167 4.0833 3.2250
9 HEALTH* 4.6667 1.7500 4.2500 3.0000 4.0000 3.5333
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
3.3333 2.2500 3.4167 3.1667 2.5000 2.9333
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 3.6667 2.6250 3.5000 2.7500 3.5000 3.2083
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
3.3333 1.6667 3.2500 3.3333 3.8333 3.0833
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
2.1667 1.2500 3.6250 1.0000 3.0000 2.2083
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
2.7778 1.5000 3.6667 2.1667 3.0000 2.6222
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
3.8333 2.8750 4.1250 3.0000 3.5000 3.4667
16 TOURISM 3.0000 1.5000 3.0000 2.5000 1.0000 2.2000
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 3.6667 2.3333 2.8333 2.6667 3.5000 3.0000
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 3.6667 1.5000 3.5000 1.0000 5.0000 2.9333
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
3.0000 2.7500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.7500
110
The incorporation of users’ perspective in the evaluation of the units is crucial
for the overall performance of units. The input-oriented VRS DEA, Targeted DEA
and Stochastic DEA programmes regard the outputs (i.e. laws) produced by every
CGD as fixed. However, focusing on the minimisation of inputs while neglecting
employees’ morale and perception of the work environment may lead to violation of
the assumption of fixed outputs. In service units, such as the CGDs, employees are a
fundamental resource for the production process. Therefore, omitting employees’
perspective from the evaluation of CGDs may lead to infeasible results in practice. It
should also be noted that users’ perspective is inversely related to efficiency, and thus
to economy (De Bruijn, 2007; Sherman and Zhu, 2006a, 2006b; Athanassopoulos,
1997; Anderson and Fornell, 1994). In this context, the QE-DEA method yields
‘balanced’ results, which are regarded as an equilibrium between the attainment of
efficiency through an input-oriented perspective and users’ satisfaction. The levels of
inputs defined by the QE-DEA method are expected to be less restrictive than those
obtained by the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes. In
addition, the levels of inputs obtained by the QE-DEA may violate the criterion of
economy.
According to the results of the QE-DEA method, 7 out of 19 CGDs need
further downward adjustment to their inputs compared to those determined by the
AR2013 (Tables 18-20). Significant adjustments should be made to the Ministry of
Education & Religion, the Ministry of Culture & Sports, the Ministry of Labour,
Social Security & Welfare, the Ministry of Administrative Reform & E-Governance,
the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Rural Development & Food. When
the users’ perspective is introduced in the evaluation, a significant increase in inputs is
needed for several CGDs (e.g. Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport & Networks,
Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Finance) to attain the optimal state, which balances
efficiency and employees’ satisfaction.
111
Table 18. QE-DEA optimal number of General Directorates and Directorates (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs General Directorates Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 12 0.50 0.50 56 56 0.00 82 0.46 0.46
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 27 0.69 1.08 119 73 -0.39 201 0.69 1.75
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 4 0.00 7 0.75 0.75 15 15 0.00 27 0.80 0.80
4 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 2 -0.67 -0.60 22 14 -0.36 12 -0.45 -0.14
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
14 13 -0.07 14 0.00 0.08 78 36 -0.54 78 0.00 1.17
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 10 -0.09 3 -0.73 -0.70 57 31 -0.46 16 -0.72 -0.48
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 2 -0.71 -0.67 41 32 -0.22 11 -0.73 -0.66
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
9 5 -0.44 3 -0.67 -0.40 35 22 -0.37 19 -0.46 -0.14
9 HEALTH* 5 4 -0.20 6 0.20 0.50 27 19 -0.30 33 0.22 0.74
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
8 7 -0.13 3 -0.63 -0.57 53 21 -0.60 16 -0.70 -0.24
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33 4 -0.56 -0.33 49 29 -0.41 27 -0.45 -0.07
112
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
10 9 -0.10 15 0.50 0.67 60 36 -0.40 90 0.50 1.50
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
12 9 -0.25 27 1.25 2.00 58 30 -0.48 129 1.22 3.30
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
4 3 -0.25 7 0.75 1.33 13 9 -0.31 24 0.85 1.67
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 6 6 0.00 8 0.33 0.33
16 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 4 1.00 1.00 10 8 -0.20 22 1.20 1.75
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 4 -0.20 4 -0.20 0.00 27 19 -0.30 21 -0.22 0.11
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 2 1.00 1.00 8 4 -0.50 13 0.63 2.25
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 10 5 -0.50 10 0.00 1.00
113
Table 19. QE-DEA optimal number of Sections and Staff (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Sections Staff
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 257 0.47 0.47 2004 1969 -0.02 2946 0.47 0.50
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 693 0.69 1.43 15836 15156 -0.04 26756 0.69 0.77
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 60 60 0.00 107 0.78 0.78 88347 87073 -0.01 157044 0.78 0.80
4 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 50 -0.33 0.04 654 642 -0.02 256 -0.61 -0.60
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
257 132 -0.49 257 0.00 0.95 1685 1683 0.00 1685 0.00 0.00
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 209 115 -0.45 59 -0.72 -0.49 177547 171946 -0.03 31202 -0.82 -0.82
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 40 -0.77 -0.60 7563 7254 -0.04 2009 -0.73 -0.72
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
139 88 -0.37 73 -0.47 -0.17 822 803 -0.02 444 -0.46 -0.45
9 HEALTH* 92 63 -0.32 113 0.23 0.79 86063 80833 -0.06 106142 0.23 0.31
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
161 79 -0.51 58 -0.64 -0.27 17150 16757 -0.02 6530 -0.62 -0.61
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 270 105 -0.61 86 -0.68 -0.18 2155 2073 -0.04 1195 -0.45 -0.42
114
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
160 134 -0.16 239 0.49 0.78 4597 4472 -0.03 6871 0.49 0.54
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
208 110 -0.47 461 1.22 3.19 830 787 -0.05 1841 1.22 1.34
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
31 31 0.00 57 0.84 0.84 15233 15726 0.03 27827 0.83 0.77
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
25 25 0.00 32 0.28 0.28 62722 63003 0.00 79609 0.27 0.26
16 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 67 1.23 1.23 831 778 -0.06 1851 1.23 1.38
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 100 71 -0.29 71 -0.29 0.00 8124 8012 -0.01 6446 -0.21 -0.20
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 54 0.59 1.84 132 123 -0.07 210 0.59 0.71
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
33 20 -0.39 33 0.00 0.65 449 435 -0.03 449 0.00 0.03
115
Table 20. QE-DEA optimal Budget (19 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Budget
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 453883932.2 0.47 0.55
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 1036201555 0.69 0.77
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3321263558 3067296000 -0.08 5903818073 0.78 0.92
4 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 17245299.43 -0.33 -0.43
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
23650714 19387000 -0.18 23650714 0.00 0.22
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3885112755 3682781000 -0.05 1105695473 -0.72 -0.70
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 80591940.58 -0.76 -0.73
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
81603046.3 32998000 -0.60 44062582.65 -0.46 0.34
9 HEALTH* 23403726.2 20841000 -0.11 28863914.36 0.23 0.38
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
512313541 536940000 0.05 30626639.68 -0.94 -0.94
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 134321651.1 -0.81 -0.73
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
774554245 560737000 -0.28 1157641808 0.49 1.06
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
70393146 70230000 0.00 156176483.4 1.22 1.22
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
36781173.6 25965000 -0.29 67189192.44 0.83 1.59
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1789703385 1742378000 -0.03 2271562587 0.27 0.30
16 TOURISM 32804872.4 26966000 -0.18 73083495.87 1.23 1.71
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 317228294 295243000 -0.07 63676031.57 -0.80 -0.78
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 11217027.52 0.59 1.00
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
42952755.6 41570000 -0.03 42952755.57 0.00 0.03
116
In the case of the reduced sample of 12 CGDs (Tables 21-23), 4 CGDs should
decrease their inputs from the levels determined by AR2013 (i.e. Ministry of Culture
& Sports, Ministry of Administrative Reform & E-Governance, Ministry of Rural
Development & Food, and Ministry of the Interior). On the contrary, the remaining 8
CGDs should significantly increase their resources to attain the optimal balance
between efficiency and employees’ satisfaction.
117
Table 21. QE-DEA optimal number of General Directorates and Directorates (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs General Directorates Directorates
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 12 0.50 0.50 56 56 0.00 82 0.46 0.46
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 27 0.69 1.08 119 73 -0.39 201 0.69 1.75
3 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 2 -0.67 -0.60 22 14 -0.36 12 -0.45 -0.14
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
14 13 -0.07 14 0.00 0.08 78 36 -0.54 78 0.00 1.17
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 2 -0.71 -0.67 41 32 -0.22 11 -0.73 -0.66
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
9 5 -0.44 3 -0.67 -0.40 35 22 -0.37 19 -0.46 -0.14
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
FOOD
9 6 -0.33 4 -0.56 -0.33 49 29 -0.41 27 -0.45 -0.07
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS
10 9 -0.10 15 0.50 0.67 60 36 -0.40 90 0.50 1.50
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
12 9 -0.25 27 1.25 2.00 58 30 -0.48 129 1.22 3.30
10 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 4 1.00 1.00 10 8 -0.20 22 1.20 1.75
118
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 2 1.00 1.00 8 4 -0.50 13 0.63 2.25
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
MASS MEDIA
2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 10 5 -0.50 10 0.00 1.00
Table 22. QE-DEA optimal number of Sections and Staff (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Sections Staff
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013 Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 257 0.47 0.47 2004 1969 -0.02 2946 0.47 0.50
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 693 0.69 1.43 15836 15156 -0.04 26756 0.69 0.77
3 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 50 -0.33 0.04 654 642 -0.02 256 -0.61 -0.60
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
257 132 -0.49 257 0.00 0.95 1685 1683 0.00 1685 0.00 0.00
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 40 -0.77 -0.60 7563 7254 -0.04 2009 -0.73 -0.72
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
139 88 -0.37 73 -0.47 -0.17 822 803 -0.02 444 -0.46 -0.45
119
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
FOOD
270 105 -0.61 86 -0.68 -0.18 2155 2073 -0.04 1195 -0.45 -0.42
8 INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS
160 134 -0.16 239 0.49 0.78 4597 4472 -0.03 6871 0.49 0.54
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
208 110 -0.47 461 1.22 3.19 830 787 -0.05 1841 1.22 1.34
10 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 67 1.23 1.23 831 778 -0.06 1851 1.23 1.38
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 54 0.59 1.84 132 123 -0.07 210 0.59 0.71
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
MASS MEDIA
33 20 -0.39 33 0.00 0.65 449 435 -0.03 449 0.00 0.03
120
Table 23. QE-DEA optimal Budget (12 Central Government Departments)
ID CGDs Budget
Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change
Actual Actual AR2013
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 453883932 0.47 0.55
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 1036201555 0.69 0.77
3 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 17245299.4 -0.33 -0.43
4 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
23650714 19387000 -0.18 23650714 0.00 0.22
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 80591940.6 -0.76 -0.73
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
81603046 32998000 -0.60 44062582.7 -0.46 0.34
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 134321651 -0.81 -0.73
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
774554245 560737000 -0.28 1157641808 0.49 1.06
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
70393146 70230000 0.00 156176483 1.22 1.22
10 TOURISM 32804872 26966000 -0.18 73083495.9 1.23 1.71
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 11217027.5 0.59 1.00
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
42952756 41570000 -0.03 42952755.6 0.00 0.03
Unlike the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes, the
QE-DEA method identifies positive average adjustments to the inputs of the 19 and
12 CGDs (Tables 24 and 25).
121
Table 24. Average change of inputs for the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness
(19 Central Government Departments)
Inputs Change
AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA
General Directorates -0.13 -0.35 -0.23 -0.31 0.13
Directorates -0.33 -0.32 -0.22 -0.31 0.17
Sections -0.29 -0.31 -0.21 -0.34 0.15
Staff -0.03 -0.28 -0.20 -0.26 0.15
Budget -0.13 -0.32 -0.13 -0.34 0.10
Table 25. Average change of inputs for the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness
(12 Central Government Departments)
Inputs Change
AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA
General Directorates -0.14 -0.36 -0.26 -0.30 0.19
Directorates -0.36 -0.31 -0.25 -0.29 0.22
Sections -0.34 -0.30 -0.25 -0.32 0.20
Staff -0.04 -0.32 -0.29 -0.33 0.20
Budget -0.15 -0.33 -0.15 -0.30 0.19
The results of the QE-DEA method, which express a balance between
efficiency and users’ satisfaction, satisfy the criterion of effectiveness and also the
mid- to long-run operability of the CGDs. However, the results obtained by the QE-
DEA methods are not considered to be appropriate for short-run strategies, which
focus on the attainment of efficiency and economy.
Comparing the results of all of the DEA-based approaches with those of the
AR2013, it is clear that deviations are present, which reveal the difficulty of the
AR2013 to lead the CGDs to either efficiency or effectiveness. That concurs to the
fact that AR2013 objectives have not been fully achieved. It is explicit that the
AR2013 is oriented towards efficiency and economy rather than effectiveness.
However, the AR2013 fails to attain the goal of efficiency and optimal economy since
122
there is room for further adjustments to the resources engaged by the CGDs. As a
result, the AR2013 could be regarded as a step towards the attainment of efficiency
and optimal economy, which would be followed by further administrative reform
frameworks.
7. Concluding remarks
The expansion of the organisational layout of ministries could be explained, among
others, through the gradual increase of citizens’ needs during the years or through the
effort of the Greek central government to respond to funding opportunities. Whereas
it was not accompanied with the respective reduction of other structures (OECD,
2011: 57).
As it was seen in the preceding analysis, the structural reform of Central
Government Departments that took place by recent reform effort did indeed produce
certain results especially in the reduction of the overall size of central ministerial
units, but leaves much to be desired in terms of more qualitative standards and criteria
of efficiency and effectiveness of central government administration and
management.
Furthermore, the recent government change, i.e. the succession of the
Government of Mr. Ant. Samaras by that of Mr. Al. Tsipras, as a result of the general
election of 25th January 2015, has seriously affected the ministerial landscape of
central government. As it has already been mentioned, the new Prime Minister of the
country has announced and indeed decided the creation of new ‘giant’ departments,
which emerged after the merger of previously independent ministerial structures in
respective areas of public policy.
That development raises in turn once again the issue of the restructuring of the
ministerial domains in the newly expanded policy areas, which has certainly to be
reflected in new organisational charts. It can be envisaged that this process will be in
dire need of some period of time to be realised and completed.
One may also hope and wish that in the new, and hopefully more substantial,
effort of ministerial restructuring and reform, there will be payed more thought and
attention not only to the results and suggestions of the present analysis and research,
but even more necessarily to standard rules, techniques and principles of applied
administrative and management science (some of which, nonetheless, have been
123
already taken into account). These are the following – presented indicatively and only
for practical purposes, namely to assist reformers who will perhaps be willing to take
advantage of them:
(a) In the novel redrafting of the organisational structure of Central Government
Departments need to be included especially:
the mission statement and definition concerning the particular ministry in
strategic and operational terms
the internal structuring and differentiation of administrative services, which
ought to take place on the basis of standard and vertically integrated units
(directorates general, directorates, sections and special offices)
the allocation of competences and jurisdictions for the implementation of
respective areas of public policy that ought to take place in the above standard
administrative units within the government departments, and not outside or
alongside them, as it has been usually the practice in the past
in an analogous manner would then take place the allocation and assignment
of personnel posts and positions within the above structural cells of central
administration, taking account of structural management ‘tools’, such as the
requisite span of control, the unity of direction and unity of command (to
name and specify just a few of them)
the qualification and specialism of personnel in terms of job description and
most certainly description and specification of responsibilities and duties of
the heads of section, at least, would necessarily be reflected and included in
the new organisational charts in each giant or not department of State.
(b) In the process of ministerial restructuring attention ought to be paid, especially
to:
the staff organisation of each government department, in the sense that its
mission statement would include and contain itself mainly to matters of policy
design, strategic orientation, coordination, control and evaluation
executive or simply operational activities and responsibilities ought to be
delegated to decentralised units and independent agencies and authorities
economy and efficiency in central government structural reform entails the
drastic merger of alike or indistinguishable services and units that serve
124
similar purposes in the same manner across the administrative landscape of
central government
equally necessary looks like the containment if not the abolishment altogether
of consultative committees and councils, so that the dispersal of responsibility
is avoided
the treatment of administrative staff on an equal and objective manner
regardless of political preferences and affiliations can hardly be stressed as a
sine qua non condition to move beyond clientelism to a new era of more
meritocratic management and administration in the central government of the
State.
(c) A number of more concrete and specific indications and suggestions of
structural reform in central government would perhaps include the following:
the abolishment or immediate mergers of directorates without any staff or with
minimal staff
immediate abolishment of sections without any staff
merger of sections with a small number of staff (2 or 3 persons)
merger or abolishment of the multitude of separate or semi-autonomous units
(sections or offices) that are excluded from the standard vertical hierarchy of
the department and are put under immediate control of the political élite of the
ministries; they ought, on the contrary, to be assimilated in the command
structure of the line administration of the ministry
any section and directorate in the new ministerial structuring would have to
exhibit unity and specificity of direction and orientation (management by
objectives and qualitative results), so that dispersal and overlapping of
authority and responsibility is avoided as much as possible; in that spirit, no
sectional unit would be staffed with less than 5 to 7 persons (civil servants),
and no directorate of central administration of the government would be
comprised of with less than 5 sections
in each department of central government needs to be set up an organisation
and methods special unit with staff responsibility to assist and encourage line
units in the job description and mission statement for each post of
responsibility; the Ministry of the Interior has to support the rest of the
125
ministries in this process providing them with technical support, manuals and
material
the design of a system of amalgamation of the multitude of branches and
pseudo-specialisms of central government personnel is highly advisable as a
precondition of breaking up the practice and tradition of excessive
fragmentation within central government administration of the country, also
useful in the promoting process of civil servants.
The aforementioned general principles of administrative practice do not only
find support in various textbooks of administrative and management science, but they
have been identified as absolutely vital and necessary standards of administrative
organisation by repeated ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of the country
(the Conseil d’Etat). It is, therefore, very likely that sooner or later drafts of central
government structural reform reflected in respective organisational charts will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court and perhaps be declared void, if and to the extent they
depart from or violate the above standards and principles of good administrative
practice.
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Appendix
Table A1. Dataset
ID CGDs General
Directorates
Directorates Sections Staff Budget Laws
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 56 175 2004 308759655.00 13
2 FINANCE 16 119 410 15836 613304369.37 22
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 15 60 88347 3321263557.79 14
4 INTERIOR 6 22 75 654 25783721.00 1
5 DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETITIVENESS
14 78 257 1685 23650714.00 4
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 57 209 177547 3885112754.78 4
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 41 177 7563 334617635.87 1
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &
E-GOVERNANCE
9 35 139 822 81603046.32 2
9 HEALTH* 5 27 92 86063 23403726.16 6
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY &
WELFARE*
8 53 161 17150 512313541.14 3
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 49 270 2155 722813921.04 4
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT
& NETWORKS
10 60 160 4597 774554245.30 16
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE
12 58 208 830 70393146.00 13
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS*
4 13 31 15233 36781173.60 9
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S
PROTECTION*
1 6 25 62722 1789703384.70 0
16 TOURISM 2 10 30 831 32804872.35 4
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 27 100 8124 317228294.00 4
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 8 34 132 7038063.00 1
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF
INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA
2 10 33 449 42952755.57 1